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Villavicienco v. Lukban 9.

The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
March 25, 1919 | J. Malcolm | Liberty of Abode deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court.
PETITIONER: Zacarias Villavicienco, et al. 10. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, prayed
RESPONDENT: Justo Lukban, et al. that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper
parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First
SUMMARY: Mayor Lukban deported 170 prostitutes from Manila to Davao. Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
Friends and relatives of the prostitutes applied for writ of habeas corpus with the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control,
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to present the and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
prostitutes but not all of them showed up. The issue is whether or not the city of Manila.
respondent Mayor has the power to order the deportation of prostitutes to Davao. 11. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo
The SC held no since there is no law authorizing such. In fact, there is a penal law Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
punishing such. city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the
DOCTRINE: There is no law that authorizes the Mayor to force a citizen to persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December
change his domicile. In fact, there is a penal law punishing such. 2, 1918.
12. Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at
FACTS: (Didn’t include discussion re writ of habeas corpus and contempt of court) their own expense. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none
1. The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, the respondents.
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
2. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined ISSUES:
to their houses in the district by the police. 1. WON Mayor Lukban has the power to order the deportation of
3. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected prostitutes to Davao – NO
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the RULING: In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas
coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo,
guard of soldiers. and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
4. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within
orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of
Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
arrival.
5. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and RATIO:
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police 1. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints
station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite
that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
deportation. Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
6. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On
night of October 25. the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
7. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person
provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. to change his residence.
8. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case,
had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled from the city of Manila. Torres, J., dissenting:
1. When the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed, were Martial Law. Also, the right invoked by the petitioners is not
obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of specifically guaranteed under the Bill of rights, though it may well
the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and be considered as a generally accepted principle of international
social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself law which is a part of the law of the land. They are not absolute
of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of
protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and
nor inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to the
diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have requirements of equally important public interests.
been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center
for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Doctrine: The right to return to one’s country is not among the
2. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of rights specifically guaranteed under the Bill of rights, though it
prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor may well be considered as a generally accepted principle of
did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the international law which is a part of the law of the land.
liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women Facts:
petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the 1. Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via
exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the
free practice of their shameful profession.
the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile to Hawaii.
2. In his deathbed, he wished to return to the Philippines to die. However,
Araullo, J., dissenting in part: Corazon Aquino, who was declared President of the Republic under a
1. Basically, he said that the Mayor disobeyed the court orders, which caused revolutionary government, barred him and his family from travelling back to
damage to the prostitutes as well as delay in the resolution of the case so a the country.
higher penalty should have been imposed instead.
3. Mrs. Aquino considered the dire consequences to the nation of Marcos’
2. I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there
should be imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various
pesos (P500), and all the costs should be charged against him. directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward.
4. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Courts to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his immediate family and to enjoin the
Marcos vs. Manglapus implementation of the President's decision to bar their return of the remains
G.R. No. 88211| September 15, 1989| Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel of Mr. Marcos along with the members of his family.
Petitioners: Ferdinand Marcos et. al. a. The petitioner’s case is founded on the following provisions in the Bill
Respondents: Honorable Raul Manglapus et.al. of Rights:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
Summary: without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into protection of the laws.
exile. Aquino’s ascenssion into the presidency has been
challenged by different failed coup attempts and plots of some of Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
the Marcoses and their loyalists. In Marcos’ deathbed, he wished limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
to return to the Philippines to die. However, President Aquino order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
barred their return as they pose threat to national interest and
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
welfare. may be provided by law.
b. Other Contentions:
The Court ruled that the President did not act arbitrarily when she
i. The President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
barred the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. This is based on
the President’s residual power and the circumstances during the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits
case wherein the country was only on its way to recovery from prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. The right to
travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
government, but there must be legislation to that effect. interest and welfare and decided to bar their return -NO
ii. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and Ruling: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
residence within the borders of each state. President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
and to return to his country. present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
iii. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Article 12 Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose Ratio:
his residence. 1. The president, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
rights recognized in the present Covenant. a. The President can exercise Commander-in-Chief powers in
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own order to keep the peace and maintain public order and
country. security even in the absence of an emergency.
5. The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to national b. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers
security over individual rights, citing Article II in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to
a. Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is
to render personal, military, or civil service. not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
b. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
2. The President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
people of the blessings of democracy. a. It is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be
the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back as the court
And the decision of other countries to ban deposed dictators like Cuba recognizes the present realities that the country is besieged from within.
(Fulgencio Batista). b. The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights
Issue: specifically guaranteed under the Bill of rights, which only treats
1. W/N, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the liberty of abode and the right to travel. However, it may well be
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines – considered as a generally accepted principle of international law which
YES is a part of the law of the land.
2. W/N the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion c. The constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners are not
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the absolute nor inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public interests.
d. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now the right to travel as it was the right violated by Marcos with regard
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of to Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other
the economy attributed to the Marcoses. The President has determined "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that
that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe unfortunate period. The Court's decision in this case sets back the
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights,
economic collapse. especially human rights for those whom we do not like or those who
are against us.
Note: “This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of Cruz, J. Dissenting
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short  Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to
space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.” the Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then,
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of abode
Fernan, C.J. Concurring
that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not
derived solely from a particular constitutional clause or article or from an Constitution to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick
express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of and the prodigal son returning, and tyrants and charlatans and
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of scoundrels of every stripe.
law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded  The government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos
to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and dead or alive would pose a threat to the national security as it had
imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on
"residual," "inherent," “ moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency." mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without
whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.
if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that
effectively and efficiently. It is in this context that the power of the President there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's
to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court
viewed. By reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly
after that hearing.
critical times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the competence of the
Executive Branch to decide. Paras, J. Dissenting

Gutierrez, J., Dissenting  There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen
 The issue as to the propriety of the President’s decision to prohibit and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
the Marcoses from returning is not a political question. there must be 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he has the right to return to his
in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or own country except only if prevented by the demands of national
Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or safety and national security.
prohibit for a political question to exist. The respondents failed to  Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger. They are bereft
any provision in the constitution which vests the determination of the of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation. True,
question raised to the Court solely in the President. there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent.
 The right to return home should not be differentiated from the right
to go abroad or to move around the Philippines. The right to come Padilla, J. Dissenting
home must be preferred than any right to travel. The framers of the
Constitution not only re-enacted but strengthened the declaration of
 With or without restricting legislation, the interest of national YAP v. CA June 6, 2001 | Gonzaga-Reyes, J. | Liberty of abode and Right to travel
security, public safety or public health can justify and even require
restrictions on the right to travel, and that the clause "as may be
provided by law" contained in Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 PETITIONERS: Francisco Yap Jr. a.k.a Edwin Yap
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
Constitution merely declares a constitutional leave or permission for
Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right to travel in the SUMMARY: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for
interest of national security, public safety or public health. The misappropriating amounts equivalent to Php 5,000,000. After the records of the case
power of the State, in particular cases, to restrict travel of its citizens were transmitted to the CA, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA
finds abundant support in the police power of the state which may be granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of Php
exercised to preserve and maintain government as well as promote 5,000,000 on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor
the general welfare of the greatest number of people. This power is, of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to
however, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all circumstances, be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be
much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational. with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of
the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA,
 The apprehensions on national security or public safety appear to be
by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He
more speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Also, if also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
such worries turns into reality, the military authorities and the certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and
Filipino people are ready to handle such problems. travel. The issue in this case is whether or not the condition required to post bail
violates the petitioner’s right of liberty of abode and travel. The Court held that the
Sarmiento, J. Dissenting right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
such lawful order as contemplated by Sec. 6, Art. III of 1987 Constitution. The
 There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a
international law: the right of travel, whether within one's own bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The whenever the Court requires his presence.
Constitution itself makes no distinctions; thus, no one should make a
distinction. DOCTRINE: The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not
 The implied powers of the Chief Executive must yield to the absolute rights as stated in Sec. 6, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. The constitution only mentioned
limits as prescribed by law or upon lawful order of the court as
exceptions to the right to travel or liberty of abode and of changing
the same Had the Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by FACTS:
Presidential initiative, it could have specifically said so. 1. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to Php 5,500,000, petitioner was
 The determination of whether Marcos’ return poses a threat to convicted of estafa by the RTC of Pasig City. He filed a notice of appeal, and
national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive, the moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier
in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC.
Court itself must not only be satisfied that the threat is not only clear
but also present. 2. At the CA, petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of
Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion,
the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the
amount of Php 5,500,000 and be required to secure a certification or guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.
However, petitioner contends that the proposed bail of Php 5,500,000 was required to inform the court in case he does so.
violative of his right against excessive bail.
3. Moreover, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents
3. The CA granted the motion and upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which
General.1 A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the issued the order. In fact, the petition submits that “the holddeparture order against
amount of bail fixed but was denied. Hence, this current petition. petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require
him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is
4. Petitioner contends that the CA unduly restricted his constitutional liberty of already unnecessary.”
abode and travel in imposing that he secure “a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he Additional information: Whether the proposed bail of Php 5,500,000 was violative
will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he of petitioner’s right against excessive bail.
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court”. However, the
Solicitor General advanced that all that the CA requires is notice in case of 1. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.
change of address; it does not in any way impair petitioner’s right to change The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,
abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence during the is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right
pendency of the appeal. to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano, this Court made the pronouncement that
it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should
ISSUE: Whether or not the condition required to post bail violates the petitioner’s the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by
right of liberty of abode and travel. - NO imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.

RULING: The petition is partially granted. Petitioner’s bail pending appeal is reduced 2. Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts
from Php 5,500,000 to Php 200,000. In all other respects, the resolutions of the CA to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
are affirmed. a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
RATIO: c) Penalty for the offense charged;
d) Character and reputation of the accused;
1. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by e) Age and health of the accused;
petitioner, are not absolute rights as stated in Sec. 6, Art. III of the 1987 f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
Constitution2. g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
h) Forfeiture of other bail;
2. In this case, the order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is
to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the 3. In this case, appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order
will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case

1 The following are the conditions in allowing petitioner to post bail: 4. Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-
1. He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of appellant’s bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident in jail.
2 The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with
prior notice to the court; be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
2. The Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
hold departure order against accused-appellant; and by law.
3. The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of
Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return;
is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at Php
5,500,000 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of DOCTRINE: The right to information is a public right and any citizen can have
petitioner’s right to bail. legal standing to assert the right. The right to information is not absolute. The
information requested must be of public concern or interest and must not be
4. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably FACTS:
calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil 1. Legaspi had requested information from the Civil Service Commission
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, Php 5,500,000) is to permit (CSC) on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a 2. These government employees (Sibonghanoy and Agas) had allegedly
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await presented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
the judgment of the appellate court. exam.
3. CSC denied Legaspi’s request. So Legaspi prays for the issuance of a writ of
5. The Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of mandamus to compel the respondent to disclose said information. He claims
Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding that his right to information of the eligibilities of the employees is guaranteed
upon the courts, “merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the by the Constitution and that he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of remedy.
criminal laws.” Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but ISSUES:
should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the 1) WoN a writ of mandamus is in order – YES
administration of criminal justice. This notwithstanding, the Court is not 2) WoN CSC’s denial of his request constitutes a violation of his Constitutional right
precluded from imposing in petitioner’s case an amount higher than Php 40,000 – YES
(based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase a. WoN petitioners have standing to sue – Yes
is dictated by the circumstances. b. WoN CSC has a ministerial duty to furnish the petitioner with the
information the petitioner seeks - Partly
LEGASPI V. CSC (RICA)
MAY 29, 1987| Cortes, J. | RULING: Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the
position of sanitarian and to confirm or deny the eligibility of the two employees.
PETITIONER: Valentin L. Legaspi
RESPONDENTS: Civil Service Commission RATIO:
1. These constitutional provisions are self-executing and they supply the rules
SUMMARY: Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed. But what the
regarding the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed in the Health Legislature may provide are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
Department of Cebu City. Legaspi’s request was denied by the CSC. Legaspi now access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
prays for the issuance of a mandamus to compel the CSC to disclose the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
information . CSC says that petitioners have no standing in the case which means public interest. The right and duty under Art III sec 7 have become operative
that the mandamus would have to fail. The SC said that since what is being and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter, therefore the
asserted here by the petitioners is a public right, it is sufficient that petitioners be right may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding.
citizens to have legal standing. With regard to the information, the SC held that 2. A petition for mandamus is instituted by a party aggrieved. The petitioner
the information must be of (1) public interest or concern and (2) must not be must be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In this case, to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
the SC held that since this is with regard to public office, it involves public trust a. In this case, petitioner has anchored this case on his right
and hence, public interest. Respondent failed to cite any law that exempts the of the people to information on matters of public concern. This is a
information requested by the petitioners. The SC also notes that the results of the public right.
passers of the Civil Service exam are released publicly. Hence, there is nothing b. When it is a public right involved, the mandamus is to
secret about the eligibility. procure the enforcement of a public duty and the people are regarded
as the real party in interest. They need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result. It is sufficient to show that he is a PETITIONER: RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ,
c. A citizen is part of the general public which possesses the REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN “NINO” ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL
right. Petioner, being a citizen, is clothed with personality to seek
RESPONDENTS: FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
3. The New Charter expressly mandates the duty of the State and its agents to
afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, SUMMARY: Petitioner Valmonte, a lawyer and member of the media, wrote a letter to
government research date used as basis for policy development, subject to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting the following:
such limitations as may be provided by law. For the information to be (1) List of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa (belonging to the
disclosed it must be: information of public concern (with reasonable UNIDO and PDP-Laban) who were able to secure clean loans of Php 2 million each
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of the immediately before the February 7 election through the intercession/guaranty of the First
information) and must not be exempted by law from the operation of the Lady Imelda Marcos; (2) Certified true copies of the documents evidencing the respective
constitutional guarantee. loans and; (3) Allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
a. the authority to regulate the manner of examining public GSIS then General Manager Feliciano Belmonte refused to prepare the list and denied the
access invoking procedural concerns, the confidentiality relationship between GSIS and
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. Only the the borrowers, right to privacy and the performance of propriety function. The issue in this
legislature may impose the prohibition. Its authority to regulate is to case is WoN Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents
be exercised solely to the end that (1) damage to or loss of public sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. The SC held that the
records may be avoided, (2) undue interference with the duties of petitioners have a right to information regarding the 2nd and 3rd request as these are a matter
said agencies may be prevented, and (3) that the exercise of the same of public concern and there is no law granting GSIS confidentiality with regard to
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured. (placed this documents. The funds of the GSIS assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate
here just in case) concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end in view of
b. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
burden of proof to show that the information requested is not of
public concern. There is no rigid test to determine if it is of public DOCTRINE: The right to information is not absolute. People’s right to information is
limited to (1) Matters of public concern and (2) Information sought must not be among
concern. It eludes exact definition and embraces a broad spectrum.
those excluded by law. *NOTE: These are the requisites before a Mandamus may be
For the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter issued regarding the right to information.
is of interest or importance as it relates to or affects the public. In
this case, the information sought is the truth of the claim of certain However, the Constitution does not accord citizens a right to compel custodians of official
government employees that they are civil service eligible for the records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
positions. information on matters of public concern. Only access to official records is permitted
c. Public office is a public trust. It is a legitimate concern of because otherwise, citizens can unduly burden the agencies with the preparation of their
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service requested lists or summaries.
eligibility are occupied by persons who are eligible. Public officers
are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibility. FACTS:
4. The information sought is within the ambit of constitutional guarantee. But 1. Petitioner Valmonte, a lawyer and member of the media, wrote a letter to the
respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting the
the constitutional guarantee is not absolute. It has exemptions.
following:
a. respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service a. List of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa
Law which would limit the petitioner’s right to know who are, and (belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban) who were able to secure clean
who are not, civil service eligible. loans of Php 2 million each immediately before the February 7 election
b. The Court also takes note that those who pass the civil through the intercession/guaranty of the First Lady Imelda Marcos
service exam, the results are released to the public. Hence, there is b. Certified true copies of the documents evidencing the respective loans
nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility, if actually c. Allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information
possessed. 2. In his letter, Valmonte stresses the premise on the provision of the Freedom
Constitution regarding the right of the people to information on matters of public
VALMONTE v BELMONTE, JR. (Ram) concern (at that time it was stated in Art. IV, Sec. 6).
February 13, 1989 | Cortes, J. | Right to Information of GSIS Loans 3. Belmonte sought the help of the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS because he
thought that it contained serious legal implications. Mr Meynardo A. Tiro declined administrative redress available under the law.
Valmonte’s request in letter saying: 2. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless
a. A confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
borrow from it, whoever they may be; authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
b. That the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; administrative forum.
c. And that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality 3. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled
unless so ordered by the courts. exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved
4. On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy 4. In the case at bar, the issue raised is a purely legal question, as it requires the
General Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information. Hence, the
receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whatever action petitioners have a cause of action.
necessary within the premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public
interest. Constitutional Right to Information
5. Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. 1. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by
Petitioners filed a consolidated reply. the people to the state. Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the
6. In his comment, respondent raised the following contentions: limits of the authority conferred by the people.
a. Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies - Procedural objection 2. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the role of
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. the citizens in governmental decision-making as well as in checking the abuse in
i. Actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the government.
Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. 3. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
ii. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not
People’s right to information is limited to:
exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action. a. Matters of public concern
b. Constitutional Right to Information b. Information sought must not be among those excluded by law
i. Matter of Public Concern - GSIS cannot reveal such information 4. Meaning of “public interest” and “public concern”
as there is a confidential relationship that exist between the GSIS a. Legaspi case - Subjects which the public may want to know, either because
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be. these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
ii. Right to Information vs. Right to Privacy – He further contends arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by courts to determine on a case by case basis.
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing
5. Matter of public concern:
loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit a. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
of the right to information. Loan transactions are private in nature employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
iii. GSIS is a governmental corporation performing proprietary benefit of the latter.
functions – outside the coverage of the people’s right to access to b. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
official records. i. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for
ISSUES: WoN Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents annual appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums,
sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government,
as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access c. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
to documents and records evidencing loans granted to members of the former Batasang resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner rules and regulations.
of inspection, not incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO d. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
ORDERED. funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the
benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
6. Information sought must not be among those excluded by law:
RATIO: a. There is no law granting GSIS confidentiality with regard to documents
b. Right to Information v. Right to Privacy
Principle of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies i. There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally
1. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be protected.
allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of ii. In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public
and the government agencies like the GSIS.
PETITIONER: Mario Jose E. Sereno, executive director of the Association of
iii. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like Petrochemmical Manufacturers of the Philippines Inc. (APMP) note;
the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related
the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings materials.
and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no RESPONDENTS: Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM) of
such ground for relief. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
iv. Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. SUMMARY: APMP, the main industry association in the petrochemical
v. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked industry, petitioned for a mandamus with the RTC to summon the minutes of the
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
meeting between CTRM and PGMA in 2005. The meeting concerned tariff rates,
c. GSIS is a governmental corporation performing proprietary functions
i. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government which would greatly affect the petrochemical industry’s profits and growth.
Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government, Petitioners invoked their Constitutional right of access to information on matters
WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some of public concern, however CTRM refused, stating that the minutes of that
business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the meeting are exempt from this guarantee because it was a closed-door Cabinet
people. meeting concerning foreign affairs, trade, and policy making. The issue is
ii. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising whether or not CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to disclose the minutes
proprietary function would NOT justify the exclusion of to APMP. The Supreme Court ruled that the minutes of that particular meeting
transactions from the coverage and scope of right to information. are indeed exempt, because it concerned sensitive matters that the government
iii. Intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
has a right to protect and keep private in order to ensure the continued free
included government owned and controlled corporations and a
transaction entered into by then is within the coverage of the State expression and exchange of ideas of those involved in the meeting.
policy of full public disclosure.
DOCTRINE: 2 requisites for writ of mandamus:
Decision on the Requests of Valmonte • information sought must be in relation to matters of public
1. Allows the 2nd and 3rd request, but denied the 1st request. concern or public interest (left to courts to determine on a case to
2. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are case basis)
entitled to “access to official records,” the Constitution does not accord them a right • it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the constitutional guarantee
like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
• In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency
3. Only access to official records is permitted because otherwise, citizens can unduly
concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be
burden the agencies with the preparation of their requested lists or summaries
4. Petitioners failed to meet the standard that there is a well-defined, clear and certain obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from
legal right to the thing demanded and imperative duty to perform the act required. the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.

Sereno v. Committee (steph)


February 1, 2016 | Bersamin, J. | Constitutional guarantee to information is confined
to matters of public concern.

FACTS:
1. CTRM of NEDA had a meeting with PGMA. They recommended to her the
lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and
certain plastic products, reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff rates
on products covered by EO 161.
2. APMP requested the minutes of the said meeting because they wanted to know
the reason behind this move of the government. (note: lifting the suspension of
the tariff reduction schedule not only brought significant losses to the
petrochemical industry that undermined the industry’s long-term viability and
survival, but also allegedly conflicted with policy directives designed to support transactions involving public interest. This also ensures transparency in
and develop an integrated petrochemical industry.) CTRM denied this request, policy-making and operations transparency, and safeguarding the exercise
stating that it was a closed door cabinet meeting and therefore considered by the people of freedom of expression.
privileged information. (authority: Section 3 e, Rule IV of the Implementing ii. However, this right is not absolute.
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and iii. 2 requisites for writ of mandamus:
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) • information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern
3. APMP invoked their Constitutional right of access to information on matters of or public interest (left to courts to determine on a case to case basis)
public concern. CTRM still refused. • it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
4. APMP petitioned for mandamus in the RTC. RTC dismissed petition for guarantee
mandamus. i. First requisite: The petrochemical industry is one of the major movers of
5. RTC banked their decision on the following: economic growth and investment in the country, hence it is a matter of public
concern.
Sec. 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, ii. Second requisite: minutes sought is from a closed-door Cabinet meeting
records and documents to any requesting public except if: dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade, and policy-making, so
EXEMPT. These meetings were directly related to the exercise of the
xxx x
sovereign prerogative of the President as Head of State in the conduct of
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade. (authority of CTRM as advisory
established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or body of the President and NEDA is in EO 230 1987. see bullet points below
settled policy or jurisprudence; for specific jobs of CTRM under NEDA)
(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts or decisions, orders, • (i) Advise the President and the NEDA Board on tariff and related matters,
rulings, policies, memoranda, etc. and on the effects on the country of various international developments;
xxx x • (ii) Coordinate agency positions and recommend national positions for
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.·In addition to acts and omissions of international economic negotiations;
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing • (iii) Recommend to the President a continuous rationalization program for
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any the country’s tariff structure. (underlining supplied)
public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful: • Chavez v. Public Estates Authority: “A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
xxx x essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.·Public officials and Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.”
employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information • Almonte v. Vasquez: “A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
the public either: a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.”
6. The RTC declared that CTRM is an advisory body composed of various • Every claim of exemption is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly
department heads or secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and against the claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for
inter-agency communications, and that the record of the communications exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted by
of such body falls under the category of privileged information because specifying the grounds for the exemption.
of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest. • In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency
concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be
ISSUE: WON the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the
petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on coverage of the constitutional guarantee.
the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the • What should determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the
State’s policy of full public disclosure— NO! exception from the people’s right to access to information was not the composition
RULING: The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed. of the body, but the nature of the information sought to be accessed.

RATIO:
i. Constitutional guarantee of the right to information of matteres of public
concern complements State’s policy of full public disclosure in all
by law.

Manila Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Laguio Jr. (Armand)


August 6, 1991 | Narvasa J. | Art 3 Sec 8
FACTS:
1. The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called
PETITIONER: MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
"mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them
ASSOCIATION et al.
members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990
RESPONDENTS: THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity
to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila et al. failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
1. SUMMARY: again been brought to the latter's attention.
There were mass actions by 800 Public School Teachers which was 2. The subject of the petitions: immediate payment of due chalk, clothing
caused by the alleged failure of authorities to act upon the teacher’s allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the
grievances such as the immediate payment of due chalk , clothing Salary Standardization Law, the recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing
allowances, 13th month pay arising from the salary standardization law, the oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-
and a few others more. cutting measures of the government,etc.
3. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities and
Even on September 17, 1990, the mass actions continued which was a
municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises
Monday and a school day. Some of the teachers who participated in the without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
mass actions did not hold classes that day. The secretary of education granting of demands. No response was made by the respondent Secretary of
filed cases against those teachers who participated in the mass actions on Education, despite the demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing
the grounds of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of protest mass actions on September, 17,1990.
Civil Service Law, absence without official leave and the likes and 4. September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day.
placed them on a 90-day preventive suspension period. The issue is WoN There is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action
did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in
employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and
G.R. No. 95590, they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning
holding strikes. The court held that employees in the public (civil) whence they proceeded to the National Office of DECS. The mass actions
service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, continued into the week despite the return to work directive, with more
although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress teachers joining in the days that followed.
for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate 5. Based on reports submitted by the principals of the various public schools in
with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio
working conditions as are not fixed by law.Public school teachers have administrative complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions and defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave
the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law,
class hours, for then this would be a strike, which is illegal for them. absence without official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive
DOCTRINE: suspension.
Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, 6. Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed
do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self- with the Manila RTC a petition for prohibition, declaratory relief and
organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain the implementation of the
return-to-work order of September 17, 1990 and the suspension or dismissal
terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government
of any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null and
agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed void.RTC rendered judgment declaring the assailed return-to-work order
valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. G.R. No. Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious
95590 is a parallel original proceeding which was consolidated with G.R. reason that it is one of fact.
No. 95445. 5. The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege the following
7. The petitioners filed an appeal to the CSC. They claim that they are such facts: (a) that teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of
parties although not individually so named in the petition in said case, being their principals and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the
among those referred to in its title as "other similarly situated public school return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the particular
teachers too numerous to be impleaded"CSC denied the petition. charges or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not
ISSUES: furnished sworn complaints, and others were suspended without any formal
WoN employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and charges; (d) that teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable time
holding strikes – YES after notice of the return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
RULING: allegations.
WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any 6. These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents, who set
appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the CSC on forth their own version: (a) Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No.
95590 admit engaging in a strike (referred by semantic interplay as
the matters complained of.
"concerted activity" or "mass action") directed against public respondent
RATIO: Cariño beginning September 17, 1990; (b) The striking teachers were given a
period of five days to file their Answers in line with Sec. 8, Rule III of Rules
1. The Court held that the resolution stating that “3) that from the pleaded and
on Administrative Disciplinary Cases; (c) Many of the striking teachers
admitted facts, these "mass actions" were to all intents and purposes a
refused to appear at the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the
strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
basis of their answers.
from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for
7. This Court finds that the facts regarding the denial of due process would
essentially economic reasons;” , that the court has not since been presented
turn are still in issue, actively controverted, hence not yet established.
with any consideration of law or established fact that would impair the
8. The petitioners cannot-as it seems they have done lump together into what
validity of these postulates or preclude continued reliance thereon for the
amounts to a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own
purpose of resolving the present petitions on their merits.
peculiar set of facts, and expect a ruling that would justly and correctly
2. Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do
resolve each and everyone of those cases upon little more than general
not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-
allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms
"representative" of each case or group of cases.
and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
9. This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court,
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. Public
especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts are
school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of
concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of
grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which
what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The
is illegal for them
petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings
3. The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a
but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein.
right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons,
nor whether or not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally evident
DISSENTING OPINIONS
from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about this.
J Gutierrez:
What therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or not
The suspensions meted against the teachers were cruel, arbitrary and punitive
any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution
and beyond the allowable 90 day period which amounts to denial of
as it applies to administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation,
substantive due process.
conduct, or disposition of the investigations complained of.
Although the SSS Ruling remains good law, what was involved here was not
4. There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue
the right to strike, but the right of the teachers to peaceful assembly, to free
and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this
speech, and to petition the governement for redress of grievances. Padcom and CA reversed their decision. Padcom contested the automatic
J. Cruz membership as a violation of its right to (and not to) association. The court said
The teachers should be ordered reinstated in the meantime pending their that the Padcom was never forced to join the association. It could have avoided
administrative investigations. They should not be indefinetely suspended. the membership by not buying the property. It was not forced to buy the property
The SSS Ruling should not be used as an excuse by the government to ignore and bought it with the conditions that were stated in its deed of sale. It voluntarily
the legitimate complaints of its employees. agreed to bound by the conditions, and thus to join an association.
Just because teachers are governed by Civil Service laws, it does not mean DOCTRINE:
The freedom to not associate is not violated by automatic membership in a
that they should be deprived of their rights to free speech and to peaceably property contract. A buyer acquires a property with knowledge of the conditions
assemble. He also said that the prohibition against strikes made by that it’s subject to, thus voluntarily associating.
government employees must be reexamined.
J. Feliciano
FACTS:
The prohibition on strikes is not statutory in nature but is only administrative 1. Padcom Condominium Corporation (Padcom) owns and manages the
and regulatory in character. The Constitution itself is silent on the matter and Padcom building located in Emeral Avenue, Ortigas Center. The land was
thus it could not be made an absolute rule. The Court failed to balance the originally acquired by another company under a deed of sale. The deed said
rights and interests of the teachers and the effective maintenance of that the transferee and its successor in interest must become members of an
government. ossociation for realty owners and long term lessees in the area.
J. Padilla 2. 1982, Ortigas Center Association (association) was organized. It sought the
There is a violation of procedural due prcoess. The dismissals and collection of membership dues in the amount of 2,724.40 a month. Padcom
suspensions were handed out in rapid succession characterized by owed the association 639, 961.47, representing membership dues.
arbitrariness and undue haste. 3. The letters between the parties through the years showed repeated demand
for payment, request of extension of payment, and even a settlement scheme
The court also dismissed the case because it supposedly involved a question
proposed by Padcom in 1990.
of fact, but proceeded to declare that the strike was illegal which could not be 4. Since Padcom couldn’t pay, the association filed a complaint for collection
doneonly if the facts were duly considered. of sum of money before the trial court. The trial court granted Padcom’s
J. Sarmiento motion to dismiss. The CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.
There was a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DECS, and the 5. CA justified by saying that they became members automatically from the
court should not shirk based on the handy excuse that it is not a trier of facts. annotation in the transfer certificate. The membership was also evident since
The issue of WoN there was due process or arbitrariness in handing out the Padcom was part of its list of bona fide members, Padcom’s president was
suspensions and dismissals of the teachers must be resolved before the court. one of the association’s incorporators, and Padcom received demands of
payment, made extensions and even proposed a new scheme of payment.
Padcom Condo. Corp v Ortigas Center association 6. Hence this petition, where Padcom raises the sole issue of whether it can be
compelled to join the association pursuant to the provision on automatic
Ellijah Ong
membership appearing in the deed of sale and the transfer certificate.
May 9, 2002 | Davide, Jr, J. | Freedom to not join associations
7. Padcoms contentions: It cannot be compelled to be a member. When they
bought the land, the association was not yet formed. The provision was
PETITIONER: PADCOM condo corporation merely anticipatory and still subject to the the formulation of implementing
RESPONDENTS: Ortigas Center Association, Inc rules. They add that the association’s by laws state an application for
SUMMARY: membership.
8. Association cites the Deed of sale which state the automatic membership for
Padcom owns and manages a building in the Ortigas center area. It was originally the owners of lots in the Ortigas center and their successor’s in interest. The
acquired by OCLP by TDC. Under the original deed of sale, there was a provision application for memberships are merely formalities and can be dispensed.
for automatic membership to an association. 1982, the Ortigas center association
was created. The association was requesting monthly payments from its members. ISSUES:
Padcom owed the association 639, 961. They were given repeated demands, asked 1. Can Padcom be compelled to join an association by virtue of the
for extensions and even made a new scheme of payment. Trial court sided with automatic membership.
RULING: 3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
RATIO: appropriated or injuriously affected; and
1. On the issue of freedom of association: The automatic membership clause is 5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
a not a violation of its freedom of association. Padcom was never forced to owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property
join the association. It could have avoided such membership by not buying
the land from TDC (the corporation that owned the land before). Nobody
forced it to buy the land when it bought the building with the annotation of
the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title therof and accepted the Deed.
Padcom voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and thus
to join the association.
2. On other unrelated issues. Under the torrens systems, liens and claims of
whatever character except those mentioned by law, existing against the land
bind the holder of the title and the whole world. When TDC bought the land,
they bound themselves to the provision on automatic membership as shown
by the deed of sale. The annotation was likewise annotated in the transfer
certificate. Those liens and claims are inseparable from the property as a right
in rem, a burden on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists FACTS:
notwithstanding a change of ownership. 1. In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
3. On contention of the need of application. It doesn’t apply to long term lessee entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis over a
as long as they own the property. Their membership will end if they stop land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Foridablanca, Pampanga.
owning the property. No application is necessary. 2. The Philippine Air Force had occupied Castellvi’s property since 1947 under
4. Also barred by principle of estoppel. (I guess since they accepted the a contract of lease.
demands and even for extensions and all that) 3. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused.
Republic vs de Castellvi (Mel) 4. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of
August 15, 1974 | Zaldivar, J. | Requisites of Taking of property the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter
that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
RESPONDENTS: Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, et al. general public
5. A follow-up letter was sent and later, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano,
SUMMARY: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year
Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for
basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and
of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already
erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
for the land in question. The trial court held that the “taking” of the properties under recommended to the President
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case. Thus, it ruled that 6. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
the Republic must pay P10 per square meter of the lands as just compensation (1959 market Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the
value). The Republic, however, argues that the “taking” shoud be reckoned from the year
land
1947 by virtue of the lease agreement. The SC held the 1959 market value should be the
basis as not all the requisites of a valid taking of property were met.
7. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these
expropriation proceedings in 1959, and, the Republic was placed in
DOCTRINE: Requisites of a valid taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.
8. The trial court held that the “taking” of the properties under expropriation
1) The expropriator must enter a private property; commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case (1959). It ruled that
2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period the Republic must pay P10 per square meter of the lands as just
compensation. installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the
9. The Republic, however, arguest that the “taking” shoud be reckoned from the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although
year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement. renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By
express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee,
ISSUE: undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition
2. WON the 1947 market value should be the basis for the just compensation? as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP.
– NO. The 1959 market value should be the basis. The SC modified the  It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
compensation to the fair market value of P5.00 per square meter. permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this intention cannot prevail over the clear and
RATIO: express terms of the lease contract.
1. In American Jurisprudence, on the subject of “Eminent Domain”, we read the  If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy
definition of “taking” as follows: permanently Castellvi’s property, why was the contract of lease
 “Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined entered into on year-to-year basis? Why was the lease agreement
generally as entering upon private property for more than a renewed from year to year?
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal C. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally legal authority (PRESENT)
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as  This circumstance in the „taking‰ may be considered as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
enjoyment thereof ."' Castellvi property as lessee.
2. Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be D. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: informally appropriated or injuriously affected (PRESENT)
A. The expropriator must enter a private property;  It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being
B. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary devoted to public use is present because the property was used
period by the air force of the AFP.
C. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal E. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
authority; as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
D. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally the property (NOT PRESENT)
appropriated or injuriously affected; and  In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property
E. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
3. In the case at bar, only requisites A, C and D are present. recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal
A. The expropriator must enter a private property (PRESENT) of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in
 This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the
the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
of the property of Castellvi.  Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment
B. The entrance into private property must be for more than a of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and
momentary period (NOT PRESENT) had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the
 Momentary means lasting but a moment; of but a moment’s time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June
duration. Momentary when applied to possession or occupancy of 26, 1959.
real property should mean “a limited period”—not indefinite or 4. It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
permanent. eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
 The lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory.
 The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some Additional info:
We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the taking 2. The direction of the prevailing wind determines when a particular runway is used.
of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: 1) that the entrance and The north-west-southeast runway in question is used about four per cent of the time
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) in taking off and about seven per cent of the time in landing. The four-motored
that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and heavy bombers and other planes of heavier types frequently passed over the
deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and property in question. Those planes come close enough at times to appear barely to
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow
US vs. CAUSBY (328 US 256) the old leaves off. (This part is to emphasize na !@#$%^& dude ang baba talaga)
1946 May 27 | J. Douglas | Military airplanes 3. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many
as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from
PETITIONER: United States fright . The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell
RESPONDENT: Thomas Lee Causby et al off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
SUMMARY: Causby owned a chicken farm and a dwelling house near an airport chicken farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family
outside of Greensboro, North Carolina used by the US military. According to Causby, has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane
noise from the airport frightened the chickens due to the loud noises when the aircrafts accidents on respondents' property, there have been several accidents near the
passed over the property. The chicken farm production had to stop because 150 chickens airport and close to respondents' place. Causby filed a complaint invoking the
were killed by flying into walls  from fright. Based on these facts, the Court of Claims ancient doctrine at common law which states that ownership of the land extended
found that respondents’ property had depreciated in value and that US had taken an to the periphery of the universe.
easement over the property in the amount of $2000. Based on the ancient common law 4. On the basis of these facts, the Court of Claims held that the property had
doctrine, Causby argued that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in depreciated in value and that the US had taken an easement 3 over the property in
this airspace, the government had confiscated his property without compensation. On the amount of $2000.
the other hand, the US argued that the Air Commerce Act of 1926 provides that the US 5. The US filed a petition for a writ of certiorari arguing that the Air Commerce Act
has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space. The United States of 1926 which provides that the US has complete and exclusive national
concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical sovereignty in the airspace over the country. The United States concludes that
invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. The when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion
issue is whether or not the flying of planes over the chicken farm constitutes a violation of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that
of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court ruled in the affirmative but at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of
rejecting the application of the common law doctrine. It held that if the landowner is to authorized air navigation. Any damages are said to be merely consequential for
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches which no compensation may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.
of the enveloping atmosphere. Given the damage caused by the particularly low, ISSUE: WON the frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over Causby’s
frequent flights over the farm, the Court held that the government had violated Causby’s property at low altitudes constitutes a violation of the Takings Clause as provided by
rights and he was entitled to compensation. the Fifth Amendment? Yes, it does. Causby is entitled to a just compensation
DOCTRINE: Without defining the specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the subject to the findings of the Court of Claims as to the amount of easement to be
land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if it led to a direct and awarded.
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. RULING: The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims
FACTS: so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with this opinion.
1. Causby owns a property near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina on RATIO:
which has a dwelling house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of 1. Common sense revolts at the idea that ownership of the land is extended to the
the airport was 2,220 feet from Causby’s property, and the glide path passed over periphery of the universe. The air is a public highway as declared by Congress. To
the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously
and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into
pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the 2. Despite the non-applicability of the common law doctrine, the Court still ruled in
national emergency, whichever is earlier. favor of Causby by holding that if, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the

3An easement is a non-possessory right to use and/or enter onto the real property of
another without possessing it.
flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or
complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the property lawfully on the land or water beneath.' Our holding that there was an
surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it. The measure of the value invasion of respondents' property is thus not inconsistent with the local law
of the property taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain. governing a landowner's claim to the immediate reaches of the superadjacent
3. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if airspace.
permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee 8. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public
interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights
surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as
irrelevant. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land—that is to say, his to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
beneficial ownership of it—would be destroyed. It would not be a case of land.
incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance.
4. In this case, enjoyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed. But that Dissent: J. Black
1. The Court's opinion seems to indicate that the mere flying of planes through the
does not seem to be controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a
column of air directly above respondents' land does not constitute a 'taking'.
valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential
Consequently, it appears to be noise and glare, to the extent and under the
section to a wheat field. Some value would remain. But the use of the airspace
circumstances shown here, which make the government a seizer of private
immediately above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a
property. But the allegation of noise and glare resulting in damages, constitutes at
diminution in its value.
best an action in tort where there might be recovery if the noise and light
5. Airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full
constituted a nuisance, a violation of a statute, or were the result of negligence.
enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of
2. There has been no taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because of
the enveloping atmosphere. The landowner owns at least as much of the space
the modern nature of the airplane. The noise of newer, larger, and more powerful
above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land. The fact that
planes may grow louder and louder and disturb people more and more. But the
he does not occupy it in a physical sense—by the erection of buildings and the
solution of the problems precipitated by these technological advances and new
like—is not material. The flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not
ways of living cannot come about through the application of rigid Constitutional
touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
restraints formulated and enforced by the courts.
entry upon it. The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and
direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit
his exploitation of it. While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that
stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in
somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light Penn Central Transportation v NYC
and air is used. June 26, 1987| Brennan, J.| Taking
6. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that
continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We PETITIONER: Penn Central Transporatation
think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that RESPONDENTS: New York City
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface. It is the
character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long SUMMARY: In 1965, herein respondent, New York City, enacted the
as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a “Landmarks Preservation Law” to enable the city to designate certain
taking.
buildings and neighborhoods as historical landmarks. Petitioner Penn Central
Transportation Co. (Penn Central) owned Grand Central Terminal in New
7. While the meaning of 'property' as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal
York City which was designated as a historical landmark under the law. In
question, 'it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.' If we look
1968, to increase its income, Penn Central leased the airspace above Grand
to North Carolina law, we reach the same result. Sovereignty in the airspace rests
Central Terminal for fifty years to UGP Properties, Inc. Penn Central
in the State 'except where granted to and assumed by the United States.' The flight
expected the lease to provide it with millions of dollars of additional income
of aircraft is lawful 'unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then
every year. Penn Central and UGP then submitted two proposals for building
existing use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put
designs to the New York City Commission and applied for permission to
construct an office building above Grand Central Terminal. However, the to the Commission for permission to construct an office building atop the
Commission denied their request on the grounds that Grand Central Terminal Terminal. Penn Central and UGP then submitted two proposals for building
was a historical landmark. Penn Central brought suit in New York Supreme designs to the New York City Commission. After lengthy hearings, the
Court against New York City alleging that the City Commission’s application Commission denied this request on the grounds that Grand Central Terminal
of the Landmarks Preservation Law which denied its rights to build an office was a historical landmark.
building above Grand Central Terminal and receive revenue from the o The first plan (Breuer I) was rejected since the Commission thought
building constituted a taking of the company’s property without just it would look silly to balance a 55-story building atop an 8-story
compensation as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The New history landmark.
o The second plan (Breuer II Revised)was also rejected since it would
York Supreme Court granted an injunction to Penn Central, but did not
strip off the exterior architectural features of the terminal.
provide damages. The state court of appeals reversed, holding that the
 Penn Central brought suit in New York Supreme Court against New York
Landmarks Preservation Law furthered an important public purpose. Penn
City alleging that the City Commission’s application of the Landmarks
Central appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Preservation Law which denied its rights to build an office building above
The issue is WoN the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Grand Central Terminal and receive revenue from the building constituted a
Central Terminal constitute a taking. NO taking of the company’s property without just compensation as required by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The SC held that it does not constitute a taking because it does not impede
existing uses or prevent a reasonable return on investment. The restrictions
imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare  The New York Supreme Court granted an injunction to Penn Central, but did
not provide damages. The state court of appeals reversed, holding that the
and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but
Landmarks Preservation Law furthered an important public purpose. Penn
also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal
Central appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
site proper but also other properties.
DOCTRINE: If the restriction is reasonable and related to a legitimate
public interest, then it does not result in a taking. Diminution in property ISSUE
WoN the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central Terminal
value alone does not establish a taking.
constitute a taking. - NO

RULING
The Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central Terminal does not
constitute a taking because it does not impede existing uses or prevent a reasonable
FACTS return on investment.

 In 1965, NYC adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law to enable the city to RATIO
designate certain buildings and neighborhoods as historical landmarks.  Rule – Taking
o After a building is designated a landmark, there are restrictions upon o A use restriction on real property may constitute a "taking" if
a property owner's options concerning use of the landmark site. not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
o The Landmarks Preservation Commission must approve in advance public purpose.
any proposal to alter the exterior architectural features. o A use restriction on real property may constitute a "taking" if it
has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the
 In 1968, to increase its income, Penn Central entered into a 50-year property.
lease and sublease agreement with Properties, Inc. (UGP), a United  The New York City's Landmarks Law has not effected a "taking" of
Kingdom corporation. Under the terms of the agreement, UGP was to appellants' property. The restrictions imposed are substantially related
construct a multistory office building above the Terminal. to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants
 Penn Central expected the lease to provide it with millions of dollars of opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but
additional income every year. Appellants UGP and Penn Central then applied also other properties.
 There is no set formula for determining when a taking occurs. However,  Additionally, Penn Central might still be able to build some sort of building
the Court has recognized several factors that have particular on top that would be approved; it just might not be able to be 50-stories high
significance.
o The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. Dissenting Opinion - Judge Rehnquist
o The extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.  The law imposes on Penn Central a substantial cost and no benefit except for
o If the taking can be characterized as a physical invasion by the honor of the designation of a landmark.
government.  Two key words in the Takings Clause need to be examined.
o Property
 The government can, however, execute laws or programs that adversely  Valuable property rights have been destroyed here.
affect recognized economic values.  The property has been subjected to a nonconsensual
o Even if economic harm is present, it is not a taking if it did not servitude not borne by any neighboring or similar
interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the properties.
reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute property for o Taken
Fifth amendment purposes.  NYC has taken/destroyed substantial property rights from
o When the state has reasonably concluded that the public welfare Penn Central.
would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of
land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or
adversely affected recognized real property interests.  There are two exceptions where the destruction of property rights does not
o In Miller v. Schoene, Court concluded that the state had not constitute a taking.
exceeded its powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property without compensation in order to save another which 1. The government may take property to prevent the property owner
was of greater value to the public. from using his property to injure others. The question is really one
o In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Court upheld ruling that prohibited of nuisance and whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the
operation of brickyard since it was inconsistent with neighboring safety, health, or welfare of others. Here, NYC is not prohibiting a
uses. nuisance.
o In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, Court held that a use restriction may 2. The government may prohibit a use if the prohibition applies over a
constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of broad cross section of land and secures an average reciprocity of
a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact upon advantage. This is why zoning regulations are not takings. Here, a
the owner's use of the property. multimillion dollar loss is imposed on Penn Central and is not offset
o In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Court said that a state statute by any benefits flowing from preservation of the 400 buildings in
that substantially furthers an important public policy may so NYC.
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a
taking.
OSG v. Ayala
September 18, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Eminent Domain v. Police Power
 The airspace surrounding a parcel of land cannot be considered a separate
parcel for purposes of taking.
o Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
PETITIONER: The Office of the Solicitor-General
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular RESPONDENTS: Ayala Land Incorporated, Robinsons Land
segment have been entirely abrogated. Corporation, Shangri-La Plaza Corporation And Sm Prime Holdings, Inc.,

 The fact that the law has a more severe impact on some landowners than SUMMARY: Respondents herein are operators of shopping malls in
on others does not in itself mean that the law effects a taking. various locations in Metro Manila that have parking facilities (inside the
 The law does not interfere with any of the present uses of the terminal. main buildings, in separate buildings and/or in adjacent lots solely
provided for parking use). The respondents are also the one which
maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they collect parking fees subject thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly
to their imposed parking rates. The Senate Committee on Trade and followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the regulatory powers
Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.
investigation to inquire on the legality of the parking fees and to find out 4. As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office of Solicitor
the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates. More importantly, to General should institute the action to enjoin the collction of parking
determine the legality of the policy of the shopping malls denying liability fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of National Building Code;
in cases of theft, robbery or carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at 2) DTI pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the provisions of Code
the back of the parking tickets. After the public hearings, the Senate relative to parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the
Committees jointly concluded that the collection parking fee is contrary National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking fees and
to the National Building Code and that the reasonable interpretation of the its waiver of liability.
code is that the parking spaces are for free; thus, the Committee 5. CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents on the
recommended that the Office of the Solicitor General should institute the following grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust administrative
necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to remedies and that an administrative review is not a condition
enforce the penal sanctions of the National Building Code. The court precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a
affirmed the previous decision that the respondents are not obliged to legal one and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
provide free parking spaces. There is no pertaining provision in the done; 2) the validity of National Building Code IRR cannot be
National Building Code that expressly provides the same. The law is clear proceeded as it was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could
and unequivocal that it needs no further interpretation, it only provides for be settled on other grounds without touching the issue of validity since
measurement requirements of the parking spaces. The OSG cannot rely the courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a
on their invoked provisions; they even failed to consider the substantial law; and 3) Section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of
differences and legal backgrounds on the jurisprudence they are insisting. IRR are clear that they are only intended to control the occupancy of
areas and structures, and in the absence of provision of law,
DOCTRINE: When there is a taking or confiscation of private property respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of
for public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another charge.
of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. 6. As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for
Review.
FACTS:
1. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala ISSUES:
Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are
Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) not obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to
their patrons and the general public. 2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees
2. The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the is a valid exercise of the police power of State.
collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to National
Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is
the land for parking. hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated
3. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming
against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of
the State’s policy of protecting the interest of consumers. Moreover, Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code,
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations RATIO:
1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only
respondents are not obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political
no merit in the OSG’s petition: society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory
fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so,
Sec 803 of National Building Code. it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
use, area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over
local zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities,
promulgated by the Secretary. they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically.
Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action
RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic
reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing ends sought to be accomplished.
for maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading
space requirements shall be observed: Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local
for specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures: building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the
meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting
6.00 meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the
computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall bounds of police power.
be drawn to scale and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans
and specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
(See Section 2 for computation of parking requirements). regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to
xxxx merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does
not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
exercise of the police power of State. destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control such as opium and firearms.
the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with
it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers,
namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire
Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and owner.
all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and
property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It
discretion and the petitioners are also assailing the constitutionality of PD
1224.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero (Villavicencio) 4. Petitioners argue that PD 1224 is unconstitutional for violating due process
September 30, 1987 | Cortes, J. | Expropriation for Housing of law: the Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size,
socialized housing is not a public purpose, violates procedural due process as
it allows immediate taking without giving the owner a day in court, unjust
and unfair valuations, and deprives the court to determine just compensation.
Petitioner: Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing
Respondent: Hon. Buenaventura Guerrero and National Housing Authority Issue: W/N “Socialized Housing” falls under “public use” – Yes
W/N expropriation is confined to landed estates - No
Summary: National Housing Authority filed a complaint for expropriation for the W/N the provisions on just compensation and due process violate the Constitution -
parcels of land of Sumulong and Balaoing pursuant to PD 1224 and for the purpose Yes
of providing housing facilities to low-salaried government officials. Petitioners
are assailing the constitutionality of PD 1224 for violating due process of law,
expropriating lands not for public use, and for failure in providing for just Held: WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June
compensation. The Supreme Court held that socialized housing is considered for 28, 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing
public use that would be a valid cause of expropriation. However, the provisions therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be
of PD 1224 on just compensation and due process violate the Constitution. There
is no just compensation because of the decree does not take into consideration all remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation
that is required, such as surroundings, improvements, and capabilities, in the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs.
determining the value. PD 1224 violates due process as it does not allow the owner
to question the valuation. Ratio:
Public Use
Doctrine: Public use, requirement for the exercise of eminent domain, is a flexible 1. Petitioners contend that socialized housing is not public use because it will
and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. benefit only a handful of people.
The public character of housing measures does not change because units in 2. PD 1224 defined socialized housing as the construction of dwelling units for
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy the middle and lower class members of our society.
prescribed qualifications. It is not possible to provide housing for all at once. 3. Public use, requirement for the exercise of eminent domain, is a flexible and
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of taking. It means evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts and condition of the 4. Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes provided that the Constitution defined
property and its surroundings, its improvements, and capabilities should be public use in 2 cases: 1) expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
considered. lots for resale at cost to individuals 2) transfer of utilities and other private
enterprises to the government.
5. The said case also provides that at present, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Facts: 6. Urban renewal or redevelopment and construction of low-cost housing is
1. National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of recognized as public use by the Constitution (Art II, Sec 9, and Art XIII, Sec
parcels of land approx. 25 hectares, including the lots of Sumulong and 9).
Balaoing. The lands were valued at 1 PESO per sqm pursuant to President 7. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in
Decrees prescribing the valuation for expropriation proceedings. With this, housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy
NHA deposited the amount of 158, 980 pesos, as the market value for the 25 prescribed qualifications. It is not possible to provide housing for all at once.
hectares, with the Philippine National Bank. Size of Property
2. The lands are being expropriated by NHA for the expansion of Bagong 1. Petitioners contend that PD 1224 would allow the taking of any private land,
Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried regardless of size. They say that there are vast areas of land in Rizal that are
government officials. owned by few landlords. It is surprising to include their lots.
3. Petittioners are challenging the orders of Judge Guerrero with regard to 2. JM Tuason Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration: expropriation is not
expropriation and the compensation that he acted with grave abuse of confined to landed estates.
3. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which expropriate private land and that the City’s expropriation was not for public use
petitioners herein failed to prove, the Court will give due weight and leave and welfare and is also politically motivated (there is also a P2M deposit but check
NHA’s choice undisturbed.
Fact #6(a)(iv)).
Just Compensation
1. The provisions on just compensation are similar in other PDs. And, these The SC held that under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409), the
were already ruled in previous cases. City has general powers over its territorial jurisdiction + power of eminent
2. Export Processing Zone Authority case: basic unfairness of the decrees is
domain. Essentially, they can acquire lands in the city and subdivide it into homes
apparent. The values given are usually uniform for very wide areas.
Individual differences are not taken into account. The value of land is based for bona fide tenants/occupants and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the
on generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, and other crops. city
Buildings are described in terms of only 2-3 classes of building materials and
DOCTRINE: Public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a
estimate of areas are more often inaccurate. Tax values cannot be absolute
flexible concept influenced by changing conditions. This includes a broader notion
substitutes for just compensation. And, owners should not estopped to
of indirect public benefit/advantage, including urban land reform and housing.
question the valuation.
That only a few could benefit from RA 409 does not diminish its public use
3. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of taking. It
character. Expropriation is also not any more confined to vast tracts of land and
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts and
landed estates.
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements, and
capabilities should be considered.
Due Process FACTS:
1. The constitutionality of the procedure in PD 1224 was already decided by 1. Phil. Columbian Association is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation
previous cases. engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its
2. Export Processing Zone Authority case: it violates due process to deny the members (located in Paco, Manila) and they also own a land adjacent to their
owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in tax documents is unfair office and facilities (4,842.90 sq. m) which they also own
or wrong. 2. Respondents are actual occupants of a parcel of land while Antonio Gonzales
3. Requisites before issuance of writ of possession, Ignacio case, 1) must be a Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila
Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, 2) provisional 3. 1982: Phil. Columbian Assn. instituted ejectment proceedings against
determination of just compensation by court, 3) deposit respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court
a. Rendered judgment ordering respondents to vacate lot and pay
reasonable compensation therefor
Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis (Casey) b. Affirmed by RTC, CA, and SC in another case
December 21, 1973 | J. Quiason | City Charter grants power to City of Manila to acquire 4. Phil. Columbian Assn. filed before Metropolitan Trial Court a motion for
lands in it for people in Manila + public use in eminent domain has flexible concept execution of judgment (which was granted 1990) and also a writ of
demolition
PETITIONER: Philppine Columbian Association 5. Respondents filed with the RTC Manila a petition for injunction and
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Domingo D. Panis as Judge, Regional Trial Court of prohibition with preliminary injunction and TRO against the granting of said
Manila, Branch 41, Hon. Ricardo Diaz, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, motion for execution of judgment and writ of demolition
Branch 27, the CITY OF MANILA, ANTONIO GONZALES, JR., KARLO 6. City of Manila also filed a complaint with RTC Manila (different branch) for
BUTIONG, et al the expropriation of the said parcel of land (4842.90 sq m) subject to
SUMMARY: Phil Columbian Assn instituted ejectment proceedings against ejectment proceedings
a. Phil Columbian Assn filed a motion to dismiss alleging that City of
respondents who are actual occupants of a parcel of land owned by petitioners.
Manila:
MeTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and this was affirmed by RTC, i. Had no power to expropriate private land
CA, and SC. Phil Columbian Assn filed a motion for execution of judgment + writ ii. Expropriation not for public use and welfare
of demolition in view of the aforementioned decision. City of Manila filed with iii. Expropriation is politically motivated
RTC Manila a complaint for the expropriation of the said parcel of land subject to iv. Deposit of P2M in the City of Manila (deposit with PNB)
ejectment proceedings. Petitioner argued that the City of Manila had no power to representing the provisional value of land was insufficient
and was made following PD 1533 (Note: PD 1533 was a. Includes broader notion of indirect public benefit/advantage,
already declared unconstitutional) including urban land reform and housing
b. RTC denied motion to dismiss and entered an order of 6. As to the P2M representing provisional value
condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was a. Not only fixed by the court, but was also accepted by both parties
properly instituted in accordance with law; also ordered both parties b. Petitioner still agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped
to submit names of nominees as commissioners to ascertain just from questioning it
compensation for the land in question c. Valuation is merely provisional, meaning there is a 2 nd stage to be
c. issued writ of possession (this was also filed ex parte earlier by City had in order to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid
of Manila) and also dismissed the MR by Phil Columbian Assn the landowner
7. CA also denied Phil Columbian Assn’s petition assailing RTC orders

ISSUES: City of Manila vs. Estrada


1. WoN expropriation was for public use – YES September 9, 1913 |Trent, J. | Just Compensation
2. WoN City of Manila has power to expropriate private property – YES PETITIONER: The City of Manila
RESPONDENTS: Balbina Estrada Y Sarmiento, minor only heiress of
RULING:
Concepcion Sarmiento, deceased, and Ariston Estrada, personally, and as
Petition denied for lack of merit.
administrator
RATIO:
SUMMARY:
1. Revised Charter of the City of Manila (RA 409) grants City of Manila
This is an extended opinion setting forth the reasons for its judgment regarding
general powers over its territorial jurisdiction + power of eminent
the just compensation of Estrada regarding their land affected by the
domain
expropriation by the city of Manila for the new market in the district of Paco.
a. General powers: “… and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease,
The Court rendered P10/m2 to be just compensation for the land based on the
convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the general
ground that the great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the
interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract
commissioners showed that P10/m2 was just compensation for the land taken, and
and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend
that the court has the authority under the Code of Civil Proceudre to revise the
to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers
report of the commissioners when the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or
hereinafter conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied)”
grossly excessive.
b. Sec 100: authorizes City of Manila to undertake urban land reform;
“… authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide
DOCTRINE:
the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents,
General rule: the market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which
giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said
the owner of condemned property is entitled under the law.
lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees.
The Court has the power to revise the just compensation set by appointed
For the purpose of this section, the city may raise the necessary
commissioners.
funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by
issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through
expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval
of the President…”
2. Essentially, City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has express FACTS:
power to acquire lands in the City and subdivide lands into home lots for sale 1. The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its
to bona fide tenants/occupants and to laborers and low-salaried employees of improvements for the new market, at that time, being erected in the district
the city of Paco.
3. That only a few could benefit from it does not diminish its public use 2. Respondents filed a complaint regarding the expropriation.
character 3. Two of the commissioners, joined in a majority report, fixing the value of
4. Expropriation not any more confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates the land at P20 / m2. They based their decision on the following:
5. Public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible a. Ariston Estrada (one of the respondents) compared the previous sale of a
concept, influenced by changing conditions land (Clarke land at P19.85/ m2) with same or similar conditions and
circumstances to the case of the Estrada land and estimated the land to i. It is the fair value of the property as between one who wants to
be worth P25 m2. Also, he said that he offered to pay P15/ m2 for any purchase and one who wants to sell it.
parcel of land in the vicinity as well located as the condemned land. ii. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
b. Real estate brokers, George Sellner and Enrique Briaz, estimated the surrounding, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown
price of the Estrada land at P10/m2 based upon the prices obtained for and considered in estimating its value.
land in the open market in the vicinity. iii. Admissible evidence for the valuation of condemned land
c. Mr. Powell, of the Internal Revenue Bureau, testified that the Estrada 1. Prices paid for other lands in the vicinity - Evidence of sale
land was appraised for taxation at P6 per square meter; that prior to 1911 of land in the neighborhood is competent on an inquiry as
it had been appraised at about P4 per square meter. to the value of land, and if the purchases or sales were
d. The president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila based his made by the party against whom the evidence was offered
testimony on the parcel of land of Clarke in the same area as the Estrada it might stand as an admission. But such testimony is
land which was expropriated. The city desires only 353.21 m2 out of received only upon the idea that there is substantial
1399.03 m2 which will result to a consequential damage making the similarity between the properties.
apparent price of the 353.21 m2 P7,002.05, or P19.85/ m2. a. Exception: Neighboring parcels of land under eminent
4. The dissenting commissioner set the value of the land at P10/m2 domain proceedings.
5. The lower court confirmed the majority report as to the improvements, but iv. Inadmissible evidence
reduced the price of the land from P20 / m2, as fixed by the majority report, 1. Offers of the land condemned
to P15 / m2. The lower court held it just and equitable to take as a a. The reception of this type of evidence would multiply
compromise between the two conflicting majority and minority opinions of the issues upon questions of damages to an extent not
the three commissioners the average of the two prices they have fixed per to be tolerated by court aiming to practically
square meter for the land in question, P20 and P10, respectively, fixing administer justice between litigants due to the many
upon P15/ m2. circumstances that has to be considered in doing so
6. Motions for a new trial were made by both parties but were denied by the b. Estrada claimed that that he offered to pay P15/ m2 for
court. Both parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the value any parcel of land in the vicinity as well located as the
of the land at P15 / m2. condemned land. This was improper evidence and
7. The record was therefore elevated to this court for a review of the evidence should not have been considered by the
and assigned errors of the parties. This court held that P10 / m2 was just commissioners.
compensation for the land, and rendered its decision accordingly. b. Evidences which lead to the Court’s decision to set the P10/ m2 as
8. This is an extended opinion setting forth the reasons for its judgment in the a just compensation for the Estrada land
case i. The testimony of the two real estate agents, Brias and Sellner,
which was based upon a sale of similarly situated land made
ISSUES: only thirty days previous to the date of the hearing.
1. WoN P10/ m2 is a just compensation for Estrada for the land taken by the City ii. Assessment of the property for taxation, at P6 per square meter.
of Manila from him - YES iii. No witnesses other than Estrada were called who could confirm
the higher valuation or even testify to an intermediate price.
RULING: iv. The price of P10 per square meter is 66 per cent greater than
After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law applicable to that obtained for land on the opposite side of the estero, and this
the questions raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per square meter is a just difference would seem amply sufficient to compensate for the
compensation for the land taken. Without prejudice to filing a more extended opinion more favored location of the condemned land
in which our reasons will be set forth in full, judgment will be entered accordingly, 2) The court has the power to revise the report of the commissioners when the
without costs. So ordered. amount awarded is grossly inadequate and excessive.
a. Definitions
i. Compensation - an equivalent for the value of the land (property)
RATIO:
taken
1) The preponderance of the evidence submitted to the commissioners showed
that P10 / m2 was just compensation for the land taken.
a. Determination of the market value of the land
ii. Just - used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to act upon the commissioners' report in one of several ways, at its
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property own discretion.
taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. d. In the case at bar, after examination of the evidences presented, the
iii. Just Compensation - a fair and full equivalent for the loss Court accepted the report of the commissioner in part and rejected it in
sustained. part. The findings regarding the improvement of the subject property
b. Section 244 of the Rules of Court: The commissioners shall assess the was found to be accurate but the awards as fixed at P15/ m2 by the
value of property taken and used, and shall also assess the majority of the commissioners and the trial court was grossly excessive.
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such The Court found P10 / m2 to be just compensation for the land taken.
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the The Court had the authority to do so as stated in the Code of Civil
owners. Procedure.
i. "To assess" is to perform a judicial act. The commissioners'
power is limited to assessing the value and to determining the
amount of the damages. SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC
ii. The value and damages awarded must be a just compensation 7 September 2007 | Nachura, J. | Payment of Just Compensation
and no more and no less. And in fixing these amounts, the
commissioners are not to act ad libitum (at one’s pleasure).
They have to discharge their function according to well PETITIONER: San Roque Realty and Development Corporation
established rules and form their judgment upon correct legal RESPONDENTS: Republic of The Philippines (through the Armed Forces of the
principles. Philippines
c. Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "Upon the filing of such
report in court, the court shall, upon hearing, accept the same and SUMMARY: The state was assailing the alleged claim of San Roque Realty over
render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may the subject land. The state was saying that it was able to secure the ownership of
recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or the said parcels of land through the decision of the CFI of Cebu for the
it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may expropriation proceedings they instituted. However, San Roque was saying that
accept the report in part and reject it in part, and may make such final there was no payment of just compensation to the owners, the state was not able
order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to annotate a lien to the titles of the said parcels of land, and that San Roque was
to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just an innocent purchaser of these lands.
compensation for the land so taken; and the judgment shall require
payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next section before the DOCTRINE:
plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the public use." Republic’s failure to pay the just compensation precluded the perfection of its title
i. This provision gave the Court the power to review the over the lot in question. In fact, the court even went further and recognized the
assessment of the commissioner. right of the unpaid owner to recover the property within five years from the
ii. The judgment of the court is rendered after a consideration of decision of the expropriation court the expropriator fails to effect payment of just
the commissioners' report and the exceptions thereto submitted compensation
upon the hearing of the report. By this judgment the court may
a) accept the commissioners' report unreservedly; b) it may Eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The
return the report for additional facts or it may set the report payment of just compensation is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the
aside and appoint new commissioners; or c) it may accept the state’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe renders the taking
report in part and reject it in part, and "make such final order ineffectual notwithstanding the avowed public purposed.
and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the FACTS:
defendant just compensation for the land so taken."  The subject parcels of lands are located in Cebu City and was originally
iii. When may the court, with propriety, overrule the award of the owned by Ismael Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza
commissioners in whole or in part and substitute its own  On September 1938, subject parcels of land together with 17 other lands,
valuation of the condemned property? The court is permitted to were subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then
Commonwealth of the Philippines
 On October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initia deposit of 9,500.00  The defendat also alleged that the government never secured a title in its name
as pre-condition for the entry of the lands sought to be expropriated. and never actually took possession of subject parcels of land from the date of
 May 1940, decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the decision up to the time the case was brought to this court despite the fact
the title of the subject parcels of land was not transferred to the government that the defendant is within viewing and walking distance from the camp
 Eventually, the land was subdivided and its old title was cancelled and new where it introduced developments on the said other parts of the lot
titles were issued by the Register of deeds of Cebu.  San Roque reiterates that it was an innocent purchaser for value and therefore
 The two parcels covered by the new titles were acquired by the defendant and entitled to protection given by the law and has every right to rely on the
the defendant begun constructing townhouses on the subject parcels of land correctness of the certificates
 On February 1996, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines filed the present case  RTC rendered a decision dismissing the Republic’s complaint and upholding
alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 San Roque’s ownership over the subject properties as supported by its actual
decision in the expropriation case and the new titles issued were null and possession and its unqualified title.
void. It argued that the defendant had no right to possess the subject  CA reversed the RTC decision on the finding that the appeal from CFI
properties because it is not the lawful owner decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners
 Meanwhile defendant San Roque realty claimed that it was a buyer in good of the subject properties and thus the expropriation in favor of the government
faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was became final and binding
initiated by the executive branch without legislative approval. Also it alleged 
that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did ISSUES:
not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation
 Plaintiff, RP contended that the said parcel of land which was originally a RULING:
private property was brought to a condemnation proceedings against the CA decision was reversed. RTC decision REINSTATED. It was San Roque
owners before the Court of First instance of Cebu for the purpose of Realty who rightfully owns the subject properties
expropriation was to carry out the development program of the Philippine
Army as provided in the National defense act (to be used as military RATIO:
reservation and others)  Republic’s bare contention and assumption cannot defeat San Roque’s
 When the government was asked to post the initial deposit, the complied and apparent ownership over the subject properties.
deposited the amount to the Philippine National Bank credited to the  By the very admission of the republic, there was no record of payment of
Provincial treasurer and the said amount was subsequently disbursed in full compensation to the land owners
but due to the destruction of vouchers, journals and cash book in the office of  In Republic v. Lim, it was emphasized that no piece of land can be finally
the Provincial treasurer during the world war, the names of the payees could and irrevocably taken from unwilling owner until compensation is paid.
not be reasonably ascertained Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer from the
 Judge Martinez issued a decision in favor of the government and fixing the landowner to the expropriator.
just compensation thereof  Thus it was ruled that Republic’s failure to pay the just compensation
 The defendant, San Roque’s predecessors, interposed and exception and precluded the perfection of its title over the lot in question. In fact, the court
notice of intention of appeal and filed their corresponding bond. This said even went further and recognized the right of the unpaid owner to recover the
action prevented the plaintiff to start using the expropriated properties property within five years from the decision of the expropriation court the
devoting to military use. expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation
 The plaintiff shows that the reason why they want to make the subject land  Eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator.
to a military reservation was because 1.) the historical account of the National The payment of just compensation is an indispensable requisite for the
Historical Commission with respecting to the subject land 2.) testimonial exercise of the state’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
accounts 3.) the remnants of the Lahug airport particularly the runway renders the taking ineffectual notwithstanding the avowed public purposed.
originally devoted to military airport  To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to
 The plaintiff also mentioned that the defendant corporation secured expropriate is the ride roughshod private rights
certificate of titles to prejudice the plaintiff and thus null and void  The state failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of
 San Roque alleged that the subject parcels of land have been covered by the just compensation and receipt thereby of property owners
torrens system and the transactions involving expropriation should have been  The court mentions that if the state was able to compensate the owners they
registered and annotated on the transfer certificates should have cancelled the titles or at least annotated a lien in favor of the
government. the passage of R.A. No. 9443, all warrant the reversal of the CA Decision.
 The state also did not comply with the registration requirement under the
Code of Civil procedure in providing a certified copy of the judgment to the REPUBLIC V. BPI (Mayumi)
office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is situated September 11, 2013 | Carpio, J. |
 From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to
cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines represented by the Department of
decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to Public Works and Highways
register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for fiftysix (56) RESPONDENTS: Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
years.
SUMMARY:
DPWH expropriated lots belonging to BPI and Villanueva. This was processed
 The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the
through an expropriation proceeding with the RTC granting the payment of
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of P40,000 per square meter. BPI thereafter filed for a motion for a partial new trial
exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the rule will claiming that the building located in the land to be expropriated was not included
defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public such as the in the first proceeding. DPWH contends this saying (1) that the period to file has
Torrens system. already lapse, and (2) the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building
is unfounded and without legal basis. The SC ruled that firstly, it was within the
 The court also reiterated that San Roque was a buyer in good faith because proper period when BPI filed for a partial new trial. Secondly, that the additional
it should be imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least sufficiently just compensation should be given to BPI for the building. No actual taking of the
remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential
warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of
damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot
indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation of private respondent suffers from an impairment or decrease in value,
consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent.
 Finally, there is a recent development that has sealed the fate of the
Republic in its claim of ownership over the DOCTRINE:
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to
 subject properties. This is the passage of Republic Act No. 9443 (RA 9443), take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and
entitled "AN ACT CONFIRMING AND DECLARING, SUBJECT TO payment of just compensation. The State’s power of eminent domain is limited
CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, THE VALIDITY OF EXISTING TRANSFER by the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND RECONSTITUTED CERTIFICATES public use without just compensation.
OF TITLE COVERING THE BANILAD FRIAR LANDS ESTATE,
FACTS:
SITUATED IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF CEBU."52 The
9. On February 12, 1998, the Department of Public Works and Highways
law confirms and declares valid all existing TCTs and Reconstituted (DPWH) filed with the RTC a case for expropriation against portions of the
Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province properties of BPI and of Bayani Villanueva. This property can be found in
and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate.53 Pamplona, Las Piñas City.
Thus, by legislative fiat, SRRDC’s titles covering Lot Nos. 933B3 and 10. DPWH needed 281 square meters of BPI’s lot, and 177 square meters from
933B4 must be recognized as valid and subsisting. Villanueva’s lot for the the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Fly-Over.
11. Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the expropriation. Hence, the trial
 In fine, we hold that the operative facts in the case at bar, to wit: (1) the court constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just
compensation.
incomplete expropriation of Lot No. 933 in view of Republic’s failure to
12. In the Board’s report dated September 29, 1998, they recommended that
prove payment in full of just compensation; (2) the registration under the amount of P40,000 per square meter as the fair market value. On November
Torrens system of the subject properties in the name of SRRDC and its 25, 1998, the trial court in its Decision set the fair market value at P40,000
predecessors in interest; (3) the estoppel and laches of the Republic for 56 per square meter.
years; (4) the status of SRRDC as an innocent purchaser for value; and (5) a. BPI
i. Awarded: P11,240,000 compensation for BPI’s building and praying that BPI’s claim for additional
ii. DPWH deposited: P632,250 just compensation be denied.
iii. Remaining amount: P10,607,750 22. Petitioner claimed that the building was never taken by the government. To
b. Villanueva support its claim, a letter addressed to the Solicitor General was attached.
i. Awarded: P7,080,000 The letter mentions how the original plan which affected the building was
ii. DPWH deposited: P2,655,000 not implemented. The area was reduced to avoid costly structure of the
iii. Remaining amount: P4,425,000 bank.
13. The trial court rendered a judgment that the Republic of the Philippines as 23. Respondent claimed that:
represented by DPWH to pay BPI and Villanueva the remaining money a. It was not aware that the original plan was not implemented
(a.iii and b.iii) b. It received no correspondence from the DPWH except for a letter
14. The acting branch clerk issued a certification stating that the decision dated which stated that “adjustment of the RROW limit of our project
December 25 of the trial court is final, executory, and unappeasable along this section is not possible”
considering that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to file any Notice c. Even “if a 3-meter setback is observed, only 75% of the old
of Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration. building could be utilized x x x [and] cutting the support system of
15. Meanwhile, BPI filed on December 16, 1998 a Motion for Partial New Trial the building x x x would affect the building’s structural integrity.”
to determine the just compensation of its building, which was not included 24. May 7, 2001: RTC denied Petitioner’s motion and ruled that the demolition
in the December 25 Decision. of the old building of BPI can be construed as a consequential damage
a. BPI claimed that its motion was timely filed since it received a suffered by BPI as a result of the expropriation. Petitioner was thus ordered
copy of the Decision on December 1, 1998. to submit its nominee to the Board of Commissioners.
b. The trial court granted partial new trial. 25. Petitioner nominated Romulo C. Gervacio (Gervacio), the Officer-In-
16. In the Partial New Trial: Charge of the City Assessor’s Office in Las Piñas City.
a. Republic’s (petitioner) counsel failed to appear during the 26. The Board thus constituted, the trial court ordered the Commissioners to
scheduled hearing despite notice. submit their recommendation.
b. RTC allowed BPI to present its evidence ex-parte. 27. Savellano recommended P2,633,000 based on the appraisal conducted by an
c. On the same day, trial court also appointed as commissioner the independent professional business and property consultant.
Officer-In-Charge of the trial court, Leticia Agbayani. She was 28. Gervaco recommended P1,905,600 based on the market value indicated on
ordered by the court to conduct an ocular inspection of the the tax declaration of said building.
building. 29. The Commissioner’s Report presented both recommendations. The RTC
d. September 10, 1999: the trial court held that just compensation for adopted Gervaco’s recommendation as just compensation for the building
the building was due and ordered Republic to pay BPI P2,633,000. of BPI.
17. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said decision on the ground that 30. Petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The CA affirmed RTC decision.
the proceeding fixing the just compensation of the building is null and void 31. Thus, this petition.
for not complying with the mandatory procedure set forth in Sections 5 to 8
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
a. Motion for reconsideration was granted by the RTC, and ordered ISSUES:
that the September 10 decision be set aside. 1. WoN the trial court’s Decision dated 25 November 1998 had become final
b. BPI filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was and executory before BPI filed its motion for partial new trial –NO
substantial compliance with the Rules –Denied. 2. WoN the award of additional just compensation for BPI’s building is
18. September 19, 2000: the trial court appointed Atty. Morante, the branch unfounded and without legal basis –NO
clerk of court, as the chairman of the Board of Commissioners.
19. The RTC gave petitioner and BPI ten days to submit their respective
nominees and their oaths of office. RULING: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of
20. September 28, 2000: BPI nominated Roland Savellano, and submitted his Appeals’ Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution dated 06 August 2012 in
oath of office. CA-G.R. CV No. 79843.
21. October 13, 2000: Instead of submitted its nominee, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion objecting to the propriety of paying just RATIO:
Additional Just Compensation for the Building or consent of respondents, without properly initiating expropriation proceedings,
1. Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take and without any compensation to respondents-landowners. Because of said
private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and
payment of just compensation. transmission lines, respondents alleged that they could no longer use their land
2. The State’s power of eminent domain is limited by the constitutional mandate as part of a subdivision project as originally intended, which ultimately caused
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just financial loss to their family. Thus, respondents filed a complaint against
compensation. petitioner and its officers with the Regional Trial Court. Respondents demanded
3. General rule: just compensation to which the owner of the condemned the removal of the power lines and its accessories and payment of damages, or in
property is entitled to is the market value. the alternative, payment of the fair market value of the affected areas totalling
a. Modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. The
26,000 square meters of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter. RTC
owner will be entitled to recover the (1) compensation for the
portion actually taken; and (2) consequential damage, if any, to the issued a Decision ordering defendant NAPOCOR to pay plaintiffs the amount of
remaining part of the property P92,827,351.00, by way of just compensation and to pay an Attorney's fees.On
4. Petitioner contends that BPI’s building was “never taken” by petitioner appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in factoring the
5. Republic v. CA and Reyes: No actual taking of the remaining portion of the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of
real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a result of respondents' land. Petitioners maintain that such inclusion of the inflation rate in
the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot of private respondent arriving at the value of just compensation has no legal basis. None of the parties
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may
contest the finding that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking
be awarded to private respondent.
was Php170.00 per square meter. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with
modification, reducing the award to P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that petitioner
Other issues: Motion for partial new trial could no longer assail the valuation that petitioner itself recommended, the same
1. Petitioner: trial court’s Decision dated 25 November 1998 had already being a judicial admission.
become final and executory DOCTRINE:
2. Respondent: motion for partial new trial filed on 16 December 1998 was
timely filed because it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998. Just Compensation
3. SC: A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the The formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not
Decision of 25 November 1998 was served upon BPI. Hence, the Court of include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through
Appeals correctly held that absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision, payment of interest on the amount due to the landowner, and through the award
the period of 15 days within which to file its motion for partial new trial did of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity
not begin to run against BPI. in the taking of property

NPC v Manalastas (Armand)


January 27, 2016 | Peralta J. | Art 3 Sec 9 Just Compensation 3. Estoppel inoperative against Government
Estoppel generally finds no application against the State when it acts to rectify
mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials and agents,
2. PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State
RESPONDENTS: ELIZABETH MANALASTAS and BEA CASTILLO without any hindrance on the part of the government from implementing laws
SUMMARY: and regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling
Petitioner, a government-owned and controlled corporation involved in the government operations and allowing others, some by malice, to profit from
development of hydro-electric generation of power and production of electricity, official error or misbehavior.
and the construction, operation and maintenance of power plants, transmission
lines, power stations and substations, on respondents' parcel of land affecting an
area of 26,919 square meters. Petitioner entered said land without the knowledge FACTS:
8. Sometime in 1977 to 1978, petitioner, a government-owned and controlled Tbe petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
corporation involved in the development of hydro-electric generation of CV No. 89366 is MODIFIED, such that petitioner is adjudged liable to PAY
power and production of electricity, and the construction, operation and JUST COMPENSATION to respondents at the rate of Php170.00 per square
maintenance of power plants, transmission lines, power stations and meter, subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
substations, among others, constructed a 230 KV transmission line for the the time of taking in 1978 up to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, six percent (6%)
Naga-Tiwi line and a 69 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac line on per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko Sentral
respondents' parcel of land covered by TCT No. 26263, affecting an area of ng Pilipinas – Monetary Board Circular No. 799
26,919 square meters. RATIO:
9. Petitioner entered said land without the knowledge or consent of respondents, 1. It should be noted that in Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
without properly initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any Highways, et al. v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson, the Court stressed
compensation to respondents-landowners. that "just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that
10. Because of said transmission lines, respondents alleged that they could no is controlling for purposes of compensation." In such case, the court said:
longer use their land as part of a subdivision project as originally intended, “the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for
which ultimately caused financial loss to their family. appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss
11. In July 2000, respondents (plaintiffs below, who were then joined by their sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of the circumstances
mother, Celedonia, and brother, Mariano; Celedonia and Mariano are no availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just
longer impleaded as parties in this petition as the CA Decision has attained compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
finality as to them) filed a complaint against petitioner and its officers with Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the
the RTC of Naga City. cost of expropriation.”
12. Respondents demanded the removal of the power lines and its accessories 2. Accordingly, in the Apo case, we held that the rationale for imposing the
and payment of damages, or in the alternative, payment of the fair market interest is to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
value of the affected areas totalling 26,000 square meters of respondents' made had they been proprerly compensated for their properties at the time of
land at P800.00 per square meters the taking.
13. RTC rendered a decision in favor of defendants and ordered NAPOCOR P92 In Republic v CA, the court ruled that: “if property is taken for public use
million pesos worth of just compensation. before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
14. On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in factoring case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be
the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value of computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation
respondents' land. is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
15. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with modification, reducing the award property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place
to Celedonia and Enrico Mariano (respondents' co-plaintiffs below) to the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was
P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer assail the in before the taking occurred. “
valuation that petitioner itself recommended, the same being a judicial 3. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
admission. Moreover, the CA pointed out that taking an inconsistent position property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
on appeal cannot be allowed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
denied, hence this petition. constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.
ISSUES: 4. The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for purposes of
1. WoN the inflation factor should be included in the computation for just determining just compensation should not include the inflation rate of the
compensation Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated
2. WoN the determination of just compensation is a judicial function (and land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest on the market
therefore are not bound to a party’s formulation of the just compensation) value of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.1âwphi1
3. WoN the award of P83 million will unjustly enrich the respondents. It is the courts, not the litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation or
RULING: application of the law and, thus, only the courts may determine the rightful
compensation in accordance with the law and evidence presented by the 1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Cristina de Knecht
parties. It is incongruous for the court below to uphold a proposition merely against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista who issued an order in the lower court
because it was recommended by a party, despite the same being with regard to a complaint for expropriation that affects properties along the
erroneous. Estoppel generally finds no application against the State when Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, including De Knecht’s house.
2. According to petitioner, 10 years ago, the government proposed the Manila –
it acts to rectify mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its
Coastal Road Project which included the extension of EDSA to Roxas Blvd.
officials and agents, irrespective of rank. (Secretary of Finance v. Oro through Cuneta Ave. (a straight route considering the direction of EDSA).
Maura Shipping Lines) 3. Then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed
5. To recapitulate, the formula for determination of just compensation to the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for
landowners does not include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is the construction and/or improvement of buildings and other structures located
properly accounted for through payment of interest on the amount due to the within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue.
landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees 4. However, shortly thereafter, the Department of Public Highways decided to
in cases where there was irregularity in the taking of property. make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
which are lined with old substantial houses.
De Knecht v Bautista 5. Upon learning of the changed the owners of the residential houses that would be
Oct. 30, 1980 | Fernandez, J. | expropriation affected, the herein petitioner being one of them, filed a petition directed to Pres.
Marcos asking him to order the adoption of the original plan.
PETITIONER: Cristina De Knecht 6. Marcos, in response, directed Minister Aquino to explain the change within 24
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judge presiding over Branch III hours and later referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for
of the Court of First Instance of the Republic of the Philippines investigation and recommendation.
7. The Settlements Commission submitted a report recommending the reversion
SUMMARY: Christina de Knecht is challenging as arbitrary the decision to of the extension of EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta
change the route to be covered by the Manila – Coastal Road project. Originally, Avenue.
the plan was that said road would pass along Cuneta Avenue. For “social impact” 8. However, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on implementing the plan to
reasons, however, it was decided that the same will pass through Fernando Rein make the extension of EDSA go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
and Del Pan streets, which are lined with houses. Correspondingly, the 9. Feb. 1979: gov’t filed before the sala of herein respondent Judge Bautista a
government filed a complaint for expropriation against owners of said houses. complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along
Christina de Knecht is one of said owners. Thus, she is now challenging this Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
choice as arbitrary and erroneous. SC agreed. It is doubtful whether the extension 10. The petitioner assails the choice of the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets route
of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground of social impact. on the following grounds:
The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the a. The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme
extension are mostly motels. Furthermore, the DPWH study recommended the or reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants.
Cuneta Avenue route and thus it is odd why all of a sudden the route was changed b. Where the legislature has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the
to Fernando Rein and Del Pan. While Congress has the power to designate question of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the intended
particular property to be taken, it is still a judicial question whether or not the improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject
exercise of such power was capricious or arbitrary. There is no question as to the however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross
right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use abuse of discretion.
upon the payment of just compensation. c. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or
capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or not the
DOCTRINE: Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution (1973) of the Philippines proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests.
provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just d. Even the claim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that there
compensation." However, the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' would be a saving of P2 million under his new plan must be reviewed
choose what private property should be taken. for it bears no relation to the site of the proposed EDSA extension.
i. As envisioned by the government, the EDSA extension would
FACTS: be linked to the Cavite Expressway.
ii. Logically then, the proposed extension must point to the south power to act in an impressive manner. With due recognition then of the power of
and not detour to the north. Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof
e. Also, the equal protection of the law must be accorded, not on to the may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a
motel owners along Cuneta (Fisher) Avenue, but also to the owners of judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party
solid and substantial homes and quality residential lands occupied for adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
generations. protection clause will not allow.
11. On the other hand, respondents defend the change by reason of the following: 4. In the instant case:
a. There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the a. It is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish
EDSA Extension to Roxas Blvd. As a matter of fact, those who were to the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue.
be adversely affected by the construction of the EDSA Extension to b. It is to be presumed that the Department of Public Highways made
Roxas Boulevard along Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets were duly studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue.
notified of such proposed project. (Note: but petitioner herein is not one c. It is indeed odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas
of those notified) Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets.
b. It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward d. It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can
(from the city center while the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line be objected to on the ground of social impact.
follows northward and inward direction). Nonetheless, both lines, e. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by
Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet the extension are mostly motels.
satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are both 5. Besides, the Human Settlements Commission, after considering the factors of
acceptable. functionality, social impact, and cost, recommended the Cuneta Avenue line
c. In selecting the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line the Government (Line 1) instead of the Fernando Rein – Del Pan line (Line 2).
did not do so because it wanted to save the motel located along Cuneta 6. Functionality: This issue has to do with the physical design of a highway,
Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or inclusive of engineering factors and management consideration.
problem involved. 7. (Line) Systematically and diagramatically, Line 1 is straighter than Line 2.
8. (Length) Line 2 is 3 meters longer. 50,000 vehicles will traverse these extra three
ISSUES: meters on a daily basis. Not good for traffic.
WON the Court can inquire into the necessity or propriety of the “taking” of private 9. (Contour) Line 1 is definitely the contour conforming alignment to EDSA while
property - YES Line 2 affords a greater radius of unnatural curvature as it hooks slightly
northward before finally joining with Roxas Boulevard.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. 10. (Crossroads) From the of highway design, it is imperative to have interchanges as
The order of June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter far apart as possible to avoid traffic from slow down in negotiating the slope on
upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the the interchanges. Up north would be the future Buendia Avenue- Roxas Boulevard
respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. Interchange. Consequently, Line 1 which is farther away from Buendia Avenue
7001-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, than Line 2 is the better alignment.
etc." except to dismiss said case. 11. Social impact: (in this regard social impact is greater in Line 1)
a. No. of property owners: Line 1 = 73; Line 2 = 49.
RATIO: b. Incidence of non-resident owner: Line 1 = 34.3%; Line 2 = 63.3%
1. There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take c. No. of actually affected residents: Line 1 = 547; Line 2 = 290
private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation based 12. Cost: Contrary to the Php2M difference averred by Sec. Aquino, the right- of-
on the provision of Sec. 2, Art. IV, 1973 Consti. Still, it is recognized that the way acquisition cost difference factor of the two alignments is only P269,196. (A
government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what private property little bit more expensive if Line 1 – but Court says, negligible difference)
should be taken. 13. The Human Settlement Commission, in choosing Line 1 over Line 2, made a
2. J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure: failure to meet tile-exacting standard choice between people on one hand and progress and development on the other.
of due process would likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of this It chose the latter (yes  progress and dev’t over people).
congressional power. 14. The Hearing Board is not unmindful that progress and development are
3. It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due carried out by the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of its people
process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness; it is the and therefore, recommends the reverend of the extension project to alignment 1.
antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state
Furthermore, it issued “binding and absolute preconditions” as recommendations,
to wit: Basis of eminent domain is necessity of a public character. A necessity must exist
a. a self sufficient community or human settlement complete with for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes.
infrastructure capture market, school, church and industries for
employment should be set up to enable the affected residents of alignment The value for compensation of the property should be fixed at the time of its
1 to maintain, their present social and economic standing taking.
b. prompt payment of fair and just compensation through the negotiated sale
approach
c. that the Department of Public Highways conduct public hearings before FACTS:
undertaking on future expropriations of private properties for public use. 1. The President issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 555 instituting a
15. Thus, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR). On the same
through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas date, the President also issued LOI No. 557, adopting slum improvement as
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval and benefits as a national housing policy.
may be provided by law. (Sec. 3, Art XIII) 2. In compliance with LOI No. 555, the Governor of Metro Manila issued, EO
677 adopting the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which
included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog
Manotok v. NHA area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program (ZIP) because the
May 21, 1987 | Guitierrez, Jr., J. | Just Compensation in Eminent Domain findings of the representative of the City of Manila and the National Housing
Authority (NHA) described these as blighted communities.
PETITIONER: Elisa Manotok, Patricia Tiongson, married 3. A fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate. Following the calamity, the
to Cayetano Tiongson, Pacita Go married to President and the Metro Manila Governor made public announcement that
Eduardo Go, Roberto Laperal III, Miguel Sison, Philip Manotok, Maria Teresa the national government would acquire the property for the fire victims. The
Manotok, Jose Clemente Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jose Maria President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners of the
Manotok and Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., assisted by their father and judicial property for the acquisition of the same. However it did not materialize as the
guardian, Jesus Manotok, Milagros Manotok, Ignacio Manotok, Jr., Felisa negotiations for the purchase of the property failed.
Manotok, Maryann Manotok, Michael Manotok, Fausto Manotok, Severino 4. The President issued Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites identified by
Manotok III, and Jesus Manotok the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human
RESPONDENTS: National Housing Authority, Republic of the Philippines Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the sites included.
SUMMARY: The President issued the challenged P.D. Nos. 1669 which provides The President then issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos. 16694
for the expropriation of the property known as the ''Tambunting Estate" and 1670 and 16705 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-
which declared the Sunog-Apog area expropriated. Petitioners contend that they Apog area expropriated.
were denied of due process and of their right to just compensation. The Court 5. Now there are 2 petitions before the court. The 1st one challenges the
found P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to due constitutionality of P.D. No. 1669 which provides for the expropriation of the
process of law, failing to provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which property known as the ''Tambunting Estate" and the 2 nd challenges the
the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties constitutionality of P.D. No. 1670 which provides for the expropriation of the
or the reasonableness of the just compensation. property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog.
6. In both cases, the petitioners maintain that the two decrees are
DOCTRINE: The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the unconstitutional because:
provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its (1) They deprived the petitioners of their properties without due process of
exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is law.
sought to be enforced. In the exercise of its sovereign right the State is not subject (2) The petitioners were denied to their right to just compensation.
to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: (1) the
taking must be for a public use; (2) the payment of just compensation must be
made; and (3), due process must be observed in the taking.

4 5
Check end of digest for content of Section 1 and 6. Check end of digest for content of Section 1 and 6.
-determination of just compensation should not have been vested solely themselves provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the
with the City Assessor and that a maximum or fixed amount of petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties
compensation should not have been imposed by the said decrees. or the reasonableness of the just compensation.
-by providing for the max amount of just compensation and by directing the
City Assessor to take into consideration the alleged existing conditions 6. The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the
(“improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is powers given to the respondent NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree
squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the
without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever.
expropriation costs") of the properties in question the City Assessor is
The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon
forced to accept, as actual and existing conditions of the property, the the signing of the decree. No deposit before taking is required under the
foregoing statements in the decrees when in fact the Sunog-Apog area has decree. There is no provision for any interests to be paid on the unpaid
been subdivided into subdivision lots and leased to the occupants thereof installments spread out over a period of five years. Not only are the owners
under contracts of lease, making them lessees and not squatters given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side,
(3) The petitioners' right to equal protection of the law was violated. or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the decisions,
(4) The decrees are vague, defective, and patently erroneous. rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond
(5) The petitioners' properties are not proper subjects for expropriation the reach of judicial review. An appeal may be made to the Office of the
considering their location and other relevant circumstances. President but the courts are completely enjoined from any inquiry or
7. The Government through the Solicitor General contends that the power of participation whatsoever in the expropriation of the subdivision or its
eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature itself or the incidents.
President through his lawmaking prerogatives exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the expropriation, and the fixing of the just 7. The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions
compensation become political in nature, and the courts must respect the in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in
decision of the lawmaking body, unless the legislative decision is clearly and order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to
evidently arbitrary, unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that all be enforced. In the exercise of its sovereign right the State is not subject to
that is required is that just compensation be determined with due process of any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: (1)
law which does not necessarily entail judicial process. The only reason why the taking must be for a public use; (2) the payment of just compensation
the determination appeared unilateral was because said petitioners did not must be made; and (3), due process must be observed in the taking.
actually state any valuation in their sworn declaration of true market value of
their respective properties. 8. The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific
decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's property and provides
ISSUES: its own peculiar manner of taking the same. Neither should the courts adopt
3. WON the decrees are constitutional? –NO, they are violative of the due a handsoff policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing
process clause. by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined
4. WON compensation provided by the Government is just as the Constitution beforehand by a statute. Although due process does not always necessarily
provides? –NO demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law, it still mandates some
5. WON determination of just compensation entails the need for judicial form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard
processes? –YES are given to the owner to protect his property rights. When it is alleged that
in the taking of a person's property, his right to due process of law has been
RULING: The petitions in G.R. No. 55166 and G.R. No. 55167 are GRANTED in violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged
that PD 1669 and 1670 respectively proclaiming the Tambunting Estate and the Estero violation.
de Sunog-Apog area expropriated, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore null and void ab initio. 9. The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is necessity. A
necessity must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses
RATIO: and purposes but accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for
5. The SC finds P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right absolute necessity. It is enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or
to due process of law, failing the test of constitutionality. They do not by practical necessity, which varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of
each case. dispute the legislative appraisal of the matter?

In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the


properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or P.D. No. 1669
what necessity impelled the particular choices or selections. The decrees Sec 1: The real properties known as the Tambunting of Manila with an area of
show no reasons whatsoever for the choice of the properties as housing 52,688.70 square meters, more or less are hereby declared expropriated. The NHA is
projects. designated administrator of the National Government with authority to immediately
take possession, control, disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated
10. The legislature may not take the property of one citizen and transfer it to properties and their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive
another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not development plan for the condemned properties.
thereby promoted. The Government still has to prove that expropriation of Sec 6: Notwithstanding any provision of law or decree to the contrary and for the
commercial purposes would be “public use” under the constitution. purpose of expropriating this property pegged at the market value determined by the
City Assessor pursuant to P. D. No. 76, as amended, particularly by P.D. No. 1533
There is no showing how the President arrived at the conclusion that the which is in force and in effect at the time of the issuance of this decree. In assessing
Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. There is no showing for a need to the market value, the City Assessor shall consider existing conditions in the area
demolish the existing valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog- notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is
Apog. squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the
expropriation cost. Subject to the foregoing, the just compensation for the above
11. Pursuant to P.D. 1533, the basis of the just compensation is the market value property should not exceed a maximum of P17,000,000 which shall be payable to the
of the propert “prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate owners within a period of 5 years in 5 equal installments.
Government Office to acquire property.”
P.D. No. 1670
In these petitions, the max amount of compensation was imposed by the Sec 1: The real property along the Estero de SunogApog in
decrees and the amounts were only a little more than the assessed value of Tondo, Manila formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc., with an area of 72,428.6
the properties in 1978 when according to the government it decided to acquire square meters, more or less, is hereby declared expropriated. The NHA is designated
the said properties. This deprives the petitioners of the opportunity to prove administrator of the National Government with authority to immediately take
a higher value since the actual taking occurred in 1980 when the decrees possession, control and disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated
where promulgated. The max amounts provided for in the decrees transgress properties and their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive
the petitioners’ right to just compensation and should not be binding for it development plan for the condemned properties.
fails to reflect the value of the property and considering other factors. The Sec 6: Notwithstanding any provision of law or decree to the contrary and for the
value for compensation of the property should be fixed at the time of its purpose of expropriating this property pegged at the market value determined by the
taking. City Assessor by P. D. No. 1533 which is in force and in effect at the time of the
issuance of this decree. In assessing the market value, the City Assessor shall consider
C.J. Teehankee Concurring: existing conditions in the area notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on
- I concurred with the tenuous majority's ruling there setting aside the lower court's the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families which should
ruling granting therein petitioner-appellee's petition to prohibit respondents-appellees considerably depress the expropriation cost. Subject to the foregoing, the just
from instituting proceedings for expropriation of the "Tatalon Estate" as specifically compensation for the above property should not exceed a maximum of P8,000,000.00
authorized by R.A. 2616, with the result that the expropriation proceedings could then , which shall be payable to the owners within a period of 5 years in 5 equal installment.
be properly filed but subject to such proper and valid objections and defenses to the
action as petitionerowner may raise. Republic v De Knecht
-I dissented from the majority insofar as it held that the constitutional power of Feb 12. 1990 | Gancayco, J. | how to expropriate land
Congress for the expropriation of lands is wellnigh all embracing and forecloses the
courts from inquiring into the necessity for the taking of the property. Does not the PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
need for a more serious scrutiny as to the power of Congress to single out a particular RESPONDENTS: Cristina de Knecht and the Court of Appeals
piece of property for expropriation, acknowledged in the main opinion, call for judicial
scrutiny, with all the acts in, as to the need for the expropriation for full opportunity to SUMMARY: Republic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas blvd and also construct
an outfall for flood waters. Along the planned extension route is De Knecht’s 19. This prompted the Republic to appeal to SC
property who does not want to sell her property. Lower court granted writ of
possession of said property to Petitioner after it deposited the required amount.
De Knecht filed a case titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in 1980. Court ISSUES:
cited social impact factor making expropriation of the land arbitrary. 1983, Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgement of this
Batasang Pambansa Passed BP340 expropriating said property. Lower Court court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation
granted Petitioner’s petition of dismissing expropriation proceeding citing said 1) W/N the enactment of BP 340 is the proper ground for the dismissal of the
law. SC affirmed said ruling stating that since residents have moved already the expropriation case
social impact factor which was the basis in De Knecht v Bautista have already - HELD: YES, CA’s decision overturned
disappeared making the expropriation proceedings not arbitrary anymore. The 2) W/N the DPWH’s choice of land to be expropriated is still an issue under the
court also said that expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner circumstances, said choice having been supplanted by the legislature’s choice
not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by taking - HELD: NO, choice proper already, most residents moved already
appropriate court action or by legislation. making the social impact factor issue in De Knecht v Bautista moot
3) W/N the law of the case theory should be applied to the case at bar
DOCTRINE: Previous ruling is no obstacle to the legislative arm to assess - HELD: NO, it is right of the petitioner to expropriate private lands
present circumstances as to propriety of expropriation and thereafter enacting for public use
legislation. Thus, previous ruling must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned
FACTS: decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 28, 1988 and its resolution dated
12. In relation with De Knecht v Bautista Case - This case involves the case De March 9, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order of Branch III
Knecht v Bautista (same De Knecht). After the court ruled in favour of De of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay City in Civil Case No. 7001-P
Knecht in 1980, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP blg 340 in Feb 17, 1983 dated September 2, 1983 is hereby reinstated without pronouncement as to costs.
expropriating the land of De Knecht thereby superseding the 1979 decision
13. This case involve the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard (to ease traffic) RATIO:
and the construction of EDSA outfall (to solve the flood problem in the area) 16. “ true that said final judgment of this court on the subject becomes the law of
14. February 20, 1979 – Republic Filed expropriation proceeding in the CFI Rizal in the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take
Pasay City expropriating lands, including De Knecht’s, along the planned private properties for public use upon the payment of just compensation is so
extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard provided in the Constitution and our laws”
15. After making the required deposit in June ’79, on the 14 th of June 1979 lower 17. Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by
court issued a writ of possession to the Republic and created a three man voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by taking appropriate
committee to determine just compensation for the lands involved court action or by legislation
16. 10-30-80 SC decided in favor of respondent in a case filed by the latter against a. Republic acquired through negotiated purchase about 80% to 85%
the writ of possession issued by the lower court in 1979 and against the of the lands involved
expropriation of her lands b. Only 10-15% which petitioner cannot negotiate through sales
a. Court ruled: “choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets (along which agreement (de Knecht 5%)
de Knecht’s property is located) as the line through which the EDSA 18. DPWH’s Choice - Social impact factor cited by the Human settlement
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not commission has disappeared already
receive judicial approval a. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated.
b. Based on recommendation of Human Settlement commission choosing b. Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to the project
Cuneta Street since it is mostly composed of motel establishments that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also
rather than residential minimizing social impact minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area
17. In 1983, Republic filed motion to dismiss the expropriation action citing BP blg.
340 expropriating same properties for same purpose, which the lower court 19. BP 340: Effectively superseded the decision in De Knecht v Bautista
granted a. Primary reason because of disappearance of social impact factor
18. Respondent appealed to CA which the latter granted citing the 10-30-80 mentioned above
decision which the latter said to be the law between the parties. b. Q: So if residents have not yet moved, would the court’s decision be the
same???(probably not? see also concurring opinion)
20. Said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the government in thereafter
making its own independent assessment of the circumstance then prevailing as to
the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and
thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this in this case.
21. Expropriation’s Public Use:
a. Easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and outlying areas
b. Controlling flood by the construction of the outlet for the Estero Tripa
de Gallina (which drains the area of Marikina, Pasay, Manila and
Paranaque)
c. Completing the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project

Cruz, J. Concurring Opinion


1. BP 340 not a legislative reversal of De Knecht v Bautista (which was decided
under a different set of facts)
a. Supervening events have changed the factual basis justifying the
enactment of the statute
2. We are sustaining the legislation because we ourselves have found that under the
changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary