The Republic by Plato PDF

Cambridge
Texts in lhe
History of
Political
Thought
Plato
The Republic
Edíted by
G. R. F. Ferrari
Translated by
Tom Griffith
Copyrighted material
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CAMBRIDGE TEXTS 1 . THE

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
PLATO
The Republic
CAMB RIDGE TEXTS IN THE
H1S1'0RY OF PO LITICAL THOUGHT
Series tdílors
RAYMOND OtUSS
Rc11dtr in Philo1ophy, U11iversi1y •f Cambridge
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Por• lisi of' tilles puhli1hed in tht .,,,;,,, plta,, ·"' ,nd oj' hook
PL ATO
The Republic
ED IT EO BY
G. R. F. F ERRARI
Un~ ertÍfJ' ,,f Califórnia , B,rL-rley
TRANSl.ATEO BY
TOM GR IFF ITH
- CAMBRIDGE
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Contents
Tramlator's pre/iue pagt vii

Editor 's pre{ace lX
lntroductiau
Tire 11,irtJ, XI
A Spartan utopia? XI\'

.
Tire philosoplter ami the kit1g xvi_ii
A política/ work.1 x.x:i.i
City anti sou/ XXV
A1atl,ematits and m,taphytics XXlX
A guide lo fi,rth,r reading XXXLI
Principal dates XXXVUI
Ahhm1inb'ons aurl Çt,u11eutian.s sli
Editor's s)mllptis o[The Republic xlii
The Repuh/ic 1
Book 2
Book 1
Book · Ili
Book • r
Book ó 186
Book 220
Book 8 2·2
Ilook 9
Book ro
346
l11t!,x 68
"
..
A
,1
Translator's preface
lf you tel1 pco11le you are translating Placo's Rrpuhlit , the question thcy
almost invariably ask is '\Vhy? Surely there are plcnty of trnnslarions
alreidy.' The answer is fairly simple. For whaccvcr rcason, Plato chose to
put bis philosophical thoughts in dialogue form, and l bclievc that whcn
he did so, be intcnde<l thcsc dialogues 10 sound like convcrsarions. i\1aybc
not straightforward, cvcryday convcrsations, but conversations nonethe-
lcss. And it is stiU true, though things havc improvecl in rt-ccnt years, that
there are mnny translations of Plaro wherc you cannot read a complete
page without coming across something which no English-speakiug
pcrson would ever sny. or cver havc said. So in balancing thc conOk-ting
dcmancls of the translator, I bave tried to give the highest prioricy, with
only a few excepcions, to thc rcquiJ-cmcnr that what I wrote should sound
likc a convcrsation. The danger in this, since l am nota professional Plaw
scholar, was that in rryi.ng to make it sound conversational l might commit
mysclf to an intcrprctation which rnn L'OUJ1ter to the agrced anel accepted
views of those who were sçholars. That bcing so, 1 havc b<,-cn cxccprion-
ally fortunate to hnve lmd John Ferrari as my aeadcm.ic m.indcr. I would
nevcr havc undertaken the project without his cncouragcmcot. and guar-
antee of help and support. And oncc cmbarkc<l on it, I found him ready
and willing to give up huge amounts of his rime to thc task of vetting my
early draft~ - a laborious task which involvcd rc11ding the wbole tcxt
against lhe Grcek, Oagging the buudrcds (liternlly) of passages wherc hc
did not agree with what l had writtcn, cxplaining in prc<.; se dctail why hc
disagrccd, and (blcss him) suggesting ,m alternative iu each and e,,ery
instance. His i.níluencc is st,rongest in thosc passages wherc the rransla-
rion of kcy tcrms has been the subject of much criticai discussion, but.
vu
"
Translator's preface
t.here is no pnn of t.he t:ranslation which hns not lx-nefitcd immeasurably

from his comments, :uivice and suggestions, anel it should be seen, 10 a
very considerable extcnt, as a joint elfort rather thnn mitie alonc. ft hus
been an enormous labour for him, and I am gteatly in his debt for per-
fonning it.
TOM GRIFFfTH
Vlll
Editor's preface
The thoughr. of translaring Plato's Republic is not unlikely to cross rhe

mind of any Platonist. Whenevcr it crosscd mine, I dismisscd it firmly.
Too many scholarly ghosts hovered about its text, too many pitfalls lurked
on every pagc, and thc impossibility of satisfyi.ng ai.! of the readers aU of
lhe time was only too casy to anticipatc. Thcn I discovcrcd Tom Gritlith's
rcmarkable translation of Plato's Symposium, and saw that there could
aftcr ali bc a role for me in produdng a ncw translation of the R.epuhlic, a
tecbnic•l, advisory role, and that the elfort would be repaid many times
over. I havc had rhe privilcge of exceptionally close editorial collaboration
with Tom as his translation took shape, and he co--0perared with unfail-
ing inrclligence, patiencc and tact. For aU my relcntlcss cditing of dctails,
the translation remains cs&-entially his. l havc L'Ontributed the introduc-
tion, notes, and orher ancillary material - ali of which ha\•e benefited &om
• .
T om s scrutmy.
J OHN FER RARI
l:X
•,
Introduction
Pia/o•, Rcpublic is the jirst great u,ork of 1-flest,rn political philMophy,

mui has retai11e1t it, grip on the i111agi11atio11 of política/ 1hinkers for over
tmo thousaml year,, li WIIJ also very m11tl1 Jhé pr(}{fur.t of par/Íéular his-
torie,,/ t'irr.umsta11ces. ln this ;.,11ru,l11ctio11 me wi/1 to11sider the polit'Ua/
i,,stability of t/,e Greek worlit i11 the /attf,jih áltd e11r/y fourt/, u n/uries BC
and i11vesJigate the c11/t11ra/ Jàctor, mos/ liktly to have influenced Plato
mlum he cam;: 10 ,vritc th.e Rcpuhlic, beari,,g in mind tha.t J,e mas "º' only
,,. pre-cmi,,ent phi'/osopher h1'l 11/so a /iterar_)' n,riler, ar, eduta.tor, a11d, 11ol
least, ª" A1he11ia11 aristocral {pp. .,·i- .uii). ~V, mil/ ehen asses, the
Rcpublic •, po,itiun w,:t1,i11 política/ philosopl,y (PP. .r.,·ii- xxv). and presem
tlie enentia-1s of its a-rgument {pp. x.rv-x.r.,'i). l·Ve begi11 u,ith a harroming
episo,le from A the11ia11 history - an episode in mhú·h Plato's fa111i()• playt1J
(t maj,,r role.
The Thirty
Plato's mother's cousin was a tyrant. ln the course of a single conruJsive
year, from summer to summer, 404-403 uc, Cri tias soo of Callaeschrus
made himself leadcr of a thirty- man junta in1posed on Athens b)•a foreign
power, disarmed thc populaLi:, ordered the murdcr of hundrcds of promi-
nent persons - some for their monei•, some 10 se1tlc old scores, othcrs
bcL'llUSC thcy werc rivais - and died 6ghting the band of exiles that s0011
after rcstored the city to dcmocracy. The discussion narrared in Plato's
R,p11blic takes place in the home of a family thar was to come to gricf at
the hands of the Thirty. Polemarchus. according to the tale his brother
Lysias sur"i"ed to teU, w:1s one of those murd(.-rcd for thcir moncy. Lysias
Xl
lntrodurtion
himsdf went on to fund tbe democratic resisrancc and supply ir from the
family's arms business. The rcsistancc was based in thc Piraeus, the port-
district of Athens, a magnet not only for sucCL-SSful immigrant familic'S
such as thnt of Lysias and Polemarchus, whose home was there, bur also
for the lower ranks of socicry, who manncd and scrviccd the Athenian
navy. T he label 'men of the Piraeus' carne to ide1ttify thosc who fought
for the dcmocracy. T hc decisivc battlc - the conflict in wbich Critias lost
his life - took place by the tem pie of Bendis, tbe goddess whose inaugural
festh'1I gavc Socrates, thc fender of the discussion ar Polemarchus' bouse,
a reason to come to the Piraeus in thc 6rsr placc. i\nother who lost his lifc
therc was Charmides, an associate of rhc Thirty with special responsibil-
ity for thc Piracus. He was Plato's unde. Nor Plato's only, but unclc too
of Glaucon and Adcimantus, for Plato gives a major role in the discussion
to his own two brothers, and purs thcm on the best of terms with a family
whom tbeir kinsmen will ruin. Socratcs was for his part 10 incur thc hos-
tili1y of the rcturning democrats bt.'Cllusc he counted the likes of Critias
anel Charmidcs among his philosophic companions.
li is difticu.lr to know ,vhat to make of Plato's mise-tn-su'n,, and tempt-
ing to rurn to an au1obiograpbical pa.qsagc of his Sro,111h L,tter
(324c-326b), wbich purports lO dcscribc his own dealings with rhe Th.irty.
Letters from celebrities werc a favourite production of 6ction wrirers and
outrighc forgcrs in antiquity, and nonc of rh e Platonic lcrters is above sus-
picion - although scholars thcse days are inclined to regard tbe se1•enth as
autbentic. But let itstand to Pia to oalyas Plato'sApology~(Socratesstands
ro che actual speech of dcfcnce rhat Socratcs delivered when on triai for
his life; still it would remain the mosc important incerprctation of Plato's
political motives to survivc from antiquity. Pia to speaks of being in,•itcd
by his relativos and by 01hers he knew in the junta to rhrow hin1self in with
thcir enrerprise, and of how tl,is excited an ide-.ilistic youth - he was in h.is
cnrly nventies - with bopcs of a better society and zc-.1I for thc power to
bring iL abou1. Discnchantme.nt came swiftly. An incident involving
Socrates is chosen to serve as an cmblcrn for thc regime's immora!icy: ics
attctnpt to co-opt him into the vindictive arrest of a citizcn that ir had dt-s-
ign:ircd a public cncmy, and his courageous refusal to do so.
The revh•ed democracy, bowevcr, 1urned out to have as litde regard for
Socratcs' indepc.ndcnc character as bad its desporic prcdecc,gsor, and
proS<."Cuted him for subvcrting tradicional rdigious belicf - a very serious
charge, tanmmount to treatshery, and a favourire to cmploy against incel-
lecruals. The resulting cxecution of his philosophic mentor camc :,$ Plato
XII
Jn1rod11rtion
was once again considering, although more cautiow;ly than before, an

cntry intO politic-s; and once again hc was brought up short. As age sharp•
ened his awareness of tbe barriers to good governn,ent, he tells us io this
opcn lettcr, he carne evcntually to understand that no form of governmcnt
in any cxisting statc was satisfoctory, and was drivcn to declare that therc
would be no cnd to the general wretchednes.~ until pbilosophers, who see
justice i.n ali its complex.ity, werc givcn political powcr, or until existing
rulers learned truc philosophy.
Faction
lt is a good St.ory, anda poignant prcfacc to thc lifc of a politically engaged
philosopher who carne to adulthood in the Greek world of the early fourtb
L"énrury BC - a world of small civic communirjcs, i.ndcpendent of cach
othcr and jcalous of thc st2tu.s confcrrcd by titizcnship, )'<'t willing to
srrikc alliances with othcr cities for sclf- protl,ction and thc discomfirurc
of thcir encmies, willing cven to acccpt tbc hcgcmony of tbose cities that
sough t to cxtcnd thcir power by offering protcction, but with ali sides
awarc how readily allegiancc grounded only in self-interest can shift.
Attcmpts madc during thc fourth ccntury to unitc thc Greek world in
'panhcUcnic' resistancc against Pcrsia wcnt hand in hand \\~th thc nostal•
gic claim tbat tbat world had once possesscd a sense of iLs commoo good,
a ccntury carlier, whcn it had rcpeUed the Pcrsian invodcr. But if ir had
e,•cr pos.sessed such a sense, its behaviour bclicd this now. Thc common
good w:is rather an ideal for cach civic commu.nicy to C.'iJ)ouse within its
own bow,daries. lndccd, it was by looking to this ideal that thc Grecl<s
mainto.incd resistancc to the Persian king on a conceprual levei cven as
some of th em srruck deaJs with h.is agcnt.s. T hroughout tbc Persian
tmpirc, they told themsclvcs, there lived only one frcc man, irs king,
whosc subjecrs werc his slave.~; but Grcck cities - those that werc not
thcmsclvcs in thc hands of tyrants - wcre self-i,.-overning republics, no
martcr whether oligarchic or dcmocTatic, howcvcr closdy heJd the privi-
leges of their ruling classes, however rcstrictcd tbeir rostcr of full c.itizens.
For whcther political frecdom belongcd co few or to many, it belongcd also
to the republic itsclf
That such was thc ideal is only con6rmed by th e tcndcncy of Greck
political thcorists to take a jauniliccd view of 1>olitical reality, and sec it as
driven by thc rcsentmcnt, avarice and ambi tion of interest groups. oc
only was thc common good forgoncn in thc hurly-burly of faccionalism
xm
b11roduction
within individual cities- that is, in the arena where that good was thought
to 6nd its natural home - but the factionalism fed oJf thc abscnce of a
common good outside that arena, in the network of relations between
Groek cities. Thucydides' History (3.82) explains how war between
Athens and Sparta ar fifth ccntury's cnd afforded factions in lesser cities
tt prete~'t to summon externa] powers to their aid - Athens if the faction
sought dcmocracy, Sparra if it sought oligarchy. ln such rimes, powcrful
allies wcrc co be had for the asking. Thc general pattern did 001 cease with
the war of which Thucydides wrote, but 1>ersisted and ramified well into
the fourth century cvcn as the powcr blocs bccamc lcss wdl dcfined -
Sparm declining, Athens reviving, and Thebes becoming prominent. It
was ch•racterist.ic of 1he political d.iscourse of the ti.me to polarise thc
troubles into an antagonism bctwct:n oligarchy and democracy, and tbis
in turn into an anmgonism between rich and poor.
Such an analysis was nor wholly accurate, as Plato knew. Some oli-
garchies and dcmo<.Tacics wcre more oligarchic or democrntic than othcrs;
the dichotomy did not in any c-nse exhaust the range of political systems;
in many placcs thcre existed whar the Greeks too called a middle class.
How-ever frequent the calls for ~-.nceUing dcbts and rcdistributing land,
chc prizc contcsrcd was political ar h.-ast as much as cconomic. Democr-atic
Athcns had its disparitics of wealth - indeed, the rich were rclied upon to
fund public services - but political powcr and legal entitlement cxtcnded
to ali adult male Athenians. Eve.rywhere struggle would typically begin as
a division within the elite: between those who would and those who would
not srrikc polirical bargain.s wirh the populacc. Despir.e thcsc cavcats, it is
understandable that ,1 concerned observer in the fourth century would
think the world trapped on a factional see-saw. A reader of the S,v,nth
Leller can wcll believe that· Plato, who saw thc man he declared tbc most
virruous of his timc suffcr first w1dcr Critias and bis oligarchy and again
under democracy, would finally cry: a plague o' both your houses.
So it is ar first sight surprising whcn Callipolis, the ideal city conceived
in the Repuhlie, rurns out not only to conform ro the constitution that
Critias sought to impose on Athens, but to push it further tban perhaps
cven Critias could havc imagined.
A Spartan utopia?
The foreign powcr that supporn:d Critias' coup was Sparta. For a well-
born Athenian such as Critias 10 be a lover of Spartan ways \"'15 nothing
XlV
Jntrodue/Íon
unusual. His varicd writings, of which we have only fragmcn1s, includcd

laudaiory dcscriptions of thc SP',r~.u, system, and he wos followcd i.n this
practice by anothcr of thc gentlcmcn among SocratcS' companions,
Xcnophon, whose Spartan Comtitutio11 survives entire. Athenians with
oligarchic ,-ympathies or elitist attitudes were often accuscd of acting like
Sparran.s, and some wcnt so far as to dress and wear thc.ir hair in 1hc
Spartan fashion. But nonc wcnt so for as Critias, who seems to havc
wan1ed to remakc ali Athens in thc imagc of Sparra.
Thc <.-ontraSts bcrwecn thc Athcnian and Spartan systems werc stark in
a number of w•ys. ln social gcography: while Athens wus •1 pains to dis-
tribute thc privilcges of citizenhood uniformly through the district under
i1s direct conrrol, thc Spartan region had a core of citizens surroundcd by
non-citizcn subordinatcs in thc ,, Uages and counrrysidc. ln their
cconomy: whcrc:is Athenians of ali so6al ranks t-ould eng,,ge in a fuU
range of commercial , agricultural and other activities likely to producc
wealth, thc smaU and tight-kni1 group of ful.l Spa.r tan citizens lived olf the
agricultural surplus produced by a largc body of public scrfs, and were
expccted to hold themselves aloof from moncy-makjng pursuits. ln thcir
military organisation: Spartiates (Spartan citizens) wcrc fuJJ- time war-
riors, who messed 1ogether even when no1 on campaign, and identificd
themselves by thc privilege of bcaring arms that non-citizcns wcrc issued
only at nL-cd; most soldiers nnd sailors who fought for Athens, by conrrast,
wc.-re callcd up at times of campaign from the body of regular citizens. ln
their degree of openness: Athens encouraged foreigners to settlc (as thc
statesman Periclcs cncourag<.-d Polemarchus' fothcr Ce.phalus to cmigrate
from Sicily), naruralised religious cults (as with thc cult of Thracian
Bendis), and welcomcd artistic variety and expcriment; Sparta was far
more cnutious on all these fronts.
Scen agains1 this bac.kground , the actions of the Th.irty reflect thc
valucs of their sponsors. They drew up a list of some 3,000 supporters -
about thc numbcr of Sparriates at the tirne - disarmed the rest, and
banncd them from living with.in thc city linúts. They made particular
1argcts of immigrants. The relation thcy began tO csrablish with thc 3,000
w·.is analogous LO that bctwecn the conse.rvative gtr<mtia or senate of
Sparro and the coUective body of Spartiates. They did all th.i.,;, wearc told,
in the caw;e of purging the city of unjust men and inclining it to virtuc
and justice. For thc fome of Sparro dcpcndcd not on irs actions abroad or
ir:s glamour at home but on a distinctive way of life. Sparta was notl1ing
"~thout thc lcngt.hy, rigorous and uniform education towards virtue
XV
f ntroducriun
lhat it imposed on the Spartiate youtb, with the aim of producing well-
disciplined men and indccd women of honour, lx-arers of an austerc and
marcial culrurc that smothercd internai faction and gavc thc place its
reputation for ,111,omia., law and order.
lf thc rule of Critias was too brief and roo harricd for us to bc surc of
its ultimate direction, there can be no doubt that a contemporary reader
would havc dctccted more than a wh.i lf of Sparta in bis cousin's Callipolis.
Ir too is a ciry distinguishcd by the way of ijfc of its military clitc, thc
guardians, who devote themselves cntirely to the tasks of defence and
poLicing, and bave their material needs provided by a subordinate class of
farmcrs and artisans. The <.ity stands or falis by the upbringing and cdu-
cation of its guardians, a notably austere and conservative process of
inculcaring discipline and shaping good character. \Vomen among the
guardians share the men's way of life to an unusual degrec. And in a
rcmarkable passagc at the cnd of Book 7, it is suggL-stcd that the quick and
ea.ry way to bring ali this about would bc for those in power to ban every-
one over the age of ten from living within thc city limits, soas to cducate
the chiklrea ia isolation from their parents.
But what would the conternporary readcr have made of this quasi-
Sparta, this post-Critian couP, when hc discovcrcd that thc rulers of
Callipolis were to be no mere senate of worrhies, but philosophers, inte.1-
k-ctuals risen from the guardian ranks and educ-ated in mathematics and
disputation? Such subjecrs formed no part of Spart:m cduc-ation; Sparta
was a notoriously nnbookish placc, wbose 6ghrers prided then1selves on
avoiding fancy talk. And would the counts laid against 'timocracy', the
6rst of the unjust societic-s considered in Book 8, have reinforced this
reader's puzzlernent, or dispclled it? Thc timocratic sociecy values mili-
tarism and puts the man of honour above aU others; its failingi; are those
of • contemporuy Sparta, untempercd by thc intcllccrual vi.rtues.
For :til that tbe institutions of Callipolis draw inspiration from histor-
ical revolutions and fan1iliar societies, in lhe end they transcend anything
known to the Greek world. Thc discussion sets itself thc task of discov-
ering a just city, but finds that it cannot stop short of utopia. How seri-
ously Plato took this utopian vision has long been a controversial issue.
The main linc of debate divides those who see CallipoLis as aa ideal whose
function is to motiv-ate efforts ar personal, not civic, perfcction, from
those who se-e it as a guidc for future progress on thc political, not just the
individual levei. A dilferenr school of thought has denied t:hat Plato
intendcd Ca!Lipolis even to secm desirable, Jet alone practicable. The
:XV'I
f ntroduction
question whether the Repuhlic is• work primarily of moral or of political

philosopby will bc add.ressed in later sections (pp. xxii-xxix). While we
are still tradng the work's historical context, let us considcr instead the
uropian ideas currenr in Placo's day. Herc thc fanrastic and serious el-
emcnts are more readily djstinguishablc than in the Republic.
The fantastic we 6nd most clcarly in thc comeclies of Arisrophanes - in
the Cloud-cuckoo-land of Birds, thc city in the sky where dreams of
absolute powcr come D'uc; i.n 1hc mt,ans lo panheJlenic peat-c and salva-
tion proposed in Lysistra/o., when the women bring thcir warring hus-
bands to rerms hy going on a sex-sll'ike; in the women's rule thar comes
ahout in IVt11ne11 ai 1/1< Assembly (or Ecdttiazusae), i.n which rhe womcn of
Athens, disguised as men, fir.a vote themselves into power, then achievc
social concord by equalising distribution of che rwo great objects of social
dcsirc: womcn and wcalrh. Equal disrribution of propcrry was 6rst pro-
posed, we are told, by a se.rious utopian theoris1, a certain Phaleas of
Cha.lcedon. Lcss shadowy is Hippodamus of Miletus - a likcly moclel for
thc A.risrophanic gcomcrer and town- planncr Mcton who otfcrs rolar our
the 'streets' of Cloud-cuckoo-land on a radiating panern. Hippodamus'
thcorics were those of the social engineer and the architecr, and som<.~
rimes of both rogethcr, as in his proposal to dh•ide land according to thc
occupations and nccds of the various classes in thc cit)'. He argued for a
strict division of the citizenry into three fünctional groups, alrhough his
wcre farmers, artisans and warriors rathcr than the produccrs, warriors
and philosopher- kings of the R,public. ln rown- planning bis namc was
associated witb thc srricrly rt-gular gcometric linc, and some of his layouts
wcre actually built - among thcm tbar for thc Piracus, where he lived and
worked. L, general, tbe modcrn rcadcr should bear in mind the case witb
whicb cities in the Greek world could be rebuilt, rclocaced, or sc.rted
fi-om scrarch. Although Socrates in the Rtpubli, makcs ir clcar that heis
using a mctnphor whcn he calls himself and bis discussion parrners thc
founders of Callipolis, starting a new township would not ba,•e been
regarded as pie-in-the-sky. There is a ~-rory that Pia to h.imself was askcd
to write thc laws for onc such cit)', ,\1egalopolis in Ascadia, but refused on
the grounds that the new citizens \\'Crc unwilling to aceept equality of
posscssions.
Yet the rown- planncr's vision of utopia, tbe det.úlcd topographic
fanrasy that became a lixture of utopian writing in Plato's immediatc
aftcrm,,th and marks out thc canon from Thomas l\1ore's UUJpia to
\Vi.Iliam l'>iorris' /Vewsfrom Nowlrere, is notably abscm from the Rcpublit.
XVII
f111rod11aion
Pinto reserves this motif for the twin dialogues 7i'macus and Critias, in
which a charactcr Critias who is eithc.r thc familiar tyrant or an anccst.o.r
mcant to rcmind us of him tlkes a social system pur porting to be that of
údl.ipolis and projects it backwards i.o time ooto a primeval Athens. He
thcn tclls the tale of its srruggle with chc now vanished island city of
Atlantis, whose glittering palaces and coneentric network of canais he lov-
ingly describes. The kinds of writing with whích theRepuJ,fjç invites com-
paris,m ha,•c less of Shangri-La about tbcm and are more overtly politfoal.
'fhe philosopher and the king

One of thcsc genres wc havc cncountcrcd alrcady, exempliJie<I by Critias'
and Xenophon's writings on the constiturion of Sparta. 'fheir manner of
contributing to thc lively contempo rary debate on thc rclative mcrits of
different constitutions was to offer a partisan, idealised deseription of jnst
one. Alternatively, a single constitution might be selected for criticis.m ,
not praise - as with thc Ath~nia11 Constitution that survives from the late
fifth century by an nnknown author often called 'The Old Oligarch'. The
traditional title of thc R,publi< conccals an allusion to such works as thesc.
For if Politeia can in Grcck name a k.ind of community that governs itsclf
and has no truck with tyranny - ' Repuhfit' is not an o utright misnomcr -
it is also the normal Greek word for 'constitutio n'. Tt was not, then, a
Sparta11 Constitution or an Ath~nia11 Constitution that Plato wrote, but
simply a Constil111.üm.
\1/hen judging constitutions against each other, fourth-century theo-
rists often groupcd them into three broad typcs, co mplic':lting thc car[ier
antithc-sis of oligarchy and democracy by thc addition of monarc.hy. Tbe
figure of the king became ao important focus for rellection on the powers
of men - not o nly the powcr of the ruler ovcr those hc rulcs, but the power
of a human being 10 live sue<X,ssfu lly. T hc cont.-entration of authority in a
single inilividual fused the moral with the policie.ai, madc thc king's
actions on the política] plane an expression of his personal virtue and an
cxcrcisc in self-dcvelopméllt. This at lcast was chc t.hemc of a sccond kind
of writing that bears comparison with the R,publit. It is represcnted for
us by works such as Xcnophon's Educa1io11 o( Cyrus, a romanticised biog-
raphy of the Persian king, in which the diflicult rclation bcrwccn rcpub-
Lit-an and imperial policies is filtcred through the virtues of that princely
paragon. Here too bclong thc Ci'Prian o ratíons o( lsocratcs ( 7o Nitod,s;
Ni,ocles, or the Cyprians; and Ev11g11ras), which contain bis opinions o n the
XVUJ
lnJroducei011
duti<-s that bind kings to thcir subjt-cts and subjccts to thcir kings. Cyru.•
wns long dcad by Xcnophon's timc, King Nicoclcs of Cyprus not only
alive but an active patron of lsocratc.s; yct both writcrs 6ctionalise thcir
cnligh1en(.-d monarchs.
And if the king was no cnlightencd monarch but an arbitrar)' dcspot
whose will was law? Then a Xenophon could imagine him confessing bis
unhappiness, as in Hi,m, in which the Sicilian tyrant of that name
lamcntS bis love.k-ss lifc in convcrs:ition with thc wisc Simonidcs, who
consoles him with some carcfül advice on gaining J)OJ>ularity. Thc early
modcl for such. • scenc - thc confron1ation of philosopher and tyrant -
can bc found in Hcrodotus' ffistory ( 1.30-33), whcrc Solon, Athcnian
sage •nd statesman, and ancc.stor of Plato, denies King Croesus the satis-
faction of being judgcd thc most forrunatc of m cn.
Xenophon and Lsocrates had both been associatcs of Socrates; other
'Socrntics' too, 10 judge by tbe titles of their lost or fragmentary works,
,vrotc on thc ropic of kingship and governmenc, and Piaro was not thc first
among thcm 10 write Socratic dialoguc-s. Thc Educatio11 of Cyrm w:is
already matched with the Repuhlic in antiquity. lsocrnres ne,, er wrote a
SotTatic dialogue, but did esrablish a school of ' philosopby' - bis namc
for what hc raught, although he rcjccted spcculativc and cosmological
inquiry as 100 abstrusc and offercd hin1Self rathcr as a masrer of the art of
words and a modcl for crnuJation by thc <.ivic-m indcd nnd politicaUy
thoughtful. Thc scbool scems to huvc mainroincd ,m une-Jsy rivalry with
thc group of srudcnrs and companions that P lato artrac1ed to his homc
near a public park just outsidc Athens, namcd after an obscure local divin-
icy, Academus. ln this P laton.ic 'Academy' ostronomcrs and mathcmati-
cians wcrc wclcomc, and thc training givc.t1 w philosopher- kings in thc
R,puhlic is usually roken to rellec1 this fact. Philosophit1 was srill an elastic
word, and embraced intellcctual activitie-s of many sorts.
Plaro wr otc thc Repuhlie, thcn, not only as a conccrncd mcmbcr of thc
political elice and a keen observer of contcm porary troubles, but as a
writer who looked back ar literary models a.nd askance at Literary com-
J)Ctitors. The Republic lirs a mouJd whcn it indictS the wrctchcd condirion
of thc t)'rant from thc perspcctivc of thc sage, and whcn it brings its polit-
ical and moral rellections to a focus in the figure of lhe cnlightcned king.
But Socrates, although he is a wise man sun,moned by th.e social elite to
say his pic~-c on vfrtuc and happincss, is not i.n dialogue with cirher kings
or ryrants; rather, in this tase rhe. advicc of the philosopher is that the
philosopher should remain no merc adviscr but should himself become
XJ.X
lntrodut tion
king, or kings become philosopbers. \Ve are to imagine a sage who could
counsel himself on kingly happiness, for he would himself be king. Here
Plato brcaks tbe literary mould.
lndecd, wc may suspect that the considerable fanfare that attends
Socrates' proposal is Phtto's way of claiming originality more as a literary
writcr and educacional theorist than as a political rcformcr. Socratcs
treads very carefully and makes a great show of hesitarion before coming
out with his advice; his audicnce r(.-acu; to it as if it wcrc quite outngeous
(473c- 474a}. Yct, historically, the coincidence of philosophic ability and
political power in notablc indi,•iduals was by no mcans unprecedenced.
One intcllectual who drafted acode of law bas alrcady beco mentioned:
Solon, Plato's sixth- century ancestor, who not only brought social reform
to Athcns but composed poetry on the political issues he was responsible
for resolving. Another example is furnished by the 'sophist' (itinerant
professor) Protagoras, who wrotc thc laws for Thurü, and is mcntione.d
in the Repuhlit (6ooc). \Vc have st<en tbat Critias too could bavc thougbt
himseJJ; at first, something of a pbilosopher-king.
i\1ore gcncrally, philosophcrs of the sixth to 6fth ccnturics tcnded to
bdong to the upper ethelon of thcir eommunities and for tbat reason
alone would have been callcd upon for political office - a duty not • few
of them are reported to have fulfilled. Or considcr thc Pythagoreans, who
followed a strict regímen of life designed to prepare tbeir souls for the
next world, a regímen that ranged dierary t:thoos toget.her wirh the prac-
tice of philosophy. Beginning in t.he fifth century, they rosc to political
power in southcrn lraly. i\ 1any aspects of Pythagc>rean philosophy, includ-
ing its mathematical crnphasis, are thought to havc lcft thcir mark on
Placo - altbough the issue of intellectual indebt~><lncss is complicatcd by
the scarcity of good evidencc for Pythagoreanism in its early days But one
Pyrhagorean philosopher, we are told, was not only an intellectual
influcncc on Plato but his political ally and his host: Archytas of
Tnrentum, seven tin1es elected to thc leadcrship of his city. He was an
e.x1,ert in military ballistics as wcll as mathematical theory, and his city
was la ter praiscd by Aristotlc for its innovaúvc and soc..ially cohcsivc pol-
itics. ,v chytas plays a considcrable role in the Se,,c111h Lc11cr; and some
havc detcctcd him bchind the mask of Timaeus, the otherwise unknown
and doubtless fictional philosopher from southern ltaly whom Plato
makes thc principal speaker in his dialogue of that name, and wbo is inrro-
duccd as one who has scaled the cwin heights of political office and pbilo-
sophic achicvement.
XX
!111rodue1i01z
So Plaro is exaggerating when he allows the prospect of philosophers

in power to seem as preposterous and laughablc as•evcr Aristophanes did
thc spccraclc of rhe rule of womcn. \Vhy does hc do itl One likcl)' rcason
is that rhc reaction to this pro1>0sal justi6c-s Socrares in giving a lcngthy
defence of his conception of the genuine philosopher, in the course of
which he e.-.:plains the position of philosophers in Atheruan soc-icty, borh
rhose who are worrhy of the tirle and those who are not, and lays out a cur-
riculum of philosophic cducation. From i:hat curriculum the art of words
taught by thc likcs of lsocr-JteS is strikingly absen1. A common word for
politician ai Arhens was simply 'speaker', rhitôr, for it was by speaking in
public assembly that a citii;.-n rypit-nl_ly madc his way 10 prominence.
Glaut-on, whosc impcruousness is both displaycd and rcmarkcd upon in
thc Rcpuhlit, apparcnciy attcmptcd to spe-Jk in the asscmbly bcforc hc was
twenty years old - a mark of e>.1:remc politiail ambition. C:Crminly he and
his brother are given thc longest and mos1 eloquent political sp;.-cches in
rhe work. ln the preface to his Nitodes, lsocrates writes of lhe hostility
aroused by thc cloquence ofthose who study philosophy - in his sensc of
the tcrm - and how thcy are suspectcd of oiming at selfish advantage
rather than virtue. Thc philosopher-kings whosc viabil.iry Socrates cven-
ruol_ly gcts G laucon and Adcima.ntus tO acccpt are truer 10 the Spartan
modcl, and avoid eloquencc. Thcir politica.l rhctoric is a mancr of
knowing how to kcep things hidden from citizcns whom lhe trulh would
only harm; thcir art of disputation, the coping-st.onc of t:heir education,
aims to teU things as thcy are. ALI chis, of course, from the pen of a con-
sununate mastcr of thc a.rt of words. Pia.to is ta.king his stand, not a.gainst
cloquence as s uch, but agai.n st its contempora.ry placc in politics and in
rhc cducation of those who rook part in politits.
Both Plato and lliOCratcs educatcd politicians. But whereas Lsocrates
bcgan from his conununicativc ort, and argued rhat thc task of discovcr•
ing rhc most dc<.-orous considerntions wirh which to frarnc discourse
dirccted at others on the wort.hic-st of copies cannot bu1 leavc its marl on
thc practitioner's conduct, whcther public or privatc, Pior.o seems rnther
ro have bcgun from a conception of virtuc as sclf-possession and sclf-
undcrstanding - attributcs rhat are in a wny the precondition of rl1c pbilo-
sophic l.ifc, yct also expressed by it, und in another way its goal - and to
havc wani-cd the characrer of rhe manto SL~mp his political discoursc, not
thc discourse to ~"tamp the man.
cvcrthelcss, ir would bc c,,sy to cxagg.::race the contrast lx:tween Plaro
and Lsocratcs. Both mcn seem in practice to h,wc bcen more intercstc'<I in
XXJ
1n1rodur.1io11
promoting con1petent government of whatever form than in seeing a par-

ticular constirution come into being. Plato's associares and srudents in the
Acadcmy wcrc a diversc 1..-ompany: some wcrc con.n ectcd to the school for
many ycars, and ljvcd primt1rily intellectual lives, interrupted in a few
cases by stints as lawgÍ\ters or ambassadors; othe.rs wcrc you.ng mcn from
promjnent fomiües who Cllme to c-omplete their education, There were
forcigners ln both catcgories. \Vh.ile some among the prominent visitors
retu.rned homc to rulc as autocrats, othcrs wcnt back to rumblc autoc.ralS
from power. ln gener,J, almost ali V'Jrieties of political sympathy can bc
found among Plato's associates, whether in foreign affairs (pro-Spartan,
pro-Athcnian, pro- Macedon.ian) or in constitutio nal prcfcrence,
Plato's own most notablc polirjcal odvenrure firs the grnnd trJdition of
Solon and Croesus. He bec.1me involved with the poLitics of Syracuse md
thc dynasry of Dionysius I, thc outstanding tJ'nlnt of his age, who \\-On
bjmself an empire in Sicily and made Syracuse tbe günering e1nbodiment
of his pcrsonal wcalth and magniliccncc. Dionysius bccame stcreot:yped as
an cncmy of libcrty, and his risc 10 powcr is thought tO have belpcd shapc
Plato's account of tbe onset of tyTinny in Book 8. A notable aspect of his
coun's magni6ccnce wa.~ its bospitatity towards poets, artists, intcllectoals;
and Pia to was onc of thc visiwrs. Swries of his debunking the tyrant's self-
image to bis face seem too good to be truc, too closely modelled on
Herodotus. iYlore credit is gjvcn to the narrative of Plato's later visits to
serve as philosophic mentor for thc tyrant's successor, Dionysius n, and of
his failure 10 influeni..-e the unworrhy ond recalcitrant young autocrat . For
thc dctails we must rcly once more on the Sev,111h l.etter, Yet even trust-
ing its portmit of a Pia to bent un prneti,,'ing wbat he bas hitherto preached,
what wc find here are poljtical proposals at once bland and constraincd by
the Sicilian contcxt. Dionysi us was to havc some moral fibrc infused in
him, tben to be sent out to w1ite the Sicilian cities aga.inst Cartbage, tbc
forcign invadcr. Tbcrc is no talk of a gu•rdian class, no call to give women
a role in govcrnmcnt or to redistributc wea.lth - no Callipolis in view.
P lato was a thinkcr, a rcacher, a writer fully cnmeshed in thc contro-
versies of bis time, botb politkal and intcllcct11al. Had hc been less of bis
rj,ne he would not, perhaps, live S<> fully on uur pagc.
A politicaJ \VOrk?
For ali the b.istorical particularity of the Republir, it ba.~ also achieved
cnduring re<.-ognition as a classic of poütical philosopby, lts pusition
..
X~ll
l111rotluc1ion.
with.in the range of política! philosophy, howcvcr, has provcd more

difficult to pinpoint than thc work's canonical status might lcad onc to
expect. Some, indecd, ha,'C wondercd wberhcr ir ougbr to bc considcred
a politit-:il work at all . Does it not set outro answer a problcrn of individual
rathcr than collective action, and demonstrar.e thc claim of morality on
individual choicc and its clfcct on individual wcll-bcing, rcgardless of
social conscquences (367h-c)I Does Socrarcs nnr explicitly subordinare
politics to ps)'cbology, describing social structurcs only as an onaloguc for
corresponding structurcs of charnctcr within thc individual (j69a)' ln
which case, it would bc bcucr to think of thc Republit as a work of moral
pbilosoph)'. Others bave chosen to emphasisc the face that its proposals
for social reform - irs utopian refoshionings of educat.ion , of properry-
right~, of the very structure of the family - go \\'CU bc)'Ond what t-orrc--
spondcnce with thc individual would rcquirc, and sccrn to bc dcvcloped
for their own sake. .Even where thar correspondence is more strictly
obscrvcd, in thc par-Jllcl analyscs of unjust soderics and individuais thnt
iill Book 8, the critique of acnial social conditions tbat emerges from tbc
correspondcnce has a relevancc and bite of its own.
Yct if the Repuh/ú would on this ac:.-count mcrit its dassification as a
política! work, disagrcemenr rerurns with the attempt to classify its polit~
ical stance. Concentrate on ÍL~ desirc ro S<.'Cure collective happiness
(420b), its warnings against disparities of wcalth and against the mercan-
tilc erhos (42 1d....::, 556c), its elforts to avoid opprcssion of thc weak by thc
powerful in society, and you may find in it tbe first stirrings of socialism.
Look rnther towards its rcstriction of política] power to a tiny elice (42<µ,
491n), consider tbeir status as moral paragons and saviours (487a, 463b),
thcir centraliscd control of thc moral and cultural as well as economic li fc
of the society, their eugcnic techniqucs (458c- 461e), thcir resort to cen-
sorship and to ouc:right dC<.-cption in ordcr to prcsen'C order and promotc
good behaviour (3891H:, 4r4b, 459c-d), and you ma)' think you are
n'<ldi.ng a prescicnt charter for fascism - as did some scholars, approv-
ingly, bcforc thc Sccond \Vorld \Var, and many, disgustedly, in its aftcr•
math.
One mo<lcrn stancc whosc ancestry it would occur 10 no one to trace
back to thc Repub/ic is libcmlism. \Vhat could bc furthcr from an ideal of
coUcctivc sclf-rule through dected govcrnmcnr and uncensored discus-
sion than the political lifc of CaJJipolis? ln a liberal socicty, thcrc are for
political purposes no morally b-Upcrior buman rypcs, but Callipolis - 10
describe it now in its own term..~ rather than wich modern categories - is
xxiií
/n1roduttion
an aristocr.icy of tbe virtuous. Philosophers qualify to form its ruling class

by their moral and intcllectual cxccllenL'C - thcir natural supcriority, rc-
inforced and perfectcd by L'arcful educarion. Should lhe R,p11blic's theo-
rctical dcscendants thereforc bc sought ralhcr in tbe \'arierics of
rcpubfü.11nism, which, broadly understood, elc,•arcs ideais of citizcnship
and community over individualism, and assigns to policies tbe goal of pro-
moting virtue? Certainl)•, Socrates does not hesitate to anribute wisdom
a.n d courage to Call.ipolis as a wbole even though the virtues in question
are n.,suictcd to smaU classes within thc populacc (428!,-,i3oc) - much as
cach Greek republic L'alled itself a free and self-governing communit)' no
maner how restricted its citizen-roll or governing class. He sets himself
thc goal of making th c enrire socicry Oourish, prcveoting any particular
class or indjvidual from Oourishing ar the ex.pense of the whole
(420!,-,i21c). And hc sums up thc task of h.is plúlosophcr- kings as that of
modclling thc community as closcly as possible on pcrmanent ideais of
virtue (501b).
Yct for ali that, it is rathcr Aristotle's Politics, with its famous dcclara-
rion that man is a polirical animal, and th•t the purpose of society is not
mcre life but a good life, that is tbe more whole-hcarted inaugurator of
tlús tradition. A r<.,ader of thc Rep11hlic is unlikcly to come away with so
L-Clcbratory a sensc of thc possibilitics of the sclf-govcrning community.
Resen'llrions come to a focus atone of the work's central and most djs-
concertjng ideas: rhat a socicty should be govcrncd by lhosc who show
lcast <'llgcrness for thc rosk. The idea appears in other writers, including
lsocrates and Aristotle, but in connection witb con,·enrional political
complaints. Thcy frown upon exccssive ambirion, or sigh for an earlier
age when the socially eminent engaged in pub!;c life from a sense of their
scarion and its duties. S uch thougbts make lheir appearance in the
R,p11blir also (347b, 5zob;I), but are devcloped in the direcrion of out-
right discnchantment with the political life - famously allcgoriscd in the
plúlosophic soul's escape from the dim and constrictcd cave of its cultural
envirorunent to the sunlj1, opcn spaces of true understanding
(5 14"-5 • 7c).
The philosophcr, even lhe philosophcr who becomes king, does not
look to society as lhe realm in wlúch to exercise bis freedom and realise
his virtue, bur looks rather to lhe lifc of the mind for his libcration; no.r
does he define hjmself by hjs soei.ai station or the ,11Jues of cirizenslúp,
but by his individual scarch for wisdom. For a work that is, in truth, no
ancestor of l.iberalism, the R ,publir lays an unusual emphasis on the indi-
XXIV
lntrodu,1io11
vidual; however, it regareis indjviduality not as • possession that confcrs

rights on aU and gi,·es society its de6ning b:isis, but as an achievement of
the few - an achievement in which society can play, ai best, only a sup-
porting role. Small wonder, then, 1hat some have doubred whether the
Repuhlit is truly a political work. One might say, rather, that it is counter-
political.
City and soul

Consider how the discussion dcvclops in its carly stagcs. Glaucon otfcrs
an account of thc origins of justice and law. Human bcings were driven to
accept leg-•I limits on their urge to take advantage of each other because
they judgcd thc unfcttered satisfaction of that urge not worth the distress
of 6ncling tbcmselves at the recciving end of the conduct to which it
prompted others also - a result that only the s1ronges1 could entirely
avoid (358e-:i59b). To establish settled laws as the criterion of right and
wrong is therefore to imposc restrictions on nature, for it is human naturc
to thrust ones-elf forward at thc expcnse of othcrs. Tbcrc is loss as wcll as
gain: the pre-eminence of natural superiority vanjghes. A 'real man', one
who could always prevaH, would never agree to restrict hjs power (359b),
Thc story of sociery's origins that Socratt-s hypotbcsi~-..-s in rcply prcscnts
con1munal life rather as an organic development that brings us happincss
at no cost to our nature. Sinre nonc of us is sclf-sufficient, each will seek
to co-<>rdinate his elforts with others so as to provide for the needs
common to all. lnclividuals will gra\' itate towards the tasks for which they
are naruraUy suited, and speciaHse in those, because their needs will be
more efficieutly addrcssed in this manner (37oc). Thc proccss givcs rise
to a simple, rustic com.muniry of farmcrs, anisans and tradt-:smcn who 1
live a contented and god- fearing life with no apparenl need for rulers or
laws (37211--b). They co-<>rdinate their labour as two men will co-<>rclinate
thcir rhythm when rowing a boat. ldentical nL-eds and a common ratiun-
ality suffice to pruduce co-uperation c\'en in the absence of hierarchy.
Thjs happy scene is firmly dismissed by Glaucon, who finds it quite
devoid of the civilised graces - a 'city of pigs' (372d), S0t-ra1es pc.r mits
himself to be drawn into cliscussion of • community equipped with urban
luxuries, including a sophjsticated cultural lifc. This placc, unlikc the
rudimentary society firsl considcrcd, would havc room for intellecruals;
yet Socrates' parting desCTiption of tbc city of pigs is tbat it is 'the true
city - 1hc hc-althy vcrsion, as ir were' (372c). The hL-althy city scts its b'Ollls
X.XV
lnrrod,,ction
no higher than economic stability and co-operntive order among its citi-
zens; thc sophisticat<-'<1 city is by contrast bloated and inflamed, and will
bc driven to make war o n its neighbours to focd its cxcessh-e appctites
(373d-e). However, when the education and discipline necessary for its
military class has rcquired a purge of decadent influences in tbe general
culturc, and so re-imposcd ausrcrity on thc city as a wholc (399"), is thcrc
not a return to bealth and indeed an achicvemcnt of bcauty in Callipolis
- rhe word mcans 'ciry of beauty' - for su perio.r to rhe simple happiness
of the ciry of pigs.? The marter is nor as dcar-cut as it may se.cm. Tbat
Plat<> thought tbe world a better place for havi.ng philosophers in it, we
cannot doubt; but we may legitimatcly doubt whcther thc goals of
Callipolis as a socicty are any higher than those of thc hcalthy <--ity, thc rruc
city that it replaces in tbe discussion.
One way in which such doubts might arise is from con,-ideration of the
similcs uscd to dcs<-Tibe thc rask of the good rulcr. Thc philosophcr-king
is like a ship's captain or hcln1sman , who recognis<'S that 10 srcer the ship
of state onc must ha,•e knowledgc of the stars, thc sea,sons, the winds. lt
is not enough, as politicians in a democracy believc, mcrely to persuade
thc shipowncr - tbe populace - to let onc take the tillcr in hand (48Sa-e).
A port of destination has no in1portance in rhis unalogy •nd is not mcn-
tioncd . \Vhen the demagogic sailors take <.-oncrol, thcir ai.m is not to sct a
ncw course bur to feast on the ship's stores and turn the voyage into a
carousal. Society is simply a ship at sea, not a ship headed for a particu-
lar port. \Vhat the true helro>man will do rhat thc-sc sailors will not is use
bis lmowledge of navig•tion to avoid storms and shoals - to keep the ship
aíloar. His political goals are limit<.-d to sccurity, stability, social harmony.
Ccrtainly, hc aims to instil virtuc inro lús cicy, as is ckar from anothcr of
the similes for the philosopher-king's task, in which hc is comparcd to a
painter working on the canvas of his átizens' characters (5ora-c); but
what hc paints thcre are mcrcly thc social ,~rtues needed in the city at
large, discipline and justit-e abo,·c ali (5ood). He himsclf has b<-.:.-ome,
through his philosophic activity and the perfecdy rntional order of things
to which ir has given him ac:1,-css, as godlikc as it possiblc for a human being
to be. Thc city that he paints on the model of this rational order, howc,•er,
is dcscribcd not as a d.ivine but only as a human likeness, and its general
citizenry are nor tbcmselves godlikc but only ' as pleasing to godas human
charactcrs can be' (500d vs. 501b-c).
Thc virtuous society and the virtuous individual are indeed alike in
point of virtue, and so the philosophcr - that paragon of ,•irtue - is akin
l 11trod11ctüm
w thc finest of citics, Callipol.is, the cicy rulcd by philosophcrs (435b,

498e). But considcr what this correspoodence amounts to. \Visdom
guidt-s thc lifc of the philosophically inclined individual and ensures lhat
his material desires do not grow distractingly materialisric - enforcing
that prcvention, if necessary, with the aid of an ambitious self-respect.
The analysis derives from the R,publit's theory of the tripartite soul,
according to which cach pcrson is charactcrised by a rational or wisdom-
lo,•ing elemcnt, a desiring, material, or pro6t- loving element, and an
ambitious or honour-lo,~ng element. Oniy in the truly virtuous person,
however, are these elements properly balanccd . Similarly in Callipolis
political life is under lhe guidance of wise philosophers, who ensure that
the farmcrs and artisans supplying rhe city's material needs keep to their
tasks and ocither unbalancc thc <."Conomy nor are permittcd disrupri,'C
inequalities of income, but instead only a deecnt sufficiency. Should
enforcement be required, the military class, which defends the honour of
the entire cicy, can do the policing.
&:cause of the manner in which the correspondence between society
and individual is establ.ished - bec,,usc it is a correspondencc of elemcors
and of the relations betwecn thosc clemcnts - lhe ,•irtues of thc lx-st
society and of the best individual c,,n be declared the same even though
thcy come to somcthing quite differcnt. Justice - rhat multivalcnt word,
in Greck as in English - was first discussed in connection with the
keeping of agrecments: repaying what one owes, and avoiding fraud
(331b). By fastening on thc broadest conStrual of what onc owes and is
owed, namcly as what is deserved, the discus&1on rcviews a tradicional
conccprion of justice unemancipatcd from venge:mce, accordjng to whjcb
' an eye for an cyc' is thc counterpart of 'one good turn deserves another'
- rhis is Polcmarchus' L'Ontribut.ion {331.d-336a). U ndcr Thrasyma.c hus'
provOC2tion it considcrs thc idL,a that what you descrvc is whatcvcr your
strengths and skills enable you 10 acquire for yourself. This is the ide• that
Glaucon reconfigures as the statc of nature, and against its background
justice appears once more as a matrer of keeping agreements, but in lhe
much widcr scnsc of abiding by thc convention of law.
E ventually lhe djscussion settles on a definitio o of justice as 'doing
onc's own' (433b), whcrc what is one's own is nor whatever onc is ablc to
gct, but what is best for one (586c). Callipolis is a just ciry btuusc each
of its three elements - philosopher-kings, warriors and producers - is
performing thc task to which ir is best suited, and each stands in the
appropriatc relntion to the othcrs. Thc civic life that this permirs is one
lntroductio11
of economic smbility and harmonious order - 1•alues not essentially

different from thosc of thc city of pigs, thc healthy city. The just indi-
vidual, by contra~! - hc of the healthy soul, with irs three clemcnts in
harmony (444e) - rurns out to be no conrented pig but a full-blown
philosopher, for to take wisdom as one's guide in life is nor merely to be
racional and prudent in thc ordinary sense but to makc th.e disintercstcd
purswt of undcrstanding one's ulrimate value. Only so is the rational
element l.iberared, open 10 t.hc full range of tasks for which ir is best suitcd:
not just conrrolling the other dcmcnts bur pursuing wisdom for its own
sake (441c, 581b, 586c).
The life that s ucb a person leads is, accordingly, not merdy stable and
harmonious but godlike and g)orious. 'Doing one's own', when it comes
to the individual , is more than doing one's part for thc communicy; it is
to L'Onduct the business of onesclf. Individuality is an achievemcnt, and
only lhe philosopher has the talent to •ch.ieve it, for only be provides each
elemenr in his make-up with what is best for it. A1l others may be a pari
of the just community, but cannot themselves, as individuais, bc just. As
ind.ividuals, Socrates is even prepared to cal! them the 'slaves' of the just
man, thc philosopher; as citizcns of Callipolis, howevcr, thcy are caUed by
their rulers not slaves but paymasters and providers, and regard tbose
rulers nota.~ masters but as sa,·ioun, and defenders (590d, 463b). Each
citizen is to find his lc,•el; nonc is to kt.-ep his place by virtuc of binh a.lonc,
but, in rheory at least, is to be promoted or demoted as appropriate
(41 5b-c, 4230'-d). ln this way, Socrotes attempts to preserve tbe pre-
eminence of natural superiority that Glaucon thought political life must
renoun<.-c. Yet he manages also to maintain the benefits of harmonious
coex.istence that Glaucon claimed as justifying the rule of law ia thc first
place.
The disparicy between the philosopher's ambition as an individual and
che goals of the ciry rulcd by philosophers becomes only more marked
wben we consider how the corrcspondcncc berwecn individual and
Society faUs out in its unjust forms (Books 8 and 9). lt is a spectrum of
increasing moral decay that runs from timocracy and thc timocratic rnan,
through oligarchy and democracy, and ends with tyranny and thc demon-
stration that the ryrannically inclined man who succeeds in becoming an
a.c tual ryrant is thc u.o.happicst wretch of all, and can fulfil no part of his
inncr being. (Altbough this deí.-ay is prcsentcd as a sequence intime, the
succ-cssion of regimes does not match thc hisrory known to Plato - sce pp.
xiii- xh• - or does so only in <.-ertain details, not in its general pattern. But
XX\'UJ
lntrodutlion
thc pattern is not purely symbolic. For one thing, it surrenders even
Callipolis ro the prospect of e,·enrual downfall .) Unlikc thc philosopher,
each of the lesser types of person can see only as far as a horizon set by
society. Thc timocrat sceks honou.r, thc oligarch moncy, thc dcmocrat
frccdom and equaliry, thc t)'rannical man an cxploitacive sclf-indulgcnce.
lt is not simply that these ambitions require a rclati"ely sophisticated civic
cnvironmcnt - that much was true also of philosophy - but d1at tbey
exprcss themsdvcs cntirely insocial tcrms, as a matter of onc's rclations
with others.
Mathematics and metaphysics

lt may be thought, however, that if Callipolis is ruled by wise philo-
sophers, its civic life is better than stable and harmonious, it can itself be
considercd wisc. And surcly thc carcful 6.ltcring of dccadent or socially
disruptivc imagcs and thought.s from the cducation of the guardians
could only be succcs-sful if the culrural environment of the cntirc com-
munity wcre characterised by thc austerc gracefulness with wbicb thc
military class must in particular be imbued (401b-<I)? Certainly, chc
Repuh/ic contains one of the earLiest extended analyses (in Books 2, 3 and
10) of thc powcr of culcu.ral artcfacts of ali sort.s to mould thc cthos of
large groups - a type of analysis fumiliar in our day from t'Ontroversies
over the inRuence of advertisenients and the ccnsorsbip of pornographic
or violent imagcs. Yet evcn thc inhabitants of so primitivc a place as thc
city of pigs sang prais.:-s to thc gods - onc part of thc poctry pcrmittcd in
Callipolis, with its verses in praisc of thc gods and of good men (372b,
6o7a). Similarly, the gracefulncss instilled in the guardians by their
musical and poetic education aims at and reílects nothing more elevated
than so<.-ial harmony and cobcsivencss, rogcther with a picty and a parri-
otism that faU short of true understanding (386a, 389d-e, 522a).
Thc education of thc most ta.lcntcd among them does not stop,
howc,rcr, at thc musical and poctic, but <.-ontinucs with mathcmatics and
philosophy. (Indecd, in rerrospect it is suggcstcd that e,·en the youngsters
should be made familiar with basic mathcmatics, 536d.) lt is thc public
policy of thc socicty as a wholc that supports this highcr 1.-ducarion, and
provides the conditions in wbich thosc with a gift for philosophy can fulfil
themselves both intellectually and morally. Tbese are conditions that
neither a healthy but rudimentary community nor in its differcnt way a
sophisticated but dec:ident city can providc. Hcre, in a political S)'Stcm
XXJX
lntroduc.1íon
worrhy of him, the philosopher's 'own growth will be greater, and he will
be the salV11tion of bis country as well as of himse.l f' (497a; compare 492a).
On the other h-,111d, when in Book 4 the whole ciry ruled by guardians is
declared wise by virtue of tbe koowledge possesscd by its ruling class
alone, that knowlcdgc has rhc ciry for its objecr - it is expertise in domes-
tic and foreign policy (428d). Only later in tbe discus_sion does Socrates
make it dcar that thc knowlcdgc which rruly qualifies a guardian to rule
is philosophic wisdom, having for its object the whole cosmos (484d,
486a). The question is, bow intimate is the connection between tbis
knowledge nnd th.e philosopher's political activiry?
lt is a question surprisingly difficult to answer. As part oí the process
of qualifying for political power, the guardians are given ten years' edu-
cation dcvoted to advanced matbematics, crowned by five years of 'dialec-
tic' . About dialcct.ic Plato is dcliberatcly cagcy. Ir is or involv~-s
philosophic disputation, as befirs its etymological connection witb the
Greek word for 'conversation' (534d, 539b--d); it takes a global, unifying
vicw of its copie (537c); it aims to disco,•er tbc definitions of things, and
thereby the uochanging principies of ali that exists - the 'forms' - arriv-
ing finally ac an understanding of lhe ultimatc principie, th.e form of tbc
good (511b-c, 532a- b, 533b). But weare noc told how it achieves this feat,
and scholars dispute whecber dialectical activity is some kind of meta-
mathemati~-s, or whethcr it quite transcends the ground that mathemat-
ics has prcpared.
On tbe one hand, ten years of mathemarics seems too longa stretch for
a srudy that would merely be meant to sharpen the intellect in a general
way. Yet wc need not regard the education of tbe philosopher-king, at the
othcr extreme, as an internalisation of roathematical structures that funo-
tion as blueprints for applying bis knowlcdge of the good to thc social
world. This would have the consequence rhat, when we read of philo-
sopbe.rs looking ro thc forms in order to paint virtues ou the canvas of the
citizens' character, we should take thcm to bc embodying in socicty a
mathematical proportion whose strucrure they hm•e first discovered in
abstraction.
A middlc ground bctween thesc 1wo positions would be the following.
A fuU tcn yL-ars' preparation i.n mathematics is required because only long
exposure to the rational order of its objecrs, in combination witb diako-
tic, ean su~-cced in transmitting 10 the soul of the sympathetic le.trner a
similarly rational order and proportion (500c}. This is consonant with tbe
cnnobling cff'ects attributcd to the srudy of astronomy and cosmic
XXX
lntrodul/Üm
harmony in the Tima,w (47b, 90d). Once educated, however, the politi-
c:il ,coe to which the philosopher- k.ing puts his ,natbemntical and ,malytic
trainjng consists in rcsolving particular problcms that arisc whilc hc is
taking his turn at running thc ciry. 1-[c do<.-s nor apply his mathcmatical
expertisc co the overall structurc of the community and its institutions.
He has inhcritcd that structure - ultimately, from Socratcs as 'founder'
of the imaginary city (519c) - and is cha~>d sirnply to preserve it. Thc
fn.-quent glanccs back and forth at· thc painter's model, thc crasurcs and
corrections - thcse would represent the work of day-to-dai• judgment,
minor lcgislation, and management of established irc<ititutions, whose
dctails Socratcs claims therc is no nccd to supply (501.b; compare 423c,
425d). Book 5 of Aristolle's Nicomad1C1111 Etlrir.s 11crhaps gives us some
idea how mathematics was tbought relevant to such work. lts topic is
ju.sticc, but its t"1k is mostly of 'proportionate equality', 'diagonal
excbaoge' and the like - coocepts in,•olved, <>0 thc one hand, in the cco-
nomics of just distribution and comrncrcc, and, on thc othcr, in thc ratios
of gain and loss, reward and penalti•, that makc for rectificarory justice.
The work of running Gtllipolis and assuring the continu,nce of its
si·stcm is regarded by philosophcrs not as a privilcge, not as somcthing
grand, but as a neccssity (540b; compare 52oe, 347d). Each t:1kcs his rour
of duty, but finds his greatest Jlleasure in philosophic activity, conducred
in the company of his peers. His attirude towards politic:il life is intrigu-
ingly reminisccnt of that which G laucon attributcd to the conventionally
just person, for whom justice is a compromisc to bc pracrisL-d not will-
ingly, as onc would practise somcthing thought to bc beneficial, but rather
as something unavoidable (358c). There is this djfterence, however,
berwecn thc two attirudes: thc philosophcr does not rulc unwillingly - ar
lcast if that is ta.ken to mcan that he would avoid ruling if hc could - but
rathcr in rL-cognition of what is necessary if things are to turn out for the
best, both for bimself and for his fellow-citizens (592a, 52oc--d). Tbe
grand and godlikc thing is only philosophy, but the philosophcr is noc
only a philosophcr. Fie is a human bcing, bcsct by a ,•aricty of nceds and
desires, adrift amid a variety of fellow bumao beings. Because he is a
pbilosopher, he makes thc bcst of thi.ngs - for only in a paradisc whcrc
souls are sirnply wi.~e could thc best altcrnative be to cngage in continu-
ous and pcrfect contemplation (5 19c- d, 611c~612a). The politic-s of the
Repuhlic draws its streogtb from a sense of loss.
X-XXI
A guide to further reading
Bibliographical note to the introduction

For those who wish to c,cplorc issucs arising directly from thc cditor's
introducrion, lhe following works are recommended.
For the general h istorical and cultural background , fundamental
and remarkably livcly are thc volumes of The Cambridge Ancient History,
2nd edition, that deal respectively with rhe fifth and the fourth ccnturies
oc: vol. v, ed. O. lvl. Lewis et ai. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers-ity
Press, 1992) and vol. VI [abbr. CAH 6), ed. O. i\1 . Lewis ,i ai. (Cambridge:
Cambridge Universiry Press, 1994). An important work of reference is K.
J. D,wer, Greck Popular ft'lorality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, repr. lndianapolis: Hackett, 1994).
A dcrailed account of the rulc of thc Tbirty can be found i.n Pcter
Krent7~ Tl,t Tltirty at Athens (Ilhaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
Plaro's l.etteN can be studied in the translarion, with criticai essays, of
Glen R. J\1orrow, Plato 's Epistles ([ndianapoLis: Bobbs Merrill, 1962).
J\1. i\1. Austi.n gives a succinct account of faction in CAH 6 pp.
528-535 ('Social and political conllicts'). There is a full survey in A. W.
Lintott, Violtnct, Civil S1,ij; 1<nd Revolution in the Classical City, 75<>-330
BC (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). Martin Ost11•.tld,
From Popular Sovereignty to 1h, Sover,ignty of La11J: la11J, Sorieiy a,id
Politin in FifU,-C,ntury At/,e11s (Berkeley: U nivcrsicy of C'.alifornia Press,
1986), is a detailed conceptual history. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Class
S1ruggl, in the Ancient Greek Wor/d: From the Archaic Ag, to the Arab
Con1J11es1s (llhaca: Cornell Uni,•ersity Press, 1981 ), views lhe iss:tit-s from
a Marxist pcrspt-ctivc. An important study of política] groupings at
XXXII
A gui,k wfurthtr rtading
Atheos is W. Robert Connor, The Ne0 Politicia11s of Fifih-C,111ury Athens

(Princeton: Princeton U niversiry Press, , 971, repr. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1992).
A very readablesocial history ofSparta and of its polarÍL)' with J\thens
is Ant.on PoweU, A1he11s 1md Sparu.: Constr11cti11g Greek Política/ a11d
Social fiistory from 478 BC (London: Routledge, 1988). The account of
the Repuhlic givcn by \V. K. C. Guth.rie, A History of Grtek Philosophy ,
v-ol. rv [Plato: 111t M1111 and His Dialogues, Ear/i,r Peri,Já) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), is reprcsentativc of the approach to
the Republic's utopianism that undcrsta.n ds CaUipolis as a personal ideal
(see esp. pp. 483- 486). M. F. Burnycac, 'Utopia and fanrasy: thc practica-
bility of Placo's idcally just ciry': 175- 187 in Jim Hopkins and Anrh ony
Savile, cds., Psychoa11a./ysis, Mind and Ar1: l',rspectives 011 Richard
l¼lll,dm (Oxford: Blackwel~ 1992), argues that Plato was serious about
the polirical rcforms projc-ctcd in Callipolis. Thc approacb tbat puts in
question whcther Plato intcndcd CalJipolis cven to sccm desirnblc is
identified witb Leo Strauss: see the second chaptcr ('On Plato's Repuhlic')
of The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). T he
intcrprctive cs.say in A.lan Bloom's translation of the Rtpublic (New York:
Basic Books, 1968) is a more acccssiblc ,•ersion of this approach. A survey
of utopian theory is included in \V. Robert Connor's chapter 'Historie-ai
writing in the fourtb ccntury oc and in the Hellenistic period': 458-471
in P. E. Eastcrling and B. ,\.!. \V. Knox, cds., Tlte Cambridg, History of
Classir11/ Literature, vol. 1 [Greek LiteratureJ (Cambridge: Cambridge
Unrvcrsity Press, 1985). The chaptcr is also relcvant to thc issues men-
tioncd next.
A widc sckcrion of pol.itical theory before Plato, including impor-
tant but relarivcly obscure texL~ such as thc 'Old Oligarch' and the frag-
ments of Cririas, is rranslared in Nlichacl Gagarin and Paul \Voodruff,
cds., Early Gruk Política/ Tlwuglttfrom Hmner 111 the Sopltists [Cambridge
Texts in the 1-listory of Politic-al Thoughr) (Cambridge: Cambridge
U niversity Prcss, 1995). On Xenophon as a política! writcr and Socratic
scc thc chaptc.r by Christopher Bruell in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey,
eds., History of Political Philo,ophy (3rd cdn, Chicago: Univcrsity of
Chicago Press, 1987). Martin Ostwald and John Lynch givc an ac<.-ount of
Isocrates and of the relation berween his and Plato's schools in chapter
12a of CAH 6 ('The growth of schools and the advance of knowledge').
Thc opcning chaptcr of Charles Kahn's Plato and rh, Sorraric Dialogue:
Tltt P/1i11JSopl1ic Use of a Litera~y Form (Cambridge: Cambridge
XXXJJJ
A g,iide to fiirtlrer readi11g
University Prcss, 1996) is a survcy of the ütcraturc written by die

Socratics as a group. D iskin Clay, 'The origins of the Socratic dialogue':
23- 47 in Paul A. Vandcr \Vaerdt, cd., Tlie Socratic Moveme111 (lthac'll:
CorneU University Press, 1994), analyses tbe models and the background
for Socratic d.i alogue as a literary form. Thc classic modero work on the
Pythngorcans is \Valter Burkcrt, Lore a11d Sci,11,·e i11 A11ci,111
Pythagorea11is111 (trans. E. M:inar, Jr., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1972). for the política! involvement of n1erobers of
P lato's Acadeiny, in addition to chapter 12a of CAR 6 mentioned in
this paragraph, scc chaptcr ro ('Plato's acadcmy and politics') of P. 1\.
Brunt, Studies i11 Crcek H istOr)' cmd T/1ought (Oxford: Clarcndon Press,
r993), which includes ao account of Plato's coonections -.irh the elder
and younger Dion ysius, asdochapters 5 and 13 of CAH 6(David Lewis'
'Sic.;ly, 413- 368 BC' and H. O. \Vcstlakc's 'Dion and Timoleon').
On pp. xxü- xxv of the introduction: the controversy o,,er whclher the
R,,puh/iç should be considered a proto-fascist work carne to a head with
thc publication of ,·ui. r of Karl Popper, The Ope11 Sor.ie()' mui it.s E11emies
(London: Routledge 1945; last revised edn 1966). The question can be
proficably studied in thc coUection of articlcs Pia to, Popper a,id Politics,
ed. R. Bambruugh (Cambridge: licffcr, 1967).
On pp. xxv-xxxi of the introducrion: see the works on psychology, on
metaphysics, and on mathernatics listed under lhe hcading 'Specific
aspects of Plato's rhought and of thc Repuhlie'.
General studies of Pia to and of Tlze Republic

Two good introductory book..s on Plato are Bernard \Villiams, Plato (New
York: Routledge, 1999), and C. J. Rowe, Plato [Philosophcrs in Context]
(New York: Sr Martin's Press, 1984). G. M. A. Grube, Pfoto's Thought
(2nd cdn, lndianapolis: Hackett, 1980) rcmains useful. The discussioo of
thc Repuhlie in vol. rv of Guthric's Jíistor11 of Creek Philosophy (full ref-
crcnce ar p. xxiii above) is useful in its own right andas a goteway to more
particular topics; and thc sarne can be said of Guthrie's entire account of
Plaw and of particular dialogues in vols. ,v and v. Ernest Barkcr's classic
Greek Politiea./ Th,ory (London: Metbuen, 1918), despitc its titlc, is
devotcd cntirc.ly to Plato and the pre-Platonic context of political
lhought. George Klosko, The Developm,111 of Pia.to·., Politiea/ Theo~J'
(New York: Methuen, 1986), is a useful modero discuss'ioo of political
rhcmcs in lhe dialogues.
XXXIV
A gui,k to fiirth,r r,adi11g
R. L. Nettleship, L,ctures on tltt R,puhlfr t1f Plato (2nd edn, London:

Macrnillan, 1901) i., sti.lJ wel.l worth rcading. Bernard Bosanquct, A
Co111panio11 to Plato's Republic for f:.'11glisl, Readers (2nd edn, London:
Rivingtons, 1925), which is a philosophic commentary keyed to a
transfation, rcmains interesting, especially for its Hegelian perspectivc.
Two books of value from mid-cenrury are 1• R. il\1urphy, Tlie
l111erpretatio11 of Plato'r R,public (Oxford: Clare.n don Press, 1951),
anel, ar a more introductory levcl, R. C. Cross and A. D. \Vooz.ley,
Plato '.< Reftuhlic: A Philosophic Comme11tary (London: Macmillan,
1963). The subsequent generation of works written by philosophers
and intended as incroductions includes Nicholas P. \1/hite, A
Compa.,,ion to Plato's R, publit (Oxford: BlackwelJ, 1979) and Julia
Annas, A11 In1roduction to Pfa,to's Retmhlir (Oxford: Clarc.ndon Press,
1981 ). More ambitious are C. 0. C. RL-cvc, Philosopher-Ki11gs: Tl,e
A rg11me11t of P/ato 's Repub/ic (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), and 't H . lrwin, Plato's Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Prcss, 1995) - a work wbich, whilc not cxclusi,·ely about the Republic,
gives •n inJlucntial accouot of its theory of justice. Studics that show
the influcnce of Strauss (sec p. x:xiij abovc) and are important in their
own right indudc Scth Benardctc, Sor.rates' Serond Saili11g: 011 Plato's
Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), aod Leon
Craig, The iVar [.o-ser: A Study of Pinto 's Repuhlic (Toronto:
U niversity of Toront0 Prcss, 1994).
Specific aspects of Plato's thought and of The Repuhlic

Thcrc is an cxtcnsivc bibliography arranged by topic in Richard Kraut,
ed. , Tire Cambridgt CompanitJn to P/a./o (C.ambridge: Cambridge
Univcrsity Prcss, 1992).
Those who wish to investigate the m etaphysical thcmes sounded in
thc Republic cou.ld bcgin with cbapter 9 of the Compa.nion just mentioned,
Nicholas P. \Vhitc's ' Plaro's mctaphysical episre,n ology', and move on to
the more adventurous territory of Richard Patterson's lmage and Reality
in Pla1t1's ~1,taphysics ([ndianapolis: Hackctt, 1985) and the difficult but
brilliaot work oí Terry Penner, 7k Asi-ent from Nominalism: Sumi!
E,-is1enee Argumen1s ;,, Pia/o 's 1Widdle Dialogue.< (Dordrccht: Reide!,
1987). Quite diffcrent is the approach of thc 'Tübingen school', which
understands thc metaphysical arguments contained in the dinlogues as
allusions to a Platonic mctaphysics never dcseribcd in them . Little of this
XXXV
A guide '" furthtr rrading
work is available in English, but note the succinct and accessible account
by Thomas A. Szlezák, Readi11g Pia.to (Ncw York: Routlcdge, 1999).
For Plaro's psycho logy in general, cons-ulr the accounts given by
Sabina L,ovibond, 'Plato's theory of mind': 35- 55 in Stephen Everson,
ed., PrycholotrJ, [Companions to Ancient Thought] (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Charles Kahn, 'Plato's theory of
desire', Re11iefl) of Metaphytits 41 ( 1987) 77-103. Probing modero studies
of the tripartite soul in the Republic include Bernard \\1illiams, 'The
analogy of city and soul in Plato's Republic': 196-206 in E. N. Lec e/ ai.,
eds., E.ugesis a11d Argume111 (Phronuis supplementary vol. 1, 1973), and
John M. Cooper, 'Plato's theory of human motivntion', H111ory 1,f
Philosophy Quarterly 1. r ( 1984) 3-21. Tbey should be read alongside tbe
quite diff'erentJ. L. Stocks, 'Plato and the tripartite sou!', Mind 24 (1915)
207- 221.
For discussion of Plato on literature and culture see G. R. F.
Ferrari, 'Plato and poetry': 9z.-r48 in George Kenned)', ed., 11,,
Camhridg, Histo~J' of Literary Crititism, vol. 1 [Classical Criticism)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Christopher J anaway,
fmages ~/' E.,·cell,nce: Pia-to 's Critique of the Arts (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), and M. F. Burnyeat, 'Culture and society in Plato's
Repuhlic', Ta-nner Út'IW'ts on Huma11 Voluts 20 (1999) 215- 324. For a
differcnt pcrsptx:tive, see chapter 3 ('Plato and thc pocts') of H.- G.
Gadamer, Dialogue a11d Dialectic: Eight flermeneu.tica/ Studits on Plato
(trans. P. Christopher Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
Andrew Barker, Greek 1\11L<Í&a.f /Vrirings (2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge
Universiry Press, 1984, 1989) includes an an.n otatcd ttanslat1on of all pas--
sages in PI.a to baving to do with mu.sic. For the wider conrext, see H . 1.
i\1arrou, Th, History ~f Educatio11 in Anriquity (trans. G. Lamb, New
York: Sheed and \\lard, 1956).
lan J\,lueller provides a useful sun,ey of the place of mathematics in
Plat.o's rhought in his 'J\1athematical metbod and philosophic truth',
chapter 5 of Tl,e Ca111bridg, Companit>n to Pia to (full reterence at p. Kxxv
aboYe). Importam studit'S that takc opposing vicws of mathematies are F
i\·l. Cornford, 'Matht.matics and diakx:tic in the Repuhlic v1- v11', A-1ind 41
(1932) 37- 52; repr.: 61--95 in R. E. Allen, ed., Sh,dies in Plato's
J.1etaphysics (London: Routledge, 1965), and J\,I, F. Burnyear, ' Pia.LO on
why mathcmatics is good for the soul', in 1: Smiley, ed., Jl.1athemtttit> a11d
Necessío, in tire ffisto~y of Philosophy [Dawes Hicks Leetures on
Philosophy, British Academy] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) .
.XXXVI
A guide to fi1r1h,r readi11g
Cornford emphasises disrinctions bctween thc mathcmarical and rhc

moral in rhe &public, Burnyeat emphasiscs their kinship. The standard
history of Greek mathematics as a whole is that of T. L . Heath, A Hi$IITT'y
of Creek 1Wa1hemalics (2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Prcss, 1921, repr. ew
York: Dover, ,98, ). A classic study of rhe curriculum in Plato's Academy
and of the place of mathematics within it is Harold Cherniss' Thc Riddle
of lhe Early Academy (Berkeley: University of C'.alifornia Press, t 945,
repr. New York: Garland, 1980).
XXX\'11
Principal dates
The chronology includes no guesses as to when Plato wrote the vnrious

dialogues. For che issues and difficulúes involvL-d in such attcmpcs, scc thc
quick overvicw in pp. x ii-xviii of the intro<luction to John ~I. Coopc.r, ed.,
Pia.to: Complete tVork., (]ndianapolis: Hackctt, 1997), or the full tre:it-
ments of Holger Thesleff, S111dies in Plato11ic Chrorwlogy ( Comm,nta.tio11,s
H11111a11aru111 LÍlterarum 70, 1982), and Leonard flrandwood, Tire
C/rr()tl(JÚJgy of Pluto's Dialogue., (Ôlmbridgc: ôimbridgc U niversity
Prcss, 1990).
Plato PolÍlical ev,11ts

431 War dcclared bcrwccn
Athens and Sparta
('Pcloponnesian \.'{ar')
427 Bi.r th of Plato
411 Oligarchic revoluúon of
'Thc Four Hundred' at
Atht.'11S
410 Ocmocracy rcsr.ored at
Atbens
405 Oionysius I of S)•racusc
rises to power
404 Spartan victory over
Arhens, oligarchic regime
of 'The Thirty' imposed
403 Democra.cy rcsrored at
Achcns
x:uviii
Prindpt,/ dates
Plato Politica/ event.,

399 Execution of Socratt"S
395 Arhcns, Thebes, Corinth
in allinncc agninSl' $parta
('Corintbian \\lar')
388 Visits south ItaJy and
S icily, meetS Archytas
the Pythagoreao and
Dionysius I of S yracusc
e. 387 Founds Academy after
return to Athcns
386 'Thc King's Pcace'
imposcd b)' Persin on thc
pareies to the Coriothian
\\/ar
386--378 Sparta in the asceodnot in
thc aftermarh of the
King's Pc-ace
378 1\theos aod Thebes in
alliance againsr Spana;
fo undation of Second
Atheniao League
371 Thebcs dcfeats Sparta at
Leuctra; Spurtan military
supremacy comes to an
cnd
3;~362 Thcbes in thc aS<--cndanr
after Leuctra; A1hens io
alliaocc with Sparta
against Thcbes
367 Death of Diooysius l of
Syrncuse; Dionysius II
succeeds him
36;-366 Plato visits Dionysius
ll in Sicily
361- 36o Plato rc,·isirs Dionysius
11
XXXIX
Pri11dpr,/ dotes
Plato Political rot11ts

36o Philíp Ir (father of
Akxander thc G,-e.11)
accedes co rhrone of
l\,tncedon and begins ro
build empire in G~;
Athens ar first in alliance,
but from 357 onwards ac
war with Macedon
357 Diooysius JJ is oustcd by
Dion, member of the
Syrncusan royal family
and Plato's conJidru11 and
srudent
354 Dion is assassinaced
347 Death of Plato
338 Fin21 vic1ory of Plúlip of
Macedon at Chlleronea
xl
Abbreviations and conventions
CA/16 D. Nl. Lewis cl 11/., eds., The Cambridge Ancicnt HiJtory, 2nd
eilirion, vol. V1 [ The Fourth C,111ury RC) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994)
DK H. Diel,, Die Fragmente der Vorsol!rariker (6th cdn, rcv. \V.
Krn.n:i, Bcrlin: \Vcidmann, 1951- 1952)
EGPT 1\•lichael Gagarin and Paul \Voodruff, cds., bariJ• Greek Political
Tlu,ught from Homer '" the Sophists (Cambridge Tcxts in thc
History of Polirical Thought] (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995)
GPA1 K. J. Do,•er, Gr,el, Popular ,Horality i11 the Time of Plato and
Anstotle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, repr. lndianapolis: Hackett,
1994)
Line references co works by ancient Greek prose writers are kcycd to rhc
Oxford Classical Text.
xli
Eclitor's synopsis of The Republic
B ook 1
3,27a: Socrates and Glaucon are dctai.ncd at thc Piracus. Tbe sccnc is sct
ar Polemarchus' house (328b). - 328c: Socratcs converses with Cephalus
about old age (328c) and 1J1c benefits of wealth (329c), and introcluce.ç thc
t.opic of justic.:: (33,c): it is not símply a maner of bcing truthful and
rerurning what one ow<.-s. - 331d: Oiscussion bctwecn Socrates and
Polcmarchus. Justice, it i.s proposed, is• matter of giving whé,t is appro-
priatc: to fricnds, giving good, 10 cnemics, bad (332c). Dut in what context
(33zd)? And won't rhe just person also be best at injustice (333e)? Besidcs,
who 11re our friends and enemies (334c)? And is it just to treat even an
enemy badly (335b)? - 336b: Thra,,-ymachus spcaks up. His definition:
justice is whnt is good for the stronger (338c). Bur does this m<."'1n: what•
ever thc str0ngc.r 1/1i1tks is good (339b)? Clarification is volunteercd by
Polemarc.h us and Clcitophon (340a). Thrasymac.hus insists that the
srronger, to the extent that he is stronger, does not make mistakes {34.od).
Socrates counters with an aoalysis of art or skilt it ain1s ar what is good
for its object, not its praclitioner (341 e). Thrasym, .c hus objects: shcp-
herds do mit aim at what is good for thcir sheep (343b) . Socrates distin-
guishcs thc shcpherd's concern for his shccp from his concern to earn a
living (345c). He suggests that the bcst rulers are rclucmnc to rule {347a).
He offers three argun1en1s in fo,,our of the just lifc over thc unjusr life: (i)
thc just m:m is wisc and good, the unj,L~ mao ignnrant and bad (349b);
(ii) injustice produces internai disharmony and prevcors cffective action
(351b); (üi) thc just person li,•cs a happi<.-r Jife than the unjuSt person
(352d). But it remains to be discovered what justice is (354b).
xlü
Editar's sy11opsis o/The Rcpublic
Book2
357a: Glaucon, as dcvil's advocatc, rcnews Thrasymachus' challenge. -
359a: His spcech againSt justice: (i) ju:,'ticc has itS o rigin in a compromise;
(ü) is practiscd only because unavoidable (ilic Gyges stor y) (359c); (iii) is
dcsir.ible only for its rewards, which c:an be gained by thc mcre appcar-
ance of justice (36oe). - 362d: i\deiro•ntus' spcech reinforcing Glaucon's
critique. Two ways of dcscribing justice are widesprcad: as something
praiscworthy not for irsdfbut for its rewards (363a), or ru; something dis-
soc.út.ed from ple-.isurc and happincss (364a}; both thcsc ,,icws tcnd to
corrupt the young (365b). Socrarcs is rcquested to proisc justice for itself,
not for t.he rcput11tion it brings (367b). - 368a: Socrntes comes to the
defcncc of justi<.-c. Hc proposcs co look for justice in thc city first, thcn for
itS equiv-~lenr in thc individual; and begins by imagining the origins of
civic We (369a). - 372c: ln response ro Glaucon's objection t.hat this hypo-
tbetical city is uncivilised, Socrarcs describes instcad a luxurious city. He
proposcs l'.hat a professional army will be ncedcd to guard the citr (373c),
made up of guardians wbo must be fierce to cnen1ics but gcntlc to their
own 1x.-ople (375c), anel educatcd with s-pecial care (376d). Traditional
stories about l'.hc gods are t.o bc cens.orcd (377b); god shoulel bc prcscntcd
to thcm as good, anel as a cause only of good (3793); also as unch•nging
(38od), andas rcfraining from dcccption (381e).
Book3
386a: Discussion of the guardians' education continues. The qualitics
that storics should promotc in them, in addition to t.he rcspcct for
aurhoriry anel rhe S-OCial harmony alrcady considcrcd, are (i) courogc
(386b), (ii) rcsistant-c to gricf (387d), (iii) rcsistance to loughter (388c),
(iv) res-pcct for truili, but including a willingness to tcU lies when neces-
sary (389b), (v) self-discipline (389d}. - 392d: Discussion turns from l'.hc
contentS of stories to the manncr in which thcy are told, and Socrates
makcs a distinction between sirnple narra.tive and narrath·e through Ílni·
tation. He irnposcs limitations on thc guardians' familiarity with and
performance of imitati,-c poctry (394e). Thcy s hould confine thcmselvcs
to the austcrc srylc anel not use e.ithcr thc elaborate or thc mi.~cd stylcs
(396c). - 398c: Equivalcnl «-stric.tions are imposed on the typcs of music
10 bc included in the guardians' education. - 400c: Finally, Socratcs
makcs a generalisation about thc importancc of good art in forming good
xliü
Editor's sy11opsis ofThe Rcpublic
charactcr, and connccts the be:iuty of art with thc beauty that iospires
crotic attnchmcnt (402d). - 403c: Turning ro r.hc guardians' physical
education, SOLTatcs rccommends a SLTaightforward diet and a,•oidance of
recoursc to doctors, which he associatcs with thc avoidance of litigation
(404c). Physical education should aim to bcne6t thc soul rathcr t.han tbe
body (410b); a balance betwccm intcllcct and s piritcdness is the ideal
(41 od). - 412b: Socrures describes how rulers should be selccted from
among the guardians. He dcsigns a patriotic myth to be believed by sub--
scqucnt generations in thc n.ewly foun.ded city (414c), an.d bricíly
sk.::rchcs the b'llardians' social organisation, forbiddi ng tbcm privatc
propcrty (4 r 5d).
Book4
4 r9a: Adeimantus objccts: \Vill the guard.i ans be happy (419a)? Soc.mt<--S
explains Llmt the task is to make the whole city huppy, not any particular
group within it (4.20b). Hc mentions further rcquiremcnrs ,f the city as a
whole is 10 bc happy: both its wealth (4.2 td) and iL~ size (423b) must be
limired. He emphasises once more thc importnnec of education (423e),
and urges .:.'Onservatism whcn it coml'S to amending laws (425c). For its
religiow1 rimais the city can defer to t.he traditional authorities (427b). -
427d: Now that the c:ity has becn thcoretically c.ttablished, discusiri.on
turns to its justice. Socrarcs proposes t.h:it irs justic.:: will bc what remai.ns
aftcr irs wisdom, eoumge and sclf-d isciplinc havc been idcnri/ied (427c).
Thc city's \l'ÍSdom is locatcd in its ruling class (428b); its courage is
located in thc army (4290); and its self-discipline consists in the fact tbat
it~ subjects are willing to bc r uled by thosc best suitcd to rulc (430d ). Its
justice, fin.illy, is a matter of each class performing its proper fun.ction
(432b). - 434d: The corresponding virtues in the individual are now to
be identificd. F irst, thc general corrcspondence between city and indi-
vidual is defended (435a), prompting the qucstion wbether the three
elemenrs in tbc sou!, cor rcsponding ro thc rhrce classes in the ciry, have
distinct functions (436b). Socrates disringuishes thc function of thc
racional from that of the d~siri1tg clemcnt (439a), and rhat of the spirited
dcment from cach of the others in niru (439c, 44oe). Hc explains how
the ,,irrues of the individual correspond in the<r clcmcnts and thcir struc-
rure to tbose of thc city (441c). An individual is jusr when each of thc
elemcnts internai ro his soul pcrforms its propcr function (442d). Tb.is
accounr is computible with conventionnl beljefs (442e). Justice, then, is a
:div
Editor', synopsis ofThc Rcpublic
hcalthy b>Alancc of tbc soul's components, and injustice an unhealthy

i.mbalancc (444c). - 445a: Socrates now comes to the quesrion whicb
Glaucon and Adeimantus originally askcd him to anS\,·c,: which is mo re
profitablc, justice or injustice? A proper rcsponsc will rcquirc cxamina-
tion of the various unjust societies and of thc unjust individuais that cor-
respond to cach.
Book s
449a: Socrates is about to describc the varicties of unjust society when
hc is distractcd by a whispercd transaction between Polemarchus and
Adcimantus. [nvitcd to sp<-"1k up, thcy dcmand a more dctailed account
from him of the proposal lhat womcn and childrcn should bc hcld in
common among the gu.ardians. - 451c: Socrates begins with ao argun1cn1
that female mcmbers of thc guardian dass should pcrform the sarne tasks
as malc guardians. Agai.nst thc objcction that womcn should bc assigncd
diffcrent rasks from mcn bct-ausc thcy diffcr from mcn by naturc (453b),
he rcsponds that lhis natural difference is not rclcvant when it comes 10
running a city (453e). Having shown thar tltis proposal is fe:isiblc, he also
argues that it is optimal (456c). - 457d: Socrates' second proposal is that
thcre should bc no separotc fa m.ilies among thc guardi:ms. He postpones
considcratio n of its fcasibiliry i.n ordcr to consider its opti.mality (458a),
and begins by explai.ning lhe sexu,tl and CUb'Cllic rcgulations lhat will be
req uircd of the guardians (458c), bcforc dcscribing how thcsc arrange-
mcnts will achicvc a unicy among Lhe 1,ruardians that can Lhcn cxrcnd to
all the citizens (46za). He points out that, living this way, lhe guardians
are likdy 10 be C.Ytremely happy (465d). Once agai.n the fcasibil.ity of
thesc arrangcmcnrs is moorcd (466d). Socrarcs launches i.nro an ae<.-ounc
of how rhe guardians will make war {466e.), but is presc.ndy interruptcd
by G laucon, who demands to b1ow preciscly how ir is possible for a
socicry such as this to come into being (471c). - 472a: After • preamble
c.xplaining that chc theorctical modcl of the ideal cicy rcmains val.id even
if its foasibility cannot be dcmonstrated, Socra1cs rc,,'J)Onds that the
model t-annot become realicy unlcss philosophcrs becomc kings, or kings
philosophers (473c). To justify this claim, an analysís of philosophy is
requircd (474b). Only philosophcrs rccognisc and take pleasu.re in the
single form behind thc multiplicit)' of appearwiccs (476a). Socrates
olfers an argument to distinguish thc philosopher's knowledge from
mcrc opinion (476e).
xlv
Editor'., synopsis ofThc Rcpublic
Book 6
484a: Gi,•cn the superior d iscernment of philosophers, Socrat('S continues,
it is to the.m thar the ciry should look for guidance, provided they can also
be shown to be capable of gaining practical experience and of achieving the
full range of hu.man virtue. The characrer tnits of the philosophcr do in
facr covcr this range, being !ove of learning, truthfulness, self-discipline,
greatncss of spirit, cou.rage, justice, quickne.~s of mind, good mcmory,
refine.mcn1 and charm (485a). - 487a: AdeimanLUS objt...:LS that actual
philosophers are either uscless or bad. Socrates responds with an analogy
(rhe ship of ~'!ate) to show thar it is not philosophcrs who are LO biame for
thcir uselessncss, but those who rcfuse to makc use of tht'Jll (488rt). lic
describes how che philosophic nature tcncls, because of its very ex~-ellence,
to become distorted by society, which would ignore a less outsranding char-
actcr (489c). Hc wa.rns against various impostors who claim rhc mande of
philosophy (495c), and who far outnumber eh.e few philosophcrs who
manage to escape corruption by society (496b). Hc explains how it is pos-
siblc for a cit)' to cope with the challenge of philosophy (497d), and tO
b«-ome frce of the prejudice against it (500a). He condudcs th•t Callipolis
is both oprima] and not unfcasiblc (502c). - 502d: Turning tO rhc qucstion
of how philosopher- kings should bc educated, Socrares argues that cheir
most important branch of study will bc thc study of thc good (505a), and
offcrs ch.rcc analogies to explain it: (i) the sun (507a); (ü) the lioe (509d ).
Book 7
5143: Tbe final analogy to explain thc study of l'he good is thar of (iii) the
cave. Education oughr to rurn thc eyc of the sou! mvay from che shadows
wich which it is surroundcd in thc cave of sociccy and lcad ir to truc
undcrsranding in thc sunlit world abovc (518c). But philosophcrs w ho
attain this undcrstanding must be made to rcturn to rhe cave and rulc
rherc (519d). - 521d: Soe.rates cxplains how ir is the srudy of machemat-
ics that will do rhe job of drawing chc soul out of the cave. ·He analyses
each br.inch of m athcmntics in turn: (i) aril'hmctic and nu.mbcr (522c); (ii)
plane geometry (526c); (iii) solid geometry (528b); (iv) asrronomy (528c);
(v) barmonics (530d). - 531d: The culminarion of thc philosopher-king's
education is the study of dialectic, which brings him to undersrand rhe
good. But Socr2tes cannot givc Glaucon a clcar idea of what dialectic is,
or how ir achieves its cnd. - 535a: lnsread, thcy discuss what qualification.s
xlvi
Etlitor's synopsis o/Tbe Republic
are neccssary for sucb a course of srudy, and at whar age the various
studies should be undenaken (536d). Socrate~ concludes with • sugges-
tion about the easicst way to bring CalJipol.is inro being (541 a).
Book8
543a: Socrates aod Glaucon take stocl:. of thc argument so for, and resume
the topic that was interrupted at the beginning of Book 5. The four main
typcs of uojust regime wiJI be system•tically described, together with the
corresponding rypcs of unjust individual, beginning with the least degen-
era te and procL-cding to the moSt. Socratcs once again offcrs a general
justification of the correspondence between city and indi.,idual (544e). -
545b: 1-lc explain.~ how timocracy arise~ from aristocracy, tbc charactcris-
tics of timocracy (5,17d), thc character of thc corrcspondingly timocratic
individual (548d), and how an individual bccomes timocratic (549c). -
55oc: Oligarchy. How it arises from timocracy, irs cbaracteristics (551c),
how thc corre.'>!)ondingl)' oligarchic indi,'ÍduaJ becomcs oligarchic (553t1),
and what his charncter is (554a). - 555b: Democracy. How it arises from
oligarchy, its charoctcristics (557b), how the corrcspondingly den1ocratic
individual bccomcs dcmocratic (558c), and what bis charaet.cr is (5610). -
562a: Tyranny. How it ariscs from dcmocracy, and what its charJcteristics
are (566d).
Book9
571a: Thc tyrannical individual. How hc becomes tyrannical, and what
his character i.~ (573c). Socrates demonstrares this indi,~duaJ's u.nhappi-
ncss by applying thc corrcspondcnc.c betwc.cn city and individual (576c).
Unhappicsc of ali is thc ryrannical individual who bccomcs cyrant of a city
(578b). Socrates condudes this lirst proof tha1 the just are happier than
the unjust with a final ranking of thc indi\'idual characters in rcspect of
bappiness (580b). - 58od: Sccond proof that the just are happic.r than thc
unjust. Socrates distingui.~hcs three fundamental hurnan typcs, the lovers
of wisdom, of honour, and of profit, and argucs that wc should trust thc
wisdom- lover's judgment that bis wtty of life is the mosr pleisant. - 583b:
Third proof that th e juSt a.r e happier than thc unju.'lt. Socrates analyses
thc nature of pkasurc. Rdief from paio can secm pleasw-ablc (583c), and
m ost, evco if not ali, bodily pleasurcs are no more than a rclicf from pa.i n
(584b). Thc only truly fuJ/illing pleasure, by contrast, is that which comes
xlvii
Editor's sy11optis ofThc Republic
from undcrstanding (585b). - 586d: Soe.r ates concludcs with the claim
tha1 each elcment in the. sou! can find its proper pkasurc if the part that
lovc'S wisdom is in control. Hc calculares thc multiplc by which the best
life is more pleasant than the worst (587a). He offers a final vindication of
justice with the help of a s-omparison between thc sou! and an imaginary
creatu.re of multiplc form (588b).
Book 1 0
595a: Socr.itcs rcturns to thc co pie of poétry, last discusscd in Books 2 and
3. \Vhat is imitation? Socrate,~ aoswers his question by considering the
cxamplc of a couch, and distinguishing bctween the form of the couch,
thc manufacrured L-ouch, anda painting of a couch (596a). Hc coocludcs
that thc products of imirntion are fur removed from truth (597e). - 598e:
Poets, like painters, are imitators. Socrares argucs that if they really bad
the cxpertise cooventionally attributed to them, they would not haYe beco
content to rcmain mere pocts (599b). Tbeir knowledge is in fact inferior
to a makcr's knowlcdgc, which is in turn inferior to a uscr's koowlcdgc
(601c). - 602c.: Socrates nuns from the copie of wbat imicators know to
that of how the)' alfcct their audiences. Using a comparison with optical
illusions (6o2c), be argues that imirativc poctry aims to stir thc irrational
elcmcnt in the sou] ((>03c). \Vorst of ali, it can ~-orrupt even decent people
(6o6c). He ~-oncludes that there is no place for such poetry in Callipolis,
but only for verses in praisc of the gods and of goo<l mcn (6o6e). - 6o8a:
Via che claim tbat imitative poctry preYcnts thc immortal sou.! from
artaining irs true reward, Socrates ma.kes the transition to a proof oí the
soul's immortality (6o8d). He insiscs that rhe sou! cannot be undersrood
in its truc nature if we consider only its association with the body, as we
ha,•e bet:n doing in this discussion (6 11b). - 612b: Finally, Socrates
de.scribs-s rhe rewards of justice, as permirtcd by the rulcs of thcir discus-
sion now that justice has first been vindicated without appeal to iLs repu-
tation or rcwards. He bridly reviews the rewards of justice and the
pcnaltie.s for injustice in rhis ljfc (612d), thcn narrates an claboratc myth,
tbe myth of Er, describing the rewards and pcnaltics tbat await us aftcr
deatb (614a). The souls of the de:id n,eet on a mcadow 10 discuss their
e:xpcrienccs of rcwa.r d and punisbment (6r4c); they tra,•el to a place from
which they cao vicw the wholc cosmos (616b); chcy choosc thcir next !i,·es
(617d); they are reincarnated (6zoc). Socrarcs cnds thc discussioo with a
farewell (62cc).
xlviii
T H E R E P U BLI C
1
Book 1
J I 1 wcnt down to thc Piraeus yestcrday with G laucon the son of Ariston, ro
•
·- offer a prayer to the goddess. 2 Also I wanted 10 watch the festival, ro see
how they would conduct it, since this was thc first rime it was bei.ng cel-
cbratcd.J Thc paradc of Athcn.ians struck me as cxc:.·dl!.-nt, and thc show
pul on by thc Thracians was cvery bit as impressive, 1 thought. \Ve offcred
our prayers, watched the festival, and then started off on our journcy back
b to towo. \Ve wcrc already on our way home whcn wc werc spottcd by
Polcmarchus thc son of Ccphalus. rlc got his slave to run afrcr us and t-cll
us to wait for him . The slavc rugged ar ruy cloak from behin<l, and said,
'Polemarchus 5'l)'S you are ro wait.' I turncd round, and asked him whcre
his masccr was.
'There hc is,' he said, 'coming along behind you. \V-J.it for him.'
'\Vc will,' said Glaucon.
e ln a few momcnts Polemarchus rcachcd us, with Glaucon's brother
Adeimantus, N iccratus thc son of Nicias, and a few othcrs. Thcy had bccn
,vatching rhc procession, apparently. And Polcmarchus said, ' lt looks as
if you'rc ali on your way back to thc ciry, Socratcs. You'rc not &'lll)'Íng,
then?'
1 [t has bccn rr.i.ditional slncc anriquity to divide thc Rr.puhlir inro tcn 'books'. f..ach
bool; corr~ponds to a i.inglc roll of papyrus, 1bc íormat io which Pbto's writin.gs
wcrc 2rchi\'\.-d, distributed, and rttd in cbc ancicnt world. \\~e do not ._now wbetbcr
rbe divis'ion int,> 1cn books \\'2.S madc by Phno himsclf or by a latcr c.-<litor. Tbc
numbcrs and lcrters in chc m11rgin follow thc p;igination of thc si.'ítccnth"'1."Clltury
edirion of Plato by Srcphaous. lt is thc pagin-aôon nornr.aUy uscd to circum,·cnt
ditfcrcnccs uf formar among subscqut..·OI cdicioos 2nd uansJations.
1 lkndis, as "e are e,·c...-ntualty rold :u me cnd of Book l (3543).
.i \\'e can date this occasion only roa "'indow of timc bet'Wt.'t..-n 431 :a.nd 41 1 OC.
Socrn.tcs, Pol,marc/11u, Cla11co11, Adeima11tus, Cephalns Tht· Rep,J,/ic
'Th•t's a prctty good gucss,' 1 replied.

'Do you sce how many of us thcrc are/' he asked.
~Ycs.'
'\Vell, thcn,' be said , 'you must eithcr ger thc bctrer of all thcsc people,
or else srny here.'
'There is another possibility,' I s-aicl. '\Vc might persuade you that you
should Iet us go.'
'And do you rcally tltink you could persuade us,' hc said, 'if wc rcfused
to Li~-ren?'
1
0f cou.rse not,' snid Gbncon.
' ln thar case, make your dccision on the assumption that we are 1101
going 10 listcn.'
328 'Haven't you hcard about the torch racel' Adeimantus t1dded. 'This
evening, on horseback, in honour of the goddess?'
'On horsebocki' I said. 'Tbnt's something new: Do you me.in a refoy
race on horseback, paSbing torchcs from onc to :anolher?'
'Ycs,' said Polernarehus. 'And rhcy're going to have an all- night ~-er-
emony as well, which sh,,uld be worth warching. ',Ve c:in go out and watch
b it after dinner. Thcrc'LI be lots of young pcople thcrc. \Ve can spcnd some
timc with thcm, and ralk 1:0 rhcm. Do sray. Pleasc say "ycs."'
'lt looks as if we shaU have ro,' said Glaucon.
'lf that's yollr decision,' 1 said, 'we shall.'
So wc went back 10 Polemarchus' housc, wherc we foi:md Polcmarchus'
brothcrs í,ysias and Euthydcmus - as weU as Thrasymachus of Chal-
ccdon, Charmanlidcs from thc dc:.-me• of Paeania, and Cleito phon the son
of Ariston)'mus. Also thcre, in the house, was Polemarchus' fother
e Cephalus. lt was a long time since [ had seen hin1, and I found him much
aged. Hc was wearing a gar land, and sitt.ing on a sort of cllshioned stool.
He had just been conduc.ting a sacri6ce in thc courtyard.; Thcrc was a.
circle of stools round him, so wc sat down with him.
As soon as he saw me, Cephalus started to make me welcomc. 'You
don't ofren come down to visit us in the Piraeus, Socrates,' hc said. 'You
should, though. Jf I wcrc stilJ strong enough to make the journey up to
d town without difficulty, there would bc no nced for you to come bcrc. We
would go to you. But as things are, you should come more oftcn. I can
assurc you, speaking for myseU; that the more the pleasures of the body
4 The territory or Athcns 11nd its surrounding (..'Ountrysidc \\'U subdividcd inro dis•
triets called •(lemes', c.-ach uith some dcgrce of sclf--go\'Cfnmc:n.L
' C.CphaJus' g:arbnJ is :m item or .s:u;:.ri6cia.1~miform..
Book , 327e-32(Jd Cephalus, Socrates
fade, thc greatcr bccome o nc's desi.re and taste for convcrsarion. So do
please spend som e rjme wirh th ese young mcn. Do come here a.nd visit us.
Rcgard us as your friends - as your family, cvcn .'
e ' \Vith pleasure, Cephalus,' T repLied. ' I l<ll'e t.11.king to the very old. Tt's
as if they're a long way ahead of us o n a road which we too are probably
going to havc to travei. 1 fcel wc s ho uld lcarn from thcm what thc road is
like - whcthcr it's stccp and rough going, or gcntlc and casy. ln particu-
lar, J'd very much like to hear how it strikes you, now that you've uctually
reached the tune of life which the poets cal! "old age, the thre.shold.',.
\Vhat is your report on it? \Vould you call it a difficult rime of l.ife?'
329 'I'll tel.l you exactly how it strikcs me, Socratcs. Thcrc's a g roop of us
who meet fairly oftcn . \Ve're ali about the sarne age, so wc'rc following tbc
words of th c old proverb. 7 \Vhcn we mcct, mosc of thcm scart complain-
ing; thcy say they miss thc things they uscd to cnjoy wbcn thcy wcre
young, and they recai! thcjr sexual exploits, their drinking, their feasring,
aod evcrything connccted wíth th ose pleasurcs. They get upset, as i.f
they'd suffcred some gn::at loss - as if rhcn thcy had lcd a wonderful life,
b whcrcas now they're not alivc at ali. &,me of them also complain about
thc lack of respect shown by their families towards old age, and under this
hcading they recite a Litany of grievanccs agai.nSt old age. 1 thin k they'rc
putting thc biame in thc wrong place, Socratcs. lf old age wcrc to biame,
thcn not only would I havc fe.lt thc sarne way about old age, hut so would
cvcryonc cise wbo has evcr rcached this age. And yct l'vc met severa!
people who are not like this- most notably Sophocles the poet. 1 was there
e once when someoneasked h.im, " How is your sex Life, Sophoclcs? Are you
still capable of mal..wg love to a woman ?" "Don't ta.lk about it, my good
sir," was Sophoclcs' rcply. " lt is with thc greatesc reLief that l havc
cs<.-aped it. Likc ~-scaping from a ficrcc and frcnzicd mastcr." ( d1ought
that a good reply ar the rime, and l still think it a good one now. Old age
is altogether a time of great peacc and freedom fro m that sort of thing.
d ' \Vhcn our appctit.cs fade, and looscn thcir g rip o n us, thcn what
happcns is cxacdy what Sophocles was tallúng about. lt is a final rclease
from a bunch of insane masters. Both in this, and in your relarions with
your famil y, th cre is o nly one thi.ng responsible, and that is not old age,
but your character. For tbosc who are civili.sed and contcnted, thcn evcn
' Tha1 ~ thc thrcshoJd of deach. The phrasc is con1moo in l--lomcr and othet cpic
J)OOIS.
7 Tbe pnwcrb runs, liter.JU)'l tPc.»plc oí the s:i.mc :age plcise t.-ru:h 01hcr~ md h.as no
cxa<.'t prO\'CrbiaJ match in English - but c..-ompare 'birds of a feather flod 1:ogc1ber'.
Cepl,alm, SocraJes Th, &public
old age is only a slight burden. Otherwise- for those who are not likc this
- both old age and youth prove hard to copc with.'
1 was vcry imprcsscd by what hc said, :md I wanted him to go on
e talking. So I prompted him further: 'l suspcct most pcoplc don't bcl.ieve
you, Cephalus, when you say that. They think it is not your character
which makcs old age easy for you, but the fact that you have plenty of
moncy. T he rich, they say, havc many consolations.'
'You'rc right,' he said. 'They don' t belicvc me. And thcre's some truth
in what tbey say. But not as much truth as thcy think. Thcmistocles'
330 famous saying is ,,cry much to the point berc. A man from Scriphus
startcd makjng disparaging rcmarks about him, and relling hlm that rus
fo.mc \V-JS duc not co bis own mcrirs, but tO those of his city. Then1istocles'
reply was that though hc himsclf would nevcr have becn famous ifhe had
been boro in Seriphus, neither would thc othcr man havc b~'Cll if hc had
beco born in Athen.s. Tbe sarne applies 10 those who are not rich, and who
lind old age hard to bear. ln povcrty, even the right temperament will not
find old age altogetbcr easy, whcreas the wrong tempcrament, cven witb.
thc ajd of wcalth, will ne\'er be ac peace with itsélf.'
'Did you inherit most of thc money you possess, Cephalus?' I askcd.
'Or is most of it money you made yoursel.f, ou top of your inheritancei'
b 'Did 1add to it, Socratcs? \Vhcn it comes to making money, l'm some-
where between my grandfather and my fathcr. l\>ly grandfathcr - my
oamcsake - inhcrited about as nmch wealtb as I now posst'SS, and
increascd it many time-s. l\-ly father Lysanias reduced ir to even less than
it is now. I shall be happy if I can lcave these boys not less, but a little bit
more, than I inherited,'
e ' The reason I asked,' I said, 'is that you've never srruck me as bcing
particularly fond of moncr Aod that's generally the attitude of those who
havcn'c madc it themselves. Comparc<l with most people, self-made. mcn
are doubly fond of thcir moncy. Those who ha\'e made a fortu nc are
dc\'Oted to rheir money in thc fir..'t plaCé because it is their own creation
- justas pocrs love their poems, or fathers !ove their childrcn - and io the
second placc for what they can do with ir, jusc like anyoncclse- This makes
them ,•ery poor company, since they c,m see no value in anything e-,ccpt
money.'
'You►rc right/ hc said.
d 'Ycs,' 1 said. '13ut J havc another question for you. \Vhat would you say
is thc ~'Teatest benefit you ha\'e deriv~-d from your possession of great
wealthi''
Book 1 32,;d- 331e C,phalm, Sotrlllts
'Onc which many pcoplc m_ig ht not be incl.incd t.o believc, if I told
them . But you <.,an takc my word for it, Socratcs, that whcn you are con-
fronted by the thought of your own death, you are visited by fear and
anx.icty about things which ocver troubled you bc.fore. Thc storics t.old
about what happens in Hadl'S, thnt anyonc who is unjust hcrc wiU have to
e pay for it there - stories you once laughed at - hegin to trouble your mind.
You wondcr if thcy may bc truc. You start SL'éÍJlg that world for yoursclf,
eirhcr through thc infirmiry of old age, or becausc )'OU are alre:idy in som e
way closcr ro it. Suddenly you are fui) of s uspicion and fe.1r; you start cal-
culating and considering whether you've donc anyone any sort of injus-
tice. And if you find many acts of injustice in your own lifc, yo u keep
33 1 waking in a panic in thc m iddlc of thc nigh t, thc way chiJdn.'fl do. You livc
in a statc of apprchension. Thc p.:.-rson with nothing on his conscicn L-c, b y
contras!, has fine aod pleasant hopes - a nursc 10 his o ld age, as J'indar
puts it. Hc fo und just t he right words for it, Socratcs, whcn he said t hat
anyonc who lives his life in righ1eousness and puriry will fmd thar
Sweet hope, old agc's nurse, which ch.ieily guides
~1cn's \\'U)~w11rd mineis, acc.ompanic.i; his heart
And so prot,'(,'IS him .•
H c's right - cou.ldo't be more right. And that's why I arroch thc g reatest
b importance to the posscssion of mo ney. Not for evcryone, but for thosc of
good characrcr. If you want 10 avoid defrauding pt:0ple, or IJ~ng to them,
however reluctantly, or going 10 thc world helow ú1 a statc of terror after
foiling to pay what you owc - whct.her sacrificcs to • god , or moncy to •
m an - then t he possession of mo ney contributes in no smaJJ mcasure to
this cnd. Of course it has m:tn)' othcr uses as weU, but wc.ighiog onc thing
against anot.her I would rate this as onc of the most important uses of
money, in thc eycs of anyone with any scnse.'
e 'That's admirably puc, Ccpholus,' 1 said. ' Dut since you \,c brough t up
the subject of justice, c:m wc say, quite simply, that it is tTutl1fulness, ,md
renirning anything you may have reccived from 2nyone elsc1 Or is it
so metimes righ1 to bchave in thcsc ways, and sometimes wrong? Lei me
gi,·c you an c.ttm1>le. Supposc you bor rowed some weapons from a frícnd
whcn he " 'as in his right mind. S uppose he l;1ter wcnt mad, and theo
askc<l for them back again. Evcryone would agrcc, 1 imagine, that you
sho uldn't gi,•e them back 10 him, ,md thllt anyone who did give them back
11 'l'he pocm from whk h this quorncion comt."S h:1s bccn lost.
Son-ates, C,phalus, Polemard,us TluRepuólü
- or who was evcn pn:pared to be completely truthful to someone in rhis

condition - would not be doing thc right thing.'
d 'Corrccc,' hc said.
'This is not tbc dcfinition of justice, then - that it is tclling thc truth,
and rcturning what you have been givcn.'
'Ycs, it is, Socratcs,' Polemarchus interrupted. 'At lenst, it is if we are
tO bclievc Simonides.'
'Pd just likc to say,' Ccphalus put in, 'tlmt this is whc.rc I hand 1l1e dis-
cussion ove.r to you. It's rime I was doing something about the sacriliccs.'
'Wcll, am I not Polcmarchus, your heir?'
'You cerminly are.' he replied with a Laugb, and wcnt off to bis
sacri.6ccs.
e 'Tel1 me thcn,' 1 said, 'you who have inhcritt.-d the argument, what d0t.-s
Simonides say about ju~ticc that you tbink is correctl'
'Thot it Ls just t.O pay everyonc what is owcd to him. 9 That's what bc
says, and I think he's right.'
' \Vcll,' I said, 'Simonidcs is a wisc and inspired man. lt is certainly not
eusy to disngree witb bin1. But what on earth does be menn by tbis
rcmark? You may wcl.l know, Polcmarchus. 1 have no idea. He obviously
doe.sn't mean what wc were tal.king about just now. If one pcrson givcs
somcthing ro anorher for safe kceping, and thcn asks for it back whcn hc
332 is not in his right mind, Simonides d oesn't mcan that the other person
should give it to him. And yer I imagine tbe thing which was given for safe
kceping is owcd r.o rhe person who gavc it, iim't it?'
'Ycs. 1
'ln tbat situation - wbell somcone goes out of bis mind, and then asks
for it back - i.sn't rcturning it completely out of thc question?'
'Yes, it is.'
'That isn't what Simonidcs mcans, apparently, when hc says that it is
just to p-,y ba.ck what is owcd, or duc. •
'No, it certainly isn't,' he said. 'What hc thinks is dueto friends is to
do tbc.m good, not harm.'
'I uudcrstand,' J rcplicd. ' lf one pcrson gi,-es back to nnotber money
b which the othcr has gfren him for safe két.,>ing, hc is not giving what is
due if bis returning it and thc othcr's re...-eiving it are harmful, and if thc
rwo of thcm are friends. lsn't that wbat you think Simonides me.tos?'
'Ycs, it is.'
' Not :a scntünenl 1h:1t is íound io the liuJc tlut survivcs of Simonidcs' poctry.
Book 1 JJ u •-3.72, Socrates, Polemardms
'\Vhat about enernics? Shou.ld you g.i ve them whatcvcr is in fact due to
thcm?->'
'You ccrrainly should,' hc said. 'And what is duc betwccn cncmics is
what is appropri•te - somcthing h•rmful.'
'Simon ides w3s speakingas n poct, then, appareody, ond di.~gui.~iog his
e definition of justice. \Vhar he mennt, it seems, was that justice was giving
•ny ind.i,•idual what was appropriate for him, but he ~-.lled it " what was
owed.'''
'Ycs, that must have becn what he mcanc.'
'Supposc, thcn, ooe of us bad said to him : "Simonides, take thc arr or
skill which is called mcdki ne. \Vhat does it gíve thnt is due and appro-
príatc, and to what does ít give itt" \Yhat do you think his onswer would
havc bccn?'
'Obviously,' he replied, 'he would have S11id it b-ives the body drugs aod
food and drink.'
'And the art of cookery? \Vhat does it give thnt is due and appropriate,
ond to what does it give it?'
d 'lt gives flavour to cookcd food .'
'Ver y weU. Then what about the arr or skill whieh we would call justice?
\Vhat does it give, and to what does it gi,•e it?'
' \VcU, if "·e are to foUow the ()re,•ious dcfinitions, Socratcs, it gives
bcnefits and injuries to fricnds and cnernil's.'
' Does he mc•n, then, that helping your friends aod hnrming your
encmies is justice?'
' l think so.'
'Ali right. \\lhco people are unwell, when it's • question of siclmess and
heahh , who ís bcst ar hclping them if they are friends ond barming thcm
if thcy •re enem.ies?'
~A doccor.'
e 'And when thcy're at sca? \Vho ~-ao best hei() or harm them amid thc
dangers of a sea voyage?'
'A shíp's captain.'
' \Vhat about t:he just man? l.n what activüy, and for what purposc, is he
the one best ablc 10 treat his friends wcU and his encmies badly?'
'ln war and alliaoces., l think.'
'Very well . Now, whcn people nren't ili, my dc:ir Polcm•rchus, a doctor
is no use to thcm.'
1
True.'
'And wbe.n they're not at sea, a ship's captain is no use ro them .'
Pol, nu,rchus, Socratts The Repuólic
'No.'
4
ÜOCS th3r mean thc just man is no use to rhem ._,1hcn thcy're not at
war?'
'No, l'm surc it doesn't. 1
'Justice is something useful e,•en in peacetime, then?'
333 'Yes, it is.'
'Hut tben so is agriculturc, isn't it?'
'YL-s.'
' For producing crops.'
'Yes.'
'And shoemaking?'
'Ycs, thar's uscfuJ.'
'For producing shoes, you would say, presumably.'
'Of course.'
' \Vhat about justice, then? \Vhen you say it's usefuJ in peacetime, what
is it useful for? \Vhat doc,s it produc,-c?'
'Contracts, Socratcs.'
'And b)' contracts do you mean partnerships, or something elsc?'
l [ mean partnerships.'
b 'A.li right. fa the juSt man a good and useful partner when it comes to
making moves in draughts?'º Or would someonc who plai•s drnughts be
more use?>
'Someone who ph1ys drnughts would be more use.'
'And when it comes to bricldaying, or building in stone, is tb.e jw."t man
a m ore useful and bt.'tter partncr than a builder?'
'Of course nor.'
' \VeU, in wbat kind of partnership is the just mana better parmer than
a lyre player, in the way a lyre player is bener at playing the notes?'
' ln partncrships involving moncy, I tb.ink.'
'Unk-ss by any chance, Polemarchus, it's a question of putting the
e mone)' to some use - if you have to buy or sell a horse jointly, for a sum
of mo ncy. ln tbat case, 1 imagine, someone who knows abont horses is
more use., isn't hc?'
'Apparcntly.'
.
captam.
.
'And for buying or seUjng a shiP, you'd want a shipbuilder or ship's
1
H) Draughts' (American 'checktrs') is 2 1nnsl:u.ion of com·cnicncc. Thc Grcck word
p,tuio SC'.t1DS to have applíc.d to S(.'., ·eral board--games. Tbe group includcs bu1 is nor
Umjtcd to strou:gic games of b:ltdc and <."l.pmre.
Book , 332e-3_14a Polemarchus, Socra/es
'So it seems.'
'ln what situation, then, requiring the joint LLSC of silver or gold , is thc
just man more uscful than anyone cise?'
'\Vhcn therc's a need to dcposit money, and havc it kept safe.'
'You mcan when there's no need to put it to any use. You just want it
to sray where it is?'
'That's right. '
'So it's whcn moncy is usckss that justice is uscful for dL-aling with
d it/' 11
' lt looks likc it.'
'And a pruning-knifcl \Vhen you want to keep it safe, tben justice is
useful, both in public life and in prh•ate life. But when you want to use it,
tben tbe art of viticulture is what you want?'
'Apparently.'
'And are you going to say thc sarne about a s hicld ora lyrc.? That justice
is uscful whcn you nccd to kL>cp thcm safe and not use them? But that
when you do need to use them, then you want the soldier's art and tbe art
of music?'
' I shall have to say that.'
'And in ali other examples, justice is useless when it comes to using any
of thcm, and useful only whcn they are tLsele.~s?'
'1 suppose so.'
e ' ln that case, my fricnd, justice might not sccm to be of any grcat
importance, if its only use is when things are usek-ss. But lct's look ata
diffcrent qucstion. ln a fight - a boxing match, poss'ibly, ora fight of some
other sort - isn't the person who is clevcrcst at delivcring a blow also the
clevercst at guarding against one?'
' He certainly is.'
'And with diseasc? Is thc pcrson who is d ever at guarding against it also
the clcvcrest at i.mplanting it sccrcdy?'
'Yes, I think so.'
334 'And in wnrfarc, thc man who is good at guarding a military camp is
also goo<l at deception. He can steal the enemies' plans, or dcfeat their
undertakings by stcalth.'
'Ccrtainly.'
'So whcncvcr someone is clev<>r at guarding something, he wiU also bc
dever at stcaling it.'
11 ~{oncy dcpositcd with bankc:r,; or in rcmplc trca.lôuric.'i did no, g:ain imen.-st.
Poltmard111s, Sorrn.t,:s Th, R,p11blir
'lt looks likc it.'

'So if the just man is clever at looking after moncy, he is also clever at
b"tealing it. •
' \Vcll, that's what the argumcnt suggc,,'ts,' he said.
'Thcn the just man, itsecms, has turncd out 10 bea kind of thief. You're
b probnbly thinking of Jlomcr. He praiscs Autolycus, Odysseus' grand-
father on bis mothcr's sidc, and ,-nys rhat
ln swt-aring oaths and thie,mg hc surp,sscd
Ali men. 11
Justice, according to you and Homcr and Simonidcs, is apparently • kind

of art of srcaling - but wir:h a vicw co hclping one's fricnds and harmiog
onc's ene.mies. \Vasn't that what you saicl?'
'No, I cert..inly didn't,' he said. 'Thougb personally, I don't any longer
know what 1. was >'llying. But one ching I do think still, and that is that
justice is treating your fricnds weU and l'Our encm.ics badly.'
e 'By friends do you mcan thc pcoplecach individual bclievcs to bc good,
or those who rcallr are good, cven if he doesn't realise itl And lhe sarne
with enemies?'
'ln ali probability,' he replied, 'pcople will Like those they think are
good, and disli.ke th osc thcy think are no good.'
'And do pcoplc ever make mistakcs in tl1is' Do thcy oft.cn think pcoplc
nre good whcn tl,cy are not, and vice versa.?'
'Yes, chey do malte mistakes.'
'So for thcsc pcople, are the good their cncmics, and the bad thcir
friends?'
'Thcy certainly are.'
d 'Is it ncver thcless juSt fo r thcsc peoplc, when thi.s happeos, 10 treat well
thosc who are no good, and 10 tre-Jt the good badly?'
·11 looks likc it.'
'And thc good are just. They're not thc kind of people who do wrong.'
'True.'
'So accordiog to your argument ir is just to hann thosc who do no
wrong.'
' lm1)ossiblc, Socratcs. 1t looks as if the argu.m ent is no good.'
''I'hen i1 must be right,' l said, 'to treat thc unjusr badly, and the just
wcU .,
1
' Odyury 19,395-396. Autolycus was a nc.1tc.lrious tritk~tcr; bis name includcs 1.hc: word
for •wolr . ·rhe rcft..Tcn<:C in 'swe:arin.g oaths1 is to pcrjury for profn.
10
Book 1 3.74a-.735c Po/,,11ar&/1111, Socrates
'That sounds bettcr.'

lln that case,, Polcma.rchus, therc :are m3ny pcoplc for whom it will turn
e oul, if thi:.-ir judgmcnt of pcople h:is been m.isrokcn, that it is right to trcat.
their friends badly, sincc chcir fricnds are no good - and thcir cncrnies
well, since their ene.m ies are good. ln thosc ôrcumsronces we shall
cnd up saying thc exact oppositc of t.hc dc6.nition wc quot.cd frorn
Simonidcs.'
'Yes,' hc soid. 'lt certainly can turn out likc that. Let's changc c,ur
definition. \Ve're probably not dclining fricnd •nd cnemy corrccdy.'
'How are we dcfining thcm,, Polcmarchus?>
'\Ve said thac thc pcrson who sccmcd to bc good was a friend.'
'And nowl How do you want co changc that dclinitionl'
335 ' If somcone both seems to be good and is, lct's c-.ill hirn a friend. lf hc
seems to be, but isn't rcally, let's say that he scems to be a lriend, but isn't
really a fricnd. And lct tbe same dclinition apply to an enemy.'
'On this dc6n.ition, it appcars, thc good rnan will be a friend, and t.he
onc who is no good will bc an cncmy.'
'Yes.'
'Do you want us w rnakc an •ddition to our definition of justice? Our
lir.,t dcfinition was that it was just co hclp a fricnd and harrn an cncmy. Do
you want us now LO add co that, and say d1aL iL is just to hdp a fricnd if hc
is good, and harrn an enemy if he is b-Jdl'
b 'Yes,' he said, 'I think that would be an exccllent definition.'
'But is it really in thc naturc of a just man,' I asked, 'to trcat an)'1Jne in
the world badJy?'
'lt ccrtainly is,' hc said . 'Hc should trcat badly thosc who are no good
- his enem1es. . '
,, does it bccomc bctter or worse?'
' lf )'Ou tre:it a horsc badl~
l\\forse.'
'\Vorse by Lhe standard we use to judgc dogs, or thc standard we use to
judge horses?'
'Thc standard wc use Lo judgc horses.'
'And dogs the sarne? lf you trcat 1/1tm badly, thcy becornc worse by the
standard wc use to judgc dogs, not horses?'
'Thcy must do.'
e '\Vhat about bumans, my friend? Are wc to say, in the sarne ""'l', thnt if
thcy are treated badly they bes-orne worse by thc &'tandard wc use to judge
huma.n exccllencc?'
'Certainly.'
li
Socrates, Polenu1rrhus Th, Repuhlic
'But isn't justice a human cxccllc.ncc?"3

'Again, it must be.. '
'ln which case, m y friend, men1bers of the human racc who are treated
badly must neccssariJy become more unjuSt.'
'lt looks likc it.'
'Are musicians ablc, by means of music, to makc people unmusicall'
' o, that's impossible..'
'Can horsemen make people unskilled with horses by means of horse-
maoship?'
' o.)
d 'And cnn i:he just makc JX.'lple unjust by mcans of justiL-é? Or in
general, cnn i:he good use human excellence to make people bad?'
'No, that's impossible. '
'Ycs, because it's not the property of hcat, l assume, to make things
cold . l.t's the property of its opposite. '
'Ycs.'
' or is it the property of dryncss to makc things wet, but of its oppo--
sire.'
'Yes.'
'And it is ccrtainJy not i:he propcrty of good to do harm, or treat people
bndly, bur of its oppo,~tc.'
'Apparently.'
'And thc just man is good?'
'Yes.'
'Ln that ~-:ise, Polemarchus, it is not rhe properry of the juSt mao to treat
his f-riend or anyonc cise badly. li is i:hc propcrty of b.is oppositc, thc
unjust man.'
' I i:h.ink you're absolutely right, Socrntes,' he said.
< 'So if anyone says it is just to give everyone. what is dueto him, and if
he means by this tbat what is duc from the just man is barm to his
enernies, and help to his f-riends, i:hen whoe,•er said tbis was not a wise
man. \Vhat he said wa$ wrong, since we have clcarly secn i:hat it is not just
to treat anrone badJy under any circu_mstanccs.'
'l agree,' he said .
'Shall we take up arn1s, then , you and I togethcr, if anyonc claims that
tllis is what was said by Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any orher of
those wise and blcssedly happy men?'
U The Gn-ck C(Ht.ld ais.o m<.-a.n 'isn'1 iusdce hum:m c.1:ccJlcncci 1
12
Book, 335c-336e Polemarchu.,, Socratts, Thrasymachus
' I ccrtainly s hall,' hc said. 'I'm ready to play my part in the battle.'
336 'Do you know,' 1 askcd, 'who I think was rcsponsiblc for the saying thar
it is just to trt.-at onc's friends wcll, a.n d one's enen,jes badly?'
'\Vho''
'l think it was Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or lsmcnias rhe
Tb.eban, or some othcr rich mao who thought he had great power.'
'You're absolutely right,' be said.
'\Vcll , then,' l said, 'since this definition of justice - and of what is jusr
- is cle-Arly not right eirher, what other definition of it might bc gi,•en?'
b E\'cn in thc middle of our con,'Crsalion Thrasymachus had rcpt.-atcdly
tricd to take control of thc discussion, but each time he had been pre-
ventcd by thosc sitting round us, who wantcd to hear thc discussion
through 10 the end. But when we reaclled this stopping-place in the argu-
ment, as I asled this question, he w,1s incapablc of rcmaining silent any
longer. Hc gathcrcd himsclf and sprang at us, likc a wild beast at its prey.
Polcmarchus and I wcre alarmcd and dismaycd.
e Speakmg up loud and clear, Thrasymachus said: ' \\lhat's this nonscnse
that has got into you two, Socrates? \Vhy be so obliging? \Vhy keep giving
way to onc othcr/ If you really want to know what justice is, then stop
simply asking qucstions, and scoring points by proving tha1 any answcr
givcn by anyonc cise is wrong. You know 11erfectly well it's easier to ask
questions than to givc answers. Come on, why don't you give some
d answers yourself? TeU us what you say justice is. And don't go telling us
that it's what's ncccssary, or what's beneficial, or what's advantageous, or
what's profitablc, or what's good for you. l won't takc any of that stuff.
No. Tel1 us pleasc, quite dearly, exactly what you mean.'
I was djsmayed by this intervention. 1 looked at him, and started 10
panic. And l'm sure, if I hadn't looked ai tbe wolf before he looked at me,
l'd have becn stTuck dumb." As it was, though, 1 had in fact looked at h.im
e 6rst - at the point where hc began to bc infuriared by lhe discussion. As
a result, l was able to answer. ' Don't bc aogry with us, ' fhrasymachus,' I
said, with some apprchen.sion. ' lf Polemarchus and I are making mistakes
in our exa.mination of thc a.rgu.ments, I assu.rc you we'rc not m.a.king c.hcro
on purpose. If we were lookjng for gold, wc wouldn't deliberatcly gi,'C
way to one another in our scarcb, and so destroy our cllances of finding
it. So since what we are accually looking for is justice, a thing mote \'lllu-
able than a large quantity of gold, you can't imagine we are so stupid as to
H This "':lS a populu supcrstition dtar bccame pro\'erbi:il (as in our 'Ôlt got your
tongucl').
13
Socratu, Thrasymach1« The Republir
make concessions to one anothcr, and not be determined to bring it as

clcarly as possiblc i.nto view. Bclicvc us, my fricnd. The troublc is, wc lack
337 thc ability. So when you dever people scc our cfforts, pity is rcally • far
more appropriate reaction than annoyance.'
Th.i.• brought an unpleasant laugb from Thrasymachus. 'Oh my god,'
hc said, 'I knew it. The irony of Socratcs. I predictcd it. 1 rold th.e se
pcoplc you'd rcfusc co gi,•e any answers, t.hat you'd prerend ro be
modcst, that you'd do anything to avoid answering, if anyonc asked you
a quesrion.'
' Clever of you, Thrasymachus. Clever enough to know what would
b happcn if you werc to ask somcone what twelve was, but then give him a
warning before hc answcred: "Now loo.k hcrc, don't go ttlling us rbat
rwelvc is t,,1icc six, or three timcs four, or sí.x rimes tw~ or four rimes
tbree. f'm not going to take any nonsense of that sort from )'OU." lt was
obvious to you, 1 imagine, thar if you asked tbc question in that way, no
onc could pos.sibly answer ir. Suppose the person you were asking had
objecred: "What do you mcan, 1' h.rasymachus? Am I not to give any of
the answers you ha"e forbidden? /\re you serious? Even if one of thcm is
i.n facr truc? Am I t.o give you some answer which is not the rruth? Or
what?" \Vhat would your rcply ha"c bccn ro bis objection?'
e ' Oh, yes,' he said. 'Sucb a dose analogyl'
' l don't see wbat's wrong witb it,' I said . 'But cveo if it isn' t dose, it
may still secm to bc, to the pcrson bcing askcd thc qucstion. Do you think
tbat will stop bim gi,•ing tbc answer he thinks is right, whether we forbid
him to or not?'
' Is that just what you'rc going tO do now? A.rc you goiog to givc onc of
the answers J told you not to give?'
' lt wouldn' t su.r prisc me,' I said, ' if on reflc<..-tion l carne to that con-
dusion.'
' \Vhat if I give you ao answer about justice wbich is quite different from
d ali those other answers, a much better answer than those? \Vhat do you
think should bc your pcnalty?' 15
'\Vcll, obviously, the pena.lty appropriate ro somconc who doesn't
lmow. He should learn, I take it, from tbc person who does know.'
'You innocent,' said Thrasymachus. 'No, you mu~'t do more than learn.
You must pay me some moncy ns wcll.'
'Very well. As soon as I have any, I will .'
IS lo Athcnian lc.g:a.l proct..-dure a dcfondant found guilLy ,v.tS givco thc 01>ponun.iry to
proposc to the jury 11 pcn11lty diffcrem from tbat dern:i.nded by hi.11: accuser.
14
Book 1 336e-338d G/o.uco11, Tltrasymoc/1u.,, Socro.tts
'You do havesome,' said Glaucon . 'lf it's money yo u're worried nbout,
T hrasymachus, go ahcad and spcak. \Ve will ali 1>ay up for Socratcs.'
e '['LI bet you will,' he said. 'Anything to allow Socrat.cs to play lús usual
trick - not answer the question lúmseU; but wait for someonc else to
answcr it, and thco take what he s:,ys and try I<> prove it wrong.'
' Rcally, my dcar fcllow!' 1 said. 'How could a11yoneanswcr thc q uestion
if fo r a start hc d idn't know 1he answer - d idn't so much as claim r.o know
it - and on top of that, evcn supposing hc did havc some idca o n the
subject, if he'd been told by a man of some authority not 1.0 say any of the
338 tlúngs he thought/ o, it makes much morcsense for you to speak. You're
the onc who daims to know thc answer and havc sometlúng to say. So
please, os a favour to me, don' t keep your answer to yoursclf. Give
GlauL-on here and the othcrs the benefit of your knowledge.'
Aftcr this appeal, G lauco n and thc rest beggcd him 10 do as I asked.
T hrJsymachus clearly wan 1cd tO speak, 10 gain credit for i:hc c.~ccllcnt
answer hc tho ught he had ready. But hc prctended to arguc, preu.-ndcd
b that he wanted me to be the o ne 10 answer. Finally he agreed, saying:
'There's thc wisdom of Socrates fo r yo u. He ref1L<es to do any teaching
himsclf, just goes around learning fro m othcrs, without so much as a
thank you.'
'That I lcarn from othLTS, Thra.symachus, is true. But whcn you say I
give them no thanks, you are wr ong. I givcall thc i:han.ks in my powcr. And
what i.s in my power is mercly prnisc1 since 1 have no moncy. How cnthu-
siastic I can be, if I approve of what somebody says, you are about to find
out, whcn you givc your answcr. Pm surc it wilJ be a good one.'
e 'Hear it, tben,' he said. 'Tsay that justice is simply what is good for the
strongcr. \\lelJ, where'sall that praisc? You're not going to give it, are you1'
'Ycs, I will - as soon as I understand what you mcan. At thc moment l
still do n't know. \Vhat isgood for thcstrongcr, you say, is just. \Vhatdo you
mean by that, 1 ' hrasym achus? If Polydam as thc all-in wrcsrler is strong<.T
than us, and eating beef is good for building his body, you prcsun1ably
d don't m ea.n that this food is also good - and right 16 - for ••• who are weak«
tha.n him.'
' Socratcs, you'rc bene-Jth contcm1>t. You'rc taking what I said in thc
way whicb m3kes it e.'\Siest ro m.isrepreseut my meaning.'
'Not at all, my friend . But you'II have to tel1 me more clearly what you
mca11.'
111
'Right' afüt 'just' both trn.nslatc tlle Greck 1/il:ain,r.
,
I-
Thrasymadws, Socrates TJ,, Repuhlic
'AU right,' hc said. 'You must be awarc that some citi,-s are tyrannies,
some are dcmocracies, and others arist()(...ãacit.-s?'
'Of course.'
'And what is in control in e:ich city is the ruling power?'
'Ycs.'
e ' Every ruling powcr makes Laws for its own good. A democracy makes
dcrnocr.itic laws, a ryranny ryrannical laws, and so on. ln making tht-sc
laws, thcy makc ir clcar that what is good for thcrn, thc rulcrs, is what is
just for thcir subjcccs. [f anyonc disobcys, tbcy pu.n ish bim for br~-aking
339 tbe law and acring unjustly. That's what l mean, " my friend," when I 53)'
that in ali cities the sarne thing is just, namely what is good for the ruling
aurhoriry. This, I rakc it, is whcrc thc powcr lics, and thc rcsult is, for
anyone who looks at it in the right way, that the same thing is just every-
where - what is good for the suonger.'
'1Vow I undcrstand what you mcan,' I said, 'though whcther or not it i~
true remains to be secn. So e,ten your answer, Thrasym,achus, is that wha.t
is good for a person is just, though rhat was an answer you rold me firmly
not to give. But you add the qualification "for the stronger."'
b 'A trh~al add.ition, you may say.'
'T hat's not yet clear. lt may well be an i.mportant one. \Vhat is clear is
that wc must examine whethcr what you say is truc. Like you, I agrec that
justice is something that is good for a pcrson, but wbile you qualify it as
what is good for the stronger, l'm not so sure. V.1e should examine the
. '
question.
'Go on, then. E.~a.minc it.'
'I shall,' I said. 'Tel1 me, don't you also say that it is jus t for subjL-cts to
obey their rulers?'
'l do.'
e 'And are they infallible, the rulers in all these cities? Or are they capable
of maki.ng misrakcs?'
'They are ccrtainly, I imagine, L-apablc of making mistakes.'
'So when they set about enacting laws, do they enact some corrcctly,
but a ccrtain numbc.r incorrectly?'
1
'ln my opinion, yes.
'And "correcdy" is enacting laws which are in their own i.ntcrest, and
"incorrcctly'' is enacting laws which are against their own interest? Is rhat
what you mean?1
'Ycs.'
Socratt,, Tltrasymaclrus, Polemarthus, Cleitophon
'But wbatever they enact, their subjects must carry ir out, and this is
justice?'
'Of course.'
'ln that case, according to your definition, it is not only just to do what
d is good for thc stronger, but also irs opposite, what is not good for him. '
' \1/hat dJJ you mean?' he said.
'l mean what you rnean, I think. Let's look at it more closely. Haven't
we agreed that the rulers, in giving orders to their subjt."<.'ts to do anything,
somctimcs malte mistakes about what is in their own bt.-st intcrest, but rhat
it is just for the s ubjects to carry ouc whatever orders their rulers give
them? [sn't that what we have agreedl'
e 'Yes,' he said. '! acccpt that. '
' Thcn you must also accept,' l said, ' rhat wc have agrt.-ed it is just to do
things which are not good for the rulers and the stronger, when the rulers
inadvertently issue orders which are harmful to themselves, and you say
it is just for their subjects to carry out the orders of their rulers. ln that
situation, most wise Thrnsymachus, isn 't the inevitable result that ir is
just to do rhe exact oppositc of what you say? After ali, the weak.c r have.
been ordered to do what is not good for the stronger.'
340 'Indccd they have, Socrntes,' said Polemarchus. 'No question about it.'
'No question at ali,' Cleitophon interrupted, 'if you are acting as a
witness for Socrates. '
'\Vho needs a witncss?' said Polemarchus. 'Thrasymachus himself
agrees that rulers sometimes issue orders wbich are bad for thernselves,
but that it is right for their subjects to carry out these orders.'
'Yes, Polemarchus, because carrying out orders issued by rulcrs was
what Thrasymacbus dcfincd as just.'
'Ycs, Cleitophon, but in his delinition he also said that what w,1s good
b for thc stronger was just. He gave both tbose definirions, and then went
on to agree that those who are stronger sometirnes tel1 those who are
weaker, their subjects, to do what is bad for them, the stronger. lt follows
from these admissions that what is good for thosc who are stronger would
be no more just than what is not good for them. '
'\Vhen he talked about what was good for thc strongcr,' said
Cleitophon, 'he meant wbat thc strongcr rhoughr was good for him. This
is what the wcak.c r must do, anel that was his definirion of justice.'
' Those weren't the words he used,' said Polemarchus.
e ' lt's neither here nor there, Polemarchus,' I said. 'lf those are the words
17
Sot:rates, Tlrrasymachus 77,e R,puhli,
Thr:isymachus is using now, let's take it in thar sense. Tel1 me,

Thrasymachus. \'l as that how you wanred to define justice, as what the
stronger thinks is good for him, whether it really is good or not? Is that
what we should take you to bc saying?'
'Certainly not,' he said. ' Do you imagine I rcgard • pcrson who mokes
a misrake, ar the moment when he is making the mistake, as stronger?'
' Thot's certainly what l thought you meant, when you agreed that
d rulers are not infallible, that they sometimes make mistakes.'
'You 'rc always rrying tO trick peoplc, So<:rates, in thc way you orgue. I
mean, if somcone makes a mistake in treating the sick, do you call hín1 a
doctor by ,'Írtue of the actuol mistake? Or an accountaot who makes a
mistake, at the precise moment whcn heis making bis mistake, by virrue
of this mistakc? No, 1 thin.k that's just the form of words we use. Wc say
"'rhe doctor made a mistnke' 11 "the accounlanc made a mista.ke'" uthe
. . .
e teacher made a mistake." But the reality, l think, is that none of them, to
the extent that he is wbat we call him, ever makes a mistake. ln precise
language, since you like speaking precisely, no ooe who exercises a skill
cvcr makes a misrakc. Pcoplc who make mistakcs make them because their
knowledge fails them, at which point they are not exercising their skill.
Tbe result is that no <me skilled, no wisc man, no ruler, at the momcnt
341 whcn hc is being a rulcr, cvcr makcs a mistakc - thougb e.vcryone would
say "thc doctor macle a mistake" or uthe ruler made a mistake." That's
how you must take the answer I gave you just now. But rhe most precise
answer is in fact that the ruler, to the extent that he is a rulcr, does not
makc mistakcs; and since hc does not make mista_kcs, hc does cnac.t wh.at
is best for him, and this is what his subjcct must carry out. So as I said
originally, my definition is thar ir is just to do what is good for the
stronger.'
'Very well, Tbrasymachus,' 1 said. 'So you think I'm a trickster, do
1
you?
'I ccrtainly do.,
'You think l've been asking the questions l ha-11e been asking with lhe
delibcratc intcntion of winning thc argumcot uofairly?'
'J'm quite surc of it. lt \\'On,t do you any good, though. You <..-an•t use
unfàir arguments without my noticing, and once I notice what you are up
b to, you don't have the resources to defeat me in o pen argument.'
'As if I'd eveo dream of trying! But since we don'r want this situarion
to arise again, could you make ooe thing clear? When you say it is right
for the weaker rodo what is good for thc stronger, do you mean the ruler
Boolt 1 34oc-341, Souares, Thrasy111ath111
and t.hc strongcr in normal usagc, o r in thc precise scnsc you wcrc talking
about just now?'
'I mean the ruler in thc mos1 precise scnsc possiblc,' hc said. '1' here
you are. Do you.r worst. I make no special picas. Try your tricks if you can.
But you won't be able t.o. '
e 'Do you think I'm crazy? Do you think I want 10 bcard 1he lion, and
starr playing tricks on Thrasymachus?'
'You ccrtainly had a try jusr now, though you wercn't much good at 1hat
êithcr.'
'\Vell,' 1 said. 'Enougb of ali this. Now 11:ll me. You wcrc talking just
now about the doctor in the precise sense. Is bc a busin,-ssmanl Ora healcr
of the sick? And make sure it's the true doctor you are talking about .'
' He's a hcalcr of the sick.'
' \Vhat ahout a ship's captain? Is a ship's captain, in thc corrcct sc.nse, a
maste.r of sailors ora sailor?'
d 'A master of sailors.'
' It's no1 an objcction, 1 takc ir, that he sails in the ship. Nor is he for
that rcason 10 bc called a saílor, sincc the ride "slúp's captain" does not
depend on his sailing, but on lús art or skill, and his authoriry over thc
sailors. ,
'Truc,' he said.
'And for cach of thcse, is thcrc somcthing which is good for himl'n
'CerrainJy.'
'Doesn't the art or skill <-Ome inlo existcncc for juSt 1his rc-ason, tu scek
oul and providc what is good for cach person?'
'Ycs, it does.'
'For each of these skills, then, is 1here anything cise which is good for
i1, apart from being as perfect as possible?'
' l don't understand your question.'
e 'Suppose you asked me if ÍI was enough for the body 10 be the body, or
whcther it neL'<lcd something cise. l would reply: " lt ~-ertain.ly does necd
something cise. That's the reason why the art of mediLine has come 10 be
invented , because the body is defective, and thcrefore no1 self-suflicient.
So the art of medicine was developed to provide it with the things which
wcre good fo r it.'' Do you think l'd bc right i.n givi.ng tbat answer, or no1?'
'Yes, I think you'd be right.'
li Tbc rcfercnt.'C could bc citbcr to the doctor a.nd ca1na.in or to thc. sid:: and 1hc sailors..
Sô Tbrasymachus could undcrina.nd Socrare:s' ne.u questiun as rcfcrring tu thc
idv,.rn1:11gcs that the artjsan derives fn>m his ;irt.
19
Socra.tes, Thra~)1madms Th, Republic
34• '\Vhat about medicine itsclf? Is that dcfcctive? Does any art or skill, for
that matter, stand in need of some virtue or exccllence, in the way that
cycs nc-cd sight and cars necd hearing, and sight and hearing require an
art or skill to preside over them, an art or skill which wiU think about and
provide what is good for them? Is therc any dcfect in the actual artor skill
itself? Does each art or skill nt-cd a furthcr art or skill, which will think
about what is good for it? And this onc which is thinking about it, does it
in its turn nced another of the sarne kind, and so on indefinitely, or does
b it think for itsclf about what is good for it? Or does no art or skill bave any
nc-cd cither of itself or of any other art or skill, for thinhng about what is
good for it in the light of its own defects? And is this bccausc no art or
skill contains any defect or fault, and because it is not appropriate for an
art or sk.iU to pursuc the good of anything other than that of which it is
the art or skill? lsn' t any art or skill itself, in the precise sense, without
fault or blemish if it is correct - so long as it is entirely what it is? And
when you answer, use words in the precise sense you wcrc talking about.
Is it as l have described, or not?'
'lt is as you have describcd,' hc said. 'Apparently.'
e 'ln that case,' I said, ' the art of medicine does not think about what is
good for the art of medicine, but wbat is good for the body.'
'Yt..-s.,
'And horsemanship does not think about what is good for horscman-
ship, but what is good for horscs. Nor does any art or skill think about
what is good for itsclf - it has no need to. No, it thinks about wbat is good
for thc thing of which it is the art or skill.'
'J\ppareotly.'
' But surely, Thrasymachus, arts and skills control, and have power
over, the objects of which they are the ares and skills.'
Hc conccded th.is, though with great reluctance.
'ln which case, there is no branch of knowledge which thinks about, or
prescribes, what is good for the strongcr, but only what is good for thc
wcaker, for wbat is undcr its control.'
d He agrced to this too, in the end, though he t,ied to resist it. And wben
he did agree, 1 continued: ' lsn't it a fact that no doctor, to the extent that
heis a doctor, thinks about or prescribes what is good for the doctor? No,
he thinks about what is good for thc patient. Aftcr ali, it was agrccd that
a doct0r, in thc prL-cisc senSé, is responsible for bodies; hc's nor a busi-
nessn1an. Isn't that what was agreed?'
Thrasymachus assentcd.
20
Book , 342a- 343c Socra.tes, Tl,rasymacl,us
e 'And that thc ship's captain, in thc prt-cisc scn$e, was in com.m and of
saiJors1 not a sailor?'
'Yes, that was agreed.'
'Soa sbip's captaia or commander of this type will not think about or
prcscribe what is good for thc ship's captam, but what is good for thc
sailor, for thc pcrson undcr his comrnand.'
He agr<>cd, though rcluctantly.
'And so, Thrasymachus,' I said, ' no onc in any position of authoriry, to
the enent that he is in authority, thinks about or prescribes what is good
for himself, but only wbat is good for the person or thing undcr his
authority - for whose bencfit hc hirosclf cxerciscs his art or skill.
Everything be says, and everything he does, is said or done with rhis
person or thing in mind, with a view to what is good and appropriate for
the pcrson or thing undcr his authority.'
:143 At this point in the arguruent it was ob,ious to everyone that the
definition of justice had changed into its opposite. Tltrasymachus dida'r
try to aoswcr. I.nsrnad hc said: 'Tel1 me, Socrar.es, have yau gora nanny?'
'I beg your pardon,' 1 said in some surprise. 'Shouldn't you bc answcr--
ing the ,1uestion rarher than asking things like thar?'
'She takes no notice of your runny nose,' he said, 'and doesn't wipe ir
clean whea it aeeds it. Sbe can't even get you to tell the sheep from the
shepherd.'
'\Vhat makes you say that?'
b 'You seem to imagine that shepherds, or berdsmen, are thiaking about
rhc good of t.hci.r shccp or thcir cattlc - that thcy are fattcning thcrn up
and looking after thcrn with some othcr cnd in vicw than the good of their
masters and themselves. ln particular, you don' t seem to realise thar rulers
in cities - rulers in the true sense - regard their subjects as their sheep,
and rhat thc only thing they'rc intercstcd in, day and night, is what bcnefir
e they thernselves are going to derive frorn thern. 18 Such an expert are you
in the just and justice, and in tbe unjust and injustice, that you haven't
even grasped that justice and the just are a.ctually what is good for
somconc cise - good for the strongcr, the rulcr - while for rhc one who
obeys and follows, tbey mean harm to himself Injustice is the opposite.
ur Thc comparison of' ruler to shepherd g01.--s back: to Homcr1 who caUs the supreme
king Aga.memnoo 'shcpherd of 1:hc Jk-."óples', using the tctm io a hcn.igo S<':DSC. Pl-.ro
will devdop thc complltison bcyond rhc confines of Bool: 1, io lhe rd.1tioosbip
bctwccn rhc rulers of the ideal city and rbcir shccpdog-likc auxilia.rics (44od, -lS9C).
lt is also importam in 1bc poliric-•I theory of bis Suuaman or Po/iJi,us (:171 d--272b1
275a).
21
Thra.,ymachus Th, R,puhlic
Ir rules over those who are truly simple-minded, the just, and its subjects
do what is good for that othcr person - theonc who is stronger. Tbey serve
d him, and make him happy. They don't makc themseh'es happy at alJ.
' You can't avoid the conclu,~on, my simple-mindcd Socratcs, that a
just man comes off worse than an unjust in evcry siruation. Take con-
tracts, for a start, where a just man goes into partnership with ao unjust.
\Vhen the partnershjp is dissolved, you' II never find the just man better
off than thc unjust. No, hc' IJ be worse off. Or think about public life.
\Vhcn thcre are spccial kvit'S to bc paid to thc statc, thc just mau
contributes more, and the unjust man k-ss, from thc sarne rcsources. 19
Whcn thcre are distributions robe made hy the statc, the just man recei,•es
e nothing, while the unjust man makes a forrune. Or supposc cach of them
holds some public office. The ourcome for the just man, cven if hc suffer.;
no other loss,20 is that bis own financial position dctcriorates, sincc he
cannot attcod r.o it, whjJe the fact that heis a just man stops him gerring
anything from public funds. 0n top of this, he becomes very uupopular
with bis friends and acquaintanass whcn hc rcfuS<.ss to act unjustly ia
order to do them a favour. ' rhe outcome for the unjusr man is thc cxact
344 opposite. I mean, of course, the man I was describing just now, the man
who has rhc abi.lity to be sclfish on a large sede. He's the one to think
about, if you want to assess thc e.,tcnt ro which it is bcttcr for him, as a
private individual, to be unjust than just.
'The casié'St placc of •li to see it is if you look at the most complete form
of injustice, the one which brings thc grcatcsr happincss to the person
who practises it, and tbe greatest misery to those who e.'<pericncc it, those
who would not be preparcd to practise it themselves. By this I mean
tyranny, which takes othcr people's possessions - things which are sacred
and things which are not - both in secret and by open force. lt d0<.'S
b düs not piccemcal but wholesale, though anyone who is s-aught commit-
ting onc of thesc crimes on its own is punished and altogether disgraced.
Temple-robbers,2 1 kidnappcrs, burglars, pickpockets and thieves, if they
1
"' Thc eispl,ora \\"aS lUl 001ergcncy le,•y on capir31 w<.-a.h:h for milíc:uy p u ~. Thcrc
was oo in,·cstigari\'Cburcaucracy LO oonduct :sudilS.
?li Ar Athcns public offiCtS werc gcnerally beld by ordi_lUl_ry citizcns in frcqucnt rota•
tion r:nhc.r than bcing 1hc provincc of carecr politicia_ns or bure:aucrats. .Most were
unpaid committcc work. Ac the cnd of thcir rerm of officc, magi:str11tcs submittcd
thcir rt.."(.'Ords ,o public scrminy. Charges :igains:t thcm and complaiots from .z.ny
citizcn werc <.~nsiden.-d by a special board imd oftcn lcd to pco:altics..
u Tcntples y;crc nor onJy So1cred placll'S but dcpositories of wcaJth. 11\ey scrYed che
funccion of tre:asuries and, i.n some c::i.scs, banks.
22
Boolt 1 343r-.745b Thrasymathus, Socra,tes
t-arry out individual acts of wrongdoing, are known by thc namcs of thcir
crimes. But tbose who seize and enslavc thc ciLizcns themsclves, and
not just their property, are not called by these rerms of reproach. They
are called bles.sed and happy, both by thcir feUow-citizens and by
e everyoncelse who hears about thc wboles.1.lc injustice they bave practised.
Those who condemn injustice do S-O not through fear of practising it, but
through fcar of c.xpcricncing it. Thcrc you are, S0<.Tatcs. Injustice is a
thing which is srronger, more free and more powcrfuJ than justice, so long
as it is practised on a large enough scale. So a.• I said in thc first placc,21
justice is in face what is good for the stronger, whereas injustice is what is
profirablc and good for oncsclf. •
d Thrasymachus was planning to lcave after this outbursr:, ha,'Íng
delugcd our eors, like some b:ith auendant, with this long, re.lentless
cxplanation. But thc people who were therc wouldn't let him go. They
forccd him to stay and justify what he had said. And I too, for my pari,
was most insistcnt. 'My dear Thrasymachus,' I said to him, ·you can't· bc
intending to chuck a speech likc that at us, and thcn go away without
properly relüng us, or finding out, wbethcr or not that is how tbings are.
e Do you thin.k it's a trivial matter, this de6nition we are after? far from it.
\Ve are trying ro define the wholc conduct of life - how each of us can tive
his üfc in the most profitable. way.'
'Havc [ said anything to suggest that Tdisagreel' Tbrasymachus askcd.
' lt doc.~n•t look as if you agrt-e,' 1 said. 'Eithcr that or you have no
conccrn for us, and don't carc whcther wc livc bcttcr or worsc l.ives as a
345 result of our ignorance of what you claim ro know. Pleasc, my friend,
enlighten usas well. lt will be no bad investrncnt for you to do a fa,•our to
a gathcring as large as we are. for my own part, 1 have to say that l'm not
convinced. l don't think injustice is something more pro6tablc than
justice, evcn if it's given a frec hand and not prevcnred from doing whar
it wants. No, my fricnd, let him bc unjust, let him havc thc power to act
unjustly, whether in secretor in open warfarc, still thc unjus1· man cannot
convince m~ that injusti~-c is somerhing more profitable than justice.
b i'vlaybc somennc cise hcre fecls thc sarne. 1 may not be thc only one. So
please be so good as to convince us lully that valuing justice more than
injustice is not the right strategy for us.'
' How am l to persuade you?' he asked. 'lf you'rc not convinced by what
1 said just now, what more can I do for you? Do you want me to s it herc
and eram the argument in with a ~-poon?'
" 338c.
23
Socra./<s, Thra.<ymachus Tlie Republic
'God forbid,' I replied . 'No, but in the first place, if you say something,
then stick by wbat you have said. Or if you change your ground, thcn do
e so openly. Don't try to do it without our noticing. At thc momcnt,
Thrasymachus, if we can take another look at our earlier discussion, you
can see that though you started off by defining the doctor in the true sense,
you didn' t then think it necessary to keep strictly to the shepherd in the
true sensc. So you don't think of the shepherd, to tbc cxtcnt that hc is a
shephcrd, as tcnding his flocks with a view to what is bcst for the sheep.
You think hc has a view to his own enjoyment- like a guest who has been
invited out to dinner - or possibly again a view to their sale, like a busi-
d nessman, not a shepherd. The art of being a shepherd, howevcr, is surely
not conccrncd with anything other than making the best provision
for what is under its direction. The question of its own excellence, I take
it, is sufficiently provided for so longas it fully meets the requirements of
the shepherd's an. That is why I thought, a moment ago,23 that we must
necessarily be agreed that any power or authority, to the e.x tent that it is a
e powcr or authority, thinks about what is bcst only for what is undcr its
L'Ontrol and in its care - and that applies to power or authority both in
public life and in prh·ate life. You, on the other hand, think that rulers of
cities - rulers in the precise scnse - are keen to bc rulc.rs, don't you?'
'No,' he said. 'I don't 1hi11k so. l'm quite sure of it.'
' \Vhat about other forros of power or authority, Thrasymachus? You
must have observed that no one is prepared to exercise them of his own
fn,c will. Thcy ask for pay, i.n the belicf that thc bene6t from their power
or authority will come not to thcm, but to those ovcr whom they excrcise
346 it. Tel1 me this. Don't we say that what makes each individual oneof these
arts or skills different from the others is thc foc't that it has a diffcrcnt
lunction? And please be good enough to say what you really believc. That
will help us to get somewhere.'
'Ycs, that's what makes each one diffcrent,' he said.
'And does each onc bring us its own individual benefit, rather than ali
bringing the same benefit? Does medicine bring health, for example, S<'a-
manship safei)' at sea, and so on?'
~Yes.'
b 'And does the art of earning a living2' bring paymcnt? Is this its funo-
tion? Or are you saying that medicine and scamanship are thc sarne?
i:i 342a~.
14
This S(luods :as odd in the Grec.k as it does in En.g:lish. The word Socr.1rcs uses for it
is probably n ncologism.
Book 1 345/,-346, Socrates, Tkrasymadtus
Using words in their precise scnse, please, as you instructed, if someone

wbilc acting as ship's captuin recovers his health becausc sea voyagcs are
goo<l for him, is that any re-.ison for you to call seanianship medicine?'
' Certainly not,' hc said.
' You don't, 1 imagine, e-ali the art of t-arning a living medicine, just
bccause someone becomes healthy while c-arning a living?'
'Certainly not. •
' Nor do you call medicine the art of earning a living, do you, if somcone
earns a living practising medicine?'
e Hc agrttd.
'Right. Now, wc agrced that· cach art or skill brought its own indi,·idual
bcnc6t?'
'\Vhat if we did?'
'\Vell, if there's any benefit which ali practitioners of arrs or skills
receive alike, then clearly the)"re ali making use of something elsc in add.i-
rion, something which is the sarne for ali of them, and bene6ts ali of
tbem.'
'lt looks that way.'
' \Ve say that they all have the practitioner's abi]ity to benefit by carning
a living, and that thcy do this by practising the art of carning a living in
addirion to thei.r own.'
He conceded this, though ,m willingly.
d ' ln which case, none of them recei,•es this benefit - earning a living -
from bis own artor skill . No, if we look ar ir in the precise sensc, 6rst med-
icine produces health, and then earn.ing a living product-s paymenr. First
the art of building produccs a hou.sc, and thcn t-arning a living comes
along afrcrwards and producs>s payment. And the sarne with ali the other
arts or skills. Each performs its own function, and benefits the object of
which it is the art or skill. lf there is no payment in addition, does the
practitioner get any bene6t fro m his art or skill?'
'Apparcntly not,' he said.
e 'Does hc then do no good when he works for nothing?'
'No, I should think hc does do some good.'
'ln that case, Thra~yma.c hus, onc thing is now dear. No art or skill, and
no P<>Wcr or authority, provides what is beneficial for itself. They provide
and prescribe, as we said originally, for whar is under their authority.1'hey
think about what is good for ir, the weaker, and not what is good for the
stronger. 'fhat, my dear T hrasyn1achus, is why I said just now that no one
was prepared, of his own frcc ,vill, to e:xcrcisc authority, to shnrc in the
Sútrates. Glaut on Th, Republi,
troublcs of othcrs, and Lry to put Lhcm right. No, they demand payment,
347 bd:ause rhe person who is going 10 bc a good pracritioner of an art or skill
nevcr does or prescribes what is best for himselí - if bis prescription is in
accordancc with h.is art or skil.l - but only what is besr for the person under
his aurhoriry. That, 1 said, appearcd 10 be rhe reason why, if people are
going to be prepared to rulc, or exercise aurhority, there has robe payment
- eithcr money, or prestige, or some pcnalty for oot rul.iog.'
'Can you explain that, Soerates?' said Glaucon. ' I can see what you
mean by the rwo forms of payment. But thc pcnalty you refor to, and how
you ean put it in thc eategory of a paymcnt, rhat I don't understand.'
b 'Then you don't understand the payment the bcst rulers receive - tbc
one which persuades the most suitable people to rulc, whcn thcy are prc-
pared to rule. You're aware, arcn't you, that ambition and gn:.-ed are
rcg-ardcd as, and indccd are, things to bc ashamcd of?'
•Yt:s, l am:
' \VeU, that's the reasou,' J said, 'why thc good ate not prcpared to rulc
i.n rcturn for money or prestigc. Thcy don't want to makc a lcgitimatc
profü from their power, and be caUed mercenary. Nor do they want to
make use of their power to take money secretly, aod be called thievcs.
'fhey woo't rule for the prestigc, be<.-ause they're not ambirious. So if
e they're going ro agrce tO rulc, thcre must bc some addirional compulsion
on rhcm, some penalty. That's probably why ir has always been regarded
as a disgracc for people ro seek ofliL-e volunmrily, rather than waiting until
thcy are forced co scek it. As for tlte penalty, ir consists principally in being
ru.led hy someooe worsc, if they refuse to rule themsclves. I tltink it's this
f.::ar which makl'S dcccnt peo1ile rulc, when they do rule, and these are the
circumsranccs in which they scel: power. They don't believc that they are
entering upon something good, or that it will bring them any benefit
d Thcy approach it as somcthing unavoidable, and bCàluse thcy have no one
bcttcr than thcmsclvcs, oras good as thcmsdvcs, to whom thcy can del-
egate the job. If there were ever a city of good men, there would probably
bc as much competition ,wt to rule as there is among us to rule. That
would be tbc proof that ir reilly is not in thc nature of thc true r uler to
think about what is good for himself, but only about. what is good fo r his
subject. T he rcsult would bc that anyone with any scnse would choosc to
let someone else do good to him, rather than go to a lot of crouble doing
e good to others. 2; This is wherc I completely disagree with Thrasymachus
U Nota com·cnti<>lllll or n.-atfüy dcclanblt moral scntimcnt., if consrrucd ~s c.."Ondon..

ing thc n,•oidan<."C of dfort on bchalf of othcrs. Gcncrosity and bcncfac:tion were
praiscwurthy 2nd cxpcc.tcd o{ those ln a positioo 10 g-i,-c it (GP};I 175- 180).
26
Book, 346t-348t Sotralet, Claucon, T/,rarymat hru
when hc says tba1 justice is wha1 is good for tbc stronger. 8u1 we'IJ have
anotber look at 1ha1 qucstion some othcr 1jn1e. Nluch more impornmt, I
tbink, is whar Thra.çymacbus is saying now, tbot tbe life of the unjusr is
better than tbc lifc of 1hc just. \Vhat about you, G laucon? \Vlúch do you
choosc.? \Vhich ,iew do you r~-gard as most accurote?'
' Personally,' he said, 'I prefer 1he vicw 1hat the tifo of the just is more
profitable.'
348 'Did you lis1cn just now,' 1 s:úd, 'to Thrasymachus' calllloguc of tbc
ad,'llntagc'S in tbe life. of tbe unjust?'
' Yes, I did,' he replicd. '8u11 don't 6nd thcm convincing.'
'Do you wan1 us to 1ry and 6nd some way of pcrsuading hin1 tha1 he L~
wrong?'
'Of course Ido,' be said.
' Well,' 1 s:iid, 'if we make a specch in opposition 10 his speech, setting
out thc argumcntS in parallcl, and saying whut advan1agcs thcrc a.rc, by
contrast, in being just, and if hc then s'J)eaks again, and tben wc makc a
second spcech, wc shall nccd to keep count of the advantages, aad
b mt-:isurc thcm, as we both makc our pai.rs of spccches. And wc shall nccd
judges of some wrt, 10 come to a dL-cision bcrwccn us. Bu1 if wc look at
tbe question, as we did jus1 now, on tbe basis of agreemcnt with one
anothcr, we shall oursclves be a1 one and the sarne time both judges and
advocatcs. ' 26
' \Ve shall indL-cd.'
' \Vell, we'll do whichcver you prcfer.'
'T he second way,' he s:úd .
'Come on, tben, Thrasymachu.",' I said. 'Let's go back to thc bcgin-
ning, and you can givc us our answcrs. Is it your claim tbat pcrfoc1 injus-
tice is more profirablc than pcrfoct justit-c?'
e 'That cerrainly is my daim, and l 've told you why.'
'Vcry wcll, ler me ask rou a quc.·6on about injustice and justice.
Prcsumably you'd call onc of thcm a ,•irtue and tbc otbcr a vice?'
'Of coursc..'
'You'd e-ali justice a virtuc, and injustice a vice/'
'Socrates, you'rc an innoc-ent,' hc said. 'Am I likely to sai• that, ifl claim
tba1 injustice pays and justice doe,m't?' 2'
i.ln some types oí O)Urt-<.":ISC the licig-.anrs "1.-rc entided to in1crlc:we 1wo specches
e:acb. Tbis ABAB pam:rn is presen·ed íor us in the 1"ctralogits of Anriphon.
n 'Virtue as :a transb.1'ion of ardê must be understood ro combine the connotarion oí
superior funcrion-ality (as w"hcn e.g. a house is said ro 'h.;ve. tbc grcu..r ,·ircuc' of bciog
cool in sutruncr :and warm i.n wintcr) with th~t oí motal rectitude. Hmcc
27
Sotrares, ThrMymachus The R.,public
'Thcn what do you call thcm?'

'The op1)0site,' he said.
lYou caJJ justice a vice?'
'No, I cal! it noblc simplicity.'
d ' I sce. And you call injustice duplicity, prcsumably?'
'No, l cal! it good judgcment.'
'And you really think, Thrasymachus, that the unjust are wisc and
good?'
'Ycs, i.f you mean those who are capable of perfect injustice, who can
bring citics and nations under their control. You probably think l'm
~•lking about srcaling purscs. J\1ind you,' hc addcd, 'e"en that can bc quite
profi~•ble, if you can get away with it. But it's trivial ~-omparcd with tbc
injustice I was describing just now.'
e 'Ycs, 1 know whicb sort you mean,' l said. 'But I Wll! surprised, before
that, by your putting injustice with goodncss and wisdom, and justice
with their oppos.ites.'
'\\lell, tbat's certainly where Ido put them.'
'That's a mucb more awkward proposition, my friend. lt makes it hard
to know what to say. lf you said that injustice was profitable, but never-
thcless admitted, as most people do, that ir was wickedness, or something
to bc asha.m ed of, we would be able to make some reply along conventional
lincs. As it is, bowevcr, you're obviously going to say that it is good and
349 strong, and <.Tcdit it with ali thc qualitics which wc uscd to anribute to
justice, since you didn't shrink from dassifying it with goodness and
wisdom.'
'That's an accurate prediction.,' hc said.
'Still, we musrn' t hesita te, in our discussion, to pursuc the object of our
enquiry for as longas I take you to be saying what you think. J\ily imprcs-
sion is, Th.rasymachus, that this rime you're not just rrying to provoke us,
but gcnuincly saying what you really beLieve about the truth of the
mattcr.'
'Does it matter to you whcthcr I really believe it or not? \Vhy don't you
try and disprove what I say?'
b 'No, it doesu't matter,' 1 replied. 'Now, I ha\'c a further question, on
top of the ones l've asked alre-.idy. Do you think onc just man would be at
ai! prcparcd to try and outdo another just man?'
foomme 17 (ron1.)
Tbrasymachus is reluc:-r2nt to dcscribc injustice - th:at IDll:Stcríu.l trait - as any1biog
but .i. ,·U'ruc. Hence coo in che :trguments at 335c md 353b-<: tbe word is trnoslatc.."<I
1
excellence'.
28
Book 1 348c-349t Tltrasy mad1u1, Sotrates
' No. lf he did, he wouldn't be the polite simpleton we know him to be.'
'How about the just action?'
'No, be wouldn't try to do outdo the just a(.'ti on cithc.r,' hc said.
'\Vould hc think it right 10 outdo an unjust manl Would he think that
was just, or would he think it was unjust?'
' He'd tllink ir just and right - but he wouldn't be able to.'
e 'That isn't my question,' 1 said. 'l\•ly quL-stion is this. Does the just man
think it wrong to outdo anothcr just man? Does hc rcfuse to do this, but
think it right to outdo an unjust man?'
'Yes, hc does.'
'\Vhat about the unjusr manl Does he rhink it right to outdo the just
man and the just action?'
'Of course he does. He tbinks it right to outdo e11,ryot1t.'
'Good. So the unjust man will try to outdo an unjust man and an unjust
action, and will strive to t:1ke the largest share of everything for himself?' 28
'Yes, he will .'
' Let's put it likc this,' 1 said. 'Thc just man does not try to outdo what
d is li.ke him, but only what is unli.kc him, whcrL-as thc unjusr man trics to
outdo both what is like him and what is unlikc him.'
'Adnúrably put. '
'The unjust man is wise and good, wbile the just man is neither of these
things.'
'Right again,' he said. ' \Vell done.'
'And is thc unjust man also likc the wisc and good, and the just man
unlikel'
'Since the unjust man is wise and good, how could be not also be /ike
the wisc and good? And how wuld thc just man 001 bc unlike?'
'Good. So cach of them has the qualities of thc p~-ople he is likc. '
' \Vhat cise?'
e '\Vcll, Thrasymachus, do you agrec that onc pcrson is musical and
anothcr lln.musica.l?'
'l do.'
'Wh.ich of them do you think knows whaL hc is doing, and which
doesn't?'
11 The ,·e:rhal phrase tran.'i'laced as ' 10 outdo' litcrally ml.~ns 'to bavc mon:', írom which
dcrin·s the r:mge oí mcaoings 'to be grccdy', 'w tuli:c unfair :.J\!:mt11gc', 11$ weU as
simpll' 'to bano. thc ad,•-ant2gc1 in a situation, without connoNtions of uníalrness. All
thc..-sc scn.st'I are. brought into play in tbis argumem. ThN..•iymachus introdu<.."Cd thc
,crm into thc di5a.1s.~ion t t 344-1 whcn hc dcscribcd thc unju.'«: rulcr as onc who "'25
capablc of bcing 'r.cl6sh 011 a large sca.le'.
Tltrasymuchus, S acra/e$
' I imagine f'd say thc musical one knows, and thc unmus.ical one
doesn't.'
' \Vhcre thc musical onc knows, he is good. and wherc the unmusical
one doesn't know, hc is bad, would you sayl'
'Yes.'
'What about someone wirh me<UcaJ knowledger L~ that the sarne?'
"Ycs, it is.'
' Do you think, t.h co, my friend, that a musician tuning a lyre would
want to outdo another musician - would thiok ir right to get the better of
him - in righrening and looscning the Strings?'
'No, l don't.'
350 'What about someone unmusical? \Vould the musician want to outdo
. ,,
hJmt'
' Hc'd bc bound to.'
' How about someone with medical knowledgel ln prescribing food and
dtink, do you think be'd want to oatdo a medical man or medical praeticel'
'Of coursc not.'
' But he would want to our.do someonc with no medical knowledge? '
'Yes.'
'Do you think ic's thc samc for cvcry branch of knowledgc and igno-
rancc? Do you think rhcre is evcr any knowlcdgt,-ablc pcrson who would
deliherate.ly choose, either in action or in speech, to do more than another
knowledgeahle person would do? \Vouldn't he do tbe san1e as someone
like himself wouJd do i.n rhe sarne situation?'
' l'm indined to think that must bc righr; he said.
b ' \Vhac about the person who is not knowledge:ible? \Vouldo' t lte try to
oucdo both equally - tbe pcrson with knowledge and the persoo without
knowledge?'
' He might .'
'And the knowlcdgeable person is wise?'
'Ycs.'
'And lhe wise persoo is good?'
'Ycs.'
'So the good and wise person will oot be prepared to oucdo the person
Uke him, but only the person unlike hin1, bis opposite.'
'Apparendy,' he said.
' \Vhereas tbe bad and ignorant person will rry to outdo both rhc persoo
like bim and his opposite.'
'lt looks likc it.'
30
Book t 349'- 35 to
' ow, Thrasymachu,s,' l said, ' docsn't our unjust man try tooutdo both
the person unlike him and the person like him? lsn't that what you sa.id?'
e ' Ycs, 1 did .'
'\Vbereas the just man will not try to ourdo the person like bin1, but
only the person unlil:.e himr'
'Ye.,c;.'
' ln that case,' l said, ' t.h c just man is li.kc the wise and good man, and
thc unjust man is likc the bad and ignorant.'
' ] supposc so.'
' But wc agreed that each of thcm had thc qualities <>f thc. pcrson hc was
likc. •2'!
'Yes, wc did.'
'So our just man has turncd out tO bc good and wise, and our unjust
man ignorant and bad.'
1'hrasyn1achus concede<! ali thcsc points, but not in thc easygoing way
d I bave just described. Hc had to bc clragged cvery stcp of tbe way, sweat-
ing profusely, as you might c,cpcct in summcr. » This was thc occasion
whcn I saw something I had nevcr seen beforc - Thrasyma.c hus blushing.
Anyw11y, when wc bad agreed that jus tice was virtue and wisdom, and that
injustire was vice and ignorance, Tsaid, ' '>Vell, let's leave that question.
But we did al,;o say that injustice was somcthing powerful. 31 Or have you
forgonen that, Thrnsymachusi'
' o, 1 havcn 't,' he said. 'But as far as l'm conc-erned, l' m not bappy
with thc argumcnt you've just put forward. 1 have some comments I
e would like to makc on it. But if I madc thcm, I know pcrfectly wcll you
would say I was making a spcech. So cither let me say as much as Twant
to say, or i.f you want to go on asking questions, then e11rry on, and 1'11
beb2ve as one does with old womcn telling stories. 1'11 say "Of coursc!"
and nod or shak.e my bead.'
'No,' 1 said. 'Not if it's not what you yourself tbink.'
'That way PU pica.se you,' hc said, 'sincc you won't alio,\' me to spcalc
\Vhat more do you wantl'
'Nothing at ali. lf tbat's what you'rc going to do, go ahcad. 1'11 osk thc
qucstions.'
'Ask away.'
' l'd like to ask thc s.ime question I asked beforc, so that we can pursue
351 ou.r cnquiry into what kind of th.ing justi~ actually is, comparcd with
19 At _149d, JO 11y our 01lcnda.r, t.hc fci;ti,-...il of lkndis took pbcc in June.
.u At 3,wc.
3r
Socrates, Tltrasymachus Th, Republi,
injustice, in an orderly way. The claim was, I believe, that injustice 11'11S
something more powerful, something stronger, than justice. \Vhereas ia
fact,' I said, ' if justice is wisdom and goodness, it will easily be seen to be
something strongcr than injustice, sincc injustice is ig:norance. No one
could any longer fajl to recog:nise that. But l don't just want a simpl.c srate-
mcnt of thac sort. l'm i.n tcr~-stcd i.n a ditfcrcnt approach. Would you say
b a city can be unjust? Can ir cry tO bring other cities into subjection, in an
unjust way? Can it succeed in bringing them into subjection, and baving
subducd a large number of thcm, can it keep them under its cootrol?'
' Of coursc ir can,' he said. 'And thc finest, the most perfectly unjust,
city will be best at ir.'
'I cao see why you say that,' 1 said. 'That was your position. But now I
have another question. \\fhen a city becomes more powerful thao another
city, wilJ it gain this powcr withouc thc aid of justice, or must it neccssar•
ily use justice?'
e 'lf your rccent a.rgume.nt is valid,1 he said, 'a.nd justice is wi.s:dom, tben
with the aid of justice. If my thc>ory was right, thcn with thc aid of injus-
tice.'
' l'm delighted to see, l ' hrasymachus, that you're not just noddiog and
shaking your head, but giving proper answers.'
'Ju~t to ple:isc you,' hc said.
' Thank you. Can you do me one more favour? TcU me this. Suppose a
city, or an army, or pirates, or thie,,es, or aoy other group of people, are
jointly sertiog about some unjust venture. Do you thlnk they'd be able to
get anywhere if they treated one another unjustly?'
d 'Of coursc not.'
' \1/hat if they didn' l treat one another unjustly? Wouldn't they stand a
much better chance?'
~rhey certainly would.'
'Ycs, because injustice, l in1agine, Thrasymachus, produces facrion aod
hatred and 6ghts among them, whercas justice producc>s co-opcration and
friendship, docsn't itl'
'Let's say it does,' hc s:iid. 'I don' t want to disagree with you.'
' Thank you, my fricnd. Now, anothcr qucstion. lf it's thc function of
injustice to produce hatred wherever it goes, then when it makes its
e appearancc amoog free mcn aod sla,•es, won't it make them bate one
another, and quarrcl with onc a.n other, and bc incapable of any joiot eoter-
prise?'
'Yes, it will .'
32
Book , JS ra-352d Sotrates, Thrasymachus
'And if it makes its appcaran~-e in two peoplc, won't they disagree, and
hate one another, and be cnern.ies both of each other and of the just?'
'They wiU,' he said.
'And if, my admirablc friend, injustice appe-.trs in an individual, it
surely won't lose its power. \,Von't it still retain itl'
'Lct's sav it wilL'
. -
'Oearly, then, its powcr is such that whatevcr it appears in - whcther
352 city, nation, army, or anything else - it 6rst renders incapable of conccrted
action, through faction and disagreements, and then makes an enemy to
itself, to everything that opposes it, and to the just? lsn't that right?'
'lt is.'
'And when it is present in an individual, too, I suspect, it ,viJJ produce
ali thcse effccts which it is its nature to bring about. ln thc 6rst placc; it
will make him incapable of action, because he is ar odds with himself, and
in disagrcement with himself. A.nd in lhe SC(,'Ond place it will make h.im
an cncmy both of himsclf and of those who are just, won't it?'
1
'Yes.
'And are the gods, my friend, among the just?'
b 'They may as well be,' hc said.32
'ln that t-nsc, Thrasymachus, thc unjust man wi.11 be an enemy of thc
gods as wcll, while the just man will bc a fricnd.'
'Go on, have a party,' he said. ' Enjoy yourself. f'm not going to object.
I don' 1 want 10 malte enemies of ali these people.'
' Come on, then,' I said. 'If you want to give usa real treat, just carry
on giving nte the sort of answers you're giving now. l can see that the just
are ckarly wiscr and bcrter and more capable of action, whert-as the unjust
e are incapable of co--operating in anyrhing; though when we speak of tbcm
as being uojust, and yet at times L'arrying out some ,•igorous joint action,
we' re not getting it exactly right. lf they were completely unjust, they
couldn't have rcsisted attacking onc another. So there was obviously som,
justice among them, which stop~'<! thcm at.-ting unjustly agai.nst t-ach
other and thcir advcrsarics at thc sarne timc, and which cnablcd them 10
achieve what they did achieve. They ser about their unjust actions in a
d state of semi-injustice, sinee those who are wholly wickcd, and completei)'
unjust, are also completely incapable of doing anr thing. l am con6dent
that this is how tbings are, and that your fina statement is wrong. 31 But
J'!Gh'Cn thc ac.·thtitics artributcd l'O 1:hc god.s of cbe tradí1:ional Greclt p:md:ioon, 1hc
answcr to this qucsrion would not gt> wi1hou1$.lying,
.u Th::u lS, the s:tarcmcnt made at 34-4-c and rcc..":IUcd a, 35od .
33
Sotra./r.s, Tlrrasynwchus TJ,e R,publit
whether thc just Livc a beucr and happíer lifo than thc unjust - whic.h was
the second question wc put forward for c.~amination" - rlüs has still to be
examined. lf you wru11 my opin.ion, 1.hcy ccrt:ii.nly sccm to, c1•en from what
wc haYe said so for. Ali the same, we ought to Jook i.nto it more closely.
After all, our discussion is not about somethi.ng incidental , but about how
wc. ought to livc our l.ivL-s.'
'Look into it, then. '
' I will. Tcll me this. Do you think a borse has something which is its
functionr
'J do.'
e 'And would you define the function - of a horse or anything else - as
that which you can only do - or can best do - with its help?'
'l don't follow,' hc suid.
'Look at i1 like this. C:m you see with anything othcr than your cy,-s?'
'No..'
'\Vhat about hearing? Can you hear with anyth.ing other than your
ears?,
' io.'
'So would we be justilicd i.n saying that these are thei.r functions?'
'Yes.'
3;3 '\Vhat about prun.ing the stem of a vine? Could you use a carving lmife,
or an engraver's kn.ife, or any number of things?'
'Of course.'
'But none of thcm would be as good, I rake ir, as a pruni.ng kn.ifc madc
for that purpose.'
'1J'ue.'
'ln that case, c:m't we define that as lts functiont
'Ycs, we cnn.'
'Now you may hnvc a bctter undcrstand.ing, 1 think, of the qucstion I
just asked you. 1 wanced to know whcther thc funcrjon of anything was
that which ir :ilone brought abour, or wbicb it brought about bctter than
anyth.ing else.'
'Ycs, Ido onder&'tllnd,' he snid. 'And I think th.is is the function of any-
thing.'
b ' R.ight ,' 1 said. 'And do you th.iol:. that everything which has some func-
tion assigncd to i1 also has an exccllcncc?35 Let's go back to the sarne
cxamplcs. The cyes, we. say, h:avc a funccion?'
l 4 .l47C,
" See note 27 to 34,Sc abovc e."tpl:1.ining how are1i ranges betwccn 'uccllcncc' a_od
'virtue'.
34
Douk 1 352d-353e Thra,rymachus, Socratt,
'Thcy do.'
'Do the eycs then also havc an cxecllcnc;,I'
'They do.'
'\Vhat about thc ears? Oid we say thcy have some function?'
tYes.'
'And an excellence as well?'
' Yes, they have an excellence as well.'
'And thc sarne with cvcrythlng else?'
'Yt.~, thc sarne.'
' \Vcll, thcn. Could thc eyes cver perform thcir own function properly
e if they lacked their own specific c.xccllcncc, if thcy had some dcfcct
instcad?'
' How could they? Presumably you mcan blindnes.s rather than
sigbt.'
' \Vhace,•cr thcir cxccllcnec is,' f said, 'though so far rhnt's not what I'm
asking. Wha_c T'm asking is whethcr it is their spccilic cxccllcncc which
rnakes them perform their function wcll, whcre they do pcrform it, and
thcir spccific dcfe<,1: which rnakcs them perforrn it badly.'
'Yes, that's truc cnough,' he sa.id.
'And the sarne with thc ears? \Vithout thcir own excellcncc, will they
perform their function badly?'
t Yes.'
'And can we upply the sarne reasoning to cvcrything cise?'

d ' l think so.'
' Very well. cxt quL-stion. Does your soul havc a function, wh.ich
nothing else in the world could perform? 1·1,ink about mami.gcmcnt, or
ruling, or dccision-making, and aU those sort~ of thi:ngs. \\lould we be
justificd in attributing those functions to anything othcr than the soul ?
Could wc say they belonged to anything elsc?'
'No.'
' But then what about living? Shall we say that is• function of the soul?'
'Most dclinitcly,' hc said.
e 'And do we also say that therc is an c..,cc.llcnce of thc souli'
'We do.'
' ln tbat case, Thrasymachus, will the soul ever perforrn its own func-
tions well if it lacks its own spcciJic exccllcnec? Or is that impossible?'
'lt's impossiblc.'
'Soa bad soul necessarily results in bad ruling and bad managemcnt,
whereas a good soul results in the successful exercise of these functions.'
'Ncccssa.ri.ly.'
35
Socrates, Tltrasy macltus Th, Rep11bli,
'And we agreed that justice was excellence of soul, and tbat injustice
was vice or dcfoct of soul?' 3º
'Wc did.'
' ln which case thc just soul and thc just man will havc a good life, and
the unjusr man a bad one.'
.154 • lt looks like it,' he said, 'according to your argument.'
'But the person who has a good life is blessed and happy, while tbe
person who doesn't is the opposite. •
'Of course.'
'So the just man is happy, and the unjust man is miserable.'
'They may as wcll be,' he said .
' But being miseroble is not profitablc, whereas being happy is.'
'Of course.'
'So injus1jcc, my cxccllcnt Thrasymachus, is ncver more profitable
than justice.'
' Go ahead, Socrates,' he said. ' lt's Bendis' Day. Make a real feast of ir.'
'Thanks to you, Thrasyn1achus,' 1 said, ' now that you' ve turned
b friendly, and stopped being angry. And even then I haven't had a proper
trcat, though that's my fault, not yours. 1 think l've been like one of those
gluttons who grab at everything that's carried past them, and tascc it
without cvcr properly enjoying what. wcnt beforc. Withour waiting to 6nd
the first thing wc wcrc lookmg for - what justice acruaUy is- l'vc droppcd
that, and gone charging off into asking qucsrions about it - whcthcr it's
wickedness and ignorance, or wisdom and goodness. And thcn a little
latcr, whcn thc claim arose that injustice was more profitable than justice,
e I couldn' t n-sist going on frorn thc earlicr qucstion to thnt one. So the
result of our discussion is that l'm nonc the wiscr. Aftcr ali, if I don' t
know what justice is, l'm hardly going to know whether or not it is in fact
some kind of excellence or virtue, or whether the person who possesses it
is unhappy or happy.'
" Ar 35oc-d.
Book2
357 With these words I thought I bad 6nished wbat l had to say. But I was
wrong, Apparenrly it was only an introduction, Glaucon is an exrremely
dete.rmined character in cvcrything he does, and on this occasion he
h refuscd 10 acccpt Thrasymachus' surrcnder. 'Socrates,' he said, ' do you
really want to convince us that it is in every way bener to be just than
unjust, or is it enough merely to seem to havc convinced us?'
' I would prefcr,' J said, 'rcally w con,•incc you, if I had a cboi.ce.'
' ln tbat o-ase,' he said, 'you are not achie,~ng your aim. Tel1 me this. Do
you think there is• good of the kind we would choose to have bec-ause we
value it for its own sake, and not from any dcsire for its results?
Enjoyment, for c:xample, and plcasures wh.ich are harm.less and produce
no consequenccs for th.e fururc beyond cnjoymcn1 for the person who
possesses them .'
e 'Ycs,' 1 said, 'I do think there is a good of this kind .'
' \Vhar about the sort we value both for itself and for its consequences?
Things like thinking, seeing, being healthy, \Ve value goods of this sorr, 1
imagine, for botb reasons.'
'Ycs,' r said.
'And can you distinguish a tbird class or category of good,' hc a.skcd, '•
class which contains physical c:xcrcisc, undcrgoing mcclical treatmcnt
when we are ili, practising medicine, and earning a living in general?
d ' fhcse wc would describe as unpleasant but beneficial. \Ve would not
choose to have them for theirown sakes, but only for the payme.nt or otbcr
benefits wh.ich rcsult from them.'
'Yes,' I said, ' thcre is this third dass as wcll. ,vhat of it?'
'ln which of thcse e.lasses,' he asked, ' do you put justice?'
37
Socratts, Glaucon Tire Republic
.,
3 -8 'In my opinion,' 1 replied, 'it is in the finest class, wbich is to be valued
by anyone who wants to be happy, both for itself and for its conse-
quences.'
'That's not what most poople tbink,' hc said. '/\>lost pooplc would pur
it in thc unpleasant class, which we should cuJtivate in return for paymcnt
and rcputation, on account of public opinjoo, but which pu.rcly for irsclf
is robe nvoided like the plague.'
'I know that's what they think,' I said. 'Thrasymachus criticised it -
and praised injustice - on those grounds some while back. But l' m a slow
lcarncr, appa.renrJy.'
b 'We.11,' hc sa.id, 'lis1en to me as wcll, and scc if you agrcc with what
I suggcst. I think Thrasymachus 100 rcadily allowed himself to be
bew:itchcd by you, like a snakc being cbarmed by a snake-charn1cr. As far
as l'm concerned, the proof is not yet l'Onvincing, either for justice or
injui.ticc. 1 want to be told what eacb of them is, and what eJfect it has,
just by irself, when it is present in the soul. 1 want to forget about tbe
rewu.r ds and results it brings. So here's what Iam going 10 do, if )'Ou havc
e no objcction. I'm going to revi,·e Th.rusymachus' :irgument. First I shall
say whar kind of tbing people reckon jus tice is, and how they think it
a.rises. Secondly I shall claim that ali thosc who practise it do soas some-
thing unavoidable, againsr thcir will, and not because they regard it as a
good. Thirdly I shalJ say that this is a ratfonal way for thcm to behave,
sincc thc unjust man, in thcir vicw, hns a much bettcr lifc than thc just
man. Thesearc not my own opinions, Soc~ates. Butl am dismaycd bythc
d unend.ing sound in my ears of Thrasymachus and thousands like him,
whereas I have ne,·er yet heard fro m anyone, in the form I would like to
hear it, the argumentfor justi<--e, the argument that it i.ç something better
than injusti<--c. l want ro bcar it praised simply for ir.sclf, and J bave high
hopcs that you, if anyonc, <,-an do this for me. So I a.m going to makc the
most powcrfuJ spc<.-ch I can in dcfencc of thc unjust lifc, and in my sp1.-ech
l shall show )'OU how I want to hcar you, in your turn, criticising injustitc
and defending justice. There you are. See if you approve of my sugges-
tion.,
e 'l'd likc nothing bettcr,' 1 rcplicd . ' \Vhar cise would anyone with any
sense prefcr to makc a habit of talking about or hearing obout?'
"fhat's good,' hc said . 'Now, listen to tbc 6rst i:hing I said I was going
to talk about - wbat sort of thing justice is, and how it nriscs. Doing
wrong, men say, is by its nature a good- and being wronged an evil - but
ºº"" 2 3580- .159(1 Glaucon
thc c,,il of bcing wrongcd oui:wcighs thc good of doing wrong. As a rcsuJt,
359 when pcoplc wrong onc t1.11othcr and are wronged by o nc another, and get
a tastc of both, those who are unable to avoid thc o ne and achievc thc other
thjnk ir will pay them to come to an agrecm cnt with one another not to
do wrong and nor to be wrongcd . T hat's how they come t<> start making
laws and agrcemcnts with o ne anothcr, and calling lawfu.l and just that
which is laid down by th e law. Thcy say that tbis is thc origin and essen-
tial nature. of justice, that it is a compromisc bctwccn thc bcst C'JSc, which
is doing wrongand gettingaway with it, and tbe worst case, which is bcing
b wrongcd and being unable to rct•Liate. Justice, being h•lf-way betweeo
these rwo c.~tremcs, is not prized as a good; it finds its value m crely in
p~-oplc's want of powcr to do wro11g. ' Iôe person who does ba,,c thc powcr
to do wrong - the truc man - wouJd ncvcr mak.c •n agreemcnt with
anyone not to do wrong and not 10 be wronged. It would be lun•tic for
him to do that. That, more or less, is tbe n•ture of justice, Socrates. Tbat
is what it is Jike, and thosc are the kinds of causes which gave rise to it,
according to this thcory. 1
'As for thc claim rhat peoplc who pracrisc justice do so reluctandy,
being too weak to do wrong, tbe easiest way to st.-e that it is true is to
e imagine something like this. Supposc we gavc each of them - the just and
thc unjust - thc frc;:dom to do whatcvcr hc likcd, and thcn fo Uowed them
and kept an eyc on thcm, to sec which way his dcsi.rc would rake each of
rhem. \Vc would soon carcb the jusr man out. Led o n by greed and tbe
desirc ro o utdo <1thcrs, hc would follow thc sarne coursc the unjust man
foUows, Lhe coursc whic.h it. is c,,crybody's natural inclination to pursuc
as a good, rhough thcy are forcibly rcdirectcd by thc law inro valuing
d equality. Roughly speaking, they would have thc freedom I am talk.ing
about if they had thc kind of power thcy say the ancesror of Gygcs thc
Lydian o nce had. They say he was a shepherd, and that he wus a serf of
th e man who was ar that timc thc rulcr of Lyd ia. One day there wa,~ a grcat
rainstorm and an c-arthquakc in the plat-c whcrc hc grazL-d bis sheep. Par t
of the ground opened up, • nd a great bole appeared in it. He aston- '"'•s
ishcd whcn hc saw it, but wcnt down into it. And the legend has ir that
among many marvcls he saw a hollow horsc madc of bro nze, with
1 Th.e p:a~-age is an early :appcanmcc of thc con..::c.p1 of a $4;>cial <.,mtr.tct imposcd on a

sttatc oí n.1rurc, wbit;h w-;is to h,1.,-e great importance in the class:ic politic11Jand mc>r11J
thcorics of thc cnligbtenmcnt. l t i."I' unck'.lr whcthcr P13to has :any particular conrcm-
potary ,·crsion o( tb.is concep1 in mind.
39
Glaucon TJ,, Repuhlic
e windows in it. Peeping through them, he saw inside what appeared to be

a corpse, larger than human, wearing nothing but a golden ring on its
hand . They say he rcmo,•ed the ring, and carne out.
' The shepherds were having one of their regular meetings, so that they
could give thc king thcir monthly report on thc fiocks. And the man
rurncd up as wcll, wcaring thc ring. As hc sat \\~th thc rc-st of them, hc
36o happened to rwist rhe setting of the ring tow·ards him, into thc palm of his
hand . \Vhen he clid this, he became invisible to those who were sitting
with him, and they started talking about him as if he had gone. H e was
amazed, and twistcd thc ring again, rurning the setting to thc oursidc. As
soem as hc did so, he becamc. visiblc. \Vhen he realised this, be started
expe.rimenting with tbe ring, 10 see if it did have this power. And he found
tbat that was how ir was. \Vhen he rurned the setting to the inside, he
became invisible; when he turned it to the outside, he became visible.
b Once he had established this, hc lost no rime arranging to bc onc of thosc
making the rcport to the king. When hc gor therc, hc seduccd thc ling's
wifc, plotted with her against rhc l·ing, lilled him and seized powcr.
'Imagine there were two rings like that, and tbat rhe just man wore one,
while the unjust man wore the othcr. People think that no one would be
sufficicntly iron- wiJlcd to rcmain with.in thc bounds of justice. No onc
could bring himsclf to kcep his hands off other pcople's posses.sions, and
steer clear of them, if he w11s free to take whatever he liked without a
e sec-ond though1, in the market-place, or go into pcople's houses and sleep
with anyooe he liked; or if he could kill or release from prison anyone he
chosc, and in general go round acting likea god among men. lf hc behaved
like this, thc just man would be actingno differcntly from 1he unju~'t. Both
would be following thc sarne course.
'This is a srrong argument, you might 53)', for thc claim that no onc i.•
just voluntarily, but only under compulsion. Justice is not thought to be
d a good thing for individuais, since whercver anyone thinks he ca11 do
wrong, he does do wrong. .Every ma.o bcJie,1es injus6ce to be much more
profitable for the individual than justice. And hc will be right to think this,
according to the pcrson purting forward this vicw. A.nyonc who e-ame into
possession of the kind of freedom I have dcscribed, and thc.n refuscd c,•cr
to do aoything wrong, and did not lay a 6nger on othcr peoplc's pos.scs-
sions, would be rcgardcd by obscrvers as the most pathetic and brainless
of crcarures - though of coursc in public they would praise hin1, lying to
one another beeausc of thcfr fcar of bci.ng wrongcd.
e 'That's ali ) have 10 say abou1 tba1 claim. As for the choice berwccn the
Book 2 359e-,161d Gtau,on
lives of the people in question, the onl)' w11y we can make ir properly is by
contrasting thc t'<lmplctcly just man with thc complctcly unju,1 man.
How shall we contras! theml Like this. We will subtract nothing either
from the injustice of the uojust man or from the justice of the just man.
\Ve will assume that each is a perfect example of bis particular W11Y of
behaving. So for a start let's make the unjust man's behaviour like that of
a skiUcd prac1:jrioncr of a profcs.s ion. A really good ship's captain or
361 docror, for example, can distinguish in thc excrcise of his skill between
what is not feasible and what is feasible. He artempts what is feasible, and
avoids what is nor feasible. \Vhar is more, if he makes a false move some-
where, heis capable of correcting it. That's how ir c:m be with our unjust
man. Let's assume, if he is going to be really unjust, that he goes about
his wrongdoings in the right way, and gets away with it. Tbe onc who gets
caught is to be regardcd as incompctcnt, sincc pcrfoct injustice consiJtts
in appcaring to be just whcn you are not. \\lc rnust crcdit the cornplctcly
unjust man, thcn, with thc most complete injusti~-c. To thc pcrsoo who
b com.m its the grcatcst wrongs we must not deny - in fact, wc must grant -
thc cnjoyment of the greatcst rcputation for justice. If he makes a false
move, we must allow him the ability to put ir righr. He must be capable of
using persuasion - so that if any cvidcnce of his wrongdoings is brought
against him, he can talk his way out of ir - bur capablc also of using force
,vhcrc force is nccdcd, relying on his courngc and strcngth, and the pos-
session of fricnds and wealth.
'That is our model of the unjust man . Beside him let us put our in1agi-
nary jusr man, a simple and honournble man who wants, in Aeschylus'
words, not to appear to be good, bur 10 be good. 2 We must de prive him of
e rhe appearance, since if he appears to be just, the appearance of justice
will bring him recognition and rewards, and then it will not be clear
whether bis motive for being just was a dcsirc for justice or a dcsirc for
thc rcwards and thc rccognition. So wc must strip him of evcrything bul
justice; wc must pur him io a situation which is the opposire of our pre-
vious cxample. Oespire doing nothing wrong, he must have the worst pos-
sible reputation for injustice. Then, if ir is unaffectcd by disgrncc and its
conscquenccs, thc puriry of bis justit-c will have bcen tt-stcd in thc tire. Lct
d hün livc our his life like this, without any cbangc, until thc day of his
dt'ath, app<.'aring to be unjust though actually being just. That way they
1 Part of thc dcscription (SrV<",, aguinst Tlitlus 59.z) of dle wi.~ and god- ft.'2_ring seu
Amph.ia.raus, cxpbinjng why hc ch(l()6es 11> put no bb:1.on on bis shidd~
Claut u11, Sutrat,s Tire Rqmblh·
can boi:h attain tbc extreme - onc of justice, thc othcr of injustice - and
the. judgmenc can be madc, which of tbcm is bappicr.'
'Hclp!' I said. vrhat's a prctry vigorous job you've donc, my de-ar
Glaucon, clc-Jning up cach of our contestants to get them rcady for judg-
ment. Like scouring a stanie.'
'['ve done my best,' he said. 'And if both their siniations are as I havc.
described, it sbouldn't be bcyond us, I imagine, to gi,•e a full a.ccount of
e the kind of We which awaits each of them. So that is what I must do now.
And if my language is rather crude and uncivill~ed, Socrates, don't
imagine it's me talking. 1o, it's t.h c JX.'Oplc who rccommcnd injustice in
prcfercncc to justice. They will claim that in rhis situation thc just man
will be whipped and put on the rack, will be thrown ioto cbains and bavc
.162 his cycs burnt out. Finally, aftcr ali these injuries, he will bc crucificd, and
realise thnt thc important i:hing to aim for is nor bei11g just, but appearing
co bc. jusc. l So what Aeschylus said turns out to be a mucb more accuratc
dcscríption of tbe unjust man, who wants not to appear to be unjust, but
to be unjust, living his l.ife in touch with rcaliry rather than trying to
saúsfy appcaranccs and public opinion,
ln bis mind enjoying thc dccp furrow's fruir,
b From wbích good L-ounscJ grows. •
ln the first place, they will say, he can be a ruler in bis city, bccause of bis
reputation for justice; secondly, he can marry where he likes, give bis
daugbters in marriagc to whom be chooses, and make contracts and part-
ncrships with anyonc he wisht-s. Besidcs ali this bc finds it casy to roakc
bimsclf a rich man, since bc bas no compunction about acting unjustly.
Tbat is why, thcy say, hc is successful in political and legal disputes - botb
e public and priva te - and wby hc gcts thc bclter of bis cncmics. lly gc1ting
the better of thcm he grows ricb, and can belp his fricnds and harm his
cnemics. Hc can makc full and generous sacrificcs aod off'criogs to the
gods, and is much bctter ablc than tbe just man to scr\'C thc gods and that
pari of mankind whom hc chooscs to serve. As a rcsult, i:hcy ela.iro, hc is
J 01-aucon is cxaggcrating. Although a typc of crucifixion \\"2S onc <•Í chc me1bods by
w-llkh criminals wcrc c·iet.-utt.-d ln Arhcn..°' rorturc and nrntilac-ion was nota smnda.rd
forme,( punishmcnt. h is rathcr whar a 1yrn_n1 wou1d i.nO.ict oo his wemi~.
" These lines 3.re also part of tbc description of Amphiarnus and foUow on immcdi..
111:cly from the line adaptcd (but nor direcdy quorcd) :ar 361 b. ln 1hcir original conte.rt
the)' rcícrred lO his intclligcnce u.nd his :utc:.mpr ro prc\·cnt hloodsbcd bct\\'.cCn tbc
rwo brothers Etwclc.-s and Polyniccs; in thcir m.'\V contcxt thc \good cou.nsel'
becomes tJ:u., carcful sc:heming of thc unju~'t mim.
42
Book 2 3611J-363h Glam·on, Ad,imamus, Sotrat,s
in ali probability more likcly than thc just man ro be thc gods' fuvourite.
Thosc are thc ways, Soeratcs, in which thcy sar thc unjus t man gcts •
better dcal, both from gods and men, than the just man .'
d \Vhen Glaucon finished, l was ali ser to reply. Bur his brotber
Adein1antus intervened. 'I hope you don't thin.k, Socrates,' hc said, 'that
that is thc wholc of thcir case.'
'\Vhy? \Vhar more is 1herel' I askcd.
'\Vc have left out thc part,' he said, 'which moSt nceds to be induded.'
' \Vcll,' l said, 'let brother stand by brother, as the saying goes. 5 By ali
means join in, and come to bis assismnce, if he has left anytb.ing our -
though as for as I am concerned, even what hc did say was enough to
throw me, and make me incapable of coming 10 thc dcfcncc of ju,~ticc.'
e ' Nonsense,' hc said. 'You must listcn to this sccond instalment as wcll.
To makc it clcarer what 11hin.k Glaucon wants, wc must go through rhc
<.-ontrary arguments to bis - thc ones which r<.'COmmcnd ju&-ticc and
363 criticisc injustice. Fa1hcrs givi.ng advice 10 thcir sons, and ali those who are
rcsponsible for others, e.n courage them to be just - not, l take it, because
they value justice by irself, but because they value the appro,,..I it brings.
lf thcy appear to bc just, tbey arguc, then this repu1ation wiJI b.r ing thcm
public officc, marriagc and aJJ thc bencfits Glaucon has just enumeratcd,
wh.icb thc just man gains from being wcll thought of. And that isn't ali
rhey havc to say about the bene6rs of rcputarion. Once they starl adding
in thc approval of the gods, thcy have an abundancc of rewards to
b olfer rhc pious - gifts of thc gods, they say. Thc admirablc 1-lesiod and
Homer" say the sarne thing. Hesiod says tbat for the just, the gods make
oak trees
Ek:ir acorns on thcir lofty tops, and bees
Beneath, on lower branches. \\'eigh1 of wool
Burdcns their llcccy shccp.
And many otber benefits of the sarne k.ind .1 Homer says much the
same:
$ Not II proverb ancsted bcforc Pl:ato. A éOl)temporary v•.1ri:1n1 runs: t'Jllcrc is partlon
for helping :a brotber.·
• As iauthor.;: of tbc Orccks1 mO)l :mcicnt pocms dcscribing lheir ~ li.csiod and
Homcr fun«."tioncd as 1boological au1horiti~.
7
~Vo,b and Doys 232- 234. Tbe od1cr bcm:fü~ mentic)ocd by He."iôd are: abscncc o(
wn.r and fa.mine, womm be:niug ch.i]drcn who are likc thcir fat.hers, abund:mcc renw
dering 1radc b)' sca unnc<.us:iry.
43
Arleima11Jus Tht Republic
Or like some worrhy king who, fearing god,

Supports the right. For him thc rich dark carth
e Bears wheat and barler, wbile with fruit his trees
Bow down. Unf.iilingly his 8<1cks bear lambs.
For him the sca yiclds fish.•
iVlus:ieus and his son makc the just receive rewards of a more exciting
kind from the gods.9 ln thcir account, thcy conduct thcm to Hadcs, sit
d thcm down, and organisc a party for thc pious. They crown thcm, and
make them spend the wholc of timc getting drunk, rcgarding perpetuai
drunkenness as thc fines! reward for human goodness. Othcrs again grant
rewards from the gods which are more extcnsivc evcn than tht-sc. They
say that childrcn's childrcn anda tribe of descendancs are. the posterity of
the pious man, dte man who keeps his oaths. Thar, and some more like it,
is what they say in praise of justice. As for the intpious and unjust, they
e bury them in Hades, in mud of some kind. They mal.e thcm carry water
in a sieve;'º and they bring them into disgra<-e whilc thcy are sriU a[ive.
Thcy imposc on thc unjust ali G laucon's list of pcnaltics for those just
people who have the reputation of being unjusr; these are all the pcnalties
they can thmk of. That, then, is their recommendation and criticism of
e:ich of the rwo w11ys of life.
'Apart from that, Socrates, you should take into account another
comn1on way of ralking about justice and injustice - both in e\'eryday
364 spcech and in the poets. ln their praise of self-discipline and justice, thcy
ali sing with one voice. They regard them as a good, but as one which is
difficult and laborious, whereas sclf-indulgeace and injustice are plcasanr
and casy to foUow; they are shameful only in rhe repu1a1ion thcy bring,
and by con,•ention. They say that for the most part unjust actions are
more profitable than just ones. They are quite happy to congratulate the
8 OJyss~J• 19. 109-113, omitting tine. 110 (~a.nd ruling OYcr maoy pc,werful mcn1, aod
bre,king off in mi<kenn:nce (' .. . yields fisb bcc•usc of bis good lcadersbip. ,nd
under hitn his people Oourish').
• A reforcnc.-e ro 'mystict cults and tbcir associatcd bodr oí poctry - cultS wbich dis--
tinguished thcmsel,·es from thc common run of rcligious ritual by rcquiriog a spcrull
rcgimcn and/or purificatory initi.ation in this lifo in order to gain uwards in thc
afterlifo. By 1'iusacus' son is prob,bly m<'lot Eumolpus, founder of cbe clan whicb
had charge oí 1he mosr famous oí the mystíc rites cngagcd in by Athcnians - the
Eleusinia.n. For 1:,reneral informarion on 1hcse cu1ts st.-e \\~ Burkert, Ont.k Re.ligio,r
(C:unbndge, !\1:iss.: Harvard Univcrsiry Pre,;s, 1<)85), eh. 6.
,e, Thc traditiooal puni.~hmcnt of thc dnughtcN o( Dan.1us. ln tbc Corgius (493a,...,c.)
thc.ir farc is uscd llS ,m allcgory for thc conscqucnccs of scJf-indulgence in Lhe
abscncc of purificatory iniüation.
44
Book 2 363h-365a Atkimantus
wicked, if they possess wealth and cxercise powcr, and to pay them
b rcspcct in botb public life and privatc life. The others they despise and
ignore - any of thcm who are wcak and poor - though thcy admit thcy are
bcttcr pcoplc than thc wicked. Howcvcr, thc most rcmarkablc stateinents
ofali on thissubjectare tho;.-e about Lhe attirudcof thcgods to human good-
nes.~. Thcy say the gods give many good peoplc unhappiness and a
wretched life, whilc to their opposites thcy givc a Lifc which is quite
differcnt. Mendic-ant priests and seers knock at Lhe rich man's door, and try
e 10 persuade him thttt they bave a power, bestowcd on them by rhe gods in
return for sacrilices and incantations, to use the delights of feasting to put
righr any wrong done by him or bis ancestors. 11 And thar if anyone wants
to harm an cncmy, for a smaU charge t.hcy can injure just and unjust alikc
with charms and spells. Thcy say they can persuade the gods to act for
them. T o ali thesc claims they call rhe poets as witnesses. Some quore
rhem on the case of wrongdoing.
Thcrc is much \\~ckcdness; it is nevcr hani
d To make thar choice. Thc way is smooth, thc goal
Lies near at hand. \linue is out of reach
\1/ithout much toil. Th•t is Lhe gods' de<.Tee."
It's a long, uphill road. Othcrs, rnlking about the way mcn t-:m inJlucncc
the gods, call Homcr to witness, with his daim that
Even the gods themselves
\\' ili hear our pr-,ycrs. l'vlcn who do wrong, and sin,
e Can thus dissuade them from their purposcs
\\tith fai.r cntrcaty or wír_
h sacri_ficc,
\1/ith incense or Lhe f:11 of offered meat. 13
They bring forward a host of books by Musaeus and O rphcus, thc chil-
dren of Sdcnc and thc Muscs, so thcy claim. Thcsc are what govern thci.r
sacrificial rituais, and they persuade cities as well as individuais that
sacrifices and pleasurable amusemenrs can win release and purification
365 from injustice both for those still alive and for thosc who have passed
11 The vic1ims uf 1.nimal sacrilicc in Gn."CI: reli1i'lous ritual were n:mde thc cc11lnpiece
oí a íe:as1.
11
Hesiod, Works and Da.,,, 287-28<). Hes.tOd goc.i "" co mitig:itc the 'long, upbill ro.ad~
with tbc thought that oncc you gct to rhc top it bc:comcs ~y to foUow.
13
Thc words spol::cn to Acbillcs by his childhood gu.:a.rdian Phoenix io 1/iad 9.497- 501.
omiuing linc 4g8: '[the gods] who are our superiors in cxccllcnce, honour and
might'.
45
Adtimalllus The Repuhlic
away. Passing l'hrough lhe. rires, they t-:ill it, which can release us from evils
in lhe afterlife. And if we don't sacrifice, then horrors awnit us.
' That's thc nature and force, Socrates, of ali the things that are said
about goodness and wickedness, and the value put on them by men and
gods. What clfect do we thin.l: thcy have on lhe minds of the young when
they hear them - the able oncs, those capable of Oitting, a.~ it were, from
b opinion 10 opinion, gathering i.nformation on what sort of pcrson to be,
and which \\"JY t.O go, in order to livc thc bes1· possible Lifc? A youn.g man
migh1 wcll ask bimself, using Pindar's words, "How climb the highest
wall? \\!ili justice help? Or devious deception?"" And so live my life to its
end, in the safcry of thccitadd? To judgc by rhe pocts, if Iam justwithout
also seeming to be jus1, l can expect oothing out of it but hardship and
dear loss. lf l am unjust, but have g-.úned a reputarion for justice, then l
e am promised a wonderful life. Thcrefore, since ''Appearance," as the wise
men ha\' C pointed out to me, "overpowers truth" and controls happi-
ness, ,s I must turn aJJ my attention to that. I must draw an exact likeness
of good.ness around myself, as a front and façade, bri.nging along behind
it the wise ArchiJochus' cmfty and subtle fox. 16
"'The trouble with that1 " someone will sav . "''
"is rhat it is bard to be evil
and ge1. ª"'>n)' with it for cvcr." "\VcU,'1 ;;:,•e shall s.:ay, "norhing grcat wns
d ever easy. But if we are going to be happy, we must follow where the trail
of our argument leads us. And to get away with it, we shall form sc..-crer.
clubs and societics,17 a.nd rhcrc are teachcrs of persua~.;on to give us the
wisdom of the assembly and the lawcourts. \Vith their hdp we shall some-
timcs use persuasion, and at othe.r tim<'S force, and so come out on top
witbout paying for it."
"'But it's impossible t.O use stealth or force against the gods." "WeU, if
the gods don't e.,m, or if they are not at ali interested in men, why should
e wc in our tu.r n bc i.ntcrcstcd in keeping what wc do a secret? lf they do
cxist, and are intcrc..'Sted i.n men, our only knowlcdge or hc..-,,rsay of them
c..-omes from custom and thc poets who sing of thc gods' family histories.
u Thc quotation is ada.prcd to fü seamlessly into tbc:: rou.ng ro:1m's thought. 01ber
sour<.-es gj,:e us :i fuUer version of rhe fragment: 'How clímb thc highcst wall] Will
juslice belp 1he raec of mcn that dwcUs on carth to stalc it? Or de"\ ious dcccptiooi
1
i\1.y m.ind is dh,idcd and (.".lnnot say for ccrtain.'

15 A fr;igment of a lost pocm by Simonidcs.
1
" Thc cunning fol oí animal fable "12s a írc:qumt 6gure in the pocms of Aréhilochus.
'' ln thc :i.b.'i-CDcc (1Í formal poliàc.al parti~ priv-.te dubs wcrc import:mt i.n launch.ing
thc polidc:dly a.mbi1fous. ln thc filih t.-c..-ntury thcy bca_me nmoriou.s hinl:5-of ol_ig-
archic couspinc,• agai.ust rhe insrit'lllions of democ:ruic Atheos..
Book 2 3650-366, Ad,iman/11.<
Bur these are the wrirers wbo tel1 us thar ir is in the gods' nature to bc
moved and won ovcr 'with fair cntreaty and with sacri6ce'. 18 \Ve must
eithcr bclicvc botb the clai.m s madc by thc pocts o r ncithcr of thcm. And
if wc bclicvc thcm, the best policy will be to act unjustly, and use the
366 procccds to pay for sacrifices. lf wc act jusLly, wc shall avoid punishmcnt
by thc gods, but also lose thc rcwards of injustiL-c, whcre-.is if we are unjust
we shall get the rewards, and by mcans of prayers wben we overstep the
mark and do wrong we t'lln persuade the gods to let us off without
penalty."
"'Ah, but wc shall have to pay in the ncxt world - cithcr wc oursclves
or our dcscendants - for the wrongs we do here." " 01 so, my friend," he
b will say, with a calculating air. "T here is great power in the mystic rites,
and the g0<.ls who gh•e absolution. So say tbe g reatest cities, and tbe chil-
dren of the gods, those wbo become the pocts and mouthpieces of che
gods; they assure us these things are so."
' \Vhat reason remains, then, for us to choose justice in prefcrencc to
the most complete injustice? If we can bave injustice coupled with coun-
terfeit respectabil.ity, then we s haU bc follo"~ ng o ur own inclinations in
our d~-alingii with gods and mcn ali.kc, both i.n our lifctúnc and aftcr our
dcath. That is thc opinion of most people and of the cxperts. ln the light
e of ali thesc argume.n ts, Socrates, what t'Ould induce anyone witb any force
of personality, any financial resourccs, any physical strcngth or family
connections, to be prcpared to r cspcct justjcc, rather than laugh whcn hc
ht-ars ir bcing rccommcnded? lf anyonc can show that what we havc said
is falsc, and is full y satisfied thnt justice is a good thing, thcn I imagine he
is very forgh•ing rowards the unjust, and does not get angry with then1.
d He knows that apart from those who are born witb a kind of divine aver-
sion to injustice, or who gain the lmowledge to refrain from it, no onc
really wants to be jusr. People conde.m n injustice as • result of cowardice,
or old age, or weakness of some other kind , and from an inabiliry to prac-
tise it. lt's quite obvious. Tbe minute one of these people comes into a
position of powcr, he immcdiatcly starts acring as unjusLly as he possibly
can.
'The reasou for aU this is simply thc observation which promptcd the
two of us to inllict thesc lo ng speeches on you, Socrates. lt is this. Thcre
e is no shortage of people like )'OU, m y admirable friend, who claim to be
supportcrs of justice, srarting with thc herocs of early days, whose words
11
Rcforrln.g b'<lck 10 364c.
47
Adeima.ntus The Republic
have come down to us, right up to people of the present day. Nonc of you
has ever condemned injustice or recommended justice except in terms of
the reputation, prestige and rewards they bring. Nobody has ever yet,
cither in poetry or in privatc discus.~ion, givcn a sufficiently dcrailed
account of cach of them in itsclf, whcn it is pn.-scnt with its own for~-c in
thc sou! of thc pcrson possessing ir, undetcctcd by gods or by mcn. No onc
has shown that injustice is the greatest of the e,•ils the sou! has within it, or
367 that justice is the greatest good. If that were what you had all been saying
right from the start, and if you had been persuading us from our earliest
years, we wou.ld not now be kceping an eyc on one anothcr, to b'Uard
against injustice. Each man would bc kccping an eyc on himself, afraid
that by doing wrong hc migbt admit the grcat<-st of c,,ijs to sharc his
abode.
'This, Socrntes, and perbaps even more than this, is what Tbr-.isy-
machus, or anyone cise for that matter, might say on the subjecr of
b justice and injustice. They as.~ign the wrong valuc to cach - a gross
mistake, in my vicw. The reason- and I will be quite open with you - why
1 havc ser out their position as vigorously as l can is that J want to hear the
opposire vicw from you. Don't just dcmonstrate to 11s by ar1,'l1mcnt that
justice is somctlúng more powerful than injusticc. 19 TclJ us what clfect
L"1Ch of them has, just by irself, on thc person posscs.~ing it, which makes
one of them something bad and rhe other something good. You nmst strip
them of their repurations, as Glaucon recommended. You must remove
from cach its true reputation, and give it a false reputatioo. Othcrwise we
e shall say that you are not defeoding justice, but the appearance of justice,
and that you are 001 condemning injustice, but the appearance of injus-
tice. \Ve shall say you are encouraging us to be secretly unjust, and that
you agra- with Thra.~ymachus when hc says that justice is what is good
for someone elsc - what is good for the srrongcr - whereas inju~'lice is
what is good and profitable for onesclf - what is bad for the weakcr. You
agreed that justice was onc of thosc grc':lt goods which are worth having
partly for their consequences, but much more so for thcir own sale,
d goods such as sight, hearing, intelligence - and health, for that mattcr -
and the rcst of that finest class of goods, those which are good b)' their
very natu.rc, and not because of the reputation they bring. 20 That is the
19 As in the :irgu01eo1 with Thra.")•machus (351:1).

20 Thc Grecl:. i.~ ambiguous, aod could also m.t-.m 4and lhe rest of that cl:m of goods
which :uc produc.tfrc by thcir very n2rure, and 001 bec::ause of rhe repurarion thcy
bri_ng'.
Ad,imantus, Socrat,s
praise of justice I wanl you to make- Just by itseu; how does il help - and
how does injustice harm - the person wbo possesses it? You can leave the
praise of rewards and reputa:ion to others. l'm prepared to accept other
people praising justice in thcse 1erms, and condernning injustice, and
listen to them extolling or criticising thc repuration and rewards associ-
ated with them. Bu1 I won't accept it from you, unless you tel1 me I must,
since tbis is precisely the question you have spcnt your whole lifc
e studying. So please don't just demonstrate to us by argument that justice
is some1hing more powerful than injustice. Tel1 us the elfec1 eacb of them
has, just by itself, on the person possessing it - whether or not gods and
men know about it - thc effcct which males one of them good and the
other bad.'
I had always had a high opinion of Glaucon's and Adeimantus' char-
acters, but when I beard what rhey had 10 say l was particularly delighted
368 witb tbem. 'So, children of the great man,'21 I said, 'Glaucon's lovcr was
righl, when you dis1inguished yourselves in the battlc ai Megara, to begin
bis poern in your honour witb the words:
Ariston's sons, great father's godly tine ... 22
A fair description, I think, my friends. There was cer1ainly something
inspircd about your performance just now - 10 be able to speak like that
in favour of injustice without being convinccd it is a bettcr thing than
b justice. And judging by thc cvidence of your whole way of lifc, J bclieve
you wben you say you are really not convinced, though from what you
actually said I wouldn't have bclieved you. The trouble is, the more firmly
1 believe you, tbe less cer1ain l am what 10 do next. I can'r defend justice.
I don' t think I have the ability. [ say thar because you have rejected tbc
arguments by which I tbought 1 had proved to Thrasymachus that justice
e wa~ somcthing better than injustice. On the other hand, I can't 1101 defend
her, since I can'I help feeling it is wrong ro stand idly by when I hear
21An obsc.,"UJ'C phrasc. Ir could bc a ptayful addrcss bctwcen intimatcs (compare )'ou
son of a gun'); m ironic allusion to the. brothcrs' inhcrirance of the argument from
Thrasymachus (compare 358~ 331d); ora.o anticipalion of 1hc ~ntion of t.hcir
father Ariston in the \'t:rse rhat Socntes procttds 10 quote.
u The identity of Glauc.-on's lovcr is not k.nown, although Critias (~ pp. xJ- x_fü o( the
incroduc,~ion) h:as beco thought a likcly candíd,uc. A p:lttcrn of homoscxuality io
which an oldcr mao would act as sociaJ mentor to a youth in rctu.m for sexual fa,·ours
was standard io Athens (scc K. J. Dovcr, Crut Homoseru.a.lity, Cambridge; Mass.:
Han•ard University Press, 1978).. h is undear wbich o( rhe many lxu-tJes berween
Athcns and Megan is mcant. Ar1ston's namc means •Best'.
49
Socrates, Adeima111m The R~puhli,
justice coming undcr attack, and not come to her defence for as long as I
have breath in my body and a tonguc in m y hcad. So the bcst thing is to
make what defcnce l can.'
\Vell, Glaucon and the resr of them insisted that tbey wante<l me to
make a defen.c c, and nor abandon the argument. They wanted me to makc
a full invcstigation into wha.t justice and injustice both were, and what tbe
true position was concerning the bcncfit they both brought. So I adopted
what seemed to me the best approach. 'Thc cnquiry we are undcrtaking
d is nota sim pie matter. If you ask me, it requires sharp cyi,sight. And since
we are not clever people, l think we should conduct our search in thc sarne
sort of way as we would if our eyesight were nor ,•ery goo<l, and wc were
rold to rt,ad some small writing from a bit of a distance away, and then one
of us rcalise<l thar a larger copy of the sarne writing, apparendy, was to be
found somcwhcrc cise, o n some larger surface. We would regard ir as a
stroke uf luck, I think, to be able to read the large letters first, and the.n
rurn our attention to rhe small ones, to s<-e if they re:illy did say thc samc
thing. '
e '\Ve certainly would ,' said Adei1nantus. 'But wbere can you see any-
thing like that in our search for justice?'
'['li tel1 you,' I said. '\Ve say that thcrc is justice in an individual; but
also, I take ir, justice in a whole ciry?'
'Yes.'
'And a city is something bigger than an individual?'
'Yes, ir is.'
'ln rhat case, maybe justice will bc on a larger scale in what is larger,
36<) and easier to find out abour. So if you approve, why don't wc srarr by
fi.nding out wbat sort of thing ir is in cities? After that wc can makc a
sim.i lar inquiry inro thc individual, trying to find the likeness of tbc larger
version in the form the smaller t:ikes.'
'1 thi11k rhar's a goo<l idea,' he said .
' Supposc then,' 1 said, 'we were to study the theoretical origin of a ciry,
would we also see the origin in ir of jusrjcc aod injustice?'
'\Ve might,' he said.
'And if we do that, is there a chance that what wc are looking for will
be (,asier to find ?'
b ' Yes, much c:isier.'
'You d1ink, then, that this is a rask wc should attempt to complete} I
suspect ir is a fairly major undcrtaking, so you decide.'
'We have dccidcd,' said /\dcimantus. 'Go ahead.'
50
Book 2 368c-37oa Socra.tes, A d,im11111us
'Vcry well,' 1 sa.id. 'Thc origin of a ci1:y lies, 1 thin.k, in the foct tha1 we
are not, any of us, self-sufficient; we have aU sorts of needs. Ôln you think
of any othcr reason for the foundation of a city?'
'No, 1 ~-an'1.'
e: 'Oiffercnt individuals, thcn, form associations \Vith onc person to mcct
one need, and with anothcr person to meet a differcn1 need. With this
variery of wants they may coUect a nun1bcr of partne.r s and allies into one
place of habitation, and to tbis joint habitation we give the name "city,"
don't we?'
'Yes, we do.'
'Doe-• one person share with another, when hc does share - or does hc
acccpt a share - bccausc hc thinks it is bctter for hi,n pcrsonaUyl'
'Yes, hc does.'
' Right then,' 1said. 'Let's construct a bypotbetical ciry, lrom lhe begin-
ning. lt is the product, apparently, of our needs. '
'Of course. '
d 'And the fi.rst and most importanl of thosc nccds, if wc are to exisr and
stay alhre, is thc provision of food.'
'Unquestionably.'
'Second comes the necd for housing, and tbird thc nccd for dothing
and things likc that.'
'That is right.'
'\Vell then,' l said, 'bow will our cicy be equal to meeting tbese require-
ments? \Von't it jusc be one formcr, plus a builder, plus a weaver? Or
should we add a shoemaker as wcU, and anyone cise wbo provides for
physical nceds?'
'Yes, we should.'
'So the mosr basic ciry would havc to consist of four or five men.'
'lt looks li.kc ir.'
e 'Ne,, question . Should each onc of them makc what he produces avail-
able to ali alike? Should the one farmer, for e,~ample, provide food for
four? Should hc put four timcs thc hours, and four times the effort, into
the production of food, and thcn sharc it with the othcrs? Or should hc
370 forge1about th~m and provide for himself alone, producing only a quarter
of tbe amount of food in a quartcr of the time - and of rbe remaining
three-quartcrs, devote a quarrer each to thc provision of housing, of
clothing, and of footWt"1r? T hat way hc would sa\'C himsclf the trouble of
sharing with othcrs, and provide for his own nL-cds by h.is own individual
efforrs.'
51
Ad,ímmuus, Socra.tes Tltt Rep11blic
'No, Socrates,' Adeimantus replied, 'the other way is probably easier.'

''fbat's certainly wbat you'd cxpcct,' T said. 'And one thing immedi-
b ately srruck me when you said that, whicb is that one individual is by
naturc quite unlike anot.b er individual, thar they dilfer in their natural
aptitudcs, and that dilfercnt peoplc are equipped ro perform clifferent
rasks. Don't you think so?'
'I do.'
'\\leU, tben. Will a single individual do better exercising a number of
sl-iUs, or will t,acb do best coneenrrating on one?'
'Conccntrating on one,' he replied.
'And another lhing. lt i~ clear, I think, that if you let lhe right moment
for a task pass by, the task suffers.'
'Yes, that is clear.'
'That is because the task in hand wiU not wait for the person doing ir
e to bave a spare momcnt. So it is csscntial that whoever is doing it should
concentra te on it, and not regard it as a hobby.'
'Yes, ir is esscntial.'
'lt follows from this lhat in any enterprise more is produced - and tbat
it is better and more easily produced - when one person does a singlc task
which is suired ro bis nature, and does it at the right timc, kceping hirnself
free from orher rasks.'
'lt certainly does.'
'Then it will take more than four citizens, Adeimanrus, to provide for
lhe nceds we were tallcing abour. The farmer, it appears, will not make
d himself a plough with his own bands - not if it's going to be a good plougb
- nor a hoe, nor any of bis olher farming implements. No more will lhe
builder, who also needs a number of tools. And the sarne goes for tbe
weaver and the shoemaker.'
'True.,
'So carpenters, and blacksmitbs, and a wholc lot of sl-illcd workers of
1ha1 kind , will become partners in our little city, and make the place quite
crowded.'
'They will.'
e 'Ali lhe sarne, it still won' t bc all thar large, even if we add cattlemen,
shepherds and other herdsmen, so tbat the farmers can have o.~en for
ploughing, and so that builders as well as tbe farmers will be able to use
animais for carrying materiais, and so that weavers a.nd shoemakers can
have hides and wool .'
,·2
Book 2 37oa- 371c Adeima11tus, Socrates
' lt certainly won't be a small city,' he said, 'if it conroins ali that.'
'T hat's not all,' 1 said. ' Ir will be more or less in1possible to locate the
t;ry itsdf in a place whcre ir won't need imports.'
'Quite impossible.'
'So it will require yet more people in addition, to bring it chc things it
needs from some ocher city.'
'It will.'
' \Vhat is more, if cheir agent goes empty-handed, taking nothing which
371 meets the needs of the people from whom chey are importing che chings
they are short of, tben he will come back empty-handed, won't hei''
' I think so.'
'So in their own cconomy the citizens must not only provide ad-
equately for themselves; they must also producc the right kind of goods
- and in large enough quantities - for the people they need to trade with .'
' Yes, they must.'
'So our city needs more farmers, and more work.ers in otber occupa-
tions.'
'Ycs.'
'And more agents as well, presumably, the ones wbo are going to do ali
the importing and exporting. Thcsc pcoplc are mcrcha.nts, arcn't they?'
'Yes.'
'So wc shall nced mcrchant5 as well.'
'Definitcly.'
b 'And if our trade is by sca, we shall need a large number of other people
as weU - experts on scafaring.'
'Ycs, a large numbcr.'
'\Vhat about trade in thc ciry itself? 1-iow will eacb group sharc its pro-
duction with othersl That after ali was our reason for forming an as..soci-
ation and establishing a city.'
'Obviously,' he said, 'by buying and selling. '
'Tbat will give rise to a market-place anda currency, a unit of exchange
for transactions.'
' Undoubtedly.'
e 'But whcn thc farmcr, or member of onc of thc othcr occupations,
brings to market part of what hc produces, he may not arrive there at the
same moment as those who need to exchange goods with hin,. Is he going
to sit around in the market-place, taking rime off from his work?'
' Certainly not,' he said . ' There are people who identify this necd, and
53
Adtima111us, Socrat,s The Repuh/ic
make themselves available for this activiry. ln a weU-run ciry thcy tend to
d bc the weakcst physically, thosc who are useless for any orber kind of
work. They havc to wait around there in the market-place, reL-civing
goods i.n exchangc for money from those who have something to sei!, and
then again money in return for goods from ali those who want to buy.'
'So this is the need,' I said, 'wbicb brings dealers into our ciry. Oon't
we calJ pcople dealers, if they s it therc in the market-place offoring a
sclling and buying service, whereas rhose who travei round the cities we
cal! merchants?'
' \Vc do.'
'And there is still anorher group of peoplc, 1 think, offering a service.
e \Ve certainly would not want them as parrncrs or associares for tbci.r
mental attributes, but tbey possess physical srrcngth suirable for manual
labour. This they offer for sale, and the price they put on it they cal! their
hirc. That, 1 imagine, is why tbey in turn are called hired labourers. Isn'r
that rightt'
'Ycs.'
'So hired labourcrs, it sccms, will also goto 6.11 up our city.'
'l think they mai•. '
' \Vell then, Adeimanrus, is our ciry now large enough? Is it complete?'
' Maybe it is.'
'ln wh.ich case, wherc exactly are justice and injustice to be found in it?
ln which of thc dcments wc havc exanúned ha,-c they made their appear-
ance?'
3;, 'Speaking for mysclf, Socratcs,' he said, 'I have no idea - unless, 1
suppose, ir is in some sort of need which thosc clcmcnts bave of one
a.nother.'
'l think thar may be the. right answcr,' 1 said. ' \Vc must e.xamine it
withour hesitation. Let's look first at thc way peoplc will spend their rime
in an economy of this kind. Vi'on't ir bc that they produce bread and wine
and clothing and shoes? They will build themseh,es houses. ln summer
they will go about thcir work Lightly clad, and barefoot, and in winter thcy
b will be properly clothed and shod. They will Live on barley-meal and
wheat flour. Kneading and baking thL-SC, they will have 6.ne barley cakes
o r whcat loaves served on reeds or fresh k-avcs. Thcy "~li eat lying on
StrJW beds covcrcd with bryony and myrtle. They can Livc very \\-CU Like
this - thcy and thcir children. Orinking wine after thcir mt-als, wt,aring
garlands on thcir heads, and singing the praises of thc gods, they will tive
S4
Book 2 371c-373a Socrau.s, Gluueon
e quite happil)' with one another. They will have no more children than
they can afford, and they will avoid poverty and war.'2.l
.1\1 this point Glaucon interrupted. ' N o art of cookery, apparently, for
th(.-se pc-oplc you dcscribe as living so wcll.'
'TI1at's a good point,' 1 said. '1 forgot that rhey will havc the art of
cookery. Obviously thcy will use salt, and olives, and chccsc, and thcy wi.11
boil the usual country dishes of wild roots and vegerobles. And for dcsscrt
d wc can offer them figs and chickpeas and beans; and they will roaSt myrtlc
bcrrics and acorns in front of the lire, with a modest amount to drink. ln
this way, living livt-s which are peaccful and in ali probability healthy, they
will die in old age, handing down thc sarne way of life to thcir descen-
dants.'
' l f you wcre organising a city of pigs, Socrates, isn't that just how you
would feed them?' 2'
' \Vcll, what sort of meals sh11uld we give them, G laucon?' 1 asked.
'The usual kind . lf they are going to eat in comfort, they should lie on
e couches, eat off rabks, and havc the cooked dishes and desserts whicb
peoplc today havc.'
' I see,' l rcplied. 'So we are not just lookingat thcorigin of a city, appar-
ently. \\le are looking at the origin of a luxurious city. Maybc that's nor
s uch a bad idea. Jf we look at that sort of city too, we may perhaps sce tbc
point whcrc justice and injustice come into ex:istence in cities. 1 think thc
rruc city - thc health y version, as it werc - is the one we have just
describcd. Bur let's look al.so at thc swollcn and in.ílamed city, if that is
what you prefer. \Ve c-an easily do that. \Vhat's to stop us?
373 'Ali this, and this way of lifc, will not , it sccms, bc cnough for some
people. They will have couchcs and tablcs, and othcr furnirure in addi-
tion, and cooked dishes of course, and incense, perfumes, call-girls, c-a.kcs
- every variety of ali these things. As for those nceds we talked abou1 at
thc beginning, wc ~-.n no longer prescribe only tbe bare necessiries -
bouses, dothing and shoes. \Vc musr introdu~-e painting and decoration,
and start using gold and ivory and ali thosc sorts of things, mustn't we?'
23 The pieture borrows some o( i1s eíf'e<:1 from th,;,;1 of the prü,u....+al goldcn age i.n
Hcsiod's ,Yorks anil Dayi ( 109--126), no1ably thc :ib...enc,."C oí w2.r .1.nd t.hc relati,~ sim-
plicit)' oí J:ife; but i1. ow1..-s much more ma scntime.nral ,·icw of t,hc lift of thc small
farmcr or pcas:rnt io thc At:hcnian counr.rysidc. The contcmpt Glaucon is about to
show for it is accordingly th:.t of the sophistic-.ncd cirr~dv;,:,Ucr.
i!-4 Pigs wcrc (..'Onsidcrcd slow and srupid (compare 535e) as wcll as diny and grc:cdy -
thc. crublem of all that w2s uocuuth.
55
Claucon, Socrates Th, Repuhlic
b 'Yes.'
'So once again we must enlarge our city, since our first, healthy city is
no longer big enough. \Ve must 611 it with a great mass and multitude of
things which are no lougcr what citi~'S must have as a matter of uecessity.
For examplc, wc must bave huntcrs of ali kinds, artists, ali thosc using
figure and colour for their imitations, and those using music, poets and
e their assistants - reciters, actors, dancers, producers - and the makers of
ali sorts of goods, especially tbose used for making women look beautiful.
\Vhat's more, we sball need more people in service. Don't you tbink we
sball need attendants for our sons, wetnurses, nannies, hairdressers,
barbers, not to mention cooks and chefs? And bcsidcs thosc, wc sball nccd
people to keep pigs as well. \Ve didn't have thcm in our earlier city, since
there was no need for them. But in this city therc wi/1 bc a need for them,
as also for ali sorts of other livestock, in case anyone wanrs rhem to eat.
lsn't tbat right?'
d 'Of course. ' 25
'And living likc this, will wc have much greatcr need of doctors than wc
did bcforc?'
' Yes. J\ilucb greater.'
' \Vbat is more, l imagine the territory wbicb was originally adequate to
feed the original population will no longer be adequate. Ir will be too
small. Do wc acccpt tbat?'
'Ycs.'
'Do we need, then, to carve oursclvcs a slicc of our neigbbours' terri-
tory, if we are going to ba\'C enougb for pasturagc and ploughing? And do
tbey in turn need a slice of our !anel, if they too give tbemselves up to the
pursuit of unlimited wealth, not confining themselves to nccessities?'
e 'They are bound to, Socratcs.'
'And will the next step be war, G laucon? Or what?'
1
\Var.'
'Let us say nothing for the moment,' 1 said, ' about whether the effect
of war is barmful or beneficial. Let us merely note that we have discov-
ered, i_n it• turn, tbc origin of war. \Var arises out of those things which
are thc commoncst ~-auses of evil in cities, when e,•il does arisc, both in
privatc lifc and public ljfe.'
'Yes.'
U Mc;ar w;as a luxury. and the rural diet w:as of neccs.trit:y mainly ,-cgetui:m. Thcrc wcre
also delibera1e \'t,getarian~ norably the Pythagorcan communitics, wbo pracrised
,·cgct:3.rl.lnism for pbilosophk rcasons.
Book 2 373b-374d Socrates, Glautori
374 'Our city needs to be evcn bigger, my fricnd. And not justa bit bigger;
wc must add t<> it a wholc army, which can go out and fight against
in\'aders, and defend ali our wealth and the other things we were talking
about just now.,
'What about tbe citizens tbemseh·es? Arcn't there enough of them?'
'No,' I said, 'not if we werc right, you and thc r.-st of us, in wbat wc
agrct-d t-arlier, wbcn wc wcre forming our ciry. Surcly we agreed, if you
remember, that no individual was capable of practising severa! arts or
skills properl y.'
'True.'
b '\Vell, how nbout 6ghting in bnttle?' I asked. 'Don't you tbink that is
essentially an art or skilL''
'Very much so,' he said.
'And should we regard the art of shoemaking as more important tban
the art of war?'
\No.'
'Well then. We didn't allow our shoemaker to try and be a farmer as
well - or a wea\'er or builder. He had to be a sboemaker, to make sure the
business of shoemaking was carried out properly. ln tbe same way we
assigned a single task to each member of tbe other occupations - the rask
he was naturally suited to, and for wbich he would keep himself free from
e other rasks, working at ir throughout bis life, and taking every opportu-
nity to produce good results. lsn't ir of the highest importancc that
warfare should be carried on as clliciently as possible? Or is war so easy
that any farmer, any shoemaker, or any practitioner of any art or sl-ill, can
be a soldier as weJL' 26
'Even to be a dccent draugbts or dice player, you ha\'e to havc becn
d playing sincc you wcrc a ch.ild. It can't bc donc in your sparc timc. So how
can you pick upa shield - or any other wcapon or instrument of war - and
imn,ediately bc equipped to ta.ke your place in thc battlo-linc, or in any of
thc other sorts of fighting which occur in time of war? Think of other
instruments: there isn't one of them that will turn a person into a cr:úts-
n,an or athlete simply by being picked up, or tbat will be of any use to hin,
if he has no expertise or bas not had cnough practice in handling it. '
' No,' he said, 'they'd bc extremcly ,·aluablc inst.rumcnts if you l'Ould.'
26 lt ~llS a poinr of pridc among lhe general ciri-1.cnry of moscor the Greek Sfll.[C$ of the
fifih and (r.o a lesser degrec) thc fourth centuries ro fight thcir own banlcs; there WCTC
no st:mding armics: of prof~'lon:l.l soldícrs. l-"'or íurther background ronsulr eh. J 2e
('\½r&re') oí CAH 6.
57
Sotra.lfs, Clau,·011 Th, R,puhlit
e 'Sincc the guardfons' job, tben,' 1 said, ' is the most important, it must
corresp,indingly call for the greatest frecdom from other activities, together
with thc highest levei of experti,;e and training.'
'That's cc.rtainly my opinion,• he said.
'And also, of course, a natural disposilion suited 10 precisei)' this way
of lifol'
'Of coursc.'
'And it would be our job, apparentl)', if we are capable of it, to choose
which dispositions, and which kinds of dispositions, were suited 10 the
dcfe.ncc of 1hc t~ty.'
'Thut would indced be our job.'
' Heavens,' I said, 'that's a major rcsponsibility we havc takcn upon
375 ou.rselvcs. Ali the sarne, as far a.s our abilitics pcrmic, we mus t rry noc 10
back our of it .'
•Yes, wc must.'
'\Vcll, thcn,' I said , 'whcn it comes ro acting as a guardian, don't you
t.hink that in his disposiúon a roung man of good birth is like a young
pcdigrce hound?'
'lo whnt way?1
'\VcU, for examplc, each of them needs acute senses, speed in pursuit
of whllt they detect, and strcngth as weU, in case they catch it and havc 10
6ght with it.'
'Yes,' he said, lthcy nec.,~ all these qualitics.'
'Plus couragc, of course, if he is to fight welJ.'
'Of c:.ourse.'
'But is any Living crea.ture Jil.ely to be brn,•e - whether horse or dog or
b anything cise - if it docim't have a spirited and energctic nature? Ha,, en't
you noticed what an irresistiblc and uncooquerable t.hing spirit is? With
spirit, any living creaturc is fcarlcss and invinciblc in the face of any
dangcr.'
' Yes, I have noticed tbat.'
'As for t.he physical characterisúcs required of a guardian, tben, they
are obvious.'
'Ycs.'
'And the mental requircment is tbat he should bc spirit:ed, or cncrgctic.'
'Yes. Tha t too.'
'ln that case, G laucon,' 1said, 'ift.heir natural disposition is as we have
dcscribcd, what is to stop them being aggrcssive towards one anot.her and
the. rcst of the dtiz.ens?'
58
C/auco11, Socrat,s
'Precious littlc,' hc said.

e 'But wc want rhem to be gcntlc in thcir dcalings with thcir own pcoplc,
and fierce in thcir dealings with the enemy. Otherwise they won't oeed to
waStc rime looking for somt-onc eis,:: to t-omc along and dcstroy thcir ciry;
thcy'II bc in thcrc lirst, doing it for thcmsch,cs.'
vrrue,' hc- sa.id.
'\Vhat shall wc do, then?' 1 asked. ' \Vhere can wc lind a natural dis-
positioo which is both gentle aod full of spirit? Alicr ali, l take it that a
gcntle disposition is the opposite of spirit.'
' lt appears to he.'
'And yct if somconc is dcficicn t in cithcr of thcsc qualitics, hc cannot
d possibly be a good guardian. Thc eombination of thcm looks likc an
impossibility, which me:ins that a good guardian is an impossibility.'
' Pcrhaps it is.'
1 didn't know what 10 say thcn. I thought ovcr what we bad said, and
thcn tricd again . 'No wondcr wc t-an't find thc answcr, m y fricnd. \Vc havc
forgonen tbe example we set up for ourselves.'
'Explain.'
' \Vc forgot that thcre actually are natural dispositions of thc kind wc
havc just dccidcd don' t exist, dispositions which do t-ont.ain thcsc oppo-
site qualities.'
' \\fhcrc?'
' \\fell, you <"lln find tbem in a nwnber of animllls, but e.,'Peóally in thc
e onc wc comparcd with our guardian. You are aware, presumably, that it is
the narurnl disposition of pur(.~ brcd dogs 10 bc as gcntlc as pos,'ible to
those thcy know and recognise, and the. exact opposite to those they don ' t
know.'
'Ycs, Jam. '
'So such • thing is possiblc,' I s.1id. 'And in looking for a guar<lian of
this kind, we are not looking for something unnatural.'
'Apparendy not.'
' ln that t-asc, do you think thc pcrson who is going to bc b'llardian ma•
teria! nccds another quality as well? Do you \\"llnt him, as well as being
spirited and energetic, to be also by temperament a lover of wisdom, a
philosophcr?'"
3;6 '\Vhat do you mean? I don't undcrstand .'
z, Philosophia in GrccL: dcri"t.1i from two word.s nicaning 'lu\+Cof wi~om'. lt is largcly
a1 Plato's h-ands rhat it comes to mc:an somcthing doscr to 'pbilosophy'. Scc pp.
X\"fü- x.rii oí rhc lntrodu<:Üon .
59
S,,cratts, Cla11con, Adtimantus The Rep11h/iç
'lt's another thing you see in dogs,' 1 replied.' Something which makes
you wonder at the animal.'
'What is that?'
'Whcn it sees someone it doc&ll't know, a dog rurns nascy, evcn though
it hasn't bt.sen badly treated by him in thc past. \l\fhen ir sces someonc
familiar, it welcomcs him, even if ir has never becn ar ali well treated by
him. Haven't you ever found that rathcr remarkablel'
'l'd never reaUy thought about ir, up to now,' he said. 'But 1 think
there's no doubr a dog does bebave like that. •
'Ir secms dever, this side of its nature. lt seems to show a true !ove of
wisdom.'
b lln what way?'
'Ilecause,' 1 replied, 'it classifies what it sees as tiiendly or hostile solely
on the fact that ir knows one, and doesn't know the other. lt must be a
lover of knowledge if ir defines friend and enemy by means of knowledge
and ignorancc.'
,v,es, ' he sa_,.d , ,.1t must. '
'And are lo,•e of knowledgc and !ove of wisdom thc sarne thing?'
'They are.'
'So can we say with some confidencc of a man roo, th•t if heis going to
e be someone who is gentle oowards those he knows and recognises, he must
by hi.s naturc bc a lo,•cr of knowlcdgc and of wisdom?'
'\Veem.'
'Thcn will thc person who is going to be a good and true guardian of
our ciry be a lover of wisdom, spirited, swift and strong?'
'Hc cerrain.ly wi.11.'
'\Vcll , so much for h.is nature. But what about the upbringing and
cducntion of our gua:rdians? \\fhat form will those lllke? \.Vill looking into
d that qu<.'Stion bc of some use to us in finding the answer to our maio
cnqu.iry, which is how justice and injusti~-c arise in a cicy? We wanr to cover
the subject propcrly, without going on ar enormous lcngth.'
Glaucon's brother answercd. 'Speaking for myself,' he said, 'l'm quite
surc tbar looking into it will be useful in our main aim.'
'ln that case, my dear Adeimantus,' 1 sa.id, '·we must certainly not leave
it out, evcn if it takes longcr than wc expect. •
'No, ,ve mustn't.'
'Very weU, thcn. L::r's imagine wc are telling a story, and that we have
aU rhc ti.me in the world. Let's d~-sign an education for these men of ours.'
< 'Ye.s, that's what we shuuld do.•
6o
Book 2 376a- 377c Socro/,s, Ad~imantus
'What should thei.r education be, thcn? lsn't it hard to finda better edu-
cation than the one whicb has been developed over thc years? It consists,
I takc it, of physical cducation for the body, and music and poetry28 for
the mind or soul. •
'lt does.'
'And shouldn't we start their education in music and poetry L>arlier than
thcir physic-al cducation?'
'We should.'
'Do you count stories as part of music and poetry, or not?'
'Yes, 1 do.'
'And are stories of rwo kinds - one true, the other false?'
'Yc.-s.'
'Should wc educatc them in both, starting with the false?'
377 ' I don' t undcrstand what you mean,' he said.
' You mean you don't understand that we start off by telling cbildrcn
legcnds? Thcsc, I take it, are broadly speaking falsc, though there is some
truth in thcm. And we start childrcn on thesc lcgcnds bcforc wc start
thcm on physic-al cducation.'
'That is right.'
'That was what l meant when I said we should start thcir education in
music and poctry before their physical education.'
'You ,..,·crc right,' hc said .
b 'Vcry wcll, thcn. You are awarc that it is the beginning of any under-
taking which is the most important part - cspecially for anything young
and tender? That is the time when each individual thing can be most
ca5i.Jy moulded, and receive whatever mark you want to impress upon it.'
l yes, o f co ursc. ·
'Shall we be pcrfcctli•contcnt, thcn, to lct our childrcn listen to any old

storics, made up by any old srorytellcrs? Sltall we let rhem open their
minds to beliefs whiclt are the opposite, for thc most part, of those we
think they should hold when they grow up?'
'No. \Ve shall ccrtainly not alJow that.'
'For a still't, then, it seems, wc must supcrvisc our storytellcrs. \Vhen
e they cell a good story, wc must decide in fa,•our of it; and whcn they tel1 a
u lnscrumcnt,11 music, a1 lcast umil thc cnd o( Phno's lifc, dire(..'tly accom~nied or
orhcrwise complcmeotcd song, chant :md dcclamation rathc.r than bcing dcYclop,cd
for its own sakc. Tbc singlc word. m611siki on thcrdOrc denote accomplishmeot in
bod, musiç and poc.try.
6.1
Socraks, Adeimar11us Tht Rtpubli,
bad onc, we must deddc against it. 29 \Ve shall persuade n=es and
morhcrs to tel1 childrcn the approvcd storics, and tel1 thcm that sbaping
children's rninds with stories is far more importnnr chan trying to shape
their bodies \\~th rheir hands.JO \Ve must reject most of lhe stories they
tel1 at the moment. '
' \Vhich ones?'
'lf we look at ou.r grcatcst stories, wc shall see how to dcal with lcsser
d cxamples as wc!J,' 1 replicd . 'Grcatcr and lcsscr must have thc saroc stan-
dard, and thc sarne clfcct. Don't you think so''
'Ycs, I do,' hc said. 'But l'm not evcn surc which these "grcat" stories
are you talk about.'
"fhe ones Hesio<l and Homer both used ro reli us - and rhe orher poetS.
They made up untrue srorics, which rhey llSed to reli people - and still do
tel1 rbero.'
'\Vlúch stJlricsi \Vhat is your objcction 10 thcm?'
e 'The one which oughr to be our first and strongcst objcction - cspc,-
~~ally if the untruth is an ugly one.'
' \\lhat is rlús objecrion?'
' \Vhen a storyteller gives llS the wrong impression of the na!llrC of gods
and hcrocs. lt's likc ao arrist producing picturcs which don't look 1.i.kc the
things he was trying to draw.'
'Ycs,' he said, ' it is right 10 object in general to rhat sort of story. But
what exactll' do we mean? \Vhich stories?'
'l'll stan,' I said, 'with an irnportant falsehood on an important subjecc.
T here is rhe very ugly falschood told of how Ouranos did the things
378 Hesiod sayshcdid, and how Kronos inhís turn took lús revengeon him.3'
As for wbat Kronos did, and what bis son did 10 lúm, even if rhey were
t.rue I wouldn't think that in the normal course of events these stories
should bc rold 10 rbose who are young and uncrirical. T he best thiog
:t \Vbilc thcn: "".IS no stat(· super,-ision in Athens c:,f thc sturics ch.ildren beard in lhe
Cúurse of their edul~Üoo, the St:ale did oontrol thc poetic ~'Ork.s du.1adult ciriuns wit-
ncssed at thc draniallc fcsth1ílli. since it \\' as lhe n.-sponsibility or vurious m:agisrr:atcs
to .sck-cr. from :i pool of :applic.i.nts., the dnm:uisrs who c.-ould iate p:tcr ea.ch yt'ar.
30 Thc ttfcrence. is to thc use of ma..'>Sllgc and 5waddling clothC!l for dirccting the growth
of iofants,
31 Hesiod, Tbc,gony 154- 182 1 45.3- 5<>6. The sky god Our:mos prC\•cn1ed t:hc chHdrcn
ooncci,·cd for tum by lhe e:u-th moth<..-r G:a.i:i. írom emcrging into thc líght. G1ia 's son
Kronos a,·enged thcm by C1Str11ting hjs f:nbcr with a sick.lc of his motbcr's manu-
&c1urc. Kronos in bis rurn swaUowcd 1hc childrco bor·oc him by his consort Rhea
:rnd succumbcd likcwi.~ to thc wllcs of the mv1her aud of onc oi 1hosc child.ren,
Zeus, wbo thcreby bc<,.mc king of lhe gods.
62
Book z 377r-378e Socrates, Adúmantus
would be to say nothing about them at ali. [f chcrc were some overriding
necessity to tel1 thcm, th cn as fcw peoplc as possiblc should hL-ar them,
,md in strict secrecy. They should havc to make sacrilice. Not a pig, but
some large and unobtainable sacrificial animal, to make sure che smallest
possiblc nu.m ber of pcople hcard them.'
'Ycs,' he said. 'Thosc storics are pretty hard 1:0 cakc.'
b ' \Vc will not have them told in our c.iry, Adcimantus. \Vhcn thc young
are lis1cning, the.y are not to be told that if thcy committed the most
borrible crin,es tbey wouldn't be doing anything out of the ordimrry, not
cven if thcy inOicrcd evcry kind of punishment on a fathcr who trcated
thcm badly. \Vc won' t tcU thcrn rbat thcy would mercly bc acting likc thc
lirsr and grcatcsr of thc gods.'
'Good hcavcns, no. Personally, 1 don'r thin.k thcsc are at aU thc righc
storics io 1dl them.'
e ' Nor, in general. any of thc stories - which are not rrue anyway - about
gods making war on gods, plotling against chem, or fighting with thcm.
1ot if wc want thc pcople who are going to protect our city to reg-.rrd it as
a crime to fali out with onc another w;thout • very good reason. The last
thing thcy nccd is to havc storics told thcm, and picturcs madc for thcm,
of battles betwecn giants, and ali lhe many and varied enmitics of gods
and berocs towards their kinsmen and familics. lf we do intcnd to 6nd
some way of convincing thcm chat no citizen has eve.r quarrelled with
d anothcr citizen, that quarrelling is wrong, then this is the kind of thing
old men and women must tel1 our ch.ildren, right from tbe start. And as
thc chi.ldren gct oldcr, wc must compel our poccs to tel1 storics similar to
thcse. As for thc binding of Hera by hcr son, thc hurling of Hcphacstus
our of hcaven by his father, for trring to protcct his mothcr wben shc was
bcing beaten, and thc bnttlcs of thc gods which Homcr tells us about,32
whcther thcse stories are told as allcgorics or not as allegorics, wc mnst
not allow them into our city. Tbe young are incapablc of judging wbat is
e aUcgory and what is not, and thc opinions they form ac that age tcnd
to bc incradicablc and unchangcable. 13 For thcse rcasons, pcrhaps, wc
J2 Thc son who bound Hcr11 a.nd thc sem who camc lc> hcr Jc.fencc against Zeus :a.re onc
2nd thc samc~Hephacsrus. Thc St<tr)' is Llu1 hc ,v;is rc.jc..-c1cd by hi11: mother ar birth
and in rcvcnge madc :a tricl. throne for her which c::aug.h1 her fas:1 w·hen she s:u i.n it.
Tbe i.nc...;deo1 "·ilh Zeus is n.a.mited by MOJ)lt:.r, llit1d 1.58~594, flattles of lhe gods
in Homcr. lliatl io.1-7.Ja, 21.385-513.
JJ At school, Athcnian youngstcrs would mcmorisc rathcr thao intcrpret poc.try, but it
w·as char:actcristic of thc professfonal intc1Joc1u2;ls "'hO offcrcd tbc clire a ttighcr edu-
c:ation to tind hidden mt.':lllings in lhe poc,s. especi:iUy Homcr.
Sotrates, Adeima11tus The Rtpublic
should regard it as of the highest importunce that the first things they hear
should be improving stories, as beautiful as can be.'
'1nat makes sense,' he said. 'But suppose someone were togo on and
ask us what these things are, and what stories we should tel1, which ones
should we say?'
'Adcimantus,' I said, 'wc are not acting as pocts at thc mo.ment, you and
379 1. \Ve are the founders of a city. ft is the founders' job to know the pat-
terns on which poets must model their stories, or be refused permissioo
if they use different ones. It is not their job to start creating stories them-
selves.'
' True,' he said. 'But what about this question of patterns for ~1:ories
about the gods? \Vhat should thcse pattcrns be?'
'Something likc this, I should think. Thcy should always, I takc iL, give
a true picturc of what god is rcally like, whethcr the poet is working in
e-pie, or in lyric, or in tragedy.'
' Yes, they should.'
' \Vell then, isn't god in fact good? Shouldn't he be represented as such?'
b ' Of course.'
'The next point is that nothing that is good is harmful, is ir?'
'No, 1 don't think so.'
'Does what is not harmful do any harm.?'
'N o.'
'Can wbat does no harm do any e,~I?'
'No, it t-an'L do that either.'
' But if something does no e,•il, it couldn't bc thc cause of any e.vi), could
it?'
'Of coursc not. '
'Vcry well. Now, is the good beneficial?'
lYcs.'
' Rcsponsiblc for wcll- bcing, io orhcr word,s?'
'Yes.'
'ln that case the good is not responsible for everything. lt is re;pons-
ible for what goes weU, but not responsible for what goes badly.'
'Absolutely.'
e 'ln which case,' l said , 'god, sin ce heis good, could not be responsible
for «erythiog, as most people claim. Some of the things that happeo to
men are his rcsponsibiliry, but most are not; after ali, we have 01any fewer
good tbings tban bad things in our lives. \Ve have no reasou to hold anyone
cise rcsponsiblc for thc good things, whereas for the bad things we should
look for some other cause, and not biame god .'
Book 2 378e-38oa Adeimantus, So;ratts
'I think you are absolutely right.'

d 'ln tbat case,' 1 said, 'we shouJd not allow Homer or any other poet to
makc such a stupid m istakc about thc gocls, and reli us that two jars
Stand in thc bali of Zeus, full fillcd with fa tcs.

One of tbe two holds good, the 01her ili.
Nor that the person to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two
Sometimes encou.oters evil, somctio1cs good,

whereas for the person to whom he does not give a mixture, but g:ives evil
in its pure form,
Drcad famine drives him ovcr earth's fair face.J•
e Nor describe Zeus as
Of good and evil steward and d ispenser.35
As for Pandarus' vio lation of the oaths and the trure, we shall dis-
380 approve of anyone who says that Athena and Zeus were the cause of it, 36
or that Themis and Zeus were the cause of the quarrel of the goddesses,
and the judgment between them.J 7 Nor again must we let the young hear
the kind of story Aeschylus tells, when he says:
For god implants thc fatal cause in mcn,

\Vben root and branch be will destrOy a bouse.
If anyone writes about the sufferings of Niobe - as here38 - or about the

housc of Pelops,:w or the Trojan \,Var, or anything like that, we must either
nor allow them 10 say thar rhese events are the work of a god, or if the poet
claims that they are the work of a god , then he must find more or less the
lt A mixture of quor-.uion a.nd description of lli•d 24.5:21- .iJl. The ~-ords are spoken
by Achillcs to Priam.
" \Vhe.re this li.ne comes from is not kno\\-11.
16 Bomer, Jliad 4.30 IJ. Ocspite thc piety of lhe Troj:ms wwards hi.m, Zeus succumbs
to cajoling by Hen :md At:hena, who suppon thc Grecks, :md agrecs to permil
Athcna lO beguile tbc Troj:m archcr Pand:arus imo brca.L'lng thc rrucc currcmly
holding bctwecn che two sidcs in tbc war.
17 Tbe Trojan pri.nc..-c Pari.s judgcd i.n fa\'our of Aphrodíle i:n thc contesr for beamy
betwccn hcr and the goddCSSt$ Hera :md Athena - a dccision tbat c,-cntuall)' lcd 1:0
the Trojan \Var.
-" Al"SChylus' N;obt. h-a.-. nor beco pre,SCr\'t..-d. Níobe bo.asred oí h-a,1iog fiocr cbildrcn
1han rhose of d1e goddess Leto - Apollo an<l Arrcn1ís. As a result, thl'SC gods were
scnt by their motbc:.-r to dc:scroy lhe children oí Niobc.
J9 Tbe lurid (ra\1:ails of t:h.e dc.-sccnd::mts of Pclops - including adultcry~child killin~
C2Mibali.'>m 1 :md n:,uhiplc n:,urder bcrwccn kin - wcrc 2 írequcnt 1:opic of tragic
dr.1ma.
6;
Socra/es, AdeimantuJ The Repuhlit
b sort of explanation we a,c looking for at the moment. He must say that
what god does is right and good, aod that thesc pcople's punishments
wcrc good for them. Wc must not allow the poet to say that those who paid
the penalcy wcrc made wretchcd, and that the pcrson responsiblc was a
god. If poets said that the. ,,~cked were madc wretched bccause they
needcd punishment, and that in paying thc penalty thcy wcre being
helped hy god, then we should allow that. But the claim that god, who is
good, is responsible for bri.nging evil on anyone, is one we must oppose
\\~th every weapon we possess. \Ve must not let anyone make this claim in
e our cicy, if it is to be well governed, nor should we let anyone hear it,
whetbcr the hearer be young or old, and whether or not the storyteller
tclls his story i.n verse. These clairns, if tbcy were made, would neither be
holy, nor good for us, nor consistcnt with onc anothcr. '
' You havc my vote for this law,' hc said. 'I thoroughly approve.'
'Tbere you are, then,' I said . '1"hat would be one of the laws about the
gods, onc of the patterns oo wbich storytellers must base their stories, a.nd
poets their poems - that god is n<>t rcspo nsiblc for cvcrytb.i.ng, hut only
for what is good.'
'Yes,' hc said, 'that should do ir.'
d ' \Vhat about a sccond law, or pattcrn? Do you th.in.k god is a magician?
\Vould he dcliberately appear in diffcrent gui= at differe.nt timcs? A.re
there rimes whcn hc really hccomes di.lfcrent, and cha.nges his sbapc into
many fo rm.s, and other rimes whcn hc dt."<.-ch,cs us i.nro th.i.nking that is
what heis doing? O r do you think he has a singlc form, and is of aU crea-
tures rhe least likely to depart from his own sbape?'
' l'm not sure l'm in a position to a.n~·wer that, just at th e moment.1
'How about a diffcrent questioo? \\fhe.n things do depart from tbeir
own shape, isn' r· it nccessarily truc rhat they eithcr changc thcmsclvcs or
are changed by somerlling cise?'
e 'Yes, it is.'
' Doesn't an externa! cause of cl1ange or m otio n have least c ffcct 0 11 thc
6.nest spccimens? Tbink of a body, for example, and the effect on it of
food, drink and exertioo. Or planes, and the effect of s u.n and wind and
rhlngs Hke that. Isn't tbe healthiest and scroogest spccin1eo leastaffecced?'
381 'Ycs, of course.'
'And wouldn't thc bravest and wisest sou! be least disrurbed and altcred
by an o ut.sidc influcnce?'
\Yes.'
'The sarne, presumabl)', goes for anything manufactured - furniture,
66
8001! 2 38ob-.18,d Socra.lfs, Adúma111u.1
houscs and dolhcs. \VhaL is wcll madc and in good condition is lcast
a.tfected by time and othcr influences.'
'Tbat isso.'
b 'So anything whic.h is a fine c:umple, whether by its naturc or ÍIS
design, or both, is thc ruost re,,-istant to being changed by an externa]
agency.'
'lt looks like it.'
'But god and b.is attributes are in every way perfect.'
' Of course.'
'So god would be most unlikely 10 takc many shap.::s as a result of exter-
na) causes.'
' J\1osLunlikely.'
' Could he, in 1ha1 case, changc. and transform himself?'
'Obviously he does,' he said. ' Tf he cbanges at all, that is.'
' Does he then turn himself into something better and more beautiful,
or into something worse and uglier 1.han himself?'
ç 'lf he does changc, it must ncccssnrily be inro somerhing worsc. l
don' t imagine wc are going t.o say that god is lacking in bcauty or good-
ness.'
'No, you are quite right,' 1 said. 'And that hcing so, do )'OU think that
anyone, 1\dcimanrus, whcthcr god or man, is prcparcd to make himself
worsc in any way at aU?'
'No, Lhat's impossible,' he said.
' ln which case,' I replied, 'it is al.so impossiblc for god to havc any desire
10 change himsclf No, ca.c h of thc gods, it appL-ars, is as be:iutiful and
good as possible, and remains for e,•er simply in his own form.'
' Ycs,' hc said, '[ think that must undoubtedly follow.'
d ' \Vcll, then, my friend, we don't want any of the poets telling us,' I said ,
'that
Disguised as s1rangcrs from afar, the gods

Takc many shap<,s, and visit many lands.'°
\\le don't want any of tbcir falscboods about Protcus and Thctis," nor do
we want tragedies or othcr poems wh.ich i.ntroduce Hera, transformcd
into 1he guise of a pricstcss, col.lecting alms for
., Hoo><r, Odyss,y 17.48_;-,i86.

<4I Both ,,·ere divi.nitics of thc oce:m w"ho slippcd írom 1hc V"-'P of ruortals by chaog~
ing int1> a muhitudc oí dUfcrent c:rc-.uu.rcs.
Socrates, Ad.eim1111tus The Republic
The life-giving sons of Argive Inachus. <l
e And there are many other falsehoods of the same sort which we don't
want them telling us - any more than we want mothers to believe them,
and terrify their children with wicked stories about gods who go round at
night, taking on the appearance of ali sorts of outlandish foreigners. That
way we can stop them from blaspheming against the gods, and also stop
them turning their children into cowards.'
'No, we don't want any of that.'
'\Vell then,' I suggested, ' though tbe gods would not themselves
change, maybe they nevertheless make it seem to us that they appear in
ai) sorts of diJferent guises? Pcrhaps thcy dl-ceivc us, and play tricks on
us.'
'Pos~ibly.'
382 '\Vhat! \Vould a god bc preparcd to dccei,•e us, in bis words or his
actions, by offerin.g us what is onJy an appt.-arancc?'
'I don't k.now.'
'You don't know,' I said, 'that the true falsehood - if one can call it that
- is hated by god and man alikc?'
' \Vhat do you mean?'
'l mean this. No one deliberarely chooses falsehood in what is surely the
most important part of himself, and on the most imporrant of subjects.
No, that is the place, more than any other, where they fcar falschood.'
b 'l sti.l.l don't u.nderstand,' bc said.
'That's lxx.-ausc you think l 'm talking about something profound,' l
said . 'But alJ J mcan is that tb.c tb.ing cvcryonc wants abo,•e ali to avoid is
being dc~-ei,•cd in his sou! about thc way things are, or 6nding that hc has
been deceived, and is now in ignorance, thar he holds and possesses the
faJschood right therc in his sou!. That is the place where people most bate
falschood.'
'1 quite agree,' he said.
'As 1 was sayi.ng jus1 now; this igno.rance in the soul, tbe ignorance of
the person who ha~ bccn deceh·cd, t-an with absolute accuracy be called
true falsebood, whereas verbal falsehood is a kind of imitation of this
e conditioo of the sou.1. lt comes inro being la1er; ir is an image, nota wholly
unm.i"ed falschood. Oon't you agree?'
'I do.'
.u We do no1 know why Mera wns collccting :alms for lhe sons of lnat.ilus. Thc line
quo,cd comes: ÍTom a los-t plily of Acsc,hylus.
68
Book 2 381d-383a Socrat,s, Ad,imantus
'1'he real falsehoo<l is hated not only by gods but also by men.'
'Yc-s, I think so.'
' \Vhat about verbal falsehood? \cVhen is it useful, and for whom? \Vhen
does it not deserve hatred? lsn't it useful against enemies, or to stop those
who are supposed to be our friends, ,fasa result of madness or ignorance
d they are trying to do somcthing wrong? lsn't a lic useful in those circum-
stanccs, in the sarne way a'i medicine is useful? And in the myths wc were
discussing just now, as a result of our not knowing what thc truth is con-
ccrning c,•cnts long ago, do we make falsehood as much like thc trutb as
possible, and in this way makc it uscful ?'
'Yes,' he said, 'that is exactly how ir is.'
' ln which of thcse ways, rhcn, is falsehood uscful to god? Does hc make
falschood rescmblc thc truth becausc hc docsn't know about cvcnis long
ago?'
'No, that would be absurd.' he said.
'So therc is nothing of the false poet in god.'
' I don't think so.'
e ' Is he afraid of his enemies? \Vould he tell lies for that reason?'
~Fn.r from it.'
'Or bccausc of thc ignorance or madncss of his fricnds, perhaps?'
'No,' hesaid . 'No one who is ignorant and mad is a fricnd of thc gods. " l
'There is no reason, then, for god to teU a falsehood.'
'No, nonc.'
'So thc supernatural and thc divinc are a.ltogethcr without falsehood.'
'Absolutcly.'
'ln that case, god is ccrrain.ly single in form and truc, both in what hc
does and what hc says. Jole d01.-s not change in h.imsclf, a.n d he does not
dccc.ive othcrs - ,vaking or slccping - e.lthcr with apparitions, or with
words, or by sending signs.'
383 'That's how it seems to me too,' hc said, 'as I listcn to what you say.'
'Do you agree thcn,' I askcd, 'that thL~ should be the second pattern for
tclling stories o r writing pO<.'TllS about thc godsr Tbcy are not m•gicians
who change their shape, eithcr in their words or their nctions, and thcy do
not lead us astray with làlschoods.'
'Yes, 1 agree.'
'So while there is much in Homer we approve of, we shall not approve
◄l Addmantu.'i: gives íu.U "➔eight to a tc:rm (tlr~üphilã) th.11 usuaUy means simply
'fo\·ourc.d by tbc god.s\ i.c. 1fortun1tc1•
Soeriit,s, Adúmantus The Repuhlit
b of Zeus' scnding a drc-am 10 Agamcmnon;'-1 nor of Acscbylus, whcn

Thetis says that Apollo, singing al hcr wedding, "dwdt upon thc chil-
1tren" she wouid ba1•e,
Their length of Lifc, thcir freedom from discasc,
And summing up, sang me a bymn of blcssing
For my good luck and favour with the gods.
1vly hopc was bjgh, for .Phocbus was • god,
And Phocbus' mouth, brimming with mantic art,
à1ust spcak rhc truth, I thought. But hc who sang,
He who was prcscnt at dtc fcast, rhc onc
\Vho said thesc things, is now rhe onc who killed
My son. 45
e \Vhen aoyone talks in this w:iy about the gods, we shall get angry with
h.im, and not graot him a chorus. 46 Nor shall we a!Iow teachers to use bis
works for the educotion of the young - not if we want our guarruans to
hecome god- fearmg and godlike, 10 the greatest ext.enr possiblc for a
human being.'
'l cntirely :igree,' he sa.id, 'with these patterns, and I would want to see
them made law.'
44 lli11d 2.1-3:t-= Zeus scnds n clream 1:0 Agamcmnon promising him vic1-ory o,·er rhc
Troj.;a_ns if hc ll-:ads an imm<-di:nc :i.:ss:auh again1n thcm, hut his real intcnttOn is: to
bring abou1 :1 Grcck defcat that will s:alvc Achillcs' wouodcd pridc.
45 Thc goddess Tbetis w·.is: 1bc uu)thcr of Acbillcs. Ach.illcs y.-•as k.illcd by an arnJw frum
the Trojau l'•ris. guided by Apollo (also knvwn as l'boebus). \\'e have 1.., lhe play
of Aeschylu.s írom wh_ich 1.hese Unes c.-ome.
◄& ·rhat i~ not allow ltim ro s,tage bis play~
Book 3
386 '\Vhcn ir comes to storics about thc gods, then,' I said, ' this is apparcndy
the sort of rhjng which fro m their earlicst childhood people must bc told
- and not cold - i_f thcy are to show rcspccr for thc gods and their parcnrs,
and put a high valuc on friendship wich one anothcr.'1
'Yes, I think our ,icws on this are corrcct,' hc said.
' \Vhat about cour.ige? If we want rh cm to bc hmve, areo' t these the
b stories wc should bc tclling them, plus 1.h e kind of stories which will min-
imi<;;: 1.h cir fear of dcath1 Do you thin k anyonc can c,•cr gct to bc bravc if
hc has this fear inside himi'
'Good hc.-avens, no.'
'How about bclicf in the underworld and its horrors? Do you think that
makes pcople fearless in the face of death, makes then1 choosc death in
preference to defeat or slavcry?'
' Of course not.'
'This is another branch of storytclling, thcn, whcre it looks as if we
must kecp an eye on rhosc who want to t.cll thcse stories. Wc shall havc to
e ask thcrn to stop being so negative about the underworld, aod 6nd some-
thing positive to say about it instead. \Vhat thcy say at tbc moment is
ncithcr truc, nor helpful to thosc wc wanl to bccome warlike.'
'Ycs, wc shall have to l::ccp an cyc on thcm/ hc said.
' Then wc shall eliminate ali descriprions of that sort, smrting with:
1hnd rarhcr labour as a common serf,
Scrving a man with nothing to his oame,
Thao be thc lord of ali tbc deod below. 2
1
Respccl for parenrs: 378b; fricndd:tip ,vich one another: 378c-<J .
1 Momcr, Odyu~J' 1 1.4B9--491 . Tbc gbost oí AchiUcs is spt.-akiug to Odysscu!I in 1he
underv; orld.
71
SocrtJtes, Adeimantus 711t Rrpuhlic
Or:
d His balls revealed to mortais and im.mo.rtals,
Grim, d:mk, abhorrent eveo to rhe gods.'
Or:
Alas, rbere is then, in the house of Hades,
A spirit and a phantom, but no mind
\>Jithin it dwells.'
Or:
Alone possesscd of though1, the rest but shadows.s
Or:
Lcaving his limbs, his soul 10 Hades Oew,
lts fatc lamcnting, and lost routh and strength.6
38; Or:
Likc smo.ke his soul dcparted, crying shrill,
Beneath the earth. 7
Or:
As in dark corne.rs of mysterious caves
The squcalcing bats takc Oight when, from the bunch
That clings together on the rock, orie falis -
So, shrilly crying, did rhese souls depart.*
b Wc sball ask Homer and the rest of the poets not to be angry with us if we
strike out these pas.~ges, and any others like tbem. Not tbat they Jack
poeric n1erit, or that they don't give pleasure to most people. They do. But
the more merit tbey have, the less suitable tbey are for boys and men who
are expcctcd to bc frce, and fear slavcry more tha.n death.'
'Absolutcly.'
'So we must also discard all the weird and terrifying languagc used
' Homa, /li,ul 20.64- 65. The ' halls' uc the realm of Hades, goo of the dead.
• JljaJ 23. 10:r-104. This is Achilles' lament :ifter he ha.~ tried :a_nd fai.led ro g:rup hold
oí rhe ghost oí h.is (riend Patroclu.5.
.s Odysuy 10,495: a dcscription of the soul of thc wisc prophet Tircsias in tbc undcr-
Yi'Orld, the s-inglc ci«.ption to thc ruk ,,oiccd by Achillcs in thc pre,1ious quor.c.
• lliad 16.856-íl57; a dcscription of Patroclus sl•in by H«:tor.
1
1/iad 23. 100-rol: ag2.in of Patroclus, as he slips í-rorn Achilles' gr:llll).
1 04)'11()' 2_..6-9: a dcscrip1ion of tbe souls of the s.uitors s.1-:ain by Odys.i.cus.
72
Book 3 386c-388a Socrates, A dtimantus
e about lhe underworld. No more wailing Cocyrus, or hareful Sr:y x,9 or food
for worms, or mouldering corpscs, or any other language of the kind
which makes ali who hcar ir shuddcr. Ir may bc fine in some other ~-ontexr,
but when i1 comes to our guardians, we are worried thal this shuddering
may make them too soft and impressionable for our needs.'
' Wc are right to be worried.' hc said.
'That sort of languagc must go, then?'
'YL-S.,
'And our storyndlcrs and poets should use languagc which follows the
opposite pattcrn?'
'Obviously.'
d ' Then wc shall gct rid of weeping and wailing by famous men.'
'We shall havc t0,' hc said. '\\lc can' t. gct rid of thentber tbings, and not
that.'
'What you ,houltl ask yourself, though,' I said, ' is whethcr or not wc
sball be righ1 to gct rid of thern . Our view is tbat a good man does not
rcgard it as a disastcr whcn death comes to anothcr good man, his friend.'
'Yes1 that is our víew.'
'So he cerrainly wouldn't lamcnt on bis fricnd's account, as if some,.
thing awful had happened to him.'
' No, he wouldn' t.'
'Bul we also say th.it when i1 comes 10 living a good life, a good man is
e the most capable of meeting bis own needs, and has less need of other
people tban anyone cise bas.'
'True.'
'So hc least of aU will rcgard it as a mis fortune to lose a son, ora brother,
or some moncy, or anything likc thac.'
'Ycs.'
'And he lenst of ali will grieve ovcr the loss. He more than anyonc can
1ake i1 in bis stride when an accident of this kind happens to him.'
' He can indeed.'
' \Ve shall be right, then, 10 get rid of the heroes' songs of lamentation,
388 puning them io the mouths of women - and not even the best women, at
thal - and cowards. \Ve wan1 the people we say we are bringing up to be
guardians of our country to be appalled ai the idea of behaving like 1his. •
'Yes, wc shall bc right,' he said.
11 '\Vailing' and 'bateíuJ' are cbc ttymologic:d mt.1ni.ng,; of tbesc nam~ oí u.ndcnrnrld
r1,•ers.
73

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Cambridge

CAMBRIDGE TEXTS 1 . THE

TOM GR IFF ITH

C AAIRIUDO I!. UNIVU.SJTV P RLSS

C ln rhc transl1.rion and cditori:d mn ter Cu:nbriJ gc Unh·crs.ity Pr~ 2000

This bool: is in cop)'right. Subj«.., to st21:wory cxecption

f'irst publi:i.ht.-d :iooo

Primed in 1he Unitcd Kingdon, :ar thc Uni'"crs:íty Press, Cal:nbridge

1j,pefac, ~·fonor)'p<" Ehrhardr 9-s/ 12 pt. Sy,um Quark.XPres.~TM ln)

Lilmuy ef Colflrt:ts Ca1alr,guing in Puh/ü,wi>n JaJ8

Tramlator's pre/iue pagt vii

A Spartan utopia? XI\'

t.here is no pnn of t.he t:ranslation which hns not lx-nefitcd immeasurably

The thoughr. of translaring Plato's Republic is not unlikely to cross rhe

J OHN FER RARI

Pia/o•, Rcpublic is the jirst great u,ork of 1-flest,rn political philMophy,

was once again considering, although more cautiow;ly than before, an

unusual. His varicd writings, of which we have only fragmcn1s, includcd

question whether the Repuhlic is• work primarily of moral or of political

'fhe philosopher and the king

So Plaro is exaggerating when he allows the prospect of philosophers

promoting con1petent government of whatever form than in seeing a par-

with.in the range of política! philosophy, howcvcr, has provcd more

an aristocr.icy of tbe virtuous. Philosophers qualify to form its ruling class

vidual; however, it regareis indjviduality not as • possession that confcrs

City and soul

w thc finest of citics, Callipol.is, the cicy rulcd by philosophcrs (435b,

of economic smbility and harmonious order - 1•alues not essentially

Mathematics and metaphysics

Bibliographical note to the introduction

Atheos is W. Robert Connor, The Ne0 Politicia11s of Fifih-C,111ury Athens

University Prcss, 1996) is a survcy of the ütcraturc written by die

General studies of Pia to and of Tlze Republic

R. L. Nettleship, L,ctures on tltt R,puhlfr t1f Plato (2nd edn, London:

Specific aspects of Plato's thought and of The Repuhlic

Cornford emphasises disrinctions bctween thc mathcmarical and rhc

The chronology includes no guesses as to when Plato wrote the vnrious

Plato PolÍlical ev,11ts

Plato Politica/ event.,

Plato Political rot11ts

hcalthy b>Alancc of tbc soul's components, and injustice an unhealthy

'Th•t's a prctty good gucss,' 1 replied.

- or who was evcn pn:pared to be completely truthful to someone in rhis

'lt looks likc it.'

Justice, according to you and Homcr and Simonidcs, is apparently • kind

'That sounds bettcr.'

'But isn't justice a human cxccllc.ncc?"3

U The Gn-ck C(Ht.ld ais.o m<.-a.n 'isn'1 iusdce hum:m c.1:ccJlcncci 1

make concessions to one anothcr, and not be determined to bring it as

Thr:isymachus is using now, let's take it in thar sense. Tel1 me,

Using words in their precise scnse, please, as you instructed, if someone

U Nota com·cnti<>lllll or n.-atfüy dcclanblt moral scntimcnt., if consrrucd ~s c.."Ondon..

'Thcn what do you call thcm?'

'And can we upply the sarne reasoning to cvcrything cise?'

1 Th.e p:a~-age is an early :appcanmcc of thc con..::c.p1 of a $4;>cial <.,mtr.tct imposcd on a

e windows in it. Peeping through them, he saw inside what appeared to be

Or like some worrhy king who, fearing god,

i\1.y m.ind is dh,idcd and (.".lnnot say for ccrtain.'

19 As in the :irgu01eo1 with Thra.")•machus (351:1).

'No, Socrates,' Adeimantus replied, 'the other way is probably easier.'

'Precious littlc,' hc said.

'Shall we be pcrfcctli•contcnt, thcn, to lct our childrcn listen to any old

'I think you are absolutely right.'