CASE DIGEST: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA G.R. No.

88550 (184 SCRA 462) Case Digest

Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:
· Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy Development
(BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to
contract for the additional three coal blocks.
· IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI
and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.
· IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy
Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to
finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted back.
· Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was
dismissed
· Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
· RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.
· CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract
cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived
from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the
determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI
would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of
rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the
rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in
its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy
of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three
(3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas
should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas
involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized
expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning
activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal.
These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative
agency.
 Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Nino Residents Association, Inc.GR No. 158455. June
28, 2005

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari dismissing civil action on the ground of litis pendenia and forum
shopping. Petitioner is the register owner of 2 parcels of land in Muntinlupa, Rizal. In 2002, petitioner filed a
Complaint for quieting oftitle against respondents and Land Management Bureau, alleging among others,
respondents unlawfully entered and occupied the lots in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Among said unauthorized persons
are members and officers of respondents. From all indications, LMB is set to recommend to the Philippine
Government, [through] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the “nullification” of TCT Nos. 131918 and
131919 and/or the reversion thereof to the Philippine Government, despite the fact that the latter, sometime
in 1927 or thereabout, sold and/or disposed of subject lots, then covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 684, pursuant to Act No. 1120 and other pertinent laws. Petitioner is the third or fourth transferee and
buyer in good faith of the lots in question. Petitioner prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
ordering the LMB to cease and desist from proceeding with the hearings in LMB Case No. 7-98, a case pending
before it where petitioner’s titles to the subject lots were being questioned by the respondents SSNRAI and
Nilda Devilleres.

Respondents filed an MTD contending forum shopping and litis pendentia. Such contention was opposed by
petitioner.

The petitioner pointed out that in LMB Case No. 7-98, the private respondents (as the petitioners therein)
sought the declaration of the nullity of the said titles issued in its favor, on their claim that their issuance was
“highly irregular and erroneous,” and that the subject properties were not disposed of in accordance with Act
No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. On the other hand, inSP Civil Action No. 02-237, the
petitioner’s right of action was based on the privateer spondents’ act of disturbing and casting clouds over TCT
Nos. 131918 and 131919, considering that such titles have long become indefeasible and conclusive.
Trial Court: dismissed on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was forum shopping and whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:
Yes, there was forum shopping and Lands Management Bureau has the proper jurisdiction in this case. The
Supreme Court held that the courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view. And in such cases, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence,
in this case, the LMB.

Machete et, al., vs CA Case Digest GR No. 109093 November 20, 1995
Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the RTC of Tagbilaran
City against herein petitioners. The alleged facts are:

1) That parties entered into a leasehold agreement regarding private respondent’s landholdings and herein
petitioners shall pay a certain amount or percentage of their harvest.

2) That herein petitioners failed to pay their respective rental despite repeated demands of private respondent.
3) That petitioner moved to the dismissal of the case on the ground, of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
arguing that the instance case is an agrarian dispute and therefore within the jurisdiction of Department of
Agrarian and Reform Adjudication Board.

Issue:

1 Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants.

Ruling:

1 The court held that collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants is within the jurisdiction of DARAB and the
SC defined “agrarian dispute” as any controversy relating to tenural arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers’
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial agreements. However, Sec. 56 of RA 6657 confers special jurisdiction on
Special Agrarian Courts which are RTC designated by the SC, regarding petitions for the determination of just
compensation and prosecution of criminal offense under Act. 16.

The SC furthered averred that failure to pay back rentals pursuant to leasehold contract is an issue which is
clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER
CO., INC., respondents. G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997

Facts:
The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140) hectares to four (4) different
owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain, but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which
he acquired the property, have been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime.
After acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.

In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber Co.Inc. However, an
“Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having
complied all the requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property since then.
Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over the property to bolster his claim which
the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same year as proof of an “Order of Award” issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made several collateral and
extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that
petitioner no longer has any substantial rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the
subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands. Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration at the Ministry of Natural Resources which likewise dismissed the petition.

On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity of Contract ( Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the contract), and
Damages” at about the same time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the
Office of the President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioner’s heir substituted in his behalf to pursue
the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance of the case ordered the case dismissed,
on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the contract and was
estopped from proving its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2)
(e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or laches.
The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by upholding the lower court’s
ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid.

HELD:
No. The provision of the law is specific that public lands can only be acquired in the manner provided for therein
and not otherwise(Sec. 11, CA. No. 141, as amended). In his sales application, petitioner expressly admitted that
said property was public land. This is formidable evidence as it amounts to an admission against interest. The
records show that Villaflor had applied for the purchase of lands in question with this Office (Sales Application
V-807) on 2 December 1948. There is a condition in the sales application to the effect that he recognizes that
the land covered by the same is of public domain and any and all rights he may have with respect thereto by
virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation are relinquished to the Government of which Villaflor is very
much aware. It also appears that Villaflor had paid for the publication fees appurtenant to the sale of the land.
He participated in the public auction where he was declared the successful bidder. He had fully paid the
purchase price thereof. It would be a height of absurdity for Villaflor to be buying that which is owned by him
if his claim of private ownership thereof is to be believed. The area in dispute is not the private property of the
petitioner.

It is a basic assumption of public policy that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated
in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied from the government. It is indispensable then that there be
showing of title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. Such sales applicant
manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the application was submitted, all of its acts prior thereof,
including its real estate tax declarations, characterized its possessions of the land as that of a “sales applicant”.
And consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its owner.

The rule on the interpretation of contracts (Article 1371) is used in affirming, not negating, their validity. Article
1373,which is a conjunct of Article 1371, provides that, if the instrument is susceptible of two or more
interpretations, the interpretation which will make it valid and effectual should be adopted. In this light, it is
not difficult to understand that the legal basis urged by petitioner does not support his allegation that the
contracts to sell and the deed of relinquishment are simulated and fictitious. Simulation occurs when an
apparent contract is a declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to
produce, for the purpose of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from
that which was really executed. Such an intention is not apparent in the agreements. The intent to sell, on the
other hand, is as clear as daylight. The fact, that the agreement to sell (7 December 1948) did not absolutely
transfer ownership of the land to private respondent, does not how that the agreement was simulated.
Petitioner‟s delivery of the Certificate of Ownership and execution of the deed of absolute sale were suspensive
conditions, which gave rise to a corresponding obligation on the part of the private respondent, i.e., the payment
of the last installment of the consideration mentioned in the Agreement. Such conditions did not affect the
perfection of the contract or prove simulation Nonpayment, at most, gives the vendor only the right to sue for
collection. Generally, in a contract of sale, payment of the price is a resolutory condition and the remedy of the
seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach, to rescind the contract under Article 1191 of the
Civil Code. However, failure to pay is not even a breach, but merely an event which prevents the vendor‟s
obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force.

The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act are: (1) the possession of the qualifications
required by said Act (under Section 29) and (2) the lack of the disqualifications mentioned therein (under
Sections 121, 122,and 123). Section 121 of the Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a corporation from
a grantee: The private respondent, not the petitioner, was the direct grantee of the disputed land. Sections 122
and 123 disqualify corporations, which are not authorized by their charter, from acquiring public land; the
records do not show that private respondent was not so authorized under its charter.
CASE DIGEST: PAAT VS. CA
11:05 AM
G.R. No. 111107
Leonardo Paat vs. CA
January 10, 1997

The truck of private respondent was seized and confiscated by the DENR because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Private respondents filed before the courts a suit for replevin
(recovery of personal property) despite the pending administrative resolution. Private respondents contended that the DENR
had no legal authority to seize the items and that said authority lies on the court as provided for in Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277.

RULING:

The Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Private respondents could not
say they were deprived of due process, knowing that an administrative proceeding is pending before the DENR,
who was yet to render a resolution on the controversy.

The Court also ruled that private respondents miserably failed to prove the wrongful detention of the subject truck confiscated. It
should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit
of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives
of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

The Court clarifies that with the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act
of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the
penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 122363 Supreme Court 2nd Division (Bellosillo, J.)

Victor Valencia vs. Court of Appeals April 29, 2003

FACTS:
Victor Valencia, a government retiree, owned two parcels of land, which he leased out to Glicerio Henson for
ten (10) years. Henson constituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on the property during his
lease. Valencia then leased the same land to Fr. Andres Flores for five years after the expiration of the first lease
contract. Fr. Flores also designated several people as workers, including Crescenciano and Marciano. The
petitioner acquired said parcels of land through a homestead grant by the government.

After the expiration of the contract between Valencia and Flores, the petitioner demanded the workers to
vacate the said land. However, the workers refused and continued cultivating the land. They applied for
Certificates of Land Transfer under the Operation Land Transfer Program of PD 27, instead. The Department
of Agrarian Reform granted the applications and CLTs were issued to the respondents.

Valencia then filed actions for recovery of possession over the subject land on the ground that the tenants and
the government unjustly withheld these lands from him. He also contested the existence of the tenancy
relationship between him and the tenant-beneficiaries.

ISSUE:
Were the subject lands wrongfully taken from the petitioner?

LAW:
RA 3844, Sec. 6 states that a Civil Law Lessee is not automatically authorized to employ a tenant without the
consent of the landowner.

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The subject lands were unlawfully taken from Valencia when the
Department of Agriculture issued Certificates of Land Transfer to the respondents (tenants). First, the lands in
question were acquired by the petitioner through a homestead grant, which is excluded from the coverage of
PD 27. Second, the tenant-beneficiaries were not really tenants of the landowner. The lessee, Fr. Flores, was the
one who hired the workers to cultivate the land. Such designation of workers was beyond the scope of authority
of a Civil Law Lessee and was made without the consent of the landowner. The security of tenure guaranteed
by the laws may only be invoked by tenants de jure, and not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The
Court also emphasized that while it is true that in case of reasonable doubt, the it has to tilt the balance in favor
of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion, it is never justified to give
preference to the poor simply because they are poor or reject the rich simply because they are rich. Justice must
always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the mandate of the law.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Facts:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and
leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would
later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a
TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these
events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim
that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA
between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution

w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110
of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan and Violeta J. Josef,
Respondents,
G.R. No. 165036; 5 July 2010
Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe, Respondent, G.R. No. 175705; 5 July 2010

Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Exam she took
in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the Board of Accountancy (Board),
requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was shown her answer sheets but since these showed
only shaded marks, she was unable to determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently, she asked the Board
for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an explanation of the grading system
(collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets,
and reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made only on grounds of mechanical error in the
grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination
Papers (other than the answer sheets) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The
Board later informed her that her exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found in the grading.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with application for preliminary mandatory injunction,
against the Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her
with all documents that would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her
answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended her Petition
to clarify that she only wanted access to the documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting in the
process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA. Petitioner passed the May 1998
CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her application for mandatory
injunction for being moot. She amended her Petition a second time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition
to access to the documents she had requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997
Exam results be made by the Board and the PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the
petition. On her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the
subsequent CPA examination did not render the petition moot because the relief “and if warranted, to issue to
her a certificate of registration as Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As
regards whether she had the constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC
resolved to let the parties first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered
the PRC to preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer keys for the
October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the case because: (1) the petition was mooted
when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of
1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and access to government documents; (3) the
Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she merely sought review of her failing marks;
(4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to
examination questions of a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she
did not elevate the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter
to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1)Whether or not petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the re-correction of her examination;
(2)Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies; (3)Whether or not the case was
mooted by petitioner’s passing the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4)Whether or not petitioner
has the constitutional right to have access to the Examination Papers.

Held:
(1) Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus.
In Agustin- Ramos vs. Sandoval [G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989 (Minute Resolution)], where the respondent
Judge was questioned for dismissing therein petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the Medical Board of
Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission to re-correct their ratings, the Supreme Court held that
“(t)he function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of
the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of
The Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of mandamus.”
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the
thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be equally clear.
No such clarity exists here. And despite petitioner’s assertion that she did not demand re-correction, the most
cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that respondents “make the appropriate
revisions on the results of her examination” belied this claim.

(2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the Board’s refusal to release the Examination
Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 223, the
PRC has the power to review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders and decisions
of the various professional Boards, including the results of their licensure examinations, and the decisions of
the Boards on administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
PRC within 30 days from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this power is not limited to
administrative investigations but encompasses requests for documents. And since the PRC itself issued the
resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to resolve questions
addressed to its area of expertise.
One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is the well-entrenched doctrine on separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily
(albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other departments. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.

Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to demand access to the Examination Papers was one such
question of law which cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.

(3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen possesses the inherent right
to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s belated passing of the CPA Board Exams did not
automatically mean that her interest in the Examination Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly,
the constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case would be repeated,
warranted review.

(4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is limited to “matters of
public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law” (Section 7, Article III,
1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public
interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The
Court has always grappled with the meanings of “public interest” and “public concern” which “embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,” and which are, in the final
analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521,
535 (1987)].
National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in
general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of
assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.
The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in
order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that
there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these
multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration.
The PRC, however, had not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or
articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Papers confidential. In view of the far-reaching
implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order
that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Ponente: J. Mariano C. del Castillo

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 – Anna

Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila with no ascendants or
descendants. She left properties worth P600,000.00 and a will written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before a Notary Public by the testatrix and her
witnesses.

In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she
was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence
of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously executed said will.

She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera; and the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the naked ownership of the building was left in
equal parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
 Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix.

Issues:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of
Dr. Rene Teotico?

Held:
1. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either
as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because
nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate.
She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by
the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our
Civil Code. It is true that she claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose and also an adopted daughter
of Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; … .”

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate
proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence
of record. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence.

Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she
was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years
prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of
a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make
her express the will of another rather than her own
3. On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castañeda v. Alemany, the
Court had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and
can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made
in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy
made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity
to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the
other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased
should also be set aside for the same reason.

HON. BARTOLOME C. CARALE, Chairman (NLRC) vs. HON. PAMPIO A. ABARINTOS

G.R. No. 120704. March 3, 1997.]

FACTS: Private respondent Pontejos was issued an original and permanent appointment dated January 10,
1989 as “Labor and Employment Development Officer (RAB VII)” in the NLRC. In 1992, the aforesaid position
was reclassified as “Labor Arbitration Associate” Private respondent holds this position up to the present . . .

Petitioner Chairman of the NLRC, issued Administrative Order No. 10-03 series of 1994, detailing/reassigning
private respondent to the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City. Similar personnel actions, prior to and after
Pontejos’ reassignment to NLRC, Cebu City, were also effected by petitioner Carale pursuant to his exercise of
administrative authority and supervision over all NLRC officials and employees . . .Private respondent filed a
complaint before the RTC of Cebu City against herein petitioners for Illegal Transfer with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages.

Motions to dismiss were respectively filed by petitioner Ceniza and Carale, arguing that it is the Civil Service
Commission which has exclusive jurisdiction over any question concerning personnel movement.
Respondent judge Abarintos issued the order denying petitioners’ Motions to Dismiss holding that alleged non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies before “where the surrounding circumstances of the matter before this
Court indicate an urgency of judicial intervention.” And Judge Abarintos granted prayer of PI

ISSUE: RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY OF THE TRANSFER ORDER
ISSUED BY PETITIONER CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION SINCE THE
CONTROVERSY IS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION.

HELD: The motions to dismiss separately filed in the trial court by petitioners Carale and Presiding
Commissioner Ceniza were principally anchored on lack of jurisdiction due to the failure of Pontejos to exhaust
administrative remedies. Obviously, the petitioners failed to appreciate that non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature, i.e., the claimed cause of action is not ripe
for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. Their motions
to dismiss must then be understood to be based on: (a) lack of jurisdiction; and (b) lack of cause of action for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; ELABORATED. — Observance of the mandate regarding

exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy. It ensures an orderly procedure which
favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of
the administrative agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative agency by
withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to
swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide
the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for this principle. The administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates
a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration the
courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. Accordingly, the party with an administrative
remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to
its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

EXCEPTIONS; NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek
administrative relief, which was both available and sufficient. Initially, he could have asked for reconsideration
of the detail order, failing which, he could have gone directly to the CSC, through the MSPB. But nothing in the
complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-16671 convinces us that Pontejos ever thought of pursuing the available
administrative remedies. Neither do we find sufficient basis for his invocation of the exception to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. What he offered were nothing but vague and general averments that
could best qualify as motherhood statements. Further, they were unsupported by allegations of fact or law
which would prima facie bring his case within any of the accepted exceptions to the rule, namely: (1) where the
question is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high government
official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and (6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

Calub and Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber.
Thedrivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of
DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by acomposite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil.
Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners
DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with
an application for replevin, is a suit against the State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a
public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities
within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and
enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing
their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no
malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against
the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino vs Jose Cuisia

G.R. No. 106064 – 472 SCRA 505 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Executive Department – Qualified
Political Agency – when not applied – Borrowing Powers of the President

During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s external
debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate
the program for foreign debts, they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. The
spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children
who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the buyback and
bond-conversion schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract”• or “guarantee”•
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power, unlike
other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines nor such power can be delegated to them.
Constantino argued that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires
that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an
entity specifically named by the Constitution, the Monetary Board, reinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President “alone and personally”• can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like
Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the President may contract
or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever, and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the
fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within
the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were
to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running
the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities, the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this
end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to
the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate
the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not
unconstitutional.

Exception

There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification
by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation
which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise
of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).

There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would
involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives
over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

Constitutional Law: Shipside Inc v Court of Appeals.

GR 143377, February 20, 2001

SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth
Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite certification on non-forum shopping
but failed to attach proof that the person signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed
the petition. The petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration which attached a secretary’s certificate
attesting to the signatory’s authority to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner.
When the court of CA denied the motion, the petitioner sought relief with the SC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision of CA recognizing the
belated filing of the certifications against forum shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further
held that with more reason should a petition be given due course when this incorporates a certification on non-
forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certifications was an authorized signatory and
the petitioner subsequently submits a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority in its motion
for consideration.

The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the signatory’s authority in signing the
certification of forum shopping.

VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

G.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into
the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed
bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent
recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted.
The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary injunction against the
Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order investigation
over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the power
to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was given the
authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86
of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision over administration of provinces,
municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order investigation
because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render power real and
effective.” However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not provided
in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor.
Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of
suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department secretaries,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The power to suspend may be exercised by the President.
It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the
President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are
assistants and agents of the President.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. L-46570