Vladimir Gligorov

Forgetting the First Principle, and as It Applies to the Balkans at That

Balkans is different, so anything goes there, so often even the expert opinion goes. What
are first principles of politics e.g. in Europe, does not apply to the Balkans. Consequently,
territorial accommodations are not only possible but indeed are the adequate way to solve inter-
state conflicts. While the first principle of international politics is not to raise territorial issues if
violent conflicts are to be avoided. Otherwise, the animosities might not only increase, indeed the
wholesale Balkanisation is possible. The term, Balkanisation, being coined on the example of the
Balkans to convey the meaning of the first principle.
Where does that arrogance come from? The answer is trivial – from ignorance and
irresponsibility. I will put these basic issues aside and just point to where the support for the so-
called swap of territories between Serbia and Kosovo had brought both sides and everybody else
to.
Before the idea of the swap of territories (ethnic territories in effect, but that is not essential
for the argument), there was a rather modest normalisation agenda which was promoted by the EU
and was to be facilitated by EU mediation. The two sides would agree to disagree about the
independence of Kosovo from Serbia, but Serbia would not stand in the way of Kosovo’s joining
the UN and other international and European institutions. In exchange, Kosovo would take into
account Serbian interests in Kosovo, i.e. of the rights of the Serbian minority and of the Serbian
Church, and agree to some reasonable terms of post-secession division of property and other assets
and liabilities. That would be a legally binding agreement, with the EU and the UN vouching for
its implementation. Eventually, the expectation would be that the two sides would formalise their
relationship with full diplomatic recognition, but that was in the end up to them. The incentive
would be the membership in the EU, but clearly that would be the decision for the two countries
and indeed primarily for Serbia to make. No territorial issues emerge, which is reasonable given
that the border between the two countries was drawn in a war. Not unlike many if not most other
current borders have been drawn and not just in the Balkans but in Europe and indeed in the world.
Thus, the first principle of international politics.
Now, one does not need to be Thrasymachus or the Hobbesian Knave to claim that power
trumps principles. Take the case of Ukraine. If you are Russia, you may just go in and take over

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Crimea and indeed the eastern Ukraine and argue that you are entitled to make your own principles
– ethnic, historical, legal, international, eternal, whatever. Indeed, most of the borders have been
drawn over time with such arrogance. And sometimes you win and other times you lose. Serbia
for example lost in all its attempts to redraw the intra-Yugoslavia borders and indeed failed to
erase its internal border with its Kosovo province.
But, in general, if you want peaceful resolution of international conflicts, the first principle
is not to touch the borders. Because even if you are Russia, the power distribution is not just
bilateral, but multilateral, and while you may be able to bully Ukraine, there is the rest of the world
that may conclude that the power can be shifted against Russia and in favour of other power
players. So, the first principle of international politics may even be biased towards peaceful
resolution of conflicts due to shifting distribution of power.
In Balkans as well as anywhere. So, what have we seen since the idea of the swap of
territories to solve the Serbia-Kosovo conflict was promoted half a year or so ago? For one, the
normalisation strategy has been shelved. This is in part due to the mistaken push by some EU
member states for the territorial solution (e.g. Austria), and by at least a tacit acquiescence to “the
historic resolution of the eternal problem” which can be achieved with the redrawing of the borders
by Ms. Mogherini and Mr. Hahn. And there are tough realists like John Bolton who agree. For
another, the two sides are not talking to each other anymore and are mostly exchanging complaints
and threats. Third, both Serbia and Kosovo have been internally destabilised. The idea behind the
Balkans being different is almost always the assumption that strong, authoritarian leaders can do
whatever they want, and the docile public will follow blindly. Especially if these leaders depend
on the foreign powers as if their countries are in effect protectorates. That has proved wrong; the
publics oppose the loss of territories irrespective of how much they might support the gain of extra
territories. And thus, finally, both sides are now asking for territorial concessions by the other side
without any territorial compensation from their side. Serbia is reclaiming the north of Kosovo
while Kosovo’s president Mr. Thaci vows to annex the three Albanian majority or plurality
counties in the south of Serbia.
That is the outcome so far. And that is without even touching on the regional and wider
ramifications. That is the consequence of the belief that the first principle of international politics
– do not talk territories if you want peaceful resolution of a conflict – does not apply to the Balkans
of all places, that gave us the concept of Balkanisation.