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ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

69 Phil 635; LAUREL; February 27, 1940

Facts:
- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the
majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The
union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; that the National
Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence
and functions of which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents.

Issue: WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR

Held: NO.
The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them.
It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory
arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture.
There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted
to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but
may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary
or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property
of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (6) The CIR or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang
Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity
to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is granted, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to
the CIR.

ASPREC V ITCHON
15 SCRA 921; SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966

NATURE: Petition for review

Facts:
-Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec
for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez
and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would survey Hernandez’ lot in Camarines Sur and
would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of the
survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months after the plan’s approval. However, even
if Hernandez paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly delivered
and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted was merely a certified copy of the
plan. It should also be noted that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel
had many times been absent, late, sick…which caused the delay of the proceedings.
-Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2) money was paid; Asprec
was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration
as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered.
-Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyor’s
certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint
against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary
injunction prayed for was rejected below
-CFI: dismiss with costs

ISSUES
1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the hearing
2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec
absented himself from it
3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings valid
(other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included)
Held: 1. NO
Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process. Really all that the law requires
to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an
opportunity to be heard.
Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and
counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial
tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the
act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason,
without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial.
2. YES
Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of
which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge
ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an
opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the
trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed
a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the
evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render
judgment upon evidence before it.
3. YES
Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules
of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings.
We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required
to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are
concerned with members of a board of surveyors — technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In
this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree
of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle
before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a
court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body.
Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original survey but a mere copy
from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez
manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he
was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions
and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the
manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not
present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a motion which for lack
of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this
technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked.
Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

VINTA MARITIME V NLRC (Basconcillo)


284 SCRA 656; PANGANIBAN; January 3, 1998

Nature:Special civil action of certiorari

Facts:
- Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) Workers’ Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc.
and Elkano Ship Management, Inc.
- The employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as
chief engineer of the M/V Boracay. They claim that he was given fair warning and enough opportunity
to explain his side, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work
performance before he was dismissed.
- The employee denied the allegations against him; contrary to his employer’s claim, he was actually
surprised when he was told of his dismissal. This occurred after he had a verbal altercation with a British
national, regarding the lack of discipline of the Filipino crew under the engineer’s supervision. No inquiry
or investigation, however, regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever
conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause
of his dismissal.
- POEA considered the case submitted for resolution by mutual agreement of the parties after submission
of their respective position papers and supporting documents. POEA Administrator Achacoso ruled that
private respondent was illegally dismissed.
- On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA.

ISSUE/S
1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative proceedings
2. WON the employee was illegally dismissed

Held: 1. NO
Ratio Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative agencies exercising
quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements.
DUE PROCESS- Cardinal Primary Rights
- In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to
have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an
adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.
- These rules equally apply to cases filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Adjudication Office. Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still
subject to the requirements of due process.
Reasoning Petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position paper and supporting
documents had become parts of the records and were considered by the POEA and by the NLRC.
2. YES
Ratio Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the
law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
- Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires NOTICE and HEARING. The employer
must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination can be legally effected: (1) notice which
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2)
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR (RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION)


86 SCRA 27; MUÑOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978

Nature:Petition for certiorari

Facts:
-In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the transportation business and operated what was then
known as the "Rural Transit".
-In that year, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the
management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which immediately ordered the
strikers to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing
before the dispute arose.
-While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge
driver Maximo Jacob from the service” for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in damage
to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which resulted in the "total destruction of bus 170" of
the company.
-The Rural Transit Employees Association denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due
to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob
-During the hearing of Bachrach’s petition, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, was
presented as the lone witness
-After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes
of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear
because he had left for abroad.
-The employee's association filed a motion praying that:
(a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records
(b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and
(c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up
to the date of his actual reinstatement.
-The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his
reinstatement with backwages
-Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari

Issue: WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob

Held: NO
Ratio
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal
or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a
fundamental right which is part of due process.
Reasoning
-CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner
presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed
however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left
for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent
association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.
-In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken
into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse
party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when
cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering
the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
-The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil
cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the
accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally
based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such
cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and
may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the
case.
-Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to
"8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob,
the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. CA (AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE)


G.R. No. 134625; MENDOZA; August 31, 1999

Nature:Petition for review

Facts:
 Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine
visitor’s visa. she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
 After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on
a twoyear leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican
and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to
the Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines."
 Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria
Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private
respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give
an oral defense.
 After going over private respondent’s dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo
JoaquinPaz that there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without proper
acknowledgment, from Balfour’s Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from
John Edye’s article entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed
by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting
Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal.
 Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four (4) out of the five (5)
panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on
the approval form.
 The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent’s graduation pending submission
of final copies of her dissertation.
 The University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of
school year 19921993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included
private respondent’s name.
 Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the
exclusion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification
of the problems regarding her dissertation.
 Dean Paz’s letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, the Board
approved the University Council’s recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including
private respondent. Two days later, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Anthropology.
 Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate
granted to her be withdrawn.
 Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent.
Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree
conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.
 In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.
 The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private
respondent’s doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The
University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents
on August 16, 1993.
 Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a
meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her.
 During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a
copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted
her written explanation in a letter.
 Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer
to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled but private respondent did not attend it, alleging
that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard.
 BOR withdrew degree
 TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by Arokiaswamy. CA reversed ordering BOR to restore her
doctoral degree.

Issue: WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process

Held: NO.
Reasoning In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent’s petition precisely on grounds of
academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due
process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its
recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioner’s Ph.D. degree, petitioner was
not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioner’s
subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to
investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held,
she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before
private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual
investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in
submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s
side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who
has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded
opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded. Private
respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her
case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board
of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those
in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

Disposition Petition for mandamus DISMISSED

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GARMENTS &


TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO.
(PHILS.), INC.
187 SCRA 409; GUTIERREZ, JR.; May 23, 1991

Nature: Appeal

Facts:
- GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations by the GTEB and, as a
result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB
decision, GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, contending that its right to
due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
- Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court issued a resolution ordering
GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS.
- However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition which the Court granted
- GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a
resolution.
- More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export quota
allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984.
- GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against it were not supported by evidence.
- Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision canceling its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress,
threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer
GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing
Corporation [DSA] and AIFC.
- GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter
into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were
allowed to service GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment.
- GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken to the Office of the President.
- At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal
claiming that the GTEB decision has long become final, and that a favorable action on the appeal would
result in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to it.
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in 1984
irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings.
- The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied.

Issues:
1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and
2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata on the ground that the final judgment in was a judgment
on the merits.

Held:
1. NO. In finding that GTEB proceedings were irregular, the OP didn’t commit GAD as GTEB indeed
violated the right to due process of Glorious. GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the
resolution against Glorious Sun. The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma
and the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in
the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in detail why the private respondent was denied
due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by the records.
RATIO: Evidence on record must be fully disclosed to the parties.
2. NO. - The dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits
of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot, under
the circumstances, constitute res judicata.
Reasoning:
- For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
. . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity between the two
cases, as to the parties, subject matter and cause of action.
- The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical
point." (Deang v. IAC).
- The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the
subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of the relevant documents.
- The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987
cured the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under the constitutional provision of due process
enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other subsequent cases.
- The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to in the 1987 decision as being
"intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled as Documents used by GTEB and "Additional Documents" which,
as earlier discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or
not presented in evidence.
- At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a
controverting statement from its own Raw Materials Importation Regulation Division,
- Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally should not be
disturbed by the courts. This general rule, however, is not without exceptions.
- As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of
discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within
its competence will not be disturbed by the courts.
- Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their
jurisdiction.
- Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by evidence; where the findings
are initiated by fraud, imposition or collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or
capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989])
- In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota
allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the
Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been
accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since
not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over
P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their
families .
-Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the Malacañang decision. It was
incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export
quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely because of the allegation
that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted on another private corporation.
Dispositive: MFR is GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution
of the Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED.

PEFIANCO V. MORAL
322 SCRA 439; BELLOSILLO; Jan 19, 2000

Nature:Petition for review of decision of CA

Facts:
- Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision.
- Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent
Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents.
- DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral was represented by her
private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed.
- Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation Committee Report. Her
petition was twice denied.
- Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying
that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be
enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report.
- Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial
court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. CA sustained
TC.
- Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco.

ISSUES
1. WON the order of the TC is proper
2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report

Held: 1. NO.
- Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a
motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor.
- The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in
Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court’s jurisdiction
over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioner’s motion to
dismiss was being denied.
- Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons
for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself
has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before
resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was
not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance
with the rules was justified.
2. NO.
- Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.
- In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right
to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary
to furnish her with a copy thereof.
- Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her
from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final.
- Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a
copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an
administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt
had been accorded these rights.
- More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent’s
removal from office was grounded.
Disposition Petition is granted.

NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE


G.R. No. 129914; PARDO; May 12, 2000

Nature:Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:
- A newspaper published an article saying that Bernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants
of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and
separated from the service.
- President Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if
necessary. The Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director General, who ordered the Criminal
Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges.
- Respondent was informed of the article and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit.
- Respondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against him were either dismissed by the
Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the
encashment of 7 treasury warrants. CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted to the Chief, PNP, a
memorandum confirming respondent’s allegations.
- By command of the Police Deputy Director General, respondent was suspended from the police service
for 90 days. Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within 5 days from
receipt of the complaint.
- Respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars.
- The CICS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical procedures obtained in the regular courts
are strictly applicable to administrative proceedings; hence, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient
to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer.
- The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a resolution recommending for respondent's dismissal
from the PNP service. The PNP Inspector General concurred with the recommendation of the Summary
Dismissal Officer.
- The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service because of heading a payroll
syndicate, unexplained assets or wealth, and falsification of public documents (falsified his transcript of
records with PUP)
- Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, which sustained the summary
dismissal of respondent from the PNP.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police
service on the ground of lack of due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975.
- After due proceedings, the CA promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 42, R.
A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due
process requirement of the Constitution.

Issue: WON the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police
Commission, on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of
the charges filed against him

Held: YES, the requirements of due process were sufficiently complied with.
Ratio Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Reasoning
- Record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity
to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed
from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board,
and submitted a memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his
side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process.
Disposition Petition GRANTED.

SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC


419 SCRA 354

SHOPPES MANILA, INC.


vs.
THE HON. NLRC, LABOR ARBITER ERMITA ABRASALDO-CUYUCA and LORIE TORNO
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
January 14, 2004
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 for the nullification of the resolution of the CA

Facts
 The petitioner corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in garments manufacturing using the
brand name "KAMISETA”.
 May 6, 1994 - Private Respondent Lorie Torino was hired as a trimmer with a salary of P80/day which
was later increased to P185/day (April 1997). The private respondent and a co-employee, Maricar
Buan, were tasked to handle the inventory of finished products.
 Sometime later, the petitioner started to receive information from the head of its production department
that, according to other employees, the private respondent had been stealing "KAMISETA" items from
the factory so an investigation was conducted on July 31, 1997 where two witnesses gave their account
(one of finding numerous KAMISETA clothing in respondent’s home and the other of the respondent
encouraging her to steal a belt from the stocks).
 On the same day, the respondent was made aware of the allegations against her and she had her
home inspected. During the course of the inspection, various KAMISETA clothing and wallpapers were
found in her home.
 On the basis of the said report, the petitioner issued a disciplinary action form suspending the private
respondent indefinitely without pay.
 On August 25, 1997, a notice of dismissal was addressed to the private respondent specifying the
charge against her, the factual basis thereof and the imposable penalties for the said charge if proven
and was called to the Head Office in order to explain herself.
 The private respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearing.
 Consequently, the petitioner decided to dismiss the private respondent from her employment.
 The private respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal.
 The case was raffled to LA Tumanong, however despite various mandatory conferences they didn’t
reach an amicable settlement and the petitioner filed for the conduct of a full blown hearing which was
granted by LA Tumanong and set for hearing.
 However, the hearing failed to materialize because of the absences of either the private respondent or
her counsel.
 Meanwhile, LA Tumanong was replaced by LA Cuyuca who ordered the case submitted for decision
and redered a decision stating that respondent was illegally dismissed awarding her with full
backwages and separation pay since reinstatement was not feasible due to the strained relations
between employer and employee.
 Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the ruling of the LA.
 Dissatisfied the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the CA via Rule 65 of the RoC
 The CA likewise affirmed the NLRC ruling and denied the petitioner’s MR.
 Hence, the present petition.

Issues/Held
(1) Whether the CA erred in finding that the absence of a formal hearing did not amount to a denial of
petitioner’s right to due process. NO
(2) Whether the CA erred in affirming the illegality of private respondent’s dismissal in spite of the existence
of just causes supporting it. NO

Ratio
1. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the CA correctly held that it did not have a vested right to a formal
hearing simply and merely because LA Tumanong granted its motion and set the case for hearing. Pursuant
to Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has the authority to
determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for
adjudication. The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor arbiter and is something
that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to decide a labor case
before him, based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties, without a trial or formal
hearing. The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in case
it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary.
The order of LA Tumanong granting the petitioner’s motion for a hearing of the case was not conclusive
and binding on LA Cuyuca who had the discretion either to hear the case before deciding it, or to forego
with the hearing if, in her view, there was no longer a need therefor as the case could be resolved on its
merits based on the records.

2. For a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there be just and valid cause as provided under Article
282 of the Labor Code; and (b) that the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.

In the case, as held by the CA, the petitioner had failed to show that it had complied with the two-notice
requirement: (a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the
employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires; (b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee, the employer must notify
him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason therefore. Thus, the SC affirms the
CA’s holding of an illegal dismissal.
Further, the SC refused to entertain questions of fact because the SC is not a trier of facts so these
questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve and in this respect, the findings of the NLRC and the CA are
accorded with great respect.

MONTEMAYOR V BUNDALIAN
GR No. 149335
PUNO; July 1, 2003
Nature:Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
- An unverified letter-complaint, was received from LUIS BUNDALIAN by the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco, California. It accused EDILLO MONTEMAYOR, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III,
of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth. Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot in
California, making a down payment of US$100,000. His in-laws in California had a poor credit standing
due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property. It accused
Montemayor of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
- Montemayor submitted his counter-affidavit before the Philippine Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC) alleging that the real owner of the property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. They
were advised by an immigration lawyer (they wanted to emigrate) that it would be an advantage if they had
real property in the US. He claimed that Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the
names of Montemayor and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to
circumvent a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full
payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. He also attached a Consolidated
Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
- While Montemayor participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents,
Bundalian could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. PCAGC repeatedly
required Montemayor to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (he did not file his SALN
from 1992-1994), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. He ignored these directives and
submitted only his Service Record.
- The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC,
ordered Montemayor’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. His MFR was
denied and his appeal to the CA was dismissed.

ISSUES
1. WON Montemayor was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC

Held: 1. NO.
Ratio The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity
to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
Reasoning The PCAGC exerted efforts to notify Bundalian of the proceedings but his Philippine residence
could not be located. Be that as it may, Montemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. He voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel.
He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a
reconsideration of the Administrative Order issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before
the CA. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of
procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement.
- The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant did not
divest the PCAGC of its authority. Under Section 3 of EO 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving
graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the
executive department. It is not uncommon that a government agency is given wide latitude in the scope
and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any
complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court
Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous
complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy
has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and
corruption in the service.
- In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
MATTHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
424 U.S. 319 | POWELL: 1976

Facts::
- Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are completely disabled under the
disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security
Act.
- Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he received a
questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed
the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical sources,
including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained
reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After considering these reports and other
information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination
that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed
termination of benefits, and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in which to obtain
and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
- In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his disability. [n2] The state agency then made its
final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. This determination was accepted by
the Social Security Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate
after that month. The notification also advised him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency
of this initial determination within six months.
- Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional
validity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
for assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an immediate reinstatement of
benefits pending a hearing on the issue of his disability.
- The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated in
accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust
available remedies. In support of his contention that due process requires a pretermination hearing,
Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, which established a right to
an "evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare benefits. The Secretary contended that Goldberg
was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based
on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability
entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence.
- The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had
terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural due process.

ISSUE: WON the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of
Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing.

HELD:
NO, the present procedure in claiming benefits under the Social Security is sufficient to meet the
due process requirement
Reasoning
- The specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
- Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
subsistence: "The crucial factor in this context a factor not present in the case of . . . virtually anyone else
whose governmental entitlements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits."
- Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. Indeed, it is wholly unrelated
to the worker's income or support from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members,
workmen's compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private
pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other important programs,
both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of
the work force . . . ." As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decision-
making process. The potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although
the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for
benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in substantial gainful activity."

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP v. NLRC


273 SCRA 352; Vitug ; June 13, 1997

Nature: Special civil action of certiorari

Facts
-Sadac was appointed VP for the Legal Department of Equitable.
-Nine lawyers 3 of the bank's Legal Department under Equitable, addressed a "letter-petition" to the
Chairman of the Board of Directors, accusing Sadac of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement,
ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Private respondent was furnished with a copy of the letter.
-Morales, Chairman of the Board of Directors, called the contending lawyers to a conference in his office in
an attempt to resolve their differences, it failed. Board of Directors, apprised of the situation, adopted a
resolution directing one of its directors, Banico, to look further into the matter and to "determine a course of
action for the best interest of the bank." Banico met with the complaining nine lawyers, he was warned that
if private respondent were to be retained in his position, the lawyers would resign en masse.
-Mr. Banico submitted a report to the Board of Directors and said that there was abusive conduct and
mismanagement and was inefficient and ineffective.The Board asked Sadac to voluntarily resign. They
emphasized that they are just saying that the Board has lost its confidence on him and they are waiting for
his voluntary resignation. Sadac again made a request for a full hearing and cautioned that, under Section
31 of the Corporation Code, individual members of the Board could be held accountable for voting or
assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation.
-Sadac persisted in his request for a formal investigation. Unheeded he filed a complaint in the NLRC for
illegal dismissal and damages.
-Board of Directors terminated Sadac and reiterated that it was one between client and lawyer. He also is
disentitled from his compensation. The Board instructed management to take the necessary steps to
"defend itself and all the members of the Board of Directors" from private respondent's complaint.
-Labor-Arbited sided with Equitable, the involved lawyer was a "mere legal assistant" tasked with certain
duties not all that related to the practice of law. The Labor Arbiter concluded that the complaint stated no
cause of action because a lawyer-client relationship should instead be governed by Section 26, Rule 138,
of the Rules of Court. Also, there were valid grounds and he was not denied due process, holding that
private respondent was "heard exhaustively on the matter of the charge lodged against him" and that, "for
valid practical reasons," petitioners "were not in a position to accede" to the demand for a formal hearing.
-NLRC concluded differently. The NLRC ruled that private respondent was denied the right to due process.
-Equitable filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution.

Issues
1. WON there was an employer-employee relationship requiring the procedural requirements
2. WON the corporation is solely liable

Held: 1.Yes, there was.


"A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the
government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay
them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers
and employees. At the same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer
basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while
the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations
practitioners, and other professionals."
The existence of an employer-employee relationship, between the bank and private respondent brings the
case within the coverage of the Labor Code. Under the Code, an employee may be validly dismissed if
these requisites are attendant: (1) the dismissal is grounded on any of the causes stated in Article 282 of
the Labor Code, and (2) the employee has been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself as so required by Section 2 and Section 5, Rule XIV, Book V, of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer" is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer. Ordinary breach of trust will
not suffice, it must be willful and without justifiable excuse. This ground must be founded on facts
established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and
incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest; otherwise, the dismissal
will be rendered illegal.
Petitioners' stated loss of trust and confidence on private respondent was spawned by the complaints
leveled against him by the lawyers in his department.
-The act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties of the employee such as would
show him to be thereby unfit to continue working for the employer. Here, the grievances of the lawyers, in
main, refer to what are perceived to be certain objectionable character traits of private respondent. Although
petitioners have charged private respondent with allegedly mishandling two cases in his long service with
the bank, it is quite apparent that private respondent would not have been asked to resign had it not been
for the letter-complaint of his associates in the Legal Department.
Confident that no employer-employee existed between the bank and private respondent, petitioners have
put aside the procedural requirements for terminating one's employment, i.e., (a) a notice apprising the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) another
notice informing the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with
these requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, any judgment
reached by management without that compliance can be considered void and inexistent. While it is
true that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of
consultation and conferences such as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the
proper observance of notice and hearing.
2. Yes, a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for
and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the
corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Nevertheless, being
a mere fiction of law, peculiar situations or valid grounds can exist to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the
disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. As a rule, this situation might arise
when a corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate
fraud, to carry out similar other unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge to commit injustice and
so circumvent the law.
The case of petitioner is way off these exceptional instances. It is not even shown that petitioner has had a
direct hand in the dismissal of private respondent enough to attribute to him (petitioner) a patently unlawful
act while acting for the corporation. Neither can Article 289 of the Labor Code be applied since this law
specifically refers only to the imposition of penalties under the Code. . . .
UY V COA
G.R. No. 130685
PUNO; March 21, 2000

Nature:Special civil action for certiorari

Facts:
- Petitioners were among the employees of the Provincial Engineering Office who were dismissed by Gov.
Paredes, allegedly to scale down operations.
- Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB found
that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and
ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. It held that while reduction in force due to lack of funds is a valid
ground for termination, employees to be terminated must be determined after being found to be the least
qualified (in terms of relative fitness, efficiency and length of service)
- MSPB later issued an order directing the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their
back salaries and other money benefits.
- At first, the Governor did not want to comply with said orders. The matter was brought up to the CSC,
wherein indirect contempt proceedings were held. This prompted the Governor to finally comply with the
order of reinstatement. The provincial treasurer also partially released some of the backwages.
- But the problems did not stop there. Later, the Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor
Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent Commission on Audit. It claims that COA is the proper authority to
determine disbursement as regards the backwages. In its decision, COA ruled that the payment of
backwages has become the personal liability of former Governor Paredes, it appearing that the illegal
dismissal was done in bad faith.
- Pursuant to the ruling of COA, the provincial treasurer stopped the payment of backwages.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally
dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant
to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission

Held: 1. NO.
Reasoning
- First, COA based its ruling on the MSRB decision. A careful perusal of said Decision will disclose that the
MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and hence,
is personally liable for the payment of petitioners' back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even found that there
was lack of funds which would have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural
infirmities in its implementation
- (important according to the syllabus) Second, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process
were violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never
made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free
to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present
evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable
ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for
the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and
present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages
arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official
and personal capacities
- Third, the MSRB decision became final and executory. Final judgments may no longer be reviewed or in
any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any
other official, branch or department of Government
Disposition Decision of COA set aside
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)

FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged with black market of electric meters
and that its meters were installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner received a
communication from General Auditing Office (GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued
subsequently a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC, during a
conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash
such subpoena. The conference was postponed twice until it was finally cancelled. In May 1962,
PSC issued an order, which after finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%,
lowered the present meter rates of petitioner. Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted.

ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required

RULING: Yes.

In support to its special defense, respondent PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative
function; that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without
previous notice or hearing. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates –
when such are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines – may
partake of legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order
exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact, whether
the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital which is denied by the
petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of the said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as
well as to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making
said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the
valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing.
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of
partakes the nature of quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without previous
notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and hence, null and
void.

Halili vs Public Service Commission

Facts:
A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and annulment of an order by
respondent Public Service Commission dated July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the
bus service established by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall,
Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public convenience to operate auto-
truck services between Balara and various points in the City of Manila and its suburbs.
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent Commission alleging that
the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-Balara line is entirely different from that supported by
the evidence presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended. On the
following day, July 3, and without previous notice to the petitioner or a previous hearing thereon,
ordered the modification of the line in accordance with the petition.

Issue:
WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the petitioner and other interested
parties, or hearing in which the latter may be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and
validly issued by the Commission.
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
Held:

The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued and petitioner’s right to
due process was violated.
In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly authorized. In the second
place, the change ordered is not provisional merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but
final and permanent in character. In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the
rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to he constitutional mandate that no person shall
be deprived of a right without due process of law. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution
binds not only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and everyone of its
branches, agencies, etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the
procedure outlines in the law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards for
the protection of individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction for the
particular class of cases to which the one in question belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar,
the Public Service Act does not include the amendment made in the disputed order among those
may be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the Act. Is the
amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well settled maxims of law? We declare it
is not, because due process of law guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who
would be affected by the order or act contemplated.

In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine the question in dispute.

By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the nature of the case, before a
tribunal having jurisdiction, which proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full
power to grant relief.

Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall
have an opportunity to defend himself.

A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have been established in our
system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.