Bayan Muna vs Romulo
Ricciardone
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group
established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as
then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The
serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave
under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by
the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only
92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J.
sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-
surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003
(E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US
proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to
and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In
esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace
of the strategic security and defense partnership between the
two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
have been effected by and between the US and 33 other
countries.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L.
Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28,
2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that,
under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER
AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that
are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to
form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot
be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain
well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations
Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term
as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement,
that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the
accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government
Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of
its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and
“executive agreements” have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and
at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner
to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The
Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements – whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment.
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-
028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself,
or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as
consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a
legally binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of
International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void
ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x
it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal
to the [ICC] x x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s
earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that
the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international
law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard
that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its
desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x
The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its
national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and
judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression
that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape
criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the
Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the
US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of
individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things,
there is nothing immoral or violative of international law
concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an
offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.
Santos vs Northwest
FACTS:
The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines.
Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a
foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A.
and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in
the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a
round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from
San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled
departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date
was specified for his return to San Francisco.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA
counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled
departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for
his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-
listed.
On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in
the RTC of Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the
option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he
has a place of business through which the contract has been
made, or before the court at the place of destination.
The private respondent contended that the Philippines was
not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business.
Neither was the petitioner’s ticket issued in this country nor
was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United
States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue
raised by the party is WON the provision of the Warsaw
convention was constitutional)
HELD:
No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional)
The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed
by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and
effect of law in this country. The petitioner’s allegations are
not convincing enough to overcome this presumption.
Apparently, the Convention considered the four places
designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the
litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and
its passenger, as distinguished from all other places.
Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trade
FACTS:
EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from
Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture
of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were
pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of
such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and
Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then).
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the
said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue
was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled
in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the Senate.
HELD:
No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are
subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of
the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall
short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments — treaties
and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges
of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements — whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time.
Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered
into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated
with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient,
in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not
treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history,
to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered
into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They
cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil
aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-
marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not
by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with
policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others,
particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims
against foreign governments, were concluded independently
of any legislation.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines vs. Duque
Facts:
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,
Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition,
the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since
respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as
officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to
2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant
and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages
of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein
assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of
Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held:
YES, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not
come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations
under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it
must be established that such rule is being followed by states
because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the
provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as
part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature
Bayan vs Zamora
I. THE FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by
the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President
Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total
membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation
of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that
the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and
sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a
treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two
requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by
the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a
treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language
should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government,
through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to
the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of
America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of
the Constitution.
Philip Morris vs CA
Facts:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws
not doing business in the Philippines and registered owners of
symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and ‘LARK’ used in their
cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent
Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes
bearing the symbol ‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or
confusingly similar with their trademarks. Petitioners relied on
Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and the
Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court
denied the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners
are not doing business in the Philippines, respondent’s
cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner.
CA granted the injunction but on a subsequent motion,
dissolved the writ.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded
protection under said laws;
Ruling:
(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no
necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response
because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965
international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been Gonzales vs Hechanova
acknowledged in La Chemise. Given these confluence of
existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there FACTS:
can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of
law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales
Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement
filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA
primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law
No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207,
when the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and
have done in the case at hand.
Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA
irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on
2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines,
account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the
and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
question whether they have an exclusive right over their
They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration
symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will
and any other government agency from importing rice and
depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in
corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may
line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus
import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign
government has already constitute valid executive
corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a
agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict
complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually
between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the
using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a
conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for
infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the
local market. ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful,
as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under
the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not,
by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by
said laws.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and
national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled
“An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions
of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines,
and against associations, among others, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by
the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and
all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process
of law.
The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in
the title thereof.
The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict
with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through
the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted
principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause
“is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”
GUERRERO'S TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. vs.
BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION SERVICES EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-KILUSAN (BTEA-KILUSAN), LABOR
ARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES and JOSE
CRUZ
FACTS:
In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a
public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate
and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval
base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-
operator of Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero),
over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent
concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock
Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblock’s 395 employees are
members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).
When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to
employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a
complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to
employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US
Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon
Guerrero’s MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being no
employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon
appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC.
The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to “absorb
all complainants who filed their applications on or before the
deadline” set by Guerrero, except those who may have
derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The
Sec. of Labor affirmed.
Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision
of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that any
non-compliance was attributable to the individual
complainants who failed to submit themselves for processing
& examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of
129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution. The order wasn’t appealed so it was declared
final & executory
Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise
Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor
the determination of members of the Union who shall be
reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The
agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of
the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption of 175
members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to
be reinstated by Guerrero.
RULING
YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor
Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/
military requirements, "to provide security for employment,
and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the US
Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to
give priority consideration to affected employees for
employment.
A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement
between states, and as municipal law for the people of each
state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid
provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the
contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base
authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new contractor
(Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the
employment of the qualified employees of the previous
contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such
obligation that Guerrero entered into the aforementioned
Compromise Agreement.
Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to
submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the
members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by
Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as
final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC,
through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement
the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's Transport
Services, subject to the following conditions:
a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock
Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and
b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the
appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.
For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure
from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at
Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the
names of the members of the Union.
Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is
more than a mere contract and has the force and effect of any
other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties
and their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon
the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is
enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.
Adolfo vs. CFI of Zambales
The petition thus squarely raised in issue the validity of the
exchange of notes on August 10, 1965, more commonly
known as the Mendez-Blair Agreement insofar as it would
modify or amend the provisions of the Military Bases
Agreement without such exchange of notes having been
submitted to the Senate for ratification as the Constitution
requires in the case of treaties. It made a distinction between
a treaty and executive agreements, to which category the
aforesaid exchange of notes belongs. Thus: “A treaty may be
defined as a compact made between two or more
independent nations with a view to the public welfare..
Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements
made purely as executive acts effecting external, relations
and independent of or without legislative authorization, termed
as presidential agreements’, and (2) agreements entered into
in pursuance to acts of Congress, designated as
Congressional-Executive Agreements.. However, the
distinction between a ‘treaty’ or the called ‘executive
agreements’ is best understood by statements of including
examples thereof what they are supposed to cover, of. This
we can find in the above-cited case of the Commissioner of
Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, supra, citing U.S.
authorities, to wit: ‘International agreements involving political
issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually
take the form of treaties. But international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take
the form of executive agreements.” 5 Therefore, said
Agreement is a treaty which must be ratified as it Was ratified,
by the Senate.” 7 The petition reinforced the above conclusion
with this argument: “Since the power to make treaties is
lodged under our Constitution with the President with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. the power to amend
these treaties must similarly be vested in those organs of the
government. After all, an amendment to a statute produces
one law, usually the statute as amended. In pari materia is the
observation that only Congress, with its legislative power, can
make laws and alter or repeal them (Cooley, p. 183). The
Chief Executive, with all his vast powers, cannot suspend the
operation of a statute; a fortiori, he cannot exercise the
greater power to amend or to revoke a statute. Therefore, as
applied to this case, the making of the treaty having been
undertaken under the joint auspices of the President and the
Senate, its amendment or revision must similarly be
undertaken by both agencies of the State as directed by the
Constitution. The August 10, 1965 notes to the U.S.-P.I.
Military Bases Agreement of 1947, not having been ratified yet
by the Senate, remain as mere proposals.” 8