Civil war
For other uses, see Civil war (disambiguation).
For specific wars, see List of civil wars, American Civil
War, English Civil War, and Spanish Civil War.
“Civil conflict” redirects here. For the college football
game, see Civil Conflict (college football game).
Aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg, American Civil War, 1863
A civil war is a war between organized groups within the
same state or country,[1] or, less commonly, between two
countries created from a formerly united state.[2] The aim
of one side may be to take control of the country or a
region, to achieve independence for a region or to change
government policies.[1] The term is a calque of the Latin
bellum civile which was used to refer to the various civil
wars of the Roman Republic in the 1st century BC.
A civil war is a high-intensity conflict, often involving
regular armed forces, that is sustained, organized and
large-scale. Civil wars may result in large numbers of
casualties and the consumption of significant resources.[3]
Most modern civil wars involve intervention by outside
powers. According to Patrick M. Regan in his book Civil
Wars and Foreign Powers (2000) about two thirds of the
138 intrastate conflicts between the end of World War II
and 2000 saw international intervention, with the United
States intervening in 35 of these conflicts.[4]
Civil wars since the end of World War II have lasted on
average just over four years, a dramatic rise from the one-
and-a-half-year average of the 1900–1944 period. While
the rate of emergence of new civil wars has been rela-
tively steady since the mid-19th century, the increasing
length of those wars has resulted in increasing numbers
of wars ongoing at any one time. For example, there
were no more than five civil wars underway simultane-
1
ously in the first half of the 20th century while there were
over 20 concurrent civil wars close to the end of the Cold
War. Since 1945, civil wars have resulted in the deaths
of over 25 million people, as well as the forced displace-
ment of millions more. Civil wars have further resulted in
economic collapse; Somalia, Burma (Myanmar), Uganda
and Angola are examples of nations that were considered
to have promising futures before being engulfed in civil
wars.[5]
1 Formal classification
Battle of Tewkesbury (1471) of the Wars of the Roses in England
James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford Uni-
versity, defines a civil war as “a violent conflict within
a country fought by organized groups that aim to take
power at the center or in a region, or to change govern-
ment policies”.[1] Ann Hironaka further specifies that one
side of a civil war is the state.[3] The intensity at which
a civil disturbance becomes a civil war is contested by
academics. Some political scientists define a civil war
as having more than 1000 casualties,[1] while others fur-
ther specify that at least 100 must come from each side.[6]
The Correlates of War, a dataset widely used by schol-
ars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000
war-related casualties per year of conflict. This rate is
2 2 CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR IN THE COLLIER–HOEFFLER MODEL

a small fraction of the millions killed in the Second Su- interpreted as rigid conditions. The conditions listed by
danese Civil War and Cambodian Civil War, for exam- the ICRC in its commentary are as follows:[7][8]
ple, but excludes several highly publicized conflicts, such (1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Govern-
as The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the struggle of ment possesses an organized military force, an authority
the African National Congress in Apartheid-era South responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate ter-
Africa.[3] ritory and having the means of respecting and ensuring
Based on the 1000 casualties per year criterion, there respect for the Convention.
were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997, 104 of which oc- (2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse
curred from 1944 to 1997.[3] If one uses the less-stringent to the regular military forces against insurgents organized
1000 casualties total criterion, there were over 90 civil as military and in possession of a part of the national ter-
wars between 1945 and 2007, with 20 ongoing civil wars ritory.
as of 2007.[1]
(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the
The Geneva Conventions do not specifically define the insurgents as belligerents; or (b) That it has claimed for
term “civil war”, nevertheless they do outline the respon- itself the rights of a belligerent; or (c) That it has accorded
sibilities of parties in “armed conflict not of an interna- the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes
tional character”. This includes civil wars, however no only of the present Convention; or (d) That the dispute
specific definition of civil war is provided in the text of has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council
the Conventions. or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being
a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or
an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purport-
ing to have the characteristics of a State. (b) That the
insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over
the population within a determinate portion of the na-
tional territory. (c) That the armed forces act under the
direction of an organized authority and are prepared to
observe the ordinary laws of war. (d) That the insurgent
civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the
Convention.

2 Causes of civil war in the Collier–

Tanks in the streets of Addis Ababa after rebels seized the capital
during the Ethiopian Civil War (1991)
Nevertheless, the International Committee of the Red
Cross has sought to provide some clarification through
its commentaries on the Geneva Conventions, noting that
the Conventions are “so general, so vague, that many of
the delegations feared that it might be taken to cover any
act committed by force of arms”. Accordingly, the com-
mentaries provide for different 'conditions’ on which the
application of the Geneva Convention would depend, the
commentary however points out that these should not be
Hoeffler Model
Scholars investigating the cause of civil war are at-
tracted by two opposing theories, greed versus grievance.
Roughly stated: are conflicts caused by who people are,
whether that be defined in terms of ethnicity, religion or
other social affiliation, or do conflicts begin because it is
in the economic best interests of individuals and groups
to start them? Scholarly analysis supports the conclusion
that economic and structural factors are more important
than those of identity in predicting occurrences of civil
war.[9]
A comprehensive study of civil war was carried out by a
team from the World Bank in the early 21st century. The
study framework, which came to be called the Collier–
Hoeffler Model, examined 78 five-year increments when
civil war occurred from 1960 to 1999, as well as 1,167
five-year increments of “no civil war” for comparison,
and subjected the data set to regression analysis to see the
effect of various factors. The factors that were shown to
have a statistically significant effect on the chance that
a civil war would occur in any given five-year period
were:[10]
 3

Availability of finance

Armed Jihad al-Muqadas volunteer fighters during the 1947–

1948 civil war in the British Mandate of Palestine

study interpreted these three factors as proxies for earn-

An economic dependence on commodities, such as diamonds be-
ings forgone by rebellion, and therefore that lower for-
[11]
ing mined by these children in Sierra Leone, is correlated with gone earnings encourage rebellion. Phrased another
an increased risk of civil war. (See also blood diamond and way: young males (who make up the vast majority of
resource curse.) combatants in civil wars) are less likely to join a rebel-
lion if they are getting an education or have a comfortable
A high proportion of primary commodities in national salary, and can reasonably assume that they will prosper
[12]
exports significantly increases the risk of a conflict. A in the future.
country at “peak danger”, with commodities comprising Low per capita income has been proposed as a cause for
32% of gross domestic product, has a 22% risk of falling grievance, prompting armed rebellion. However, for this
into civil war in a given five-year period, while a coun- to be true, one would expect economic inequality to also
try with no primary commodity exports has a 1% risk. be a significant factor in rebellions, which it is not. The
When disaggregated, only petroleum and non-petroleum study therefore concluded that the economic model of
groupings showed different results: a country with rela- opportunity cost better explained the findings.[10]
tively low levels of dependence on petroleum exports is
at slightly less risk, while a high level of dependence on Military advantage
oil as an export results in slightly more risk of a civil war
than national dependence on another primary commod-
ity. The authors of the study interpreted this as being the
result of the ease by which primary commodities may be
extorted or captured compared to other forms of wealth;
for example, it is easy to capture and control the output of
a gold mine or oil field compared to a sector of garment
manufacturing or hospitality services.[11]
A second source of finance is national diasporas, which
can fund rebellions and insurgencies from abroad. The
study found that statistically switching the size of a coun-
try’s diaspora from the smallest found in the study to the
largest resulted in a sixfold increase in the chance of a
civil war.[11] Communist soldiers during the Battle of Siping, Chinese Civil
War, 1946

Opportunity cost of rebellion High levels of population dispersion and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the presence of mountainous terrain, increased the
Higher male secondary school enrollment, per capita in- chance of conflict. Both of these factors favor rebels,
come and economic growth rate all had significant ef- as a population dispersed outward toward the borders is
fects on reducing the chance of civil war. Specifically, a harder to control than one concentrated in a central re-
male secondary school enrollment 10% above the aver- gion, while mountains offer terrain where rebels can seek
age reduced the chance of a conflict by about 3%, while sanctuary.[11]
a growth rate 1% higher than the study average resulted
in a decline in the chance of a civil war of about 1%. The Grievance
4 4 DURATION OF CIVIL WARS

Most proxies for “grievance” – the theory that civil wars
begin because of issues of identity, rather than eco-
nomics – were statistically insignificant, including eco-
nomic equality, political rights, ethnic polarization and
religious fractionalization. Only ethnic dominance, the
case where the largest ethnic group comprises a majority
of the population, increased the risk of civil war. A coun-
try characterized by ethnic dominance has nearly twice
the chance of a civil war. However, the combined effects
of ethnic and religious fractionalization, i.e. the greater
chance that any two randomly chosen people will be from
separate ethnic or religious groups, the less chance of a
civil war, were also significant and positive, as long as the
country avoided ethnic dominance. The study interpreted
this as stating that minority groups are more likely to rebel
if they feel that they are being dominated, but that rebel-
lions are more likely to occur the more homogeneous the
population and thus more cohesive the rebels. These two
factors may thus be seen as mitigating each other in many
cases.[13]
Population size
4 Duration of civil wars
Ann Hironaka, author of Neverending Wars, divides the
modern history of civil wars into the pre-19th century,
19th century to early 20th century, and late 20th cen-
tury. In 19th-century Europe, the length of civil wars
fell significantly, largely due to the nature of the conflicts
as battles for the power center of the state, the strength
of centralized governments, and the normally quick and
decisive intervention by other states to support the gov-
ernment. Following World War II the duration of civil
wars grew past the norm of the pre-19th century, largely
due to weakness of the many postcolonial states and the
intervention by major powers on both sides of conflict.
The most obvious commonality to civil wars are that they
occur in fragile states.[16]
4.1 Civil wars in the 19th and early 20th
centuries

The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war

rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil
war rises approximately proportionately with the size of
a country’s population.[10]

Time

The more time that has elapsed since the last civil war, the
less likely it is that a conflict will recur. The study had two An artillery school set up by the anti-socialist “Whites” during the
possible explanations for this: one opportunity-based and Finnish Civil War, 1918
the other grievance-based. The elapsed time may rep-
resent the depreciation of whatever capital the rebellion Civil wars in the 19th century and in the early 20th cen-
was fought over and thus increase the opportunity cost of tury tended to be short; civil wars between 1900 and 1944
restarting the conflict. Alternatively, elapsed time may lasted on average one and half years.[17] The state itself
represent the gradual process of healing of old hatreds. formed the obvious center of authority in the majority of
The study found that the presence of a diaspora substan- cases, and the civil wars were thus fought for control of
tially reduced the positive effect of time, as the fund- the state. This meant that whoever had control of the cap-
ing from diasporas offsets the depreciation of rebellion- ital and the military could normally crush resistance. A
specific capital.[13] rebellion which failed to quickly seize the capital and con-
trol of the military for itself normally found itself doomed
to rapid destruction. For example, the fighting associated
3 Other causes with the 1871 Paris Commune occurred almost entirely
in Paris, and ended quickly once the military sided with
[18]
Evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazawa has argued the government at Versailles and conquered Paris.
that an important cause of intergroup conflict may be the The power of non-state actors resulted in a lower value
relative availability of women of reproductive age. He placed on sovereignty in the 18th and 19th centuries,
found that polygyny greatly increased the frequency of which further reduced the number of civil wars. For
civil wars but not interstate wars.[14] Gleditsch et al. did example, the pirates of the Barbary Coast were recog-
not find a relationship between ethnic groups with polyg- nized as de facto states because of their military power.
yny and increased frequency of civil wars but nations hav- The Barbary pirates thus had no need to rebel against the
ing legal polygamy may have more civil wars. They ar- Ottoman Empire – their nominal state government – to
gued that misogyny is a better explanation than polygyny. gain recognition for their sovereignty. Conversely, states
They found that increased women’s rights were are asso- such as Virginia and Massachusetts in the United States
ciated with less civil wars and that legal polygamy had no of America did not have sovereign status, but had signif-
effect after women’s rights were controlled for.[15] icant political and economic independence coupled with
4.2 Civil wars since 1945
weak federal control, reducing the incentive to secede.[19]
A plane, supported by smaller fighter planes, of Francisco
Franco's Nationalists bombs Madrid during the Spanish Civil
War (1936–1939)
The two major global ideologies, monarchism and
democracy, led to several civil wars. However, a bi-
polar world, divided between the two ideologies, did not
develop, largely due to the dominance of monarchists
through most of the period. The monarchists would thus
normally intervene in other countries to stop democratic
movements taking control and forming democratic gov-
ernments, which were seen by monarchists as being both
dangerous and unpredictable. The Great Powers (defined
in the 1815 Congress of Vienna as the United Kingdom,
Habsburg Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia) would
frequently coordinate interventions in other nations’ civil
wars, nearly always on the side of the incumbent gov-
ernment. Given the military strength of the Great Pow-
ers, these interventions nearly always proved decisive and
quickly ended the civil wars.[20]
There were several exceptions from the general rule of
quick civil wars during this period. The American Civil
War (1861–1865) was unusual for at least two reasons:
it was fought around regional identities as well as polit-
ical ideologies, and it ended through a war of attrition,
rather than with a decisive battle over control of the capi-
tal, as was the norm. The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)
proved exceptional because both sides in the struggle re-
ceived support from intervening great powers: Germany,
Italy, and Portugal supported opposition leader Francisco
Franco, while France and the Soviet Union supported the
government[21] (see proxy war).
4.2 Civil wars since 1945
In the 1990s, about twenty civil wars were occurring con-
currently during an average year, a rate about ten times
the historical average since the 19th century. However,
the rate of new civil wars had not increased appreciably;
the drastic rise in the number of ongoing wars after World
War II was a result of the tripling of the average duration
of civil wars to over four years.[22] This increase was a
result of the increased number of states, the fragility of In sharp contrast, decolonization was an entirely different
states formed after 1945, the decline in interstate war, process of state formation. Most imperial powers had
and the Cold War rivalry.[23]
Following World War II, the major European powers di- pendence; for example, Britain had given limited self-
5
Members of ARDE Frente Sur at rest after routing a Sandinista
National Liberation Front garrison at El Serrano during the
Nicaraguan Revolution (1987)
vested themselves of their colonies at an increasing rate:
the number of ex-colonial states jumped from about 30
to almost 120 after the war. The rate of state forma-
tion leveled off in the 1980s, at which point few colonies
remained.[24] More states also meant more states in which
to have long civil wars. Hironaka statistically measures
the impact of the increased number of ex-colonial states
as increasing the post-WWII incidence of civil wars by
+165% over the pre-1945 number.[25]
While the new ex-colonial states appeared to follow the
blueprint of the idealized state – centralized govern-
ment, territory enclosed by defined borders, and citi-
zenry with defined rights -, as well as accessories such
as a national flag, an anthem, a seat at the United Na-
tions and an official economic policy, they were in actu-
ality far weaker than the Western states they were mod-
eled after.[26] In Western states, the structure of govern-
ments closely matched states’ actual capabilities, which
had been arduously developed over centuries. The devel-
opment of strong administrative structures, in particular
those related to extraction of taxes, is closely associated
with the intense warfare between predatory European
states in the 17th and 18th centuries, or in Charles Tilly's
famous formulation: “War made the state and the state
made war”.[27] For example, the formation of the modern
states of Germany and Italy in the 19th century is closely
associated with the wars of expansion and consolidation
led by Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont, respectively.[27]
The Western process of forming effective and impersonal
bureaucracies, developing efficient tax systems, and in-
tegrating national territory continued into the 20th cen-
tury. Nevertheless, Western states that survived into the
latter half of the 20th century were considered “strong”
by simple reason that they had managed to develop the
institutional structures and military capability required to
survive predation by their fellow states.
not foreseen a need to prepare their colonies for inde-
6 4 DURATION OF CIVIL WARS

An American Cadillac Gage Light Armored Reconnaissance Ve-

hicle and Italian Fiat-OTO Melara Type 6614 Armored Person-
nel Carrier guard an intersection during the Somali Civil War
(1993) A checkpoint manned by the Lebanese army and US Marines,
1982. The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) was characterized
by multiple foreign interventions.
rule to India and Sri Lanka, while treating British So-
maliland as little more than a trading post, while all ma-
sovereignty or control of their own territory, including the
jor decisions for French colonies were made in Paris and
privileges of international diplomatic recognition and an
Belgium prohibited any self-government up until it sud-
equal vote in the United Nations. Further, the interna-
denly granted independence to its colonies in 1960. Like
tional community offers development aid to weak states,
Western states of previous centuries, the new ex-colonies
which helps maintain the facade of a functioning mod-
lacked autonomous bureaucracies, which would make de-
ern state by giving the appearance that the state is ca-
cisions based on the benefit to society as a whole, rather
pable of fulfilling its implied responsibilities of control
than respond to corruption and nepotism to favor a par-
and order.[30] The formation of a strong international law
ticular interest group. In such a situation, factions ma-
regime and norms against territorial aggression is strongly
nipulate the state to benefit themselves or, alternatively,
associated with the dramatic drop in the number of inter-
state leaders use the bureaucracy to further their own
state wars, though it has also been attributed to the ef-
self-interest. The lack of credible governance was com-
fect of the Cold War or to the changing nature of eco-
pounded by the fact that most colonies were economic
nomic development. Consequently, military aggression
loss-makers at independence, lacking both a productive
that results in territorial annexation became increasingly
economic base and a taxation system to effectively extract
likely to prompt international condemnation, diplomatic
resources from economic activity. Among the rare states
censure, a reduction in international aid or the introduc-
profitable at decolonization was India, to which scholars
tion of economic sanction, or, as in the case of 1990
credibly argue that Uganda, Malaysia and Angola may be
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, international military inter-
included. Neither did imperial powers make territorial
vention to reverse the territorial aggression.[31] Similarly,
integration a priority, and may have discouraged nascent
the international community has largely refused to rec-
nationalism as a danger to their rule. Many newly inde-
ognize secessionist regions, while keeping some seces-
pendent states thus found themselves impoverished, with
sionist self-declared states such as Somaliland in diplo-
minimal administrative capacity in a fragmented society,
matic recognition limbo. While there is not a large body
while faced with the expectation of immediately meeting
of academic work examining the relationship, Hironaka’s
the demands of a modern state.[28] Such states are con-
statistical study found a correlation that suggests that ev-
sidered “weak” or "fragile”. The “strong"-"weak” catego-
ery major international anti-secessionist declaration in-
rization is not the same as “Western"-"non-Western”, as
creased the number of ongoing civil wars by +10%, or a
some Latin American states like Argentina and Brazil and
total +114% from 1945 to 1997.[32] The diplomatic and
Middle Eastern states like Egypt and Israel are considered
legal protection given by the international community, as
to have “strong” administrative structures and economic
well as economic support to weak governments and dis-
infrastructure.[29]
couragement of secession, thus had the unintended effect
Historically, the international community would have tar- of encouraging civil wars.
geted weak states for territorial absorption or colonial
domination or, alternatively, such states would fragment
into pieces small enough to be effectively administered 4.2.1 Interventions by outside powers
and secured by a local power. However, international
norms towards sovereignty changed in the wake of WWII There has been an enormous amount of international in-
in ways that support and maintain the existence of weak tervention in civil wars since 1945 that some have argued
states. Weak states are given de jure sovereignty equal to served to extend wars. According to Patrick M. Regan
that of other states, even when they do not have de facto in his book Civil Wars and Foreign Powers (2000) about
 7

Fall and demolition of the Berlin Wall at Checkpoint Charlie

(1990)
A fast attack boat of the rebel LTTE in Sri Lanka in 2003 passes
the hulk of an LTTE supply ship that had been sunk by govern-
ment aircraft, Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009) ogy would attract the attention of a superpower to obtain
support. Using a separate statistical evaluation than used
above for interventions, civil wars that included pro- or
2/3rds of the 138 intrastate conflicts between the end
anti-communist forces lasted 141% longer than the aver-
of WWII and 2000 saw international intervention, with
age non-Cold War conflict, while a Cold War civil war
the United States intervening in 35 of these conflicts.[4]
that attracted superpower intervention resulted in wars
While intervention has been practiced since the inter-
typically lasting over three times as long as other civil
national system has existed, its nature changed substan-
wars. Conversely, the end of the Cold War marked by
tially. It became common for both the state and op-
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 resulted in a reduc-
position group to receive foreign support, allowing wars
tion in the duration of Cold War civil wars of 92% or,
to continue well past the point when domestic resources
phrased another way, a roughly ten-fold increase in the
had been exhausted. Superpowers, such as the European
rate of resolution of Cold War civil wars. Lengthy Cold
great powers, had always felt no compunction in interven-
War-associated civil conflicts that ground to a halt include
ing in civil wars that affected their interests, while distant
the wars of Guatemala (1960–1996), El Salvador (1979–
regional powers such as the United States could declare
1991) and Nicaragua (1970–1990).[34]
the interventionist Monroe Doctrine of 1821 for events
in its Central American “backyard”. However, the large
population of weak states after 1945 allowed intervention
by former colonial powers, regional powers and neighbor- 5 See also
ing states who themselves often had scarce resources. On
average, a civil war with interstate intervention was 300% • The Logic of Violence in Civil War
longer than those without. When disaggregated, a civil
war with intervention on only one side is 156% longer, • War of Independence (disambiguation)
while when intervention occurs on both sides the average
civil war is longer by an additional 92%. If one of the in- • Wars of national liberation
tervening states was a superpower, a civil war is a further
72% longer; a conflict such as the Angolan Civil War, in • List of civil wars
which there is two-sided foreign intervention, including
by a superpower (actually, two superpowers in the case
of Angola), would be 538% longer on average than a civil 6 References
war without any international intervention.[33]
[1] James Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War” in Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2007. For further discussion on civil war
4.3 Effect of the Cold War classification, see the section “Formal classification”.

The Cold War (1945–1989) provided a global network
of material and ideological support that often helped per-
petuate civil wars, which were mainly fought in weak
ex-colonial states rather than the relatively strong states
that were aligned with the Warsaw Pact and North At-
lantic Treaty Organization. In some cases, superpowers
would superimpose Cold War ideology onto local con-
flicts, while in others local actors using Cold War ideol-
[2] Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the
American Civil War | Book Reviews, EH.net. “Two na-
tions [within the U.S.] developed because of slavery.” Oc-
tober 2006. Retrieved July 2009.
[3] Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International
Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil
War, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2005,
p. 3, ISBN 0-674-01532-0
8 7 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[4] “Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in
Intrastate Conflict”. Foreign Affairs.
[5] Hironaka (2005), pp. 1–2, 4–5
[6] Edward Wong, “A Matter of Definition: What Makes a
Civil War, and Who Declares It So?" New York Times
November 26, 2006
[7] Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of
1949, (Volume II-B, p. 121)
[8] See also the International Committee of the Red Cross
commentary on Third 1949 Geneva Convention, Article
III, Section “A. Cases of armed conflict” for the ICRC’s
reading of the definition and a listing of proposed alternate
wording
[9] See, for example, Hironaka (2005), pp. 9–10, and Collier,
Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis, “The Collier-
Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study
Project Research Design,” in Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1,
p. 13
[10] Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 17
[11] Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 16
[12] Henrik Urdal – A CLASH OF GENERATIONS?
YOUTH BULGES AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE –
un.org. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
[13] Collier & Sambanis, Vol 1, p. 18
[14] Satoshi Kanazawa (2009). “Evolutionary Psychological
Foundations of Civil Wars”. The University of Chicago
Press: 25–34. doi:10.1017/S0022381608090026.
[15] Gleditsch, K. S.; Wucherpfennig, J.; Hug, S.; Reigstad,
K. G. (2011). “Polygyny or Misogyny? Reexamining the
“First Law of Intergroup Conflict"". The Journal of Poli-
tics 73: 265. doi:10.1017/S0022381610001003.
[16] Hironaka, 2005, p. 28
[17] Hironaka, 2005, p. 1
[18] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 28–29
[19] Hironaka, 2005, p. 29
[20] Hironaka, 2005, p. 30
[21] Hironaka, 2005, p. 31
[22] Hironaka, 2005, p. 1, 4-5
[23] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 7 & 23
[24] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 36
[25] Hironaka, 2005, p. 40
[26] Hironaka, 2005, p. 54
[27] Hironaka, 2005, p. 6
[28] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 59–61
[29] Hironaka, 2005, p. 56
[30] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 6
[31] Hironaka, 2005, p. 16
[32] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 37–40
[33] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 50–51
[34] Hironaka, 2005, pp. 48-50
7 Bibliography
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• Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Greed and
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• Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: civil war
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• Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds. (2005).
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• Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds. (2005).
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• Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A
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and Escalation (Princeton University Press, 1996).
• Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated
Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993,” American
Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (summer 1995):
pp 681–690.
• Andrew Mack, “Civil War: Academic Research and
the Policy Community,” Journal of Peace Research
39, no. 5 (2002): pp. 515–525.
• David T. Mason and Patrick 3. Fett, “How Civil
Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (fall 1996): 546-568.
• Patrick M. Regan. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers:
Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (2000) 172
pages
• Stephen John and others., eds. Ending Civil Wars:
The Implementation of Peace Agreements (2002),
729 pages
 9

• Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Vi-

olence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of
Territory (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,
2003). ISBN 0-691-12383-7.
• Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Suc-
cessful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2002),

• Elisabeth Jean Wood; “Civil Wars: What We Don't

Know,” Global Governance, Vol. 9, 2003 pp 247+
online version

8 External links
• Royal Air Force Doctrine – The Nature of War and
Armed Conflict

• “What makes a civil war?", BBC News, 20 April

2006
10 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1 Text
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Engels, Khendon, LA2, Paul~enwiki, Deb, Roadrunner, SimonP, Isis~enwiki, Mrwojo, Infrogmation, Michael Hardy, Rhorn, Bewilde-
beast, BrianHansen~enwiki, Georgec, Ixfd64, Sannse, Gbleem, Mdebets, Ahoerstemeier, Muriel Gottrop~enwiki, Jniemenmaa, Den fjät-
trade ankan~enwiki, Kingturtle, Александър, Jasper, Jiang, Deisenbe, Evercat, Hashar, RodC, Dcoetzee, Reddi, CBDunkerson, Asser
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bot, Happy43, Krisspike131, Zamy~enwiki, Corkie5555, WeirdoEditer, X!, VolkovBot, Louiesoto, CWii, Lammerz27, Pleasantville,
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Angncon, Fishy289, Keilana, PookeyMaster, Toddst1, Radon210, Oda Mari, Oxymoron83, Dictionarydude1, Lightmouse, Techman224,
RyanParis, OKBot, Nancy, Billyg, Pinkadelica, Kanonkas, Troy 07, Faithlessthewonderboy, ClueBot, The Thing That Should Not Be,
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Cenarium, Legacypac, Tnxman307, Jawdizzle5, Razorflame, Redthoreau, Xabiereus, Fitzy93, Abhishek Jacob, Hadeshelper4, La Pianista,
Signhands, Zazar513, Rds865, Specopserdude747, Semicolie, ThreeOneFive, Versus22, Pinkpeople68, Name12342434, Kruusamägi, Du-
bins12, Zim455555, Monkeymj 14, Berean Hunter, Chipfsu30, Mclovinlovers, Jacko101, Vanished user uih38riiw4hjlsd, Sockpuppet872,
SimiValley, Anal34, DumZiBoT, Templarion, Morenax3, Jmanigold, Scormio, Amandatim, Stevenpan25, BarretB, Awood7309, Fastily,
Spitfire, Bullseyedesigns, Rror, Skullblast, SilvonenBot, Albert159, Doobiedoo6986, Dnvrfantj, Airplaneman, Eklipse, Addbot, Xp54321,
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9.2 Images 11

HerculeBot, Legobot, Middayexpress, Luckas-bot, TheSuave, Yobot, Piemasterbater, Ilikepie24, Senator Palpatine, Pieeaterman, Darfel-
lan, Washburnmav, Princejj, QueenCake, Epictale79, Zbman151, Xxdavester, Tempodivalse, Billybobsue, Tester02222, AnomieBOT, Fa-
tal!ty, CNCSCRPT, 1exec1, Flysky259, Alexk13524, Galoubet, Piano non troppo, Ubitubi, Moneybaby8675, Zomgzomg123, Lowhanga5,
Collectcall, Nikeone, OllieFury, ArthurBot, Xqbot, Isketcher24, Stars4change, Unscented, Little billy 123, Skarl the Drummer, Permethius,
Abce2, -Lt.Frag-, Bassman5, Spartan341, Dylanneumann, Homie777, The joker123, GhalyBot, Sonic123amy, Ihope4me, Ptah09, Jordan-
pimentel, Tibi ecuador95, ESpublic013, Surv1v4l1st, AlexanderKaras, Pepper, Bam4991, Aruseusu, D'ohBot, Jamesooders, SH9002,
HamburgerRadio, Ntse, Winterst, Alonso de Mendoza, Blubro, Jhbuk, Jauhienij, FoxBot, TobeBot, GregKaye, Brj3937, Jaba1977, The
Utahraptor, Ienpw III, Linksterkinadobothada, Loganhowell44, CHoooooo, Salvio giuliano, Drama123, EmausBot, Ladiesman2217, Im-
munize, Dewritech, Bull Market, AvicBot, Illegitimate Barrister, Dolovis, Traxs7, MithrandirAgain, A930913, Ross8394, Pmorries, Final-
Rapture, Comedianable, NotObama, As008, Ieatbabies429, ThroshMotel, Subrata Roy, Nightgown22, Sonicyouth86, ClueBot NG, Tan-
bircdq, Blorsch, Movses-bot, Christle2212, Watercolor merger, Helpful Pixie Bot, PhnomPencil, Joeykai, AvocatoBot, CitationCleanerBot,
Polmandc, Pendragon5, Acadēmica Orientālis, Lubiesque, Khazar2, Stumink, Dexbot, Gabby Merger, AcidSnow, Yilku1, ProKro, Fortuna
Imperatrix Mundi, Theparties, Forhistoryonly, KasparBot, MitchellPritchettLSD and Anonymous: 953

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• File:Arab_volunteers.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/21/Arab_volunteers.jpg License: Public domain
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• File:Battle_of_Gettysburg.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/33/Battle_of_Gettysburg.jpg License: Pub-
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• File:Battle_of_Siping01.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Battle_of_Siping01.jpg Li-
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12 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9.3 Content license

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