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The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to
inflict revenge for the following reasons:
On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the
household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman.
Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was mortally
wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread among the Constabulary that the Police who
shot Macasinag was back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead. There were
also rumors that the said shooting was ordered.
On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks
through a window (the saw out the window bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were
organized in groups under the command of their sergeants and corporals. They attacked some
Manila policemen in these specific instances:
On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an American
Policeman and his friend.
The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer-by, causing a death and wounding
most of the passengers.
While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. Wichman
(asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty for the crime of sedition?

Yes, the accused are guilty for the crime of sedition.
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The
trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been
committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act
No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two
armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of
section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it
applies. In one scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.


Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act
No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two
armed bodies of the Philippine Government.

Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the
persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the
Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.


The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the
crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before
different judges of first instance.
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E.
Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caña, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but
later, after the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty
were permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the
prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventy-seven confession of the defendants,
introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made
by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The prosecution
further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.

We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5,
paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined
in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each
of the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña,
Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero,
Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway,
Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto
Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano,
Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis,
Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo
Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caña, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde,
Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto,
Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial
Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda,
Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to
suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private
Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window through which the defendants passed from
Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente
Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to
suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the
costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to
suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the
costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable exercise of the discretion which the law
reposes in him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent
observations found in the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the
closed of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey said:
Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so
villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this
case with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292,
imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate with the
enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military
sciences which is worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to
themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the means furnished to them by the
Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by force and violence
and outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous
attack upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila.
Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting
these same defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose
penalties in this case, yet it is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one
seventy-seventh of the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.



NATURE OF THE CASE: The violation of oaths of allegiance, and kindred crimes provided for in
Act 292, United States Philippine Commission which included in the general terms "treason and
sedition" in the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.

Defendant was charged for violation of:
Section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission, which is as follows: "Any
person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer of the Army of the United
States, or before any officer under the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands, whether such
official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in which oath
the affiant in substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United
States of America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the
laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall,
after the passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of such oath or any of such terms
or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."cralaw virtua1aw


The defendant was convicted of the crime of treason notwithstanding the fact he is a former
insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of amnesty but there is no
evidence in the record showing that it was committed pursuant to orders issued by the enemies
or political dissensions but falls within "offenses of treason and sedition”. virtua1aw library
The defendant is found by the court below to have violated the oath was that of denying to an
officer of the United States Army the existence of certain rifles, which had been concealed by his
orders at the time of his surrender in April, 1901, and of the existence and whereabouts of which
he was cognizant at the time of the denial.
It was probably also an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United
States, giving them aid and comfort, and if the element of breach of promise is to be regarded
as merely an incidental circumstance forming no part of the essence of the crime of violation of
oaths of allegiance, the offense in this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered by
the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted under another name.

Whether or not the defendant is entitled to amnesty for treasonable acts contemplated by
Amnesty Proclamation dated July 4, 1902.


The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation, and upon filing in this court the
prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the respondent court with directions that he be

(4) Pp vs Hadji
GR L-12686 24Oct1963

The herein defendant, together with two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out
to look for two men whom they suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of the
followers of the defendant. The search ended when the defendant and his companions chanced
upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering
vines. Thereupon, threatening to kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with them, Kamlon and his
companions seized the pair and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that time,
Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his captives the
reason for their abduction, and, although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or
responsibility for the disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their
protestations of innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.
Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. They were ordered by Kamlon, their
hands were then tied to the roof by Ulluh. Thus seated and with their hands tied to the roof,
Kamlon leveled his automatic carbine at Jamalul Alling and fired, killing him instantly. Kamlon
then ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead man whereupon Ulluh, with a barong or native
bolo, did as he was bidden. Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his
vinta by the shore and paddled out far into the sea. When he returned, he no longer had with
him his gruesome load.

Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he imposed on Jamalul Alling.
Instead, Ajibun was conducted back to Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his
alleged participation in the disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must have caused
Kamlon to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at its end.

Whether or not the petitioners committed sedition.

No, the Court rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common offenses
of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Murder and other acts
of violence were absorbed by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed
in furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that reason,
were consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for political ends. In the
prosecution at bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes no
allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for
on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or social color, but
purely motivated by personal vengeance."

Defendant contend that the length of time which intervened between the actual commission of
the crime charged and the filing of the same in the trial court — a period of 21 months —
attests to the unreliability of the prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who testified
for the government did actually witness the defendant commit the murder, they would have
forthwith reported the incident to the authorities and this case would have been filed sooner. It
is vigorously impressed on the delay betrays the truthfulness of the case for the prosecution.

sedition is not the same offense as murder.

kidnapping complexed with murder

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of therespondent judge
directing petitioners to amend the information filed in criminal case No 9414 of the CFI of
Camarines Sur entitled, People of the Philippines versus Eligio Orbita, so as to include as
defendants Governor Armando Cledera and Assistant Provincial Warden Jose Esmeralda of
Camarines Sur. In said case, Orbita, a provincial Guard, was prosecuted for infidelity in the
custody of a prisoner for the escape of detention prisoner, Pablo Denaque, in the course of the
trial, the defense alleged that Esmeralda received a written note from Gov. Cledera asking him to
send in the prisoners which party included Denaque, who was then under the custody of Orbita,
to his house in Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur to work in the construction which made
Denaque escape possible, and thus, Esmeralda and Gov. Cledera should be equally guilty of the
offense with Orbita.

Whether or not respondent Judge erred in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda
with Orbita for the escape of Pablo Denaque


The respondent judge erred in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda with Orbita for
the escape of Pablo Denaque. Decision annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge directed to
proceed with the trial of the case.

The offense of delivering prisoners from jails as defined in Article 156 is usually committed by an
outsider who: (1) removes from jail any person therein confined or (2) helps him escape. If the
offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoners, he is liable for infidelity
in the custody of prisoners defined and penalized under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Gov. Cledera as Governor, is the jailer of the province and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article
156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their
prosecution for conniving with or consenting to evasion under Art 223, and Art 224 which
punishes evasion through negligence.

(6) US v. TOLENTINO, GR No. 1451, Mar 06, 1906 (CARSON, J.)

Aurelio Tolentino was charged with the crime of "uttering seditious words and writings,
publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.” He unlawfully utter seditious words and speeches
and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
which tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government established
by law within the Philippine Islands. The said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and
scurrilous libels are in the Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio
Tolentino, and which was presented by him and others on the said 14th day of May, 1903, at the
"Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas'
(Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow). The accused was in fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

WON Tolentino was guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition.

Yes. The Court agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama directly and
necessarily tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to
suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the

Violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission

Satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the
Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the
opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and
setting up another in its stead.

They insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he is charged does
not appear from the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary and
artistic production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future, as imagined
by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.


It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did in fact write the
drama and the announcement thereof, substantially as set out in the information, and did, with
other members of a theatrical company, of which he was director, utter and publish the same
substantially in manner and form as charged.
The public presentation of the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than two years
after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a widespread and
dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and there throughout the
Islands occasional outbreaks still required the use of the armed forces of the Government for
their suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong, composed of persons whose announced
purpose and object in organizing was the overthrow of the present Government, was actively
engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these Islands from peaceably accepting the
authority of that Government, and this junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was still
able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which it hoped to fan into open
revolt and rebellion at the first favorable opportunity.

Whether the writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the accused was in fact guilty of a
violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.


This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests
and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential
information” that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was
charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New People’s Army.
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a
gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person who was
listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of
the NPA liquidation squad responsible for the killing of two CAPCOM soldiers the day before.
He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside.
They now question their warrantless arrest assailing that the arrests made were invalid.
Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.
Yes, Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crime.
Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith.
On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his
arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.

Motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, for committing the crimes
against the state and national security are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of
Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested.
That the crime committed by the accused-petitioner is a continuous crime and therefore
the arrest without warrant is VALID.
The Court held that, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons
of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the
records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to
rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case
on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly
ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly
challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that
everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court.
will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the
legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of
Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
Rule 113 Section 5 of the Rules of Court (Warantless Arrest)
(9) Martinez vs Morfe On January 2, 2012

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above
constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, “arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable
under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.” For under the Constitutional
Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against
petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations
against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a
contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal
prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being
that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would
be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.

Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When
it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would
be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from
the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government
might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely
all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption
of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim their
claim to immunity.
***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place.”

EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace. Treason
exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them
aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled
principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders
one susceptible to prosecution. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.

(10) PEOPLE vs EVANGELISTA G.R. No. L-36278 October 26, 1932


Association with the Communist Party is Illegal as its purpose is inciting sedition and disorderly
opposition to the government.

Crisanto Evangelista et al, were charged with the crime of illegal association in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila in that on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time
prior thereto, the said accused affiliated to, and became members of, the so-called Communist
Party of the Philippines whose principal purposes and object were to bring about by force the
downfall of the present form of government and establish in its place another patterned after
the Soviet Government of Russia, and to incite a revolt of the laboring class.

The principal defense set up by the appellants is that the Communist Party of the Philippines is
not an illegal association in that it preaches only a social but not an armed revolution, neither is
there any merit in the appellant's argument that communism is not prohibited in any part of the
civilized world.

Whether or not association in a Communist Party is not illegal.

Yes. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by the appellants is clearly
illegal. Article 188 of the Penal Code, as substituted by article 24 of the Royal Decree of
September 12, 1897 (Alcubilla, Diccionario de Administracion, Apendice de 1897, p. 454), says
that illegal associations are those the object of which is against public morals, to commit some
crime, or to attack the fundamental basis of the social order or alter the regularity of its

And as to the validity of the law prohibiting communism, the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the law of California prohibiting the display of the communist red flag as a sign
inciting sedition and disorderly opposition to the government.


G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

The deceased, Philippine Constabulary Lt. Guillermo Masana together with his companions were
having lunch when they saw, appellant Floro Rodil outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Lt.
Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel went out of the
restaurant, and asked the appellant. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana, appellant
moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun.

Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun and gave it to Lt. Masana. After that, they went inside
the restaurant. Lt. Masana asked appellant to countersign the receipt for then gun, but appellant
refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected
appellant's plea. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a
double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and
stomach causing his death several hours thereafter.

Rodil was found guilty of murder. He made an appeal contending that it was the deceased who
committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun
after he refused to surrender his ID.

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with
assault upon an agent of authority

The crime committed was homicide aggravated by contempt for or insult to a public authority
or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank.

Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, ... shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance'
(See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code).
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious
that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the


MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I believe that neither the aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to the public
authorities under Article 14, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, nor that of insult or disregard of
the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank under Article 14, par. 3 of the same
Code, is applicable to the present case.

1. For the circumstance of contempt of, or with insult to, public authorities to be considered
aggravating, it is essential (a) that the crime is committed in the presence of a public authority,
not a mere agent of the authorities.

In this case, Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary is not a public authority nor a
person in authority as these terms are defined by Article 152, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code
for he is not directly vested with jurisdiction, that is, power or authority to govern and execute
the laws or to hear and decide a cause; he is a mere agent of a person in authority as defined by
Article 152, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he being a member of the Philippine Constabulary
which is a government military agency in charge of the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of fife and property. In fact, the Decision itself calls him an agent of a
person in authority (p. 13). And even if Lt. Masana were a person in authority, this aggravating
circumstance cannot be taken into account because it is he himself who is the offended party
(People vs. Siojo, supra).

2. Neither can the second circumstance, that of disregard of the respect due to rank, be
made to apply. It is not the existence alone of rank of the offended party that determines the
presence of this aggravating circumstance. There must be a difference in the social condition of
the offender and the offended party. Where the offender and the offended party are of the
same rank, this aggravating circumstance does not apply.

In the case at bar, the difference in the social condition and rank of the victim, a Lieutenant in
the Philippine Constabulary, and that of the accused, who is a member of an anti-smuggling
unit and an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines, is not of such a degree as
to justify consideration of disrespect of rank due to the offended party as an aggravating


G.R. No. L-3857, October 22, 1951

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the
appellant of direct assault upon a person in authority.
On September 2, 1947, Hilarion Sarcepuedes laid hands on Lucrecia L. Bustamante, a teacher-
nurse, in the school building of the town by hitting her twice on the face with his raincoat and
violently pushing her to the window. The assault took place because Lucrecia had ordered the
closing of a pathway across her land thru which Hilarion and his wife to pass in going to and
from the school, closing which Hilarion deeply resented. It seems that Hilarion sought Lucrecia
at the school premises to demand an explanation.
The appellants contend that the offended party was not a person in authority. According to the
Court of Appeals Lucrecia L. Bustamante was, on the day of the commission of the offense, a
teacher-nurse of the San Enrique Elementary Public school, among her official duties being to
give health instruction to the pupils to instruct teachers about how to give first aid treatment in
the school clinic and to look after the sanitary facilities of the school. The contention must
consequently be overruled, since a teacher is expressly included in article 152 among the
officials deemed to be persons in authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for Direct Assault upon a Person in Authority.

Yes. The Court ruled that Lucrecia was hurt while performing her ordinary Government tasks, the
motive for the aggression becomes immaterial. U.S. vs. Baluyot 40 Phil., 385). She was pounced
upon "while engaged in the performance" of her official duties, within the meaning of Article
148. The penalty imposed, i.e., from one year, eight months and one day to four years nine
months and eleven days of prision correccional plus a fine of P500, is in accordance with law,
inasmuch as the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the sex
of the offended party. Like the Court of Appeals we feel that the penalty is rather excessive for
this sudden outburst of temper; but the remedy lies in the hands of the Executive.

(13) Pp vs Tac-an GR No 76338-39 26 Feb 1990

Appellant Renato Tac-an, then 18 years old, and the deceased Francis Ernest Escano III, 15 years
old, were classmates and close friends in high school. They were also members of the same
gang, the Bronx gang. Later, Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang and their relationship
became strained. In of Dec. 14, 1984, Renato entered Room 15 to attend his class. Renato placed
his scrapbook on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to raise a question.
Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was
angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on which Francis was seated. Francis,
however, explained that he had not intentionally sat down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight
would have ensued but some classmates and 2 teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Pasilbas,
intervened and prevented them from assaulting each other. While the class was still going on,
Renato slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. The class under Mr. Pasilbas
had just started in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and
holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Renato fired 4 time at Francis. The 4th time,
Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel, another classmate and both fell to
the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor
bleeding profusely. Renato then went out of the Room. A teacher, Mr. Baluma, apparently
unaware of what Renato did, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was
still alive inside the room. Renato re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him and aimed
at the chest of Francis and fired once more. Then he locked Francis alone inside Room 15.
Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room and hostages the people in
it. After some persuasion from his father and brother, Renato surrendered his gun then he was
arrested. While Francis died before reaching the hospital. Renato was convicted of qualified
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and murder and the penalty imposed upon him
is death in both cases.

Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.

No. The trial court erred in finding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance. Article
152 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 1978 and PD No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. — Who shall be deemed as
such. — In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No.
299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of
a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a
person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents
of such person) of the RPC. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the RPC for the application of which any person "directly vested with
jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a
longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words
used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority"
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the RPC, the provision the trial court applied
in the case at bar.
Additional Questions:
1. Crime Charged
Qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and murder
2. Petitioner’s Contention
3. Respondent’s Contention
4. Lower Court Ruling
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is considered a
person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was already
checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil act, the accused
ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror he had
done to Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and held hostage
the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the court, this act of the accused was
an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callous disregard of other's feelings and
safety and completely reprehensible.
5. CA Ruling
6. SC Ruling
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and of having acted with contempt of
or insult to the public authorities shall be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the
special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and
with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account.
There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the appellant shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the trial court
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
7. Law in question
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority


• The appellant together with other various accused were members of Communists Party
of the Phils. (CPP) and Hukbalahaps (HUKs)
• They were charged with committing the following:
1. Ambush and killing of Mrs. Aurora Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon
City, Major P. San Agustin, Lieutenant Lasam, Philip Buencamino III, and several soldiers and the
wounding of General Jalandoni and Captain Manalang.
2. Taking funds (80,000), supplies and equipment from the Provincial Treasury of Laguna;
and burning and looting private buildings in towns.
3. Capturing police sergeant Nemesio Palo. After which, with evident premeditation,
treachery and intent to kill, they stab, shot and cut the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby
causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio Palo.
4. Ambush and firing upon an Army Patrol headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in seriously
wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta a civilian in Camarines Sur.
5. Murder of Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant.
• Geronimo initially entered a not guilty plea but later on changed it to guilty plea.
• On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life
imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a
mitigating circumstance.
• Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the
accused was only prision mayor, for the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex
crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of murders
robberies, and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime
charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion.
• The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion

WON rebellion can be complexed with other crimes such as murder, robbery and

No. As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is
integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of
article 135. It follows, therefore that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in article 134,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct
crimes in themselves.
If any of such counts, however, constituted an independent crime as seems to be the case under
the facts alleged in Count No. 5 (the killing of Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in the
information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere conclusion,
cannot be a bar to Appellant’s conviction and punishment for said offense.


If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any political
motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the
rebellion. This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should commit
rape; certainly, the latter felony could not be said to have been done in furtherance of the
rebellion or facilitated its commission in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two
separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be merged into a juridical whole.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused
convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of
guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of
prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article
38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more
than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of
P6,000; and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.


151 SCRA 592

Marcos Gabutero was a Brgy. Captain. Because of the approaching fiesta, a dance was held in
the barangay. Before the start of the dance and while Gabutero was delivering his speech,
intoxicated Pedro went to the middle of the venuw brandishing his nknife and challenging
everyone in the venue who was brave enough to fight him. Gabutero approached Pedro and
attempted to pacify him. However, insted of heeding to the advice of Gabutero, Pedro stabbed
the latter with his knife. Pedro’s companion rushed to Gabutero and stabbed him to death. The
trial court held them guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting
to murder. Accused contends that it is not correct.

Whether or not Barangay Captaion Garbutero was killed while in the performance of this official
Yes. Records clearly shows that the barangay captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro
who was making trouble in the premises when the dance was held, when he was stabbed to
death. He was therefore killed in the performace of his official duties.