RULE 114

BAIL

A. NATURE & DEFINITION

Definition; Persons Covered or Required to Post Bail

RULE 114, Sections 1 & 3

SECTION 1. Bail defined.—Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(1a)

SECTION 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.—No person under

detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail. (3a)

CASES:
FELICIANO VS. PASCIOLAN
2 SCRA 888 (1961)

Who may apply for bail?

The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except
those charged with capital offense s when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to
the limitation that the person applying for bail should be in the custody of the la w,
o r o t he r wise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release
and it would be incongruous to gran t bail to one who is free.

SHORT FACTS:

In the instant case, the petitioner upon learning that an amended information
charging him and seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had
been filed, and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into
hiding and until now is at large. Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in
which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending
trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the
jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to decide on
the merits of a motion filed by the petitioner in which he asks that the Court fix at
P10,000.000 the amount of the bail for his liberty pending trial.

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FACTS:

Here’s what happened:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When he found out that an
Information had been filed and that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him,
he went into hiding. His lawyer, at the instance of his wife, fined a motion asking that
the Court fix the amount of the bond at P10K for the petitioner’s release pending
trial, but the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga opposed the motion on the ground that
the filing was premature because the petitioner had been arrested. The respondent
Judge dismissed the motion on the ground that the petitioner does not have the right
to ask for the court to admit him to bail pending his arrest or surrender.
The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong," Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16),
Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words "all persons" used in said
constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean "all persons, without
distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal
offense".

ISSUE:

WON the judge erred in not granting the petition for admission to bail.

HELD:

NO. There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner. Such
is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person
applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise
deprived of his liberty.

In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, this Court held:

xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged
with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those
persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their
liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order
that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he
should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the
moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the
law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains
unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is
strong.

And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held:

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 xxx the right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his
liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous
to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, `bail is the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in the custody of the law.'

Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix
the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that
the petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission
to bail.

VILLASEÑOR VS. ABAÑO

G.R. No. L-23599, September 29, 1967

FACTS:

Reynaldo Villasenor was charged with murder of Police Sergeant Madla before the
CFI of Marinduque. He was admitted to a P60,000-bail which was reduced to P40,000.
He posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty.

Before arraignment, Prov. Fiscal amended the information, charging the accused with
Direct Assault. Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder. Aug. 7 - Judge
Abano sua ponte cancelled Villasenor’s bond and ordered his immediate arrest.

Sept. 9 - After hearing on Villasenor’s motion to reconsider, Judge Abano resolved to

admit him to bail provided he puts ups a cash bond of P60,000.

Sept. 15 - Villasenor asked the court that the original bond previously given be
reinstated. Judge Abano resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount
of P60,000.00, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque
actually staying therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and
ownership of said residents for five years."

Villasenor filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction seeking
to set aside Judge Abano’s orders of Aug. 7, Sept. 9 and Sept. 15 and to reinstate
the bail previously approved by Judbe Abano. He charges Judge Abano having acted
without any or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the disputed orders.

ISSUES:

1. WON the P60k-bond fixed by Judge Abano transgress the constitutional injunction
that excessive bail shall not be required.

2. WON the requirement that the property bond be posted only by residents of the
province of Marinduque actually staying therein collides with Sec. 9, Rule 114.

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3. WON it is beyond the power of Judge Abano to require that properties be offered
as bond must be in possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five
years.

Note:

*Since the two orders of Aug. 7 and Sept. 9 was replaced with the order of Sept. 15,
they became functus officio (retains no legal authority because his or its duties and
functions have been completed) *

*This is a 1967 case hence the reference to a different ROC.

HELD:

1. NO. The court has the power to grant bail in bailable cases and the discretion to
fix the amount thereof. In the instant case, there is no abuse of discretion.
1 Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. — The necessary qualifications of sureties to a
bail bond shall be as follows:

(a) Each of them must be a resident householder or freeholder within the

Philippines.

 Villasenor - he is a mere gov. employee, earning a salary of P210 a month and

the sole breadwinner of a family of five.
 Sec. 12, Rule 114 provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either
increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be
committed to custody unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called
upon to furnish."
 We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to secure bail in a
certain amount. This circumstance by itself does not make the amount
excessive.
 Guidelines used by the courts in determining the amount of bail.
 The purpose of bail as provided in the definition under Sec. 1, Rule 114 - the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
 The condition of bail as provided under Sec. 2, Rule 114 - defendant shall
answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which
it may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to
the Court of First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or
bail, that he will, surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the
appellate court may render, or that, in case cause, is to be tried anew or
remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be
remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof.
 The following principles should be considered in fixing the amount of bail:
 the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose;

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  the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused;
 the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from
unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances
surrounding each particular accused.

Certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be summarized as follows:

1. ability of the accused to give bail;

2. nature of the offense;
3. penalty for the offense charged;
4. character and reputation of the accused;
5. health of the accused;
6. character and strength of the evidence;
7. probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8. forfeiture of other bonds;
9. whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases

The principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are
directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid
punishment." Of importance then is the possible penalty that may be meted.

Villasenor is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person
in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of the capital
punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the Department of Justice,
reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18, 1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to
recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to
the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless
circumstances warrant a higher penalty.

2. NO. The posture taken by respondent judge does not offend the good sense of
justice.

Judge Abano - it has been his experience that "it is hard to send notices to people
outside the province." He explains that the usual procedure of his clerk of court is
to send notices by registered mail accompanied by return cards; that when trial
comes, the return cards in many instances have not yet been received in court;
that when the parties fail to appear; there is no way of knowing whether the
notices have been duly received; that he cannot order the confiscation of the bond
and the arrest of the accused, because he is not sure whether the bondsmen have
been duly notified; that sending telegrams to people outside the province is costly,
and the court cannot afford to incur much expenses.

We read Sec. 9, Rule 114 to mean that the directive that bondsmen be resident
householders or freeholders in the Philippines is but a minimum requirement.
Reason for this is that bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the
Philippines, are not within the reach of the processes of its courts.

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 It is not intended to tie up the hands of a judge to approve bail so long as it is
offered by a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines. For a court
has broad powers essential to its judicial function.

Judge Abano only wanted to make sure that when the proper time comes for the
court to order the sureties to produce the person of defendant, no undue delay
will be incurred. If bondsmen reside in far-away places, even if within the
Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There is the insufficiency of the
mails as an effective means of communication. And then, there is the problem of
complying with the constitutional mandate of speedy trial. If notice to sureties is
not served, no trial can be had.

Furthermore, reading of his petition fails of an averment that the requisite exacted
that bondsmen be residents of and actually staying in Marinduque would cause
him prejudice.

3. NO Judge Abano - he relied on Circular 2, dated January 23, 1964, of the

Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, addressed, among others, to Judges of First
Instance. That circular recites that it had been brought to the attention of the
Department of Justice that in certain provinces, unscrupulous persons who are
spurious landowners, have been accepted as sureties. The Secretary then
suggested that it may be a good policy not to accept as bail bonds real properties
not covered by certificate of title unless they have been declared for taxation
purposes in favor of the person offering them as bond for at least five (5) years.
Its purpose is to prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting
of personal bail bonds and to protect the interests of the Government. If the
bondsman is not the owner, bail fails of its purpose, prejudice to the government
sets in. We note that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of properties in
general. Failure of specificness on the part of Judge Abana then could have been
a case of oversight. To obviate misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to
clarify that order. We do say now that the order of September 15, 1964 is to be
understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the requirement
that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership
of the sureties for at least five years."

DISPOSITION we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and to dissolve the
writ of preliminary injunction issued herein.

DEFENSON-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ

217 SCRA 663 (1993)

What is the effect of posting a bail bond?

Posting of bail bond, she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court. It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we
have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time
of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore

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enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the afore-cited doctrine in Feliciano.
Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally
be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and
the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly
arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities
either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

FACTS:

Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release
fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash
bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but
she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional
release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile,
it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she
made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would
be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed
a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure
order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold departure order
was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise argued that the
hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of
speech.

ISSUES:

1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

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2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any
motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?

3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

HELD:

1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant
for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary appearance of the
accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities
either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of

respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of
the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond
she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion
"she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court.
Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations,
she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over
the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the

presiding court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that
she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking
judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing
sua sponte the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an
exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country
during the pendency of the case.

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Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. Parties with
pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same
courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

MIRANDA VS. TULIAO

486 SCRA 377 (2006)

FACTS:

Two (2) burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and
SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, but the venue
was later transferred to the RTC of Manila which convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court on automatic review where we accused therein was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he

executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo
B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe,
as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet
dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal.
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying
said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the
meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to
the Department of Justice.

The new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint
Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the

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cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise
applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer
for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with
the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond
evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication
on the merits.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and
setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal
cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief
if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:

WON the accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person
of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant
of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the
police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over
his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs.
Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused
must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda,
Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested
or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants
of arrest."

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before
the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such

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jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing
a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter
of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as
a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired
by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law
is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of
his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody
of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.

Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very
rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who
will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination
of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really
did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.

CORTES VS. CATRAL

279 SCRA 1 (1997)

FACTS:

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Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for granting bail without hearing.

Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a crime that is supposedly not
bailable) without hearing. Catral says: In one of them, the case was frustrated
homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of 200K, plus the circumstantial
evidence were weak. In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-
866 for murder, the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no
bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon
information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the information made no mention of a
bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended bail in
the sum of P200,000.00 instead.

Respondent judge “acting on the said recommendation and again guided by the
provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence
extant on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao.”
A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carrao’s letter dated September 3, 1996
addressed to the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by the
respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused without
conducting any hearing.

Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal possession of firearms case from 180K
(recommended by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. Catral says: bailbond
recommended was 180K. Accused filed for reduction and there was no opposition
from prosecutor.

Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a bailbond
of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because this
Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto. Catral says: he was acting on
the recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines
in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on
record is merely circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the commission of
crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.

Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio ‘Bong’ Dicierto was sued for concubinage
and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban appealed and it
was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo
Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge
Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban’s house to get the envelop.

ISSUE:

WON the allegations of the complainant would warrant the imposition of

administrative sanction against respondent judge by granting bail without a hearing.

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HELD:

YES. Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount
fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet
reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be
excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable
notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must
be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is
required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant’s character
and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.

When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines
set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the
existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.

Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with murder,
without having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong.

In a crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended the sum of

P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. The records do not reveal whether a
hearing was actually conducted on the application for bail although respondent judge
implies that there was one, stating that “acting on this recommendation of the
provincial prosecutor and taking into account the guidelines prescribed in Section 9
of Administrative Circular 12-94, the court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the
amount of P200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.”
Subsequently, counsel for accused Ahmed Duerme filed a motion for reduction of
bail. The “hearing” of the motion was conducted on August 21, 1995 with the
prosecution, not having interposed any opposition, and submitting the resolution of
the motion to the sound discretion of the court instead. Respondent judge then
issued an order granting a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00 for accused Ahmed
Duerme inasmuch as “the evidence was not so strong to warrant the fixation of said
amount.” The order granting the reduced bailbond, however, did not contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution.

In another murder case, after conducting a preliminary investigation, the inquest

judge issued a warrant of the arrest for the accused with no bail recommended. When
the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court, the information made no mention
of a bailbond. Consequently, accused through counsel filed a petition for bail. In the
hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused was strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended the
sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge, “acting on said recommendation and
again guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in
conjunction with the evidence extant on record,” issued an order granting bail to the
accused in the sum of P200,000.00. Unable to post the said bond, accused through

13
counsel filed a motion to reduce bail. In the course of the hearing of the petition, the
public prosecutor manifested that he had no objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as
bail for the accused. Respondent judge, then “guided by the factual setting and the
supporting evidence extant on record” reduced the bail bond from P200,000.00 to
P50,000.00 as recommended by the prosecutor. Once again, the order granting the
bail of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail bond of P50,000.00, did not contain
a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the

prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail
to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to
grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not
a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
the lack of it against the accused.”

The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or

not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted
to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal.

The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that even though
the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be
arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent
evidently knew that the accused were still at large as he even had to direct their
arrest in the same order where he simultaneously granted them bail. At this juncture,
there is a need to reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed
of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it
would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed.

PEOPLE VS. MANALO

400 SCRA 129 (2003)

14
FACTS:

Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nineyear old daughter Rosaldiza
Nabor tenanted and lived in a coconut plantation located in Barangay Salugan,
Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the family’s
dirty laundry every Saturday at the barangay reservoir. The route to the reservoir
was uninhabited. Going there was quite a long trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen
minutes to negotiate the grassy path from the reservoir to their house.

In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut gatherer. Alex
helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a week.

One day, in 1992, Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash her clothes and to take a
bath. On her way back home, Manallo suddenly appeared from the bushes, grabbed
her and raped her. Alex dressed up and warned her not to tell her parents, brothers
and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her
clothes and ran home. Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened to her.

Medico-Legal. Then Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police station and executed
their respective sworn statements. An information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City, charging Alex with rape.

No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992,
a motion for bail with no specific date and time for the hearing thereof. Upon the
filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and
fixing his bail bond at P50,000.00. On the same day, Alex posted a property bond
which was immediately approved by the court. Alex was forthwith released from
detention.

At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty. Trial was set on June 18, 1992. The prosecution prayed the trial court to
cancel the bond of Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without due
hearing. However, the trial court held in abeyance resolution of the motion until after
the prosecutor shall have presented its witnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court
stated that the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in
Alex’s petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, 1992, the trial court issued
an order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set
for the hearing on his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial on
said date. The trial court issued and order for his arrest. However, Alex could no
longer be found at his address. It was only six years thereafter, or on January 22,
1998, that he was arrested.

He denied raping Rosaldiza and claimed that they were lovers. He was found guilty.
(short story version.)
ISSUE:

15
WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant not on the basis of
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence but rather on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.

HELD:

NO. Even a cursory reading of the decision of the trial court will readily show that it
convicted appellant of the crime charged in light of the testimony of Rosaldiza and
Dr. LoriaFlorece and the physical evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The trial court considered appellant’s flight from the scene of the crime, his having
jumped bail and for eluding arrest for six long years as evidence of his guilt for the
crime charged

BAIL-RELATED ISSUE:

WON there is a procedural lapse on the part of trial court by granting bail to the
appellant without hearing.

HELD:

YES. The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of record its concern
and displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial court in granting bail to
appellant. It bears stressing that he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:

SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. – At the hearing of an application for

admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion
of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless
the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.

(please see previous case for the duties of the trial court in resolving a motion or
petition for bail)

In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There was no
specific date and time for the hearing of said motion. And yet, on the same day that
the motion was filed, the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail bond
for the provisional liberty of the appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 without any
factual basis therefore stated in the order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed
the court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of the appellant
on the ground that the trial court granted his motion for bail without even affording
the prosecution a chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in opposition
thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolution thereof and even allowed the

16
appellant to remain free on his bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the
prosecution was deprived of its right to due process.

A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty,
but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the
community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a
magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his
exercise of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE VS. NITCHA

240 SCRA 283 (1995)

FACTS:

An indictment for murder was filed against herein accused-appellant (p. 18,Rollo)
who, after trial, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on account of the positive
identification made by the People’s witnesses, the defense of accused-appellant
anchored on denial being found unavailing. Accused-appellant argues the procedural
infirmities attended the trial below such as (a) the hearsay character of the testimony
of the People’s third witness which was heard in the absence of accused-appellant
and his counsel; (b) the denial of due process on account of the perceived bias of the
trial judge; (c) the illegality of appellant's arrest and detention; and (d) the absence
of preliminary investigation. However, as correctly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the record of the case indubitably shows that accused-appellant's
counsel opted not to cross examine Agustin Sibayan (p. 323, Record) which
deliberate omission obviously negates the so-called hearsay nature of said witness'
testimony. Similarly wanting in substance is accused-appellant's claim relative to the
alleged bias of the trial judge considering that mere apprehension that a magistrate
is partial is inefficacious to sustain a charge of breaching the tenet of "cold neutrality"
normally expected of a judge. And even on the assumption that accused-appellant's
arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation, such a hypothesis was
nonetheless negated by accused-appellant's act of posting a bail bond thereafter,
apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty which is tantamount to
foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is entitled to bail despite the fact that there is a procedural
infirmities that the arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation.

HELD:

NO. The act of posting a bail bond, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not
guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity; Bail
is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of discretion when the offense charged

17
is punishable by reclusion perpetua; If accused is convicted by the crime (reclusion
perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion. Bail must not
be granted.

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of as amended, that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter

of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion id limited to determining whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail also becomes a matter of right. . . .

The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to
suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have
only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been
sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the
accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be
granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs.
Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital

offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled
to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong.

B. NATURE

18
Matter of Right

ARTICLE III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

RULE 114, Section 4

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody shall be

admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)

CASES:

PEOPLE VS. DONATO

198 SCRA 130 (1991)

FACTS:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986
for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a
Motion to Quash alleging that:
a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;
b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and
d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.

This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed
that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital
offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987
the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees.

Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a
condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten
days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present

19
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused
will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee
from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest
and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner
whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the private respondent has the right to bail.

HELD:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not
a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only
when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was
wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing
the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case (petition for habeas corpus).
Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with
a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said
petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is
another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal
to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

20
 LAVIDES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000

FACTS:

Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610
(an act providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its violation, and other
purposes). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment
conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant
Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had
been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time
the police received reports of petitioner’s activities.

When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing
only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were
submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 was filed against petitioner.

Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause;
(2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident,
Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged.

Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children.

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail
in the nine cases.

TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the aboveentitled case. He is
hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a
total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending resolution of
his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May
23, 1997. He filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be

21
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment.

The trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s motions to reduce bail bonds,
to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00,
subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order
of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon
the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and
academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its
treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes
petitioner’s arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His
contention is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid
because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.

ISSUE:

WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.

HELD:

CONDITION IS VOID. Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the

accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is
quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment
of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of
petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at
any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"
while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is
required to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash
and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved,
his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so
that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios
certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail.

The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the accused
cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings
of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail
under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express

22
waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial
shall proceed in absentia."

Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused
to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit:

a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,

b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and
c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the
accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.

IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997
WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made
only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of
petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail
to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him
are valid.

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

396 SCRA 443 (2003)

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,
assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his
petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for
habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein
petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada,
Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and several others.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit foundation established in February
2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor
and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to
research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.

Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the

amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis
“Chavit” Singson.

Accused by Singson. Informations filed.

23
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner. In the
meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioner’s
coaccused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner’s Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than
the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioner’s arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set
the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner’s petition for bail on May 21
to 25, 2001.

The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well

as all the other accused during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of
waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused
to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.

The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege
a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. By
way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner
agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner’s
motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail.
He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus.

Meanwhile, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying
that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.

The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash the

amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada was also
denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail
may be conducted;

24
2. Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during
the pendency of his petition for bail;

3. Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other
accused is mandatory;

4. Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the
petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of
petitioner for the crime charged.

HELD:

1. NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings

on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused
need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.

In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,

otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.

However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the
hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the
rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before
a complaint or information is filed against him. The Court’s pronouncement in
Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed
a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him.
Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on
his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once
and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct
of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an
accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling
in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an
accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
“authorized” under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the

25
 arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for
bail.

2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of
an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given
for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while
at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person
may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an
Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused
may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each
other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when
charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but
after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude
his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense.
It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted
and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for
bail of an accused may become moot and academic.

3. No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules
of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more
petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused
be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The
matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for
bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly
with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion. It may be underscored that in the exercise of its
discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience
of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases
and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused.
After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States Supreme
Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic
individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has
become rampant over the earth.

26
4. No. Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to
prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has
refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution
did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioner’s
application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in
several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the
court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the
filing of this petition on June 29, 2001. The delay in the conduct of hearings on
petitioner’s application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the
Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor,
as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution.

“When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court
at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires
that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right
of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.”

Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan

conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor.
Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not
strong before he may be granted bail.

Discretionary

ARTICLE III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

27
RULE 114, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 24

Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or

violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional

pardon;

d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(5a)

Section 6. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense is an offense which, under

the law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to
bail, may be punished with death. (6a)

Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)

28
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. (8a)

Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. — No bail shall be allowed after
the judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused has
applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no
bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release
on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no
case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (24a)

CASES:

TEEHANKEE VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

76 PHIL. 756 (1946)

FACTS;

Teehankee was detained by the US Intelligence Arm for conspiring with the Japanese
and was subsequently turned over to the Commonwealth Government for custody.
No information was filed against her in the People’s Court for about a year and she
applied for bail which was denied. She appealed to the SC assailing the People’s
Court’s order on the ground that she was not given a hearing. SC granted her appeal
and a hearing was set. The Solicitor General recommended a bail of PhP50K but the
People’s Court did not rule on the application for bail and merely concluded that the
amount of bail really shows that the charge against her is serious.

Teehankee appealed to the SC again and prayed for it to direct the People’s Court to
render a judgment on her application for bail. SC granted but the People’s Court
instead of complying, set a third hearing where the Judge asked the same questions
tending to compel the prosecutor to produce evidence and when the Special
Prosecutor refused to adduce evidence stating that it would imperil the success of
the prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the Judge had the prosecutor arrested
for contempt of court. The prosecutor was released through habeas corpus.
Teehankee again asked the SC to decide on her application for bail and the SC again
directed the People’s Court to render a decision but in the resolution the SC declared
that if the People’s Court does not feel justified in the Special Prosecutor’s attitude of
not opposing the petition for bail by the petitioner and the Sol Gen files a statement
that doing so would imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public
interest, the People’s Court may not inquire further into the prosecution’s evidence
and the prosecutor may not be held guilty in contempt of court for refusing to answer
the PC’s question and that the hearing should be made in the presence of the
petitioner or with due notice to her. The People’s Court however, instituted a fourth
hearing, this time, when the prosecutor refused to adduce evidence, the Judge called

29
the prosecutor into a private conference where he allegedly acquired strong evidence
of Teehankee’s guilt. The People’s Court thereafter rendered a decision based on the
evidence acquired in the private conference denying the petition for bail. Teehankee
again filed a petition in the SC alleging that the People’s Court’s order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion and prayed for her provisional release under bail as
may be fixed by the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the People’s Court may compel the prosecution to adduce evidence in the
petitioner’s application for bail.

HELD:

NO. In resolving the issue, the SC clarified that the Constitutional provision gives all
persons the right to bail except those charged with a capital offense or when evidence
of guilt is strong. All persons mean everyone, not only those who have been charged
but also those which have only been arrested, detained, or restrained and all persons
before conviction retain this right until charged with a capital offense and when
evidence of guilt is strong. This is because of the presumption of innocence. If the
presumption of innocence is available to a person already charged or accused more
so for a person who was merely arrested or detained. The Constitution does not
qualify because to limit it to those charged would be a curtailment of individual
freedom. The right to bail is therefore available to Teehankee especially because she
has not been charged of any offense yet.

The SC then proceeded to rule that the People’s Court has the discretion after due
notice and hearing to allow political prisoners to be released on bail even before
presentation of the information unless it sees strong evidence for the commission of
a capital offense. But this judicial discretion to grant bail must be within reasonable
bounds guided by the Constitution, statutes, rules of court, and principles of equity
and justice. The Sol Gen is empowered to oppose the application for bail and to
adduce evidence based on the State’s interest. If it refuses to do so, then the People’s
Court must rule on what it was presented and in the absence of strong evidence of
guilt, the People’s Court must grant the bail. Hence, the People’s Court cannot coerce
the prosecution if it does not oppose the application for bail of the petitioner and
refuses to adduce evidence because it might imperil the success of the prosecution
and jeopardize public interest. The People’s Court must therefore grant the petition
for bail.

Also, the SC held that the People’s Court deprived Teehankee of substantive due
process when it violated the SC’s order to conduct the hearing in her presence and
instead received evidence in a private conference because it deprived Teehankee of
the opportunity to be heard in defense and such private conference is in the nature
of the Judge’s personal knowledge which he has no right to act.

30
 PEOPLE VS. SAN DIEGO
26 SCRA 522 (1988)

FACTS:

In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the
information charged the defendants, Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza,
Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid
with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
superior strength and with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed
men and craft or fraud.

The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants
would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary
proceeding.

In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses,
the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same despite the objection
of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present.

The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 for each defendant on the ground
that the evidence of guilt was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very
angry because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he used
contumacious language for which he was forthwith cited for contempt. Fortunately,
after the fiscal had submitted his answer and explanation, the trial judge, in a
forgiving mood, did not punish him for contempt on condition that the contumacious
words be deleted from his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process.

HELD:

YES. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail.

If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground.

The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light
of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting

31
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed
by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.

The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are
defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that
the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the
orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand.

OCAMPO VS. BERNABE

77 PHIL. 55 (1946)

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eduardo Ocampo to set aside an order issued
by the Fourth Division of the People's court denying his application for bail.

FACTS:

The petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Armed Forces of
the United States and confined in Muntinlupa Prisons since July 30, 1945, and
pursuant to Executive Order No. 6555 he was turned over to the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and later on filed with the Peoples Court his application for bail under
Act No. 682.

At the hearing of the application, the special prosecutor stated that petitioner with
having pointed out Placido Trinidad as a guerilla to the Japanese and for that reason
Placido Trinidad was shot to death.

No evidence, however, was presented by the special prosecutor and all that he did
at the hearing was to recite the contents of an affidavit which has no reference to
count No. 4, and to state further that he had 27 more affidavits.

Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital is not a evidence and that
evidence cannot be considered strong which has not been subjected to the test of
cross-examination.

He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges preferred against him and
stated that said charges are mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad.

Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of the People's Court composed of
Judges Jose Bernabe, Emilio Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order dated
February 23, 1946, denying the application for bail.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

32
ISSUE:

WON no proof was presented by the special prosecutor to show that the evidence of
guilt is strong, thus, the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the application for bail.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court by citing the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons (76 Phil., 756), held that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except
when charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. the general rule,
therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charges, are, before their
conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the
charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong.

At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls
within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7.

The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in
Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very
nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs.
Ramos, 45 Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having
the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.

Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere
hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.

And this is the prevailing doctrine in the United States. In some states of the American
union, the burden of showing that proof is evident or the presumption great, lies on
the prosecution while in others on the petitioner, but the rule seems to be uniform to
the effect that no matter which side bears the burden of proof, the evidence of guilt
should be adduced before the court for a proper determination of its probative force

In Corpus Juris Secundum the rule is summarized as follows:

Unless the presumption from an indictment for a capital offense is conclusive

against accused which has been considered in section 34 b(2) (b) the
determination as to whether the proof is evident or the presumption great must,
on an original application, be determined from the evidence adduced on the
application no matter which side bears the burden of proof. Where accused under
a capital indictment bears the burden of proof he should offer the witnesses whose
names are endorsed on the indictment, although he is not limited to such
witnesses.

33
 The court should hear all material and relevant evidence offered by either party,
such as the grand jury minutes, and should consider the evidence as a whole. (8
C.J.S., section 46 [b], p. 94.).

Upon the hearing it is proper to require the prisoner to begin the evidence, although
it imposes upon him the necessity of producing evidence upon which the state
intended to rely for his conviction on the final trial. But the accused will not by this
procedure be denied the opportunity of cross-examining the people's witnesses. (Ex
parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. To the same effect, Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26
So., 711; ex parte Nathan[Fla.]; 50 so., 38." (39 L. R. A., New Series, pp. 752, 774,
775.).

The evidence for the state, as well as that for the accused, should be presented (1)
by the petitioner in an application for bail. (Ex parte Tully [Fla.], 66 S., 296; Rigdon
vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 S., 711; Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. (2) But the
petitioner, by proper procedure, may test the probative force of the testimony for the
state in order to fully present his case for the purposes of the hearing. Ex parte Tully,
supra; Ex parte Heffren, supra. (6 C.J., p. 984, fn. 50 [a], section 214.).

Where on a motion to admit to bail after the indictment, the evidence of the witnesses
who testified before the grand jury does not make a prima facie case against the
accused, he is entitled to bail, and it is an error to refuse bail upon the statement of
the district attorney that he has other evidence which he will not disclose for fear of
weakening the state's case. (In ex parte Reynald, 37 Texas, 1.)

And this is in conformity with the former rulings of this Court. (MARCOS V. CRUZ AND
HERRAS CASE)

True that in the same case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra, we
said that the hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court. By "summary hearing" we meant such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court "does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed
to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted." (8 C. J. S.,
93,94.)

The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses
and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on
details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.

Objection has been made long ago to this method of hearing wherein the regular trial
is anticipated though to a limited extent at least. But the objection was dismissed.

34
It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of the application for bail filed by
the petitioner no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of
guilt is strong, the Fourth Division of the People's Court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying the bail applied for.

SIAZON VS. JUDGE

4 SCRA 184 (1971)

FACTS:

At the outset it should be mentioned that the instant petition is formally defective in
that the petitioner appears to be the State Prosecutor handling the case below instead
of the People of the Philippines, who should properly be represented in this
proceeding by the Solicitor General. (BUT FOR SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE,
THIS INFIRMITY IS OVERLOOKED. SC PROCEEDS).

At the outset, let it be stated that after the arraignment of the accused and before
the commencement of the trial, the applications for bail, were heard.

The Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the
applications for bail. On this same occasion the Court also considered the motion filed
by the prosecution to discharge the defendant Angelico Najar. Without any objection
on the part of the defense, said motion to discharge was granted and accused Najar
was discharged to become state witness pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court.

As the trial progressed, with the prosecution presenting several witnesses whose
testimonies have not established evidence directly linking the accused Escribano and
Padilla to the conspiracy alleged in the informations in these cases, the defense on
August 2, 1971 filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the order given in
open Court ordering a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the applications
for bail, to which the prosecution also filed its opposition.

The Court reconsidered its previous order and ordered that the applications for bail
be first heard to which the prosecution gave its assent.

ISSUE:

WON a proceeding in an application for bail is still summary in nature as it was under
the old rule.

HELD:

YES. As a general proposition, all persons shall before conviction be bailable except
when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.

35
At the hearing of the application for bail the burden of showing that the case falls
within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court.

The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of

judicial discretion, which in the very nature of things may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Neither under the old nor
under the new Rules is there any specific provision defining what kind of hearing it
should be, but in the two cases cited at the footnote hereof it was stated that the
hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court.

"By 'summary hearing,' this Court added, "we mean such brief and speedy method
of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence
for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence
for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted.' (8 C.J.S. 93, 94.)

The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses
and reducing to a reasonable minimum at the amount of corroboration particularly
on details that are not essential to the purposes of the hearing."

We do not see that the addition of the provision Sec. 7, Rule 114 has materially
changed the nature of the hearing on a petition for bail to the extent of depriving the
Court of its discretion to confine the evidence to the extent necessary for the proper
determination of the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The
only change that has been introduced is that such evidence shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial in order to avoid unnecessary repetition.

The prosecution had had three months since the hearing started until the questioned
order was issued and had called 27 witnesses just to lay a sufficient corroborative
basis for the testimony of its principal witness, Angelico Najar. The plea that this
witness will reveal the names of persons who have some knowledge of circumstances
which tend to connect the two accused with the crimes and who presumably will also
be called to testify, and whose willingness to do so may thereby be adversely
influenced by such revelation, does not appear to be convincing, since the record of
the cases already contains the testimony which Najar gave at the preliminary
investigation, aside from his three sworn statements consisting of 16 pages typed
single space in question and answer form. (TANGGAPIN NA KASI NILA NA
INSUFFICIENT NGA DAW)

The proviso that any witness may be recalled at the trial for additional examination
underscores, if anything, the difference between the hearing for purposes of the
petition for bail and the trial on the merits. This is as it should be, because one has

36
for its purpose, from the endpoint of the prosecution, to show that strong evidence
of guilt exists while it contemplates proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of evidence and the order of
presentation of the witness while not to be disregarded, must nevertheless be
equated with the purpose of the hearing, which is to determine whether the accused
falls within the exception to the general rule that he is constitutionally entitled to bail
before conviction.

To allow the prosecution to conduct the hearing as if it were a full-dress trial on the
merits who defeat the purpose of the proceeding.

DISPOSITIVE: the petition is dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued
by this Court is lifted, with instructions to the respondent Court to resume the hearing
forthwith for the presentation of Angelico Najar as witness for the prosecution,
without prejudice to said Court's allowing, in the exercise of its discretion, the
presentation of such other prosecution as it may deem advisable, in the interest of
justice.

MAMOLO VS. NARISIMA

252 SCRA 613 (1995)

FACTS:

On 16 May 1994 a criminal complaint for murder was filed against Antonio Balagot
and Ariel Acha for the murder of Daniel Mamolo,Jr., son of complainant After Judge
Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the requisite preliminary examination he issued the
corresponding warrants of arrest against the accused. Respondent Judge
recommended no bail since murder is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was
strong. Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered to the PC Provincial
Command in Cotabato.

Subsequently, Balagot through counsel filed a Petition For Admission to Bail and set
the same for hearing. At the scheduled hearing defense counsel informed the court
that Balagot was ill and asked the court to dispense with the submission of his petition
and, instead, to allow Balagot to be treated at the hospital (SPECIAL TREATMENT???).

MAMOLO: claims that despite the fact that respondent Judge recommended no bail
for both accused he nevertheless allowed Balagot to put a bail of P150,000.00 without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

MAMOLO: also avers that on several occasions he saw respondent Judge and counsel
for accused Balagot together and engaged in a series of private talks at a nearby
restaurant.

37
In his Memorandum of 21 July 1995, approved by Court Administrator Ernani Cruz
Paño, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez found that respondent Judge
disregarded procedural due process in granting bail to the accused. He opined that
the prosecution’s waiver to present evidence ought to have prompted respondent
Judge “to ask the prosecution to present its witnesses at another date set for the
purpose (of asking) clarificatory questions from which he may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt of the accused.”

ISSUE:

WON Judge Narisima acted inappropriately in recommending the bail for Balagot.

HELD:

YES. The procedure of conducting a hearing on the application for admission to bail
should provide the basis for judges to determine whether the prosecution’s evidence
is weak or strong. In the case at bench, while respondent conducted a hearing on
Balagot’s petition for bail such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution
to guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition.

The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot excuse respondent’s disregard of

his peremptory duty. It is worthy to note that in the resumption of the hearing in the
afternoon of 25 May 1994 the prosecution prefaced its submission with a statement
of its “serious vehement objection to the petition for bail.” Such manifestation ought
to have alerted respondent of the next appropriate steps in resolving the petition.

In Borinaga v. Tamin, we delineated a clear guideline on the exercise of judicial

discretion in hearing petitions for bail -“x x x (w)hile the determination of whether or
not evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion by the
nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody in
a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail. If the
prosecution should be denied of such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered
void on that ground x x x (E)ven where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution
such questions as would ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail x x “

The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic, fundamental procedure cannot

be lightly overlooked. As correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by respondent
constitutes gross ignorance of the law since it resulted in depriving the prosecution
the time-tested and enduring procedural due process.

It is an oft-repeated dictum that a judge should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For the role of judges in the

38
administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence.
Indubitably, the industry of a judge in keeping abreast with the law and court rulings
will enhance the faith of our people in the administration of justice since litigants will
be confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of the bench cannot justly
be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

CORTES VS. CATRAL

279 SCRA 1 (1997)

FACTS:

A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B.
Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed
when (1) he granted bail in murder cases without hearing (People v. Duerme, et al.,
Criminal Case 07-893 for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-
866 for murder); (2) he reduced the bailbond granted by the provincial prosecutor
from P180,000 to P30,000 without hearing (Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda’s
Criminal Case 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm); (3) he granted a bailbond
of P14,800 in a homicide case (Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors spreading that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral
went to Jimmy Siriban’s house to get the envelop. The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint saying that there is
nothing in the allegations of the complainant that would warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against the judge.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to
the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866.

HELD:

As held in Basco vs. Rapatalo, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application
of bail to the sound discretion of the court.

A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in

opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has
been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of
it against the accused. The reason for this is plain.

Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is

39
directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if
not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his own
rebuttal. The fact that Criminal Case 07-874 was subsequently dismissed by Judge
Alameda does not completely exculpate Judge Catral. The judge is not bound by the
recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn statements of the
witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly be the basis for
determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The
procedural lapse of the judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the accused
in Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed Duerme), have yet to be arrested,
respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00.

The right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to
say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet
to be curtailed.

In sum, Judge Segundo B. Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having
granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866 without having
conducted the requisite hearing.

PEOPLE VS. TUPPAL

395 SCRA 72 (2003)

NATURE OF THE CASE:

On appeal is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela,
finding appellant Saturnino Tuppal guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

Appellant’s conviction stemmed from four charges filed on August 21, 1992, by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela.

Appellant remained at large for almost nine (9) years after the filing of the aforesaid
cases. It was only on March 5, 1998 that appellant was arrested in Cainta, Rizal and
in connection with another case for robbery.

Appellant was arraigned. Assisted by counsel, he pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The cases were then consolidated and trial ensued.

The prosecution’s evidence established that:

On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses Bonifacio and Florfina Solito
and their four-year-old child, Efren, attended the wedding of Florfina’s younger

40
 sister, Loida Atuan, at Barangay Banguro, Reina Mercedes, Isabela. At about
11:30 P.M., the Solitos accompanied by Bartolo Atuan, Jr., Florfina’s 26-yearold
brother, left the wedding reception. They had barely traveled some 300 meters
away and were in front of the house of Felix Sacang, when they were waylaid by
appellant and his four companions, now the co-accused.After Ben Tuppal
announced a heist, Danilo Tuppal immediately ran off with Florfina’s handbag
containing P2,500.00 in cash. Appellant then shot Florfina with a short firearm,
hitting her in the abdomen. Bartolo Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina from further
harm but Marcelo Tuppal then shot Bartolo, killing him on the spot.

Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried towards a nearby banana
plantation. The malefactors gave pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her
further at the buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to be dead and fell to the
ground. The ploy worked because she heard accused Pedro Tuppal say, “Let us go,
she is already dead.”

In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio Solito and his son Efren
scampered towards the house of Felix Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran after both
father and son. He aimed the gun at them, but the gun jammed and did not fire.

In the present cases, appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi.

ISSUE:

WON the fact that the trial court had held during the bail hearing that the prosecution
evidence was weak, it is estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after the trial.

HELD:

NO. Said findings should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of the

prosecution’s evidence. It is well-settled that the assessment of the prosecution
evidence presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and
intended only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional
release of the accused.

41
 ENRILE VS. PEREZ
G.R. No. 147785
(Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated May 5, 2001)

MELO, J.:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob

armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation
No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
"rebellion" were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion,"

which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related
petitions were filed before the Court-

(1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with
an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar
O. Mancao; (2) G.R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G.R. No. 147799
for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order filed by Rolando A. Lumbao; and (4) G.R. No. 147810 for certiorari
and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
thereof, as having no basis both in fact an in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001,
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of
rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered
moot and academic. As to petitioner's claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary
of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in
connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions
to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38.
Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:

[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities
to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to
and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigators will henceforth be
conducted.

42
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p.
16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)

With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be

laid to rest.

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."

Moreover, petitioners' contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781

(Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the
extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected
to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the
Rules of court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit
himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under
custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the
periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting
officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the
detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting
officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for
damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily,
petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of,
thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time
(Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).

Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for
the dismissal of the petitions at bar.

G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson,

Aquino, and Mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations
against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with
the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly
premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed
against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later
filed, this court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of a duly
issued warrant.

As regards petitioner's prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be
declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. The are

43
not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to
set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.

Anent petitioner's allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their

application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is
not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-
an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this
very day.

G.R. No. 147781

The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for

mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal
right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue the right to relief is
clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present
time, petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of
being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically
stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.

G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his
part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine
of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which
has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May
1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the
general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.

We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides
that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion..." thus, we held in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15,
2000):

xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is
a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts.
Besides the absence of testual standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment
might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might
be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

44
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential
or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-
spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great
loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. xxx

(at pp. 22-23)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation
No. 38 having been lifted.

G.R. No. 147810

Petitioner Laban ng Demoktratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule

requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here,
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to
be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members,
and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the
crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent
threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief,
petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly
is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is
invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort
to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a
petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction
of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However,

in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent
with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined
from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

SO ORDERED.

45
C. TYPES AND CONDITIONS OF BAIL

Corporate Surety

RULE 114, Sections 1, 2, 10, 13, 21, 22

Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(1a)

Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to
the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;

(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court of these Rules;

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case,
the trial may proceed in absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount
of the undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size)
taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the
accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)

Section 10. Corporate surety. — Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a

surety in accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide
bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly
authorized by its board of directors. (10a)

Section 13. Justification of sureties. — Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken
before the judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding
section. He shall describe the property given as security, stating the nature of his
title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered into by him
and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties
upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No
bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. (13a)

46
Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by
the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required,
his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the
bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bond. (22a)

Cash Deposit

Rule 114, Sections 1, 2, 14, 21

Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(1a)

Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to
the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;

47
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court of these Rules;

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case,
the trial may proceed in absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount
of the undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size)
taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the
accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)

Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. — The accused or any person acting in his behalf
may deposit in cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city,
or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate
of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of
section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money
deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the
deposit. (14a)

Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by
the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required,
his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the
bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

Property

48
Rule 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22

Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(1a)

Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to
the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;

(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court of these Rules;

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case,
the trial may proceed in absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount
of the undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size)
taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the
accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)

Section 11. Property bond, how posted. — A property bond is an undertaking

constituted as lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail.
Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the
annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds if
the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space
provided therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and
municipal assessor concerned.

Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his
failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and
his re-arrest and detention. (11a)

Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. — The qualification of

sureties in a property bond shall be as follows:

(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;

49
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the
amount of the undertaking;

(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that
expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be
equivalent to the whole amount of bail demanded.

In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking
over and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution.
(12a)

Section 13. Justification of sureties. — Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken
before the judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding
section. He shall describe the property given as security, stating the nature of his
title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered into by him
and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties
upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No
bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. (13a)

Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by
the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required,
his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the
bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bond. (22a)

50
Recognizance

Rule 114, Sections 1, 2, 15, 16

Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(1a)

Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to
the following conditions:

(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;

(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court of these Rules;

(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case,
the trial may proceed in absentia; and

(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount
of the undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size)
taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the
accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)

Section 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court
may release a person in custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible
person. (15a)

Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall
be required when the law or these Rules so provide.

When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released
immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on
appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro,
he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

51
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or
on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)

R.A. No. 10389

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10389

March 14, 2013
AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF GRANTING THE
RELEASE OF AN INDIGENT PERSON IN CUSTODY AS AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL
CASE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Recognizance Act of 2012.

SECTION 2. Statement of Policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to promote

social justice in all phases of national development, including the promotion of
restorative justice as a means to address the problems confronting the criminal
justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged resolution of cases, lack of legal
representation, lack of judges, inability to post bail bond, congestion in jails, and lack
of opportunity to reform and rehabilitate offenders. In consonance with the principle
of presumption of innocence, the 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes and
guarantees the right to bail or to be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. In furtherance of this policy, the right of persons, except those charged with
crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, to be released
on recognizance before conviction by the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether
the case was originally filed in or appealed to it, upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

SECTION 3. Recognizance Defined. – Recognizance is a mode of securing the release

of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable
to post bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been
filed shall allow the release of the accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the
custody of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the
accused resides.

SECTION 4. Duty of the Courts. – For purposes of stability and uniformity, the courts
shall use their discretion, in determining whether an accused should be deemed an
indigent even if the salary and property requirements are not met. The courts may
also consider the capacity of the accused to support not just himself/herself but also
his/her family or other people who are dependent on him/her for support and
subsistence.

Other relevant factors and conditions demonstrating the financial incapacity of the
accused at the time that he/she is facing charges in court may also be considered by

52
the courts for the purpose of covering as many individuals belonging to the
marginalized and poor sectors of society.

SECTION 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the

Constitution. – The release on recognizance of any person in custody or detention for
the commission of an offense is a matter of right when the offense is not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment: Provided, That the accused or
any person on behalf of the accused files the application for such:

a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and
b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a person in
custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on the person’s
recognizance.

SECTION 6. Requirements. – The competent court where a criminal case has been
filed against a person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the release of
the detained person on recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all of
the following requirements are complied with:

a. A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or incapacity

either to post a cash bail or proffer any personal or real property acceptable as
sufficient sureties for a bail bond;

b. A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office of
the municipality or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is
indigent;

c. The person in custody has been arraigned;

d. The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the accused resides
of the application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall include in its agenda the
notice from the court upon receipt and act on the request for comments or
opposition to the application within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice. The
action of the sanggunian shall be in the form of a resolution, and shall be duly
approved by the mayor, and subject to the following conditions:

1. Any motion for the adoption of a resolution for the purpose of this Act duly made
before the sanggunian shall he considered as an urgent matter and shall take
precedence over any other business thereof: Provided, That a special session shall
be called to consider such proposed resolution if necessary;

The resolution of the sanggunian shall include in its resolution a list of

recommended organizations from whose members the court may appoint a
custodian.

53
2. The presiding officer of the sanggunian shall ensure that its secretary shall submit
any resolution adopted under this Act within twenty-four (24) hours from its
passage to the mayor who shall act on it within the same period of time from
receipt thereof;

3. If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, fails to act on the said
resolution within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof, the same shall be
deemed to have been acted upon favorably by the mayor;

4. If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, disapproves the
resolution, the resolution shall be returned within twenty-four (24) hours from
disapproval thereof to the sanggunian presiding officer or secretary who shall be
responsible in informing every member thereof that the sanggunian shall meet in
special session within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the veto for the sole
purpose of considering to override the veto made by the mayor.

For the purpose of this Act, the resolution of the sanggunian of the municipality or
city shall be considered final and not subject to the review of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, a copy of which shall be forwarded to the trial court within three (3)
days from date of resolution.

e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such processes as, but not
limited to, photographic image reproduction of all sides of the face and
fingerprinting: Provided, That the costs involved for the purpose of this subsection
shall be shouldered by the municipality or city that sought the release of the
accused as provided herein, chargeable to the mandatory five percent (5%)
calamity fund in its budget or to any other available fund in its treasury; and

f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of hearing therefor within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of the application for release on
recognizance in favor of the accused: Provided, That such hearing shall be held
not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours nor later than forty-eight (48) hours from
the receipt of notice by the prosecutor: Provided, further, That during said
hearing, the prosecutor shall be ready to submit the recommendations regarding
the application made under this Act, wherein no motion for postponement shall
be entertained.

SECTION 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. – Any of the following

circumstances shall be a valid ground for the court to disqualify an accused from
availing of the benefits provided herein:

a. The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit prescribed
under Section 5(a);
b. The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed
a crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
c. The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance
without valid justification;

54
d. The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or under
conditional pardon;
e. The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts surrounding
his/her case indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance;
f. There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the
pendency of the case; and
g. The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty to
the new crime he/she is being accused of.

SECTION 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on

Recognizance. – Except in cases of children in conflict with the law as provided under
Republic Act No. 9344, the custodian of the person released on recognizance must
have the following qualifications:

a. A person of good repute and probity;

b. A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;
c. Must not be a relative of the applicant within the fourth degree of consanguinity
or affinity; and
d. Must belong to any of the following sectors and institutions: church, academe,
social welfare, health sector, cause-oriented groups, charitable organizations or
organizations engaged in the rehabilitation of offenders duly accredited by the
local social welfare and development officer.

If no person in the barangay where the applicant resides belongs to any of the sectors
and institutions listed under paragraph (d) above, the custodian of the person
released on recognizance may be from the qualified residents of the city or
municipality where the applicant resides.

SECTION 9. Duty of the Custodian. – The custodian shall undertake to guarantee the
appearance of the accused whenever required by the court. The custodian shall be
required to execute an undertaking before the court to produce the accused whenever
required. The said undertaking shall be part of the application for recognizance. The
court shall duly notify, within a reasonable period of time, the custodian whenever
the presence of the accused is required. A penalty of six (6) months to two (2) years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the custodian who failed to deliver or produce
the accused before the court, upon due notice, without justifiable reason.

SECTION 10. Role of the Probation Officer. – Upon release of the person on
recognizance to the custodian, the court shall issue an order directing the Probation
Office concerned to monitor and evaluate the activities of such person. The Probation
Office concerned shall submit a written report containing its findings and
recommendations on the activities of the person released on recognizance on a
monthly basis to determine whether or not the conditions for his/her release have
been complied with. The prosecution including the private complainant, if any, shall
be given a copy of such report.
SECTION 11. Arrest of a Person Released on Recognizance. – The court shall order
the arrest of the accused, who shall forthwith be placed under detention, due to any
of the following circumstances:

55
a. If it finds meritorious a manifestation made under oath by any person after a
summary healing, giving the accused an opportunity to be heard;
b. If the accused fails to appear at the trial or whenever required by the
abovementioned court or any other competent court without justification, despite
due notice;
c. If the accused is the subject of a complaint for the commission of another offense
involving moral turpitude and the public prosecutor or the mayor in the area where
the offense is committed recommends the arrest to the court; or
d. If it is shown that the accused committed an act of harassment such as, but not
limited to, stalking, intimidating or otherwise vexing private complainant,
prosecutor or witnesses in the case pending against the accused: Provided, That
upon the issuance by the court of such order, the accused shall likewise become
the proper subject of a citizen’s arrest pursuant to the Rules of Court.

SECTION 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or Commencement

of Sentence; Exception. – The benefits provided under this Act shall not be allowed
in favor of an accused after the judgment has become final or when the accused has
started serving the sentence: Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to an
accused who is entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law if the application for
probation is made before the convict starts serving the sentence imposed, in which
case, the court shall allow the release on recognizance of the convict to the custody
of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused actually
resides.

SECTION 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or the application of
such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of
this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected by such declaration.

SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof
inconsistent herewith are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same
are more beneficial to the accused.

SECTION 15. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

56
D. AMOUNT OF BAIL; WHEN NOT REQUIRED

Guidelines

RULE 114, Section 9

Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily,
but not limited to, the following factors:

(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)

CASES:

DELA CAMARA VS. ENAGE

41 SCRA 1 (1971)

FACTS:

An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner,
Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for
certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail.

The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought
setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot
be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus
rendering this case moot and academic.

57
It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower court judges, to set forth
anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing the
amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a
constitutional right.

Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested

on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged
participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of
the Tirador Logging Co.

Thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case
for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against petitioner,
his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the
aforesaid occurrence.

Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the
lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with
such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence.
Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the
prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition,
the defense had not presented its evidence.

Respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting
that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would
flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the
excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
murder.

Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente
Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent
Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise
a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however
remained adamant. Hence this petition.

The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances
concerning the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which,
to his mind would disprove any charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find support in circulars of the
Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the
petition for lack of merit.

Respondent Judge submitted a supplemental answer wherein he alleged that

petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then
remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for
lack of merit, to which petitioner countered in a pleading, and filed with this Court

58
the next day with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently
interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of
the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate
of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition that calls for the
resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la
Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power
of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail."

ISSUE:

WON the bail recommended was excessive and violative of the Constitution.

HELD:

YES. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital
offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance
and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a
person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just
simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is
intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted.

Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital
offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the
outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.

Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee
were found in the fundamental law.

It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a
prohibition against excessive bail.

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner,
the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being
fourteen victims, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated
murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision.

Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder
and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be

59
ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.

Villaseñor v. Abano: The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the
opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows:

1. ability of the accused to give bail;

2. nature of the offense;
3. penalty for the offense charged;
4. character and reputation of the accused;
5. health of the accused;
6. character and strength of the evidence;
7. probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8. forfeiture of other bonds;
9. whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases."

Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the
end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on
the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon
a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to
provide the required remedy."

No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged

order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at
the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum.

It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its
wake. Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not
entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for
repudiation from this Court.

Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by
virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably
inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading
of the Abano opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement
may elicit approval if to do so would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form
of words. Not only is the order complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but
it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with
the command of reason.

60
 VILLASEÑOR VS. ABAÑO
G.R. No. L-23599, September 29, 1967

FACTS:

Reynaldo Villasenor was charged with murder of Police Sergeant Madla before the
CFI of Marinduque. He was admitted to a P60,000-bail which was reduced to P40,000.
He posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty.

Before arraignment, Prov. Fiscal amended the information, charging the accused with
Direct Assault. Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder. Aug. 7 - Judge
Abano sua ponte cancelled Villasenor’s bond and ordered his immediate arrest.

Sept. 9 - After hearing on Villasenor’s motion to reconsider, Judge Abano resolved to

admit him to bail provided he puts ups a cash bond of P60,000.

Sept. 15 - Villasenor asked the court that the original bond previously given be
reinstated. Judge Abano resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount
of P60,000.00, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque
actually staying therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and
ownership of said residents for five years."

Villasenor filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction seeking
to set aside Judge Abano’s orders of Aug. 7, Sept. 9 and Sept. 15 and to reinstate
the bail previously approved by Judbe Abano. He charges Judge Abano having acted
without any or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the disputed orders.

ISSUES:

4. WON the P60k-bond fixed by Judge Abano transgress the constitutional injunction
that excessive bail shall not be required.

5. WON the requirement that the property bond be posted only by residents of the
province of Marinduque actually staying therein collides with Sec. 9, Rule 114.

6. WON it is beyond the power of Judge Abano to require that properties be offered
as bond must be in possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five
years.

Note:

*Since the two orders of Aug. 7 and Sept. 9 was replaced with the order of Sept. 15,
they became functus officio (retains no legal authority because his or its duties and
functions have been completed) *

*This is a 1967 case hence the reference to a different ROC.

61
HELD:

4. NO. The court has the power to grant bail in bailable cases and the discretion to
fix the amount thereof. In the instant case, there is no abuse of discretion.
1 Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. — The necessary qualifications of sureties to a
bail bond shall be as follows:

(a) Each of them must be a resident householder or freeholder within the

Philippines.

 Villasenor - he is a mere gov. employee, earning a salary of P210 a month and

the sole breadwinner of a family of five.
 Sec. 12, Rule 114 provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either
increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be
committed to custody unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called
upon to furnish."
 We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to secure bail in a
certain amount. This circumstance by itself does not make the amount
excessive.
 Guidelines used by the courts in determining the amount of bail.
 The purpose of bail as provided in the definition under Sec. 1, Rule 114 - the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
 The condition of bail as provided under Sec. 2, Rule 114 - defendant shall
answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which
it may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to
the Court of First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or
bail, that he will, surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the
appellate court may render, or that, in case cause, is to be tried anew or
remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be
remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof.
 The following principles should be considered in fixing the amount of bail:
 the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose;
 the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused;
 the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from
unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances
surrounding each particular accused.

Certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be summarized as follows:

1. ability of the accused to give bail;

2. nature of the offense;
3. penalty for the offense charged;
4. character and reputation of the accused;
5. health of the accused;

62
6. character and strength of the evidence;
7. probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8. forfeiture of other bonds;
9. whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases

The principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are
directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid
punishment." Of importance then is the possible penalty that may be meted.

Villasenor is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person
in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of the capital
punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the Department of Justice,
reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18, 1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to
recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to
the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless
circumstances warrant a higher penalty.

5. NO. The posture taken by respondent judge does not offend the good sense of
justice.

Judge Abano - it has been his experience that "it is hard to send notices to people
outside the province." He explains that the usual procedure of his clerk of court is
to send notices by registered mail accompanied by return cards; that when trial
comes, the return cards in many instances have not yet been received in court;
that when the parties fail to appear; there is no way of knowing whether the
notices have been duly received; that he cannot order the confiscation of the bond
and the arrest of the accused, because he is not sure whether the bondsmen have
been duly notified; that sending telegrams to people outside the province is costly,
and the court cannot afford to incur much expenses.

We read Sec. 9, Rule 114 to mean that the directive that bondsmen be resident
householders or freeholders in the Philippines is but a minimum requirement.
Reason for this is that bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the
Philippines, are not within the reach of the processes of its courts.

It is not intended to tie up the hands of a judge to approve bail so long as it is

offered by a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines. For a court
has broad powers essential to its judicial function.

Judge Abano only wanted to make sure that when the proper time comes for the
court to order the sureties to produce the person of defendant, no undue delay
will be incurred. If bondsmen reside in far-away places, even if within the
Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There is the insufficiency of the
mails as an effective means of communication. And then, there is the problem of
complying with the constitutional mandate of speedy trial. If notice to sureties is
not served, no trial can be had.

63
 Furthermore, reading of his petition fails of an averment that the requisite exacted
that bondsmen be residents of and actually staying in Marinduque would cause
him prejudice.

6. NO Judge Abano - he relied on Circular 2, dated January 23, 1964, of the

Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, addressed, among others, to Judges of First
Instance. That circular recites that it had been brought to the attention of the
Department of Justice that in certain provinces, unscrupulous persons who are
spurious landowners, have been accepted as sureties. The Secretary then
suggested that it may be a good policy not to accept as bail bonds real properties
not covered by certificate of title unless they have been declared for taxation
purposes in favor of the person offering them as bond for at least five (5) years.
Its purpose is to prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting
of personal bail bonds and to protect the interests of the Government. If the
bondsman is not the owner, bail fails of its purpose, prejudice to the government
sets in. We note that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of properties in
general. Failure of specificness on the part of Judge Abana then could have been
a case of oversight. To obviate misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to
clarify that order. We do say now that the order of September 15, 1964 is to be
understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the requirement
that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership
of the sureties for at least five years."

DISPOSITION we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and to dissolve the
writ of preliminary injunction issued herein.

E. WHEN NOT REQUIRED OR REDUCED

RULE 114, Sections 16; 20

Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall
be required when the law or these Rules so provide.

When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released
immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on
appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro,
he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or
on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)

Section 20. Increase or reduction of bail. — After the accused is admitted to bail,
the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When
increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the

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increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal
charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may,
at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt
appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof,
committed to custody. (20a)

R.A. NO. 6036

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6036

August 04, 1969

AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BAIL SHALL NOT, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, BE

REQUIRED IN CASES OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES AND
IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES WHEN THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR SUCH OFFENSES IS
NOT HIGHER THAN ARRESTO MAYOR AND/OR A FINE OF TWO THOUSAND PESOS
OR BOTH.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION. 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall
not be required of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a
light felony and/or a criminal offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher
than six months imprisonment and/or a tine of two thousand pesos or both, where
said person has established to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate
authority hearing his case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond,
except in the following cases:

a. When he is caught committing the offense in flagranti;

b. When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later
repudiated by him in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted
through force or intimidation;
c. When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or jumped bail;
d. When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;
e. When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously
convicted for an offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty;
f. When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and
g. When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor
for violation of municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.

SECTION 2. Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by
Section 1 hereof shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good
standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending final decision
of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his case periodically every two
weeks. The Court, may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged,
require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a

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responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility.
In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall include a statement of the person
charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by
the Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused
person to the Court. Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons
including circumstances beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any
violation of this sworn statement shall justify the, Court to order his immediate arrest
unless he files bail in the amount forthwith fixed by the Court.

SECTION 3. This Act shall apply to all persons who, at the time of its approval, are
under temporary detention for inability to post bail for charges contemplated by
Section 1 above.

SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, August 4, 1969.

F. FORFEITURE AND CANCELLATION OF BAIL; REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION

OF BAIL CONDITIONS

RULE 114, Sections 21, 22, 23; BAIL

Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by
the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required,
his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the
bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to
do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

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In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bond. (22a)

Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. — For the purpose of surrendering the
accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a
certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any
other person of suitable age and discretion.

An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if

he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the
case is pending. (23a)

G. BAIL FILED WITH OTHER COURTS:

RULE 114, Section 17

Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge,
or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein.

(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be
released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the
case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.

(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)

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 Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Tamang
617 SCRA 428 (2010)

Doctrine:

1. The bail bond may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or with any
RTC of the place of arrest, or with any RTC with any MeTC or MTC of the place of
arrest.

2. All applications for bail and judicial bonds shall be coursed through the clerk of
court who shall see to it that the bonds are in order – every bond shall be
accompanied by a clearance from the SC showing that the issuing company is
qualified to transact business, which clearance is valid only for 30 days from the
date of its issuance.

FACTS:

An investigation revealed that Judge Tamang (MeTC Judge in Pateros and San Juan)
approved bail bonds issued by Covenant Assurance Co. despite Covenant being
blacklisted since 2002. Judge Tamang had approved the bail bonds without any
showing of the unavailability of all the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering the accused
persons were charged in criminal cases pending before the RTC in Pasig and is
detained in Pasig City Jail.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made its findings that:

In Mandaluyong City – 3 criminal cases, wherein bail bonds were secured in San Juan
and approved by Judge Tamang, notwithstanding the presence and availability of the
Judges in RTC Mandaluyong City whose courts the cases are pending

In RTC Pasig – considerable number of criminal cases were approved despite the
same violation. And most of the bonds were secured thorugh Covenant Inc.

Recommendation: to file an administrative complaint against Judge Tamang, subject

her to disciplinary proceedings, declare all bail bonds secured from Covenant as Null
and Void.

Judge Tamang, upon such findings, claims innocence and conducted an investigation
and thus cited the following:
a) That such was the practice of the pervious judge of the MeTC in San Juan
wherein the cases involved were pending in RTC and MeTC Pasig City, Quezon
City and Mandaluyong City
b) 14 orders of release were issued at 6pm on Fridays, when there were no
available judges in the other courts
c) Some cases involved the accused being held in San Juan but the case was
pending in Pasig City

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 d) There was a cover-up done by the court personnel of the MeTC in San Juan
wherein they did not give copies of the orders of Judge Ynaga of RTC Pasig
City

OCA included the Clerk of Court Sorio and Process Server Medrano included as
respondents.

Judge Manalastas of the RTC in Pasig City found no evidence of bad faith, dishonesty
or deliberate intent to do injustice on the part of Judge Tamang, but rather she be
held liable for gross negligence, while the co-respondents guilty of grave misconduct.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Tamang competently act in approving the questioned bail bonds.

HELD:

NO. In accepting surety bond, the Clerk of Court should see to it that the following
requisites are complied with, otherwise, the bond should be rejected:

 Photographs of the accused

 Affidavit of justification
 Clearance from the SC
 Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner
 Authority of Agent
 Current certificate of Agent
 Procedure

All applications for bail/judicial bonds, before their approval by the judge concerned,
shall be coursed thru the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel who shall
see to it that the bond is in order and the signature of the bonding officer authentic
before affixing his signature thereto. He shall also indicate therein the outstanding
liability of the bonding company, if any, for the information and guidance of the court.

Judge Tamang approved the bail bonds issued by Covenant although they lacked the
required clearance from the SC indicating that Covenant was qualified to transact
business with the courts.
 Covenant was blacklisted at the time of issuance of the bail bonds
 Judge Tamang was guilty of neglect of duty because she is still bound to review
the supporting documents before approving the bail bonds
 Considering the seriousness of the purpose in the posting of bail bond,
approval thereof should pass through strict scrutiny and with utmost caution
on the part of both the Clerk of Court and the approving Judge.

Sec 17 (a), Rule 114 ROC governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases
pending OUTSIDE the judge’s territorial jurisdiction

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Sec 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge is available,
with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.

Under this provision, the bail bond may be filed either:

 With the court where the case is pending, or
 With any RTC of the place of arrest, or
 (if no judge is available) with any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest.

The list of approved bail bonds involved accused detained in Pasig City, Taguig City,
San Juan and Pateros

Judge Tamang contends that the accused voluntarily surrendered at San Juan
therefore could apply for bail in San Juan.

She was correct in approving the application for bail of the accused who voluntarily
surrendered detained in San Juan, Pateros and Taguig, because Sec7(a) granted her
authority to approve applications for bail of the accused detained within her territorial
jurisdiction, in the event of the unavailability of any RTC judge in the area. (there
was still no RTC judge stationed in San Juan and Pateros).

However, she did not substantiate here approved bail application of the accused in
Pasig City. She offered no proof to justify her approval of the questioned bond.

H. BAIL ON APPEAL

LEVISTE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010

FACTS:

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide
and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal
on the grounds of his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence
of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

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The Court of Appeals denied his application for bail and found that petitioner failed to
show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger and the physical
condition of petitioner does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal
physician.

The Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s conviction and that there
was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now questions as grave
abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:

WON an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial
court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary
nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the
other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if
none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application
for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating ]circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate
court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists
does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

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On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may
either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the
appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances
that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any
of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.

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