EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests Page 1 of 65

Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & Development Corporation

(PLMDC) which previously filed an application for an MPSA with the
2.  Testimonial privilege MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on January 6, 1992. Through the said
application, the DENR issued MPSA-IV-1-12 covering an area of
Sec. 25.  Parental and filial privilege 3.277 hectares in barangays Calategas and San Isidro, Municipality of
Narra, Palawan. Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or
        3.  Admissions and confessions assigned its rights and interests over the MPSA application in favor of
Narra. Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed with the DENR
Region IV-B, labeled as MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47)
over 3,402 hectares in Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja,
Sec. 26.  Admissions of a party Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan. SMMI subsequently
conveyed, transferred and assigned its rights and interest over the
1. NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
said MPSA application to Tesoro. On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed
TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and
before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3) separate
MCARTHUR MINING, INC., petitioners, vs. REDMONT
petitions for the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA
CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., respondent. [G.R. No.
designated as AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 and MPSA IV-1-12. In the
195580. April 21, 2014.]->
petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI
FACTS: Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont
Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation
reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of
organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining
petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the
and exploring certain areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring
MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since it knows that it
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
can only participate in mining activities through corporations which are
it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and
deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’
mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production
capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro
disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which
and McArthur. Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest
are reserved only for Filipino citizens. 
Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA and
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: Narra question the Court of
Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
Appeal's use of the exception of the res inter alios acta or the
(MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of Environment and
"admission by co-partner or agent" rule and "admission by privies"
Natural Resources (DENR). Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA-
under the Rules of Court in the instant case, by pointing out that
AMA-IVB-153 covering an area of over 1,782 hectares in Barangay
statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in this case since it
Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-
is not a party to the case and that it is not a "partner" of petitioners.
IVB-44 which includes an area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay
Narra also claimed that before Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 can be
Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and EP were then
applied in the instant case, "the partnership relation must be shown,
transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on
and that proof of the fact must be made by evidence other than the
November 6, 2006, assigned to petitioner McArthur. Petitioner Narra
admission itself." Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding
acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development
that a partnership relationship exists between them and MBMI when
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
the parties entered into a joint venture because, in fact, no such
partnership exists.
Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or declaration
of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and
during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration itself. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. — Where one derives title to property
from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former.
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of
the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have
a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. They challenged the
conclusion of the CA which pertains to the close characteristics of
"partnerships" and "joint venture agreements." Further, they asserted
that before this particular partnership can be formed, it should have
been formally reduced into writing since the capital involved is more
than three thousand pesos (PhP3,000). Being that there is no
evidence of written agreement to form a partnership between
petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created.
ISSUE: Whether the admission made by MBMI binds Narra?
RULING: YES, the admission made by MBMI binds
Narra. Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into
by and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent
the legal prohibition against corporations entering into
partnerships, then the relationship created should be deemed as
"partnerships," and the laws on partnership should be applied.
Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among
Page 2 of 65
corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since the
elements of partnership are present. Considering that the
relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are
considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in
applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves
to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the
intention of dividing the pro ts among themselves. On the other hand,
joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it
is difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships.  
2. JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, respondent. [G.R. Nos.
212593-94. March 15, 2016.] ->
FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their
respective participations in the anomalous Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by
whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina
Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds
sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile)
for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of
P172,834,500.00. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints,
namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-
C-13-0318 (NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019  filed by the Field Investigation
Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, docketed as
OMB-C-C-13-0396 (FIO Complaint).
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
For their part, the Napoles siblings filed their Joint Counter-
Affidavit  on February 24, 2014, opposing their inclusion as
respondents in the FIO Complaint. They claimed that the said
Complaint: (a) is insufficient in form and substance as it failed to state
in unequivocal terms the specific acts of their involvement in the
commission of the offenses charged, as required in Section 6, Rule
110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (b) failed to allege
and substantiate the elements of the crime of Plunder and violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA They likewise argued that the affidavits and
statements of the whistleblowers contain nothing more than mere
hearsay and self-serving declarations, which are, therefore,
inadmissible evidence unworthy of credence.
Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan, charging, inter alia, Reyes,
Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder, docketed
as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238; and Reyes, Janet Napoles,
the Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fteen (15) counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
CRM- 0241 to 0255, which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third
Division.
On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238,
"along with several other related cases," the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against "all the accused," opining therein that the filing of a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate
the resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before
it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. In view, however, of the Separate
Opinion issued by Justice Samuel R. Martires, dissenting to the
issuance of warrants of arrest against the Napoles siblings, along with
several others, upon the premise that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) still needs to present additional evidence with
respect to the aforementioned persons, pursuant to Section 5, Rule
112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 120 a Special Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan, composed of five (5) members, was
created.
Page 3 of 65
A day later, or on July 4, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued another
Resolution 121 dated July 4, 2014 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
CRM-0238 and SB-CRM-0241 to 0255, denying Reyes's Motion to
Suspend Proceedings for lack of merit. In view of the foregoing
developments, Reyes voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan
on even date, and accordingly, underwent the required booking
procedure for her arrest and detention. 122 This prompted Reyes to
file the petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 213163-78, 123 assailing the
July 3, 2014 124 and July 4, 2014 125 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. 
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
CRM-0241 to 0255, nding the existence of probable cause against
them, and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment.
The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the reconsideration of the
judicial nding of probable cause against them and requested that their
arraignment be held in abeyance pending the resolution of their
motion. However, the Napoles siblings alleged that the
Sandiganbayan acted on their motion for reconsideration through the
latter's Resolution dated November 14, 2014, declaring that the
presence of probable cause against them had already been settled in
its previous resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the ling
of the petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the
September 29, 2014 and November 14, 2014 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The Napoles siblings invoked the res
inter alias acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 which states that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under
the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule.
ISSUE: Whether the principle of res inter alias acta may be applied
during preliminary investigation?
RULING: NO, the principle of res inter alias acta may not be
applied during preliminary investigation. Therefore, on account
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
of the above-mentioned acts which seemingly evince the
Napoles siblings' participation in the conspiracy involving
Senator Enrile's PDAF, no grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed against the Ombudsman in finding probable cause
against them for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 as charged. Neither can the Napoles siblings discount
the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their invocation
of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule
constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be
rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be
inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the
preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the
similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting
the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection
interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res
inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies,
"[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation," as in this case.


Page 4 of 65
Sec. 27.  Offer of compromise not admissible
Sec. 28.  Admission by third party
Sec. 29.  Admission by co-partner or agent
Sec. 30.  Admission by conspirator
• HAROLD V. TAMARGO , petitioner, vs. ROMULO
AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA,
JR., respondents. [G.R. No. 177727. January 19, 2010.]->
FACTS: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter,
Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15,
2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The
police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain
Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an a davit dated September
12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a
drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent
Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed
Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he
knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of
Geron's affidavit, the investigating prosecutor  issued a resolution
dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and
three John Does. On February 2, 2004, the corresponding
Informations for murder were led against them in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of
Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the
minor Gail Franzielle. Columna was arrested in the province of
Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention
and trial.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit admitting his
participation as a “look out” during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan as the gunman, Richard Mecate and
tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda Jr and Llyod
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
Antiporda. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as
private prosecutor.  Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V.
Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
The allegations from Columna’s affidavit was denied by
the respondent specially their involvement in the killings.
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented
Columna's unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to
respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna's jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and
narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial
confession. Columna stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an
affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columna's letter and affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna
to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During
the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted
the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed
the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus, on
November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor
Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was
only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during
the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to
his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another
detention center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, Tamargo filed an appeal to
the Department of Justice (DOJ). 17 On May 30, 2005, the DOJ,
through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and
Page 5 of 65
ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.  He opined that the
March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached
by the subsequent recantation and that there was enough evidence to
prove the probable guilt of respondents. Accordingly, the Informations
were filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC
of Manila, Branch 29. However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary
Gonzales granted the Antipordas' motion for reconsideration (MR) and
directed the withdrawal of the Informations. This time, he declared
that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against
respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not
corroborated by other evidence. As a result, on August 22, 2005, the
trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On
October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied Tamargo's MR.
RTC RULING: Granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an
order dated October 26, 2005. Tamargo filed an MR but the judge
voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases
were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.
Judge Daguna granted the MR of Tamargo in a resolution dated
December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based on Columna's March 8,
2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor,
there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the
MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
CA RULING: Ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion
because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into
account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all
the accused. It also held that Columna's extrajudicial confession was
not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the
recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented
to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the
confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while
the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Tamargo argues that, based on the
independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
based on the earlier a davit of Columna. She considered all the
pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna's recantation.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondents counter that Judge
Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her
evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable
cause while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They
also contend that Columna's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible
against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
ISSUE: Whether Columna’s March 8 affidavit may be admissible as
evidence against his co-accused in view of the rule on admission by
co-conspirator?
RULING: NO, Columna’s March 8 affidavit may not be admissible
as evidence against his co-accused, in view of the rule on
admission by co-conspirator. Considering the paucity and
inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the
respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from
the pain of going through a full blown court case. When, at the
outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation
is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession
of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not
prosper so that the system would be spared from the
unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive
litigation. The rule is all the more significant here since
respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the
murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Daguna.  (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna
was only to satisfy herself whether there was probable cause or
sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-conspirators.
Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause
against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the
Page 6 of 65
Informations for murder against them were issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios
acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.  Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against
his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it
would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that
a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers;
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by
a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is
shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. 
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests Page 7 of 65

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on
recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct
or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants.
DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON
CENZON, defendants-appellants. [G.R. No. L-7973. April
27, 1959.] ->
FACTS: Respondents Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano, Anastacio
Reyes et al. were charged with the crime of murder for killing Pablo
Navarro in conspiracy with each other. The accused denied all
allegations and presented different alibis. During the trial of the case
before the lower courts, Anastacio Reyes was discharged to testify as
a witness for the prosecution. Reyes narrated before the court the
events that took place from the time he and his co-conspirators
plotted the killing up until the body of the victim was hid.
ISSUE: Whether Reyes’ testimony is admissible and may be used
against his co-conspirators?
RULING: YES, Reyes’ testimony is admissible and may be used
against his co-conspirators. The rule that "The act or declaration
of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence other than such act or
declaration,”  applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration,
but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime
is always subject to grave suspicion, “coming as it does from a
polluted source," and should be received with great caution and
doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and
competent. The trial court did not err in convicting the
appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the
death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the
proportionate costs against the appellants.
 
Sec. 31.  Admission by privies
Sec. 32.  Admission by silence



RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Serrano and the others contend

further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be
admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and
be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the
conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by
the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing
but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-
conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been
established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone
testimony of their co-conspirator.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BONIFACIO CIOBAL Y PABRUA, EUSEBIO EBREO Y
RINGOR, ESTER PAJIMOLA Y EBREO, RICARDO LIM,
RICARDO MIRANDA and EDDIE PAJIMOLA, defendants-
appellants. [G.R. No. 86220. April 20, 1990.] ->
FACTS: An information dated February 15, 1985 was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union charging the accused
Bonifacio Ciobal, Eusebio Ebreo, Ester Pajimola, Ricardo Lim,
Ricardo Miranda, and Eddie Pajimola of the crime of qualified theft.  action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him."
TRIAL COURT RULING: Rendered a decision convicting the accused
of the offense charged in this manner: "WHEREFORE, finding the
accused Bonifacio Ciobal, Eusebio Ebreo, Ester Pajimola, Ricardo
Lim, Ricardo Miranda and Eddie Pajimola guilty of the crime of
qualified theft as charged in the information beyond reasonable doubt
as principals, they are hereby sentenced to suffer RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended party the amount of
P118,855.21 jointly and severally; and to pay the costs. Considering
the penalty imposed, let the record of this case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for review."
On May 2, 1988, Ciobal filed a motion for reconsideration thereof
questioning the imposition of the penalty alleging that it should only be
12 years and 1 day to 14 years, 5 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal. This was denied by the trial court. Later on, Ciobal filed two
successive motions - a motion for new trial and motion to admit
additional evidence, which was still denied by the trial court. Lastly,
Ciobal filed a motion to avail of the new amendment to Rule 119,
Section 15 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which was still denied
by the trial court.
The evidence for the prosecution must rise or fall on the sole
testimony of the offended party Benjamin Galvez as found by the
court a quo. It is not contradicted as the accused were not allowed to
present their evidence. Nevertheless, it is uncorroborated. Moreover,
coming as it is from an interested party his testimony should not be
Page 8 of 65
accepted hook, line and sinker. It should be assessed with extreme
care.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The prosecution countered that the
said admissions are admissible against the other appellants as an
admission by silence as an exception to the aforesaid Section 22 of
the Rules under the next section which provides —
"Section 23. Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration made in
the presence and within the observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
To be admissible as an admission by silence the following requisites
must concur as correctly stated by the prosecution —
"(a) He must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the
other person;
(b) He must have had the opportunity to deny it (People v. Ranario, 49
Phil. 220);
(c) He must have understood the statement;
(d) He must have an interest to object as he would naturally have
done if the statement was not true;
(e) The facts are within his knowledge; and
(f) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is
material to the issue."
ISSUE: Whether an admission by silence is applicable in this case? 
RULING: NO, an admission by silence is inapplicable in this
case. Galvez had not established through his testimony that all
these requisites provided by Section 23 of Rule 130 are present.
He did not state that the other appellants were present and heard
the admissions against them; that they had the opportunity to
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
deny the same; that they must have understood the statement;
and that the facts are within their knowledge. Indeed, even
appellant Ciobal who allegedly admitted his participation denied
the alleged imputation of appellant Lim that he placed gasoline in
2 containers. Absent such evidence an admission by
silence cannot be attributed to the other appellants.
 

• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. FULGENCIO RANARIO and LEON CADAY,
defendants. FULGENCIO RANARIO, appellant.  [G.R. No.
25083. August 17, 1926.] ->
FACTS: Respondent Leon Caday made a confession about the
murder of Agustin Galanida. In his confession, Caday related that at
about 8 o'clock on the night of October 16, 1925, while Agustin
Galanida was seated on a bench underneath Maximo Barejo's house
in Garcia Hernandez, Bohol, with his back towards the street leaning
against a bamboo wall, he was stabbed, through the said wall, with a
bolo in the left lumbar region, causing a wound which passed through
his body as a result of which he died in about twenty-four hours. Later
on, Caday confessed that he was the one who killed Galanida
and induced to do so by respondent Fulgencio Ranario, who promised
to give him P10, and gave him a bolo, which he returned to him after
he had committed the crime.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Finding the accused Ranario guilty as
principal, by induction of the murder of Agustin Galanida committed by
Caday, took into consideration the previous dispute had between the
deceased and Ranario regarding land boundaries and the supposed
suspicion of Ranario that Galanida was the cause of his son Moises
Ranario's illness, but principally the confession of Caday.
Page 9 of 65
This appeal is taken by Fulgencio Ranario from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Bohol, finding him, together with the
accused Leon Caday, guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing
him to life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties, to pay, jointly
and severally with said Leon Caday, to the heirs of the deceased
Agustin Galanida y Abuel the sum of P1,000 by way of indemnity, and
one-half of the costs of the action.
ISSUE: Whether the admission by silence is applicable in this case? 
RULING: NO, the admission by silence is inapplicable in this
case. This court has already held that an extrajudicial confession
made by an accused implicating his co-accused is not
admissible against him. (People vs. Durante, 47 Phil., 654.) It is
true that when Leon Caday made his confession contained in
Exhibit B, in which he implicates Fulgencio Ranario, the latter
was present and said nothing, according to justice of the peace
Castor del Bando, but it does not appear that Fulgencio Ranario
heard the confession of Leon Caday nor had the opportunity to
deny it. On the other hand, however, it does appear that when
Leon Caday, in the presence of the Constabulary soldiers, was
shown the bolo that Fulgencio Ranario carried and said it was
the one that had been given him by the appellant, a discussion
took place between them in which the said Fulgencio Ranario
denied having given the said Leon Caday his bolo and having
been in his house. Neither is the presumption of innocence
sufficiently rebutted by the fact that before the commission of
the crime Fulgencio had a dispute with the deceased on the
question of boundaries, which was amicably settled aside from
the fact that Agustin Galanida did not suspect him but his son
Moises Ranario. Considering all of the evidence presented at the
trial by the prosecution and the defense, we are of the opinion
that the guilt of the accused-appellant has not been established
beyond a reasonable doubt and that he has the right to the
benefit of the doubt. By virtue of the foregoing, the accused is
acquitted and it is ordered that he be released.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO DELA
CRUZ and FELIX SORIANO, defendants-appellants. [G.R.
No. L-5871. December 17, 1910.]  ->
FACTS: On the night of August 1, 1909, respondents Pedro de la
Cruz, Felix Soriano and Alejo Root, went to the house of the
Chinaman, Juan Marquez and entered the house, inquiring for two
individuals - mestizos with mustaches who, they said, had insulted
Sergeant Cruz. These two men who were being sought were Primo
Avedillo and Cirilo Enriquez and they had been in the said house a
few moments before. The landlord's daughters, Elena and Valentina
Marquez, told the searchers that Avedillo and Enriquez had already
gone, so the said Cruz and Soriano left, accompanied by Alejo Root,
who had not entered but remained on the lot, in search of the said
mestizos. Afterwards, Alejo Root came face to face with the mestizo
Primo Avedillo, who was then leaning with his arms against the fence
of the lot on which the house stood, and immediately gave him a
heavy blow on the mouth with his fist. On account of this assault
Avedillo started to run and Cirilo Enriquez followed him, dispersing at
the same time the other parties who were assembled there for the
serenade; the latter, on account of the suddenness of the assault,
were unable to observe how it occurred nor what else happened, for
three of them, Juan Candido, Tomas Francisco, and Pablo Candido,
present during the disorder, on seeing the blow given to Avedillo,
started to run, and Cirilo Enriquez alone stated that, on running
behind the deceased, he saw the three Scout soldiers, one of them
Sergeant Cruz, catch Avedillo, and that, while two of them held him
fast and struck him, the other stabbed him to death with a weapon
with which he was provided. In fact, according to the examination and
autopsy made on the following day by Dr. J. B. Clayton, of the military
medical corps, the body of the deceased bore three wounds, one near
the eighth rib, which slightly injured the stomach and severed a few
veins, including a large one which could not be exactly determined on
account of the coagulation of blood; another, three inches and a half
deep, near the  fifth rib, which pierced the pericardium and the left
ventricle of the heart and must have caused instant death; and the
Page 10 of 65
third wound, a bruise, on the upper lip, produced by a blow with a
clenched fist. The two wounds first described were inflicted with a
dagger or like weapon.
Later on, an information for the crime of murder was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, charging Pedro de la Cruz,
Felix Soriano, and Alejo Root. 
CFI RULING: Convicting the accused of the crime of homicide and
sentenced them to the penalty of seventeen years and four months of
reclusion temporal,to pay jointly and severally an indemnity of P1,000
to the heirs of the deceased, to the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to the payment of the costs.
ISSUE: Whether the admission by silence is applicable in this case?
RULING: YES, the admission by silence is applicable in this
case. Although Alejo Root did not appeal from the judgment
rendered in this cause, in view of the fact that, in incriminating
his codefendants, Cruz and Soriano, he at the same time
confessed to his having attacked the deceased and wounded him
with a dagger, such statements undoubtedly tend to prove that
his said two codefendants actually pursued the deceased,
Avedillo, and afterwards overtook him, and that while they held
him fast, stretched out on the ground as he was, Root leaped
upon the assaulted man and wounded him with a dagger; from
all of which testimony it is concluded that the three defendants
acted together in common accord with unity of purpose and
action in order to attack the deceased. It is to be noted that, as
antecedents of the criminal act, the three defendants went
together in their quest for the party who they claimed had
insulted the first sergeant of their company, and thus they went
to the house of Juan Marquez, and, as they did not  find the said
party there, they continued their search with intentions which
doubtless were neither peaceable nor lawful, and then together
approached several persons who were playing musical
instruments, whom, without any cause whatever, they illtreated,
on which occasion Root struck the deceased, Avedillo, a blow on
the mouth, and the latter, as well as others, the musicians, on
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
running away without defending themselves, were pursued by
the appellants determinedly until they overtook Avedillo and held
him fast and laid him out on the ground; in this situation Alejo
Root, who came immediately behind his two co-accused, took
part in the assault. The two appellants, therefore, are
unquestionably co-perpetrators of the murder, as they took a
direct part in the commission of the crime which was
consummated by their participation, inasmuch as, had they not
caught, held, and stretched out on the ground the deceased,
Primo Avedillo, perhaps the latter might have been able to
escape out of the reach of the said Root, who apparently was the
only one of the aggressors who was armed.


• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
TIA FONG alias AH SAM, defendant-appellant.  [G.R. No.
L-7615. March 14, 1956.] ->
FACTS: It appears that early in the morning of February 21, 1950 the
Municipal Mayor of Mambaiao, Misamis Oriental, was informed that a
dead body was lying in the coconut plantation of one by the name of
Juan Neri in said municipality. The Mayor and some of his policemen
and the President of the Sanitary Division went to the place indicated,
and there they found the dead body of a Chinaman named Lian Kao,
28 years of age, son of Chinaman Wong Kiat. The authors of the
crime could not be immediately determined until a lieutenant of the
Constabulary by the name of Alberto N. Chavez was detailed to
conduct the investigation. He began making inquiries in and about the
place. He suspected Florencio Bahala, who was living in the
neighborhood, and subjected him to a rigid questioning. He noticed
that his statements did not agree with those of his common- law wife.
After some time Chavez succeeded in convincing him, through the
help of the wife, to own his part in the crime. Bahala made a
confession on March 9, 1950. The confession of Maximo Alcantar and
Page 11 of 65
Rufino Palarca were also secured. So an information was led on
March 9, 1950. This was amended on March 10, 1950. The persons
accused were the three above-mentioned who has confessed, and
Heracleo Limbaco and the respondent Tia Fong alias Ah Sam. Both
Limbaco and Ah Sam denied complicity in the crime. At the trial, the
other defendants repudiated the confessions they had made. During
the course of the trial, it was found out that Ah Sam was in
partnership with Wong Kiat and other Chinamen. Ah Sam separated
from Wong Kiat and the others and established a store of his own. Ah
Sam complained that his business was dying because Wong Kiat, the
father of the deceased, and his companions would not sell him bread
to sell in his store. Ah Sam after a while said it is better that Wong Kiat
and Lian Kaw be whipped.
CFI RULING: Finding the said Ah Sam, Maximo Alcantar, Florencio
Bahala and Rufino Palarca guilty of homicide and sentencing each of
them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Lian Kaw in the amount of P3,000 and to pay the costs.
The evidence mainly relied upon for the conviction of Ah Sam is his
silent participation in the reenactment of the crime by his co- accused
Florencio Bahala, Maximo Alcantar and Ru no Palarca. With the
confessions of these three accused on hand, Lt. Chavez and a
subordinate of his, Sgt. Fernandez, asked the accused to reenact the
crime and photography of the acts reenacted were caused to be
taken. In all the most important incidents and details of the
commission of the crime. Ah Sam took part, although silently, under
the direction of the Constabulary and his three co-accused.
In Exhibit "Q" Tia Fong reenacted his position while waiting for his co-
accused. In Exhibit "R" he reenacted his own position when he and
his co-accused were talking together planning the commission of the
crime. In Exhibit "S" Ah Sam also reenacted his own position or
participation while he and his co-accused were waiting for Erak
(Heracleo Limbaco), who had gone out to look for the intended victim
and present him to them. In Exhibit "K" Ah Sam also reenacted his
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
own position in relation to the other accused when Erak accompanied
the victim and the other accused followed them - Erak and the victim.
Exhibit "M" represents the positions of all the accused, Ah Sam
included, as the victim fell unconscious after he had been assaulted.
In this same exhibit, Ah Sam reenacted the part he took in untying the
belt of the victim. In Exhibit "N" Ah Sam played his own part, showing
the method in which he strangled the victim. Exhibit "U" is the
photograph of the manner in which appellant tied the belt which he
took from the victim's waist and with which the latter was strangled,
while Exhibit "W" reenacts the distribution of the money by him to his
co-accused.
The witnesses for the prosecution especially Lt. Chavez, testified that
Ah Sam took part in the reenactment of the crime and without any
opposition on his (Ah Sam's) part. He (Ah Sam) neither opposed nor
denied to take part.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Ah Sam testified that before the
reenactment of the crime he was told before hand to obey whatever
instructions Sgt. Fernandez would give, and that he (Ah Sam) tried his
best to obey said instructions. According to him, Sgt. Fernandez
would first read the paper (confession of his co-accused), then direct
the accused to assume the positions, and lastly ordered pictures to be
taken. Ah Sam further declared that he just followed the directions
given by Sgt. Fernandez because he had already been maltreated.
The supposed maltreatment consisted in having been boxed in the
solar plexus as a result of which he involuntarily urinated.
ISSUE: Whether the admission by silence is applicable in this case?
RULING: YES, the admission by silence is applicable in this
case. It is to be noted that the implication of guilt in the case at
bar is not derived from mere silence; it is inferred from
appellant's silent acquiescence in participating in the
reenactment of the crime. More than mere silence, appellant
committed positive acts without protest or denial when he was
free to refuse. Had he not actually participated in the commission
Page 12 of 65
of the offense for which he is charged, he would have protested
being made to take part in the reenactment thereof; he would
have informed the public officials at the time of the reenactment,
or immediately prior thereto, that he did not actually take part in
the commission of the offense. We, therefore,  find that the trial
court committed no error in taking into account appellant's
participation in the reenactment as voluntary and in considering
it as evidence against him. The circumstances or evidence
submitted against the appellant in this case are as follows: he
was the only one among the accused who had a motive for
causing the death of Lian Kaw; had he not actually participated
in the commission of the offense he would have been able to
introduced positive evidence that he was either not present
or was somewhere else and, therefore, could not have taken part
in the said crime; the confession of his co-accused as to the
reason for the killing and as to the manner in which the offense
was committed corroborates or indicates the probability of the
appellant having participated therein; and his silent
acquiescence in taking part in the reenactment and his voluntary
and ready participation therein produce conviction as to his
actual participation in the commission of the offense. The above
circumstances convince us that the appellant Ah Sam
participated in the commission of the crime, inducing his co-
accused to help him perpetrate it, he himself actually taking
direct part therein. We find, therefore, that the trial court
committed no error in finding him guilty as charged.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified and instead of
homicide the appellant Tia Fong alias Ah Sam is found guilty of
murder, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court is therefore raised to
that of reclusion perpetua.
 

 

EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
 
• FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. VIRGILIO P.
BALAGUER and INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING
CORPORATION CHANNEL-13, respondents. [G.R. No.
180197. June 23, 2009.]  ->
FACTS: On March 31, 1992, petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then
Assistant Manager for Operations of Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation-Channel 13 (IBC-13) was dismissed from employment on
the ground of loss of con dence for purportedly selling forged certi
cates of performance. Contesting his termination, petitioner led a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about
irregularities in IBC-13 were published in the July 18, 1992 issue of
the Manila Times and the Philippine Star, and in the July 19, 1992
issue of the Manila Bulletin.
In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President
of IBC-13, was quoted to have said that he uncovered various
anomalies in IBC-13 during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an
operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance.
On September 25, 1992, Villanueva filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against
Balaguer, which was later amended by impleading IBC-13 as
additional defendant.
RTC RULING: Villanueva is entitled to an award of damages.
LA RULING: Rendered a Decision finding Villanueva's dismissal as
illegal.
NLRC RULING: Affirmed LA’s decision.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Villanueva argues that by not
responding to the above letter which expressly urged them to reply if
Page 13 of 65
the statements therein contained are untrue, Balaguer and IBC-13 in
effect admitted the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on
admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130, and the disputable
presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact.
ISSUE: Whether the admission by silence is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO, the admission by silence is inapplicable in this
case.  One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof
on the other party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot make evidence for
himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he
wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by
sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts
[stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a
charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods.
Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the
absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite or
natural has no effect as an admission”. Moreover, the rule on
admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if
the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the
declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the
party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the
statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt
response can generally not be expected if the party still has to
resort to a written reply. In the same manner, we also cannot
assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by
virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to him
by the newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As
explained above, the rule on admission by silence is relaxed
when the statement is not made orally in one's presence or when
one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no
mutual correspondence between the parties. As for the
publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state
what the defendant said are inadmissible against him, since he
cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "while the subject
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
news items indicated that Balaguer was the source of the
columnists, proving that he truly made such statements is
another matter”. Villanueva failed to prove that Balaguer did
make such statements.Notably, Villanueva did not implead the
editorial staff and the publisher of the alleged defamatory
articles. Contrary to Villanueva's assertion, he should have at
least presented the authors of the news articles as witnesses to
prove his case against Balaguer and IBC-13 in the absence of an
express admission by the latter that the subject news articles
have been caused by them.
Sec. 33.  Confession
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-
appellant. [G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999.]  ->
FACTS: 29-year-old respondent Bernardino Domantay was charged
with rape with homicide for the death of 6-year-old Jennifer Domantay,
whose body was found in a bamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the
back and whose hymen was completely lacerated on the right side,
though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt.  confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove,
Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza
and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza testified that
appellant confessed to the killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the
location of the bayonet used which was submitted as evidence for the
prosecution. According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel
but the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of
counsel. On the other hand, Manuel declared that appellant, in an
interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just
outside the cell when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his
uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen were about 2-3
meters from him and that no lawyer assisted appellant during the
Page 14 of 65
interview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-
legal expert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the
lacerations on the victim could have been caused by something blunt
other than the male organ. Raised in this appeal was the admissibility
of two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which
appellant claimed to have been obtained from him in violation of
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Domantay is guilty as charged and was
sentenced to death. 
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession made by Domantay to
Manuel is admissible in evidence?
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confession made by Domantay
to Manuel is admissible in evidence. Accused-appellant was
interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed
outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of
the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions
freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he
was willing to accept the consequences of his act.  Domantay's
extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In
addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the other
prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his
followed by the victim. For the foregoing reasons, the Court is
convinced of accused-appellant's guilt with respect to the killing
of the child. Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there
is no sufficient proof that it was accused-appellant who had
raped her. He did not confess to having raped the victim. From
the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also
committed rape. In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers
around because about two to three meters from the jail were the
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
police station and the radio room. We do not think the presence of the
police o cers exerted any undue pressure or in uence on accused-
appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.   only circumstance from which such inference might be made is that
Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is
no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even
assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the
interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating
information from Domantay. To the contrary, the media are known to
take an opposite stance against the government by exposing official
wrongdoings. cdasia
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the
police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where
it is apparent that Domantay confessed to the killing out of fear. As
already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6
days after Domantay had already confessed to the killing to the
police.
Domantay's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In
addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the other
prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his confession.
He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove, followed by the
victim. Later, he was seen standing near the bamboo grove where the
child's body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Page 15 of 65
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from
which to infer that accused-appellant sexually abused the victim. The
accused-appellant was seen with the victim walking toward the place
where the girl's body was found. It is noteworthy that the deceased
was fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt when her body was
brought to her parent's house immediately after it was found.
Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her
shorts. This must be because she was wearing this piece of clothing
when the stab wounds were inflicted or immediately thereafter, thus
allowing the blood to seep into her shorts to such an extent. As
accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down the girl's lower
garments in order to consummate the rape, then, he must have,
regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled up the
victim's shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise,
the victim's shorts would not have been stained so extensively. Again,
this is contrary to ordinary human experience.
 
 

 

§3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction . —

An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti.

§4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. — No person charged with

treason shall be convicted unless on the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
•  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CARLITO DE
LEON, BIEN DE LEON, CORNELIO "AKA" NELIO CABILDO
and FILOTEO DE LEON , appellants. [G.R. No. 180762.
March 4, 2009.] ->
FACTS: On June 14, 1989, an Information was filed charging
Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo
and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads: That on or about the 5th day of April, 1986, in
the Municipality of Peñaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding
and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously burn or set on fire the house of one RAFAEL MERCADO,
an inhabited house or dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said
Rafael Mercado in an amount that may be awarded to him under the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Gaudencio Legaspi died on February 5, 1987 prior to his
arraignment. 
TRIAL COURT RULING: Convicting all the accused for arson.
CA RULING: Affirmed the trial court ruling.
Respondents denied the charge against them
and presented their respective alibis. However, it was Carlito on
cross- examination who admitted that on March 12, 1986, he
destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael on the subject tumana
when the prosecution confronted him with evidence which showed
that he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case No.
1985 filed against him by Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of
Peñaranda.  demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the trial judge can
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession made by Carlito on
cross examination may be used against him and his co-accused?
RULING: YES, the extra-judiclal confession made by Carlito on
cross examination may be used against him and his co-accused.
Page 16 of 65
In the instant case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
found the testimonies of witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy
of credence, thus: The inconsistencies and contradictions
presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that
Rafael's house was intentionally burned by accused-appellants
who were positively identified by witnesses Aquilina and
Leonisa. In the face of these positive declarations, accused-
appellants' puerile attempt to discredit them crumples into
dust. Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the
prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal offenses. Corpus
delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a
crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is
generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the re, e.g.,
the charred remains of a house burned down and of its having
been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of
a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the
corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. The corpus delicti has
been satisfactorily proven in the instant case.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any
showing of ill- motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. The appellants had not shown that it
was physically impossible for them to be present at the time and place
of the crime. 
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's reliance on the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Findings and conclusions of
trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of
respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the
observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
ippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization
of an oath — all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination
of a witness' honesty and sincerity.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
The appellate court correctly imposed the penalty in its maximum
period,i.e., reclusion perpetua considering the presence of the special
aggravating circumstance. The crime was committed by a syndicate
since it was carried out by a group of three or more persons.
On the matter of damages, the appellate court likewise correctly
awarded temperate damages in the amount of P2,000.00. In view of
the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.


• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ARTEMIO GARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellants. [G.R.
No. L-8264. May 31, 1956.]->
FACTS: Artemio Garcia, Marcelino Tugade, Geronimo Buena or,
Casimiro Lopez, Francisco Raquem, Pastor Sison, Pedro Ballares,
Marcelo Barreto and Jose Ruiz were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan with the crime of double murder, in that,
conspiring together and taking advantage of their superior strength
and of nighttime, and in connivance with Marcelo Barreto who was at
large, they feloniously, and in an uninhabited place and with evident
premeditation and treachery, cut the necks of and killed Marciano
Birog and Rafael Birog.
TRIAL COURT RULING: The case was dismissed as against the
defendants Marcelino Tugade, Geronimo Buena or and Francisco
Raquem for insufficiency of evidence. It found Pedro Ballares and
Jose Ruiz guilty as principals, Artemio Garcia guilty as accomplice,
and acquitting the defendants Pastor Sison and Casimiro Lopez for
insufficiency of evidence. 
As a result of the Philippine Constabulary’s investigation, appellants
Jose Ruiz and Pedro Ballares admitted having committed the crime
Page 17 of 65
upon order of appellant Artemio Garcia. Their admissions were
reduced to writing and accordingly contained in affidavits (Exhs. "C" to
"C-7" and "D" to "D-5" of appellant Ruiz, and Exhs. "A" to "A-6" and
"B" to "B-10" of appellant Ballares). According to the confessions,
appellant Ruiz decapitated Mariano Birog while Rafael Birog was
decapitated by Marcelo Barreto; and during the ceremony appellant
Pedro Ballares was watching with a carbine in hand. At first refusing
to do so, appellants Jose Ruiz and Pedro Ballares led the authorities
to Mount Dimalagan where they re-enacted their crime. At the place
indicated by said appellants, bones were found which, according to
findings of the National Bureau of Investigation, belonged to two male
persons.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The  prosecution had failed to
prove the corpus delicti. It is thus alleged that although the
Government expert was able to identify two sets of bones and knits of
hair as belonging to two male persons, said expert could not tell with
certainty whether the bones and hair were those of a Filipino or a
Japanese; that there is uncontradicted evidence that in the place
where said bones and hair were found many Japanese stragglers
died of hunger during the liberation; that the re-enactment of the crime
by appellants Ruiz and Ballares was involuntary, having been made
merely to avoid maltreatment; and that the death of Rafael Birog and
Mariano Birog was just inferred by the trial court from their
disappearance. Also, the confessions of appellants Jose Ruiz and
Pedro Ballares were obtained by means of violence, and were the
product of continuous maltreatment and ceaseless questioning, said
appellants having been in the custody of the investigators for a month,
held incommunicado; that said appellants had chosen to confess as a
last resort to escape further physical tortures and hideous cruelties on
the part of the investigators and thereby to keep themselves alive;
and that notwithstanding rigid and exacting cross- examination, said
appellants testified in court flawlessly and maintained their innocence
throughout.
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confessions made by Ruiz and
Ballares are admissible as evidence?
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confessions made by Ruiz
and Ballares are admissible as evidence. The fact that Rafael and
Mariano Birog died, is established by the extra-judicial
confessions of appellants Jose Ruiz and Pedro Ballares, to the
effect that they liquidated the former on the night of January 18,
1949. The confessions are supported by the finding of the bones
and hair of two male persons at the exact place indicated by said
appellants; by the testimony of Leon Bona and Francisco
Raquem, to the combined effect that on January 18, 1949, the
deceased father and son (Rafael and Mariano Birog) were
hogtied and gagged and taken somewhere by appellants Ruiz
and Ballares and Marcelo Barreto upon order of appellant Garcia,
and that in the following morning they returned without Rafael
and Mariano and reported to appellant Garcia that the two had
already been liquidated; and by the testimony of Cecilia
Cardenas and Aquilina Birog, to the effect that Rafael and
Mariano Birog had disappeared and never returned to their home
since January 18, 1949. The allegation that many Japanese died
at or about the place of the commission of the crime, is
inconsistent with the finding of the bones of only two male
persons. In the first place, the justices of the peace before whom
the confessions were sworn to, positively testified that they were
thumbmarked by affiants voluntarily and freely and after their
contents were read to each. In the second place, no proof of
actual physical injury was presented by either appellant; in the
third place, even assuming the involuntary character of said
confessions, the finding of the bones and hair above referred to
confirms the admissions of guilt and renders the confessions
admissible in evidence.  with bolos. Sabino inquired from his nocturnal visitors why they came,
In the case of Bery vs. U.S., 2 Col. 186, it was held that "if the
involuntary confessions are confirmed on material points by facts
subsequently discovered in its consequence, the whole confession
should be received and admitted as evidence. The finding of the
goods at the place indicated not only tends to corroborate the
declaration of the prisoner that they will be found there but also his
declaration that he stole them and concealed them at that place, if he
made this statement.”
Page 18 of 65
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EMETERIO SASOTA ET AL., defendants; EMETERIO
SASOTA and ALEJO SANCHEZ, defendants-
appellants. [G.R. No. L-3544. April 18, 1952.] ->
FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the two
Sanchez brothers Pablo and Alejo, their nephew Juan Sanchez and
one Emeterio Sasota were accused of murder for killing one Sabino
Bucad.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Emeterio Sasota and Alejo Sanchez were
found guilty of the crime of murder and were sentenced each to
reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Sabino Bucad in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the
proportional costs of the proceedings. Their co- defendants Pablo
Sanchez and Juan Sanchez died during the pendency of the case in
the lower court and on motion of the Fiscal, the case was dismissed
as against them.
The evidence in the record shows that at about ten o'clock in the
evening of October 17, 1943, Sabino Bucad who was living with his
common law wife Maria Evalla and his 18-year old son Arsenio Bucad
in the barrio of Masoli, Bato, Camarines Sur, was awakened by calls
from outside his house. Lighting an oil lamp, he took it to the window
to see who was calling. Arsenio who was also awakened followed his
father to the window and peeping, saw and recognized the two
appellants herein with their two co- accused, Pablo and Juan, armed
and the group requested him to come down so that they could all go
to the house of the councilor. Reluctantly, Sabino complied with their
request. According to Arsenio, as soon as his father had gone down,
the four accused grabbed his hands and tied them and then took him
away. Not long thereafter Arsenio heard the sound of beating and the
groans of his father. Because he was scared he did not dare leave the
house to follow his father. Three days afterward Pablo Villez came
and told him that his father had been taken to the lake by the four
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
accused, placed in a banca and while sailing toward the opposite
shore, was maltreated and killed by them.
For the purpose of determining the criminal responsibility of the
appellants, it is unnecessary to ascertain and find the specific criminal
acts of each. It is clear that they and their co-accused confederated
and helped each other and acted in concert from the time that they
lured Sabino from his home to come down and tied his hands until
they reached the lake where they placed him in abanca and then took
turns in maltreating their victim until he died. In other words, there was
a conspiracy between all of them and consequently, appellants are
responsible for the acts of each and every one.
The appellants interpose the defense of alibi, insisting that they could
not have committed the crime because on the day in question,
particularly that time of the night, they were elsewhere.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondent’s counsel claims that
there is no conclusive evidence of the death of the deceased,
because his body was never found, neither was the place where he
was supposed to have been buried indicated, the corpus delicti was
not established.
ISSUE: Whether the corpus delicti was established in this case?
RULING: YES, the corpus delicti was established in this case. In
a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the
body or to show where it can be found. There are cases like
death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is
impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency
causing it be proven. There are even cases where said death and
the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be
presumed or established by circumstantial evidence. There is
nothing in the record to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution had any reason for falsely imputing this serious
crime of murder to them. Of course, appellant Alejo Sanchez
insinuates that Arsenio Bucad had a motive to testify against him
because he (Alejo) was a witness against him in a criminal case
Page 19 of 65
in the Justice of the Peace Court for physical injuries where
Arsenio was sentenced to arresto menor and to pay P60.00
damages. It turns out however that Alejo never testified in said
case for the reason that Arsenio Bucad pleaded guilty to the
charge. As regards the motive behind the killing, there is
evidence showing that defendant Pablo Sanchez was
maintaining illicit relations with Sabino's common law wife, Maria
Evalla, and that the former probably to have the woman all to
himself, liquidated Sabino. Now, why did his co-defendants help
him in carrying out his dastardly plan? The reason is not far to
seek. Alejo Sanchez was his brother, and Juan Sanchez was a
nephew. As to Emeterio Sasota, he was a friend.
 
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MOROS ANSANG, ET AL., defendants. MORO ANSANG
and MORO JUBAIL, defendants-appellants. [G.R. No.
L-4847. May 15, 1953.] ->
FACTS: Moros Ansang, Jubail and Jaho were accused of multiple
murder of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga.
Sometime in October, 1949, Ansang complained to the Chief of Police
of Maluso that Moro Berto was taking away the coconuts from his
(Ansang's) plantation. The chief of police told him to complain to the
provincial scal. Ansang was unable to see said officer. Berto
continued picking up the coconut fruits, claiming that he was the
owner of the plantation.
On October 7, 1949, Jubail, the foster son of Ansang, went to the
seashore of Sangbay, Basilan City, Zamboanga, and there saw Moros
Berto, Abdani, Eka, and Kasim, loading seven sacks of copra
gathered from the plantation Jubail asked Berto what was he going to
do with the copra. The latter answered that he would take it to the
town of Isabela that same day. Berto and his three companions sailed
for said place. A few days afterwards, Moro Abdul Samad saw Jubail
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
with Jaho, boarding another vinta, Jubail carrying with him three home
made bombs or hand grenades. When Moro Wahina asked what
those objects were, Jubail answered that they were home made
bombs which they were going to use for  fishing. Afterward Jubail and
Jaho sailed away. When they returned to Sangbay, Samad and
Wahina noticed that they no longer had bombs, and that they did not
bring any  fish. From that time, Berto, Abdani, Eka, and Kasim have
not been seen or heard from by anybody. Abdul Samad saw pieces of
Berto's vinta on the seashore of the Island of Pilas.
When the authorities were apprised of the disappearance of Berto and
his three companions, and the discovery of the wreckage of Berto's
vinta, they began to make an investigation, and arrested Ansang,
Jubail, and Jaho.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Moro Jaho was acquitted, but Ansang and
Jubail were found guilty, and each was sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua, to pay the heirs of each victim jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law, and
each to pay one-third of the costs.
At the trial of the case, Ansang, Jubail, and Jaho did not assail the
validity of their respective confessions, con ning themselves to a
general denial of the crime charged. They did not say that they were
forced, tortured or given a promise to induce them to make and sign
their confessions.
Ansang-ordered his foster son Jubail to follow them and kill them.
Jubail-upon order of his foster father, he gathered three home made
bombs and invited Jaho to sail with him, telling the latter that they
were going to sh. With Jaho as helmsman, they followed the vinta of
Berto, which had sailed ahead. Upon reaching a point about seven
brazas distant from Berto's vinta, he, Jubail, ignited the bombs one by
one and threw them successively at Berto's vinta, causing its
destruction and the disappearance of the four passengers. Then they
sailed back and kept silent as to what they had done.
Page 20 of 65
Jaho-he was invited by Jubail to go fishing with dynamite. He acted as
helmsman and upon instruction of Jubail, they followed the vinta of
Berto. When they came near it, to his surprise, he saw that Jubail was
throwing bombs or hand grenades at said vinta. He told Jubail that
had he known that that was the purpose, he would not have
accompanied him. Before going with Jubail, he believed that they
were going to fish and had no idea at all that Jubail intended to
commit a serious crime.  
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondent’s counsel contend that
a conviction cannot be based on an extrajudicial confession without
proof of the corpus delicti, independent of the confession.
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confessions made by Ansang,
Jubail and Jaho established the corpus delicti?
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confessions made by Ansang,
Jubail and Jaho established the corpus delicti. Jubail was the
foster son of Ansang, who had a grudge against Berto. Jubail
and Jaho were seen by Samad and Wahina sailing from the shore
of Sangbay, Jubail carrying three hand grenades. When asked
where they were going, Jubail answered that they were going to
 fish. Berto and his companions have never returned from the
trip and have never been seen or heard of by anybody. When
Jubail and Jaho returned, they no longer had hand grenades nor
did they bring any fish. The pieces of the wreckage of Berto's
vinta were seen on the shore of the Island of Pilas. Berto and his
companions must have met a violent death due to the
commission of a crime.


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
AQUILINO NIEM, ET AL., defendants-appellants. [CA No.
521 . December 20, 1945.] ->
FACTS: In the sitio of Balanoy, barrio of Mabacan, municipality of
Calauan, Province of Laguna, along an uninhabited railroad truck,
Toribio Quiogue and Genaro Gelitia were held up at about noon of
January 18, 1945, by four waylaying men, three of whom were armed
with revolvers and one with a knife. At the subsequent investigation
conducted by Constabulary Sergeant Julian Artillaga, Genaro Gelitia
easily identi ed the herein appellants, among many persons shown to
shim, as the four individuals who robbed him and his companion
Toribio Quiogue, of their clothes and other personal belongings worth
P116.41; and in the search made in the house of Aquilino Niem with
whom the other appellants lived, the belt buckle (Exhibit C) and the
pandan bag (Exhibit D) taken away by the appellants, were
recovered. More speci cally, Genaro Gelitia testified in positive terms
that he was confronted and ordered to undress by Benito Niem and
Jose Buenafe, the latter holding a revolver and the former a knife, and
that, in the meantime. Filemon Niem poked his revolver at Toribio
Quiogue's side while Aquilino Niem acted as guard holding a revolver.
Although Toribio Quiogue was also able to identify Filemon Niem, he
was frank enough to admit that he could not recognize the other
three.
CFI RULING: Convicting the herein appellants, Aquilino Niem,
Filemon Niem, Benito Niem, and Jose Buenafe, of the crime of
robbery in band committed in an uninhabited place and sentencing
them to the indeterminate penalty ranging from two years and four
months o f prision correccional to seven years, ten months and
twenty-one days of prision mayor; to indemnify the offended parties,
Toribio Quioque and Genaro Gelitia, jointly and severally, in the
respective sums of P89 and P27.41, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether the testimonies made by Quiogue and Gelitia and
the discovery of the robbed items sufficiently established the corpus
delicti?
Page 21 of 65
RULING: YES, the testimonies made by Quiogue and Gelitia and
the discovery of the robbed items sufficiently established the
corpus delicti. Genaro Gelitia spoke the truth not only because
he appears to have no motive in testifying falsely but because
there is corroboration in the discovery in appellant's house of
two of the articles robbed. Upon the other hand, the candid
admission of Toribio Quiogue that he could identify only Filemon
Niem, far from being a detracting circumstance, serves to make
the evidence for the prosecution more truthful and persuasive.
Indeed, Toribio's failure to recognize all the appellants may be
due to his inferior perceptive power or to the fact that he was not
in so good a position as to view all the appellants well enough to
be remembered for some time. The SC cannot accept appellant's
speculative contention that the initials "G. G." appearing on the
belt buckle was a probable fabrication and that Genaro Gelitia,
being illiterate, could not have read said initials. Said buckle had
been positively identified by its owner and it is not unusual for
even an illiterate to recognize his property by any familiar
distinguishing mark. Contrary to appellant's allegation, there is
satisfactory proof that all the appellants were armed and the
articles specified in the information had really been taken away
by them. The fact that only the knife (Exhibit A), the belt buckle
(Exhibit C), and the pandan bag (Exhibit D) had been produced
before the court does not prove any deficiency in the evidence
for the prosecution regarding the corpus delicti, but merely
indicates the speed with which the appellants were able to
conceal or dispose of their weapons and the other articles
robbed.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BIENVENIDO NOCUM, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No.
L-482. February 25, 1947.] ->
FACTS: About 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there
was a fistic fight between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at
the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets, City of Manila.
Desiring to stop the encounter, respondent Bienvenido Nocum
shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a
45 caliber pistol and shot twice in the air. The bout continued,
however; so Nocum fired another shot at the ground, but
unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an
innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was
promptly carried to the St. Luke's Hospital where he expired soon
after. The above paragraph is a composite and abridged statement of
the declarations of several witnesses (Jesus Santos, Vicente and
Juan Aurencio and Ramon Gagui) in connection with Nocum's
confession which is marked as Exhibit F.
For having discharged a gun and accidentally killed Eugenio
Francisco, Nocum, was tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
before the Honorable Alfonso Felix, judge. Found guilty of homicide
through reckless negligence, Nocum appealed in due course.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Nocum’s attorney, assailing the
validity of said confession on the ground of involuntariness, contends
in this Court that inasmuch as the corpus delicti had not been
demonstrated by evidence detours that document, his client should be
absolved, pursuant to several pertinent decisions.
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession which was marked as
Exhibit F made by Nocum is admissible?
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confession which was marked as
Exhibit F made by Nocum is admissible. There is competent
proof establishing the fact that, during the affray, pistol
detonations were heard, and that one of the bullets produced the
tragic death of Eugenio Francisco, whose photograph is Exhibit
B. That is proof of the corpus delicti, i. e., proof of violent death,
Page 22 of 65
whether or not feloniously caused. The confession Exhibit F
served to identify the person who fired those shots and
committed the offense. The SC does not feel any inclination to
reject such confession, because the uncorroborated and
implausible testimony of Nocum, alleging he had been
manhandled before signing this document, about which he knew
nothing, could not definitely overcome the positive assertions of
Pablo Montilla of the Manila Police Department (before whom
Exhibit F had been executed) that no force or intimidation had
been employed on Nocum, who willingly signed it "after
propounding to him all the questions and explaining to him the
contents" thereof. The impartiality of that officer of the law has
not been shaken by the lone testimony of Nocum, which, as
explained in the People's brief, deserves no credence. Nocum
said in court that he signed Exhibit F when Montilla told him "it
was simply a proof that they arrested me" (p. 27, t. s. n.). This is
inconsistent with the alleged third-degree methods. If he was
forced, deceit was unnecessary. And yet, he could not be
deceived thusly, because he was no illiterate, being seventh
grader. Anyway, the trial judge had the chance to see the
opposing witnesses, and to observe their demeanor on the
stand. 
The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless
imprudence, the slaying having been unintentional (cf. People vs.
Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 468). It
is apparent Nocum willfully discharged his gun — for which he
exhibited no license, by the way — without taking the precautions
demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and
the likelihood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of
the Manila thoroughfare.


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• HAROLD V. TAMARGO , petitioner, vs. ROMULO
AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA,
JR., respondents. [G.R. No. 177727. January 19, 2010.] ->
FACTS: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter,
Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15,
2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The
police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain
Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an a davit dated September
12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a
drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent
Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed
Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he
knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of
Geron's affidavit, the investigating prosecutor  issued a resolution
dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and
three John Does. On February 2, 2004, the corresponding
Informations for murder were led against them in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of
Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the
minor Gail Franzielle. Columna was arrested in the province of
Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention
and trial.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit admitting his
participation as a “look out” during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan as the gunman, Richard Mecate and
tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda Jr and Llyod
Antiporda. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as
private prosecutor.  Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V.
Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
The allegations from Columna’s affidavit was denied by
the respondent specially their involvement in the killings.
Page 23 of 65
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented
Columna's unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to
respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna's jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and
narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial
confession. Columna stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an
affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columna's letter and affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna
to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During
the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted
the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed
the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus, on
November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor
Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was
only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during
the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to
his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another
detention center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, Tamargo filed an appeal to
the Department of Justice (DOJ). 17 On May 30, 2005, the DOJ,
through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and
ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.  He opined that the
March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached
by the subsequent recantation and that there was enough evidence to
prove the probable guilt of respondents. Accordingly, the Informations
were filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC
of Manila, Branch 29. However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary
Gonzales granted the Antipordas' motion for reconsideration (MR) and
directed the withdrawal of the Informations. This time, he declared
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against
respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not
corroborated by other evidence. As a result, on August 22, 2005, the
trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On
October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied Tamargo's MR.
RTC RULING: Granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an
order dated October 26, 2005. Tamargo filed an MR but the judge
voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases
were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.
Judge Daguna granted the MR of Tamargo in a resolution dated
December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based on Columna's March 8,
2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor,
there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the
MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
CA RULING: Ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion
because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into
account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all
the accused. It also held that Columna's extrajudicial confession was
not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the
recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented
to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the
confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while
the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Tamargo argues that, based on the
independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause
based on the earlier a davit of Columna. She considered all the
pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna's recantation.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondents counter that Judge
Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her
evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable
cause while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They
also contend that Columna's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible
against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Page 24 of 65
ISSUE: Whether Columna’s March 8 affidavit may be admissible as
evidence against his co-accused?
RULING: NO, Columna’s March 8 affidavit may not be admissible
as evidence against his co-accused, in view of the rule on res
inter alios acta. Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession,
which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was
presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence
against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios
acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.  Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against
his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against
them. The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it
would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that
a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers;
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PELAGIO CONDEMENA, CASAMERO PETIÑO, SIMPLICIO
ANIEL, RICARIDO CAUSING @ GARIDO, defendants,
SIMPLICIO ANIEL, defendant- appellant. [G.R. No. L-22426.
May 29, 1968.] ->
FACTS: Respondents Pelagio Condemena, Casamero Patiño,
Ricarido Causing and Simplicio Aniel were charged with the crime of
robbery in band with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and dwelling.
CFI RULING: Found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery in band with homicide without, however,
making a finding on any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in
the information, instead it took into consideration the lack of
instruction and education in mitigation of their criminal liability, and
sentenced each to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay P6,000.00
to the heirs of the victim, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the proportionate costs.
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confessions made by Condemena
and Patiño in their sworn statements is admissible?
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confessions made by
Condemena and Patiño in their sworn statements is admissible.
The positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was
further bolstered when Pelagio Condemena and Casamero
Patiño, in their sworn statements Exhibits "B" and "C", named
Simplicio Aniel as one of them in the group when they killed
Fermin Lamoste and robbed the house of P200.00 on October 6,
1962, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon.Extra-judicial
confessions, independently made without collusion, which are
identical with each other in their essential details and are
corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show
the probability of the latter's actual participation in the
commission of the crime. Barcelisa Lamoste, in the words of the
trial judge who had personally seen and observed her behavior
Page 25 of 65
and manner of testifying on the witness stand, "unhesitantly and
unmistakenly" pointed to Simplicio Aniel as the person who
rushed towards her and pointed his gun, about one foot long, at
her face, warning her at the same time not to shout or else she
will be killed. Esmeralda Lamoste substantially corroborated the
testimony of her mother. And Crispin Bactol's testimony has
demonstrated a circumstance of strong persuasion when he
recognized Condemena and his companions when they were
passing in front of his house. The credibility of their testimony
was never successfully impugned by the defense when they
were cross- examined on the witness stand. No motive was
shown by the defense why these witnesses should impute so
grave a crime to Simplicio Aniel who they did not even know
before the crime was committed.
As this Court has said: "While confession of a co-conspirator are not
ordinarily admissible as evidence against another co-conspirator, the
fact that they implicate the latter and were made soon after the
commission of the crime, is circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of their co-conspirator having actually participated therein."
(People vs. Lumahang, et al., L-6357, May 7, 1954.)
The commission of the crime was attended by treachery. The act of
the accused in suddenly rushing towards the victim, then two of them,
each holding the hands of the victim, and the third of them stabbed
the victim, is characterized by treachery insuring the accomplishment
of their purpose without risk to themselves from any defense or
retaliation the victim might offer.
The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally proven.
Their acts collectively and individually executed have clearly
demonstrated the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishments of the same unlawful purpose and objective - to rob
the house of Lamoste. Altho the killing of Fermin Lamoste was
accomplished by only three of the intruders without any physical
participation thereof by the appellant Simplicio Aniel, however, as
conspiracy has been established, the crime committed is robbery in
band, and the homicide was committed on the occasion thereof, all
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
the members of the band are liable for robbery with homicide (People
vs. Evangelista, et al., L-2489, April 12, 1950). And
". . . any member of a band who is present at the commission of a
robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the
assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted
to prevent the same." (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code.)
the appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as principal because the
evidence does not show that he had attempted to prevent the assault
and the killing of Fermin Lamoste. (People vs. Garduque, et al., L-
10133, July 31, 1958.).
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROGER VICTOR @ "Ger" and "Gerry", ROBERTO
MONTEBON @ "Bobby" and "Bento" and CEFERINO
GUNEDA @ "Prino", defendants, CEFERINO GUNEDA @
"Prino", defendant-appellant. [G.R. Nos. 75154-55.
February 6, 1990.] ->
FACTS: Two criminal cases were jointly tried in this case. A joint
Decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao,
Cebu, in Criminal Case No. AR-912 for Robbery with Homicide, and
Criminal Case No. AR-913 for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunitions.
In Criminal Case No. AR-912, the Regional Trial Court found: a) Both
Roberto Montebon and Ceferino Guneda guilty beyond doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. They were both sentenced to suffer
Reclusion Perpetua, and the accessory penalties provided for by law;
and b) Roger Victor guilty beyond doubt of the offense of simple
Robbery, with two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty to
Robbery and testifying as to true facts in favor of the State. He was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Page 26 of 65
The two accused Montebon and Guneda were commanded, jointly
and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Charles Turner in the sum of
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. AR-913, the RTC found Roberto Montebon guilty
beyond doubt of the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearm. He was
sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of imprisonment of 17 years and
4 months, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
pay one-third of the costs.
Roger Victor and Ceferino Guneda were acquitted for failure on the
part of the prosecution to establish actual or constructive possession
of any firearm in their person or residence.Cdpr
In this Court, only accused Ceferino Guneda is appealing from the
RTC Decision, which adjudged him guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: In arguing that the evidence
presented by the prosecution does not establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, Guneda assails the extra-judicial confessions of his
co-accused Roger Victor and Roberto Montebon (Exhibits "Y" and "Z",
respectively) as inadmissible for having been obtained through force,
threats and intimidation. Guneda also alleges that the testimony of his
co-accused Roger Victor, affirming the latter's extra-judicial
confession, is not to be believed for being filled with inconsistencies
and that such affirmation, taken together with the extra-judicial
confessions abovementioned, may not be used in evidence against
him pursuant to Sections 27 and 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which provide:
RULE 130. Sec. 27 — ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR. The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
RULE 130. Sec. 29 — CONFESSION. The declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be
given in evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether the judicial confession of Victor and the extra-judicial
confession of Montebon is admissible as evidence?
RULING: YES, the judicial confession of Victor and the extra-
judicial confession of Montebon is admissible as evidence. At
this juncture, it must be pointed out that Section 27 refers only to
the extra-judicial statement or admission of a conspirator. When
such extra-judicial statement is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to
be hearsay. It becomes, instead, a judicial admission being a
testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those
it implicates. The extra-judicial confession of Roger Victor
(Exhibit "Y") was re-iterated and affirmed by him in open court,
during the trial. Thus, such confession partakes of the nature of
a judicial testimony admissible in evidence not only against the
declarant but even against his co- accused, Ceferino Guneda.
Finally, there is the extra-judicial confession of Roberto
Montebon (Exhibit "Z"), sworn to by him before Judge Alfredo
Buenconsejo of the Municipal Trial Court of Boljoon, during the
Preliminary Investigation, which confession points to Guneda as
the mastermind. While the general rule is that an extra-judicial
confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not
admissible against his co-accused, it has been held that such a
confession is admissible against a co-accused where the
confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator. The judicial
confession of Roger Victor as corroborated by the other
evidence, establishes the guilt of accused-appellant Guneda
beyond reasonable doubt.
First of all, the voluntariness of the testimony is beyond question.
Roger Victor was presented by his own counsel as witness in his
(Roger Victor's) own behalf at the hearing of 26 September 1985. The
direct examination conducted reveals that his testimony was
Page 27 of 65
spontaneous and made without compulsion to the point of being self-
incriminating despite proper advice from counsel.
This Court has exercised utmost caution in those cases where the
conviction is based on the testimony of a discharged co-accused. In
the case at bar, however, the witness, Roger Victor, was not
discharged as co-accused and yet he testified as to his and his co-
accused's participation in the crime. He was, in fact, convicted of
Robbery. Moreover, his testimony was made during presentation of
evidence by the defense, not by the prosecution. It was only during
the presentation of rebuttal evidence that he was again called to
testify, this time, by the prosecution. The credibility of his testimony
having remained unimpeached, such testimony, therefore, carries
great weight in the determination of appellant Ceferino Guneda's guilt.
Second, the testimony of Roger Victor is replete with details that only
a participant in the crime could have known, such as, how and when
Guneda proposed the commission of the crime (TSN, 26 September,
1985, pp. 26-29), how they first tried to rob Myles Castle (TSN, 26
September 1985, pp. 8-10); where they first examined the articles
taken from the victim Charles Turner (Ibid, p. 33-35); how Turner was
killed; and who took custody of the loot (Ibid, pp. 29-35). All such
details underscore the credibility of Victor's testimony (People v. San
Miguel, L-30722, 31 July 1981, 106 SCRA 290).
Third, the testimony of Roger Victor is corroborated in its material
points by other evidence on record, to wit: the testimony of Captain
Gerry Barias and Patrolman Marcos Florida that the weapon used in
killing and the articles taken from the victim were in the possession of
Roberto Montebon when he was arrested (TSN, 24 July 1985, pp.
15-16; 31 May 1985, pp. 9-30); the testimony of Artemio Panganiban
Jr., Supervising Ballistician of the NBI, that the .38 caliber "paltik"
revolver taken from Roberto Montebon was the same weapon which
fired the cartridge found in the possession of Roger Victor (TSN, 27
June 1985, pp. 11-56); the testimony of Carlito Lozada, the Sensaldo
bus conductor, that Roger Victor and Roberto Montebon boarded his
bus at Boljoon enroute to Cebu City (TSN, 26 June 1985, pp. 8-10);
the testimony of Juanita Guneda Victor, wife of Roger Victor and a
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
relative of accused-appellant Ceferino Guneda, that the latter and her
husband knew each other and that they would often go to the market
of Boljoon where according to Roger Victor, Guneda proposed the
commission of the crime (TSN, 26 July 1985, pp. 14-22); and, lastly,
the testimony of Josefina Romero, corroborating that of Victor, that
both the latter and Montebon were among the customers in her store
in the afternoon of 16 October 1984, before the crime was committed.
All these testimonies corroborate Victor's and serve to strengthen his
credibility.
Guided by the requirements of credibility and corroboration on
material points in the appreciation of the evidence on record, we hold
that the testimony of Roger Victor is sufficient to warrant the
conviction of accused-appellant Ceferino Guneda.


• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CRISPIN
VELARDE y BANDOJO, appellant. [G.R. No. 139333. July
18, 2002.] ->
FACTS: On the bases of the circumstantial evidence and the extra-
judicial confession of the accused Crispin Velarde, the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan convicted Velarde of the crime of rape with
homicide and the supreme penalty of death was imposed upon him.  control" over the PNP unit in that municipality. Moreover, during the
In this automatic review, Velarde contended that the extrajudicial
confession taken during the investigation was inadmissible in
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession made by Velarde is
admissible as evidence?
RULING: NO, the extra-judicial confession made by Velarde is
inadmissible as evidence, as it is a clear violation of Section
Page 28 of 65
12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The dead body of Brenda
Candelaria was found in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan.
But Velarde, a resident of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of
Malolos was brought to and detained in the Malolos Police
Station, where he was investigated by the Malolos police. It is
significant to point out that, during the cross-examination and
perhaps in total confusion, the investigator even went so far as
to state that Atty. Domingo had not acted as Velarde's lawyer. If
this were so, then Velarde had absolutely no counsel when his
extra-judicial confession was taken. In whatever way we may
look at the situation, it is clear that, in palpable violation of the
Constitution, Velarde was not assisted by a competent and
independent counsel during the custodial investigation and the
taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court is duty-
bound to disregard it.
Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
"Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel."
The Court agreed with the trial court. Atty. Danilo Domingo cannot be
considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos
at the time. As such, he exercised "operational supervision and
investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and
competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give
any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant. The former
did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of his
extrajudicial confession.
Further, in case of doubt, the scales must be tipped in favor of the
accused. Circumstantial evidence as a basis for criminal conviction
should be weighed and accepted with great caution. Jurisprudence
teaches that it is preferable for the guilty to remain unpunished than
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
for the innocent to suffer unjustly — in this case, to be sentenced to
die by lethal injection. Thus, without the extrajudicial confession, the
circumstantial evidence becomes utterly insufficient to pass the test of
moral certainty. Accordingly, Crispin Velarde was acquitted on
reasonable doubt.


• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE, accused whose death sentence
is under review. [G.R. No. L-44690. March 28, 1980.]->
FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976,
Celso Saminado, 37, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison
hospital, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch
water. The accused, Jose Tampus, 27, and Rodolfo Avila, 28,
prisoners in the same penal institution, who were tubercular patients
in the hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their
bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted eight incised
wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times. Saminado
died upon arrival at eleven o'clock on that same morning in the prison
hospital.LexLib
After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a
prison guard with their knives (Exh. B and D). They told the guard:
"Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."
The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both
members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales
in December, 1975 by a member of the Batang Mindanao gang, a
group hostile to the Oxo gang. Saminado was a member of the
Batang Mindanao gang. Rosales was a member of the Oxo gang. The
officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written
report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence
transpired, he stated that, according to his on- the-spot investigation,
Page 29 of 65
Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was seated in the comfort
room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the
victim on the chest and neck (Exh. J dated January 14, 1976). Two
days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard
investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial
confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado
(Exh. A and C).
CFI RULING: Convicting Jose Tampus of murder, sentencing him to
death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Celso
Saminado, an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos (Criminal Case No.
18510). In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the co-accused of
Tampus, was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of fourteen years and eight months of reclusion
temporal as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay the same indemnity.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The counsel de oficio contends that
the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Article IV of the
Constitution and also points out that before the confession was taken
by investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta on January 16, 1976,
Tampus was interrogated two days before, or on the day of the killing,
by the officer of the day, Vivencio C. Lahoz, and that at that alleged
custodial interrogation, Tampus was not informed as to his rights to
have counsel and to remain silent. 
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession made by Tampus is
admissible as evidence?
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confession made by Tampus is
admissible as evidence. As the confession in this case was
obtained after the Constitution took effect, section 20 applies
thereto (People vs. Dumdum, L-35279, July 30, 1979). There is no
doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The investigator
in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to
comply with section 20, as shown in the following parts of the
confession. The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the
killing, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered
to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom they
encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed
an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement. elicited without
any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same
time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that. The two
accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of
the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right
to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission
was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty
and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of
conviction. It should be stressed that, even without taking into
account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty
and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt
by the evidence of the prosecution.
"SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.”


Page 30 of 65
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GUIAMAD MANTUNG, accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
130372. July 20, 1999.] ->
FACTS: Employees of the Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop, Maribel
Mayola and Rejie Balderas, were found dead inside the pawnshop
with gunshot wounds on their heads. Taken from the shop were
P62,000 cash and P5,300 worth of jewelries. Accused-appellant
Guiamad Mantung, a Moslem, who was then the guard on duty before
the crime was discovered, disappeared. Mantung was charged with
robbery with homicide when part of the loot was discovered in his
possession after his warrantless arrest in Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato.
During a press conference called for by Mayor Joey Marquez of
Parañaque, Mantung admitted killing the two employees because they
gave him pork to eat. Mantung’s statements were published in two
newspapers and the video footage shown in TV. Mantung’s testimony
at the press conference was testified to by Ricardo Diago, an
employee of the pawnshop who was present during the said
conference. 
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Mantung, for his defense, denied
the charge, claiming that the crime was perpetrated by three
unidentified men. Mantung also refuted the newspaper reports that he
allegedly made at the press conference. 
TRIAL COURT RULING: Gave more weight on the prosecution's
evidence rather than Mantung's bare denial, rendered judgment of
conviction. 
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confession made by Mantung in a
press conference which were published in two newspapers and a
video footage showing thus is admissible as evidence? 
RULING: YES, the extra-judicial confession made by Mantung in
a press conference which were published in two newspapers and
a video footage showing thus is admissible as evidence. The
Supreme Court held that the totality of circumstantial evidence,
coupled with the extrajudicial confession of the accused,
established beyond reasonable doubt that Mantung committed
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
the crime; that denials, unsubstantiated by convincing evidence,
are not enough to engender reasonable doubt in light of
sufficiently telling proof of guilt presented by the prosecution;
that flight is a strong evidence of guilt; that the right to counsel
during custodial investigation does not apply to spontaneous
statements; and that failure to timely object to the legality of the
arrest and to the evidence obtained incidental to a warrantless
arrest constitutes a waiver of its admissibility.


4. Previous conduct as evidence
Sec. 34.  Similar acts as evidence
Sec. 35.  Unaccepted offer
5. Testimonial knowledge
Sec.  36.  Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded
Page 31 of 65
• SAVORY LUNCHEONETTE , petitioner, vs. LAKAS NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, ELISEO GUZMAN, ROMEO
RASCO, LUCIA VIVERO, PEDRO BASILIO, CESAR
MARTINEZ, RAFAEL IBANA, RICARDO ELICO, CIRILO
ENOLPE, VIRGINIA BACLOR, FEDERICO BALIBALOS,
RODITO DAVA, ALEXANDER GARCES, DRISENCIO
RUBIO, HONORATO OLIVERIO, ROGELIO CANUEL,
PUBLIO JAPSON, SONIA BALDON, ANDY VELOSO,
ANTONIO DE LA ROSA, JULIET NALZARO, PEDRO ACAL,
CELEDONIO PEREZ, EDUARDO ESTRADA, ANTONIO
COSTALES, BLANCAFLOR FLORES, PEDRITO DE
GUZMAN, SOFRONIO JARANILLA, ARMANDO MARARAC,
DOMINADOR QUINTO, GREGORIO BALBIN, and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. [G.R. No.
L-38964. January 31, 1975.] ->
FACTS: On September 27, 1972, petitioner Savory Luncheonette filed
a complaint charging respondent LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, with unfair labor practice for having violated certain
provisions of Republic Act 875 (Industrial Peace Act). To sustain its
charges, Savory presented Atty. Emiliano Morabe as a witness. Atty.
Morabe had allegedly taken charge of the labor-management
problems of Savory and had thereby acquired first-hand knowledge of
the facts of the labor dispute. Accordingly, the cross-examination of
Atty. Morabe was re-scheduled for several times, but when such date
arrived, Atty. Amante (LAKAS’ counsel) did not appear and so the
cross-examination was once more transferred to March 17, 1973, with
the warning from the court that "should the respondents still fail to
cross-examine Atty. Morabe, the right to cross-examine him will be
deemed waived."
Later on, Atty. Morabe succumbed to a heart attack on March 31,
1973. On April 12, 1973, LAKAS PILIPINO filed a motion to strike out
the direct testimony of Atty. Morabe from the records on the ground
that since cross-examination was no longer possible, such direct
testimony "could no longer be rebutted." On June 14, 1973, private
respondents filed another motion seeking the recall of Savory's
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
witness Bienvenida Ting for further cross-examination. Mrs. Ting was
presented as a witness by Savory on March 27, 1973 and was cross-
examined by the private respondents on June 4, 1973. In an Order
dated May 3, 1974, respondent court granted the two motions.
Thereupon, Savory filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order
but the same was denied in a resolution en banc dated July 5, 1974.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Savory now strongly asserts that
respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion when the latter
ordered that the direct testimony of its principal witness, Atty. Morabe,
be stricken off the record for "(T)o strike out the testimony of Atty.
Morabe after the respondents had been given su cient and repeated
opportunities to cross-examine him, and after they have practically
waived their right to cross-examine him is unjust and unfair. It is not
warranted by our rules of procedure and would place a premium on
respondents' repeated failure and refusal to cross-examine the
witness. Respondents should not be allowed to pro t and bene t from
their own neglect and omission.  and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage
ISSUE: Whether Atty Morabe’s testimony should be stricken off the
record?
Page 32 of 65
examination but through fault of his own failed to cross-examine
the witness.
The SC ruled that the right of a party to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in
nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly
or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record. The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied
waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the
common basic principle underlying the application of the rule on
implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront
of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.



RULING: NO, Atty Morabe’s testimony should stay on the

record. Private respondents through their counsel, Atty. Amante,
were given not only one but  five opportunities to cross-examine
the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warnings and
admonitions of respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the
cross-examination or else it will be deemed waived, and despite
the readiness, willingness, and insistence of the witness that he
be cross- examined, said counsel by his repeated absence and/
or unpreparedness failed to do so until death sealed the
witness's lips forever. By such repeated absence and lack of
preparation on the part of the counsel of private respondents,
the latter lost their right to examine the witness, Atty. Morabe,
and they alone must suffer the consequences. The mere fact that
the witness died after giving his direct testimony is no ground in
itself for excluding his testimony from the record so long as the
adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ABELARDO PARUNGAO, accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
125812. November 28, 1996.] ->
FACTS: On May 30, 1989, early in the morning, the detention
prisoners in Cells No. 2 and 6 of the Pampanga Provincial Jail at the
Provincial Capitol in San Fernando, staged a jailbreak. On the
occasion thereof, Jail Guards Conrado Basa and Emilardo Valencia
were killed, while Jail Guard Arnel Aldana was seriously wounded.
Several pieces of rearms valued at P41,000.00 were also forcibly
taken and carried away from the Provincial Jail Armory. The incident
triggered the filing on April 16, 1990, of an Information against herein
accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao and 15 other prisoners
charging them with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Serious
Physical Injuries.  we can not agree with the trial court that Parungao is guilty as
RTC RULING: Convicting Abelardo Parungao y Gatus guilty and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay solidarily alongside with Romeo Pamintuan y Bautista, Edgar
Pabalan y Benamira, Ronnie Pilapil y Esaya and Mario Briones y
Guinto
ISSUE: Whether Parungao’s guilt was established by the hearsay
evidence?
Page 33 of 65
trial court gravely erred in accepting, and worse still, in giving
weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana,
that accused-appellant masterminded the jailbreak, and was a
co-conspirator. Too, it defies logic to say that Parungao is the
mastermind of the jailbreak, giving written instructions even, but
in the same breath say that he did not in fact join the jailbreak
and sat meekly inside his detention cell. However, it must be
noted that neither Parungao nor his counsel objected to the
admission of the testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana. The
general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However,
the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being
admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking
that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative
value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
can not be given credence for it has no probative value. Again,
principal by inducement simply because as testified by Jail
Guard Pacheco, he shouted out words of encouragement to
Briones. Parungao's remarks or utterances did not make him a
principal by inducement.

RULING: NO, Parungao’s guilt was not established by the

hearsay evidence. To give weight to the hearsay testimony of
Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana, and to make the same the basis for
finding Parungao a co-conspirator and for imposing the penalty
of life imprisonment, gravely violates the hearsay rule and the
constitutional right of the Parungao to meet the witnesses face-
to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid
test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test their
truthfulness, memory, and intelligence. Such testimonies being
merely hearsay because said witnesses testified and conveyed
to the court matters not of their own personal knowledge but
matters only narrated to them by other detainees. Obviously, the
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests Page 34 of 65
• ARNOLD P. MOLLANEDA, petitioner, vs. LEONIDA C. existence of such a fact. Signi cantly, respondent herself and her
UMACOB, respondent. [G.R. No. 140128. June 6, 2001.] -> witnesses were present during the hearing of the case. Hence,
petitioner was given the opportunity to cross-examine them. The
FACTS: Petitioner Arnold Mollaneda was charged of sexual real basis for the exclusion of hearsay evidence lies in the fact
harassment by respondent Leonida Umacob and the records of the that a hearsay testimony is not subject to the tests which can
case were elevated to the Civil Service Commission who then ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of the truth of
designated Atty. Anacleto Buena to hear and receive evidence. testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for
Thereafter, Mollaneda was found guilty of grave misconduct and cross-examination.
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and was meted
the penalty of dismissal from government service with all its 

accessory penalties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and,
hence, this petition where the factual findings of the Commission were
questioned on the ground that the Commissioners did not personally
hear the case.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Mollaneda asserts that the testimony
of Umacob's witnesses are hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies given by Umacob’s witnesses is

considered as hearsay and thus, inadmissible as evidence?

RULING: NO, the testimonies given by Umacob’s witnesses is

not considered as hearsay and thus, admissible as evidence. A
reading of the testimonies of Umacob and Mariano shows that
they were not presented to prove the truth of respondent's
accusations against petitioner, but only to establish the fact that
respondent narrated to them what transpired between her and
petitioner. While it is true that the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing
the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a
statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As
a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.,
represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA
JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III,
ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE
CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ROXAS CITY, respondents. [G.R. No. 146030. December 3,
2002.] ->
FACTS: Subject matter of this case is a parcel of land with an area
of .3899 hectares, more or less. On December 28, 1978, Felipe
Alejaga Sr. predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, led a Free
Patent Application covering the subject property. On March 14, 1979,
Free Patent No. (VI-2) was approved and issued. The corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-15 was issued on the same date. On
April 18, 1990, petitioner Republic, alleging that respondents had
obtained the free patent and the Certificate of Title through fraud and
misrepresentation, instituted an action for annulment/ cancellation of
patent and title and reversion of the subject lot to the mass of public
domain. The trial court favorably ruled for the petitioner. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and it brushed aside as
hearsay Isagani Cartagena's testimony that Land Inspector Efren L.
Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent
application of Felipe Alejaga Sr. 6 The CA added that petitioner had
failed to support its claim that the lot covered by respondent's free
patent and title was foreshore land.
ISSUE: Whether Cartagena’s testimony is considered hearsay and
thus, inadmissible as evidence?  merely evidence of the former. Verily, we must uphold petitioner's
RULING: NO, Cartagena’s testimony is not considered hearsay
and thus, it is admissible as evidence. Since Cartagena's
testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had
conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence,
properly admitted by the trial court. Thus, because Cartagena
took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-
examination, the Investigation Report he had submitted to the
Page 35 of 65
director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony.
Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal
knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. On the
other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio
may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may
be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue  or (b) is circumstantially relevant to
the existence of such fact.
The report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been
successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that
he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection
of the parcel of land. Cartagena's statement on. Recio's alleged
admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A witness
may testify as to the state of mind of another person — the latter's
knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former's statements
may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the
hearsay rule. 
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioner's
contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. 39
Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of
Title. The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the
Certificate of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is
claim that the issuance of the Alejagas' patent and title was tainted
with fraud.


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION
OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD,
respondents. [G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015.] ->
FACTS: Sometime in November and December 2013, respondent
Office of the Ombudsman served on petitioner Senator Jinggoy
Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others.
Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints
filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March
2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be
Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right
of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence
on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman).” The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.
Moreover, the sufficiency of the evidence put forward by the
Ombudsman against Sen. Estrada to establish its nding of probable
cause in the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313
and OMB-C-C-13-0397 was judicially con rmed by the
Sandiganbayan, when it examined the evidence, found probable
cause, and issued a warrant of arrest against Sen. Estrada on 23
June 2014.
ISSUE: Whether probable cause can be established by hearsay
evidence?
RULING: YES, probable cause can be established by hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable
cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation
is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
Page 36 of 65
obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where
rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is
“substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even
partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same
as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes
hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence
of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of
guilt.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not
akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed
in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to
establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,”
while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than
‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the
concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause
is this:  In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
6. Exceptions to the hearsay rule
Sec. 37.  Dying Declaration
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL LORICA LABAD,
accused-appellants.[G.R. No. 188124. June 29, 2010.] ->
FACTS: Respondents Jonel Falabrica Serenas alias “Joe-An” (Joe-
An) and Joel Lorica Labad (Joel) were convicted with the of the crime
of murder with the RTC of Parañaque. On 8 December 2002, Niño
Noel Ramos (Niño) had just brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse
Gavino (Dianne) home in Parañaque City. On his way back, Niño
passed by a bridge and was stabbed and was mauled thereat. Cesar
Ramos (Cesar), Niño’s brother, met the latter on the bridge and
noticed that his brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño relayed to
Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar immediately brought
Niño to the hospital where the latter expired thirty (30) minutes later.
Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station
that her cousin informed her of a commotion on the bridge and when
she got there, she met a friend who told her that Nino was stabbed. In
her testimony during the trial, however, Dianne narrated that she
actually saw Joe-An stabbing Niño. Lending full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court convicted
appellants. It gave fullweight to the dying declaration uttered by Niño
to his brother, as well as the statement of Dianne, who allegedly
witnessed appellants threaten Niño the night before the incident.CA
affirmed decision with modification as to exemplary damages.
RESPONDENTS' CONTENTION: Serenas and Labad question the
alleged dying declaration of the victim in that they were not sufficiently
identified as the persons responsible for Niño's death. Serenas and
Labad anchor their argument on the utterance of the word "Joe-An"
when the victim was asked on who stabbed him. Serenas and Labad
advance that the victim may have been referring to some other
person. Moreover, the victim did not even mention "Joel" or "Joel
Labad," the other suspect.
ISSUE: Whether the dying declaration of Niño is admissible as
evidence?
RULING: YES, the dying declaration of Niño is admissible as
evidence. All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently
Page 37 of 65
met by the statement of the victim communicated to Cesar. First,
the statement pertained to Niño being stabbed, particularly pin-
pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second, Niño must have been
fully aware that he was on the brink of death considering his
bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the bridge. Third,
the competence of Niño is unquestionable had he survived the
stabbing incident. Fourth, Niño's statement was being offered in
a criminal prosecution for his murder. The OSG defends the
victim's dying declaration and insists that there was no mistake
that the victim was indeed referring to Joe-An, considering that
the latter was familiar to him. As an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement
is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation. 
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites
must concur:  first, the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the
time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is
competent as a witness; and fourth, the declaration must be offered in
a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim.
Note however that based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was
no direct evidence linking appellant Joel to the crime. With respect to
Joe-An, the lower courts properly appreciated the presence of
treachery in qualifying the crime to murder.


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RENATO BAUTISTA, ARMAN HERNANDEZ, ARNOLD
MENDOZA & JESS SABARIN (At large), defendants-
appellants. [G.R. No. 111149. September 5, 1997.] ->
FACTS: On the night of December 14, 1989, Rodel Yarza was
seriously stabbed. Yarza was originally brought to Mary Johnson
Hospital for treatment and was transferred that same evening to the
emergency room of Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was
operated on. Yarza, however, died the following morning.
Respondents Renato Bautista, Arman Hernandez, Arnold Mendoza
and Jess Sabarin were charged with murder. Bautista pleaded not
guilty and interposed the defense of denial claiming that Rodel, the
deceased, hit him with a bottle on the left side of his head with no
apparent reason and that it was his three co-accused who assaulted
Rodel.
Charlie Yarza, who testified for the prosecution, positively identified
Bautista as the person who stabbed his cousin (Rodel) at Moriones
Street after being chased by all four accused. The widow of the
deceased, Zenaida Yarza, testifying also for the prosecution, declared
that her husband who then was very pale, profusely perspiring and
very weak told her that it was Bautista who stabbed him. Zenaida also
testified that the Bautista’s father told her that on that night Bautista
went home, took a knife and ran away, and that he offered to defray
the medical expenses of Rodel. Giving more weight on the dying
declaration of the deceased, the trial court rendered judgment of
conviction.  is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS: Bautista maintains that the
testimony of Zenaida Yarza to the effect that the victim told her that it
was accused-appellant who stabbed him should not be admitted as a
dying declaration simply because it was not made "under a
consciousness of impending death," which is the most important and
decisive requisite for a statement to qualify as a dying declaration.
Also, Bautista insists that had the victim believed that his death was
Page 38 of 65
imminent, he would have immediately given the details of the attack
against him; instead, he acquiesced to his wife's suggestion, while
they were at the hospital, that they "talk about it later after his
condition be safe first." 19 Thus, the defense argues, the victim Rodel
Yarza, at the time he gave his so-called "dying declaration" was
confident that he would recover from his wounds.
ISSUE: Whether Rodel’s dying declaration is admissible as evidence?
RULING: YES, Rodel’s dying declaration is admissible as
evidence. The Supreme Court held that the law does not require
that the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has given
up the hope of life. It is enough if, from the circumstances, it can
be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of
mind. The fact that the deceased did not expire right after his
declaration to his wife will not alter the probative force of his
dying declaration since it is not indispensable that a declarant
expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death
and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that
renders the dying declaration admissible. The hope to survive,
as we know, springs eternal in the human heart, but then the
victim knew in this case that his life was, notwithstanding
medical intervention, slowly ebbing away. Moreover, the fact that
Rodel Yarza did not expire right after his declaration to his wife
at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of December 14, 1989, but
survived until 2:30 o'clock the following morning, or about four
(4) hours from the time he made the declaration, will not alter the
probative force of his dying declaration since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It
death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible. Added to the statement of the deceased, which
deserved the highest credence, is the fact that it was only Renato
Bautista who had the motive to kill the victim considering that,
according to the defense, the victim hit accused-appellant with a
bottle on the left side of the head while the latter was playing
cards with his friends. This act of violence is more than sufficient
to have impelled accused-appellant to get back at the victim.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, accused, EDUARDO QUISAYAS,
accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 198022. April 7, 2014.]  ->
FACTS: Appellant and accused Sonny Gatarin y Caballero were
charged in an Information with Robbery with Homicide. The
prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1)
Maria Castillo, Januario (the victim)'s wife; (2) Howel Umali (Umali),
who allegedly saw how Gatarin mauled Januario; (3) SPO3 Gregorio
G. Mendoza (SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw
Januario lying on the floor and Gatarin running away from the crime
scene, and testified on the dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr.
Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr. (Dr. Rasa), who attended to Januario when
he was brought to the hospital; and (5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel
(PO1 Coronel), who saw Gatarin running fast near the crime scene
and who, likewise, testified on Januario's ante mortem statement.
RTC RULING: Rendered a Decision against Gatarin. It gave
credence to the testimony of Maria Castillo not only as to the fact of
taking money from Januario but also the amount taken. The fact of
death was, likewise, found by the court to have been adequately
proven by the testimony of Dr. Rasa. Though there was no evidence
whether the unlawful taking preceded the killing of Januario, the court
held that there was direct and intimate connection between the two
acts. As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the
victim's response to SPO3 Mendoza's question as to who committed
the crime against him as part of the res gestae, which is an exception
to the hearsay rule. As to appellant's defense of alibi, the court gave
more weight to the prosecution's rebuttal evidence that indeed the
former was an actual resident of Mabini, Batangas.
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary, however, to the
RTC's conclusion, the appellate court considered Januario's
statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones who
stabbed him and took his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but
also as a dying declaration.
Page 39 of 65
ISSUE: Whether the utterances made by Januario is considered as
dying declaration and may be admissible as evidence?
RULING: NO, the utterances made by Januario is not considered
as dying declaration, yet it is admissible as evidence by
res gestate. In the case at bar, it appears that not all the
requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records,
no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to
Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the
consciousness of his impending death when he made the
statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, affixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must
be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death
and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on
death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by
Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration. 
However, even if Januario's utterances could not be appreciated as a
dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of
the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestaeis,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony. The requisites for admissibility of a
declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. When Januario
gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring
to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his
co-accused. At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle
that would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive
his identication of the assailant. His utterance about appellant and his
co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests Page 40 of 65
Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the Q Where did this happened? (sic) date and hour?
startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it
identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of A In barangay Lorenzo Tan, Tangub City at about 8:30 o'clock in the
Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the night on Oct. 1, 1982.
prosecution.
Q How many persons fired at you?


A There were four persons that gunned me.

Q Do you know anyone of the four that fired their guns at you?

• THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. A Yes, it is Lamber Tanaman who is from Lorenzo Tan, Tangub City.
NORBERTO TANAMAN alias LAMBER TANAMAN alias
LAMBERTO TANAMAN, VICTORIANO SEBIAL, PEDRO Q What was the reason why they gunned you down?
BULOCBULOC, ALFREDO BANAAG and GLICERIO
BANAAG, accused, NORBERTO TANAMAN alias LAMBER A Because he favored Luis Sebial when his cow was lost.
TANAMAN alias LAMBERTO TANAMAN, accused-
appellant. [G.R. No. L-71768. July 28, 1987.]-> Q What do you feel about your wounds, will you be saved.

A My wounds are serious and I have no chance (Translated during the

trial as 'I am not sure' t.s.n., Sept. 20, 1983, p. 143).
FACTS: The fatal shooting of Sgt. Romulo Bazar of the Philippine
Q Where are your wounds and injuries of your body?

Constabulary in the evening of October 1, 1982, at Barangay Lorenzo
A In my abdomen, at my back and in my breast.

Tan, Tangub City, while on his way home carrying 2 sacks of rice bran
Q Do you know what kind of firearms were used in firing at you? A
on his head, led to the filing of an Information for Murder on
They were using 45 caliber.

December 8, 1982 before the then Court of First Instance of Misamis
Q Do you have anything more to say and you will sign this?

Occidental (Crim. Case No. OZ-1585), later transferred to the
A No more, and I will sign.
Regional Trial Court at Tangub City (Crim. Case No. TC-039), against
Norberto Tanaman alias Lamber Tanaman, alias Lamberto Tanaman,
Witnesses:
Victoriano Sebial, Pedro Bulocbuloc, Alfredo Banaag, and Glicerio
Banaag. (SGD) FELIX CAMUNAY MSGT PC
 The victim's ante-mortem statement was taken by P/Lt. Osias
Dumanjug in the hospital in the latter's own handwriting and in the (SGD) ROMULO BAZAR
Visayan dialect which, translated into English reads as follows: 
(SGD) SINFORIANA R. DEL CASTILLO, M.D."
"Q. Why are you here now in the hospital?

A I was gunned down.

EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests Page 41 of 65
On the other hand, and as admitted in appellant's Brief, "the evidence the chest which was fatal as it involved the respiratory organ, one
for the defense consists chiefly of denial: that they were not above the umbilicus, and the other on the right hip bone. The
responsible for the shooting and killing of the deceased, who was shot physician who examined him in the hospital testified that, upon
and killed by unknown assailants.”  admission, his blood pressure was 60/40 and that the patient was in a
very serious condition. In fact, the victim's condition necessitated his
TRIAL COURT RULING: Convicting Norberto Tanaman of murder.  transfer from the Tangub City Emergency Hospital to the Ozamis City
Emergency Hospital for "further management." There he expired on
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Tanaman argues against its October 3, 1982 or two (2) days after the incident. There should be no
admissibility on the ground that it was not made under consciousness question either about the veracity of the ante-mortem statement. P/Lt.
of an impending death since the victim, in reply to the question "What Osias Dumanjug, the Station Commander, who took the same was a
do you feel about your wounds, will you be saved?" answered "my disinterested witness. He described in detail the manner in which he
wounds are serious and I am not sure.”  had taken down the statement in his own handwriting, the questions
he had propounded and the answers given by the victim, as well as
ISSUE: Whether Bazar’s utterances constitutes dying declaration and the latter's identification of the Appellant. Sgt. Felix Camunay, also
is admissible as evidence? confirmed in open Court that he witnessed the taking of the dying
declaration and saw the victim affix his signature. Considering that, as
RULING: YES, Bazar’s utterances constitutes dying declaration testified to by said witness, he was a "compadre" of Appellant 9 and
and is admissible as evidence. It is true that, in response to a that the latter was at one time an "asset" of the PC, and formerly a
question whether he would survive, the victim replied that "he member of the INP, there is every reason to believe that he would not
was not sure." However, for the validity of an ante-mortem testify against Appellant if his testimony were not, in fact, the truth.
statement, it is not indispensable that the declarant expressly
state that he has lost all hope of recovery. It is sufficient that 

circumstances are such as to inevitably lead to the conclusion
that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant would
not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. The
degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death
supervened thereafter constitute substantial evidence of the
victim's consciousness of his impending death. The victim was
shot from behind and the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery, therefore, existed. No other modifying circumstances
may be appreciated as treachery absorbs nocturnity. In fine, as
against the mere denials of Appellant, the ante-mortem statement
of the victim identifying his assailant, corroborated by other
evidence on record, satisfy the test of moral certainty and point
to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The seriousness of the victim's condition is shown by the fact that he

had suffered five (5) gunshot wounds, two (2) at the back, one (1) in
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SENEN OLA, defendant-appellant. [G.R. No. L-47147. July
3, 1987.] ->
FACTS: The accused-appellant Senen Ola, was charged before the
then Court of First Instance of Marinduque as the principal in the
crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and Unintentional Abortion
of Lolita Muhi punishable under the Revised Penal Code. His co-
accused, Jose Bustamante and Rustico Matimtim were charged only
as accomplices.
ISSUE: Whether the gesture made by the Lolita may be considered
as a dying declaration and is admissible as evidence?
RULING: NO, the gesture made by the Lolita will not be
considered as a dying declaration and is inadmissible as
evidence. Found the gesture of the dying woman too vague to be
given much probative value in determining the culpability of the
appellant. The disadvantage presented by this kind of evidence
is that, unlike an oral or a written declaration, a simple gesture of
the hand unaccompanied by words is open to various
interpretations by the witness who testifies to its existence. Such
an equivocal act of pointing with the hand does not in anyway
corroborate Bustamante's testimony on the identity of Ola as the
victim's assailant. Neither does it prove any other fact from
which his participation in the crime may be inferred. Whether this
piece of evidence exists in the record as a dying declaration or
hearsay evidence not objected to, the same shall be treated like
any other testimonial evidence. In the case before Us, the
witness Diosdado Muhi testified that after he asked the dying
victim for the identity of her assailant, she responded by pointing
to the direction which the witness referred to as "Ilaya." But that
is only one of a number of ways to interpret said gesture. Any
direction pointed out from inside an enclosure may refer to a
place as near as the next-door neighbor's house, or to
somewhere as far as the next barrio, for the obvious reason that
both may lie along the general direction indicated. And even if
Page 42 of 65
the witness' interpretation is adopted, it does not incriminate Ola
alone. All residents of that area lying in the direction of "Ilaya"
are thus, equally suspect.
Thus, the evidence comes to the courts couched in the witness'
second hand perception and possibly, imbued with his personal
meanings and biases. This is what makes hearsay evidence
objectionable. The second hand evidence is placed before the court
without the benefit of cross-examination by the party against whom it
is brought, nor of any other means for assessing the competence and
credibility of its source.LibLex
As a matter of exception to the Hearsay Rule, statements made by
the victim at the point of death which qualify as dying declarations
may be admitted by the courts (Rule 30, Sec. 31). It is not clear from
the decision under review whether the dying gesture was admitted as
a dying declaration. Without ruling on the admissibility of said
evidence as a dying declaration, We find that Even as a dying
declaration, it is not more sacred than the testimony of a witness
presented in court (People v. Aniel, G.R. No. L-34416, February 21,
1980, 96 SCRA 199, 211).
It becomes apparent that the reliance by the trial court upon the
circumstantial evidence cited in its decision as corroborative of
Bustamante's testimony was misplaced. This leaves Bustamante's
testimony standing alone as basis for Ola's conviction.
 Given the weak evidence presented by the prosecution on the
participation of the appellant Senen Ola in the crime of Attempted
Robbery with Homicide and Unintentional Abortion, reasonable doubt
sets in. The prosecution's failure to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence entitles the appellant Ola to an
ACQUITTAL.
Sec. 38.  Declaration against interest
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents. [G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996.] ->
FACTS: At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto
Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto
Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan
del Sur. Petitioner Alejandro Fuentes Jr called Malaspina and placed
his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you
with a long hair but now you have a short hair.” Suddenly, Fuentes
stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina
fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Fuentes
fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his
abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him. An
information for murder qualified by treachery was filed against
Fuentes.  Zoilo is inadmissible as evidence and is not an exception to the
RTC RULING: Found Fuentes guilty of murder qualified by treachery
and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00
and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.
CA RULING: Affirmed the judgment of the trial court
Fuentes would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes,
Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an
exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was
allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and
Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr.
Felicisimo testi ed that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay
San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in
"retaliation"; that he even showed him the knife he used and asked
his help in nding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working
out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day
however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that
petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.  statement. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why
Page 43 of 65
For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after
the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989,
petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo.
Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who
fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to
surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to
investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already
fled.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration against penal interest attributed to
Zoilo is inadmissible as evidence and is not an exception to the
hearsay rule?
RULING: YES,  the declaration against penal interest attributed to
hearsay rule. For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness
behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against
penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant
case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual
scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of
accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to
their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the
victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One
striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a
statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to
accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same
can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the
admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to
Wigmore, "shocking to the sense of justice." Let us assume that
the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis
acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo
was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his
admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing,
absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that
the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the
instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or
physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates.
His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso
facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the
defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can
break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and
his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed
Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any
serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be
misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the
real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing
the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have
every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that
the declarant himself is unable to testify.
• DANILO L. PAREL, petitioner, vs. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO,
respondent. [G.R. No. 146556. April 19, 2006.] ->
FACTS: On February 27, 1992, respondent Simeon Prudencio
(respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against petitioner Danilo Parel with the RTC Baguio alleging
that: he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No.
61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public
Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed
solely from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said house
in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the second floor of
said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner's parents,
Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and
occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was
Page 44 of 65
on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials;
when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975,
respondent allowed petitioner's parents and children to transfer and
temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as
petitioner's parents have no house of their own and since
respondent's wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner's father; in
November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to
vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he
needed the place to which petitioner's parents heeded when they
migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent's knowledge,
petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of respondent's house; petitioner's refusal to vacate the
house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the
instant action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked
petitioner for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every
month thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and
surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and cost of suit.
RTC RULING: Found the following matters as conclusive: that Parel's
father was an allocatee of the land on which the subject house was
erected, as one of the lowly-paid government employees at that time
when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave them the chance to construct
their own house on said reservation; that Prudencio failed to show
proof of any contract, written or oral, express or implied, that the late
Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as
mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole
ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was the one who
gathered the laborers for the construction of the house and paid their
salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between
respondent and petitioner's father, Florentino. Also, it did not give
credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents
showing the City Assessor's assessment of the property all in
respondent's name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring
the house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be
read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it
was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests Page 45 of 65
Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property's tax taxes on the house declared under his name since 1974. In fact,
assessment and Florentino, thought then that it should be the petitioner during his cross- examination admitted that there was
respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any
accepted for being hearsay. portion of the house in their name.   The theory under which
declarations against interest are received in evidence
ISSUE: Whether the document executed by Florentino (Parel’s father) notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the
is considered declaration against interest? occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and,
further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which
RULING: YES, the document executed by Florentino (Parel’s are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. 
father) is considered declaration against interest. The affiant,
Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner's father and had
adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his
statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that
while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the
owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing
in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have
made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his children's interests as his
heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably,
during Florentino's lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said
affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that
he had revoked such a davit even when a criminal complaint for
trespass to dwelling had been led by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house
which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence
showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter's will
and held that the remedy of respondent was to le an action for
ejectment; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was
subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent's action
should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court. Moreover, the building plan of the
residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of
respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner's
cross- examination that the existing structure of the two-storey
house was in accordance with said building plan.Notably,
respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• MARISSA R. UNCHUAN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J.P.
LOZADA, ANITA LOZADA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF CEBU CITY, respondents. [G.R. No. 172671. April 16,
2009.] ->
FACTS: Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada
Saribay were the registered co-owners of 2 lots in Cebu City.
The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their
nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada  under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a
Special Power of Attorney from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of
their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), Dr. Lozada agreed to
advance the purchase price of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for
Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later notarized and
authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office and new TCTs were
issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan
caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa
claimed that Anita donated an undivided share in the lots to her under
an unregistered Deed of DonationAntonio and Anita brought a case
against Marissa for quieting of title with application for preliminary
injunction and restraining order. Marissa filed an action to declare the
Deed of Sale void and to cancel the new TCTs.
At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated
sworn statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated
land in favor of Marissa.  appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides
RTC RULING: Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of
the properties in question and Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is
ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and Anita Lozada damages.
On motion for reconsideration by petitioner, the RTC issued an Order
dated April 5, 1999. Said order declared the Deed of Sale void,
ordered the cancellation of the new TCTs in Antonio’s name, and
directed Antonio to pay Marissa damages, P100,000 attorney’s fees
and P50,000 for expenses of litigation.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. On July 6, 2000, Presiding
Judge, the RTC reinstated the Decision dated June 9, 1997, but with
Page 46 of 65
the modification that the award of damages, and attorney’s were
disallowed.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
CA RULING: Affirmed with modification the July 6, 2000 Order of the
RTC.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Unchuan faults the appellate court for
not excluding the videotaped statement of Anita as hearsay evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the videotaped statement of Anita is a declaration
against interest?
RULING: NO,  the videotaped statement of Anita is an
admission. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility
of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
be produced. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay
evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of
demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. It is a hornbook
doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
maker did not take the witness stand. Verily, the sworn statement
of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to
affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not
cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita
that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been
settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions
against interest and declaration against interest. Admissions
against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by
one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party,
and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person
who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are
secondary evidence and constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
as a witness. Thus, a man’s acts, conduct, and
declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against
him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond
with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. However, as a
further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in
this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing
that it was a faithful reproduction. Lacking this, we are
constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of
Anita. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion
concerning petitioner’s failure to prove, by preponderant
evidence, any right to the lands subject of this case.
• ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband,
ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D. SANTOS; ADOLFO
SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES,
assisted by her husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.;
REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS , petitioners, vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA
AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL
A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO
AGUSTIN, respondents. [G.R. No. 152364. April 15, 2010.] -
> worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.
FACTS: On November 4, 1998, herein petitioners Alejandra Lazaro
filed against herein respondents Modesta Agustin a complaint for
partition with the MTCC of Laoag City. 
MTCC RULING: Dismissing the complaint and denying petitioners'
prayer for partition. It ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value
could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein
she purportedly acknowledged her co- ownership of the subject
property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the
Page 47 of 65
a ant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the
statements made in her a davit were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC
held that two credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and
straightforward manner that at the time the a davit was supposed to
have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Basilisa was
already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her hand
to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also gave credence to the
testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was
supposedly signed and sworn to, that the said a davit was already
complete and thumbmarked when the same was presented to him by
a person who claimed to be Basilisa.
RTC RULING: Affirming with modification, the judgment of the MTCC.
The RTC found that the house erected on the disputed lot was built
and renovated by petitioners in good faith. As a consequence, the
RTC held that petitioners were entitled to indemnity representing the
costs of the construction and renovation of the said house.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Lazaro contend that Basilisa's sworn
statement which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed
property is a declaration against interest which is one of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that
since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in
court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that
the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as
clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized
document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document
which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents
ISSUE: Whether Basilisa's sworn statement which was duly notarised
is a declaration against interest?
RULING: NO, Basilisa's sworn statement which was duly
notarised is an admission against interest. Indeed, there is a vital
distinction between admissions against interest and declarations
against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by
a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identi ed in legal
interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
declarant is available as a witness.15 Declarations against
interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in
privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible
only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 16 In the
present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-
interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the
former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed,
should be considered as an admission against interest. A
cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that
it refers to a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 10678 while
the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676.17 On this basis, it
cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being
referred to in the sworn statement is the same property claimed
by petitioners. Although the questioned sworn statement is a
public document having in its favor the presumption of
regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by
competent witnesses
Sec. 39.  Act or declaration about pedigree
• People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 154278, 27 December 2002
Sec. 40.  Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
Sec. 41.  Common reputation
Sec. 42.  Part of the res gestae
Page 48 of 65
• PEPITO CAPILA Y YRUMA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 146161. July 17,
2006.] -> 
FACTS: On August 24, 1993, an Information for robbery was led with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City, against petitioner
Pepito Capila y Yruma, his brother Bonifacio Capila y Yruma,
Deogenio Caparoso y Porfero, and Dimas dela Cruz y Lorena.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Rendered its Decision acquitting all the
accused, except Pepito.
CA RULING: Affirming the assailed judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether Dimas’ statement is considered res gestae?
RULING: YES, Dimas’ statement is considered res gestae. We are
in accord with the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that all the
requisites of the rule on res gestae are present. The principal act,
which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is
the robbery of which petitioner is being charged. Immediately
after the robbery, Dimas dela Cruz, the security guard then on
duty, informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators is herein
petitioner. Dimas likewise reported at once the incident to the
police and to the security agency. When questioned by SPO4
Maximo, Dimas, who was still shocked, named petitioner herein
as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo
were made before he had the time and opportunity to concoct
and contrive a false story. We note that Dimas personally knows
petitioner considering that both worked in the same security
agency and assigned in the same office. 
First. The principal act is a startling occurrence which is the robbery in
question.
Second. Dimas Dela Cruz informed the investigating officers that it
was appellant who robbed the Meralco o ce immediately after the
incident occurred and before he had the time to contrive a story. 
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
The robbery happened at around eight o'clock in the evening of
August 9, 1993 (p. 4, TSN, February 24, 1994). Immediately after the
incident, dela Cruz called up the police station (p. 17, TSN, January
31, 1994). In ten minutes, SPO4 Maximo and his companion were in
the Meralco o ce where they immediately conducted an investigation
(pp. 3-9, TSN, February 24, 1994). During this investigation, DELA
Cruz pointed to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Further, immediately after the robbers ed, dela Cruz informed Ariel
Arellano (the bank representative detailed at the Meralco o ce) that
appellant was one of those who robbed the office (pp. 15-17, TSN,
January 31, 1994). In other words, statement of dela Cruz was
spontaneous as correctly observed by the trial court.
Third. The statement of dela Cruz refers to the robbery or incident
subject matter of this case.
A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution relied
heavily on the testimony of SPO4 Maximo that immediately after the
incident, Dimas reported to him that one of the robbers is Pepito. The
Court of Appeals, in affirming the court a quo's judgment convicting
petitioner, ruled that Dimas' statement is part of the res gestae.
The rule on res gestae is provided under Section 42, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. — Statements made by a person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following
requisites must be met: (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement
Page 49 of 65
is made during the occurrence or immediately or subsequent thereto;
and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
 
• CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 163217. April 18,
2006.] ->
FACTS: Petitioner Celestino Marturillas was charged with homicide in
an Information 7 dated November 5, 1998, worded as follows: "[T]hat
on or about November 4 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople, thereby inflicting fatal
wound upon the latter which caused his death."
ISSUE: Whether Artemio’s statement also constitutes res gestae?
RULING: YES, Artemio’s statement also constitutes res
gestae. All these requisites are present in this case. The principal
act, the shooting, was a startling occurrence. Immediately after,
while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling
occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating Marturillas. Also, the
declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the
latter's statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res
gestae. Aside from the victim's statement, which is part of the
res gestae, that of Ernita — "Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang
akong bana?' ("Captain, why did you shoot my husband?") —
may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement
was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered
spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no
opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related
to the circumstances of the shooting.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA,
CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and
ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR , accused-
appellants. [G.R. No. 196735. May 5, 2014.]->
FACTS: On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the
Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they
were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and
lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his
injuries. A case was filed against several members of the Scintilla
Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla,
Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L.
Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,
Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and
Rodolfo Peñalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219.
Prosecution witnesses saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.
The men were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their
heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. A witness
positively identified Danilo Feliciano, Jr. as he was beating Venturina
up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit
Venturina. Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St.
Luke’s Hospital on December 8, 1994 and died two days later.
The defense employed the defense of alibi.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren
Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. It however, acquitted Reynaldo
Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano,
and Raymund Narag. 
Page 50 of 65
The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the
court until his apprehension.
CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether the bystanders’ statement is considered res gestae?
RULING: YES, the bystanders’ statement is considered res
gestae. Although admissible, have little persuasive value since
the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at
different vantage points and at different points in time. Even
Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack,
testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later
on, some remained masked and some were unmasked. When the
bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims
who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end
at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the
fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident,
therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of
the victims. According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer
Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the
bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the
attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be
evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae. There is
no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch
on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that
the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after
the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence
given in res gestae.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• JUANITO TALIDANO, petitioner, vs. FALCON MARITIME &
ALLIED SERVICES, INC., SPECIAL EIGHTH DIVISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND LABOR ARBITER ERMITA
C. CUYUGA, respondents. [G.R. No. 172031. July 14,
2008.] ->
FACTS: Petitioner Juanito Talidano was employed as a second
marine officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven. His 1-year contract of employment
commenced on 15 October 1996. He claimed that his chief officer, a
Korean, always discriminated and maltreated the Filipino crew. This
prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the
International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a measure that
allegedly was resented by the chief officer, which led to his dismissal
on 21 January 1997. But he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on
27 October 1999.
Falcon Maritime countered that Talidano had voluntarily disembarked
the vessel after having been warned several times of dismissal from
service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and insulting
attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving Talidano's
incompetence, as proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to
it on the date of incident, as well as a copy of the report of crew
discharge issued by the master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after
the incident.
LA RULING: In favour of Falcon Maritime.  THAT THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT OSAKA
NLRC RULING: Reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.  ORDER. CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL
CA RULING: Dismissed the appeal based on technicality.
Page 51 of 65
the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged
incident. In addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine
if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful
deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax
messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the
first kind. Neither will the verbal acts apply, the requisites are: (1)
the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the
equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement
must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a
legal significance to the equivocal act. Talidano’s alleged
absence from watch duty is simply a harmless act or at least
proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was
the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any
statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of
the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine
whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the
purported equivocal act. Furthermore, the material contents of
the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route encroachment
or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author
of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained
such information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily,
the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
The first fax message dated 18 January 1997 is reproduced below:
JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER
PORT. DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL
FROM JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP
IS INVADING OTHER ROUTE.

ISSUE: Whether the fax messages constitute as res gestae.  SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O NOT
CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.

RULING: NO, the fax messages does not constitute as res MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT
gestae. Assuming that Talidano's negligence — which allegedly HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID THAT HE
caused the ship to deviate from its course — is the startling WILL COME BACK HOME.
occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
LLB4302
FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE
SCALE.
 appellant. [G.R. No. 208749. November 26, 2014.] ->
MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US HIS REPATRIATION WITH
I.E.U.
PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING.
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a report
of crew discharge essentially containing the same information as the
first fax message.
Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts
which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements
and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the
startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the
statements accompanying the equivocal act. We find that the fax
messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the spontaneous statements, it is required
that: (1) the principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending circumstances.


Page 52 of 65
• PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, accused-
FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision 1 dated March 25, 2013
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05374, which
upheld the Decision 2 dated November 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City (stationed in Taguig City), Branch 69, in
Criminal Case No. 139521, convicting Anecito Estibal y Calungsag
(accused-appellant) of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A (2), in
relation to Article 266-B (5) (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 3 and in further relation to
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 8369.
The accusatory portion of the Information for rape against the
accused-appellant filed on February 6, 2009 reads: That on or about
the 5th day of February, 2009 in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while taking advantage of his moral authority and
ascendancy and with his intention to gratify his sexual desire upon his
daughter [AAA], by means of force, violence and intimidation did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will and consent, the said crime
having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationship
and minority, as the said accused being the natural father of the
victim, a thirteen (13)[-]year[-]old, a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, which is aggravated by the circumstances of
abuse of superior strength and dwelling, all to the damage and
prejudice of the said victim [AAA].
RTC RULING: Considered the spontaneity of the declarations made
by AAA as confirmed by PO3 Cobardo as part of the res gestae, and
convicted the accused-appellant.
CA RULING: Affirmed the RTC ruling.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
ISSUE: Whether AAA’s statements constitutes res gestae?
RULING: NO, AAA’s statements does not constitutes res
gestae. AAA's statements to the barangay tanod and the police
do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of the missing
element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time
between the rape and the declarations which afforded her
sufficient opportunity for reflection. AAA's revelation to DDD and
BBB set off an inexorable chain of events that led to the arrest of
the accused-appellant. There is no doubt, however, that there
was nothing spontaneous, unre ected or instinctive about the
declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanod and later
that night to the police. Her statements were in fact a re-telling of
what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that
afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the
police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve,
exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put
behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities
precisely because she was seeking their help to punish the
accused-appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about
her so-called res gestae narrations, even as it is remarkable to
note that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police,
her father was already being held in detention, and the
investigation was conducted exactly to determine if there was a
basis to hold him for trial for rape.  It is obvious that AAA had by
then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother,
whose own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so
emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her
fear of her father.
 
Sec. 43.  Entries in the course of business
Page 53 of 65
• BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR., petitioner, vs. MICHAELMAR
PHILS., INC. and MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES,
INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 169606. November 27, 2009.] -
>
FACTS: Respondent Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the
Philippine agent of Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an
undertakingdated 2 July 2002 and an employment contract dated 4
July 2002, MSSI through MPI engaged the services of petitioner
Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T Limar. On 8 October
2002, a random drug test was conducted on all officers and crew
members of M/T Limar at the port of Curacao. Jose, Jr. was found
positive for marijuana. Jose, Jr. was informed about the result of his
drug test and was asked if he was taking any medication. Jose, Jr.
said that he was taking Centrum vitamins. Later on, after the random
drug test was conducted, Jose, Jr. was repatriated to the Philippines.
When Jose, Jr. arrived in the Philippines, he asked MPI that a drug
test be conducted on him. MPI ignored his request. On his own, Jose,
Jr. procured drug tests from Manila Doctors Hospital, 12 S.M. Lazo
Medical Clinic, Inc., 13 and Maritime Clinic for International Services,
Inc. He was found negative for marijuana.
Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI for
illegal dismissal with claim for his salaries for the unexpired portion of
the employment contract.
LA RULING: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
NLRC RULING: Set aside the Labor Arbiter's 18 June 2003 Decision.
The NLRC held that Jose, Jr.'s dismissal was illegal and ordered MPI
and MSSI to pay Jose, Jr. his salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract.
CA RULING: Set aside the 19 January and 22 March 2004
Resolutions of the NLRC and reinstated the 18 June 2003 Decision of
the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether all the requisites to establish it under Section 43 ,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is present?
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
RULING: YES, all the requisites to establish it under Section 43 ,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is present. In Canque v. Court of
Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for admission in
evidence of entries in the course of business which were found
in the instant case: 1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the
entries were made near the time the random drug test was
conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to know the facts
made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his
professional capacity and in the performance of his duty; and (5)
the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty. The fact that the drug test result is unsigned
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was
not found positive for marijuana.
In the present case, the following facts are established (1)
random drug tests are regularly conducted on all officers and
crew members of M/T Limar; (2) a random drug test was
conducted at the port of Curacao on 8 October 2002; (3) Dr.
Heath was the authorized physician of M/T Limar; (4) the drug
test result of Jose, Jr. showed that he was positive for marijuana;
(5) the drug test result was issued under Dr. Heath’s name and
contained his handwritten comments. 
Page 54 of 65
was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries
were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty;
and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
The Court of Appeals found that: The tests administered to the crew
were routine measures of the vessel conducted to enforce its stated
policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued
and released by the medical officer. The ship’s physician at Curacao
under whom the tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It
was under his name and with his handwritten comments that the
report on the respondent came out, and there is no basis to suspect
that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his
duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in
itself and does not require additional supporting evidence except if it
appears that the drug test was conducted not in accordance with drug
testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has even been
suggested in this particular case. 



Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of Appeals’ ruling is violative of
any law or jurisprudence. Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
states: SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made
at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.

In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for
admission in evidence of entries in the course of business: (1) the
person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to
testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made the entry
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
•  LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
MONET'S EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORP.,
VICENTE V. TAGLE, SR. and MA. CONSUELO G. TAGLE,
respondents. [G.R. No. 184971. April 19, 2010.] ->
FACTS: On June 25, 1981 petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank) and respondent Monet's Export and Manufacturing
Corporation (Monet) executed an Export Packing Credit Line
Agreement (Agreement) under which the bank gave Monet a credit
line of P250,000.00, secured by the proceeds of its export letters of
credit, promissory notes, a continuing guaranty executed by
respondent spouses Vicente V. Tagle, Sr. and Ma. Consuelo G. Tagle
(the Tagles), and a third-party mortgage executed by one Pepita C.
Mendigoria. Land Bank renewed and amended this credit line
agreement several times until it reached a ceiling of P5 million.
Land Bank claims that by August 31, 1992 Monet's obligation under
the Agreement had swelled to P11,464,246.19. Since Monet failed to
pay despite demands, the bank led a collection suit against Monet
and the Tagles before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 1 In
their answer, Monet and the Tagles claimed that Land Bank had
refused to collect the US$33,434.00 receivables on Monet's export
letter of credit against Wishbone Trading Company of Hong Kong
while making an unauthorized payment of US$38,768.40 on its import
letter of credit to Beautilike (H.K.) Ltd. This damaged Monet's
business interests since it ran short of funds to carry on with its usual
business. In other words, Land Bank mismanaged its client's affairs
under the Agreement.
RTC RULING: Rendered a decision that, among other things,
recognized Monet and the Tagles' obligations to Land Bank in the
amount reflected in Exhibit 39, the bank's Schedule of Amortization
from its Loans and Discount Department, but sans any penalty. The
RTC ordered petitioners to pay Land Bank the same.
CA RULING: Rendered judgment on October 9, 2003, affirming the
RTC decision.
Page 55 of 65
ISSUE: Whether there is a need to present the Consolidated Billing
Statement?
RULING: YES, there is a need to present the Consolidated Billing
Statement.But a bank statement, properly authenticated by a
competent bank officer, can serve as evidence of the status of
those accounts and what Monet and the Tagles still owe the
bank. Under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries
prepared in the regular course of business are prima facie
evidence of the truth of what they state. The billing statement
reconciles the transaction entries entered in the bank records in
the regular course of business and shows the net result of such
transactions. Entries in the course of business are accorded
unusual reliability because their regularity and continuity are
calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision.
If the entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and
audited. In actual experience, the whole of the business world
function in reliance of such kind of records. 
In reverting back to Exhibit 39, which covers just one of many
promissory notes that Monet and the Tagles executed in favor of Land
Bank, the RTC and the CA have shown an unjusti ed obstinacy and a
lack of understanding of what the Court wanted done to clear up the
issue of how much Monet and the Tagles still owed the bank.
The bank lawyer who claimed that Land Bank had no further evidence
to present during the hearing was of course in error and it probably
warranted a dismissal of the bank's claim for failure to prosecute. But
the bank's motion for reconsideration, asking for an opportunity to
present evidence of the status of the loans, opened up a chance for
the RTC to abide by what the Court required of it. It committed error,
together with the CA, in ruling that a reopening of the hearing would
serve no useful purpose. 
The CA of course places no value on the Consolidated Billing
Statement that Land Bank would have adduced in evidence had the
RTC granted its motion for reconsideration and reopened the hearing.
Apparently, both courts believe that Land Bank needed to present in
evidence all original documents evidencing every transaction between
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
Land Bank and Monet to prove the current status of the latter's loan
accounts.  those records contained, his testimony was hearsay evidence
 

Sec. 44.  Entries in official records
• HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA
G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner, vs.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., respondent. [G.R. No. 162243.
December 3, 2009.] ->
FACTS: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA.
PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against
then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to
sign andexecute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has
complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion
of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of
PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the
trial
court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document
signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP
ISSUE: Whether Section 44 may be invoked to excuse the testimony
of SFMS Evangelista?
RULING: NO, Section 44 may be invoked to excuse the testimony
of SFMS Evangelista. The presentation of the records themselves
would, therefore, have been admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule even if the public officer/s who prepared them was/
were not presented in court, provided the above requisites could
be adequately proven. In the case at bar, however, neither the
records nor the persons who prepared them were presented in
court. Thus, the above requisites cannot be su ciently proven.
Page 56 of 65
Also, since SFMS Evangelista merely testified based on what
twice removed, which was one step too many to be covered by
the official-records exception to the hearsay rule. SFMS
Evangelista's testimony of nonpayment of forest charges was,
furthermore, based on his failure to  find official receipts
corresponding to billings sent to PICOP. As stated above, PICOP
attached official receipts in its Addendum to Motion for
Reconsideration to this Court. While this course of action is
normally irregular in judicial proceedings, we merely stated in
the assailed Decision that "the DENR Secretary has adequately
proven that PICOP has,at this time, failed to comply with
administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of
TLA No. 43 into an IFMA”, and that "this disposition confers
another chance to comply with the foregoing requirements”. In
view of the foregoing, we withdraw our pronouncement that
PICOP has unpaid forestry charges, at least for the purpose of
determining compliance with the IFMA requirements. 
SFMS Evangelista, while not relying on the Memoranda of Orlanes
and Arayan, nevertheless relied on records, the preparation of which
he did not participate in.78 These records and the persons who
prepared them were not presented in court, either. As such, SFMS
Evangelista's testimony, insofar as he relied on these records, was on
matters not derived from his own perception, and was, therefore,
hearsay.
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which speaks of entries in
official records as an exception to the hearsay rule, cannot excuse the
testimony of SFMS Evangelista. Section 44 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a public o cer of the Philippines, or
by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, 79 we enumerated the following requisites for the
admission of entries in o cial records as an exception to the hearsay
rule: (1) the entries were made by a public o cer or a private person in
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
the performance of a duty; (2) the performance of the duty is
especially enjoined by law; (3) the public o cer or the private person
had su cient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.


• THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C.
AFRICA and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-
appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.) INC., MATEO BOQUIREN
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-
appellees. [G.R. No. L-12986. March 31, 1966.] ->
FACTS: On March 18, 1948 in the afternoon, a fire broke out at the
Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire
spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the
personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among
them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and
Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the
second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of
both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and CA found petitioners failed to prove negligence.
ISSUE: Whether reports submitted by (1) the fire department and (2)
police officer may properly be considered as an exception to the
hearsay rule?
RULING: The reports submitted by the fire department is not an
exception to the hearsay rule, while the ones submitted by the police
officer may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
Page 57 of 65
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
(1) The material facts recited in the reports of fire department, as to
the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal
knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official
information? As to some facts the sources thereof are not even
identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an
employee at the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores,
driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at
the time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent
Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V- Africa, give
any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as
"official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the
reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give
such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting
officers through official information, not having been given by the
informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
(2) The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in
the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal
observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an
exception to the hearsay rule


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. , petitioner, vs. RODELIO
ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
respondents. [G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012.]->
FACTS: At around 5 o'clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an
accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati
City, involving four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by
Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker with
plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate number
PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732. 4
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan Insurance
issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the
aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability, own
damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against
such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated October
18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured
amounting to PhP700,000.  requisites could be adequately proved. Here, there is no dispute
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of
the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter,
Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents
Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the
registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo
Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured.
When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance
was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence
against respondents. 7
RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared
respondents liable for damages
CA RULING: Reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court
and ruled in favor of respondents
Page 58 of 65
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Malayan Insurance contends that,
even without the presentation of the police investigator who prepared
the police report, said report is still admissible in evidence, especially
since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation
in evidence. 16 Respondents counter that since the police report was
never confirmed by the investigating police officer, it cannot be
considered as part of the evidence on record.
ISSUE: Whether the police report conformed with the requisites of
Section 44?
RULING: NO, the police report lacked the third requisite of
Section 44. Nonetheless, the police report is still admissible in
evidence, since the respondents failed to make a timely
objection to the police report's presentation in evidence; thus,
they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. Notably, the
presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who
prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above
that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the
report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However,
what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient
personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus,
the third requisite is lacking.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, 23 this Court reiterated the requisites
for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule
of entries in o cial records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a
public o cer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public o cer in the performance of his or
her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public o cer or other person
had su cient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must
have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or
through official information.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
Sec. 45.  Commercial lists and the like
• PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION,
respondents. [G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998.]->
FACTS: On the morning of September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia
XV (of the private respondent) was navigating the waters near
Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila when it collided with the vessel “Petroparcel”, owned at that
time by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).The Board of Marine
Inquiry found the Petroparcel at fault for the collision and based on
this and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private respondent
sued LSC and Petroparcel captain Edgardo Doruelo for actual and
compensatory damages. During the pendency of the proceedings,
PNOC Shipping Transport Corporation acquired ownership of
Petroparcel and replaced LSC in the trial.
CFI RULING: Ruled in favor of private respondent, awarding it: the
sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with
interest of 6% per annum; P50,000 attorney’s fees and the cost of
suit. The basis of said amount was the testimony of the general
manager of Maria Efigenia Fishin Corporation,Edilberto del Rosario
and several documentary evidence that included: ownership
certificate, price quotations, and invoices issued at the request of Del
Rosario. It also ruled that PNOC-STC was unable to contest such
evidence with only the testimony of its senior estimator Lorenzo
Lazaro as sole witness and without any documentary evidence.
CA RULING: Affirmed the CFI decision ruling that where a lower court
is confronted with evidence which appears to be of doubtful
admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather
than of non-admissibility.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued, among other things, that the
documents were not sufficient evidence to support the extent and
actual damages incurred by private respondent. The price quotations
Page 59 of 65
were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not
have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither
was he an expert on the subjects thereof.

CA argued that the documents were sufficient and exempt from the
hearsay rule as they are part of “commercial lists” defined in sec.45
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence in so far as they fall under
the “or other published compilation” phrase of the rule.

Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements
of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained
in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein.
ISSUE: Whether the documents fall under the exception to the
hearsay evidence rule under sec. 45 rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence 
RULING: NO, the documents does not fall under the exception to
the hearsay evidence rule under sec. 45 rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. The documents presented by private
respondent were regarded as hearsay evidence. Del Rosario
could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as he
was not the author of them. He can only testify as to facts of his
personal knowledge. As such, the price quotations were
considered ordinary private writings which under the Revised
Rules of Court should be proffered along with the testimony of
the writers thereof. One of the exemptions to the hearsay
evidence rule under Sec.37-47 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence is “commercial lists”. However, the quotations do
not fall under “other published compilation” mentioned in the
said exemption as they are not published in any list, register,
periodical, or other compilation. They are also not standard
handbooks or periodicals containing data of everyday
professionals need and relied upon in the work of occupation.
They are merely letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
Sec. 46.  Learned treatises
Sec. 47.  Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
• REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA
(substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR.,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs),
IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted
by his heirs), respondents. ->
FACTS: On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
led a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L.
Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated
the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless
Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which
shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for
themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
organized, bene cially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos. 4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present
petition.Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was not
impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009. 5
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, 6 among
them, Civil Case No. 0130. 7 The present respondents were not made
parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
ISSUE: Whether the admission of Bane’s deposition may be used
invoking Section 47?
Page 60 of 65
RULING: YES, the admission of Bane’s deposition may be used
invoking Section 47. For the admission of a former testimony or
deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply
requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or
unable to testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that
was taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify
dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in open
court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the
deponent's inability to attend or testify, as follows: (3) that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours] The phrase
"unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to appear at the
witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence
notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the
Philippines," which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction 128 — the
petitioner's excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in open
court — may still constitute inability to testify under the same
rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this
instance of unavailability will always be upheld.Where the
deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to
accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be
rejected in evidence.
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a
former proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this
testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The
witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were
testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere
hearsay. The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also
inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan's reliance on the Bane deposition in the
other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the
requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present
case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
no basis to presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous
condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains
and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another
case or proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the
same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition,
in principle, being necessity, the burden of establishing its existence
rests on the party who seeks the admission of the evidence. This
burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the
previous condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the
non-presentation of the deponent in court.
 
7. Opinion rule


Sec. 48.  General rule
Sec. 49.  Opinion of expert witness
• EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 187246. July 20,
2011.]->
FACTS: Edwin Tabao (petitioner) seeks reconsideration of our
Resolution, dated June 8, 2009, denying his petition for review on
certiorari for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed Court
of Appeals (CA) decision to warrant the exercise of this Court's
discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual
issues. DCATHS
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts:
At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving
his Toyota Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor
Page 61 of 65
Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly
ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was
crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown
into the middle of the road on her back.1 Thereafter, Leonardo
Mendez' speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number
PES-764 ran over Rochelle's body. Bystanders — armed with stones
and wooden clubs — followed Mendez' car until it stopped near the
Nagtahan Flyover.2 Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy,
pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside
Mendez' car, sat beside him, got his driver's license, and ordered him
to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit
the center island twice while backing up. 3 Cielo went out of the car
and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner
brought Rochelle's body inside Mendez' car. The three of them (the
petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital, 4
where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to
traumatic injuries. Both the RTC and CA convicted Tabao of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Tabao likewise claims that the CA
violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court when it
disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector
Danilo Cornelio who testified that the petitioner's car could not have
bumped the victim because the latter's body was not thrown in line
with the car, but on its side. The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp.
Cornelio is highly qualified in the  field of traffic accident investigation,
and as such, his statements are "backed-up by [the] principles of
applied physics, engineering, and mathematics."
ISSUE: Whether P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s statement may be considered
as an expert witness?
RULING: NO, P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s statement may not be
considered as an expert witness. The SC emphasize that P/Sr.
Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his
testimony was merely based on the Traffic Accident Report
prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness the
incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio's testimony
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been
involved in the incident. From the foregoing, it is clear that P/Sr.
Insp. Cornelio did not discount the possibility that the victim
could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that
the location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would
also depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the
opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence. The use of the word "may" signifies that the use
of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on
the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that
courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The
testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been
presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to
assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for
the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the
attendant facts and the applicable law.
• NOEL CASUMPANG, RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA and SAN
JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL, petitioners, vs. NELSON
CORTEJO, respondent. [G.R. No. 171127. March 11,
2015.] ->
FACTS: Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer
Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain,
stomach pain, and fever.
Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined
Edmer.
Page 62 of 65
Based on these initial examinations and the chest x-ray test that
followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia."[7]
Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of
administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an
antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune
Care card and was thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr.
Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited with Fortune Care.
At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first
time examined Edmer in his room. Using only a stethoscope, he
confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia.” Mrs. Cortejo
recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She
immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and
had no colds or cough[10] but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her
son's “blood pressure is just being active,"[11] and remarked that
"that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."
Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the
morning the following day.
Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in
Edmer's sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr.
Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and
reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is... bronchopneumonia.
At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited
"phlegm with blood streak"[15] prompting the respondent (Edmer's
father) to request for a doctor at the nurses' station.
Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one
of the resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although
aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed
to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it...
away. She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for
examination. Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering
Edmer's head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes
that were not typical of dengue fever.
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon
seeing Dr. Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood
specimen, and reported that Edmer had complained of severe
stomach pain and difficulty in moving his right leg. Dr. Miranda then
examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted that he was
bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, she
inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his stomach
with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an  instruction not to
pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral medication. Thereafter
conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative...
ordered the monitoring of the patient's blood pressure and some
blood tests. Edmer's blood pressure was later found to be normal.
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his
clinic and told him about Edmer's condition. Dr. Casumpang ordered
several procedures done including: hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood
typing, blood transfusion  and tourniquet tests. The blood test results
came at about 6:00 in the evening.
Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results
showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever."
Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he recommended his
transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent...
consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to
the respondent that they hire a private nurse. The respondent,
however, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the
last time, checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood pressure
was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable."
The respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that
the driver was nowhere to be... found. This prompted him to hire a
private ambulance that cost him P600.00. At 12:00 midnight, Edmer,
accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was transferred
Page 63 of 65
to Makati Medical Center. Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the
attending physician the patient's clinical history and laboratory exam
results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed
"Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.[24] His Death
Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic Shock/
hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."... the
respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its
attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda (collectively
referred to as the "petitioners”) before the RTC of Makati City.
RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of the respondent... the RTC found
untenable the petitioning doctors' contention that Edmer's initial
symptoms did not indicate dengue fever. It faulted them for heavily
relying on the chest x-ray result and for not considering the other...
manifestations that Edmer's parents had relayed.
CA RULING: Affirmed RTC ruling. The doctors' failure to read even
the most basic signs of "dengue fever" expected of an ordinary doctor
constitutes as medical negligence.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: petitioners tried to discredit Dr.
Jaudian’s expert testimony on the ground that he lacked the proper
training and fellowship status in pediatrics.
ISSUE: Whether Dr Jaudian is qualified as an expert witness?
RULING: YES, Dr Jaudian is qualified as an expert witness. In the
case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is
competent to testify on the standard of care in dengue fever
cases. Although he specializes in pathology, it was established
during trial that he had attended not less than 30 seminars held
by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been
practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than
50 dengue related cases. As a licensed medical practitioner
specializing in pathology, who had practical and relevant
exposure in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are
EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
convinced that Dr. Jaudian demonstrated sufficient familiarity
with the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever cases.
Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge and
experience sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on
the subject. The competence of an expert witness is a matter for
the trial court to decide upon in the exercise of its discretion. The
test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon
the subject matter of the investigation, and the tness of the
expert witness.  In our jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be
the expert witness’ special knowledge experience and practical
training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical medical
matters to the Court.  question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity,


• BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, represented by Attorney-in-
Fact, MINDA G. ROSALES (now represented by her new
Attorney-in-Fact, GARY LLOYD G. ROSALES), petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO and
JOSEPHINE S. GARABATO, respondents. [G.R. No.
200013. January 14, 2015.]->
FACTS: This case pertains to a Deed of Sale over a parcel land in
Pasay City, originally owned by Spouses Eduviges and Nick Garbo. In
March 1977, Eduviges, with the supposed consent and signature of
Nick, sold said lot to their daughter, Florence. Florence registered the
property in her name in October 1996. In 1996, Florence sold said lot
to respondents Spouses Garabato. Thereafter, Eduviges, Nick and
Florence died.
Petitioner Betty Gepulle-Garbo, Nick’s second wife after the death of
Eduviges in 1978, alleges that the sale between Eduviges and
Florence in March 1977 was void as Eduviges’ and Nick’s signatures
therein were forged. To support her allegation, petitioner presented
Page 64 of 65
the report and testimony of a document examiner of the National
Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUE: Whether there is a need for an opinion of a handwriting expert
in this case?
RULING: NO, there is no need for an opinion of a handwriting
expert in this case. The opinion of handwriting experts are not
necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function being
to place before the court data upon which the court can form its
own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the
which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens
of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing
ones.  A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must
conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature
in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.  Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did
not explain the manner of examination of the specimen
signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained observer.
The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not bound by expert
testimonies especially that the examination was upon the
initiative of Nick and Betty and they had complete control on
what documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI.
Betty, in coming before us, had the onus of showing that the
signatures were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her
case fell within the limited exceptions for disturbing
conclusiveness of factual findings of lower courts. 


EVIDENCE FEB 27 ASSIGNMENT Secs 25-51, Rule 130 Digests
• NILO B. ROSIT, petitioner, vs. DAVAO DOCTORS
HOSPITAL and DR. ROLANDO G. GESTUVO,
respondents. [G.R. No. 210445. December 7, 2015.] ->
FACTS: Petitioner Noli Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident where
he fractured his jaw. He was referred to respondent Dr. Rolando
Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries, who operated on Rosit.
As the operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo
cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr. Gestuvo knew that
there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so
inform Rosit supposing that the latter would not be able to afford the
same.
Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his
mouth and was in pain. Xrays showed that his jaw was aligned by the
screws used on him touched his molar. Dr. Gestuvo referred Rosit to
Dr. Pangan, a dentist who then opined that another operation is
necessary and that it is to be performed in Cebu. Rosit went to Cebu
and underwent the operation successfully.
On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded the Dr. Gestuvo reimburse
him for the cost of the operation and the expenses incurred in Cebu
amounting to P140,000. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay. Thus, Rosit filed
a civil case for damages. RTC adjudged Dr. Gestuvo negligent
holding that res ipsa loquitur principle applies, thus, expert medical
testimony may be dispensed with because the injury itself provides
the proof of negligence. CA reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether there is no need for an expert testimony when the
res ipsa locitur doctrine is applicable?
RULING: YES,  there is no need for an expert testimony when the
res ipsa locitur doctrine is applicable. In this case, the essential
requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
are present. The first element was sufficiently established when
Rosit proved that one of the screws installed by Dr. Gestuvo
struck his molar. An average man of common intelligence would
know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a
screw would cause severe pain. Anent the second element, it is
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sufficient that the operation which resulted in the screw hitting
Rosit’s molar was, indeed, performed by Dr. Gestuvo. Lastly, the
third element, it was not shown that Rosit’s lung disease could
have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he suffered
because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit’s
molar. Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds
application in the instant case and no expert testimony is
required to establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
To establish medical negligence, the Court has held that an expert
testimony is generally required to define the standard of behaviour by
which the court may determine whether the physician has properly
performed the requisite duty toward the patient. But, although
generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits
to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. The exception may be availed of if the following
requisites concur:
1. The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent
2. The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured


Sec. 50.  Opinion of ordinary witnesses
8. Character evidence
Sec. 51.  Character evidence not generally admissible;  exceptions