PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JERRY OBOGNE, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of
rape in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the
afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused by
means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously . . . succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
"AAA", 1 a 12-year old mentally retarded person, to the
damage and prejudice of the said "AAA". 2
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. 3 On March 13, 2008, the
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43,
rendered a Judgment, 4 viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding Jerry
Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape committed against "AAA" and, hereby,
sentences him to suffer a penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify "AAA" the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5 HCaIDS
The trial court did not consider "AAA's" mental
retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that
the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of
"AAA's" mental disability.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of
Appeals. 6 In its Decision 7 of March 28, 2011, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling with
modifications, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment,
dated March 13, 2008, of the Regional Trial Court of
Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 34, 8 in Criminal Case No.
3303, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is further ordered to pay "AAA" the additional
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity apart from the
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages and of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution 10 dated February 15, 2012, we required
both parties to file their Supplemental Briefs. However,
they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the Court
of Appeals as their Supplemental Briefs. 11
Appellant argues that the testimony of "AAA" deserves
no credence because she was incapable of intelligently
making known her perception to others by reason of her
mental disability.
We are not persuaded.
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity
or immaturity. — The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully. SaIEcA
In this case, "AAA" is totally qualified to take the witness
stand notwithstanding her mental condition. As correctly
observed by the trial court:
When "AAA" was presented on November 14, 2006,
defense counsel manifested his objection and called the
Court's attention to Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of
Court, which lists down persons who cannot be
witnesses; i.e., those whose mental condition, at the
time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others . . . .
During the continuation of AAA's testimony . . . she was
able to recall what [appellant] did to her . . . .
"AAA" recalled that while she was playing, [appellant]
saw her and asked her to go with him because he would
give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought "AAA" to his
house and while inside, 'he removed her panty, and then
inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife
and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her
and then she went home.'
xxx xxx xxx
This Court finds "AAA" a very credible witness, even in
her mental condition. Contrary to defense counsel's
objection that "AAA" was not capable of intelligently
making known her perception to others, "AAA" managed
to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands
of the accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner
....
"AAA's" simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects
sincerity and truthfulness.
While it is true that, on cross-examination, "AAA"
faltered in the sequence of events . . . this is
understandable because even one with normal mental
condition would not be able to recall, with a hundred
percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But
"AAA" was certain that 'it was a long time . . . after the
incident' when it was reported to the police. Likewise,
she was very certain that the accused inserted his penis
into her vagina . . . . 12
In the same vein, the appellate court found "AAA"
qualified to take the witness stand, viz.: CIAHDT
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that "AAA"
was shown to be able to perceive, to make known her
perception to others and to remember traumatic
incidents. Her narration of the incident of rape given in
the following manner is worthy of note:
xxx xxx xxx
Private complainant "AAA" provided a clear, convincing
and competent testimonial evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused-appellant of the crime of rape beyond
reasonable doubt. As found by the trial court, the
testimony of "AAA" was replete with consistent details,
negating the probability of fabrication.
We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant's
assertions, mental retardation per se does not affect a
witness' credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible
witness. 13
Appellant's assertion that the trial court and the
appellate court should have considered his alibi must
likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be
shown that appellant was at another place at the time of
the commission of the crime but that it was also
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene. In
this case, appellant attempted to show that he was
at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape incident.
However, as found by the trial court, the distance
between barangay Ananong and barangay Ogbong is
only four kilometers and could be traversed in one hour
or even less. 14 HIaSDc
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
found appellant guilty of simple rape and properly
imposed upon him the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that "AAA's"
mental disability could not be considered as a qualifying
circumstance because the Information failed to allege
that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time
of the commission of the crime. As held in People v.
Limio: 15
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is
a mental retardate does not call for the imposition of the
death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such
mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately
proved by the prosecution.
For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly provides
that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of
'(10) when the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime.' Said knowledge . . . qualifies rape as a heinous
offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-
B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the
offender may be held liable for simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 16
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate
does not automatically merit the imposition of the death
penalty. Under Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal
Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability,
emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of
the commission of the rape is the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death
penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally
alleged in the information and duly proved by the
prosecution. aITECA
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances
to be alleged with specificity in the information. . . . But
in the absence of a specific or particular allegation in the
information that the appellant knew of her mental
disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof
that appellant knew of this fact, Article 266-B (10), RPC,
could not be properly applied . . .
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple
rape, as defined under Article 266-A of the [Revised]
Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. 17
However, it must be mentioned that appellant is not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 18 of Republic
Act No. 9346. 19
The awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity are likewise proper.
However, the award of exemplary damages must be
increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. 20 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03270 finding appellant
Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay "AAA" civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of
P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
appellant is not eligible for parole; the amount of
exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
G.R. No. 138471 October 10, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y
RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
 On 27 January 1995, an information for rape
was filed against accused-appellant Manuel
Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez
(hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog,
Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
thru force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette
Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against the
will and consent of the latter, to her damage and
prejudice.
 Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and
gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital,
testified that on 3 January 1995, she conducted
a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and
took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall
through scraping. The urinalysis report includes
a positive finding for "sperm cells." Dr. Quiroz
explained that the presence of sperm cells in
the vaginal canal signified that sexual
intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the
person of the patient. There was no laceration;
but there was hyperemia, which means
reddening of the tissue around the vaginal
opening.
 On the other hand, PRUNA denied having raped
LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3
January 1995, he was in his house preparing
coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left, several men
arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to
him. Carlito and the latter’s friend then brought
him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTE’s father
boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the
Pilar Municipal Jail.
ISSUES:
1. Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible
witness considering that she was allegedly only
3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and
5 years old when she testified. YES
2. Whether or not there was sufficient Evidence
of LIZETTE’s Minority to substantiate the
propriety of the Imposition of the Death
Penalty. NO
RULING:
1. As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness
stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes
that he is competent. The court cannot reject the
witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency.
The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to
the competency of a witness to establish the ground of
incompetency.
Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be
witnesses. Among those disqualified are "[c]hildren
whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they
are examined and relating them truthfully."
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children
shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not
the age, of a young child is the test of the competency
as a witness. It is settled that a child, regardless of age,
can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in
perceiving, can make known his perception to others
and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for
which he is examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the
court must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact
to be testified to occurred such that he could receive
correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the
obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts truly
to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The
examination should show that the child has some
understanding of the punishment which may result
from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of
consequences is disclosed where the child states that he
knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be
punished if he does so, or that he uses language which
is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for
false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it can
be shown that his mental maturity renders him
incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is
being examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, appellant questions the competency of
LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground of her age. He
failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental
immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can
be gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of
observation, recollection, and communication34 and
that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie.
We, therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her
testimony and according it great weight.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that
LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years after
the alleged rape "when the interplay of frail memory
combines with the imagination of earlier years." It must
be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the
manner in which the crime was committed and the
identity of the person responsible therefor.
In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a
rape victim who is of young or tender age is credible
and deserves full credit, especially where no motive is
attributed to the victim that would make her testify
falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow
the examination of her private parts; and undergo the
expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a
public trial unless she was in fact raped.
2. The following are guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar
authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of
LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. In view of the
uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative
evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other authentic document should be
introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying
circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection
on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse
the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the
defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of
questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily
an admission that she was below 7 years of age when
PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the
case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and
hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing
guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE’s mother that she
was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable
for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the
first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA
should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN
LENNON", accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a 10-year-old
child would need for lunch money, a known
acquaintance of their family would destroy a child's
dignity by having illicit carnal knowledge of her. This
case involves an act that is so dastardly that it is
punished by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as
statutory rape which carries a sentence of reclusion
perpetua.
We are asked to review the Court of Appeals
decision 1 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02955. This decision
affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for
statutory rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 30, 2005, an information 2 was filed
against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 59. The information reads:
That on or about November 29, 2005, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the offended party, (AAA), who is
under twelve (12) years old.
Contrary to law. cSIHCA
Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded "not
guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was
then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at Camp 7
Elementary School in Baguio City. She testified that on
November 29, 2005, she went home from school at
around 12 noon to have lunch. 3 On the way home, she
met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room
and laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt
and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants and
then inserted his penis into her vagina. 4
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a
long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white liquid
came out. He then gave her five pesos (P5.00) before
she went back to school. 5
AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser,
Agustina Chapap, asked her where she came from
because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer.
When asked again why she was tardy, AAA admitted
she came from "Uncle Rod." She also admitted that she
went there to ask for money. Chapap then brought AAA
to Rona Ambaken, AAA's previous teacher. Together,
they brought AAA to the principal's office. AAA was
brought to the comfort room where Ambaken inspected
her panties. The principal was able to confirm that AAA
was touched since AAA's private organ was swelling.
Her underwear was also wet. 6
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to
Baguio General Hospital where her underwear was
again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On
the way to the hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay
hall and the police station to report the incident. 7
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-
appellant had done the same thing to her about 10
times on separate occasions. After each act, he would
give her ten (P10.00) or five (P5.00) pesos. 8
The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as
an expert witness. Dr. Ogues was the superior of Dr.
Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based
on the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma
that could have been caused by sexual abuse. She also
stated that there was another medico-legal certificate
issued by Dr. Carag, surgical resident of the Department
of Surgery of Baguio General Hospital, showing findings
of some hematoma in AAA's legs. 9
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his
house at 12 noon on November 29, 2005 and claimed
he was already at work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA
for a long time since his family rented the house of
AAA's grandfather from 2001 to 2004. 10 When the
police came and asked him if he knew AAA, he
answered in the affirmative. He was then brought to
Baguio General Hospital where he was told that AAA
identified him as the one who raped her. 11
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's
sister, and they even lived together as common-law
spouses. 12 He also admitted that a similar complaint
was filed against him by AAA's mother when AAA was
eight years old, but they settled the case at the
barangay level. 13
On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a
judgment 14 finding Rodrigo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of statutory rape and imposing on him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was additionally
required to indemnify the offended party P50,000.00
moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages
with costs of suit.
Rodrigo appealed 15 to the Court of Appeals claiming
that AAA's testimony fell short of the requirement of
the law on the quantum of evidence required. He
argued that she did not cry for help when her family's
house was just nearby, which was cause for reasonable
doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate. aITDAE
On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 16 affirming the conviction.
On March 11, 2013, Rodrigo filed a notice of
appeal 17 with the appellate court, which was given due
course in a resolution 18 dated March 15, 2013.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In the resolution 19 of September 9, 2013, this court
required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both parties,
however, manifested that they were dispensing with
the filing of a supplemental brief as their arguments
were already substantially and exhaustively discussed in
their respective briefs filed before the appellate court.
The only issue to be resolved by this court is whether
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused-appellant was guilty of statutory
rape punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code.
Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is
committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxx xxx xxx
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended
party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has
carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there
was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim
was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it
was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It
is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that
there was sexual intercourse.
People v. Teodoro 20 explained the elements of
statutory rape committed under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1) (d):
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed
statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12)
years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical
evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the
only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a
will of her own on account of her tender years; the
child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil. (Emphasis
supplied)
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10
years old at the time of the incident. Her birth
certificate was presented before the trial court. 21What
is critical in this case, therefore, is whether there is a
showing that Rodrigo had carnal knowledge of
AAA. HaEcAC
In the testimony of AAA, she narrated that on
November 29, 2005, she met Rodrigo in his house, thus:
Q: Now, when you met the accused, what did he do?
A: He brought me in the room, Ma'am.
Q: The room is located inside his house?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And, was that the first time you entered the room?
A: (The witness nods.)
Q: After entering the room, what did Uncle Rod tell
you?
A: He laid me down, Ma'am.
COURT:
Q: Where?
A: On the bed, Ma'am.
PROS. BERNABE:
Q: Who were the persons inside the room aside from
you and Uncle Rod?
A: (Witness shook her head — meaning no persons
around.)
Q: After lying down on the bed, what did he do next?
A: He raised up my skirt.
Q: After raising up your skirt, what else did he do?
A: He removed my panty, Ma'am.
Q: Was he able to remove it from your legs your
panty? [sic]
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: Until where was he able to remove?
A: (Witness is pointing down to the ankle.)
Q: After pulling down your panty until your ankle, what
happened?
A: He pulled down his short pants, Ma'am.
Q: After pulling down his short pants, what did Uncle
Rod do?
A: He brought out his penis.
Q: After bringing out his penis, what did he do next?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina, Ma'am.
Q: Will you please show us where is your vagina?
A: (The witness stood and pointed to her private part.)
Q: You also mentioned AAA that Uncle Rod inserted his
penis to your vagina, could you point to the "ari" of
Uncle Rod?
A: (The witness pointed to a portion where the private
part of the elder brother was standing.)
Q: Was it painful when Uncle Rod inserted his penis
inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am. DSEIcT
Q: Did you cry when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside
your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Did he stay long on top of you? At around how many
minutes?
A: Very long, Ma'am.
Q: Did he withdraw his penis from your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And after he withdrew his penis inside your vagina,
what happened?
A: There is some white liquid that came out of his penis,
Ma'am. 22
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in
a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was
done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant
risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full
weight and credence. People v. Veloso 23 stated that:
In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the
testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full
weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate
that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex
and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime
so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her
candid narration of how she was raped bears the
earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will — as in
this case — motivates her to testify falsely against the
accused. It is well-settled that when a woman, more so
when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment.
The accused may thus be convicted solely on her
testimony — provided it is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things. 24
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her
teachers whose concern for her led to the discovery of
the crime. The medical certificate presented in court,
together with the testimonies of the physicians, is
consistent with the finding that she was sexually
abused.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help
shows reasonable doubt. He noted that her house was
just near his house where the incident happened.
This argument is so feeble that it could only have been
put up out of desperation.
Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle
Rod." He admitted that AAA's family had known him for
a long time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any
elder in the family of AAA had. Instead of providing the
moral guidance that his status allowed him, he took
advantage of AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his
illicit carnal desires. To cover this up and seemingly
justify his actions, he gave his child-victim the measly
sum of five pesos. Rodrigo knew that what he did was
wrong; AAA would have probably doubted whether
such act was normal among adults.
With his moral ascendancy, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that even the child-victim's
desire for help would be muffled by her fear of her
"Uncle Rod." To a young 10-year-old, the ordinary world
can be daunting. To be so young and silently aware that
one is the victim of such callous depravation by Rodrigo,
who she could have expected to take care of her, can
create the kind of lasting fear that diminishes the
development of her own person and her own
convictions.
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a
charge of statutory rape since "[t]he law presumes that
such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not
and cannot have a will of her own." 25
Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA,
a minor who was only 10 years of age, on November 29,
2005. AICTcE
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code requires that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed in
cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266-
A where there are no aggravating or qualifying
circumstances present. The lower courts correctly
imposed this penalty.
Their award of damages, however, must be modified in
light of recent jurisprudence.
It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is
mandatory upon a finding that rape was committed,
along with the award of moral and exemplary
damages. 26 In People v. Degay, 27 the accused-
appellant was found guilty of raping his nine-year-old
neighbor. This court did not hesitate to increase the
award of civil indemnity and moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In People v. Gambao, 28 we
have also increased the award of civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each.
Due to the utter heinousness of the crime involved in
this case, we, therefore, exercise our judicial
prerogative and increase the damages to P100,000.00
as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
There are not enough words to condemn the depravity
that one adult can do to a child-victim. The many years
that Rodrigo Gutierez will, by law, serve in prison will, of
course, not make up for the wrong and the injury that
he has so selfishly and callously caused and with utter
disregard for what truly makes us human: that we care,
nurture, and protect our children because we hope that
they can make their world better than ours. All this was
lost on Rodrigo Gutierez. The five pesos that he gave on
every occasion that he defiled his child-victim simply
underscores the ignominy of his act.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
finding the accused-appellant Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-
appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is
ordered to pay AAA the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with an interest of
6% per annum from the finality of this decision until its
full satisfaction. EDCIcH
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROGER UGOS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
Before us is an appeal from the October 25, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00310-MIN entitled People of the Philippines v.
Roger Ugos y Lanzo alias "Dodong". The CA affirmed the
February 8, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 15 in Davao City in Criminal Case No.
39413-97, finding accused-appellant Roger Ugos guilty
of raping his stepdaughter and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua. DSCIEa
The Facts
On August 11, 1997, accused-appellant was charged
with rape under an Information which reads:
That on or about August 7, 1997, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with . . . [AAA],
who is only seven (7) years of age. 1
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a not guilty
plea. caHCSD
The prosecution presented the following facts:
On the evening of August 7, 1997, accused-appellant,
while drunk and looking for a bolo, 2 asked his
stepdaughter, AAA, then seven years old, to look for her
mother at her grandmother's place. But as her mother
was not at her grandmother's residence, AAA went to
look for her at a neighbor's house accompanied by
accused-appellant. Her mother was not there, either.
Accused-appellant thereupon held AAA and brought her
to a nearby creek. Once there, he undressed her and
then proceeded to insert his finger into her vagina four
times. 3 Thereafter, accused-appellant bit AAA's face
and inserted his penis into her vagina. Not content, he
held her by the neck and boxed her in the face and
stomach. 4 He then threatened to kill her if she told her
mother about the incident. 5
When asked upon reaching home about the lumps on
her face, AAA told her mother that she fell at the
waiting shed. 6 The next morning, however, AAA
revealed the truth about her injuries, relating how
accused-appellant, while holding her neck, bit and
punched her on the cheek "causing a swelling and black
right eye and bruises on the neck". 7 Mother and
daughter then reported the incident to, only to be
ignored by, the barangay captain. They then repaired to
the police station in Toril to file a rape complaint before
Police Station Child and Youth Officer Leonilo Jickain, 8
after which they proceeded to Barrio Catigan, the scene
of the crime. Mother and daughter pointed to accused-
appellant as the rapist. 9 After a short chase, he was
apprehended and charged. 10
Dr. Danilo Ledesma testified having examined AAA on
August 11, 1997. 11 His findings: AAA had sustained
contusions on her left eye and on her cheek. She also
had a hemorrhage on both eyeballs. He also found that
there was a complete hymenal laceration at the 5 and 9
o'clock positions, showing recent genital trauma. 12
Accused-appellant, the lone witness for the defense, on
the other hand, presented the following story, as
summarized in the RTC decision:
. . . [O]n August 7, 1997 from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M. he was in
his employer's house because it was their barrio's fiesta,
that on reaching home at about 7 P.M. only [his]
step[children] AAA, 7 years old, Reggie 3 years old and
[his] 10 year [old] niece were around. . . . his wife was
not there so he went to their grandmother's house
alone to get her, that his wife was not there, that he
returned home at about 8 P.M. but she was not there in
their house so he went to his ninang [godmother] and
his neighbors looking for his wife, that he told the victim
to go with him to the barrio which was about one
kilometer from their house to look for his wife, that he
told the victim to look for her mother while he waited in
a shed, that the victim fell because the road was dark
and slippery, that his wife was already home when they
returned, that his wife smelled of liquor that night, that
he and his wife quarreled and he hit his wife, that he did
not rape and hit the victim, that he does not know why
he is charged with rape. 13
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, ROGER UGOS is
hereby sentenced to Reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
The preventive imprisonment shall be credited to the
sentence of the accused if he voluntarily abides in
writing to follow the rules under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. 14 EaHIDC
Accused-appellant thus appealed the RTC Decision with
this Court.
On December 13, 2004, this Court, in accordance with
People v. Mateo, 15 ordered the transfer of the case to
the CA for intermediate review.
By a Decision dated October 25, 2007, the CA affirmed
that of the RTC with a modification on the award of
damages, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the lower court's Decision dated 8
February 2000 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
AFFIRMED, WITH THE MODIFICATION that appellant is
ordered to pay P50,000.00, representing moral
damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by the trial
court. cHAIES
SO ORDERED. 16
On November 22, 2007, accused-appellant filed his
Notice of Appeal of the CA Decision.
Accused-appellant presents a lone issue before the
Court:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING HIM
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE INSTEAD OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS
Accused-appellant claims that the testimonies of AAA
and her mother reveal only the commission of acts of
lasciviousness. There was no sexual intercourse,
according to him, as he only inserted his finger into her
sex organ, adding that this was what AAA originally told
her mother. He surmises that AAA, being underage,
might have been confused with what the word "rape"
meant. Accused-appellant further states that AAA only
testified that he inserted his penis into her vagina when
probed by the prosecutor through leading questions.
Our Ruling
We affirm the appellate court's decision.
AAA, as found by both the trial and appellate courts,
was unequivocal in her testimony that she was raped by
accused-appellant. While her mother may have
contradicted AAA's testimony by stating that AAA
reportedly told her she was merely "fingered" by
accused-appellant, it is AAA's clear and credible
testimony that should determine accused-appellant's
guilt. She detailed both in direct and cross-examinations
how accused-appellant violated her; she minced no
words about what accused-appellant did to her on
August 7, 1997.
Accused-appellant does not dispute AAA's testimony,
arguing that she might have been coached in her
answers. He likewise states that what AAA and her
mother reported to the police was an attempt to rape
AAA. It was only when the prosecutor asked her leading
questions that she testified that accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina.
The Court is not persuaded by his contentions for the
following reasons: First, the testimony of Police Officer
Jickain, who related that AAA's mother approached him
on August 7, 1997 while he was on duty as Police
Station Child and Youth Officer, has documentary
support. He stated that AAA's mother reported that
accused-appellant raped her daughter. 17 Second,
accused-appellant's contention is at odds with what are
contained in the records, which show that during cross-
examination the trial court asked AAA what accused-
appellant did to her, as follows:
COURT:
Q You said it is painful, is it because the finger was
inserted or the penis?
A Because he inserted his finger into my vagina.
Q He did not insert his penis?
A He inserted. 18
The prosecutor, on the other hand, examined AAA in
this wise:
Q Who mounted you?
A Ondongan.
Q This Ondongan is in court could you point him?
A (Witness pointing to a person seated on a chair with
white t-shirt printed navy when asked he said he is
Roger Ugos).
Q What did Ondongan or your stepfather do?
A He placed his hand on my vagina.
Q Were you still dressed?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he do to your dress?
A He inserted his finger [in] my vagina 4 times.
Q When he did that to you were you still dressed or
were you already naked? 19
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else?
A After that the accused stood up on a coco trunk [and]
inserted his finger in my vagina four times.
Q What else did he do, did you see his penis?
A He inserted inside my vagina.
Q What did you feel when he inserted his penis in your
vagina?
A I was angry, because he mounted me and it was very
painful. 20 HIaSDc
The line of leading questions objected to by accused-
appellant was warranted given the circumstances. A
child of tender years may be asked leading questions
under Section 10 (c), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Sec.
20 of the 2000 Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
also provides, "The court may allow leading questions in
all stages of examination of a child if the same will
further the interests of justice".
The afore-cited rule was formulated to allow children to
give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma
to children, encourage them to testify in legal
proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.
21
We find that the alleged coaching used in the course of
examining AAA merely aided her in testifying with more
detail and did not suggest to her the answers integral to
the actual commission of rape.
What is more, AAA's charge of rape finds support in the
medical report on her physical injuries. The medico-
legal witness, Dr. Ledesma, testified that he examined
AAA four days after the rape incident and found fresh
bruises on her face and lacerations in her vagina. 22
Accused-appellant's denial of the crime cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of the victim. As held in
People v. Suarez, a rape victim's straightforward and
candid account, corroborated by the medical findings of
the examining physician, is sufficient to convict the
accused. 23 This conclusion becomes all the more firm
where, as in this case, the child-victim takes the witness
stand. Previous decisions involving rape cases have
shown us the high improbability that a girl of tender
years would impute to any man a crime so serious as
rape if what she claims is not true. 24 Also, as correctly
pointed out by the CA, corroboration of a child's
testimony is not even required under Sec. 22 of the Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness, thus:
Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a
child. [The child's] testimony, if credible by itself, shall
be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or
judgment subject to the standard of proof required in
criminal and non-criminal cases.
Accused-appellant's suggestion that the charge against
him could have been fabricated, an offshoot of the
argument he had with AAA's mother, has nothing to
support itself. There is likewise nothing in the records
indicating that the prosecution witnesses testified
against accused-appellant out of malice.
A rape victim's testimony as to who abused her is
credible where she has absolutely no motive to
incriminate and testify against the accused. 25
Categorical and positive identification of an accused,
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over
denial and alibi, which are negative and self-serving. 26
We thus affirm the trial court's appreciation of the
testimonial evidence adduced. It is basic that the trial
court's evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses
should be accorded the highest respect as it has the
best opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
witnesses on the stand and to establish whether they
are telling the truth. 27
As to the award of damages, the RTC was correct in
awarding civil indemnity in the amount of PhP50,000.
Civil indemnity needs no proof other than the fact of
the commission of the offense. 28 The award is proper
even if the minority of AAA was alleged. There was no
allegation in the Information that accused-appellant
was the victim's stepfather, precluding a charge for
qualified rape which would have increased the award to
PhP75,000.

The CA was also correct in additionally awarding moral

damages of PhP50,000. This is separate and distinct
from civil indemnity. It does not require proof of mental
and physical suffering. 29

As a final note, we reject accused-appellant's argument

that had he been found to have merely fingered AAA's
sexual organ, he would only be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness. As held in De Castro v. Fernandez, Jr., the
new law on rape now includes sexual assault. 30
Although the amendment to the law on rape was made
after accused-appellant was charged, it is well to point
out that with its expanded definition, rape can now be
committed through sexual assault by inserting "any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person". 31 DcTaEH

WHEREFORE, the appeal of accused-appellant is

DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 25, 2007 of the
CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00310-MIN finding him guilty
of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.