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1.

Declaration Again Interest (§38, Rule 130)


Cases:

1. Parel v. Prudencio, 487 SCRA 405 (2006)

X= Danilo Parel
Y=Florentino Parel, Danilo’s father (deceased)
Z=Simeon Prudencio

Question:

The Court of Appeals declared Z as the sole owner of a two-storey residential house. X filed for
a Petition for Certiorari. X argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of Y, petitioner’s
father declaring Z as owner of the subject house as conclusive proof that Z is the true and only
owner of the house since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
which it was executed. Is Y’s affidavit should be given weight as conclusive proof of Z’s sole
ownership.

Answer:

YES.

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:


SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

Based on the affidavit, it is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless
he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his
heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute.

Case Digest:

FACTS:
On Feb. 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Danilo Parel with the RTC Baguio.
Prudencio is claiming that he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No.
61 Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound,
Baguio City
He also claims that the house was constructed in 1972-1975 from his own funds and
declared in his name in a tax declaration and that he has been paying the taxes on it ever since
In 1973, when the 2nd floor of the house was already habitable, he allowed Parel’s
parents to live there and supervise the construction below. When the house was finished, the
Parel family was allowed to live there since they have no house of their own.
Parel’s dad, Florentino, now deceased, was Prudencio’s wife’s younger brother.
In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house
as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place.
Danilo’s parents heeded this when they migrated to US in 1986, however, Danilo and his
family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of the house; and refused to
leave despite many demands
So Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession, and also asked from Parel for a
monthly rental (3k) from April 1988 until he leaves the premises, plus moral and exemplary
damages and costs.
Parel filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that his parents are co-owners of the
house (ground floor to Parel, 2nd floor to Prudencio), and that his parents spent their own
resources in improving the house and that the construction workers were hired by Florentino, and
that Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands.
He also claims that Prudencio had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against
them involving the subject house, which were all dismissed.
Parel asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s
fees.
RTC declared that the house is co-owned by Parel and Prudencio, so Prudencio cannot
evict Parel. Parel was also ordered to pay moral and actual damages, atty.’s fees, and costs.
RTC concluded that the land was allocated to Florentino as part of a program of the
former mayor of Baguio (Lardizabal) to allow lowly-paid gov’t workers to construct their own
houses on the reservation; that Prudencio failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral,
express or implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners
but as mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the
house; and, that the late Florentino was the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of
the house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-ownership existed between
respondent and petitioner’s father, Florentino.
From this, RTC concluded that Florentino and Prudencio had an agreement that
Florentino would contribute money for the construction and once the house is completed, hati
sila.
RTC also questioned that Prudencio only claimed sole-ownership after 15 years.
RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents
showing the City Assessor’s assessment of the property all in respondent’s name since tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership.
It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by
respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its
execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the
City Treasurer concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought then that it
should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for
being hearsay.
From this decision, Prudencio appealed, decision reversed by CA, declaring him the sole
owner.
The CA found as meritorious respondent’s contention that since petitioner failed to
formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence
offered by respondent.
It ruled that the TC’s statement that defendants’ occupancy of the house is due to a SPA
executed by his parents is wanting of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of
attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioner’s evidence to support his
claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it
was Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain,
who testified that the lot was allocated to petitioner’s father, there was no supporting document
which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the trial court’s conclusion; and that the rule
on offer of evidence is mandatory.
The CA found the affidavit dated Sep. 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioner’s father, stating
that he is not the owner of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondent’s
sole ownership of the subject house as it is a declaration made by Florentino against his interest.
It also gave weight to Prudencio’s tax declarations as sufficient to establish his case
which constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Parel filed an MFR, denied.

ISSUES:
1. WON Florentino’s affidavit should be given weight as conclusive proof of Prudencio’s
sole ownership. YES.

RULING:
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring
respondent as owner of the subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is the true and only
owner of the house since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
which it was executed.
Prudencio had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of
possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. He presented
the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant
City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:

I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation
No. 1, after having been sworn to according to law depose and say:

That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1,
Baguio City which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office
of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes;

That I am not the owner of the building in question;

That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at
55 Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.
Further, affiant say not.

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:


SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of
such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which
are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.
Based on the affidavit, it is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration
unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests
as his heirs.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute.
There is also no evidence that Florentino revoked such affidavit, even when the criminal
complaint for trespass to dwelling was filed by Prudencio, although this was dismissed because
of absence of evidence that Florentino entered the house against Prudencio’s will and that and
action for ejectment should be his remedy; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the
ground that respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the MTC.
The building plan of the house was in the name of Prudencio and his wife and the house
was built in accordance to said plan.
Prudencio was the one paying the real estate property taxes on the house under his name
since 1974, and the Parels did not pay this any time in their name. While tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. But in this case, the taxes, taken with the other
circumstances, SC concludes that Prudencio is the sole owner of the house

2. Viacrucis v. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176 (1972)

3. Fuentes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)

MARIKIT, Febeh
Topic: Declaration Against Interest

M = Malaspina
Z= Zoilo Fuentes
A = Alejandro Fuentes
Question:
M while at a benefit dance was stabbed and before he died he muttered that A stabbed him.
Witnesses Osok and Tolin who were with the victim testified that they saw A stabbed M. A
raised the following to deny the said stabbing

He was conversing with M when the latter was stabbed.


He insisted that he is innocent and that his cousin Z aka 'Jonie’ (was the one who stabbed M.
That after the incident out of fear he went to his brother’s house where he met Z and the latter
confessed to him.
That Z also made a confession to their uncle, Felicisimo, that he stabbed M.
A presented a witness named Nerio Biscocho, who during the cross examination, testified that Z
and Jonie Fuentes are one and same person.

Is the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Z is admissible in evidence as an


exception to the hearsay rule?

Answer:
No.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify
existed.

The admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is
not “unable to testify.” There is no showing that Z is either dead, mentally incapacitated or
physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon
the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and
assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and
his uncle to the effect that Z admitted having killed M, the records show that the defense did not
exert any serious effort to produce Z as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always
for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit.
But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus
increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie
and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.

2. Pedigree (§39, Rule 130)

Cases:
1. Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)
By Andrew M. Navarrete

Gravador V Mamigo
Topic: Pedigree (Section 39 of Rule 130) DATE OF BIRTH; CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING
THE SAME
Legend:
A – Petitioner Pedro Gravador
B – Respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Davao
C – Respondent District Supervisor Eutiquio Mamigo

Question:
A, School Principal was advised of his separation, effective immediately, unless he can show valid
proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that he is below 65 years of age. According to
the pre-war records and Employee's Record Card, which had just been found in connection with
the verification of the services of all school officials, A was born on November 26, 1897.

A wrote the Director of Public Schools protesting his forced retirement with attached affidavit of
2 affiants who declared that they knew that A was born on December 11, 1901 instead of
November 26, 1897 because they were neighbors of A’s parents. Later, A asked for the dismissal
of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement
from the service on December 11, 1966.

Is the court correct in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth of
A?

Suggested Answer:
Yes

Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding
pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 39 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In the instant case, the court gave three cogent reasons:


1. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives, and his testimony in
such case is an assertion of family tradition.

2. The import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother, contained in a verified pleading
in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old,
cannot be ignored.

3. The parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on
June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner
then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records
indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
Therefore, the court is correct in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date
of birth of A.

Case Digest

Doctrine:
ID.; EVIDENCE; DATE OF BIRTH; CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING THE SAME. —
Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to
his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives, and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of family tradition. Indeed, even in his application for backpay, filed through the Office
of the Superintendent of Schools, on October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth
is December 11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked
the Government Service Insurance System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date
of his birth to December 11, 1901. Again the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother,
contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner
was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this
statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section
39 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth
of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem
motam of a deceased relative.

Facts:
The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then Superintendent of
Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his
separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
according to his pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools, including his Employee’s
Record Card. He was advised of his separation from service “effective immediately unless you can
show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below 65 years of age
today” (excerpt from the advice given).

On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced
retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11,
1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo
and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in which these two affiants declared that they
knew that the petitioner "was born on December 11, 1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly
known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the
neighbors of the late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA
[petitioner's parents], and we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born;
furthermore,we were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said
PEDRO GRAVADOR."

On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues
posed thereby had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and
the payment to him of the corresponding retirement benefits. We deem it necessary, however, to
review the trial court's decision on the merits, considering that the computation of retirement
annuities is based among other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree, and that
payment of benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date
of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this Court
ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim.

Issue:
WON the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of
birth of the petitioner.

Held:
No

The court gave three cogent reasons:


1. As Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth,
he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony
in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.

2. The import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother, contained in a verified pleading
in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old,
cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once
a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of Section 33 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

3. The parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June
10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then
could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate,
because Constantino is admittedly older than he.

2. Tison v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

3. Family Tradition (§40, Rule 130)

Cases:

1. People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991)

Pasagui, Chelvier

X – Cristina Villarosa, complainant


Y – Alfredo Alegado, accused-appellant
Bar Question:

X was playing at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City when Y held
her by the hand and took her upstairs to the second floor which was deserted at the time, and
raped her. A similar incident happened a few days after. Y was charged with two counts of rape
and was later convicted of statutory rape. Y appealed, arguing that X’s age at the time of the
alleged incidents of rape was not established with certainty, hence, it was an error on the part of
the trial court to convict him of statutory rape.

Was the age of X established with certainty so as to convict Y of statutory rape?

Answer:

Yes.

Sec. 40, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides in part that the reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Sec. 39, Rule 130 has three requisites for its
admissibility: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a
family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. 

In this
case, Sec. 39 of Rile 130 is applicable to prove the victim’s age because all the preconditions are
obtaining. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her
maternal grandfather do not constitute hearsay evidence but rather fall under the exceptions to
the hearsay rule provided under Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130. Declarations with regard to
pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of
persons who must know the truth.

Case Digest

Facts:

On April 14, 1988, the complainant was playing at the Freedom Square inside the public market
of San Carlos City when Alegado held her by the hand and took her upstairs to the second floor
of the public market where he raped her. Thereafter, Alegado gave the complainant P2.00 and
left. The complainant never told anybody about it for she was threatened by Alegado that he
would kill her. Another incident happened on April 20, 1988. Alegado was charged for two
counts of rape and was later convicted of statutory rape. He appealed the decision and contended
that the victim’s actual age at the time of the alleged rape incidents was not established with
certainty, hence, the trial court erred in convicting him of statutory rape.

Issue: Whether or not the actual age of the victim was established with certainty so as to convict
the accused of statutory rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

Sec. 40, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides in part that the reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
offended party herself and her maternal grandfather that the victim was born on September 5,
1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule
provided under Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130.

“Pedigree” under Sec. 39, Rule 130 includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.
Declarations with regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they
are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree testimony is admitted
because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from
the rejection of such proof than from its admission.

Sec. 39 has three requisites for its admissibility: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of
the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to
the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family
of said person. 
In this case, all the preconditions are obtaining; that the date of birth of the rape
victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim’s grandfather relating to tradition
(sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was
filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the victim.
The testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although hearsay and though a person can
have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age
is acquired from what he is told by his parents – he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition.

2. Ferrer v. De Ynchausti, 38 Phil. 905 (1918)


By: Jerelyn Ponsica
TOPIC: FAMILY TRADITION ( section 40, Rule 130)
Trend:
X- Rafael Ferrer (Plaintiff)
Y- Rosa Viademonte (mother of Rafael)
J-Joaquin Jose de Inchausti (defendant)
Isabel Gonzales (alleged mother of Rosa)
R-Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr.
Don Remegio Rodriguez (priest)

BAR QUESTION:
X filed a complaint against J, et al claiming that he and his sister are the sole heir of their mother
Y, who, being the daughter of A, is also entitled to 1/5 of the estate of A just like A’s other
children.
J, et al. countered that Y is not the daughter of A, and to support their claim, J et al. presented a
certificate of live birth which was allegedly Y’s. Their claim was also supported by the
presentation of a memorandum in a day book kept by r during his lifetime and such
memorandum states that sometime in September 1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a child
three days old named Y (Rosa Matilde Robles), according to the baptismal certificate issued by
the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to
their mother and the child was baptized by the priest B with the authority of said rector, and
according to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents."
QUESTION:
WON the day book kept by R during his lifetime admissible as evidence?
ANSWER:
Yes.
According to Jurisprudence, section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as
evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
In the case at bar, the testimony of J, confirming the handwriting of R contains some reference to
a member of the family, and concerning the family genealogy of the same, is admissible, for they
are members of the same family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No.
190.

CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Rafael J. Ferrer y Viademonte and Maria Angelina Ferrer y Viademonte with her husband
Ricardo Hernandez y Aracil filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
praying for the rendition of a final judgment declaring that Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzalez
had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez in the same proportion and
capacity as the other four children of the latter, namely, Ramon Viademonte, Rafael C. de
Inchausti, Joaquin C. de Inchausti, and Clotilde de Inchausti de Vidal; that the plaintiffs Rafael
and Maria Angelina Ferrer are the only and legitimate heirs of the deceased Rosa Viademonte
and the only ones entitled to receive her share of the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez, that is,
the on-fifth part of the latter's estate and its fruits and interest.
Inchausti confirmed that Isabel Gonzales married twice, first is with Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte and then to Don Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, but denied that Rosa Viademonte is a
child out of Isabel’s first marriage. A Baptismal certificate, was presented with a name of Rosa
Matilde Robles which was allegedly one and the same person with the named Rosa Viademonte.
This allegation was further proved upon the presentation of a day-book which Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime, appears a memorandum which says: On September
1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a children three days old named Rosa Matilde Robles,
according to the baptismal certificate issued by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the
Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to my mother; this child was baptized by the priest
Don Remegio Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and according to the baptismal
certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This memorandum agrees with the above-
mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.

ISSUE:
Is the memorandum in the day-book kept by Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr., during his
lifetime admissible as evidence?

RULING:
Yes.
According to Jurisprudence, section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as
evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree. The law does not
require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those
events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect attributed to it.
In the case at bar, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti confirming the handwriting of
Ramon contains some reference to a member of the family, and concerning the family genealogy
of the same, is admissible, for they are members of the same family, in accordance with the
provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190, and consequently, the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde
is the same Rosa Matilde Robels which is mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in
1852, in no manner could her be legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzalez.

5. Common Reputation (§41, Rule130)

Case:

1. City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)


Topic Admission by privies (§31, Rule 130)

Lumbre, Jeany Lou P.

X= Lorenzo Del Rosario, seller/witness


A= City of Manila, transferee/Plaintiff
B= Jacinto Del Rosario, transferee/Defendant

Bar question:

X signed a document transferring the title to a parcel of land in favour of A.


However, when X signed such document, the title to subject property has not yet
been transferred by Y, the owner of land, to X. Another document was signed by
X transferring the title to B.

Is X’s act of signing the document transferring the title to A binding against B?

Answer:

No. It is not binding against B.

Sec. 31, Rule 130 provides. Where one derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration or omission of the latter while holding the title, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former.

When X signed the document, he has not yet acquired the title to the subject
property. Therefore, his act is not taken as evidence against B.

Detailed Digest

A parcel of land in Tondo was occupied by defendant, Jacinto del Rosario. The
plaintiff, City of Manila claims ownership thereof and instituted an action for the
recovery and possession of such land. The court rule in favor of City of Manila.

The defendant , Jacinto Del Rosario, introduced documentary evidence, the most
important of which is the petition made by Lorzenzo Del Rosario, his brother,
addressed to the Mayor of the City of Manila which he signed on misapprehension
that the land belongs to CIty of Manila and to avoid litigation. Lorenzo admitted
the authenticity of the document and that he signed it before the title of the land
was transferred to him by Roco. After the land was transferred by Roco to
Lorenzo, he signed the second document so the land was transferred to Jacinto del
Rosario who took possession of the same and had it registered.

Issue:
WON Lorenzo’s act is binding against Jacinto?

Ruling:

No. When Lorenzo signed the document, the title has not yet been transferred to
him by Roco.

Where one derives title to real estate from another, the declaration act, or omission
of the latter to the property is evidence against the former only when made while
the latter holds the title. (Sec. 278, Code of Civil Procedure.)

6. Res Gestae (§42, Rule 130)

Cases:

1. People v. Latayada, 423 SCRA 237 (2004)

Sala, Ivan

- On Res Gestae,

Facts:

A (Elwin Latayada), with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, steal and drive
away a Honda motorcycle belonging to Y. In the course of the crime, accused stab Z causing Z’s
death, but the circumstantial evidence failed to show that the accused is guilty of carnapping.

Issue:

Whether A is guilty of carnapping with homicide based on the evidence presented?

Ruling:

No. A will be guilty only for homicide. The utterances of Z were instinctively made at a time
when he had no opportunity to concoct a fabricated version of the events, identifying that A was
the assailant. Hence, Z’s ante mortem statement is admitted correctly by the trial court. The
utterances separately made by the victim (A) to each of the witnesses were correctly appreciated
as part of the res gestae.
2. People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)

Sitoy, Martin

Bar Q

X was a widow, 52 years of age. She had been married three times.

Y invited her at 10:00 P.M. to step out of her house to join him to observe the persons drinking
wine in the market stall identified as Linda’s canteen in violation of barangay ordinance
prohibiting the same after 10PM.

She complains thereafter that she was sexually assaulted by Y. However, she did not
immediately go home after the incident.
She went home at about 12 midnight with her clothes all muddy, had some bruises on her body
and back.

When she reached home she was confronted by her daughter as to what happened and she told
her that she was abused by the appellant but she was not prepared to reveal everything and
promised to tell all the details to her daughter the following day.

The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Z of what happened
to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae.

The accused, through counsel, assailed the credibility of the complainant and interposed the
defense of denial and alibi and emphasized the failure of the prosecution to establish
involuntariness on the part of the victim.

WN the revelation to her daughter of what happened constituted res gestae

No

It is important to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at
a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. As the Court
observed the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She took a
walk. She spent sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some
bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual
intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will
be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.

Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that if there was any
sexual congress between appellant and complainant, it was upon their mutual consent. There was
no compulsion or force. The version of the complainant is far from credible.
Digest

Complainant was a widow, 52 years of age.


She had been married three times.

Appellant invited her at 10:00 P.M. to step out of her house to join him to observe the persons
drinking wine i the market stall identified as Linda’s canteen in violation of barangay orinance
prohibiting the same after 10PM. She went home at about 12 midnight with her clothes all
muddy, had some bruises on her body and back. When she reached home she was confroneted by
her daughter as to what happened. She told her that she was abused by the appellant but she was
not propared to reveal everything and promised to tell all the details to her daughter the
following day.

The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of what
happened to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae.

The accused, through counsel, assailed the credibility of the complainant and interposed the
defense of denial and alibi and emphasized the failure of the prosecution to establish
involuntariness on the part of the victim.

WN the revelation to her daughter of what happened constituted res gestae

It is important to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at
a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. As the Court
observed the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She took a
walk. She spent sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some
bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual
intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will
be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.

Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that if there was any
sexual congress between appellant and complainant, it was upon their mutual consent. There was
no compulsion or force. The version of the complainant is far from credible. A verdict of
acquittal is in order.

3. DBP Pool of Accredited Companies v. Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. 480


SCRA 314 (2006)
4. Entries in the Course of Business (§43, Rule 130)

Cases:

0. Sadagnot v. Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc., et al., G.R. No.


152636, 8 August 2007
Gladys Viranda

Title: Sadagnot v. Reinier Pacific International Shipping G.R. No. 152636, 8


August 2007
Topic: Entries in the Course of Business (Sec. 43, Rule 130)

BAR QUESTION
X filed an illegal dismissal case against Y Shipping Inc. X alleged that he was repatriated
to the Philippines because of his refusal to perform hatch stripping, as ordered by the
vessel Master, on the ground that it was not related to his duties as Third Officer. While
Y Shipping alleged that his failure to obey the Master’s lawful orders constituted
insubordination. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of X however on appeal, the NLRC set
aside the ruling. CA affirmed the latter’s decision based on a report in the logbook duly
signed by the Master. Was the CA correct in adopting the logbook entry as evidence of
X’s misconduct?

ANSWER:
Yes, the CA is correct.
The ships logbook is the official record of a ships voyage which its captain is obligated by
law to keep. It is where the captain records the decisions he has adopted, a summary of
the performance of the vessel, and other daily events. The entries made in the ships
logbook by a person performing a duty required by law are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated in the logbook.
In this case, X failed to prove that the entry was fabricated by the Master and admitted
that he did not obey the Masters order and even suggested that it would be better if the
hatch stripping shall be performed by able-bodied seaman.
Hence, CA is correct in giving weight to the logbook entry.

LONG VERSION:
FACTS:
Reiner Pacific International Shipping Inc, (respondent) hired Crislyndon Sadagnot
(petitioner) as Third Officer of the vessel MV Baotrans. Petitioner’s contract was for ten
months. Petitioner alleged that while on board MV Baotrans, the vessels Master ordered
him to perform hatch stripping, a deck work. Petitioner refused the order on the ground
that it was not related to his duties as Third Officer. Petitioner alleged that when the order
was issued, he was on watch standing duty and was doing nautical publications as
required by standard maritime practice. Petitioner alleged that because of his refusal to
obey the order, the Master made several negative reports against him. Consequently,
respondents repatriated petitioner to the Philippines.
Petitioner filed an action for illegal dismissal against respondents. Respondent alleged
that petitioner was repartriated because of his willful disregard of and failure to obey the
Masters lawful orders which constituted insubordination.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner however on appeal before NLRC, the latter
set aside the LA’s decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, the latter
affirmed the the NLRC’s decision and noted that petitioners repatriation was based on a
report in the logbook duly signed by the Master and the Chief Officer.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the logbook entry as evidence of
petitioners misconduct.

HELD:
No.
The ships logbook is the official record of a ships voyage which its captain is obligated by
law to keep. It is where the captain records the decisions he has adopted, a summary of
the performance of the vessel, and other daily events. The entries made in the ships
logbook by a person performing a duty required by law are prima facieevidence of the
facts stated in the logbook.
Petitioner failed to prove that the entry was fabricated by the Master. While petitioner
claimed that the Master entered untruthful reports in the logbook, he also admitted that
he did not obey the Masters order and even suggested that it would be better if the hatch
stripping shall be performed, as it should, by an able-bodied seaman.
Hence, we sustain the Court of Appeals in giving weight to the logbook entry.

2. Canque v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 579 (1999)

Pasagui, Chelvier

X – Canque
Y – Socor Construction Corporation

Bar Question:

X had contracts with the government for the restoration and asphalting of roads, and as such, X
entered into two sub-contracts with Y. After a year, Y sent X a bill containing a revised
computation which X refused to pay. Y filed an action for the collection of sum of money, but X
in her Answer now denied that she entered into sub-contracts with Y. The RTC ordered X to pay
and ruled that the entries in Y’s Book of Collectible Accounts enjoy the presumption of having
been made in the ordinary course of business and are thus trustworthy. The CA affirmed this
decision. X contended that the entries are mere hearsay, thus, inadmissible and that evidence that
is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose.
Y argued that its entries are admissible as an exception to hearsay and even if they are not, they
may still be admitted as memorandum.

Are the entries in Y’s Book of Collectibles inadmissible for being mere hearsay?

Answer:

Yes.

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
The entries were made in is professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

In this case, the business entries do not meet the first and third requisites. The bookkeeper
admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. Such facts could
be established by the company’s project engineer alone, who was not presented during trial.
Case Digest

Facts:

Canque, a contractor, had contracts with the government for the restoration and asphalting of
roads. In connection with these contracts, she entered into two other contracts with Socor
Construction Corporation. A year later, Socor sent Canque a bill containing a revised
computation which Canque refused to pay, claiming that Socor failed to submit the
corresponding delivery receipts. Socor filed an action for the collection of sum of money, but in
her Answer, Canque now denied that she entered into sub-contracts with Socor. Socor presented
its Vice President and bookkeeper to testify while Canque merely presented her lone testimony.

The RTC ordered Canque to pay and ruled that the entries in Socor’s Book of Collectible
Accounts enjoy the presumption of having been made in the ordinary course of business and are
thus trustworthy. No proof was offered to demonstrate the irregularity of these entries. The CA
affirmed this decision. Canque then contended that the entries are mere hearsay, thus,
inadmissible and that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered
cannot be admitted for another purpose. Socor argued that the entries in its Book of Collectibles
are admissible as an exception to hearsay and assuming arguendo that they are not, they may still
be admitted under Sec. 16, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as memorandum.
Issue: Whether the entries in Socor’s Book of Collectibles are inadmissible for being mere
hearsay.

Ruling:

Yes.

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
The entries were made in is professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

The entries in the Book of Collectibles do not meet the first and third requisites. The bookkeeper
who made the entries admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the
entry. She only made the entries based on the bills given to her but she has no knowledge of the
truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials were supervised by
an engineer for such functions. The person who has personal knowledge of the facts and who
could established them is the project engineer alone, but he was not presented during trial.

3. Land Bank v. Oñate, G.R. No. 192371, 15 January 2014

Pasagui, Chelvier

X – Cristina Villarosa, complainant


Y – Alfredo Alegado, accused-appellant

Bar Question:

X was playing at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City when Y held
her by the hand and took her upstairs to the second floor which was deserted at the time, and
raped her. A similar incident happened a few days after. Y was charged with two counts of rape
and was later convicted of statutory rape. Y appealed, arguing that X’s age at the time of the
alleged incidents of rape was not established with certainty, hence, it was an error on the part of
the trial court to convict him of statutory rape.

Was the age of X established with certainty so as to convict Y of statutory rape?


Answer:

Yes.

Sec. 40, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides in part that the reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Sec. 39, Rule 130 has three requisites for its
admissibility: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a
family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. 

In this
case, Sec. 39 of Rile 130 is applicable to prove the victim’s age because all the preconditions are
obtaining. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her
maternal grandfather do not constitute hearsay evidence but rather fall under the exceptions to
the hearsay rule provided under Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130. Declarations with regard to
pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of
persons who must know the truth.
Case Digest

Facts:

On April 14, 1988, the complainant was playing at the Freedom Square inside the public market
of San Carlos City when Alegado held her by the hand and took her upstairs to the second floor
of the public market where he raped her. Thereafter, Alegado gave the complainant P2.00 and
left. The complainant never told anybody about it for she was threatened by Alegado that he
would kill her. Another incident happened on April 20, 1988. Alegado was charged for two
counts of rape and was later convicted of statutory rape. He appealed the decision and contended
that the victim’s actual age at the time of the alleged rape incidents was not established with
certainty, hence, the trial court erred in convicting him of statutory rape.

Issue: Whether or not the actual age of the victim was established with certainty so as to convict
the accused of statutory rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

Sec. 40, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides in part that the reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
offended party herself and her maternal grandfather that the victim was born on September 5,
1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule
provided under Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130.

“Pedigree” under Sec. 39, Rule 130 includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.
Declarations with regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they
are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree testimony is admitted
because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from
the rejection of such proof than from its admission.

Sec. 39 has three requisites for its admissibility: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of
the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to
the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family
of said person. 
In this case, all the preconditions are obtaining; that the date of birth of the rape
victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim’s grandfather relating to tradition
(sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was
filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the victim.
The testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although hearsay and though a person can
have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age
is acquired from what he is told by his parents – he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition.

1. Official Records a) §44, Rule 130

b) §§23-25, Rule 132

Cases
1. Unites States v. Que Ping, 40 Phil. 17 (1919)

By: Jerelyn Ponsica

Topic: Official Records (section 23-25, Rule 132)

Trend:
X- Que Ping
A- Bernado Marquez (surety)
B- Bernardo Dagala (surety)
BAR QUESTION:
X was convicted of homicide. He appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and to secure his
release during the pendency of the appeal, X filed a bail bond in the sum of P10,000, with A and
B as sureties. SC already made a decision and for the purpose of reading it to the accused, CFI
of Manila ordered the A and B to produce the body of X before the court but X did not appear on
the date fixed. A and B then filed a motion to be relieved from their obligation because X died of
gastritis as evidenced by a certificate of death issued by the President of the Municipal Board of
Health in San Pablo Laguna. The said certificate of death was admittedly done without seeing the
corpse of the deceased.

QUESTION:
WON the document/s presented is/are conclusive as evidence?
ANSWER:
No.
According to US vs Que Ping, two exhibits being in the nature of entries in public records, made
in the performance of their duty by public officers of the Philippine Islands, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. However, Code of Civil Procedure, sections 280, 315
provides that documents, however, are not conclusive evidence. Their probative value may either
be substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
In the case at bar, there is certain hearsay evidence of little or of no value with regard to the
testimony of the witness that the death certificate was issued by the president of the municipal
board but without seeing the corpse of the deceased.

CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Que Ping was convicted of homicide in the lower court, he appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court. To secure his release from imprisonment during the pendency of the appeal, Que Ping
filed a bail bond in the sum of P10,000, with Bernardo Marquez and Bernardo Dagala as
sureties. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the imprisonment. For the
purpose of reading the decision to the accused, CFI of Manila ordered the sureties to produce the
body of Que Ping before the court but Que Ping did not appear on the date fixed. Marquez and
Dagala filed a motion to be relieved from their obligation because Que Ping died. Fiscal
objected, trial was held. Court held that the death of Que Ping was not satisfactorily proved and
ordered that the bail was forfeited.
A certificate by the municipal secretary of San Pablo, Laguna and copy of general form No. 84,
Bureau of Health No. 6, certificate of death, given by the president of the municipal board of
health of San Pablo. Laguna, and also certifying that one Que Ping had died of gastritis on April
7, 1917 were presented as evidence. Appellants' contention that the documents should have been
admitted by the court, and that they should be taken as indisputable proof of the death of the
accused Que Ping. The said certificate of death was admittedly done without seeing the corpse of
the deceased.
ISSUE:
WON the document/s presented is/are conclusive as evidence?
RULING:
No. (Code of Civil Procedure, sections 280, 315.) Such documents, however, are not conclusive
evidence. Their probative value may either be substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.
Admitting, therefore, that appellants' contention that these documents should have been admitted
by the court, is correct, but not admitting that they should be taken as indisputable proof of the
death of the accused Que Ping.
There is the evidence of the clerk in the office of the municipal secretary who declares that it was
he who issued the certificate of death at the instance of a Chinaman named Que Siong, who was
unknown to him personally, and that he did so upon the presentation of the cedula of Que Ping,
but without seeing the corpse of the alleged deceased. There is the testimony of a sanitary
inspector of San Pablo, somewhat in contradiction to other evidence, who affirmed that the
persons who prepared the certificate of death were the president of the municipal board of health
and himself, but who, likewise, admitted that it was done without seeing the corpse of the
deceased. In addition, there is certain hearsay evidence of little or no value. In direct opposition
of this evidence is that of the porter of the cemetery who swore that on April 8, 1917, the alleged
date of the burial of Que Ping, there was no burial in the cemetery. It is also noteworthy that the
Chinaman Que Siong who secured the burial certificate was not introduced as a witness.

2. People v. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84 (1996)

Sala, Ivan

- On Official Records, Sec. 44, Rule 130

Facts:

X was found guilty of murder. The prosecution witness positively identified the suspects. On
appeal, X contends that the entries in the Advance Information Sheet ( AIS) did not mention
him only his other accused.

Issue:

Whether the AIS is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

No. It could not be categorized as official . The AIS prepared by the police which did not
mention X cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Entries in official records, are only prima facie evidence of the facts, they are not conclusive, it
could be incomplete or inaccurate. The defense did not offer the AIS as evidence , so the
reliance of the accused of such document must fail. The Court cannot consider any evidence
which has not been formally offered.
Also, the AIS is not an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, admissible. It also cannot be
classified as official information, if such, the person must have personal knowledge and duty to
give such statements to the record. X is guilty of murder.
3. Escobar v. Luna, 519 SCRA 1 (2007)

Sitoy, Martin

Hearsay > XPNS > Official Records

Bar Q

X separately bought two parcels of land TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362,
respectively, on the same date.

Eleven years later Y filed a complaint before the RTC of Tagaytay City to nullify TCT Nos. (T-
21294) T-13361 and (T- 21295) T-13362 of the Escobars.

Y claimed that he had been in actual, public, adverse, continuous, and notorious physical
possession of an unregistered parcel of land located in Barrio Tolentino, Tagaytay City since
March 21, 1941, as shown in Tax Declaration No. GR- 019-0173, which was issued to him in
1985.

Y engaged the services of a geodetic engineer to survey the same parcel of land to have his title
confirmed and discovered that the land had been illegally and fraudulently titled in the name of
X by the use of fictitious and simulated documents and court records.

X allegedly made it appear that the two titles originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 5483, which however, did not exist in the records of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Batangas per certification of Atty. E, Acting Register of Deeds.

Additionally, Decree No. 3465, on which OCT No. 5483 appeared to have been issued, pertained
to a parcel of land located in San Juan, Batangas, not to the subject properties located in
Tagaytay City.

Similarly, Survey Plan Psu-24039, which supposedly technically described the land mentioned in
OCT No. 5483, did not pertain to the subject properties but to a different parcel of land located in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, per letter of Privadi JG. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of
the Lands Management Bureau, DENR.

RTC rejected X’s argument and ruled that X is a purchaser in good faith and for value and that Y
failed to prove the case for cancellation of the TCTs since the documentary evidence he
submitted was not supported by testimonial evidence, thus it was hearsay.

WN the respondents’ evidence are competent

Yes
Section 44 of Rule 130 provides that Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

However, Section 28 of Rule 132 further provides that "A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no
such record or entry.”

Respondents’ evidence are competent evidence, having been issued by government offices,
certified to by authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and duty to issue such
certifications.

In this case, the certification issued by Atty. Cainza-Valenton, who was duly authorized to issue
the certification, stating that OCT No. 5483 was not existing in the files of the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Batangas and which confirmed that OCT No. 5483 was fictitious, making the
titles derived from it spurious, is sufficient evidence for the stated purpose.

The Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas is the repository of all records regarding
OCTs issued in that province, and the certification is therefore competent and admissible
evidence to prove that the titles of the Escobars derived from it are from a fictitious source.

Digest

Petitioners Adelaida Escobar and Lolita Escobar separately bought two parcels of land located in
Barrio Tolentino, Tagaytay City on February 28, 1979 and were issued TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-
13361 and (T-21295) T-13362, respectively, on the same date.

Eleven years later, on September 11, 1990, Clodualdo Luna 􏰃led a complaint before the RTC of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, seeking to nullify TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T- 21295) T-
13362 of the Escobars. Luna claimed that he had been in actual, public, adverse, continuous, and
notorious physical possession of an unregistered parcel of land located in Barrio Tolentino,
Tagaytay City since March 21, 1941, as shown in Tax Declaration No. GR- 019-0173, which
was issued to him in 1985.

Sometime in 1990, when he engaged the services of a geodetic engineer to survey the same
parcel of land to have his title confirmed under the provisions of Act No. 496, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529, he alleged that he discovered that the land had been illegally and
fraudulently titled in the names of the Escobars by the use of fictitious and simulated documents
and court records.

The Escobars allegedly made it appear that the two titles originated from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 5483, which however, did not exist in the records of the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Batangas per certification 7 of Atty. Eva Cainza- Valenton, Acting Register of
Deeds, issued on June 11, 1990.

Additionally, Decree No. 3465, 8 on which OCT No. 5483 appeared to have been issued,
pertained to a parcel of land located in San Juan, Batangas, not to the subject properties located
in Tagaytay City.

Similarly, Survey Plan Psu-24039, which supposedly technically described the land mentioned in
OCT No. 5483, did not pertain to the subject properties but to a different parcel of land located in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, per letter of Privadi JG. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of
the Lands Management Bureau, DENR.

WN the respondents’ evidence are competent

Yes

Section 44 of Rule 130 provides that Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public of􏰃cer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

However, Section 28 of Rule 132 further provides that "A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no
such record or entry.”

Respondents’ evidence are competent evidence, having been issued by government offices,
certified to by authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and duty to issue such
certifications.

In this case, the certification dated June 11, 1990 issued by Atty. Cainza-Valenton, who was duly
authorized to issue the certification, stating that OCT No. 5483 was not existing in the files of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and which confirmed that OCT No. 5483 was
fictitious, making the titles derived from it spurious, is sufficient evidence for the stated
purpose.

The Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas is the repository of all records regarding
OCTs issued in that province, and the certification is therefore competent and admissible
evidence to prove that the titles of the Escobars derived from it are from a fictitious source.

2. Commercial Lists (§45, Rule 130)

Case:

1. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 (1998)
1. Learned Treatises (§46, Rule 130)

Case:
1. Estrada v. Noble, 49 O.G. 139 (1952)

1. Prior Testimony a) §47, Rule 130

b. §4, Rule 23

Cases:

1. Manliclic, et al. v. Calaunan, 512 SCRA 642 (2007)


Mareja Aña Arellano

Bar Question
Bus A – Philippine Rabbit Bus
A – PRBLI
Aa - Mauricio Manliclic
Jeep A – Owner Type Jeep
B – Modesto Calaunan
Bb - Marcelo Mendoza
C – Fernando Ramos

Question:

Bus A, owned by A and driven by Aa collided with Jeep A, owned by B and driven by Bb. B
suffered minor injuries while his driver Bb, was unhurt. By reason of such collision, a criminal
case was filed against Aa, subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed against Aa and A. Bb
prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)of the testimonies of B, Bb and C in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case. Can the TSNs from criminal case be admitted in evidence in
civil case?

Answer:

Yes.

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules
for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Testimonies are still admissible on the ground that petitioner failed to object on their
admissibility. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

In the case at bar, A did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of B, Bb and C, in the
criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.

Facts:

Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic
collided with an owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.

Subsequently respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
before the RTC of Dagupan City.

The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.


When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs)of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.

Issue:
Whether or not the TSNs from the criminal case may be admitted in evidence in civil case.

Ruling:
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules
for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI's employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability
of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed
to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document
is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object
is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same
were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.

Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato
Ganiban in the criminal case.

It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal
case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness
for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit
the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to
object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section
47.

2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, 13 December 2011

Bucog. Roseller

BAR QUESTION:
A- (Petitioner) Republic of the Phils
SB- (Respondent) Sandiganbayan
BCDE-(Respondents in Civil Case No. 009 also respondents in this present case)
F- Maurice Bane (Bane Deposition)

Question:
A filed a case docketed as Civil Case No. 0009 against BCDE before the Sandiganbayan (SB)
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation
that BCDE illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless
Limitedin Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) which spawned numerous
incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by Victor Africa filed a
case seeking to nullify the PCGG orders directing him, among others, to account for his
sequestered shares in ETPI. A filed with the Sandiganbayan a Second Amended Notice to Take
Deposition of A Upon Oral Examination, the deposition upon oral examination of F, former
director and treasurer-in trust of ETPI, was taken before Consul General Ernesto Castro at the
Philippine Embassy in London, England. Among the defendants in the main Civil Case No.
0009, only Victor Africa appeared during the taking of the deposition.

On 14 December 1999, A made its Formal Offer of Evidence consisting of Exhibits A to XX-
27. However, through oversight, petitioner failed to include among its exhibits the deposition of
F. Thus, in its Urgent Motion And/Or Request for Judicial Notice dated 21 February 2000, A
prayed that it be allowed to introduce as additional evidence the deposition of F, or in the
alternative, for the Sandiganbayan to take judicial notice of the facts established by the said
deposition. On 21 August 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion.

Question:
Should SB take judicial notice of the facts established in the deposition?

Answer:
No. SB should not take judicial notice.
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge. This rule though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made
to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
A itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve
issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of A’s argument, we would be espousing
judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which
was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed
lineage of the cases.

Digest:

Facts:
In 1993, SB ordered the consolidation of cases related to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of
Marcos Family and cronies. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion
stating that petitioner wishes to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary
exhibits presented and identified by them in another related case. This motion partly denied
insofar as the adoption of testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud
for the reason that said deponents are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the
respondents.
Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take judicial notice of the facts established by
the Bane deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. This was again denied
by the SB, to wit: Judicial notice is found under Rule 129. This provision refers to the Court’s
duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those
cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court
finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be
acted upon as the same is considered redundant.
Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again denied by SB. Hence, petitioner filed the instant motion
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of SB’s refusal to take judicial notice of or to admit
the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. Petitioner asserts that the case where the Bane
deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence is but a "child" of the
"parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any
of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.

Issue

Whether courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial notice of testimony and evidence
presented in one of the cases consolidated.

Ruling:

No.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made
to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient
basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. The
petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood,
involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we
would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in
one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on
the supposed lineage of the cases.
IV. Opinion Rule

1. §§48-50, Rule 130

2. §22, Rule 132

3. Rule on DNA Evidence

Cases:
1. People v. Duranan, 349 SCRA 180 (2001)

Cagaanan, Vic Raymond C.

A = complainant
X = accused

BAR Question

On or about the 7th of March 1994, X has carnal knowledge with the victim
against her will. A, who was 25 years old at the time of the incident, is
considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. X contends
that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental age was not
proven. He argues that the age is an essential element for the prosecution for
rape of a mental retardate and a psychiatric evaluation of the complainants
mental age is needed. However, the lower court convicted him. Is the court
correct?

Suggested Answer:

Yes. X can be convicted of rape even if A’s age was not proven
through a psychiatric evaluation.

Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:


Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper
basis is given may be received in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient
opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person
in question.
In the case at bar, A’s mother testified as to the mental capacity of A. Thus,
the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was mentally
deficient.

Detailed Digest

FACTS:

On or about the 7th of March 1994, the accused with force and intimidation
have carnal knowledge with the victim against her will and without her
consent. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each
charge of rape against him. Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old at the
time of the incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up
to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores
for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainants family in the
same apartment in xxx where he rented a room that he shared with several
other people.

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied
it in its November 17, 1995 order. The defense thereafter presented its
witnesses to prove that it was impossible for him to commit the crime.
However, he was found guilty of the crime of rape.

First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since


the victims mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of
the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a
mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainants mental age to
determine if her mental age is under twelve.

Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed, complainant


could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130, 20, any
person who can perceive and make known his/her perception is qualified to
be a witness.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:
WON the accused cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s
mental age was not proven

WON complainant could not be a competent witness since she is a


retardate

HELD:
1. Yes. The accused can be convicted of rape even if the victim’s
mental age was not proven.

Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:


Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper
basis is given may be received in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient
opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person
in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and
reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is.
As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations
or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or
upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations,
dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

In the case at bar, the mother testified as to the mental capacity of her child.
Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was
mentally deficient. The rule that findings of fact of the trial court should not
be disturbed.

2. Yes. The complainant can be a competent witness

Under Rule 130, 20, any person who can perceive and make known his/her
perception is qualified to be a witness.
In this case, although complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to
tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her and to answer the
questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel.

2. Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile, 474 SCRA 246 (2005)

3. People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, 26 October 2007

Capao, Henna Auggie M.

A - Umanito
B - Victim (real name was omitted in the case)

Bar Q: A was charged with the crime of rape against B. B bore a child as a
result of the purported rape. The Court ordered A, B, and B's child to
submit themselves to a DNA testing. Did the Court validly ordered to
resort to DNA testing

Suggested Answer: Yes. DNA print or identification technology is now


recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available.
Furthermore, Section 4 of the Rules provides that the courts are
authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio order a DNA
testing.

Detailed Case Digest:

FACTS: Umanito was charged with the crime of rape in a criminal


complaint. That the victim bore a child as a result of the purported rape.
On arraignment, Umanito pleaded not guilty. However, finding that the
prosecution had proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

In his appeal, Umanito seeks his acquittal on reasonable doubt. He


asserted that the court a quo erred in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of the complaining witness and in not acquitting him on
reasonable doubt.

The Court ordered Umanito, the victim, and the victim's child to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the
New Rules on DNA Evidence.

ISSUE: Did the Court validly ordered to resort to DNA testing?

RULING: Yes. DNA print or identification technology is now recognized


as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve
one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. For
purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source
of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

The determination of whether Umanito is the father of the victim's child,


which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair
and correct adjudication of the instant appeal.
Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing
and notice, motu proprio order a DNA testing.

However, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not
conduct hearings, the case was remanded to the RTC for reception of
evidence in appropriate hearings, with due the parties.

4. People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 505 (2004)

5. People v. Webb, G.R. No. 176389, 14 December 2010


ENGCOY, Krystel Merianne A.

BAR Q:

Estrellita Vizconde – E
Jessica Alfaro – J
Hubert Webb – W

E and her daughters were brutally murdered in their home in Parañaque. The NBI announced the
resolution of the crime as they presented a star witness A who pointed at the accused W et.al. as
the main culprits. Relying on A’s testimony, information for rape with homicide was filed by the
public prosecutors against appellants. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused W et. al.
guilty as charged, imposing them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. A motion for reconsideration on the same court was
also denied, hence the present appeal on the Supreme Court. The Court granted the request of W
to submit the semen specimen taken from the daughter’s cadaver on DNA analysis, believing it is
under the safekeeping of the NBI. The NBI, however, denied that the specimen is under their
custody and that it was turned over to the trial court. The trial court on the other hand, denied the
claim that the specimen was under their care. This prompted W to file an urgent motion to acquit
denying W of his right to due process.

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether or not the Court should acquit W outright, given the government’s failure to produce the
semen specimen that the NBI found on one of the victim’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence.

No.

U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Youngblood held that due process does not require the
State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter
is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.
In this case, during the previous appeals made on CA, the appellants expressed lack of interest in
having a DNA test done, and so the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it may
be required to be produced some future time. The idea of keeping the specimen secure even after
the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither W nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Case Digest:

On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally
murdered in their home in Parañaque. In an intense investigation, a group of suspects were initially
arrested by the police, but were eventually discharged due to suspicions of frame up. Later in 1995,
The National Bureau of Investigation announced the resolution of the crime as they presented a
star witness Jessica M. Alfaro who pointed at the accused (herein appellants) Webb et.al. as the
main culprits. She also included police officer Gerardo Biong as an accessory to the crime. Relying
on Alfaro’s testimony, information for rape with homicide was filed by the public prosecutors
against appellants.

Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City Branch 274 presided over by Judge Tolentino took over
the case. With Alfaro’s detailed narration of the events of the crime, the court found her testimony
credible, noting that her delivery are spontaneous and straightforward. On January 4, 2000, trial
court rendered judgment finding accused (herein appellants) guilty as charged, imposing them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua while Biong, as an accessory to the crime, was given an
indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months and one day to twelve years. Damages
were also awarded to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, with a modification on Biong’s
penalty to six years minimum and twelve years maximum, plus increased awards of damages to
Lauro Vizconde. A motion for reconsideration on the same court was also denied, hence the
present appeal on the Supreme Court.

On April 20, 2010, the Court granted the request of Webb to submit the semen specimen
taken from Carmela’s cadaver on DNA analysis, believing it is under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The NBI, however, denied that the specimen is under their custody and that it was turned over to
the trial court. The trial court on the other hand, denied the claim that the specimen was under their
care. This prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit denying Webb of his right to due
process.

ISSUE/HELD:

1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce
the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence.

No.
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Youngblood held that due process does not require the
State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter
is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.

In this case, during the previous appeals made on CA, the appellants expressed lack of interest in
having a DNA test done, and so the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it may
be required to be produced some future time. When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing
DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the
test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently,
the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA
testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime.

V. Character as Evidence 1. §51, Rule 130 2. §14, Rule 132 3. §6, R.A. 8505

1. People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)

Eupena

Topic: Character as evidence

Bar Q
Haro is a lessee of a land owned by Copreros due to the failure of Babiera to repurchase the same.
A series of trial was made to recover the property but to no avail. During all these, Haro financed
the respondent. At about 7 o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Haro and his
companions were returning to the town of Oton, they had an encounter with accused Babiera, his
father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores in which, Haro received several wounds in
consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo. During trial, the
defense attempted to prove that Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and
fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it.
Was the trial judge correct in not admitting the defense of the accused?
Yes
Sec. 51 (a) (3) rule 130 of the rules provides that: the good or bad character of the offended party
may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged.
Here, While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may
prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof
must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts, such as
the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting
such proof.

Case digest
Severino Haro had leased from Basilio Copreros two parcels of land the ownership of which had
passed to him due to Justo Babiera's failure to repurchase them within the stipulated period. Nor
is there any question that the latter tried to recover them, first, by an accion publiciana (action for
unlawful detainer), and then by an action for the recovery of possession. There is likewise no
question that Severino Haro paid the expenses of the defendant Basilio Copreros for the reason
that he was already in possession of said lands as lessee. There is also no question that Clemente
Babiera's cow damaged the plantings of Fermin Bruce, for which reason the letter caught said cow,
tied it, and notified his master of the matter when the latter went to visit the lands leased by him.
Neither is there any question that there was an agreement between Clemente Babiera and Severino
Haro whereby the latter ordered his copartner on shares Fermin Bruces, to take the cow near
Clemente Babiera's house and tie it up there. In like manner there is no question that at about 7
o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning
to the town of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente
Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an
encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro received several wounds in consequence
of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo. On the same morning, August 22,
1927, and in the same hospital, Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal,
Edmundo S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were
present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the
said month and year when he had given up all hope of recovery.
During trial, The defense attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition,
provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge
would not permit it.
Issue:
Whether the character of Haro is admissible in evidence?
Held:
No.
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove
the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must
be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts, such as the
accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting
such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of such a
disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that
it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the deceased.

2. People v. Soliman, 101 Phil. 767 (1957)


Evardo, Benny Boy P.
X accused GERONIMO SOLIMAN
Y victim Ernesto Basa
X was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila and was sentenced to
suffer the extreme penalty of death for killing Y who was sleeping in a pushcart. Accused claimed
that the trial court erred in not allowing him to prove that the deceased Y had a violent, quarrelsome
or provocative character shall also be in considered in his favor.
Is the contention of the accused correct?
Suggested Answer:
No
While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense such is not necessary in a crime of murder where
the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only
be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger
in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary." This rule does not apply to cases of murder.
Digested
PEOPLE v SOLIMAN, 101 Phil 766
Ernesto Basa was sleeping in a pushcart together with Ernesto Balaktaw was also sleeping on a
box situated near the pushcart, with their heads opposite each other, Balaktaw was awakened when
someone kicked his hand. Upon awakening, Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward the head
of Ernesto Basa and hold the latter by the shoulder at which moment his companion Geronimo
Soliman approached Ernesto Basa and stabbed him many times with a balisong. Ernesto Basa died.
The Court of First Instance of Manila convicted the accused was sentenced to suffer the extreme
penalty of death.
The Accused claim that the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to prove that the deceased
had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character must also deserve consideration in his favor.
Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct.
Held:
Yes
While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense such is not necessary in a crime of murder where
the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only
be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger
in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary. This rule does not apply to cases of murder.
3. People v. Cheng 279 SCRA 129 (1997) - Ellah Galacio

PEOPLE vs. ELESEO CHENG


FACTS:
On February 20, 1989, jail guards Ramos and Lamiao were in the night shift at the Manila City
Jail. Before 4 A.M., Aburawash and Viterbo went out of the jail and some time thereafter, Cheng who was
then on duty on the night shift escorted out Siaco and then a detainee in the said city jail, Malubay, without
any authorization from the desk officer or platoon commander on duty. At about 4:30 oclock, Ilocso and
her companions just come from a disco joint right outside the vicinity of Manila City Jail. Ilocso decided
to pass by the city jail to see her brother who was detained. She stopped at a nearby Burger Machine stand
and witnessed the commission of the crime. Ilocso saw the Egyptian national, Aburawash and Viterbo
engaged in an argument with Sioco, and a third man. Thereupon, she heard the first gunfire from Cheng
which caused Aburawash to fall to the ground. Two shots then quickly followed, one from Sioco, and
another from Cheng. Afterwards, Cheng and Sioco shot Viterbo, after which the two ran towards the
direction of the Central Market.
The two dead bodies were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation for autopsy. Dr. Maximo
Reyes, who performed the examination, testified during the trial that the three gunshot wounds on
Aburawash were all fatal as they involved the brain. He likewise testified that the gunshot wounds of
Viterbo at the neck, face, and head were all fatal because they involved vital organs. He also observed that
the sizes of the wounds concerned were different, prompting him to opine that at least two firearms were
used, and that it was possible that more than one assailant was involved. Eleseo Cheng and Salvador Sioco
were found guilty of the crime of MURDER
ISSUE:
WON the alleged loose morals of Ilocso is a ground to discredit a witness.
RULING:
We stress that in this jurisdiction, loose morals per se is not a ground to discredit a witness. There must
be clear indications militating against her credibility other than her being a person of ill repute. Otherwise
stated, even a prostitute may be a competent witness to the extent that even with her sole testimony an
accused may be duly convicted, provided that such witness is not coached and her testimony is not rehearsed
and on all other counts worthy of credence beyond reasonable doubt.
The all too sweeping contention in accused-appellants motion for reconsideration that it is improbable
that Ilocso will tell the exact truth where there is the slightest motive for testifying falsely as she would
probably be willing to bring her evidence to market as she was ready to offer her person for sale, presents
a cynical and too dark an outlook of a human person for acceptance. In the first place, Ilocso has not been
shown to be a person of ill repute. Then too, the reputation of this witness is not germane to the case.
BAR Q:
X and Y were found guilty of the crime of MURDER. On February 21, 1989, the said accused
conspiring together attack, assault and use personal violence upon Mr. A, by shooting her three (3)
times with an unknown caliber inflicting upon her mortal and fatal gunshots wounds, which were
the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter and Mr. B, an Egyptian national, by shooting
the latter three (3) times, hitting him in the head with an unknown caliber thereby inflicting upon
him mortal and fatal gunshots wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter. X and Y assail the credibility of Ms. C who rendered an eyewitness account of the
killing of Mr. A and Mr. B alleging the loose morals of Ms. C. Is the alleged loose moral of the
witness a ground to discredit her testimony?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. There must be clear indications militating against her credibility other than her being a
person of ill repute. Otherwise stated, even a prostitute may be a competent witness to the extent
that even with her sole testimony an accused may be duly convicted, provided that such witness is
not coached and her testimony is not rehearsed and on all other counts worthy of credence beyond
reasonable doubt.

4. Civil Service Commission vm. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578 (2004)

G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004.*


CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN,
respondent.

X=Civil Service Commission


Y=Allyson Belagan
Z= Magdalena Gapuz

Question:

Z filed a case against Y, Superintendent of DECS, sexual indignities and


harassment and various malfeasances.

DECS Secretary found Y guilty of sexual indignities and ordered dismissed. He


was absolved of charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty.

CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which requires a high
degree of moral uprightness

Belagan filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been
charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service.

CSC denied MR: The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual
assault is of minor significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the person accused of having committed the offense

CA reversed: Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being


questionable, while Belagan has an unblemished service record for 37 years.

Is Z a reliable witness?
Answer:

Yes.

Section 51, Rule 130 on rules on character evidence provision pertain only to
criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin
cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be
limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.

In this case, no evidence bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were presented


were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical
injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Evidence of one’s character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question.
In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from
the commencement of the suit.

Case Digest:

FACTS:

Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of Mother and Child Learning center and Ligaya Anawi,
public school teacher at Fort del Pilar Elementary, filed a case against Dr Allyson Belagan
Superintendent of DECS sexual indignities and harassment and various malfeasances

Magdalena
When applying for a permit to operate a pre-school, Belagan, who offered to conduct the
inspection, suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Upon follow-up
of her application, Belagan told her," Mag-date muna tayo." When they reported the incident,
Belagan merely denied any personal relationship with Magdalena

Ligaya
On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind, pulled her close to him with his organ pressing against her. Aside
from this, Ligaya charged him with delaying teachers' salaries, failing to release differentials to
substitutes, refusing to release teachers' uniforms and allowances, and failing to constitute the
Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations

DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and ordered dismissed. He was absolved of
charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty

CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which requires a high degree of moral
uprightness

Belagan filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been charged of any
offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with
numerous offenses before MTC Baguio, which casts a doubt on her character, integrity, and
credibility
- 22 Criminal Cases for light and grave oral defamation, slight and serious physical
injuries, grave threats, malicious mischief, light threats, unjust vexation
- Also, 23 complaints filed with the Brgy Chairman for unjust vexation, grave threats,
rumor mongering, oral defamation, false accusation, harassment, habitual trouble maker

CSC denied MR: The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of having
committed the offense

CA reversed: Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable, while


Belagan has an unblemished service record for 37 years.

ISSUE:
WON Magdalena is a credible witness

HELD
YES Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be
limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
In this case, no evidence bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were presented were
charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Regarding Magdalena’s credibility as a witness, the charges and
complaints against her happened way back in the70s and 80s while the act complained of
happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character
or reputation. Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too
remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from
the commencement of the suit. “It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the
path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable
to change or reform.” The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is
not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or
prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that
a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b)
that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be
impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.

Gladys Viranda
Title: Civil Service Commission v. Belagan 440 SCRA 578 (2004)
Topic: Impeachment of Witnesses – Sec. 11, Rule 132

BAR QUESTION
X filed a complaint of sexual harassment against Y, Superintendent of DECS. X alleged that Y
stole a kiss from her during the inspection of X’s premise as a requirement of her application for
permit to operate a pre-school and also asked her to a date. In defense, Y presented a numerous
cases and complaints against X from MTC and Barangay Chairmen to cast doubt on her character,
integrity and credibility. Is X’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility?

ANSWER:
No.
The general rule prevailing that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or
that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility.
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories:
(a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility,
(b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime,
(c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established,
and
(d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts
of misconduct.
In this case, Y failed to prove that X was convicted in any criminal cases specified by Y. Such
evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time because the witness
may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts as happened in this case.
Therefore, X is credible despite derogatory records.

LONG VERSION:
FACTS:
Magdalena Gapuz, founder of the Mother and Child Learning Center filed a complaint of sexual
indignities and harassment against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
Magdalena alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an application with the DECS Office
in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondent volunteered to conduct the
inspection as part of the requirements of the issuance of permit. In the course of inspection, while
both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her
husband might harm respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet. Days later, Magdalena went to DECS
to follow up her application however the respondent instead asked her to a date. Magdalena
declined as she is married. She then reported the matters to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter
Ngabit. Magdalena forced to reveal the incident to her husband when asked about the permit.
They went to respondent and thereafter respondent forwarded the said application to the DECS
Regional Director for approval.
Later that year, Magdalena wrote a letter of complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to
former DECS Secretary after reading from a local newspaper that certain employee of DECS
charging respondent of same act.
The DECS Secretary find respondent guilty of 2 counts of sexual advances against Magdalena
and was ordered dismissed from the service.
Upon appeal, Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the DECS’s decision. On motion for
reconsideration, respondent presented that Magdalena was charged with several offenses before
the MTC of Baguio City and complaints against her with the Barangay Chairmen. Respondent
claimed that the numerous cases cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility. CSC
denied the MR however on appeal before the CA, the latter reversed the CSC’s ruling on the
ground that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable.

ISSUE:
Whether Magdalena’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility
HELD:
No.
Firstly, settled is the principle that evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to
a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the
character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period
remote from the commencement of the suit.
Here, most of the cases against Magdalena relates to acts committed in the 80’s whereas the
instant case was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalena’s character and reputation.
Secondly, the general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible
to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. This view has
usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere
unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that
innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be
impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any criminal cases
specified by respondent. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the
waste of time because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts
as happened in this case.
Therefore, the CA erred in according much weight to such evidence and witness is credible
despite derogatory records.

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