PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO
M AGLALANG
[198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]
Facts:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending
ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing,
among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now
granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to
the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed
a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow
it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused
will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held:
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital
offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule
that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CARPIO VS.
[196 SCRA 41; G.R. NO. 78162; 19 APR 1991]
Facts:
On January 8, 1987, information for the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan Bataan
was filed against Escaño and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the RTC
of Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order
of arrest against Escaño recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who
acted on the warrant returned to the court with a certification issued by NBI agent Gonzales,
stating therein that accused was still under investigation.
Through counsel Rolando T. Cainoy, Escaño filed in court an urgent ex-parte motion for his
commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be where his family
and counsel could have easy access to him. He alleged therein that his detention at the NBI
headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the warrant of arrest issued by the court.
This was granted.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed physical
custody of Escaño for the identification of the other accused in the case who were still the
objects of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI agents that the other
accused and suspects in the case were subversive elements or members of the New People's
Army, it was for the best interest of Escaño that he be detained at the NBI lock-up cell where
security measures were adequate; and that the NBI would produce the person of Escaño before
the court whenever required and every time that there would be a hearing on the case. However
another motion was executed by Escaño stating that he now wants to be detained in the NBI,
alleging that he did not authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escaño's counsel
Rolando T. Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escaño was arrested by NBI agents
on December 7, 1986 without a warrant having been presented to him and that since then he
had been detained in the lock-up cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a warrant,
searched his house when he was arrested; that he was subjected to inhuman torture and forced
to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to implicate other persons, and that
during the custodial investigation, he was not represented by counsel. In opposing said
application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital offense
for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons advanced in said application would be
overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was
represented by counsel. The court granted the application for bail fixing the same at P30,000,
having found no sufficient evidence against accused. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his
actions and so as not to be considered in contempt.
Issue:
Whether or Not the order granting right to bail was proper.
Held:
No. The order granting bail had been rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been
released from NBI custody, but also because Escaño jumped bail and did not appear on the
date set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the issue of the legality of the
order granting bail to Escaño. Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the
accused, in the judicial determination of the availability of said right, the prosecution should be
afforded procedural due process. Thus, in the summary proceeding on a motion praying for
admission to bail, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to present evidence and,
thereafter, the court should spell out at least a resume of the evidence on which its order
granting or denying bail is based. Otherwise, the order is defective and voidable. In the case at
bar the RTC erred in not summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely
stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to
Escaño.
The facts, however, that Mayor Payumo was killed on August 20, 1986 when the 1973
Constitution allowing the death penalty was still in force and that the application for bail was
made on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which abolished the death
penalty, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the application for bail in accordance with
the Constitution and procedural rules. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides
that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has
been replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt
is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all
accused. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital punishment"
in Section 4, Rule 114 has been amended to reclusion perpetua, the court should have
proceeded accordingly: i.e., resolved the application for bail pursuant to Section 13, Article III of
the Constitution. It did not have to invoke the abolition of the death penalty and the lack of
legislative enactment restoring it in justifying the grant of bail. All it had to do was to determine
whether evidence of guilt is strong in the light of the provision of Section 13, Article III.
The RTC has the discretion in the consideration of the strength of the evidence at hand.
However, in the exercise of said discretion, the court is controlled by the following: first, the
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court
may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of
the laws of the land. 27 The lower court not only failed to properly apply the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution and the Rules but it also disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take
into account the factual milieu surrounding the detention of Escaño.
PEOPLE VS. FORTES
[223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]
Facts:
Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to
report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was
apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional release.
The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was
denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue
denial of his constitutional right to bail.
Issue:
Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.
Held:
No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of
guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of
right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA
[200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to
appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of
the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the
provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred
to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at
the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again
after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990,
to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be
deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-
emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release
and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional
Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on
petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy
trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge
investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right
of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454,
the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Baylon v Judge Sison
[243 SCRA 284; A.M. No. 92-7-360-0; 06 Apr 1995]
FACTS:
A case for double murder against several accused was docketed and later raffled to respondent
judge. The accused then filed a petition for bail which was heard and granted by the trial court
despite opposition from the prosecution.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the prosecution is entitled to be heard in a petition for bail.
RULING:
YES. When an accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, a
hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the motion is resolved in summary proceedings or in the
course of regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present all the evidence
that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused before the court resolves the
motion for bail. Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence, or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing, or ask
searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt,
or lack of it, against the accused.
Respondent judge is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
Tucay v Judge Domagas
[242 SCRA 110; A.M. No. RTJ-95-12186; 02 March 1995]
FACTS:
Ludovico Ellamil, Bernardo Ellamil and Melchor Ellamil are accused of murder. Teresita Tucay,
the wife of the victim, is the complainant. A petition for bail was filed on behalf of the accused
Bernardo Ellamil. The petition was denied by respondent judge on the ground that it did not bear
the conformity of the provincial prosecutor.
A second petition for bail was filed by the accused with the prayer that he be allowed to post bail
in the amount of P50,000.00. This time, the petition contained the notation "No objection" of
Provincial Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo. Without holding a hearing to determine whether
the evidence of the prosecution was strong, respondent judge issued an order on the same day,
in which he granted bail and directed the release of accused from detention
The present complaint was filed, protesting the grant of bail without hearing and without notice to
trial fiscal, Atty. Tita Villarin, of the Provincial Prosecutor's recommendation for approval of the
bond. It is alleged that the assessed value of the property given as bond is only P47,330.00,
and, therefore, is short of the amount fixed for the release of the accused.
Complainant alleged that respondent judge required the accused, Bernardo Ellamil, to post an
additional bond only after she had pointed out the deficiency of the original property bond. She
further alleged that the provincial prosecutor recommended no bail, despite the fact that MCTC
Judge Rodrigo Nabor who, had ordered the arrest of the accused after a preliminary
investigation, had fixed no bail for his temporary release.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the letter-complaint was sent, finds the
respondent judge grossly ignorant of the law in granting bail without a hearing in a criminal case
involving a capital offense and recommends that he be fined and given a stern warning. It
likewise points out that, in his order releasing the accused on bail, the judge did not state that he
was granting the petition for bail but simply ordered him released.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a hearing is required for posting additional bond.
HELD:
Yes. We agree with the foregoing observations of the OCA. We wish to add that, although the
Provincial Prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent
judge should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained
from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application. He should
have called a hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines in Rule 114,
Sec. 6 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in fixing the amount of the bail. As it
is, the respondent judge simply fixed the amount of bail at P50,000 and ordered the release of
the accused. It turned out that the property given as security for the bond had a market value of
only P42,940. Although it appears that an additional bond was later posted, this was done only
after the complainant had objected to the bond. In failing to observe these rudimentary
requirements, the respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law for which he should be
fined.
De los Santos-Reyes v. Judge Montesa
[247 SCRA 85; A.M. No. RTJ-93-983; 07 August 1995]
Facts:
On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain Pedro Panganiban and Armando
Vitug were ambushed along Ipo-road, Kay-pian, San Juan del Monte, Bulacan, resulting in the
untimely death of Reyes and Panganiban. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an...
inquisition of the incident and after which charged petitioners Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo
Bolsico, together with Romeo Adviento, Romeo Permejo, Rolando Gozum and four (4) John
Does with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder before the Municipal Trial Court of San
Jose... del Monte, then presided over by Judge Virginia Pagarogon.
Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the witnesses and on November 14,
1990 issued an order admitting the complaint and ordering the detention of all the accused after
finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is reasonable ground to...
believe that the accused are probably guilty thereof. No bail was recommended.
Judge Pagarogon then forwarded the records of the cases to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
of Bulacan for appropriate action. The Investigating Prosecutor, without conducting a thorough
investigation of the cases, concluded that there was no probable cause and ordered... motu
proprio the release of the accused from custody. So, the widow of Patrolman Reyes petitioned
the Department of Justice to disqualify the Provincial Prosecutor's Office from conducting the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases.
In due course, the DOJ acted favorably on the petition and designated State Prosecutor
Santiago Turingan to take over and handle the cases. The State Prosecutor found probable
cause for murder and frustrated murder against all the accused and consequently, they were...
formally charged with said crimes on March 13, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 487-M-91, 488-M-91 and 489-M-91. No bail was
recommended and the corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.
The accused were quick to learn of the filing of the informations. On the same day (March 13,
1991), they filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest,"
praying for the suspension of court proceedings on the ground that they are filing a... petition for
review of the resolution of the State Prosecutor.
On March 21, 1991, the accused, who were not yet arrested or placed under the jurisdiction of
the trial court (after their precipitate release earlier), filed a "Petition to Grant Bail" in C.C. Nos.
487-M-91 and 488-M-91 and a "Petition to Reduce Bail in C.C. No. 489-M-91.
On March 25, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying the petitions since the accused had
not yet surrendered and/or apprehended and, therefore, the court has not acquired jurisdiction
over their persons.
On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of heart, issued an order consolidating
the petitions for bail, set them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the DOJ and/or the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the preliminary... investigation of
the cases within ten (10) days from notice.
Respondent judge asserts that he is not administratively liable for what he did because he was
merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix,[3] to the effect that the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be... personally determined by the judge.
Since in these cases the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on the certification
of the state prosecutor, he granted the motion to quash the warrants of arrest and, considering
that on the date of the hearing to... determine probable cause the witnesses for the prosecution
did not appear and the private prosecutor submitted the issue on the basis of the proceedings
had at the preliminary investigation and the affidavits of witnesses, he formally resolved it on
such basis.
He further... alleges that since he found the evidence purely circumstantial, except as against
Romeo Permejo who was positively identified as the gunman, he believed that the evidence of
guilt as against the others was not strong and, accordingly, admitted them to bail in the amount
of
P80,000.00 each.
Issues:
In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes charges the respondent
judge with gross ignorance of law and evident dishonesty in the performance of his work in that
he granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 487-M-91,... 488-M-91, and 488-M-91
without the required petition for bail and without conducting any hearing to accord the
prosecution an opportunity to establish that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.
Ruling:
The explanation of the respondent judge is wholly unacceptable for, contrary to his belief that he
has shown perfect knowledge of the rules on the issuance of warrants of arrest and grant of bail,
he has demonstrated either gross ignorance of the constitutional and statutory... principles and
settled jurisprudence thereon or gross incompetence which no claim of good faith can exculpate
or even mitigate.
From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the criminal cases before
the trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed their petitions to grant bail and to reduce bail,
motion to reinstate petition to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants... of arrests before
the court acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective service and
enforcement of the warrants of arrest or their voluntary surrender, i.e., before they were placed
in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their... liberty.
Such being so, the trial court, initially, denied correctly the petition for grant of bail but
subsequently disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted on the motion to
reinstate the petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on 6
April 1991, directing, for that purpose the Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the preliminary investigation.
In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of his liberty.[4] While it may be true that the disregard of this precept was
not consummated, it was not because the... respondent judge corrected himself, but because
the accused withdrew their petition for the grant of bail and opted to pursue their urgent motion
to quash the warrants of arrest grounded on want of probable cause. Instead of retracing his
steps back to the proper judicial path,... the respondent judge, still forgetting that the accused
remained scot-free, not only quashed the warrants of arrest, but, thereafter motu proprio
converted, in effect, the "hearing" for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, which... he set on 15 May 1991, to a hearing on the matter of admission to
bail, as his order of 17 May 1991 indisputably shows. In so doing, the respondent judge had
either utterly confused the proceeding to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest from the... proceeding on a petition for admission to bail, or deliberately ignored the
basic requisites for the grant of bail.
Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was then nothing to be heard
or acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they did not withdraw their petition, they have no right
to invoke the processes of the court since they have not been placed in... the custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the filing of the
information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the petition.
At the very least, the respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence. Gross ignorance of law
and incompetence are characteristics and quirks impermissible in a judge. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural... rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.[16] He should be studious of the
principles of the law,[17] and he must be faithful to the law and must maintain professional
competence.[
The respondent judge does not have an enviable record as a living personification of justice and
the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of law or incompetence and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, respondent Judge CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of
Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the
service... with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
service of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial
courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial
judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982,
of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise
prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him
for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has
no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right
to travel.
conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City
Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard
to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.

Issue:

Whether or Not the right to bail a matter of right.

Held:

The right to bail is a matter of right if the charge is not a capital offense or punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA

[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]

Facts:

Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge
of Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner
Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of
the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was
jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600,
petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case
did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held:

Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at
bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can