Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

NPT
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS (NPT)
Opened for signature: 1 July 1968. States, and enter into force within 18 months after
Entered into force: 5 March 1970. their accession to the Treaty.
Duration: Indefinite. Twenty five years after the Compliance: Unlike the CWC and the CTBT, the
entry into force of the NPT, at the 1995 NPT Review NPT does not have a builtin mechanism for non
and Extension Conference held in New York at the compliance. In case of noncompliance with IAEA
United Nations from 17 April to 12 May 1995, States safeguards, the IAEA Board is to call upon the viola
Parties agreed without a vote “that the Treaty shall tor to remedy such noncompliance and should report
continue in force indefinitely.” the noncompliance to the UN Security Council and
Number of Parties: 189 States (this number ex General Assembly; The UN bodies may impose spe
cludes the DPRK) cific penalties, such as curtailment or suspension of
Depositories: Russia, United Kingdom, and United assistance, return of materials, or suspension of privi
States. leges and rights. An incentive to comply is peaceful
nuclear assistance.
Treaty Text Iraq and Compliance: In December 1998, UN
mandated UNSCOM inspections in Iraq were sus
Obligations: pended. By then, the IAEA Iraq Action Team had
formed a technically coherent picture of Iraq’s secret
× Nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not to transfer nuclear weapons program, and inspectors had effec
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or tively uncovered, mapped, and neutralized it.
other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist,
encourage, or induce any nonnuclear weapon A UN panel of experts tasked in 1999 with reporting
states (NNWS) to manufacture or otherwise ac on the results of the UNSCOM and IAEA efforts
quire them. concluded that “the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weap
ons programme has been eliminated,” but the experts
× NNWS are not to receive nuclear weapons or emphasized that important issues remained unre
other nuclear explosive devices from any trans solved. They further warned that, if weapons inspec
feror, and not to manufacture or acquire them. tors were kept outside Iraq, the risk that Iraq might
× NNWS must place all nuclear materials in all reconstitute its programs would grow, and the initial
peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safe assessments from which inspectors had been working
guards. would be jeopardized. The experts said the status quo
was unacceptable, and they called for reestablishing
× All Parties are obligated to facilitate and partici an inspection regime in Iraq that was “effective, rig
pate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and
orous and credible.”
scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On 12 September 2002, US President Bush delivered
× All Parties must pursue negotiations in good faith a speech to the United Nations General Assembly
on effective measures relating to the cessation of calling on the organization to enforce its resolutions
the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, for disarming Iraq. Four days later, the Iraqi govern
and on a treaty on general and complete disarma ment announced that it would allow arms inspectors
ment under strict and effective international con to return “without conditions.” Iraqi and UN officials
trol. met on September 17 to discuss the logistical ar
rangements for the return of inspectors and announce
Verification and Compliance: NNWS are to con that final arrangements would be made at the end of
clude agreements with the IAEA for safeguards to be the month. Inspections were renewed 27 November.
applied on all source or special fissionable materials On 19 December, 9 January 2003, 27 January, 14
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory February, and 7 March, IAEA Director General El
of such States. Such agreements are to be concluded Baradei and UNMOVIC Chief Hans Blix briefed the
with the IAEA, individually or together with other Security Council on Iraq inspections and plans. On
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Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Last Update: 1/11/2010
NPT
18 March 2003, UN inspectors were withdrawn from DPRK Withdrawal: On 10 January 2003, the Security
Iraq due the US invasion of Iraq. Council again received notification from North Korea
of the country's withdrawal from the NPT. The
DPRK and Compliance: The DPRK is the only State
DPRK government announced that its withdrawal
to announce its intention to withdraw from the NPT.
“will come into force automatically and immedi
On 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced its inten
ately” on the next day, claiming that it had suspended
tion to withdraw based on its supreme national inter
its 1994 withdrawal from the Treaty on the last day
ests, citing the Treaty’s withdrawal clause (Article X
of the required threemonth notice period and thus
(2). North Korea gave two reasons for its intention to
did not need to give additional notice to other NPT
withdraw: (1) the Team Spirit “nuclear war re
Parties and the Security Council as required under
hearsal” military exercises, and (2) the IAEA demand
Article X of the Treaty.
for special inspection of two suspect sites. On 11
June, one day before its withdrawal from the NPT Following North Korea’s announcement on 10 Janu
was due to take effect, bilateral negotiations with the ary 2003, the Board of Governors adopted a third
United States resulted in North Korea suspending the resolution (GOV/2003/3) on 12 February 2003, de
“effectuation” of its withdrawal and accepting normal claring that North Korea was “in further non
IAEA inspection of the seven sites it had declared in compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards
its initial report to the Agency. The United States and Agreement pursuant to the NPT” and decided to re
DPRK signed an Agreed Framework in Geneva 21 port “to the United Nations General Assembly and
October 1994. the Security Council, North Korea’s continued non
compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify non
The DPRK, which joined the IAEA in 1974, with
diversion of nuclear material that is subject to safe
drew its membership from the IAEA 13 June 1994.
guards.”
The DPRK Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA
remains in force, although there have been difficul Although no statement on North Korea’s withdrawal
ties in verifying the DPRK’s compliance. In Septem has to date been issued by the NPT States Parties, the
ber 2000, the Secretariat determined that it would generally held view is that North Korea’s withdrawal
need three to four years to carry out all the activities came into effect on 10 April 2003 when its three
required to verify the correctness and completeness month notice of withdrawal expired. Moreover, the
of the initial report. The focus has shifted from the 2003 session of the Preparatory Committee (Prep
actual substantive work to obtaining full DPRK co Com) for the 2005 Review Conference did not take
operation to carry out these activities. So far the any specific decision with regard to North Korea’s
DPRK has not agreed to even discuss a program of withdrawal. Instead, the PrepCom Chairman in his
work. The last technical meeting was held in Novem factual summary of the meeting stated inter alia that
ber 2001. the “States parties felt that the DPRK’s decision to
withdraw from the Treaty represented a serious chal
A new phase started on 16 October 2002 with the
lenge to the global nonproliferation regime” and that
announcement by the United States that the DPRK
the “States parties called upon the DPRK to disman
side had acknowledged, in talks with Assistant Secre
tle its nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, veri
tary Kelly in early October that it had a “program to
fiable and irreversible way” (see paragraph 28 of the
enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.” On 29 Novem
Chairman’s factual summary).
ber, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution
without a vote in which the Board insisted that the Other Major Provisions: Other major provisions
DPRK should reply and cooperate with the Agency. include the right of any group of States to conclude
On 22 December, the DPRK started to cut IAEA regional treaties to assure the absence of nuclear
seals and disable IAEA surveillance cameras at its weapons in their respective territories; and the con
nuclear facilities. On 27 December, it ordered the vening of review conferences every five years (seven
IAEA inspectors to leave the country. review conferences have been held: in 1975, 1980,
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005).
In light of these developments, the IAEA Board of
Governors adopted a new resolution 6 January 2003 The NPT was accompanied by United Nations Secu
in which the DPRK was called upon to cooperate rity Council Resolution (UNSCR) 255 (19 June
urgently with the Agency. The Board affirmed that 1968) on security assurances to NPT NNWS. On 11
unless the DPRK would take all required safeguards April 1995, the five NWS through UN Security
measures, it would be in further noncompliance with Council Resolution 984 issued harmonized negative
its safeguards agreement. security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT.
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2009 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 ployed. By Thursday of the first week (7 May), Am
Review Conference bassador Chidyausiku was able to issue a fairly bold
set of draft recommendations for the RevCon, taking
into account the positions put forward in the general
The 2009 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) con debate. The delegations had the weekend to prepare
vened from 415 May at UN Headquarters in New responses and then consulted with the chairman in
York under the chairmanship of Ambassador Boni private meetings on Monday and Tuesday. A revised
face G. Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe. The Committee’s draft was released on Wednesday 13 May.
objectives were to adopt a provisional agenda and
draft rules of procedure for the 2010 Review Confer Ambassador Chidyausiku concluded that there was
ence (RevCon), nominate a presidentdesignate, and insufficient time and political will to reach a consen
most challengingly, forge consensus on substantive sus document and suggested that States not spoil the
recommendations for the Conference. Representa positive atmosphere by continuing the indirect nego
tives from 135 States Parties participated in one or tiations. Indonesia supported this suggestion on be
more sessions of the PrepCom. In addition, represen half of the NAM, but a diverse set of countries (in
tatives of 77 nongovernmental agencies attended the cluding several NAM members) exhorted States to
meetings of the Committee. work until the last possible minute to reach consen
sus. Under pressure from these States, a third draft
On the third day of the meeting, the Committee was was released on the final day of the PrepCom (15
able to adopt a provisional agenda for the 2010 May). This set of recommendations sought to find
RevCon. Unlike the 2005 agenda (which was not middle ground between the first two drafts, but in the
adopted in advance of that RevCon), the 2010 draft end, the issues were not ripe for consensus.
agenda stipulates that the review will take into ac
count the decisions and the resolution adopted by the Ambassador Chidyausiku decided that the draft rec
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the ommendations would not be forwarded to the
final document of the 2000 RevCon, as previous ob RevCon as a chairman’s working paper, breaking
jectors no longer insisted on excluding reference to with tradition from recent PrepComs. Despite the
these agreements. lack of a final report, many viewed the 2009 Prep
Com as a success as it had been able to reach consen
In addition to the agenda, the PrepCom agreed on sus on an agenda for the upcoming RevCon. Al
other procedural matters including the draft rules of though no final recommendations were adopted, the
procedure and the designation of the main chairs for issues of greatest contention were identified and ac
the RevCon. The Committee unanimously endorsed knowledged, and the groundwork was laid for future
Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan of the Philippines cooperation. The positions of the new U.S. admini
for the Presidency of the 2010 Review Conference. stration presaged by President Obama’s speech in
Thomas Markram (Senior Political Affairs Officer, Prague on 5 April played a key role in creating a
Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for positive atmosphere for the conference. States were
Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secre receptive to the renewed emphasis on multilateral
tariat) was nominated to serve as provisional Secre diplomacy, arms control, and disarmament.
taryGeneral of the 2010 Review Conference. In ad
dition, the Committee was able to agree on the During the general debate and in consultations on the
schedule for the division of costs for financing the draft recommendations, the States Parties focused on
RevCon. After reviewing availability of conference the following issues:
facilities, the Committee decided to hold the 2010
RevCon from 328 May in New York, a week later
· Nuclear disarmament and security assur
than originally planned.
ances: With a more progressive position
than its predecessor, the U.S. delegation is
For the first time in many years, States were able to
sued commitments to pursue ratification of
negotiate, albeit indirectly, on issues of substance
the CTBT. The first draft recommendations
through a set of private consultations with the chair
proposed an “action plan to achieve nuclear
man. Regional tensions present in recent PrepComs
disarmament, including specific practical
and RevCons had dissipated somewhat, particularly
measures.” Among these measures were the
between the United States, Iran, and Egypt. All three
CTBT, FMCT, verified reductions, greater
appeared more willing to compromise or at least did
transparency, reducing operational status,
not engage in blocking techniques previously em
and refraining from qualitative improve
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ment of nuclear weapons. The recommen would have to be nondiscriminatory and not

dation of negotiating a nuclear weapons infringe on Article IV rights. States af
convention, however, gained little traction firmed the importance of both multilateral
among the nuclear weaponstates (NWS), and bilateral nuclear cooperation programs.
particularly France. France was also reluc
tant to discuss binding negative security as · Middle East: The issue of implementing the
surances. China requested to move the lan 1995 resolution on the Middle East was of
guage on “international stability” and “un great importance at this PrepCom and was
diminished security for all” from step 9 of addressed in all three drafts. The second and
the 13 steps to the top of the disarmament third drafts contained three concrete rec
action plan. This was contentious, as it ap ommendations including the establishment
peared to imply that depending on the situa of a subsidiary body at the 2010 RevCon
tion there could be justification for the nu “to consider concrete practical steps to
clear weapon states refusing to take any promote the earliest implementation” of the
disarmament actions. The five NWS issued resolution; appointing a special coordinator
a joint press release on the final day, but to consult with all countries in the region
displayed little consensus except regarding and report to the RevCon; and convening a
a positive attitude toward the CTBT and the future conference on the issue. These pro
negotiations between Russia and the United posals gained wide support after their en
States for a followon treaty to START. The dorsement by Russia, though they were
press release did, however, reiterate the drawn from previous working papers sub
NWS’ “enduring and unequivocal commit mitted by Egypt, Iran, and others.
ment to work towards nuclear disarma
ment,” language from the 2000 final docu · Withdrawal: North Korea’s withdrawal was
ment that had been avoided by the previous discussed, with the focus oriented around
U.S. administration. how to interpret and apply the Article X
provision on withdrawal. Each of the three
· Nonproliferation: Developed countries ar drafts recommended that the RevCon “con
gued that States needed to do more to ad sider the proposals presented in the Prepara
dress possible cases of noncompliance with tory Committee that identified modalities
NPT obligations, with the EU and countries under which States parties could collec
such as Australia raising concerns over tively respond to notifications of with
Iran’s nuclear program. All state delega drawal. Withdrawal has been particularly
tions supported the call for the countries challenging because it was a nonissue be
outside the NPT to join the treaty immedi fore 2003, and 2000 was the last time States
ately. States expressed common support for reached consensus on issues of substance.
nuclearweaponfree zones (NWFZs) as a
means of strengthening the NPT, although For more details, see the CNS Feature Story “Report
France, the United States, and the United from the NPT Preparatory Committee 2009” by
Kingdom preferred to recognize rather than Miles A. Pomper.
welcome the recent establishment of the
Central Asian NWFZ. Developed countries 2008 Preparatory Committee for the 2010
including those in the EU also sought to
Review Conference
make the IAEA Additional Protocol the
new standard for safeguards; however Bra
zil implied that existing comprehensive The 2008 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) con
safeguards were sufficiently effective, a po vened in Geneva from 28 April until 9 May under the
sition also maintained by many NAM coun Chairmanship of Ambassador Yelchenko of Ukraine.
tries. Representatives from 106 States Parties participated
in the work of the second session. The following spe
· Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: Many cialized agencies and international and regional or
States supported the consideration of multi ganizations were present as observers: the Brazilian
lateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle Argentine Agency for Accounting of and Control of
including assurances of supply. NAM Nuclear Materials (ABACC) the European Commis
States insisted that any such arrangement sion, the League of Arab States, the Organization for
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the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nu · Syria: Canada and the United States raised
clearTestBan Treaty Organization (CTBTO Prep the issue of the DPRK assisting Syria with
Com) and the International Atomic Energy Agency the construction of a clandestine nuclear re
(IAEA). Representatives of 64 nongovernmental actor (destroyed by an Israeli air strike in
organizations also attended the meetings of the Com September 2007). Syria denied the veracity
mittee. of these allegations and claimed that the
United States falsified the accounts in order
Unlike the 2007 PrepCom session, the 2008 session to exert pressure on the DPRK.
did not involve much debate on procedural issues and
agenda setting. With the 2007 agenda as a basis, the · U.S.India Deal: The NAM expressed, with
debate involved discussions on more substantive mat out naming countries, their concern about a
ters. During the general debate, statements focused certain nuclear cooperation deal between a
on the following issues: NWS and a nonNPT state, obviously refer
ring to the U.S.Indian nuclear deal.
· Nuclear Disarmament: Most delegations ex
pressed their support for the entryintoforce · Safeguards: Many states expressed their
of the CTBT. The EU (represented by the support for the IAEA and the safeguards
Slovenian Presidency) for instance talked system. The EU, Russia and South Korea
about “new momentum” for the treaty; how stressed the need to promote the universal
ever, the United States did not refer to the implementation of the provisions of both
CTBT throughout the proceedings. Many comprehensive safeguards and the additional
states expressed support for a fissile material protocol.
cutoff or ban, though it was noted that this
process was held up within the CD. Many · The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Some states re
delegates reaffirmed their belief in the con called the NPT provision for promoting
tinuing relevance of the “13 Steps” adopted peaceful uses of nuclear technology and re
by the 2000 RevCon. Norway and Indonesia ferred to state sovereignty issues and the
made reference to the February 2008 Oslo possession of complete fuelcycle capabili
Conference. Some delegates also made spe ties. However, other states, such as Russia
cial reference to the need to address the is and Austria, brought forward the idea of an
sue of tactical nuclear weapons. enrichment center under international con
trol matched with fuel supply guarantees.
· Nuclear Force Modernization: Many states,
mostly members of the “New Agenda Coali · Education: Japan called attention to its ef
tion” (NAC) and the NAM, criticized the forts undertaken in collaboration with
modernization of their nuclear submarine UNIDIR aiming at promoting education in
capabilities by France and the United King disarmament issues.
dom. Delegates also voiced concern about a
trend of vertical proliferation related to re · NuclearWeaponsFreeZones: The Arab
placement and modernization projects by the States reaffirmed their interest in establish
NWS and by the nonNPT states. ing a NuclearWeaponsFreeZone in the
Middle East (MENWFZ) and recalled the
· Iran: Western delegations expressed concern relevant Resolution adopted by the 1995
over Iran’s nuclear program, referring to the RevCon. They also revisited the issue of
relevant UN Resolutions. Iran replied that its NPT universality.
program is entirely for peaceful purposes
and stated that Israel is the real danger in the · Disarmament: In their respective statements,
Middle East. each NWS emphasized their own achieve
ments in advancing nuclear disarmament.
· North Korea: Many states recognized the For example, Russia and the United States
dangers and challenges to the non mentioned, among other things, their deep
proliferation regime posed by the DPRK, reductions in their arsenals while China
but also underlined the positive steps taken noted the small size of its own arsenal as
towards denuclearization. well as its unconditional negative assurances
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and nofirstuse policy. Criticism also ever, Russia and China distanced themselves from
emerged between the NWS as Russia criti this statement. Iran submitted a working paper advo
cized the ongoing development of U.S. mis cating compensation rights to any state whose rights
sile defenses, while China sought deeper re have been violated under Article IV. All states rec
ductions in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles. ognized the importance of the IAEA safeguards sys
tem. Western states, the EU and Russia all empha
Many points made during the general debate resur sized the need to universalize the Additional Proto
faced during the debate on Cluster 1 issues related to col, while Arab states pointed to the need for univer
Disarmament. However, several other issues were sal application of the CSA standards, alluding to the
broached during the discussions. One issue that re case of Israel. NAM states criticized the NSG as a
ceived considerable attention was Russia’s proposal “producers’ cartel”, while member states viewed the
to extend and “globalize” the INF Treaty. Finland, NSG as a useful tool of the nonproliferation regime.
onbehalf of a group of European nonNATO coun Finally, many states praised the value of UNSC 1540
tries, called for a legally binding undertaking towards and Russia endorsed the promotion nonproliferation
the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons by the resistant technologies, such as INPRO.
United States and Russia. The United Kingdom
elaborated on the nature of their cooperation with The prospects for a NWFZ in the Middle East mo
Norway and VERTIC, a nongovernmental organiza nopolized the discussions on Regional Issues. Almost
tion, on mechanisms to verify disarmament. The all of the delegations endorsed this longstanding
NAM called for a subsidiary body on nuclear disar proposal. However, there were two different ap
mament to focus on fulfilling obligations under Arti proaches. Arab and Islamic countries, similar to the
cle VI. The European Union, the NAC countries, NAM statement, pointed at Israeli policy as the sole
Brazil and Japan in particular, revisited the principles problem. Western states, however, linked progress on
of transparency and irreversibility. Iran criticized the this issue to a lasting solution to the Israeli
failure of NWS to deliver on their Article VI obliga Palestinian conflict based on a twostate model.
tions. The United States and the United Kingdom Western states also called for wider compliance with
replied that nonproliferation concerns are the most NPT provisions by all states in the region, while
damaging to progress on disarmament. some directly named Iran. In principle, almost all
speakers expressed their support for the idea and
On the specific Cluster 1 issue of Negative Security practice of NWFZs, but there was no mention of the
Assurances (NSA), NAM countries lead by South absence of NWS signatures to the Protocols to the
Africa, Indonesia and Mexico, and further supported Central Asian and the SouthEastern Asia NWFZs.
by Canada and Ukraine, asked once again for legally There was sporadic reference made to other regional
binding NSA within the framework of the NPT. The issues such as DPRK and South Asia.
NWS once again alluded to their belief that unilat
eral, mostly conditional NSA provided through There were differences between developed and de
UNSC Resolutions were sufficient. veloping countries during the debate on Cluster 3
issues related to the peaceful use of nuclear technol
Many delegations expressed concern over non ogy. Statements from developed countries frequently
compliance during the debate on Cluster 2 issues mentioned their contributions to technical coopera
related to NonProliferation. Western states referred tion projects and noted that the prospective expansion
to Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions, while of the nuclear energy sector is welcome, providing
South Korea, Japan and Australia also referred to the safeguards, safety and security norms are met. They
North Korean case. Australia and the Untied States called for universal adherence to the relevant treaties
also mentioned Syria’s clandestine rector and the on physical protection, nuclear safety and fuel man
alleged cooperation with the DPRK. In response, agement. Moreover, they declared their support for
Iran repeated that its program is intended only for projects advancing proliferation resistant technolo
peaceful purposes and accused Australia of supplying gies. Some also brought forward proposals for inter
Israel with nuclear material, an allegation that Aus national/multilateral enrichment or fuelproduction
tralia dismissed. Indonesia questioned why the facilities. Meanwhile, developing countries empha
United States did not inform the international com sized the importance of the right to peaceful use un
munity prior to the bombing of the Syrian installa der Article IV and called for the support of the Tech
tion. The United Kingdom stated that the UNSC P5 nical Cooperation programs of the IAEA, fuel supply
plus Germany were in agreement on the gravity of assurances, and less stringent restrictions in exports.
the Iranian case and the dire need to address it, how These states also expressed their concerns about
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technical cooperation becoming a tool of political an official to act as a provisional Secretary General to

pressure as developed states provide funds for the the 2010 Review Conference, a nomination to be
programs on a voluntary and selective basis. Fur confirmed by the Conference itself. Finally, the Se
thermore, Egypt (which did not explicitly name the cretariat issued a note estimating that the overall cost
United States), Iran and Syria accused the United of the 2010 Review Conference, including the costs
States of violating their NPT obligations for their of the three sessions of the PrepCom, will probably
agreements and cooperation with Israel, a non exceed $13.4 million. The Committee called upon all
member to the NPT. Iran also declared that it is not states to pay their dues in full and requested that the
opposed to international fuelcycle ventures, pro UNSG circulate a financial report as a formal docu
vided the arrangements do not interfere with the right ment at future Review Conferences and PrepCom
of a single country to do the same. The Central Asian sessions.
states, represented by Kyrgyzstan, pointed out the
necessity to address issues concerning the clean up
and proper management of radioactive waste from 2007 Preparatory Committee for the 2010
former nuclear plants and nuclear testing sites.
Review Conference
On the specific Cluster 3 issue of “other provisions of
the Treaty”, delegations focused on the right of with The 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) was
drawal under Article X of the NPT. There were two held in Vienna from 30 April until 11 May under the
main positions taken. The first one, supported by Chairmanship of Ambassador Amano of Japan. Rep
Indonesia, Iran, Cuba and others, insisted that this resentatives from 106 States Parties participated in
sovereign right should not be further conditioned or the work of the first session. The following special
limited but it should remain as originally intended. ized agencies and international and regional organi
All western states that spoke held the position that zations were present as observers: the European
should a state exercise its right to withdrawal from Commission, the League of Arab States, the Organi
the Treaty, its liability under international law to re zation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the
solve any violations committed prior to its with Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nu
drawal would remain intact. clearTestBan Treaty Organization and the Interna
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Representatives of 66
The Chairman of the 2008 PrepCom, Ambassador nongovernmental organizations also attended the
Yelchenko, drafted an extensive twelve page factual meetings of the Committee.
summary in an effort to objectively address all of the
issues covered by the statements and take note of the In its task of preparing for and making recommenda
main arguments delivered by the delegates. However, tions towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the
similar to the 2007 PrepCom, objections by some 2007 PrepCom faced significant challenges early on
states (such as Iran and the United States) to annex in its session. Despite conducting consultations with
ing the chair’s summary to the final report necessi various delegations prior to the start of the meeting,
tated the submission and official release of the sum Chairman Amano’s recommended draft agenda gen
mary in the form of a “Chair’s Working Paper.” Am erated disputes that prolonged the adoption of the
bassador Yelchenko was, however, congratulated by agenda and prevented substantive discussions from
all delegates in their closing remarks for the conduct commencing until the second week. Contested in the
of the proceedings and thanked by most for the com agenda was the absence of any reference to the 2000
pilation of the factual summary. Iran and the United Review Conference agreement in the paragraph that
States both criticized the summary, seemingly for frames the work of the Preparatory Committee. A
contradictory reasons. reference was agreed upon by delegations, but at the
insistence by some parties (France and the United
In further preparation for the 2010 Review Confer States) that references to the 1975, 1985, and 2005
ence, the Committee agreed that the third PrepCom Review Conferences were also included, thereby di
session will be held in New York from 4 to 15 May luting the significance of the 2000 outcome. The ma
2009. The Committee endorsed the candidacy of jor point of contention, however, surrounded agenda
Ambassador Boniface Guwa Chidyausiki of Zim item VI calling for states parties to “reaffirm the need
babwe as the chairman of the next session. A deci for full compliance of the treaty.” Iran insisted that
sion was also taken to hold the 2010 Review Confer the text be changed to clarify that “full compliance”
ence in New York from 26 April to 21 May 2010. entailed compliance with all provisions of the treaty,
The UN Secretary General was invited to nominate a position that was geared towards preventing a for
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malized and official censure of its enrichment activi Costa Rica, supported by Malaysia, submitted an

ties. Chairman Amano discouraged parties from pro updated version of a model nuclear weapons
posing amendments to the agenda, noting that the convention with the purpose of assisting states
draft agenda had represented a fine balance of vari parties in their deliberations concerning article
ous positions based on prior consultations and that VI of the NPT at the 2010 Review Conference.
one amendment would invite other parties to propose
changes thereby further delaying work on substantive · Regional Issues: In one session allocated specifi
issues. cally to this topic, states parties focused their
discussions on the Middle East and North Korea.
During the course of the first week, seven possible The NAM expressed regret that no progress had
solutions were debated. South Africa’s proposal, pre been made on Israel’s accession to the NPT, and
sented on the final day of the first week, exhibited the the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear
most optimism for compromise. The proposal would WeaponFree Zone. Oman proposed eight prac
put forth Iran’s requested understanding of “full tical steps to achieving a NWFZ some of which
compliance” on record as a “decision” of the meeting included: the establishment of a subsidiary body
that would be adopted along with the proposed agen within Main Committee II strictly dedicated to
da. Iran eventually agreed to the South African pro addressing the issue and the convening of an in
posal with the qualification that a footnote be in ternational conference on establishing a nuclear
cluded defining “full compliance.” After several days weaponfree zone in the Middle East.
spent debating the agenda, it was finally adopted. The
agenda will also be used for the following two Pre The United States suggested there was little hope
paratory Commission sessions in 2008 and 2009 re in achieving a Middle East free of WMD unless
spectively. nations of the region uphold existing agreements
to which they are parties. This was an indirect
Although substantive discussions were delayed until reference to Iran and its failure to fully comply
the last three days of the conference, a number of with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The Euro
main issues emerged. pean Union (EU) called upon all states in the re
gion to accede to the various WMD treaties
· Nuclear Disarmament: A majority of states ex while emphasizing the need for political solu
pressed support for early entryintoforce of the tions to facilitate this process.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It was noted
that new opportunities are approaching, such as · Other Issues: A number of opinions were ex
the CTBT Article XIV conference, to refocus pressed on how to confront the issue of with
efforts in bringing those states that have not yet drawal from the NPT. While most states agreed
done so to ratify the treaty. that suspending the right of withdrawal was not
feasible, a large number of states, most forcefully
Although there remains diverging views as to ve Japan, argued that costs of withdrawal be raised
rification of a Fissile Material CutOff Treaty, all as to make those states that decide to withdraw
states were in support of the Conference on Dis responsible for any violations of the NPT com
armament commencing negotiations on an mitted while a party to the treaty. The United
FMCT. The NonAligned Movement (NAM) as States and the EU also outlined a list of measures
well as a number of other states emphasized the that should be considered when and if a state de
importance of preventing an arms race in outer cides to withdraw.
space (PAROS) and progress towards legally
binding security assurances. Many delegations A majority of states reaffirmed the importance
voiced their support for the CD’s P6 initiative, a of Article IV of the NPT, but many states how
program of work calling for simultaneous con ever focused their remarks on the necessity of
sideration of an FMCT, PAROS, and legally ensuring that nuclear programs remain dedicated
binding negative security assurances. The NAM to peaceful purposes. Accordingly there was sig
insisted that legally binding negative security as nificant discussion on multilateral approaches to
surances should remain a priority for both the ensure the supply of nuclear fuel. The EU ex
CD and the NPT review process. Working pa pressed its view that the “multilateralization” of
pers submitted by Italy and China also empha the nuclear fuel cycle would be a viable method
sized the need for progress on the matter. of implementing article IV.
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The Preparatory Committee concluded its work with Ambassador Philip Richard O. Owade (Kenya) chair
the adoption of its report. There was significant resis ing the Credentials Committee.
tance to the proposal of annexing the chairman’s
summary of the proceedings to the final PrepCom Following the election of the Conference President
report. Some delegations, most notably Iran and other and SecretaryGeneral, the first plenary was ad
NAM states had indicated that the chairman’s sum dressed by United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi
mary did not evenly include issues discussed during Annan, who made an impassioned plea for the dele
the committee’s session. A procedural solution was gations to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation
agreed upon, whereby the chair’s summary, instead regime and “come to terms with all the nuclear dan
of forming part of the final report, would be submit gers that threaten humanity.” The Secretary General
ted and turned into an official document of the con was followed by IAEA DirectorGeneral Mohammad
ference in the form of a working paper. ElBaradei who described the need to strengthen the
Agency’s verification regime, address the prolifera
In further preparation for the 2010 Review Confer tionsensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, secure
ence, the committee agreed that the second session of nuclear material, commit to nuclear disarmament,
the Preparatory Committee would be held in Geneva and enforce compliance.
from 28 April to 9 May 2008. The Committee unani
mously endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador Vo From the afternoon of 2 May to 11 May, the Confer
lodymyr Yelchenko of Ukraine as the chairman of ence heard opening statements from 93 States Parties,
the next session of the Committee. including the regional and political groupings of the
European Union, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC),
the NonAligned Movement, the Arab Group, the
2005 Review Conference Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Pacific
Islands Forum Group. These opening statements pre
The seventh Review Conference of the NPT was held sented some of the key issues that the Conference
in New York from 227 May, and was attended by was expected to discuss but offered few proposals as
153 States Parties. Also in attendance were a number to how the Conference may address them. The chal
of international and regional intergovernmental or lenges detailed in these statements include:
ganizations, including representatives from the Inter
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Agency · Treaty complianceA number of states noted
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin the need to enhance compliance with Arti
America (OPANAL), the International Committee of cles I and II of the Treaty
the Red Cross, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Preparatory Com · SafeguardsSeveral states called for the Ad
mission for the Comprehensive NuclearTestBan ditional Protocol to become the new safe
Treaty, the African Union, the League of Arab States, guard standard while others stressed the vol
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlan untary nature of the Protocol and suggested
tic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nearly 120 non that a compromise was needed for such a
governmental organizations (NGOs) and research measure to be adopted.
institutions were also present for the Conference.
· The Nuclear Fuel CycleA number of states,
The Conference opened with the election of the as well as IAEA DirectorGeneral El
president of the Conference by acclamation, Ambas Baradei, have argued that the sensitive as
sador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, and the pects of he nuclear fuel cycle constitutes a
confirmation of the Conference SecretaryGeneral, “loophole” through which States Parties
Jerzy Zaleski (Senior Political Officer, United Na may develop the necessary technology for
tions Department for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva). nuclear weapons. Many states therefore wel
The Committee officers consisted of Ambassador comed the IAEA report on “Multilateral
Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia) chairing Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle” sug
Main Committee I, Ambasador László Molnár (Hun gesting that the report should guide efforts
gary) chairing Main Committee II, Ambassador to address the nuclear fuel cycle. A couple
Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier (Sweden) chairing Main of states went further to suggest additional
Committee III, Ambassador Doru Romulus Costea controls or restrictions on the development
(Romania) chairing the Drafting Committee, and of the nuclear fuel cycle. Such suggestions
received considerable opposition from many
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other states which argued that limitations on
the nuclear fuel cycle would constitute a · Fissile Material CutOff Treaty (FMCT)
considerable reinterpretation of Article IV Three different views appeared to be ex
of the Treaty. pressed regarding the FMCT. Most states
called for negotiations on the FMCT to
· IranMany delegations expressed various commence in the Conference on Disarma
levels of concern over Iran’s nuclear activi ment (CD). Another group of states called
ties and supported the ongoing negotiations for negotiations to begin in the CD without
between the EU and Iran. A few states stated preconditions. On the other hand, other
that Iran must permanently cease its enrich states stressed the need for verification to be
ment and reprocessing activities. apart of such negotiations in accordance
with the Shannon mandate.
· North KoreaThe majority of states recog
nized the challenge posed by the DPRK’s · NonStrategic Nuclear WeaponsSeveral
withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent states called for further reductions in non
announcement that it has developed nuclear strategic nuclear weapons, with some stating
weapons. Most states also called for the the need for the full implementation of the
DPRK to return to the SixParty Talks in or 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
der to ensure a diplomatic solution. In addi (PNIs).
tion to these calls, a number of delegations
also stressed that the DPRK must verifiably · Security AssurancesA key concern of many
dismantle its nuclear weapons program. nonnuclearweapon states (NNWS) was the
lack of legallybinding negative security as
· Nonstate actorsMany states noted the need surances issued by the nuclearweapon
to address the issue of nuclear proliferation states (NWS). A large number of NNWS
to nonstate actors, whether illicit trafficking called for the creation of a subsidiary body
networks such as that of A.Q. Khan, terror within the Conference to address the issue of
ists, or both. Most states discussing this is security assurances, a proposal which has
sue recalled new measures to address these faced considerable opposition from most
threats such as the Convention for the Sup NWS. A subsidiary body to address both
pression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Se disarmament and security assurances, was
curity Council resolution 1540, and IAEA ultimately created within Main Committee I.
efforts to secure nuclear material.
· NuclearWeaponFree Zones (NWFZ)As
· Treaty WithdrawalA number of states sug the Conference followed on the heels of a
gested the need to prevent states from with conference of NWFZ States Parties held in
drawing fore the purpose of developing nu Mexico the week before, considerable atten
clear weapons. Some of these states simply tion was paid to the role of NWFZ in streng
sought to address the withdrawal provisions thening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
of the Treaty while others called for meas In particular, many delegations welcomed
ures to discourage withdrawals, including the recent agreement on a Treaty to establish
the establishment of consequences for with a Central Asian NuclearWeaponFree Zone
drawal, such as the freeze or dismantlement (CANWFZ) and calls continued for the crea
of nuclear assistance received while party to tion of a weapons of mass destructionfree
the Treaty. One state called for the Security zone in the Middle East.
Council to automatically consider any notice
of NPT withdrawal. · Strengthening the Review ProcessOne state
continued its call for changes in the NPT re
· Comprehensive NuclearTestBan Treaty view process to “overcome the institutional
(CTBT)The vast majority of states called deficit” of the Treaty. The proposals for
for the early entry into force of the CTBT. such changes included the creation of an
One state suggested that such support by the NPT standing bureau and the convening of
majority of states for the CTBT’s entry into annual meetings of States Parties. These
force should be recognized in the final doc propositions received very limited support
ument. from other States Parties.
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working papers during plenary sessions. These ses

Following the opening plenary statements, including sions were then used to present proposals until an
the statements made by 17 NGOs, the delegations agreement was made on 18 May regarding the time
spent considerable time discussing the procedural which would be allocated to the main committees and
issues for the Conference to adopt an agenda. On subsidiary bodies. The three subsidiary bodies were
Friday of the first week, the President’s draft agenda determined to address nuclear disarmament and secu
and statement of understanding was blocked by one rity assurances, regional issues and the Middle East,
NNWS on the grounds that the statement did not in and Treaty withdrawals. It was also decided that
clude the intention of the Conference to “take into Main Committee I would address disarmament and
account” the “outcomes” of previous conferences. nonproliferation education and Main Committee II
This objection has its roots in the refusal of one NWS would address proposals to strengthen the review
to accept reference to the outcome of the 2000 Re process.
view Conference, which included the “13 Practical
Steps towards nuclear disarmament,” a refusal which While the Conference did not agree on any language
appeared to have the tacit support of some other drafted in the Main Committees, substantive discus
NWS. sion did commence in the little time that remained.
Each of the main committees and their subsidiary
On 11 May, the 10 th day of the Conference, the dele bodies considered text prepared by their chairs:
gations were able to adopt an agenda through the use · Main Committee I (MCI): A number of top
of an unconventional tactic to satisfy previous objec ics pertaining to nonproliferation were dis
tions by key NAM members. In paragraph 16 of the cussed in MCI. In particular, the delegations
agenda, which specifies the Conference’s review of discussed text regarding the role of the NPT
the operation of the Treaty, an asterisk was added and its three pillars, nuclear sharing for mili
linking both a presidential statement and a NAM tary purposes, the universality of the Treaty,
statement to this review. According to the presiden the reaffirmation of the commitments of the
tial statement, “It is understood that the review will States Parties to Articles I and II, the possi
be conducted in light of the decisions and the resolu bility of nuclear weapon proliferation to
tion of previous Conferences, and allow for discus nonstate actors and the role of Security
sion of any issue raised by States Parties.” Further Council Resolution 1540, compliance en
more, the NAM statement expresses the understand forcement, the preference to address prolif
ing that, “The agenda establishes a framework for eration concerns in multilateral negotiations,
conducting the review of the operation of the Trea and nonproliferation and disarmament edu
ty…the decisions and resolutions of previous Confer cation. The subsidiary body established un
ences, in particular the 1995 Review and Extension der MCI addressed issues such as the princi
Conference and the decision of the 2000 Review ples of irreversibility, transparency, and
Conference….” (Note: At the end of the Conference, verification as they apply to nuclear disar
additional debate ensued over the agenda and the mament, the unequivocal undertaking by the
linkage made by this asterisk. The linkage to the NWS to pursue nuclear disarmament, the
presidential statement remained; however, the link Moscow Treaty, further reductions in non
age to the NAM statement was removed from the strategic nuclear weapons, reducing the role
draft final document.) of nuclear weapons in security policies, se
curing excess fissile material, reporting on
In spite of the adoption of the agenda on 11 May, the implementation of Article VI, the CTBT,
discussion of procedural issues continued to prevent the need to maintain the moratoria on nu
the substantive issues of the Treaty from being ad cleartesting, and disarmament efforts in the
dressed. The States Parties were in disagreement as to CD (such as the FMCT). Elements were also
what issues would be discussed in the main commit considered on security assurances, including
tees and which were to be addressed in subsidiary the possibility of including discussion on a
bodies. There was particular disagreement over a legallybinding instrument on security as
subsidiary body on negative security assurances as surances in the next NPT review period. In
the NAM insisted on a separate subsidiary to discuss spite of significant disputed text in both the
this topic while one NWS objected giving the issue MCI and its subsidiary body, the report from
such a focus. Therefore, while the debate over the MCI was adopted and sent to he president
deliberative bodies continued, the President arranged on 25 May. Two Chairman’s working pa
time for the delegations to present their accumulating pers were integrated into the MCI report
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with the understanding that they did not re tion while acknowledging that some ele
flect the views of all states parties. ments did not enjoy consensus, or not in
cluding the paper in the MCII report to the
· Main Committee II (MCII): MCII was Conference. Support for these options was
tasked with discussing the broad topics of characterized by a deep division falling
safeguards, nuclearweaponfree zones largely along the lines of the political group
(NWFZs), strengthening the review process, ings, with one many members group favor
and included a subsidiary body on regional ing the inclusion of the chair’s paper and
issues and the implementation of the 1995 key members of another group rejecting
Resolution on the Middle East. The Com such inclusion. A third option to carry out
mittee therefore addressed the issues of consultations without using the chair’s text
safeguards compliance, the role and author as a basis was proposed by one state, but re
ity of the IAEA, the need for states to con ceived very limited support. While the
clude Comprehensive Safeguards agree States Parties attempted to find a way
ments, the proposal to make the Additional around this impasse, one NWS took the
Protocol a condition of supply for nuclear floor to criticize the five Central Asian (C5)
materials, the conceptual framework for in States for failing to take into account the
tegrated safeguards, the widerapplication of comments expressed by three NWS regard
voluntary offer safeguards, the continued ing the negative security assurances Protocol
use of Small Quantities Protocols, the role of to the draft CANWFZ treaty text, noting a
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in joint demarche issued to the UN Secretary
limiting the use of HEU in research reactors, General regarding this concern. One of the
the role of Security Council Resolution 1540 C5 responded by citing the negotiations that
and export controls, concerns regarding il have previously occurred to address such
licit nuclear supply networks, combating nu concerns, and suggested that further consul
clear terrorism, maintaining standards for tations may take place. The Committee re
the physical protection of nuclear material, mained in deadlock by the time its time had
supporting existing and future NWFZs, pro expired in the evening of 24 May. Commit
posals to strengthen the review process, and tee Chairman Molnar, stated that, “The
the participation of civil society. The sub committee did not reach consensus to attach
sidiary body for MCII also discussed the the Chair’s draft to the final report of the
importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Committee and to forward it to the confer
Middle East, the role which a weapons of ence for further consideration.”
mass destructionfree zone would play in the
Middle East peace process, calls for Israel to · Main Committee III (MCIII): MCIII en
accede to the NPT as a NNWS, the adoption gaged in negotiations over the peaceful use
of the Additional Protocol in the Middle of nuclear energy. In this context, the dele
East, Libya’s decision to abandon its weap gations considered text on reaffirming the
ons of mass destruction and longrange mis inalienable right of states parties to develop
sile programs, the IAEA’s investigation into and use nuclear energy for peaceful pur
Iran’s nuclear program, concerns regarding poses and participate in the fullest possible
the DPRK’s nuclearweapon capabilities and exchange of nuclear technology, the need
the SixParty Talks, and measures to deal for such peaceful activities to conform with
with the nuclearweapon arsenals of India Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty, the role
and Pakistan. The chair of this subsidiary of IAEA technical cooperation activities,
body, Ambassador Nuñez (Spain), reported concerns over the proliferation risks of sen
to MCII that, “there is no consensus on vari sitive fuel cycle activities, the IAEA expert
ous proposals” and that he would submit his group report on multilateral approaches to
working paper under his won responsibility the nuclear fuel cycle, the requirement that
to the Committee with the understanding states suspend nuclear cooperation with
that there was no agreement on any part of states found in violation of their nuclear
the text. When MCII sought to reach agree nonproliferation and safeguards commit
ment on its report, Committee Chairman ments, nuclear safety standards, minimizing
Molnar provided two options: to adopt the the need for HEU for peaceful purposes, and
Chair’s paper as a draft for further consulta promoting transparency in peaceful nuclear
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NPT
activities. The subsidiary body under MCIII harshly critique the policies United States over the
discussed both Articles IX, and X of the last five years. Following this speech, Conference
Treaty. In regard to Article IX, which is re President Duarte brought the Conference to a close
lated to the universality of the NPT, the by thanking the delegations, the Conference officers,
delegations discussed the need for the uni and the Secretariat.
versality of the Treaty, for universal compli
ance, and specifically for India, Pakistan and 2004 Preparatory Committee for the 2005
Israel to join as NNWS. The discussion of Review Conference
Article X, which addresses withdrawal from
the Treaty, produced preliminary text on the
sovereign right of withdrawal from the The third session of the Preparatory Committee
Treaty, the need for consultations with a (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
state exercising its right of withdrawal, the (RevCon) was held in New York from 27 April to 7
recognition that a withdrawal from the May 2004, under the chairmanship of Ambassador
Treaty may pose a threat to international Sudjadnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia. Ms. Silvana
peace and securityand thereby the role of da Silva (Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction
the Security Council in regard to Treaty Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United
withdrawal, the liability of a withdrawing Nations) served as Secretary of the PrepCom.
State Party for any violations committed
while still party to the Treaty, and the status A total of 123 States Parties registered to attend the
of nuclear technology, material, and equip meeting. As in the past, representatives from the In
ment received while party to the Treaty in ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also at
cluding the resumption of IAEA safeguards. tended the meeting while representatives from spe
The text from MCIII was blocked from cialized agencies and international and regional in
adoption by the disagreement of two states tergovernmental organizations such as the Agency
that had played obstructive roles throughout for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
the Conference. At first, one NAM state ob America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the Prepara
jected to the text regarding Article X, argu tory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear
ing that the revised text proposed by the TestBan Treaty Organization, the European Com
chair had not been discussed. In spite of mission, the League of Arab States, and the Organi
suggestions that the text be annexed to the zation of the Islamic Conference, attended as observ
MCIII report, as agreed in MCI, this state re ers. A total of 69 nongovernmental organizations
fused to support such a proposal, resulting in (NGOs) also attended the PrepCom as observers
the removal of the language on withdrawal.
In response, a NWS then objected to the re The PrepCom was tasked by the 2000 Review Con
port in its entirety just before the remaining ference to make recommendations to the 2005 Re
text was to be adopted by the chair. view Conference, taking into account the delibera
tions and results of the two previous sessions. It was
also to finalize the organizational arrangements for
The Review Conference concluded with a presenta the Review Conference, including the endorsement of
tion of the procedural reports by the main and draft a candidate for the presidency of the Review Confer
ing committee chairs, and closing remarks by several ence, agreement on the Rules of Procedure, and
delegations. Each delegation expressed some degree agreement on the agenda and the program of work for
of disappointment in the Conference’s failure to the Review Conference. These tasks included the
adopt an agreed final document, and most suggested possible establishment of subsidiary bodies to the
that the issue of nuclear nonproliferation and disar Conference’s Main Committees. It was furthermore
mament continue either within the NPT or in other tasked by the 2000 Review Conference to make rec
fora. One Western Group state in particular issued ommendations on legally binding security assurances
stern rebuke of the failure of the States Parties to pur to the Review Conference.
sue solutions to the core challenges facing the Treaty, Thirty meetings were devoted to the substantive dis
stating that, “We have let the pursuit of shortterm, cussions of the Committee. Each discussion was
parochial interests override the collective longterm structured according to indicative timetables that took
interest in sustaining this Treaty’s authority and in into consideration three clusters of issues and three
tegrity.” The last statement of the Conference was specific blocs of issues. The clusters included: (a)
issued by a NAM state which used the opportunity to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament,
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and international peace and security; (b) nonprolif (only two weeks), negotiating substantive recom
eration of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and nuclear mendations to the Review Conference would in all
weaponfree zones; and (c) the inalienable right of all likelihood fail. The Chairman received the mandate
States Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, pro from the meeting to prepare a summary (on his own
duce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, responsibility) of the proposals made at the meeting,
without discrimination and in conformity with arti taking into account the PrepCom’s prior sessions.
cles I and II. Prior to the cluster debate discussions, The paper, introduced late during the second week
the Chairman announced that time would be allocated was, however, criticized by several delegations, in
for discussions on security assurances and the issue particular those from the United States, the Russian
of the 1995 Middle East resolution. Federation, and Iran, who wanted to defend them
selves or who felt their positions had not been ade
Discussion on the status of the Democratic People’s quately represented. As a result, the paper could not
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was again circumvented be attached to the final report of the PrepCom as was
when the Chairman announced that, based on his the case with the summaries prepared by the Chair
consultations with various States Parties, there would men of the prior PrepCom sessions. The paper was
be no open debate on the issue and that the Secre instead recognized as a working paper
tariat would hold the nameplate of the DPRK tempo (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.27) by the Chairman
rarily as it did during the second PrepCom session. (as were all other papers submitted by national dele
gations).
More than 40 general statements from States or
groups of States such as the NonAligned Movement The meeting ended on 7 May with the delegations
(NAM), the European Union, the New Agenda Coali unable to agree on most issues, including on the
tion, and the League of Arab States were delivered. agenda or background documentation for the Review
Significant differences emerged from the very begin Conference. This was due, mainly, to disagreement
ning between those who saw the Treaty's obligations between the United States and France on the one
primarily in terms of articles I and II and wanted to side, and the NAM supported by many other States
focus on the noncompliance of a handful of States on the other, on whether to recognize the outcome of
such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya, and those for the 2000 Review Conference in the agenda for the
whom the nuclear weapons States' failure to make 2005 Review Conference. The main area of diver
sufficient progress towards complying with article VI gence arose over the continued relevance of the “13
was more important. This pattern continued through practical steps” on nuclear disarmament agreed to at
the cluster debates where the United States mostly the 2000 Review Conference. Other related contro
focused on its concerns about Iran’s failure to comply versies included disagreement on how to deal with
with its nonproliferation obligations. Other States the issue of negative security assurances, and whether
Parties devoted considerable attention to the 13 to establish subsidiary bodies to the Main Commit
“practical steps,” especially the CTBT, tactical nu tees of the Review Conference.
clear weapons, nuclear doctrines and policies, and
verification. Other significant issues that were raised The only significant decision taken by the PrepCom
included: proposals for addressing the NPT's lack of was to endorse the candidacy of Ambassador Sergio
institutional decisionmaking powers; reporting and Duarte (from Brazil) as PresidentElect for the Re
accountability; negative security assurances; the need view Conference. This decision was primarily moti
to make the IAEA Additional Protocol vated by the realization that without such endorse
(INFCIRC/540) into a mandatory safeguards re ment, the PresidentElect would not be able to con
quirement under article III; nuclear safety and secu sult with delegations on the many outstanding organ
rity; disarmament education; civil society participa izational and substantive issues that need to be re
tion and access for NGOs; and the relationship be solved before the Conference can start its work. The
tween the NPTbased nonproliferation regime and PrepCom confirmed that the Conference will be held
initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative in New York from 2 to 20 May 2005, and agreed on
and those contained in UNSC Resolution 1540, the draft rules of procedure, to endorse the chairper
which the Security Council adopted while the Prep sons of the three Main Committees of the Review
Com was in session. Conference, the appointment of the Secretary
General (Ms. Da Silva from DDA), and the financing
of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory
Prior to the start of the PrepCom, the Chairman’s Committee. The final report of the PrepCom is con
consultations showed that, given the time limitations tained in NPT/CONF.2005/1.
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nameplate and that it would not be displayed among
2003 Preparatory Committee for the 2005 those of the States Parties, but that it would remain in
the conference room. No decision was, however, tak
Review Conference en by the State Parties as to the status of North Korea
visàvis the Treaty.
The second session of the Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
(RevCon) was held in Geneva from 28 April to 9 As was the case in 2002, the PrepCom discussions
May 2003, under the chairmanship of Ambassador were structured according to an indicative timetable
László Molnár of Hungary. This PrepCom was the that provided equal time for the consideration of
second of three sessions that are to be held prior to three clusters of issues and three specific blocks of
the 2005 RevCon. As decided at the 2000 RevCon, issues (details on these clusters and blocks of issues
the Second PrepCom session carried out the first are provided under developments at the 2002 Prep
phase of the “new” strengthened review process. Com – see below). As was done at the 2002 Prep
Under the new process, the first two sessions (2002 Com, the Chairman prepared a Chairman’s factual
and 2003) considered “principles, objectives and summary of the Committee’s consideration of the
ways in order to promote the full implementation of issues, which was contained in Annex II to the 2003
the Treaty, as well as its universality.” The third PrepCom report. This document comprises 43 para
PrepCom (held in New York from 26 April to 7 May graphs of text capturing the Chairman's factual distil
2004) was required to make recommendations to the lation of the views expressed by States Parties on a
2005 RevCon, taking into account the deliberations number of substantive matters, including North Ko
and results of the two previous sessions. rea’s withdrawal and noncompliance; allegations of
Iranian noncompliance; nuclear disarmament and the
One hundred and six States Parties as well as repre implementation of the 13 “practical steps” toward the
sentatives from the International Atomic Energy elimination of nuclear arsenals; nonstrategic nuclear
Agency (IAEA) participated in the PrepCom, while weapons; security assurances; the situation in the
representatives from the Agency for the Prohibition Middle East; utilizing the strengthened review proc
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Carib ess through regular reporting; disarmament and non
bean (OPANAL), the Preparatory Commission for proliferation education; the role of the IAEA and its
the Comprehensive NuclearTestBan Treaty Organi safeguards system; nonproliferation export controls;
zation, the European Commission, the League of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; the
Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Con threat of nuclear terrorism; and further strengthening
ference attended as observers. Representatives from of the review process. The Chairman’s initiative to
37 nongovernmental organizations attended the ple invite delegations to offer specific text proposals pro
nary meeting of the PrepCom. Ms. Silvana da Silva vided him with a good basis to formulate language
(Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, De that accommodated most views. He furthermore con
partment for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations) sulted with various key delegations on specific para
served as Secretary of the PrepCom. graphs of his summary with the result that it was to
some extent negotiated.
Although the generally held view among State Parties
was that North Korea’s withdrawal came into effect 2002 Preparatory Committee for 2005
on 10 April 2003, when its threemonth notice of Review Conference
withdrawal expired, some uncertainty existed over
The first session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT
North Korea’s status at the PrepCom. On 10 January
Review Conference was attended by 140 of the then
2003, the DPRK announced that its withdrawal “will
187 States Parties. Cuba (a nonState Party at the
come into force automatically and immediately” on
time), seven intergovernmental organizations, and 62
the next day, claiming that it had suspended its 1994
nongovernmental organizations attended the open
withdrawal from the Treaty on the last day of the
meetings of the PrepCom. Ms. Hannelore Hoppe
required threemonth notice period and thus did not
(Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, De
need to give additional notice to other NPT Parties
partment for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations)
and the Security Council as required under Article X
served as Secretary of the PrepCom. Among the pro
of the Treaty. Given that this uncertainty could have
cedural decisions taken, it was decided that the sec
led to a procedural and potentially divisive debate at
ond session of the PrepCom would be held in Geneva
the start of the PrepCom meeting, the Chairman an
from 28 April to 9 May 2003; the third session would
nounced that he would take custody of the DPRK's
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be held in New York from 26 April to 7 May 2004; The Chairman prepared a factual summary of the

and the provisional dates for the Review Conference Committee’s consideration of the issues, which was
in New York would be 2 May to 27 May 2005. Am contained in Annex II to the report of the 2002 Prep
bassador László Molnar (Permanent Representative Com. Ambassador Salander produced the Chairman’s
of Hungary to the United Nations), representing the factual summary under his own responsibility, and its
Group of East European States, was unanimously content was not open for negotiation or change. This
selected as the Chairman of the 2003 PrepCom. The document comprises 37 paragraphs of text capturing
Chairman of the third session and the President of the the Chairman’s factual distillation of the views ex
2005 Review Conference would be nominated by the pressed by States Parties on a number of substantive
NonAligned Movement (NAM) States. matters, including nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear
disarmament, safeguards, export controls, nuclear
Following two days of general debate comprising
weaponfree zones, regional issues (DPRK, Iraq,
opening statements, the PrepCom held a total of 11
South Asia, and the Middle East), strengthened phys
meetings for substantive discussion. The substantive
ical protection of nuclear material, and reporting.
discussion was structured according to a timetable,
which provided equal time for the consideration of
three clusters of issues and three specific blocks of 2000 Review Conference
issues. The PrepCom considered the following three The 2000 NPT Review Conference was convened at
clusters of issues as contained in Annex VIII of the United Nations Headquarters from 24 April to 19
final report of the Preparatory Committee to the 2000 May 2000, with 157 of 187 States Parties participat
Review Conference: (1) implementation of the provi ing. One nonState party, Cuba attended as an ob
sions of the Treaty relating to nonproliferation of server. Palestine was also granted observer status;
nuclear weapons, disarmament, and international 141 research institutes and nongovernmental organi
peace and security; (2) implementation of the provi zations attended as observers.
sions of the Treaty relating to safeguards, and nu
clearweaponfree zones; and (3) implementation of The bureau of the Review Conference comprised
the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable inter alia: President Abdallah Baali (Algeria) and
right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, SecretaryGeneral Hannelore Hoppe (Chief, WMD
production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Branch, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs).
purposes, without discrimination and in conformity The 33 VicePresidents were Armenia, Australia,
with Articles I and II.
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, China,
The PrepCom considered the following three specific Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, France, Ger
blocs of issues: (1) implementation of article VI of many, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland,
the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Deci Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico,
sion on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru,
proliferation and Disarmament,” as well as the Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Ukraine, United
agreements, conclusions, and commitments listed Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uz
under the section entitled “Article VI and eighth to bekistan, and Viet Nam.
twelfth preambular paragraphs” contained in the Fi Main Committee I: Chairman Camilo Reyes (Colom
nal Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference; bia); ViceChairmen: Jean Lint (Belgium) and Vadim
(2) regional issues, including with respect to the Reznikov (Belarus); Subsidiary Body 1: Clive Pear
Middle East, the implementation of the 1995 Middle son (New Zealand).
East resolution and the commitments, conclusions,
and followup submissions to the United Nations Main Committee II: Chairman Adam Kobieracki
SecretaryGeneral, the President of the 2005 Review (Poland), ViceChairmen: Suh Daewon (Republic of
Conference, and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Korea) and Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana); Subsidiary
Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant Body 2: Christopher Westdal (Canada). Main Com
subparagraphs listed under the section entitled “Re mittee III: Chairman Markku Reimaa (Finland);
gional issues: The Middle East, particularly imple ViceChairmen: Igor Dzundev (the former Yugoslav
mentation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle Republic of Macedonia) and Hamid Baidi Nejad (Is
East,” contained in the Final Document of the 2000 lamic Republic of Iran). Drafting Committee: Chair
Review Conference; and (3) safety and security of man André Erdös (Hungary); ViceChairmen: Fayza
peaceful nuclear programs. Aboulnaga (Egypt) and Pedro VillagraDelgado (Ar
gentina); and Credentials Committee: Chairman
Makmur Widodo (Indonesia); ViceChairmen: Ion
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Botnaru (Moldova) and Wernfried Köffler (Austria). International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996; and (9)

The Conference appointed representatives from the the further development of the verification capabili
following States parties as members of the Creden ties that will be required to provide assurance of
tials Committee: Chile, Greece, Morocco, Slovakia, compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for
Slovenia, and Switzerland. the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear
weaponfree world.
The 2000 Review Conference held 16 plenary meet
ings together with several sessions of informal con In the Conference’s review of Article VI, the NWS
sultations. On 19 May, the Conference adopted a agreed to the following steps toward nuclear disar
Final Document by consensus. mament in a way that promotes international stability
and the principle of undiminished security for all:
Nuclear Disarmament: The Conference agreed on
the following practical steps for the systematic and × further efforts by the NWS to reduce their nuclear
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the arsenals unilaterally;
NPT and Paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision × increased transparency with regard to nuclear
on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non weapons capabilities and the implementation of
Proliferation and Disarmament”: (1) the importance agreements;
and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without
delay and without conditions and in accordance with × the further reduction of nonstrategic nuclear
constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an
into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear TestBan integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and
Treaty (CTBT); (2) a moratorium on nuclear disarmament process;
weapontest explosions or any other nuclear explo × concrete agreed measures to further reduce the
sions pending entry into force of the CTBT; (3) the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Dis
armament (CD) on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, × a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty policies; and
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear × the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accor NWS in the process leading to the total elimina
dance with the statement of the Special Coordinator tion of their nuclear weapons.
in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking
into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nu Safeguards: The Conference reaffirmed the funda
clear nonproliferation objectives; the CD is urged to mental importance of full compliance with the provi
agree on a program of work which includes the im sions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards
mediate commencement of negotiations on such a agreements. The Conference reaffirmed that the
treaty with a view to its conclusion within five years; IAEA is the competent authority responsible for veri
(4) the necessity of establishing in the CD an appro fying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of
priate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compli
nuclear disarmament; the CD is urged to agree on a ance with its safeguards agreements with States Par
program of work which includes the immediate es ties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations un
tablishment of such a body; (5) the principle of irre der Article III, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a
versibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
and other related arms control and reduction meas peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
ures; (6) an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to explosive devices. The Conference emphasized that
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arse nothing should be done to undermine the authority of
nals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all IAEA in this regard. States Parties that have concerns
States Parties are committed under Article VI; (7) the regarding noncompliance with the safeguards
reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts agreements of the Treaty by the States Parties should
of States in the disarmament process is general and direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence
complete disarmament under effective international and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate,
control; (8) regular reports, within the framework of draw conclusions, and decide on necessary actions in
the NPT strengthened review process, by all States accordance with its mandate.
Parties on the implementation of Article VI and Pa The Conference considered that IAEA safeguards
ragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and provide assurance that States are complying with
Objectives for Nuclear NonProliferation and Disar their undertakings under relevant safeguards agree
mament,” and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the ments and assist States to demonstrate this compli
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NPT
ance. It stressed that the nonproliferation and safe confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear
guards commitments in the Treaty are also essential material and activities in a State as a whole and that
for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and those measures are now being introduced as an inte
that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the gral part of the IAEA’s safeguards system.
environment for peaceful nuclear development and
The Conference noted, in particular, the relationship
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nu
between the additional protocol and the safeguards
clear energy. The Conference stressed that compre
agreement between the IAEA and a State Party as set
hensive safeguards and additional protocols should
out in Article I of the Model Additional Protocol. In
be universally applied once the complete elimination
this regard, it recalled the interpretation provided by
of nuclear weapons has been achieved. The Confer
the IAEA Secretariat on 31 January 1997 and set out
ence reiterated the call by previous conferences of the
in document GOV/2914 of 10 April 1997 that, once
States Parties for the application of IAEA safeguards
concluded, the two agreements had to be read and
to all source or special fissionable material in all
interpreted as one agreement.
peaceful nuclear activities in the States Parties in
accordance with the provisions of Article III of the The Conference noted the high priority that the IAEA
Treaty. The Conference noted with satisfaction that, attaches, in the context of furthering the development
since 1995, 28 States have concluded safeguards of the strengthened safeguards system, to integrating
agreements with the IAEA in compliance with Arti traditional nuclearmaterial verification activities
cle III, Paragraph 4, of the Treaty, 25 of which have with the new strengthening measures and looked
brought the agreements into force. forward to an expeditious conclusion of this work. It
recognized that the aim of these efforts is to optimize
The Conference reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards
the combination of all safeguards measures available
should regularly be assessed and evaluated. Decisions
to the IAEA in order to meet the Agency’s safeguards
adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at
objectives with maximum effectiveness and effi
further strengthening the effectiveness and improving
ciency within available resources.
the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be sup
ported and implemented. It also reaffirmed that the Furthermore, the Conference noted that credible as
implementation of comprehensive safeguards agree surance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material
ments pursuant to Article III, Paragraph 1, of the and activities, notably those related to enrichment
Treaty should be designed to provide for verification and reprocessing, in a State as a whole could permit a
by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a corresponding reduction in the level of traditional
State’s declaration so that there is a credible assur verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear
ance of the nondiversion of nuclear material from material in that State, which is less sensitive from the
declared activities and of the absence of undeclared point of view of nonproliferation.
nuclear material and activities. The Conference also
The Conference recognized that measures to
fully endorsed the measures contained in the Model
Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between strengthen the effectiveness and improve the effi
State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency ciency of the safeguards system with a view to pro
for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 viding credible assurance of the nondiversion of
(Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA nuclear material from declared activities and of the
Board of Governors in May 1997. The safeguards absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
strengthening measures contained in the Model Addi must be implemented by all States Parties to the
tional Protocol will provide the IAEA with, inter NPT, including the NWS.
alia, enhanced information about a State’s nuclear Middle East: The States Parties also reaffirmed the
activities and complementary access to locations Resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995
within a State. NPT Review and Extension Conference, and in its
The Conference recognized that comprehensive safe review of its implementation:
guards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 × The Parties called on Israel by name to accede to
have been successful in providing assurance regard the Treaty for the first time in the NPT’s history,
ing declared nuclear material and have also provided as it is the only state in the region not to have
a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of done so. The Conference recalled that operative
undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Con Paragraph 4 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle
ference noted that implementation of the measures East “calls upon all States in the Middle East that
specified in the Model Additional Protocol will pro have not yet done so, without exception, to accede
vide, in an effective and efficient manner, increased to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their
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NPT
nuclear facilities under fullscope International the CTBT, and it urged them to accede to the NPT as

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” The Confer NNWS, and to place all their nuclear facilities under
ence noted, in this connection, that the report of comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference
the United Nations Secretariat on the Implementa urged both countries to observe a moratorium on the
tion of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,
(NPT/CONF.2000/7) states that several States pending the conclusion of a treaty banning the pro
have acceded to the Treaty and that, “with these duction of fissile material for nuclear explosives.
accessions, all States of the region of the Middle
DPRK: The Conference noted with concern that,
East, with the exception of Israel, are States Par
while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nu
remained a Party to the NPT, the IAEA continued to
clear Weapons. The Conference welcomed the ac
be unable to verify the correctness and completeness
cession of these States and reaffirms the impor
of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by
tance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the
the DPRK and was therefore unable to conclude that
placement of all its nuclear facilities under com
there had been no diversion of nuclear material in the
prehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal
DPRK. The Conference looked forward to the ful
of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle
fillment by the DPRK of its stated intention to come
East.”
into full compliance with its safeguards agreement
× All States Parties, particularly the NWS and the with the IAEA, which remains binding and in force.
States of the Middle East, are to report on the The Conference emphasized the importance of action
steps that they have taken to promote the by the DPRK to preserve and make available to the
achievement of “a Middle East zone free of nu IAEA all information needed to verify its initial in
clear weapons as well as other weapons of mass ventory.
destruction” at the 2005 Review Conference.
Universality: The Conference reaffirmed the long
× Bearing in mind the importance of full compli held commitment of parties to the Treaty to universal
ance with the NPT, the Conference noted the membership and noted that this goal had been ad
statement of 24 April 2000 by the IAEA Director vanced by the accession to the Treaty of several new
General that, since the cessation of IAEA inspec States since the 1995 Review and Extension Confer
tions in Iraq on 16 December 1998, the Agency ence (NPTREC), thereby bringing its membership to
has not been in a position to provide any assur 187 States Parties. The Conference reaffirmed the
ance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations un importance of the Treaty in establishing a norm of
der UN Security Council Resolution 687. The international behavior in the nuclear field. The Con
Conference further noted that the IAEA carried ference called on those remaining States not parties
out an inspection in January 2000 pursuant to to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an
Iraq’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA dur international legally binding commitment not to ac
ing which the inspectors were able to verify the quire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices
presence of the nuclear material subject to safe and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear
guards (low enriched, natural, and depleted ura activities. These States are Cuba, India, Israel, and
nium). The Conference reaffirmed the importance Pakistan. In this context, the Conference welcomed
of Iraq’s full continuous cooperation with the the signature by Cuba of the protocol additional to its
IAEA and compliance with its obligations. safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The Confer
South Asia: The Conference deplored the nuclear test ence particularly urged those nonparties to the
explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan Treaty that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities
in 1998. The Conference declared that such actions — India, Israel, and Pakistan — to take similar ac
do not in any way confer NWS status or any special tion, and affirmed the important contribution this
status whatsoever. It also called on India and Pakistan would make to regional and global security.
to abide by Resolution 1172 (1998) and to implement Strengthened Review Process: The States Parties
a series of confidencebuilding measures, including also agreed to measures to improve the effectiveness
moratoria on further testing and fissile material pro of the strengthened review process as follows:
duction for weapons. Furthermore, the Conference
called upon all States Parties to refrain from any ac × Three sessions of the PrepCom, normally for a
tion that may contravene or undermine the objectives duration of 10 working days each, should be held
of UNSCR 1172. The Conference noted that India in the years prior to the review conference. A
and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further fourth session, would, if necessary, be held in the
nuclear testing and their willingness to sign and ratify year of the review conference.
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NPT
× Specific time should be allocated at sessions of commitment” to fulfilling their NPT obligations and
the Preparatory Committee to address “specific to the ultimate goals of a complete elimination of
relevant issues.” Subsidiary bodies for this pur nuclear weapons and general and complete disarma
pose can also be established at Review Confer ment. The statement also noted that none of the NWS
ences. targets nuclear weapons at any other state. It reiter
ated their view that, in accordance with the Treaty,
× The first two sessions of the PrepCom would India and Pakistan do not have the status of NWS,
“consider principles, objectives and ways in order and stressed that the two countries should implement
to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, UN Security Council Resolution 1172. The NWS
as well as its universality.” statement also called for the preservation and streng
× Each session of the PrepCom should consider thening of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as
specific matters of substance relating to the im a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for
plementation of the Treaty and NPTREC Deci further strategic offensive reductions. Furthermore,
sions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the the statement referred to negotiation of a fissile mate
Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of rial cutoff treaty (FMCT), but placed it in the context
subsequent Review Conferences, including devel of an agreed work program for the CD.
opments affecting the operation and purpose of New Agenda Coalition: Among the NNWS, the New
the Treaty. Agenda Coalition (NAC)—a grouping of states that
× The Chairpersons of the PrepComs will carry out cuts across traditional regional associations and in
consultations in preparation for the subsequent cludes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
meeting. South Africa, and Sweden—played a dominant role
in putting forth disarmament proposals and in directly
× The PrepComs are to factually summarize their
negotiating the text on disarmament with the NWS.
results and transmit them to the next meeting. The
last PrepCom meeting before the Review Confer The coalition proposed identifying “areas in which”
ence, should make every effort to produce a con and “means through which” future progress should be
sensus report containing recommendations to the sought on nuclear disarmament. A key demand of the
Review Conference and should decide on its pro coalition was for the NWS to “make an unequivocal
cedural arrangements. undertaking” to totally eliminate their nuclear arse
nals and to “engage in an accelerated process of ne
× A meeting should be allocated to non gotiations” during the upcoming 20002005 review
governmental organizations (NGOs) to address period. In addition, the coalition called for early and
each session of the PrepCom and the Review interim steps, including adaptation of nuclear pos
Conference. tures to preclude the use of nuclear weapons; dealert
In addition, the final document contained well over ing and removal of warheads from delivery vehicles;
one hundred paragraphs dealing with other aspects of reductions in tactical nuclear weapons leading to their
the Treaty, such as strengthened safeguards, compli elimination; greater transparency with regard to nu
ance, the authority of the IAEA in implementing clear arsenals and fissile material inventories; and
safeguards and technical assistance cooperation, ef irreversibility in removing excess fissile material
fective physical protection of all nuclear material, the from weapons programs and in all nuclear disarma
highest possible standards of nuclear safety, efficacy ment, nuclear arms reduction, and nuclear arms con
of and transparency in export controls, the safe trans trol measures. They also promoted an appropriate
port of radioactive materials, radiological protection subsidiary body in the CD with a mandate to deal
and radioactive waste management, conversion of with nuclear disarmament and the rapid negotiation
military nuclear materials to peaceful uses, nuclear and conclusion of legally binding security assurances
weaponfree zones, nonrecognition of any new for NNWS party to the Treaty. See the Final Docu
NWS, and universal adherence to the Treaty. ment.
Other significant developments at the 2000 Review

Conference included: Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 1997
1999
Joint NWS Statement: A joint statement was issued
by the five NWS on May 1. The 23paragraph docu The 1999 PrepCom took place from 1021 May in
ment covered nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, New York. It was chaired by Ambassador Camilo
nuclearweaponfree zones, nuclear energy, and safe ReyesRodriguez of Columbia and was attended by
guards. The statement referred to their “unequivocal 119 States Parties. Israel and Cuba attended as ob
NPT20
NPT
servers, as well as more than 60 NGOs. In addition to Czech Republic, Finland, France, Indonesia, Iran,

discussing the implementation of 1995 Principles and Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Ro
Objectives, the PrepCom also considered proposals mania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa,
concerning the expected outcome of the Review Con Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine,
ference. The Committee reached agreement on the United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Unit
provisional agenda for the Review Conference, the ed States, and Venezuela); Main Committee I:
allocation of items to the three main committees, the Chairman Isaac Ayewah (Nigeria), ViceChairmen:
office bearers of the Conference, the draft rules of Richard Starr (Australia) and Anatoli Zlenko
procedure for the Conference, as well as the esti (Ukraine); Main Committee II: Chairman André
mated costs of the Conference and the schedule of the Erdös (Hungary); ViceChairmen: Enrique de la
division of costs. Torre (Argentina), Rajab Sukayri (Jordan); Main
Committee III: Chairman Jaap Ramaker (Nether
The 1998 session of the PrepCom took place from 27
lands); ViceChairmen: Yanko Yanes (Bulgaria),
April to 8 May in Geneva and was chaired by Am
Gustavo Alvarez Goyoaga (Uruguay); Drafting
bassador Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland). The session
Committee: Chairman Tadeusz Strulak (Poland);
was attended by 97 countries, two observers (Brazil
ViceChairmen: Nabil Fahmy (Egypt) and Pasi Pato
and Israel), and 76 NGOs. The Committee continued
kakallio (Finland); and Credentials Committee:
the process of reviewing the operation of the Treaty,
Chairman Andelfo Garcia (Colombia); Vice
taking into account the decisions and the Resolution
Chairmen: Alyksandr Sychou (Belarus) and Mary
on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review
Elizabeth Hoinkes (United States).
and Extension Conference. Specific time was also
allocated for discussions on three issues: security The 1995 NPTREC held 19 plenary meetings to
assurances for parties to the NPT; the resolution on gether with several sessions of the informal “Presi
the Middle East; and a nondiscriminatory and uni dent’s Consultations.” On 11 May, the Conference
versally applicable convention banning the produc adopted without a vote a package of three decisions,
tion of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other comprising Decision 1 (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4) on
nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty”;
Decision 2 (NPT/CONF.1995/L.5) on “Principles and
The first session of the Preparatory Committee for
Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disar
the 2000 NPT Review Conference was held at UN
mament”; and Decision 3 (NPT/CONF.1995/L.6) on
headquarters in New York from 718 April 1997. The
“Extension of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of
PrepCom was attended by 149 countries under the
Nuclear Weapons.” The Conference decided thereby
chairmanship of Ambassador Pasi Patokallio (Fin
“that, as a majority exists among States party to the
land). Brazil, Cuba, Israel, and Pakistan participated
Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with
as observers. One hundred and thirteen NGOs also
Article X, Paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in
attended. The Chairman issued a statement recom
force indefinitely.” The NPTREC also adopted draft
mending that time be allocated at the second session
resolution (NPT/CONF.1995/L.8) on the Middle
for discussion and consideration of proposals con
East, as orally amended, without a vote, as Resolu
cerning security assurances, the Resolution on the
tion 1, sponsored by the three NPT depositary States.
Middle East, and an FMCT.
Decision 1 on a strengthened review process for the
The 1995 Review and Extension Confer Treaty (largely based on Canadian and South African
suggestions) specified that:
ence (NPTREC)
× Review Conferences should continue to be held
every five years and that the next such conference
The Review and Extension Conference was convened should be held in the year 2000;
at United Nations Headquarters from 17 April to 12 × beginning in 1997, the PrepCom should meet for
May 1995, with 175 of the then 179 States Parties 10 working days, in each of the three years prior
taking part. Ten States not parties attended as observ to the Review Conference, and if necessary, a
ers, as did 195 NGOs. The bureau of the NPTREC fourth PrepCom may be held in the year of the
comprised President Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka); Review Conference;
SecretaryGeneral Prvoslav Davinic (Director of the
UN Center for Disarmament Affairs); 33 Vice × the purpose of the PrepCom would be to consider
Presidents (Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, principles, objectives, and ways in order to pro
Belarus, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Congo, mote the full implementation of the Treaty, as
well as its universality, including those identified
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in Decision 2, and to make recommendations promoting transparency in nuclear related export

thereon to the Review Conference, as well as controls.
making procedural preparations;
On the basis of a draft resolution on indefinite exten
× the present structure of the three Main Commit sion cosponsored by Canada and 103 other cospon
tees should continue and the question of overlap sors, as well as Decisions 1 and 2, the NPTREC in
of issues being discussed in more than one Com Decision 3 agreed without a vote that “as a majority
mittee should be resolved in the General Commit exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefi
tee; nite extension, in accordance with Article X, Para
× subsidiary bodies could be established within the graph the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.”
respective Main Committees; and In the Resolution on the Middle East, cosponsored
× Review Conferences should look forward as well by the three NPT depositary States to secure the con
as back, identify areas for further progress in the currence of the Arab States Parties to indefinite ex
strengthened implementation of the Treaty. tension, the Conference inter alia:
Decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear × endorsed the Middle East peace process and rec
nonproliferation and disarmament covered seven sub ognized its contribution to a Middle East zone
stantive areas to promote the full realization and ef free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons
fective implementation of the Treaty that included of mass destruction;
inter alia: × noted with concern the continued existence in the
× furthering universal adherence to the Treaty; Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities
and called upon all States with unsafeguarded fa
× promoting nuclear nonproliferation without ham cilities to place them under fullscope IAEA safe
pering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; guards;
× pursuing nuclear disarmament, in particular a × called upon all States of the Middle East that have
“programme of action” on: (i) completion by the not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as soon as
CD of a universal and internationally and effec possible and to place their nuclear facilities under
tively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996, and fullscope IAEA safeguards;
pending the entry into force of a CTBT the NWS
should exercise utmost restraint; (ii) immediate × called upon all States in the Middle East to take
commencement and early conclusion of a non practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at
discriminatory and universally applicable FMCT; making progress towards, inter alia, the estab
and (iii) determined pursuit by the NWS of sys lishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East
tematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and
weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of elimi their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking
nating those weapons, and by all states of general any measures that preclude the achievement of
and complete disarmament; this objective; and
× endorsing the establishment of internationally × called upon all States Parties to the NPT, and in
recognized NWFZs, on the basis of arrangements particular the NWS, to extend their cooperation
freely arrived at, as enhancing global and regional and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to en
security, especially in regions of conflict such as suring the early establishment by regional parties
in the Middle East; of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
× noting the security assurances under UNSC Res. systems.
984, and calling for an internationally and legally
binding instrument on such assurances; The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs main
tains a website with resources on the NPT meetings:
× requiring fullscope safeguards and internationally http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html.
legally binding commitments not to acquire nu
clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
as a necessary precondition for new supply ar
rangements for nuclear materials and technology;
and
× promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in con
formity with Articles I, II, and III of the NPT, and
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Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

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Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

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NPT