150 JUHA MANNINEN
Calculus Ratiocinator: An Ulti'!f~te Presupposition of Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Kluwer,
Dordrecht 1997. Contrary to Hmtlkka, the one-domain assumption seems to have been an inte-
gral part ofCamap's overall philosophical views.
49. E,Kaila to M. Schlick, January 13, 1929, yeA. To be published in an edition of Schlick's corre_
spondence by R.Fabian, M. Iven and H. Rutte, Springer. Wien.
50. 'Gesprach mi,t V:ajsma~n'. ,ASP RC 102-?6-03. Cf. R. Camap to M.SchIick, September 28,
1932, YeA: Ja 1eh weiSS bls heute ooeh meht, wic Wittgcnsteins Auffassung hier ist, da Wais-
man~ ja oieht deutlich Stellung genommen hat. sondcm nur sagte. dass cr (und Wittgcnstcin)
gewlsse Bedenken haben, ohne sic jedoch formulieren zu konnen."
51. More, about the MS and the participants in J, Manninen. 'Oas verbotene Buch des Wiener Krei-
ses', m: Topos, VoL 17,2001, p. 65-77, Schlick's letter to Frank, containing his motivations, is
to bc found among the unidentified letters of the YCA.
52. RCarnap to O.Neurath, July 25,1930, ASP RC 029-14-1 L Carnap's first suggestion was that
HCinr.ich .Neider should help Neurath. but he wrote then: "Falls Neider nieht wil\ oder kann,
wtire Ich 1m l1ussersten Fall bereit. obwoh! ich nieht soviel Zeit daran setzen konnte wie N "
53. R. Camap to M.Schlick, September 28, 1932, YCA. . AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
54. R.Camap to M.Schlick, August 28,1930, YCA.
55. Sec the paper mentioned in note 51, Cf. also J.'Manninen, 'Otto Neurath oder die Unmoglichkeit
einer "privaten Sprachc" und die Moglichkeit der Yisualisierung" J. Manninen, Feuer am Pol.
Zum Aujbau der Vernunfl im europrlischen Norden, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1996
pp,393-412.
56, Cf. 'B~prechung fiber Physikalismus am 4.3.1931', VeA ON KA, and the discussions docu-
mented In Stadler, Studien zum Wiener Kreis, p,275 ff.
57. Neurath formulated this in his last period by quoting Karl Popper's view that empirical science
sh.o~l.d represent only the one real world, the world of our experience, and thcn he delivercd his
cntlclsm: "I speak of pi uri-statements and therefore I see no way how to reach THE ONE
~ORLO, or one prefcrred sy~tem of statements. '" 1 think that Philipp Frank fought suffi-
cte.ntly ~he one rca! world beSIdes the many possible worlds, J myself and hc and Duhem and
Pomcare belong together. we are only more consistent than Duhcm and Poincare." Neurath also
asked: "I should like to learn from you what you say about that." No answer was given.
0, Ncurath to RCarnap, April I. 1944, YCA,
History ofScicnce and Ideas
University ofOulu
P,O, Box 1000
FIN-900140ulu
Finland
juha.manninen@ouJu,fi
WOLFGANG RUEMER
LOGICAL EMPIRlCISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY:
FELIX KAUFMANN'
1. THE RELATION BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY
The history of philosophy of the twentieth century can be best characterized, it
has been argued, by the opposition between two of its main movements,
'
phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This strategy seems appropriate since
both movements have their beginnings around the turn of the century, and most
philosophical positions after the Second World War have their roots in one of the
two movements. In addition, there was not much contact between the two
movements, but there were exceptions. In this paper I will discuss one of the
earliest attempts to actively combine the results of Husserlian phenomenology
with the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle, which was proposed by Felix
Kaufmann in a number of articles he published in the early forties.
In the last two or three decades an increasing number of philosophers have
pointed out that there are important paral1els between Russerlian phenomenology
and analytic philosophy, Peter Simons, for example, states that the divide be-
tween the two traditions "did not exist at the tum of the century and only became
clearly apparent after the Second World War." 1 Similarly Michael Dummett,
who mentions in his History of Analytical Philosophy that to a German student
of philosophy in 1903 - i.e., two years after the publication ofRusserl's Logical
Investigations, where he first developed his phenomenological project - HusserI
and Frege must have appeared ""[n]ot, certainly, as two deeply opposed thinkers:
rather as remarkably close in orientation, despite some divergence of interests." 2
In fact, there are considerable parallels in the positions of the two philoso-
phers, who had exchanged letters and sent each other their publications as early
as the 1890s. In addition, Frege reviewed HusserI's Philosophy of Arithmetic,
criticizing his project of developing a psychological foundation of logic which,
in turn, was onc of the factors that convinced HusserI that this project was
doomed 3 and to develop his critique of psychologism in the Logical Investiga-
tions, whcre he distinguished normative from pure logic, the latter being about
ideal (logical) objects. Moreover, it was this ontological move of accepting the
existence of ideal objects that allowed Husserl to further develop Franz Bren-
tano's method of descriptive psychology into his own phenomenological
151
F. Stadler (ed.), The Vienna Circle and Logical Empin'cism: Re-evaluation and FuJure Perspectives,
151-161.
© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Printed in the Netherlands.
 152 WOLFGANG HUEMER
method, a method that aims at describing the essential aspects of OUf mental acts.
Hence, we could say that Frege indirectly influenced Husserl in his developing
the phenomenological method. But also in Husser}'s later philosophy, there are
striking parallels to Frege, as the ground-breaking work of Dagfinn F011esda1 4
shows.
The exchange and the parallels between phenomenology and analytic phi-
losophy are not limited to the work of Hussed and Frege, though. We find, for
example, that there was a strong interest in the early work of Hussed among
Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers in the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury: Russell, for example, brought Hussed's Logical Investigations with him to
prison with the intention of reviewing it for Mind - without ever fulfilling this
intention. In addition, Moore and Ryle showed a great interest in Husserl's
s
Logical Investigations. I assume that their attention to HusserI stems from an
interest in Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, and runs parallel to an interest
in Meinong's theory of objects.
In short, at the beginning of the century the two emerging traditions were
rather close, and their relationship was characterized by a mutual interest in the
other position. If we look at the situation some thirty years later, however, we
find that things have changed dramatically. HusserI's so-called 'transcendental
turn,' which was first proposed in his Ideas of 1913, as well as the work of his
students, mainly Martin Heidegger, have caused various analytic philosophers to
become suspicious of phenomenology, a trend that is reflected in Ryle's articles
on phenomenology as well as in the debate between Schlick and HusserI: Schlick
harshly criticized Husserl's phenomenological project in the first draft of his
book General Theory of Knowledge, to which HusserI reacted in the foreword to
the second edition of the Logical Investigations 6, which caused Schlick to revise
the argument, but not the tone of his critique in the second edition. After this
exchange HusserI ignores Schlick's work, while Schlick goes on to occasionally
criticize the phenomenological movement. 7
This exchange between HusserI and Schlick, however, created a clear line of
demarcation between the phenomenological movement and the Vienna Circle
that was respected by most members of the two schools - even though there
were some personal connections between the fronts: Rudolf Carnap, for exam-
ple, attended Husserl's seminars in 1924/25 8• It has been pointed out repeatedly
that there are strong parallels between Husserl's notion of constitution and
Carnap's constitutional system as developed in The Logical Structure of the
World c). It is not clear how strong HusserI's influence in this phase of Camap's
work actually waslO, but if there was any, it is quite obvious that it diminished
drastically in later years. Camap's attitude towards the phenomenological
movement in the thirties is well documented in his harsh attack on Heidegger in
the paper The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Lan-
guage, where Heidegger's phenomenology has become the prototype of bad
metaphysics.
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: FELIX KAUFMANN 153
2. FELIX KAUFMANN
The only member of the Vienna Circle who actively tried to bridge the gap
between logical empiricism and Husserlian phenomenology is Felix Kaufmann,
who was an associated - but very active - member of the Vienna Circle. I I
Kaufmann was primarily interested in philosophy of law and the methodological
foundations of the social sciences. Originally a student of Kelsen, he soon be-
came interested in Hussed, who had a strong influence on his work. Kaufmann
contacted HusserI in the early twenties; they met various times and exchanged
numerous letters. 12 In their correspondence they hardly discussed philosophical
problems, though. The letters are interesting mainly for historical reasons, since
they document Hussed's attempt to emigrate from Nazi-Germany to Czechoslo-
vakia in the thirties. Husserl hoped that Kaufmann could support him in this
project.
Kaufmann did not always have an easy time within the Vienna Circle. Since
he did not hide his interest in Hussed, he was considered a phenomenologist by
the other members. Gustav Bergmann writes in his Memories of the Vienna
Circle that "when they [Kaufmann and Neumann, another participant of the
meetings who was interested in HusserIJ took the floor, during the classical
period Schlick occasionally showed a certain impatience and sometimes even
interrupted the discussion outright." 13 Bergmann adds that the situation some-
what improved when the Wittgensteinians gained more influence in the Vienna
Circle since "they [the phenomenologists] claimed to recognize many of the
ideas now advanced [by the Wittgensteinians] as old teaching from their own
school" 14 which was, however, rejected by Schlick and Waismann. The latter,
however, "in private recommended reading HusserI." IS This rapprochement
might have somewhat improved the situation for the phenomenologists, but defi-
nitely backfired for the Wittgensteinians. "It was from this side, moreover, that
criticism set in. In the Circle Hahn once asked Waismann directly how he distin-
guished himself any more from a phenomenologist." 16 These remarks clearly
show that being associated with Husserlian phenomenology did not improve
Kaufmann's position within the Vienna Circle.
In the years when he participated at the meetings of the Vienna Circle,
Kaufmann was not a professional philosopher, but worked as a manager for the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1938 he had to emigrate to the USA. He got a
call to the New School for Social Research, where he taught philosophy until his
death in 1949.
 WOLFGANG HUEMER
154
3. KAUFMANN'S POINTS: EIDETIC INTUITION AND
ANALYSIS OF SENSE-DATA
After his emigration, Kaufmann somewhat lost his interest in phenomenology.
He became interested in Dewey and turned more and more towards pragmatism.
Shortly after arriving in New York, however, he wrote some articles in which he
17
discussed the relationship between phenomenology and logical empiricism. In
these articles he concentrated on two points. First, he argued that the critique of
phenomenology raised by the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle was based
on a misunderstanding of Husserl's notion of eidetic intuition (Wesensschau),
which they criticized as bad metaphysics. Second, he gave a phenomenological
critique of the empiricist notion of raw sense data.
Let me first tum to Kaufmann's discussion of the positivistic critique of
HusserI's notion of eidetic intuition. Kaufmann addresses the standard critique
brought up against Husserlian phenomenology in the Vienna Circle, especially
by Moritz Schlick - without mentioning Schlick's name, though. We can see
several main strands in this critique. Even though he advocates an empiricist
18
position, Schlick shares HusserI's concerns about psychologism. He cannot,
however, accept Husserl's solution, according to which pure logic is concerned
with ideal logical objects. For Schlick this move is unacceptable, as it buys into
Platonism. And, in fact, HusserI's Logical Investigations do create the impres-
sion of having strong Platonistic tendencies, for his arguments are based on the
acceptance of a 'pure logic,' a discipline that is concerned with 'ideal logical
objects. '
However, Schlick's concerns do not really address HusserI's position. As
Kaufmann points out 19 , Husserl explicitly rejects Platonism in his later work.
Moreover, even though some fonnulations, esp. the talk about ideal logical ob-
jects and essences, invite a Platonistic reading of the Logical Investigations, this
interpretation is nonetheless a misreading and a misrepresentation of HusserI's
concerns. Husserl never explicitly advocates Platonism in the Logical Investiga-
tions. In a later text, Draft to an Introduction to the Logical Investigations of
1913 (which was only published posthumously), he complains that many readers
have interpreted his text in a Platonistic way:
This accusation is not at all justified; it is, rather, in stark contrast to my account and is
based on exactly those historical prejudices from which I first had to liberate myself in an
arduous way.20
The historical prejudices HusserI is speaking about have to do with the identifi-
cation of an acceptance of pure logic with the acceptance of a Platonistic on-
tology in which HusserI believed when he fIrst read Bolzano, i.e., more than ten
years before he wrote the Logical Investigations: "1 mistook, however,. his [i.e.,
Bolzano's] original thoughts on presentations, propositions, truths 'm them-
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY; FELIX KAUFMANN 155
selves' to be metaphysical absurdities" 21. Only by reading Lotze, HusserI states,
did he realize that he was misreading Bolzano, which influenced the develop-
ment of his critique of psychologism in the Prolegomena of the Logical Investi-
gations in a decisive way. Thus, one can say that HusserI's terminology, at least
in his Logical Investigations, was not very clear, or that he should have added a
few clarifying paragraphs, but not that HusserI advocates a form of Platonism in
this work.
Schlick's point concerning HusserI's alleged acceptance of Platonic essences
is, however, connected to a second strand of criticism which might even apply to
a non-Platonistic reading of the 'ideal object' theory. This critique is directed
against the kind of mental act in which we are, according to HusserI, directed
towards these ideal logical objects, i.e., against the intuition of essences. Schlick
doubts that we are in a position to intuit abstract essences. "We ask: How in
general can non-real objects - concepts or judgments - be 'given' to us when all
that we arc acquainted with as given are real contents of consciousness?" 22
Somehow, Schlick continues, these non-real, ideal objects must be real contents
of conscious acts - otherwise we could not have any knowledge about them. He
goes on to criticize HusserI for explaining this problem by distinguishing be-
tween real and ideal evidence, the latter of which can account for our grasping
ideal objects in eidetic intuition. Schlick counters that this does not solve the
problem, since we could ask again how one knows about ideal evidence. This
would have to be a real property of our mental acts 23 , and we face the same
problems as before. The strategy adopted by HusserI, according to which we can
acknowledge a fact only if we know it with a high degree of evidence, cannot
possibly solve any problem, Schlick argues, since one must be aware of the fact
that one knows with a high degree of evidence; Le., one would need evidence for
this second order knowledge, which would lead to an infinite regress.
This empiricist critique of HusserIian phenomenology, Kaufmann argues, is
based on a misunderstanding of Husserl's notion of evidence. Rather than for-
mulate an argument, Kaufmann quotes HusserI's Formal and Transcendental
Logic of 1929, a book with which Schlick was likely unfamiliar. In this quo-
tation, HusserI talks about the sensualistic misunderstanding of the notion of
evidence, i.e., the characterization of evidence as a certain fonn of feeling we
experience in conjunction with a certain act. Husserl calls that view an absurdity
and explains that evidence is not a feeling that accompanies the act, but rather an
intentional accomplishment, something that does not arise from one act alone,
say a perception, but rather in connection with recollections~ This interplay of
various partial intentions
gives for the first time 'original certainty' in the full sense of the existence of a subjective
object called a psychic datum ... something to which one can always return and which
one can always recognize in reactivation as the Same.24
In short, evidence is for HusserI not a feeling that accompanies the act, but an
accomplishment that makes perception of objects possible. Schlick's critique,
156 WOLFGANG HUEMER
thus, stems from a misunderstanding of HusserI's notion of evidence and a
Platonistic misinterpretation of HusserI's attack on psychologism. With these
remarks, Kaufmann showed that the empiricist critique of the phenomenological
notion of "eidetic intuition' is not justified.
Kaufmann's second point consists in his argument that the basic assumption of
logical empiricism, according to which raw sense data cannot be further ana-
lyzed, is itself a pseudo-explanation.
Empiricists still do not recognize with sufficient clarity how close the kinship is between
the idea of objectively given sense-data, inaccessible to further analysis, and the meta-
physical ontology which they oppose.25
In this context, Kaufmann discusses Carnap's cntlque of synthetic a priori
statements which is based on his distinction between pure and interpreted calcu-
lus, where the former is concerned with the signs on a merely syntactical level,
whereas the latter assigns meaning to these signs. According to this critique, the
tendency to accept synthetic a priori statements stems from a confusion of syn-
tactical sentences, i.e. sentences about language, on the one hand, and object
sentences, i.e. sentences about objects in the narrow sense, on the other. The
sentence "Every color is at a place," is often quoted as an example of a synthetic
a priori statement. According to this critique, this is a mistake that is based on a
misunderstanding of what the sentence is actually about: it is misinterpreted as
an object-sentence when it actually is a syntactical sentence; it is not about
empirical objects in the world, but rather informs us how the words it contains
are used in language. This becomes most obvious if we substitute the fonnal
language for the object language: "Then, e.g., instead of the sentence <Every
color is at a place,' the sentence <A color-expression is always accompanied in a
sentence by a place designation; would occur."26 According to this view, "'the
rules of a pure calculus can be described entirely within the limits of logical
syntax." 27 In consequence, there is no need for synthetic a priori statements, it is
rather determined by the rules of syntax whether a certain expression can be
fonnulated or not.
When we actually use a language we have to add the semantic level; i.e., we
have to interpret these signs, which can be done by giving a series of correlative
definitions that state the meaning of the signs used.
This meaning is determined by indicating experiences that shall constitute the sufficient
condition for using the expressions in question, e.g., it is stipulated that one may use the
sentence' A blue thing is at the place p at time t,' on the basis of an optical perception of a
certain kind. 28
It is at this point that Kaufmann's critique sets in: this analysis of Carnap's
position shows, according to Kaufmann, that the logical empiricists ascribe a role
to raw sense-data which they cannot play. Camap's analysis presupposes that
"[s)igns and formulae are given as objective, Le., are regarded as identifiable at
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: FELIX KAUFMANN 157
different times and by different persons.,,29 This creates a tension within the
empiricist program that bases everything on raw sense data:
The empiricist, however, who defines the 'world' in terms of possible experience and
bears in mind that every experience is the experience of a particular man at a particular
time, should see clearly that the presupposition of an intertemporal and intersubjective
harmony of experiences - a presupposition implicit in operating with objectively given
signs - is accessible to, and urgently requires, further analysis. 3o
Kaufmann points out that Carnap's program presupposes that we have objective
experiences and that the meaning of the words we use have their source in these
experiences. What happens, however, if we ask for the meaning of "objective
experience"?
We are then confronted with the following situation: The meaning of 'objective experi-
ence' is defined in terms of certain rules of method including presuppositions concerning
given fundamental meanings. These meanings in turn point back to experiences as con-
stitutive clements, ObViously the meaning of 'experience' cannot be the same in both
cases. J !
Kaufmann argues that here we are facing two different 'strata of experience.' In
other words, we are using the word 'experience' in two completely different
ways. On the one hand, as we have seen above, we use it to define the meaning
of other words (like blue, yellow, etc). If we try to clarifY the notion of experi-
ence, on the other hand, we find ,that we need to make important presuppositions
to use that concept. We conceive of the physical world that is experienced as
being the same for every human being. The notion of human being, thus, is pre-
supposed by the notion of objective experience, etc. On this lower stratum of
experience, we ask "'what presuppositions are implicit in the idea of an objective
world of experience and how these experiences enter into every single experi-
ence of the individual." 32
In consequence, the differences between phenomenology and logical empiri-
cism may be seen as resulting from these distinct strata of experience. Both see
the task of philosophy in analyzing meaning. "As far as this analysis remains
within the stratum of objective meanings it is logical analysis; as far as it
transcends this stratum it may be called transcendental analysis." 33 If the logical
empiricist would gain some appreciation for this distinction of various strata of
experience and try to analyze the meaning of experience on the lower stratum,
he learns to see that even the simplest object-perception contains a manifold of complexly
interwoven anticipations of one's own and other persons' potential perceptions - antici-
pations that my be fulfilled or disappointed. 34
Kaufmann argues, as this quotation shows, that the logical empiricists base their
position on the notion of experience which, however, should itself be analyzed.
If they would direct their attention to this basic level of their theory, and
transcend the stratum of objective experience, they would appreciate the need for
158 WOLFGANG HUEMER
a holistic understanding of experiences. In its present form, logical empiricism
accepts a metaphysical assumption that is not proven, namely that there are
experiences that cannot be further analyzed. Logical empiricists, thus, have to
face a critique they have brought up against phenomenology: namely, that they
do bad metaphysics.
Kaufmann's argument, thus, amounts to abandoning the very project oflogi-
cal empiricism - or at least adding a whole new dimension to it, since it
challenges its empiricist basis. This does not mean, however, that Kaufinann's
diagnosis stands in contrast to the program of the Vienna Circle, since it is com-
patible with a scientific approach to philosophy and a positivistic point of view.
On the contrary, if Kaufinann's argument is right, not to reform one's position in
the way suggested and to continue holding the notion of raw sense data would
amount to accepting a piece of bad metaphysics.
With these two points, Kaufmann has reached his goal to show first that phe-
nomenology and logical empiricism are not incompatible, but rather complement
each other on different levels, and second that "if the logical empiricists are con-
sistent in seeking their goal, namely, the analysis of scientific methods, then the
problems that form the point of departure for phenomenological reflection must
emerge within their field of vision." 35 Thus, if the logical empiricists take their
own program seriously, then sooner or later they should, according to Kaufmann,
gain appreciation for the phenomenological program and possibly start doing
phenomenology themselves.
4. ANALYTIC PHENOMENOLOGY
We have seen that one of the decisive reasons for the schism between phenome-
nology and logical empiricism was - apart from the differences in their positions
which were not that insuperable after all- the debate and the resulting personal
antagonism between Schlick and Husserl. This mutual opposition continued after
the death of its proponents, when most of the members of the Vienna Circle -
unlike some of the prominent proponents of the phenomenological movement -
had to emigrate from Europe. In North-America, Schlick's article "Is There a
Factual A Priori,,,36 where he criticizes the phenomenological notion of the
'synthetic a priori,' was anthologized in Feigl's and Sellars' book Readings in
AnalytiC Philosophy, and so created a bad press for phenomenology among a
younger generation of Anglo-North-American analytic philosophers. Kauf-
mann's article, on the other hand, was published in a book that was only inter-
esting to North American phenomenologists, and thus escaped the attention of
philosophers interested in logical empiricism.
It is noteworthy, however, that with his critique Kaufmann points his finger
at that weak point of logical empiricism that was aimed at also by Wilfrid
Sellars' attack on the Myth of the Given:n . Kaufmann, thus, uses Husserlian
phenomenology to criticize an assumption of logical empiricism that also has
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: FELIX KAUFMANN 159
been criticized from within, and therefore in a way that could be more easily
accepted by the logical empiricists. The original and valuable aspect of Kauf-
mann's critique is, however, that he does give a case study of how one can com-
bine the results of Husserlian phenomenology with the method of analytic phi-
losophy. His intention is not to make a historical point on the question of
whether the two movements are compatible or not or what they have in common
and where their disagreements are, but rather to develop a new methodological
standpoint that makes it possible to address and resolve actual philosophical
problems. With this strategy, Kaufmann's position is still today an important
example not only of how to deal with competing positions in philosophy, but
also of how to approach a field that could best be characterized as analytic phe-
nomenology,
NOTES
I would like to thank Johannes Brandl. Tommaso Piazza, and Christian Beyer for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Peter Simons, Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Balzano to Tarski. Dordrecht:
Kluwer. 1992, p. 2.
2. Michael Dummett, Origins 0/ Analytical Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993, p.26.
3. Husserl was also strongly influenced by Bolzano and Lotze. In a conversation with Boyce
Gibson he states that Frcgc's critique "hit the nail on the head." (qtd. in Dagfinn F011esdal,
"Response by Dagfin F0Ilesdal". in: H.Dreyfus and H.Hall (Eds.), Husser!. Intentionality. and
Cognitive Science. Cambridge: M.LT. Press. 1982,52-56, p.55).
4. Cf. Dagfinn F01lesdal, "Husserl's Notion of NO,ema" In: Journal ofPhilasophy 66,1969,681-
687.
5. For a discussion of the reception of Husserlian phenomenology among British philosophers. ef.
Mathieu Marion "Les Recherches Logiques et Ie r6alisme britannique" (2001. forthcoming).
6. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Husserliana XIX/2. Dordreeht, Kluwer. 1984,
p.535f. Husserl complains about Schlick's superficiality and lack of precision, but misquotes
the German title of Schlick's book Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre: "Wic bequcm es sieh manehe
Autoren mit wegwerfenden Kritiken machen, mit welcher Gewissenhaftigkeit sie lesen.
welchen Unsinn sie mir und der Phanomenologie zuzumutcn die KUhnheit habcn, das zeigt die
Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie [sic!] von Moritz Schlick."
7. For the relationship between Schlick and Husserl, cf. M.M. Van de Pine, "Schlick's Critique of
Phenomenological Propositions", in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45, 1984,
195-225; Jim Shelton, "Schlick and Husserl on the Foundations of Phenomenology". in:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, 1988. 557-561; or Roger Schmit, "Moritz
Schlick und Edmund Husser!. Zur Phlinomenologiekritik in der When Philosophic Sehlieks",
in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 58/59, 2000, 223-244, who argues that Schlick developed his
own position by contrasting it with Husserl's.
8. Cf. Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern. and Eduard Marbach. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenome~
nology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1993, p.22! and Karl Schuhmann. Husser!
Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls. Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1977, p. 281.
9. Cf. Guido Kling, "The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoche and as Explication," in: The
Monist 52, 63-80; Verena Mayer, "Die Konstruktion der Erfahrungswelt: Camap und Husser!"
In: Erkenntnis 35, 287-303; Tommaso Piazza, "Fenomenologia nell'Aujbau? Camap, Husser! e
10. eostituzione del monda". to appear in: Lanfrcdini, Roberta (Ed.) Forma e contenulO. Milano:
 LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: FELl X KAUFMANN 161
160 WOLFGANG HUEMER

37, Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". in: Herbert Feigl and Michael
LED. 2002; or Wolfgang Huemer, "Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution," in: Synthese Scriven (Eds,) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1. Minneapolis: University
(forthcoming). of Minnesota Press, 1956, pp, 253-329.
10. Verena Mayer conjectures that Camap's book might be a revised version ofa draft that could
have had more references to Husserl in a first draft, which, however, might have been deleted
under the influence of Schlick. (Cf. Meyer. op. cit., 301, fn. II),
11. Cf. Friedrich Stadler. Studien ;:um Wiener Kreis. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997. esp. p. 712ff as
well as chapters 6 and 7. Department of Philosophy
12. These letters arc reprinted in: Edmund Husserl, Briefoiecltsel. Band IV: Die Freiburger Schiller. Universillit Erfurt
K. und E.Schuhmann (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994. Gennany
13. Gustav Bergmann, "Memories of the Vienna Circle. Letter to Otto Neurath (1938)", in: wolfgang,hucmer@uni-erfurt.de
Friedrich Stadler (Ed.), Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development. Vienna Circle Institute
Yearbook I. Dordreeht: Kluwer. 1993, 193-208, p.200.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Cf. Felix Kaufmann. "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism", in: Marvin Farber (Ed.),
Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husser!' Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1940, 124-142 and his "Strata of Experience", in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
1.1941, pp. 313-324.
18. He docs, however, express the assumption that psychologism might only be thc result of impre-
cise fonnulations: ..... they must surely have had some inkling of the fact that a concept is not a
reality of consciousness but., as it were, an unreal fiction." (Moritz SChlick, General Theory of
Knowledge. Trans!. by Albert Blwnberg. WienlNew York: Springer. 1974, p.134)
19. Cf. Kaufmann "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism", op. cit., p.135.
20. Edmund Husserl. "Entwurfciner 'Vorrcde' zu den 'Logischen Untersuchungen''', in: Tijdschrift
voor fllosofle I, 1939, 106-133 and 319-339, p. 118. My translation. "Diescr VOlWUrf ist vollig
unbercchtigt, er steht mit dem lnhalt meiner Darstellungen in schiirfstem Widerspruch und
beruht auf der Obennacht eben dcr historischen Vorurteilc, von dencn ich mieh einst miihsam
losringen musste."
21. Husserl. Entwury einer 'Vorrede', op. cit, p.129. My translation. "Seine originellen Gedanken
aber Vorstellungen, Siitze, Wahrheiten 'an sich' missdeutete ich aber als metaphysisehe Ab-
surditllten."
22. Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, op. cil., p.139.
23. Cf. Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 141: "How do we know anything
about an ideal self-evidence or about its possibility? Its existence must make itself known
realiter in some way in our consciousness, through a feeling of self-evidence or some other
phase of mental rcality. And then all the earlier objections are revived, and everything remains
as it was before: the problem pursues us no matter how often we seek to elude it by some twist
or tum."
24. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic. Husserliana XI!. Dordrecht, Kluwer,
1970. p. 166; quoted in: Felix Kaufmann. "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism", op. cit.,
136.
25. Felix Kaufmann, "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism", op, cit., p, 131.
26. Ibid., p. 129,
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. p. 131.
30. Ibid.
31, Felix Kaufmann, "Strata of Experience", op. cit.. p.322,
32. Felix Kaufmann, "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism", op. cit., p. 132,
33. Felix Kaufmann, "Stratn of Experience", op. cit., p,322.
34, Felix Kaufmann, "Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism", op. cit., p. 132.
35. Ibid, p, 125.
36, Moritz Schlick, "Is There a Factual a Priorn" in: Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (Eds,):
Readings in Philosophical Analysis. New York: Appleton, 1949,277-285.
 VIENNA CIRCLE INSTITUTE YEARBOOK [2002] THE VIENNA CIRCLE
10
Institut 'Wiener Kreis'
AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
Society for the Advancement of the Scientific World Conception
RE-EVALUATION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Series-Editor:
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EDiTORlAL
On the occasion of its 10 th anniversary, the Institut Wiener Kreis /Vienna Circle
Institute, together with the Zentrumfor ubeifakultlire Forschung /Center for In-
terdisciplinary Research of the University of Vienna, organized an international
symposium on "'The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Re-Evaluation and
Future Perspectives of Research and Historiography". This event was hosted by
the Department of Contemporary History at the Campus of the University of
Vienna, in Vienna July 12 - 14, 2001.
The Institute Vienna Circle (IVC) was founded in 1991 as a non-profit soci-
ety. It has been supported ever since by the Austrian Ministry of Science and Re-
search and the City of Vienna. The institute is a member of the International
Union of the History and Philosophy of Science - Division of Logic, Methodol-
ogy and Philosophy of Science, and has been working together with the Univer-
sity o/Vienna since 1997 on the basis ofa co-operation agreement.
Since the very outset, the IVC has worked together closely with similar
institutes and societies in Austria and abroad, focusing on the promotion, culti-
vation and dissemination of a scientific philosophy and history and philosophy of
science in the tradition and spirit of the Vienna Circle ILogical Empiricism. The
Institute's research activities also include the documentati~:m, application and
development of its results. NC adheres to a pluralist and (post-)enlightened con-
ception of science and philosophy of science that is committed to the democrati-
zation of knowledge and science and the critique of all forms of irrationalism,
dogmatism, and fundamentalism. To this end, the IVC regularly organizes con-
ferences and lectures in Austria and abroad, edits three book series (in English
and German), and maintains a library and archives with materials by, and on,
members of the Vienna Circle and associated philosophers as well as scientists.
(cf. survey at the IYC's Website: http://ivc.philo.at).
As regards the most recent activities, one should draw attention to the Vienna
International Summer University - Scientific World Conceptions, which has
been taking place every year (in July) since 2001 at the University Campus. Each
summer university has had a different focus on research-related topics: 2001
(Unity and Plurality of Science), 2002 (Mind and Computation), and 2003
(Cosmological and Biological Evolution). Another current activity is our partici-
pation in the ongoing ESF-Network on "Historical and Contemporary Perspec-
tives of Philosophy of Science in Europe", from 2001 to 2003, which is planned
to be extended as a follow-up prognun of ESP. The edition of Moritz Schlick's
papers (Moritz Schlick Edition) is another international research and publication
project, which is presently underway with a team of scholars from the University
ofGraz and the University ofRostock (Germany). The proceedings of the ....Third
VI EDITORIAL

International History of Philosophy of Science Conference" (HOPOS 2000) are

to be found here in the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 912001.
This Yearbook presents the contributions of invited lecturers as well as a TABLE OF CONTENTS
selection of contributed papers of the aforementioned lOth anniversary jubilee
conference. It also features work from international research and historiography
on Logical Empiricism and its influence, in addition to its further development
by renowned scholars and a younger generation of philosophers. We have di-
vided this yearbook papers into thematic chapters that focus on the origins, his-
tory and historiography, with such leading figures as Schlick and Reichenbach A, THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
along with other members of this influential movement. The yearbook also ad-
dresses more topical issues such as the unity and plurality of science, contexts of
science, epistemology and ethics, and some (long neglected) women of Logical
Empiricism. The reception of the Vienna Circle I Logical Empiricism in the So- FRIEDRICH STADLER: What is the Vienna Circle?
viet Union and Russia is dealt with in a special concluding report section. Some Methodological and Historiographical Answers ................................. XI
As usual, the volume also has a review section on recent publications dealing
with scientific philosophy and philosophy of science.
In this regard it is important to note that the selected papers on Rudolf Carnap 1. ORIGINS AND HISTORY
have been published separately in the 2nd volume of the IVC series "Vienna
Circle Institute Library" established this year. This volume, Language, Truth, ARNE NAESS: Pluralism of Tenable World Views ......... "" ... "."""",,"",, ............ 3
and Knowledge, edited by Thomas Bonk, is to appear at the same time as this
Yearbook published by Kluwer. Several other invited papers will be part of the PAOLO PARRINI: On the Formation of Logical Empiricism .................................. 9
forthcoming Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, ed. by Alan
Richardson and Thomas Uebel. ANITA VON DUHN: Bolzano's Account of Justification ...................................... 21
Last not least let me thank to all who helped make the anniversary conference DAVIDJALALHYDER: Kantian Metaphysics, and Rertzian Mechanics .............. 35
possible and contributed to the publication of the proceedings in these two vol-
umes: my colleagues Elisabeth Nemeth and Eckehart Koehler as members of the
Program Committee, the members of the Local Organizing Committee with II. MORITZ SCHLICK
Margit (Mischa) Kurka, Daria Mascha, Robert Koller from the IVC and
Marianne Ertl from the Department afContemporary History. Here I would like HUBERT SCHLElCHERT: Moritz Schlick's Idea of Non-territorial States ............ 49
to express my sincere gratitude to our financial supporters: the Austrian Ministry
of Education, Science and Culture, the City of Vienna (Division of Culture) and MASSIMO FERRARI: An Unknown Side of Moritz Schlick's Intellectual
the Bank Austria. Finally, I would like to thank our review editor Michael Biography: the Reviews for the "Vierteljahrschrift fUr wissenschaftliche
St6ltzner, and Camilla Nielsen, Christopher Roth and Hartwig Jobst, who, Philosophie und Soziologie" (1911-1916) ................................................. 63
together with members of the Advisory Editorial Board, were involved in the
production of this Yearbook. HANS JORGEN WENDEL: Between Meaning and Demarcation ........................... 79

DAGMAR BORCHERS: "Let's Talk about Flourishing!" - Moritz Schlick

and the Non~cognitive Foundation of Virtue Ethics ..................................... 95
Vienna, October 2002 Friedrich Stadler
(University of Vienna,
and Vienna Circle Institute)
Ill. HANS REICHENBACH

CARSTEN KLEIN: Coordination and Convention in Hans Reichenbach's

Philosophy of Space ................................................................................... 109
VUl
IX

ROBERT RYNASJEWICZ: Reichenbach's E-Definition of Simultaneity VII. EPISTEMOLOGY

in Historical and Philosophical Perspective ................................................ 121
DANIEL COHNITZ: Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Thought Experiments
and Modal Epistemology ............................................................................ 281
IV. OTHER PROPONENTS AND PERIPHERY
F.0. ENGLER: ~tructure and Heuristic: in Praise of Structural Realism
JUHA MANNINEN: Towards a Physicalistic Attitude ......................................... 133 in the Case of Niels Bohr ............................................................................ 297

WOLFGANG HUEMER: Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology:

Felix Kaufinann .......................................................................................... 151
ARTUR KOTERSKI: Bela von Juhos and the Concept of "Konstatierungen"
PAOLO MANCOSU I MATHIEU MARION: Wittgenstein's Constrnctivization
of Euler's Proof of the Infinity of Primes ................................................... 171
VIII. ETHICS
163
UWE CZANIERA: The Neutrality of Meta-Ethics Revisited - How to Draw
on Einstein and the Vienna Circle in Developing an Adequate Account
of Morals .................................................................................................... 313

GRACIELA DEPIERRIS: Quine's Historical Argument for Epistemology

Naturalized ................................................................................................. 189
IX. WOMEN OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

DAGMAR BORCHERS: No Woman, no Try? - Else Frenkel-Brunswik and

V. UNITY AND PLURALITY the Project ofIntegrating Psychoanalysis into the Unity of Science .......... 323

ELLIOTT SOBER: Two Uses of Unification ....................................................... 205 MICHAEL BEANEY: Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna Analysis ........ 339

CHRlSTOPHER HITCHCOCK: Unity and Plurality in the Concept of NIKOLA y MILKOV: Susan Stebbing's Criticism ofWittgenstein's Tractatus ... 351
Causation .................................................................................................... 217
ADELHEID HAMACHER-HERMES: Rose Rand: a Woman in Logic .................... 365
DIEDERICK RAVEN: Edgar Zilsel's Research Programme: Unity of Science
as an Empirical Problem ............................................................................. 225

VI. CONTEXTS OF SCIENCE

GREGOR SCHIEMANN: Criticizing a Difference of Contexts -

On Reichenbach's Distinction between "Context of Discovery" B. GENERAL PART
and "Context of Justification" .................................................................... 237

GIORA HON: Contextualizing an Epistemological Issue:

the Case of Error in Experiment ................................................................. 253 REPORT ~ DOCUMENTATION
JUTIA SCHICKORE: The Contexts of Scientific Justification.
OLESSIA NAZAROVA: Logical Positivism in Russia ........................................ 381
Some Reflections on the Relation Between Epistemological
Contextualism and Philosophy of Science .................................................. 265