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Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688

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Telecommunications Policy
URL: www.elsevierbusinessandmanagement.com/locate/telpol

Between a rock and a hard place: Recession and telecoms taxation


P. Koutroumpis a,n, A. Lekatsas b, G. Giaglis c, P. Kourouthanasis c
a
European Investment Bank & Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece
b
ICAP Group, Greece
c
Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece

a r t i c l e i n f o abstract

Available online 28 June 2011 Excessive taxation in the telecoms services sector is rarely found in developed
Keywords: economies as it hinders high technology investments, confines innovation and even-
Mobile tually impedes economic growth. Recession eventually complicates this process. In this
Taxation paper the repercussions of multi-layer service taxation on the Greek mobile sector
Recession during the last five years are studied. It is found that public revenues, companies and
Economic growth subscribers would significantly benefit from a direct decrease of the special levy
imposed on the use of mobile services today. An econometric model that links the
consumption propensity of mobile voice service usage with the disposable income of
the users and the price of the product is applied. The results of this research indicate
that the adoption of high sector specific service taxes with the objective of increasing
government revenues creates an economic distortion that lowers service usage, shrinks
sector revenues, and, ultimately, jeopardizes the competitiveness of the mobile
telecommunications sector.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The telecommunications industry has evolved from several niche markets into a conditio sine qua non of modern
economies. It has particularly affected the quality and speed of information exchange and has effectively shaped the
capabilities of other industries. Telecommunications make a significant contribution to gross domestic product and
general economic welfare, both directly and through important positive externalities spreading to the rest of the economy
(Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, & Woessmann, 2011; Greenstein & McDevitt, 2009; Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2011;
Koutroumpis, 2009; Lehr, Gillett, Osorio, & Sirbu, 2005; Roeller & Waverman, 2001). Spillover effects have a measurable
impact on growth, which, compounded over time, can make a significant difference in overall wealth indicators (Katz,
Flores-Roux, & Mariscal, 2010). From a public policy perspective, telecommunications’ expansion and use has beneficial
effects to the economy and therefore the industry should – if not actively subsidized or promoted – be supported to extend
its reach and activities. Moreover, consumers facing the decision to adopt the new technologies or increase their use of
several telecom services should, at least, not be discouraged from doing so.
In practice, however, the opposite is frequently observed. Revenue collection is a costly business and the oligopolistic
structure of most telecom markets, especially in mobile telecoms, provides an easy way to achieve high returns from
ongoing consumer activity. Thus, taxing telecommunications firms provides an easy way of generating public revenue in

n
Correspondence to: Evelpidon 47a & Lefkados, 11362, Athens, Greece. Tel./fax: þ 30 210 8152898.
E-mail addresses: p.koutroumpis06@imperial.ac.uk (P. Koutroumpis), alekatsas@icap.gr (A. Lekatsas), giaglis@aueb.gr (G. Giaglis),
pkour@aueb.gr (P. Kourouthanasis).

0308-5961/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2011.06.005
682 P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688

an efficient manner. Although such taxation may seem inconsistent with government policies to promote broadband
adoption and telecom-led innovation, it is in fact a relatively common priority in the fiscal agenda. Telecommunications
services have negative price and positive income elasticities: an increase (decrease) in prices or a decrease (increase) in
disposable income results in lower (higher) demand. The repercussions of lower demand result in lower overall adoption
and usage, which may, in turn, negatively affect tax revenues, thus negating or even reversing the intended effects of
added taxation on public revenues.
In this study the effects of state tax policies on mobile service usage, prices and demand are measured. For this purpose,
data from the three major Greek mobile network operators for the period 2005–2010 are used, when two major tax
changes occurred. This view is also placed in an international perspective. The assumption of rigid demand elasticity is
econometrically tested in order to check for its validity, existence and significance. Moreover, the preferential treatment
for fixed line operators is examined – in a case of perfectly substitute services (mobile and fixed broadband) – and the
potentially distortionary effects of this policy on the industry are explored.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes different taxation regimes across the world. Section 3 sets out the
current macroeconomic conditions in the Greek market. In Section 4 our data sources and background information on
the Greek mobile market are shown. The model used and the results are also included in this section. A discussion of the
outcomes is presented in Section 5 and the conclusion in Section 6.

2. Background on mobile service taxation

While the operation of a state heavily depends on adequate funding, it is within its rightful discretion to plan, decide and
appropriate the industries, individuals or organizations that bear most of the burdens. Moreover, the various tax instruments that
can be imposed have a significant effect on incentivizing specific patterns of behavior. For example, increasing taxes on cigarettes
or alcoholic drinks has a multiple effect: first, it deters individuals from consuming those goods in order to reduce the risk of
adverse health complications, it protects other individuals (such as passive smokers or those subject to potentially violent
behavior of people under the influence of alcohol) and it limits the societal cost born on the health system; second, for the part of
the population that is addicted to alcohol or smoking, excessive taxes help maximize the returns from price-indifferent
individuals (Grossman, Sindelar, Mullahy, & Anderson 1993; Saffer & Chaloupka, 1994).
Along the same lines, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has been designed to limit environmental
pollution and also maximize public returns. Policy makers therefore incentivize an emission reduction attitude so that the
future of the environment and the economy is sustained (Convery & Redmond, 2007; Ellerman & Buchner, 2007).
Hence, in most cases tax collection is designed in a way that at least intends to either maximize public funding that is
socially beneficial or incentivize firms and individuals to adopt a pro bono behavior. Nevertheless, public policies are often
made without much recourse to economic reasoning. Policy makers may in practice be unaware of the exact effects of their
decisions, thus resulting in suboptimal outcomes or even distortions to free economic activity.
An illustrative example of a consumption deterring tax policy for mobile services has taken place in the Greek
telecommunications market where during the last five years (2005–2010) both ad valorem and usage-based taxes have
been constantly increasing. While a misallocation of excise taxes is economically irrelevant, provided the total tax between
merchants and consumers is constant, the imposition of usage-based levies has a direct effect on consumption (Rochet &
Tirole, 2004). Moreover, the price alterations of the service also affect demand in a dynamic context. Therefore, this study
is particularly interesting in terms of the effects of different policies on actual usage, state income and social welfare.
According to a recent GSMA report on mobile taxation (Katz et al., 2010), there are three different types of service
taxation imposed across the world on mobile markets. These are the following:

a. Value-added tax: Most countries impose some form of value-added tax, a general sales tax or similar consumption tax
as a percent of the total charges.
b. Telecom-specific taxes: Some countries charge an additional special communications tax as a percent of the service
charges.
c. Fixed taxes: In addition to the tax as a percentage of usage, some countries charge a fixed tax that could be driven by
either general communications usage or wireless usage.

Countries that intend to maximize tax revenues leverage mobile communications as a source of direct taxation, by
combining high value-added tax, high sector specific taxes and/or a fixed levy. Most developed and some developing
nations promote the quicker diffusion and use through reduced service taxes. Greece stands out as the only EU27 country
to breach this policy. Table 1 illustrates this finding.

3. Current setting in the Greek mobile market

While the global downturn hit the Greek economy in 2008, its effects were not significant until the second quarter of
2009. The country’s high level of public debt, combined with a large and growing budget deficit, eventually led to a joint
EU/ECB/IMF intervention in May 2010.
P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688 683

Table 1
Mobile tax schemes by country (adapted by Katz et al., 2010).

Continent Value-added tax Telecom-specific taxes Fixed taxes

Eastern Europe Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazkhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan Albania, Ukraine


Central and Western Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czeck Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Greece
Europe France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK

Table 2
Mobile sector performance after the recession.

Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010

Change in mobile service revenues, YoY (%)


EU average  0.8  1.6  2.6  2.8  2.6
Greece  3.4  3.5  9.2  11.6  11.5

Change in EBITDA, YoY (%)


EU average  1.1  0.6  0.9 1.0 0.6
Greece  9.6  15.2  21.3  18.5  19.6

The outlook for the immediate future appears no better due to the fiscal measures that are being taken, which directly
and indirectly affect personal income and demand. Such measures have significant side effects: for example, unemploy-
ment has already exceeded 15% in February 2011.
As part of the economy, the mobile telecoms sector has already been hit by this surrounding uncertainty in the
macroeconomic environment. Moreover, having reached saturation in terms of subscriber numbers, investments have
stagnated during the last years and are forecast to plummet by a third in 2011.
The financial performance of the mobile sector reflects the effects of the recession since mobile service revenues in
Greece dwindles almost four times faster than the EU average (Table 2). Moreover, the EBITDA of the sector in Europe seem
to turn to positive figures while in Greece they drop at almost 20% year on year.

4. Methodology and data

In this study quarterly observations for the period 2005–2010 are used from the dataset of Bank of America and Merrill
Lynch (2010). The variables of interest include pre- and post-paid mobile service charges adjusted by the respective
market shares of each operator. For this period, three operators (Cosmote, Vodafone and Wind) offered mobile services in
the Greek market. GDP per capita (GDPC) is used as an income proxy since micro information is unavailable.
Two major tax shocks took place in the Greek mobile market during the last years. In October 2006, the existing special
levy increased from approximately 2.5% of the service price to more than 5%. In September 2009, the special levy was
further increased to reach an average of 13% of the mobile service price (12% on pre-paid cards, which were taxed for
the first time, and 12% to 20% on post-paid contracts, depending on the monthly bill amount). To make matters worse, the
economic downturn critically affected the country, breaking a series of two decades of high growth and drastically
decreasing individual disposable income. At the same time, the base VAT rate (which is also applicable to mobile services)
increased from 18% in 2005 to 23% in 2010. VAT is raised not only on the industry’s value added but also on the special
levy. Fig. 1 illustrates these changes.
On the contrary, the base (pre-tax) prices for mobile services have consistently decreased during the same period. Fig. 2
shows this trend and the increasing chunk that taxes represent in the final price paid. Notably, the seasonal trend of the
pre-tax prices shows that mobile operators do not conform to a steady drop policy but tend to slightly increase pre-tax
prices in the third quarter of each year before further reducing them later. This is likely to be linked to marketing policies
and the seasonality of sales (summer holidays being with the third quarter).
The model used in the study is presented in Eq. (1). It is a classic linear model linking the consumption propensity based
on the disposable income and the price of the product.1
logðMinute_of_UseÞ ¼ a1 logðGDPCÞ þ a2 logðPriceÞ þ e ð1Þ
The mobile service price elasticity (a1 coefficient) was estimated at 1.645 and was found to be significant at the 1%
level, practically meaning that a 10% increase in mobile service charges results in 16.45% less usage. This may seem quite
large but reflects the effect of a price change in the mobile services market. In terms of income elasticity, the a2 coefficient

1
More information on the model can be found in the Appendix.
684 P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688

120 15%

100
10%

80 Levy Revenue
5% (m )

60
% Price from
0% Levy
40

-5% GDPC (% YoY)


20

0 -10%
2005q1
2005q2
2005q3
2005q4
2006q1
2006q2
2006q3
2006q4
2007q1
2007q2
2007q3
2007q4
2008q1
2008q2
2008q3
2008q4
2009q1
2009q2
2009q3
2009q4
2010q1
Fig. 1. Tax and recession ‘shocks’ in the Greek mobile market (left axis in h million).

0.3 30%

0.25 25%

0.2 20%
Price ( per
0.15 15% minute
before tax)

0.1 10%
% Total Tax
0.05 5%

0 0%
2005q1
2005q2
2005q3
2005q4
2006q1
2006q2
2006q3
2006q4
2007q1
2007q2
2007q3
2007q4
2008q1
2008q2
2008q3
2008q4
2009q1
2009q2
2009q3
2009q4
2010q1

Fig. 2. Pre-tax price decrease in the mobile market (left axis in h million).

was estimated equal to 1.213 (at the 5% level). This in turn suggests that for example, the effect of the 4.52% economic
downturn,2 and therefore GDPC, in 2010, would result in 5.48% decrease in mobile services usage.

5. Effects of the recession and taxation policies on corporate and tax revenues

In this section the results of the econometric model are used to develop scenarios assessing the effect of tax changes on
the mobile sector and public revenues. In these scenarios, several parameters are taken into account. First, the GDPC, VAT
and the pre-tax average revenue per minute (ARPM) are assumed to be constant at Q1 2011 levels. Therefore, any change
in the taxation, materialized in the scenarios as a decrease in the special levy, cascades to the after-tax ARPM and therefore
to the overall use of the mobile services—as shown from the model in the previous section. Corporate revenues are
affected due to the change in mobile service use. These in turn affect corporate tax revenues and, ultimately, public
revenues. Table 3 illustrates the base scenario used (data as of Q1 2011) and three different scenarios on the expected
effects of special levy decreases (decreases of 25%, 50% and 100%).
Aside from the direct effects of changing or abolishing the special levy on the companies and state revenue shown in
Table 3, there are also significant indirect effects on tax revenues and the broader economy. These effects are caused by the
tax’s impact on the usage of the industry’s services and by extension in the industry’s contribution in GDP, employment
and direct taxes.

2
Eurostat Flash Report (35/2011). Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-03032011-BP/EN/2-03032011-BP-EN.PDF.
P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688 685

Table 3
Scenarios: Tax decreases and their effects on corporate and tax revenues.

Base scenario (Q1 2011) 25% Decrease in special levy 50% Decrease in special levy Special levy abolition

GDPC h19,170
VAT 23%
ARPM (pre-tax) h0.1050
% Levy/price 12.92 9.69 6.46 –
ARPM (post-tax) h0.1458 h0.1417 h0.1375 h0.1292
% Change ARPM  2.86  5.72  11.44
Minutes of use 128.7 137 145.3 161.8
Corporate income (k h) h3,012,726 h3,206,961 h3,401,197 h3,789,667
% Change corporate revenue 6.4 12.9 25.8
Tax revenue (k h) h1,171,673 h1,119,809 h1,052,513 h871,623
% Change tax revenue  4.4%  10.2%  25.6%

%GDP mobile sector contribution

4 1.89% 2.0%

% GDP mobile sector contribution


1.69%
Public revenes in Euro (billions)

1.60%
1.50%
3 1.5%

1.996 1.909 1.912 1.900 1.840


2 1.0%

1 0.5%

0 0.0%
Base Scenario Levy -25% Levy -50% Levy -100%
Fig. 3. Industry’s contribution to GDP and public revenues by scenario.

In 2009 the Greek mobile industry’s contribution to national GDP, including the supply chain of operators, reached
1.81%.3 This estimate excludes externalities and spillover effects and captures the supply side contribution of the sector.
The magnitude of the network effects of the mobile sector to the Greek economy has been estimated at approximately
4.97% (Qiang & Rossotto, 2009). Its direct effects on job creation (including indirect and multiplier effects) were estimated
at 80,000 jobs. Total public revenues, including social security contributions, from the industry came close to h2 billion.4
According to the base scenario, the existing macroeconomic conditions (special levy at current levels, VAT at 23% and a
GDP per capita fall of 4%), lead to a reduction in the mobile market contribution of 0.31% GDP, almost 17,000 less jobs
and a drop of h70 million in public revenues.
Following these effects, three scenarios are introduced that either reduce or abolish the special levy, and find important
improvements in the industry’s contribution to GDP and employment with minimal losses in public revenues. Regarding
public revenues, the decline of direct tax inflows (from the special levy and the VAT that is raised on the special levy) is
compensated to a large degree by an inflow from other sources of tax revenues as a result of the increased usage of the
mobile industry’s services.
These revenue sources are the VAT, corporate and personal income taxes, the corporate profit taxes and social security
contributions. The dynamic effects of the change in the industry’s GDP in the national GDP per capita are also taken into
account and therefore, using the mobile telecoms income elasticity of demand, on the usage of the industry’s services, its
revenues and taxes paid. Finally, it is worth mentioning that VAT revenues include revenues from terminals and other
services (non-voice).
As shown in Fig. 3, abolishing the special levy altogether results in a net loss of h77 million in public revenues, from
h1918 million to h1849 million; a net loss of only h8 million if the levy is cut in half and a net gain of h3 million in case the
levy is decreased by 25%. These estimates do not take into account the progressive nature of direct taxation and therefore
may underestimate the increase of revenues from income taxes.

3
ICAP and AUEB (2009).
4
The actual estimate was at h1996 million.
686 P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688

Fig. 4. Public revenues from the mobile telecoms industry depending on the level of the special levy.

The limited losses in public revenues from the reduction or abolition of the special levy have to be compared with the
gains in GDP and employment. As shown in the Fig. 3, reductions in the special levy will have significant effects in
the national GDP. Moreover, the effects of the sector on total factor productivity that have frequently been found in the
literature have not been incorporated in the analysis (Maliranta & Rouvinen, 2006).
It is also noteworthy that the gap between the abolition of the special levy and the base scenario in the industry’s
contribution to GDP is comparable with the expected growth of the entire economy in the 5-year period of 2010–2015
(IMF forecast5), which is estimated at 0.24% annually (or 1.2% for the whole 5-year period).
The effect of the reduction or elimination of the special levy on employment is also significant. The existence of the
special levy costs 16 thousand jobs in the sector (the gap between the base scenario and the abolition of the special levy).
In an attempt to identify the level of the special levy that optimizes total tax revenues from the industry it is found that
this level is approximately 20% below its current rates, while small net increases in public revenues occur even if the
special levy is reduced by 35%. Fig. 4 is quite enlightening. It presents the level of public revenues by category and their
change from the base scenario, depending on the percentage change of the special levy from its current rates (the range is
from þ100% to 100%).

6. Conclusion

In terms of public policy, this paper raises a highly topical issue. The redesign of tax measures in the telecommunica-
tions sector, especially within a Eurozone framework, has to follow a future proof path that allows the industry, the
countries and the union to prosper. Making the locally optimal or short-term public policy choices with the hope of finding
the global optimum has some well known cases of failure (in optimization algorithm theory and the economy) and may
even produce (in optimization theory) the unique worst possible solution. To make matters worse, greedy algorithms, like
the ones followed in the mobile sector case for the Greek economy, appear to work in optimal substructures, a case not
applicable to debt-ridden Eurozone economies. While the value of this analysis has some clear quantified indications on
the lack of insight in certain policy decisions made during the last years, this situation is far from an exception.
In this study an econometric model was developed that links the consumption propensity of mobile voice service usage
based on the disposable income and the price of the product. The model applies to the Greek mobile telecommunications
sector and aims to illustrate the effect of the special levy imposed on the mobile service price per minute. To examine the
effects of the special levy on the mobile sector’s competitiveness and overall contribution in the Greek economy a
scenario-based analysis was performed taking into account the economic indices for the year 2010.
The results of this research indicate that the adoption of high sector specific service taxes with the objective of
increasing government revenues creates an economic distortion that lowers service usage, shrinks sector revenues, and,

5
IMF Country Report No. 10/110. Retrieved from: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10110.pdf.
P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688 687

ultimately, jeopardizes the competitiveness of the Greek mobile telecommunications sector. According to this analysis, the
direct effects of the levy lead to decrease of corporate revenues by 20%, while government taxes increase by 14%.
Nevertheless, it has severe indirect effects on employment and contribution of the telecommunications sector to the GDP.
Indeed, the special levy costs 17,000 jobs in the sector and decreases the contribution of the sector to the GDP by almost
a fifth.
An abolishment of the levy will have profound beneficial effects for the sector. Service usage will increase by a fourth, 15,000
new jobs will be created and the sector contribution to the GDP will increase by 26%. While direct government revenues will be
reduced, most of this loss will be offset by an indirect increase of other government revenues (e.g. value-added tax revenues and
social security contributions). Hence, the net decrease of government revenues is estimated to 6.8%. However, even this decrease
may be offset by contributions to productivity and spillover effects to other sectors of the economy.

Appendix

Model and results

The econometric model developed in this study delves into the effects of price/tax alterations on mobile voice services
only (in other words, mobile data services are not included). The normalized per minute cost was taken into account as the
benchmark variable that affects subscriber behavior. Moreover, for the voice charges the final cost paid by subscribers is
used (including VAT and all levies) since it is the total cost, not the pre-tax figures, that affect consumer behavior. The
variables used are presented in Table A.1.
Mobile service per minute prices can also be related to interconnection prices, market competition, subscriber
saturation and taxes. Interconnection charges have steadily dropped during the sample period and therefore may
contribute to the effects of price changes in the mobile market. However, market conditions in terms of competition and
saturation have been constant for the same period. Taxes have significantly changed during the same time.
The possibility of reverse causality from mobile usage to GDPC can be raised in this model. This observation relates
mostly to infrastructure investments, as it has been raised in several studies (Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2011; Roeller &
Waverman, 2001), which has remained constant during the last five years in the Greek market. Nevertheless, the
externalities that still exist in the market may affect the findings.
Coefficient a1 represents the income elasticity and a2 the price elasticity. The model included operator, year and quarter
effects to account for unobserved effects not captured by the model. The results are presented in Table A.2.

Table A.1
Variables included in the model.

Variables Description

Minutes_of_Uset Total mobile minutes of use


GDPCt GDP per capita (constant h prices)
Priceit Mobile service price per minute for pre and
post-paid use (including special levy and VAT)

Table A.2
Model results.

Minutes_of_Use (1)

Log(GDPC) 1.213** [0.569]


Log(Price)  1.645***[0.276]
Constant  1.021 [4.904]

Operator effects Yes


Year effects Yes
Quarter effects Yes

Obs. 63
R-sq 0.95
Clusters 3 (21)

GLS fixed effects estimation with operator, year and quarter fixed effects. Standard errors
reported in brackets. Asterisks ** and *** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1%,
respectively.
688 P. Koutroumpis et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 681–688

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