TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on
April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or in any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature.
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice
to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
 PITC v Angeles
The Philippine International Trading Corporation, a government owned
and controlled corporation issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01 under which application to the PITC for importation from the People’s
Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed
Export Program of the Philippine Products to China carried out by the
importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer from PROC
in an amount equivalent to the value of importation from PRC being
applied for, or simply at one-to one ratio. Two domestic corporations,
Remington and Firestone, both applied for authority to import from PROC,
which were granted, but later on were withheld for failure to comply with
the require one to one ratio of import and export. They filed a complaint
asserting that the administrative order is unconstitutional. The RTC ruled
that the order was a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 and 19 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. PITC elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling:
The order was not valid.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order
is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original
Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importations, was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is
published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code,
which reads: Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
(or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it
is otherwise provided. xxxThe fact that the amendments to
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and
published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative
Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the
Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera[36] stated, thus:We hold therefore that all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation,Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the
petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were
never legally effective, and private respondents, therefore, cannot
be made subject to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-01
embodying the same was never published, as mandated by law, for
its effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the amendments
to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center,
and published in the National Administrative Register as required by
the Administrative Code of 1987.
REPUBLIC v Extelcom
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted
Bayantel the provisionalauthority to operate a Cellular Mobile
Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiativeapplying Rule
15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and
Procedures.Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should
have applied the Revised Rules which were
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where
the phrase “on its owninitiative” were deleted and since the 1993
Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law
Center is the law in forceand effect in granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which
implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules.
Publication in the OfficialGazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rulesand
regulations can take effect.
Judicial proceeding:
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property
which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure
of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the
power of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi
in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected
with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various
parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on
January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy,
China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this
requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the
City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was
rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale
by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On
August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However,
about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was
made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the
original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set
aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was
that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related,
senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court
to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular
kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the
parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the
litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the
nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it
may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance
of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is
acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation
may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under
special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property
is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property,
though at all times within the potential power of the court, may
never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the
action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide
the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term
potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to
register the title of land under our system for the registration of
land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the
property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be
owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to
adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a
mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi
rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or
lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment
entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for
whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a
personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not
affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the
action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with
reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
CRIM PRO Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046 October
24,
(hearing)
Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the
incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo
Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide
and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to
death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma
Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned,
respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw
Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted
by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same
day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against
herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on
January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of
petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order
denying the motion to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners
before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by
Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original informations,
and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8,
1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and,
in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals,
assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos
which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new
informations. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the
petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations
is null and void on the ground that there was no notice and hearing
as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the
trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the
ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they
could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice
and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein
accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but
the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver
offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new
informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no
cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about
the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss
filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93
does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original
informations and the consequent filing of the new ones
substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous
an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the
original informations been amended so as to charge the capital
offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their
right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than
with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering
that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is
strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an
amended or a new information.

Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and

hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the
merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court
granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of
hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction
over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the
merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such
cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to
appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”