Two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
making.
BELGICA vs. OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Justice Bernabe
FACTS:
HISTORY”: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a
term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of the Legislature
(“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has
also come to refer to certain funds to the
Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can
be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of
1922), the Support for Local Development
Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao
Development Fund and Visayas Development
Fund and later the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino
presidency, and the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph
Estrada administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present
Benigno Aquino III administrations.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically
associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of Congress, the present cases and the
recent controversies on the matter have, however,
shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to
include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund.
Recently, or in July of the present year, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an
entire decade.
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S.
Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of
even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional xxxxx in
whatever form and by whatever name it may be
called, and from approving further releases
pursuant thereto. The Alcantara Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco
Antonious Beda B. Belgica, xxxx filed an Urgent
Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," xxxxx and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The Malampaya Funds was created as a special
fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 910, issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. Petitioners
contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used.
ISSUE (based on the syllabus):
Whether or not Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power since
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioners’
submissions.
Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court
to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the
same section and thus, construe the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to other
purposes related "to energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."
While the designation of a determinate or
determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to
exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling
up the details of the law for its enforcement,
known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation, referred to as contingent rule-
making.
TWO (2) FUNDAMENTAL TESTS
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure
that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
making are indeed adequate. The first test is
called the "completeness test." Case law states
that a law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand,
the second test is called the "sufficient standard
test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative
policy, and identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented.
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law. That the subject phrase
may be confined only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government" under the principle
of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include – or
be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of
the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first,
the phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class
and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory
reference of specific things from which the
general phrase "for such other purposes" may be
limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts
the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and,
third, the Executive department has, in fact, used
the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is
limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
government."
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have
passed the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is clearly deducible from its
text, the phrase "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law
should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as
it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to
finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
government," remains legally effective and
subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase
is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds
would be used – as it should be used – only in
accordance with the avowed purpose and
intention of PD 910.