MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

March 27, 2000 G.R. No. 135962

Facts: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati
City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice
dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular
traffic starting January 2, 1996.

Actions Filed:
BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing,
trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati
by ordinance.
MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

Issues: 1) Whether MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
2) Whether the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order
the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic.

Held: 1) The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power.

2) The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err
in so ruling.

The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
 Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following
conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a
commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for
patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar
eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or
independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a
prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and
eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind
lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a

complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in
its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19,
1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit
effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise
of police power, in the grant of business permits

Held: NO. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond
cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised
in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process
and equal protection of the law. In the case under consideration, the business permit granted
by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees
with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority
in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or
ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the
imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid
exercise of police power. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to
issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the
State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through
the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.
 Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction
No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to
procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or
is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft,
which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned
in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral
because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P
56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists
who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to
the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning
device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee
of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.

Issue: Whether the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is
unconstitutional

Held: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are
constitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to
promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the
resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on
traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing
number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.
 Jejomar C. Binay v. Eufemio domingo
GR No. 92389, 1991-09-11
Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality... approved Resolution No. 60 Burial
Assistance Program. Bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other
requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the
Municipality of Makati. The municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. Resolution
No. 60 was referred to Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit.
Respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of
funds for the implementation thereof. Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners Mayor
Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent. Petitioner averred that Resolution No. 60 and the
intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power' and 'parens patriae'.

Issue: Whether the Resolution is valid.

Held: YES. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in
their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It...
extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost
every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is
especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions
which exist so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the... preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation

Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate
the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice.
 Quezon City v. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such,
the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial
ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions
not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts
the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue: Whether section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power.

Held: NO. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power. An
examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that
would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee,
and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in
the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The
ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery.

in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
 PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm “engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,” challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of “GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS”.

Specifically, the measure is assailed for “discrimination against males or females” that it “does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills”, that it
is violative of the right to travel.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of
the POEA invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether D.O. No.1 in the nature of a police power measure is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The concept of police power is it is the authority of the State to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” It may
be consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, and (2) in order to foster the
common good.

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties “Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s will.” It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the sordid tales of maltreatment suffered
by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government’s efforts.

Petition is dismissed.
 Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A Prohibiting the interprovincial transport of carabaos. A
case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Whether E.O. 626-A unconstitutional.

Held: YES. The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process
 Ramon Fabie v. City of Manila
G.R. No. L-6583 February 16, 1912
Facts: On September 21, 1909 the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 124, which is an
amendment of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, enacted June 13,
1908 relating to the issuance of permits for the erection of buildings. Sec. 107 of the of the said
ordinance provides: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially approved."

Ramon Fabie, et al sought to obtain a building permit authorizing the construction of a small
nipa house upon the their property which forms a part of Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa in
the City of Manila. Their application was denied on the ground that the site of the proposed
building did not conform to the requirements of section 107.

The appellees contend that the provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental
rights of the property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of
these Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion of their
property rights without due process of law. The lower court ruled in their favor and declared the
ordinance null and void, at least to the extent of the above-cited provision.

Issue: Whether the Sec. 107 of the amended Ordinance No. 124 is constitutional.

Held: YES. The court held that purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly
to protect and secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages
of fire and disease. The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings within the
city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley
which has been officially approved," is in our opinion reasonably necessary to secure the end in
view.

There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the ordinance under
discussion. It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of
Manila generally and was not conceived in favor of any class or of particular individuals. Those
charged with the public welfare and safety of the city deemed the enactment of the ordinance
necessary to secure these purposes, and it cannot be doubted that if its enactment was
reasonably necessary to that end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power.

The court opined that that the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the public
good, and that it should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the people is the
highest law" (salus populi suprema est lex).

We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing: "That the building shall
abut or face upon a public street or alley which has been officially approved," is valid, and that
the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, without special condemnation of costs