How does Fichte's transcendental idealism differ from Kant's, and does it improve upon it?

This essay notes that scholars like Beiser1 believe there to be four main differences between
Kant’s transcendental idealism and Fichte’s idealism. This essay works on the premise that
there is one major difference, just as there is one major problem at the centre of critical
philosophy, best understood as the problem of understanding and sensibility. Thus this essay
did not grant the other main areas of difference: the theory of the self, the primacy of the
practical and the unity of theoretical and practical reason the same depth. It would be
impossible within the word limit to write robustly on Kant and Fichte on four major areas in a
great deal of depth. In an attempt to show a broad understanding and significant insight into
the main problem of critical philosophy, certain sacrifices were made. The unity of theoretical
and practical reason is not discussed in any great detail. Kant, too, did not discuss it in much
detail but Fichte’s philosophy is in the first instance a manifestation of that unity. The theory
of the self and the primacy of the practical are not discussed in depth akin to that of the
understanding and sensibility. The reason for this is that not only is the understanding and
sensibility are huge topic but Fichte’s interpretation of it and arguably his choice to give the
practical greater significance was shaped by another’s philosophy. This essay took the time to
include a detailed understanding of Maimon’s philosophy because it is only through his work
that the most important problem of Kant’s philosophy, which is in fact a problem of
Descartes’ too, and arguably the irresolvable problem of metaphysics, was thoroughly
addressed at the time. In a letter about Maimon’s work, Kant himself is known to have
confessed that ‘none… had understood the main problem so well.’2 It was on these grounds
that I chose to place emphasis on Maimon’s work. This essay, like Fichte’s philosophy is
ultimately the manifestation of perpetual striving. On y va.

First, this essay will look closely at the theory of the self in both philosophers. Kant’s theory
of the self included the notion of inner sense and the transcendental apperception, which can
be understood as the synthetic unity of apperception and transcendental unity of apperception.
The inner sense is the means through which the mind ‘intuits itself or its inner state’3. Where
Kant’s outer sense is spatial, the inner is temporal. As the outer sense allows us to perceive
objects in space, the inner allows us to perceive empirical content in time. However the inner
sense offers no ‘intuition of the soul itself as an object’4, it understands the self purely as
appearance. The synthetic unity of apperception can be explained as follows: all

1 Beiser, F. (eds) German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism e-book, accessed on 4th April 2014

2 Maimon, S. Solomon Maimon: An Autobiography e-book accessed 3rd March 2014

3 Gardner (2014) German Idealism Lecture Notes from Fichte’s Theory of the Self
4 Ibid
representation that an individual receives via the intuition requires an accompanying ‘I think’ 5
so that a consistent representation of selfhood can take place. Without it there is nothing to
clarify that all the representation belonged to the individual. This representation is ‘an act of
spontaneity’ 6 , depicted by Kant as ‘pure apperception.’ 7 The transcendental unity of
apperception thus explains the overall possibility of experience, the reconciling of the self and
the world. Kant describes this as the manifold, via the intuition being ‘united into a
conception of the object’ 8 . The transcendental apperception is formally understood, the
representation ‘I think’ is intellectual, not subjective. Unlike the inner sense it is pure which
means it is without empirical content and whilst being the ‘highest principle’ 9 of human
knowledge it offers no insight into ourselves things-in-themselves or even as appearances.
We can merely think the ‘transcendental subject = X’10.

There are three issues here. First, we’ve no understanding of the self as a thing-in-itself;
we’ve ‘no knowledge’11 of ourselves as we are, ‘merely as we appear’12. The gulf between
consciousness of self and knowledge of self is vast. Second, we’ve no grasp of how the inner
sense and the transcendental apperception are united. ‘How the I that thinks can be distinct
from the I that intuits itself… these questions are no… less difficult than’13 how one can be an
object to themselves, in particular one of intuition or inner perceptions14. Lastly and perhaps
most puzzling of all, we receive no explanation as to how it is possible that the I think
accompanies the representations.

Fichte’s theory of self focuses mainly on the self-positing theory. ‘The self begins by an
absolute positing of its own existence.’15 It begins with the union of theoretical and practical
reason. In the 1794-95 version of the Wissenschaftlehre, the self’s positing of itself is the
evidence it exists. The self-positing self is both act and fact simultaneously. Fichte’s theory
deals with the subject object relation by declaring them as ‘one and the same’ 16, that which
cannot be separated from each other. Fichte notes that without object, consciousness would be
unfathomable and without the subject, one would be driven externally to find it. Fichte’s

5 Kant, I. (eds) The Critique of Pure Reason e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 142

6 Ibid p. 142
7 Ibid p. 142
8 Ibid p. 148
9 Ibid p. 145
10 Gardner (2014) German Idealism Lecture Notes from Fichte’s Theory of the Self
11 Kant, I. (eds) The Critique of Pure Reason e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p.161
12 Gardner (2014) German Idealism Lecture Notes from Fichte’s Theory of the Self
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
15 Ibid
16 Gardner (2014) German Idealism Lecture Notes from Fichte’s Theory of the Self
solution is to have the I posit itself as subject-object within immediate consciousness,
immediately.

Fichte’s self positing I cannot be said to improve upon Kant’s. Rather it introduces a number
of additional questions, whilst the previous ones remain unsolved. Fichte’s self is inextricably
connected to the primacy of the practical and the unity of theoretical and practical reason.
Fichte’s determination to avoid Kant’s dualism is made evident here. Fichte’s I is meant to
encompass everything, so it makes sense that both subject and object would be within it. By
fusing them into one entity ‘subject-object’ Fichte does not resolve the dualism. His
explanation for why he has done so is not one that highlights how they work as one. Quite
why they do not exist in immediate consciousness as subject and object is unclear. Perhaps
the most problematic issue of all is that of the self positing I. This foundational principle has
to be taken on faith – one has to accept ‘self-positing’ as evidence for existence. This strikes
as fundamentally unsatisfying and fundamentally weak. On the other hand having an
apodictic foundational principle does seem like an efficient choice, lest we forever chase the
burden of proof. However Kant’s decision to discuss the metaphysics of experience and
simply declare, as he does in the Prolegomena than ontological queries will get us nowhere,
seems to be a more effective way of dealing with this problem. Fichte’s involves deciding
upon a solution, upon which everything else rests. It would handicap the following
philosophical insights to doubt the premise, but it is intellectual cowardice to accept the
premise for ease or so as not to lose the additional insights.

With the importance of additional insight in mind this second deviation will focus, as per the
introduction, on Kant, Maimon and Fichte. Fichte was greatly influenced by Maimon’s
critique17; detailed knowledge of that critique will aid us in understanding Fichte’s deviation
and the extent to which he has tackled the issues in Kant’s understanding and sensibility and
thus the extent to which he has improved upon it. Fichte has, in trying to improve upon Kant’s
philosophy, exposed it to and admitted the insights of scepticism. His conclusion, a Sisyphean
compromise regarding the Absolute I’s eternal striving for the ideal, infinite understanding, is
heavily indebted to Maimon’s philosophy.

In the first Critique, the Transcendental Aesthetic explains that the relationship between our
knowledge and objects is by means of ‘an intuition.’18 According to Kant, this (objects being
presented to individuals via intuition) has to affect us: this affect is sensibility. However when

17 Beiser, F. (eds) German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism e-book, accessed on 4th April 2014

18 Kant, I. (eds) The Critique of Pure Reason e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p63
one is receives the representation of an object, they are affected immediately. For the
individual, intuition and sensibility are simultaneous. For Kant in the first Critique,
understanding takes place when concepts are applied to the intuited object. The
Transcendental Deduction is more focused on concepts and the understanding than the
previous Aesthetic. Here Kant questions our right (quid juris) to apply the pure conceptions
of understanding (the categories) to things given in experience. He states that he will in fact
examine the ‘manner’19 in which the categories apply to objects, that the how is a sufficient
justification to the question of right. For Kant, the answer to quid juris regarding the
categories is to present a justification of them, to prove their necessity. Kant believes that
self-consciousness necessitates consciousness, knowledge of objects that one can apply to the
categories, the pure concepts. Thus it requires knowledge of an ‘objective rule governed
world.’ However one must already be convinced of the ‘absolute necessity’ 20
of
transcendence deduction, first.

In the Prolegomena the sensibility is the capacity for the individual to be affected by
particular ‘real things’21. The sensibility is how one comes to sensible intuitions. Here Kant
describes the sensibility as being available to the individual ‘in advance’22 of the impressions
given by objects. In the Critique, however, Kant presents intuition and sensibility differently;
there, they’re simultaneous. In the Prolegomena Kant considers his awareness of the fact that
his experiences will reflect the forms of sensibility as a priori knowledge. One might argue
that Kant is begging the question here. Kant is explaining that sensibility, which comes from
experience, can be a priori because, as he explained it, he is aware that his perceptions are
shaped by his sensibility. First, that this is a priori is mistaken. He only knows this because he
had experience and worked backwards to deduce the relationship between the categories and
the objects of experience and thus knows that the forms of sensibility dictate the frame of his
perception. But without experience or without understanding and appreciating understanding
for what it was he could not have come to this conclusion.

Kant would most likely reply in the same vein as he did when he took quid juris about
applications of the categories to require proof that it is necessary or has been done. Kant may
reply as though the comment were in fact the question quid facti. It may appear to be circular
reasoning, however forms of our sensible intuition like time and space are available to us a
priori. Thus insofar as he knows that the experience will take place in a temporal spatial

19 Ibid p. 131
20 Ibid p.133
21 Kant, I. (eds) Prolegomena e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 17

22 Ibid p. 17
framework sensibility is both simultaneous with intuition in how it is experienced but also
available to him a priori because of the nature of these particular forms. However sensibility
is not a form like the other a priori intuitions. Thus there is no frame/outline than can be
distinguished and understood prior to experience.

Salomon Maimon, in his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy exposes a number of issues

with Kant’s work on understanding and sensibility. This essay will address three key
criticisms that directly relate to the aspects of the understanding and sensibility presented
above in Kant’s Critique and Prolegomena. Maimon takes the following questions, seemingly
solved by Kant in the Prolegomena and the first Critique and refutes their plausibility. Here
Maimon critiques the feasibility of a priori synthetic propositions, proving that when tested
their explanations are inadequate. The essay also focuses on the major problem of dualism:
how can the a priori and the a posteriori work together, when they have difference sources of
cognition and thus different rules, (which reduces to) how an object can be ‘brought under a
concept23. Lastly, it looks at Kant’s categories, using the example of causation to critique the
judgments of experience. For ease I numbered the individual areas and divided the
consequent passage into corresponding (consecutive) paragraphs.

1. The explanation of the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions

a. The possibility of synthetic propositions in mathematics
2. The conceivability of the notion that a priori forms should ‘agree’ with things given
a posteriori, when they are subject
3. The possibility of proving causation in the relation between material objects

Maimon takes the question of the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions and offers two
interpretations. It could be considered a way of explaining the ‘meaning of a rule or
condition’. 24 Maimon elaborates with an example: the first interpretation thus requires a
‘symbolic concept’ 25 to become intuitively conceivable. His second interpretation can be
seen as proceeding in the opposite direction. Here the a priori synthetic proposition could be
deemed a ‘genetic explanation’ of a concept whose meaning is already familiar. The essay
assumes the words ‘familiar’ and ‘meaning’ to be akin to describing that which has been
‘gleaned empirically’. (Maimon’s example seems to follow that train of thought.) Maimon
then exposes the flaws in both. He gives the example of the principle square root of 2. The
meaning of the rule for the principle square root of 2 is that when multiplied it becomes 2.

23 Kant, I. (eds) Prolegomena e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 20

24 Maimon, S. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 34
25 Ibid p. 35
Yet it lies in contention with the first interpretation because the root of 2 is not ‘objectively
conceivable.’26 Thus one has a rule that is conceivable but an object that cannot possibly be
conceived of. This undermines Kant’s philosophy on two counts. It’s a particularly pointed
strike at the idea of a priori synthetic truths in mathematics and a strike against the overall
possibility of synthetic statements, as per the first interpretation. For the second interpretation
Maimon offers the proposition that a ‘straight line is the shortest distance between two
points’ 27 . Maimon’s example implies that the meaning has been attained empirically, ‘by
constructing a line.’28 He then goes on to elaborate that the genesis of the explanation, the
how is still uncounted for. The relation is in reference to a rule of an object given in
experience, not an a priori universal form. The understanding and sensibility in the Kantian
system use different sources of cognition and thus one cannot start with one source and work
backwards, as it were, to find further explanations in another. At the very least, this is not a
universal rule that can be applied in every instance and as a consequence it is not a rule that
should be applied at all, if it cannot be consistent.

Maimon’s second critique continues on in that vein seeking an adequate explanation of the
‘community’29 between the a priori and the a posteriori. He notes that this question is the
same as the question he deems the most important in all ‘previous philosophy’ 30 , the
community of the soul and the body or the question as to the world’s ‘arising’31, as matter,
from ‘an intelligence’32. He addresses these questions through the contradiction that arises in
the relationship between the understanding and objects. The objects must be subject to the
rules and conditions of the understanding, but they are not created by the understanding (and
thus the understanding’s self-prescribed rules). As Maimon puts it, they come from
‘elsewhere’33. This is significant because it means that they must be subject to alternate rules.
It seems implausible that the understanding should be able to subject the object to its
‘power’34 whilst the object is not literally in its power. How are the rules the object is subject
to and the rules the understanding dispenses upon it not in contention with each other? Or

26 Maimon, S. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 35

27 Ibid p. 35
28 Ibid p. 35
29 Ibid p. 36
30 Ibid p. 37
31 Ibid p. 38
32 Ibid p.38
33 Ibid p. 36
34 Maimon, S. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 38
alternatively, how can the object shirk its original rules and become subservient to the
understanding? As Maimon remarks, these issues are ‘insoluble.’35

Having previously critiqued Kant according to the question quid juris, which Maimon treats
as meaning, can we use (it) legitimately, he now engages, in a rather different way, with
Kant’s deduction of the categories, in particular, the concept of causation. Kant’s causation
stems from the hypothetical judgment in logic. Maimon believes we have inferred causation
from material objects and transferred it into logic. Thus he investigates causation in the
material world using the term quid facti, as his mode of inquiry. Here he questioning whether
the fact (in this case causation) is apodictically true and thus can be used in relation to actual
objects. Thus Maimon tackles the judgment of experience, deduced from causation, presented
in the Prolegomena36with a similar example of his own. Here Maimon channels Hume, as he
argues that to say a fire warms a stone is not to describe the necessity of the ‘succession of the
two appearances’37, (the fire and the warmed stone) and thus is not a judgment of experience
but a perception still. For Kant, in the Prolegomena, the perception must be ‘brought under a
concept of the understanding’38 before it is transformed from a judgment of perception to one
of experience. In this scenario, causation is that concept of understanding. Yet Maimon
declares that when the fire warms the stone what we do indubitably see is an ‘association’39 of
perceptions. This, as mentioned earlier is a Humean argument, and clearly one Maimon
upholds. In response to the idea that Kant has thus proved that the forms could not have been
transferred to logic from experience, Maimon proposes the following Humean response: ‘the
concept of cause…’ 40 could not be present in ‘symbolic’ 41 cognition as it is not in the
‘nature’42 of our thought. One can take this to mean that without objects of experience one
cannot engage with the narrative of causation, as events are a posteriori. Thus the Humean
perspective has rendered causation, and thus the hypothetical judgment, as one that cannot be
declared an indubitable fact, nor an a priori presence. Maimon declares the logic
‘untrustworthy’43, as it fails to answer affirmatively the question quid facti and thus insists
concepts that ‘determine particular objects’44 be removed from logic.

35 Ibid p. 36
36 Kant, I. (eds) Prolegomena e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 36
37 Maimon, S. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 42
38 Kant, I. (eds) Prolegomena e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 20
39 Maimon, S. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 42
40 Ibid p. 42
41 Ibid p. 43
42 Ibid p. 43
43 Maimon, S. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 43
44 Ibid p. 43
Fichte in the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge addresses Maimon’s claim that
Kant has essentially replaced Descartes’ mind-body problem with a form of his own and that
the chasm between understanding and sensibility remains in Beiser’s words, ‘unbridgeable’45.
Fichte argues that we have no reason to assume the categories apply directly to our
sensibility. Fichte thinks that a more useful question would challenge the premise that objects
are ‘given independent of the activity of the imagination’46. Whilst Fichte admits Maimon’s
scepticism is apt, that we have no reason to assume a connection between the concepts and
the objects, he believes that we must if we are to avoid concluding that all experience is
illusory. Here, Fichte argues in a similar manner to Kant, when arguing for the practical.
Rather than argue for the innate legitimacy of the imagination, Fichte argues for its practical
necessity. Here we have series of notions that are not immediately connected that Fichte
assembles to refute Maimon’s sceptic position. We have the notion that ‘all experience is the
work of the imagination’, we also know that illusion is anti-truth. In addition we know that
we want to avoid illusion and thus scepticism and more importantly that we want truth.
Lastly, it is argued that the ‘activity of the imagination’ 47 is inescapable. In Beiser Fichte ties
all these together by stating that ‘the activity of the imagination’ provides the rule of truth.
This is not the case. By declaring the activity of the imagination to be ‘true’ 48 we avoid
floundering in confusion. But Fichte here is just choosing the appearance of resolution over
the actuality. He has admitted that we cannot tie the understanding to the objects; there are
serious flaws within the presumptions of dualism. His response amongst other things is highly
pragmatic, more pragmatic than it is intellectually sincere.

However Fichte has a more compelling argument that we shall attempt to cover fully here.
Maimon called the fundamental dilemma for the critical philosopher, ‘the universal antimony
of thought’49. Maimon believes there to be ‘discrepancy between our ideal of knowledge’50
and the finite nature of our selves. Fichte’s antithesis is inspired by Maimon’s antimony. For
Fichte we are individuals that should be autonomous but instead we are dictated and
controlled by our environment. We are divided dualistically and our sensibility is determined
by nature. In order to live, as Fichte believes we should, we need to gain control over nature,
reverse the relationship between the self and the natural world. This is impossible for mere
mankind and Fichte knows this. His option is of the Sisyphean sort; we are to eternally strive
towards that which we cannot ever truly attain. Needless to say by challenging Kant’s

45 Beiser, F. (eds) German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism e-book, accessed on 4th April 2014 p. 250

46 Ibid p. 253
47 Ibid p. 253
48 Ibid p. 253
49 Ibid p. 256
50 Ibid p. 256
problematic dualism in this way, Fichte certainly improves upon Kant. Yet one might argue it
is a pyrrhic victory; a life sentence of striving does not a metaphysical problem solve.

Fichte’s frustrations with the limitations the external world pose on the individual can be seen
through his primacy of the practical. Expanding upon Kant’s it is impossible to separate
Fichte’s primacy of activity from his desire to gain control over the natural world. Kant does
also see the primacy of the practical, as evidenced by the second Critique (albeit for different
reasons). For him the concept of freedom is proven by practical reason (or rather the
‘apodictic law of it’51). Freedom as a concept is the grounds for ‘all other concepts’52; Kant
specifically mentions God and immortality in this regard. In the second Critique the practical
reason is ‘the consciousness of moral law’ 53 . For Kant one’s will is ‘determined by this
law’54. In addition, to Kant practical reason is not about knowledge or even the ‘possibility’55
of knowledge. The ideas are simply not subject to an ontological inquiry – Kant admits he
cannot affirm our knowledge or understanding of them. The will is applied to objects, via
these ideas; the ideas are ‘conditions’56. The will is given to the object via the prism made up
of ideas. We thus can only assume the possibility of these ideas. Even as we assume their
possibility, we cannot know them theoretically. From the theoretical perspective all we have
is a ‘merely subjective principle of assent’57. It is considered ‘objectively valid’58 by reason as
‘pure’59 as the speculative reason. The principle of pure but practical reason confers upon the
ideas of God and immortality, via the ‘concept of freedom’ 60, ‘authority’ 61 and ‘objective
reality’62. This is what Kant describes as a ‘subjective necessity’ 63. It is essential for pure
reason, according to Kant that we ascribe this authority on the ideas and conditions of
practical reason. Regarding the primacy, Kant defines it as ‘the prerogative of the interest of
one insofar as the interests of others is subordinated to it’64. He thinks practical reason has this
primacy. Practical reason is not shackled to the subjective desires of the individual. It is

51 Kant, I. (eds) The Critique of Practical Reason e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 3

52 Ibid p. 3
53 Ibid p. 4
54 Ibid p. 4
55 Ibid p. 4
56 Ibid p. 4
57 Ibid p. 4
58 Ibid p. 4
59 Ibid p. 4
60 Ibid p. 4
61 Ibid p.4
62 Kant, I. (eds) The Critique of Practical Reason e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 4
63 Ibid p. 4
64 Ibid p. 157
‘pure’ and independent of what Kant calls ‘pathological conditions’ 65. He asserts that ‘all
interest is ultimately practical’66. He deems theoretical reason ‘conditional’67, only complete
in ‘practical use’68.

Fichte’s primacy of the practical is quite distinct from Kant’s. The foundations of Fichte’s
philosophy are activity; his philosophy is founded on the notion of the self-positing I, the
fact/act: the Tathandlung. The existence of the I is posited by itself, affirmed by acting upon
itself. The I positing itself is the first instance of Fichte’s primacy of the practical. The
practical has primacy because it explains the ‘fundamental presupposition of theoretical
reason’69, the existence of a world outside itself. Fichte’s practical reason, by giving us the
existence of an external world, gives us conditions for moral action. We are thus permitted to
hold particular beliefs about religion and morality because for Fichte these moral beliefs are
‘goals for action’70. Practical reason grants us both ‘medium and means’ 71 through which we
can strive towards what Kant called the summum bonum. Fichte is less interested in us
holding personal beliefs than the fact that they can be utilised as impetus to moral and social
good. The third reason Fichte makes practical reason superior to theoretical is because he
believes that we know objects through activity directed by the will which takes place in the
external world. One can argue that Maimon’s critique of Kant’s understanding and sensibility,
his query as to how objects can be subject to the understanding when they come from the
external world is being addressed by Fichte’s primacy here. Fichte’s primacy of the practical
differs from Kant’s because it believes activity necessary for intellectual knowledge.

As to whether it improves upon Kant’s, it certainly improves upon it by if not avoiding, then
lessening the significance of Maimon’s critique of the understanding. Fichte’s primacy of the
practical improves on Kant’s with regard to the weight it gives unsupported moral theory.
Fichte believes in the necessity or the value of religious ideals as a means to end. One can
argue that Fichte is not really advancing beyond Kant in this regard. Rather Fichte upholds
Kant’s perspective in the first Critique in which he states that the idea is a ‘regulative
principle’ 72 and should remain thus. Fichte’s argument that theoretical reason requires
practical reason to grant it existence is a robust and plausible argument. Theoretical reason

65 Ibid p. 157
66 Ibid p. 157
67 Ibid p. 157
68 Ibid p. 159
69 Beiser, F. (eds) German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism e-book, accessed on 4th April 2014 p. 232

70 Ibid p. 234
71 Ibid p. 233

72 Kant, I. (eds) The Critique of Pure Reason e-book accessed 3rd March 2014 p. 392-93
tends to presume an external world, practical reason gives the presumption reality, and in
doing so reveals why it must precede it. This also advances Kant’s assumption that all reason
is practical reason – all reason certain requires and presumes practical reason and thus if
practical reason is a condition of theoretical reason then to some extent all reason does
involve the practical. The theoretical could not manifest without it. Of course one could argue
that being contingent on is very different from being the same as and we would concede that
point noting that practical reason is perhaps a part of theoretical reason. It is required in order
that theoretical reason makes sense, that its presumptions are not hollow. Thus it precedes and
encompasses it. In that sense all reason can be seen as practical.

Kant’s comment in the second Critique that it was still ‘one and the same reason which
whether theoretical or practical judges according to a priori principles’73 can be seen as his
perspective on the unity of theoretical and practical reason. As Beiser notes Kant failed to
explain the source of this unity. In many ways there was not much for Fichte to improve
upon, there was merely room for Fichte to explain.

As mentioned prior to this conclusion, the decision was made to focus this essay on the major
question of critical philosophy at the expense of elaborating on Fichte’s theoretical and
practical unity. Keeping that aside and considering the three major differences it did discuss,
this essay will conclude that Fichte’s significant improvement was in the understanding and
sensibility. In the body of the essay I referred to it as a pyrrhic victory. This is because we
have gained clarity and insight into our fundamental problem; our desire to be autonomous
and to attain knowledge is permanently and irreparably hampered by our subservience to
nature. However the victory of that insight has revealed the futility of our efforts – futility
Fichte believes we should entrench in literature and continue to adhere to and we are without
alternate satisfying options.

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