COMMUNICATIONS MATERLS AND DESIGN, INC., v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ITEC INTERNATIONAL, G.R.

No. 102223

FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE
INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC,
INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines.

ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as “Representative Agreement”. Pursuant to the
contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its “exclusive representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s
products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a “License
Agreement” entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name
“ITEC” in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC
(Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties’ Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the
same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their
agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using
knowledge and information of ITEC’s products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and
product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC’s own, and offering them to ITEC’s former
customer.

The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is
simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the principle of “forum
non conveniens”. The MTD was denied.

Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner corp, despite allegations
of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non
convenience?

HELD: petition dismissed.

1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been “engaged in” or “doing business” in the
Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and
agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements,
with these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not
authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and
benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality
of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the
doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to
deny its corporate existence and capacity.

In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used scheme of
defaulting local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in
business in the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously,
the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner
from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary arrangements between the parties.

2. YES; Petitioner’s insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of
the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play.
According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give
cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This
argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit,
by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty
to question plaintiff’s standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the
Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case,
whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience. Hence,
the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction.
Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met:

1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts;
and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court’s disposition to give due course to
the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the “most convenient” as a ground for
the suit’s dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,
in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureauin Manila,
three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son, Mychal, to visit the cities of
Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changed their
itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding
boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but were denied
boarding because the flight was overbooked. The CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to comply
with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not
complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on
Oversales of the USA.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD: No. According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a contract is
made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,obligation and interpretation
shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is
different from the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contract
of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s
agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,however, such fact did not change
the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

Boman Environmental Development v Court of Appeals

Nilcar Fajilan was a stockholder and the president of Boman Environmental Development
Corporation (Boman). In 1984, he wrote a letter to the Board tendering his resignation and
his offer to sell his shareholdings for P300k. The Board accepted the resignation as well as
his offer to sell. The Board advised Fajilan that Boman will be paying the shares in
installment. Fajilan is to transfer the shares upon completion of payment. Boman paid the
first two P50k installments but defaulted in paying the remaining P200k. Fajilan then sued
Boman in the RTC of Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction.
HELD: No. This is an intra-corporate dispute and as such the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has jurisdiction. This case involves an intra-corporate controversy
because the parties are a stockholder and the corporation. Fajilan is still a stockholder.
There has been no actual transfer of his shares to the corporation. In the books of the
corporation he is still a stockholder. Fajilan’s suit against the corporation to enforce the
latter’s promissory note or compel the corporation to pay for his shareholdings is cognizable
by the SEC alone which shall determine whether such payment will not constitute a
distribution of corporate assets to a stockholder in preference over creditors of the
corporation. The SEC has exclusive supervision, control and regulatory jurisdiction to
investigate whether the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings to cover the payment
for the shares, and whether the purchase is for a legitimate corporate purpose.
NOTE: This is a 1988 case, now the RTC has expanded jurisdiction. Some RTCs are
granted special jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate disputes.

Tolentino v sec of finance 235 scra 630

FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling
price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base
of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.

The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition of VAT
on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate
the constitutional provision of “non-impairment of contracts.”

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contract clause
under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the
sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law
would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract
but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the
exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only
are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth,
the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this
claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be
made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive
aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the
enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes - beyond
those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the principle of
separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the
free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive,
oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause
are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES,
REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
 Facts:

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the
Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his
employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a
vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National
Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from
petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the
law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot
take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Board’s
Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay
jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same
decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

Held:

The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line
of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of
employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section
5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondent’s husband states that In the
event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due
to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If such
illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be
terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such
illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation
shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of
the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and
resolved in favor of labor.

SANTOS III v. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES

o INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty

commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force
and effect of law in this country.
o INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international
transportations of persons by aircraft for hire." Whether the transportation is "international"
is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket.
When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between
certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the
provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and
liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
o INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-
vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the
place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this
 expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of
carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place
where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest

Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota,
U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In
December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued
NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the
constitution so as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile
of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of
business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place
of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as
the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was
concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The
Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on
October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9,
1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951.
On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every
article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic
of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine

government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of

persons performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation"
shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be
a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the

parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage
provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated
terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the
Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the
airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the
United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the
four places where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a

dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in
accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the
jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable
domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined
will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the
law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was
Manila?
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is
determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the
ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket
shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return
flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA
was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should
therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping
place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for
purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure
and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression
indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of
carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate
place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so

ordered.

American Airlines Vs. CA 327 SCRA 482

Facts:

Private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila conjunction tickets from
Manila-Singapore-Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-New York. In
Geneva, he decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen and go straight to New York. In the absence
of a direct flight under his conjunction tickets from Geneva to New York, he exchanged the
unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a one way ticket from Geneva to New York from
American Airlines, which issued its own ticket to respondent in Geneva and claimed the value of
the unused portion of the conjunction ticket from the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) clearing house in Geneva. In September, 1989, respondent filed an action for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he
suffered at the Geneva Airport when American Airline’s security officers prevented him from
boarding the plane.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of American Airlines of a new ticket in exchange of the
conjunction ticket the respondent purchased in Manila bar him from seeking recourse in
Philippine courts.

Ruling:
The petitioner contends that under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, action for damages
may only be brought upon the following courst:

a.) Domicile of the carrier

b.) Carrier’s principal place of business
c.) Place where carrier has a place of business
d.) Place of destination

Since neither of these elements is present in the case, the petitioner contends that plaintiff
cannot file the case in the Philippines. He further posits that the second contract cannot be
deemed as an extension of the first as the petitioner airline is not a participating airline in any of
the destinations under the first contract.

Respondent on the other hand contends that the second contract she entered into at Geneva is
part and parcel of the first contract, thus the third option under Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention would apply to him. He further pointed out that petitioner cannot deny the contract
of agency with Singapore Airlines after it honored the conjunction ticketsissued by the latter.

The court ruled that petitioner’s argument is void of merit with reference to Article 1(3) of the
Warsaw Convention. According to the said article, transportation to be performed by
several carriers shall be deemed as one and undivided. The number of tickets issued does not
detract from the oneness of the contract of carriage. Hence, the third option of the plaintiff under
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is clothed with jurisdiction.

PAL vs. Savillo et. al.

FACTS: Private respondent Simplicio was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors
Annual Golf Tournament held in Jakarta, Indonesia. Heand several companions decided to
purchase their respective passenger tickets from PAL with the following points of passage:
MANILA-SINGAPORE-JAKARTA-SINGAPORE-MANILA. Private respondent and his
companions were made to understand by PAL that its plane wouldtake them from Manila to
Singapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from Singapore to Jakarta.Upon arrival in
Singaore, Griño and his companions proceeded to the Singapore Airlines office to check-in for
their flight to Jakarta howeverSingapore Airlines rejected the tickets because they were not
endorsed by PAL. It was explained that if Singapore Airlines honored the ticketswithout PAL’s
endorsement, PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage. Griño tried to contact
PAL’s office at the airport but it wasclosed. Eventually, Griño and his companions were forced
to purchase tickets from Garuda Airlines and board its last flight bound for Jakarta andthey had
to arrange for their transportation to the hotel at a very late hour.Upon his return to the
Philippines, Griño sent demand letters seeking compensation for moral damages to PAL and to
Singapore Airlines. However,both airlines disowned liability and blamed each other for the
fiasco. Later, Griño filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC.PAL filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that the Warsaw Convention, particularly Article 29 thereof, governed this case,
as it provides that any claimfor damages in connection with the international transportation of
persons is subject to the prescription period of two years. Since the Complaint wasfiled more
than three years after PAL received the demand letter on, it was already barred by
prescription.The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and maintained that the provisions of the
Civil Code and other pertinent laws of the Philippines, not theWarsaw Convention, were
applicable to the present case. The CA likewise dismissed the petition filed by PAL and applied
Article 1144 of the CivilCode, which allowed for a ten-year prescription period.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Warsaw Convention are applicable in this case

RULING: NO. The Warsaw Convention does not "exclusively regulate" the relationship
between passenger and carrier on an internationalflight. In United Airlines v. Uy, this Court
distinguished between the (1) damage to the passenger’s baggage and (2) humiliation he suffered
at thehands of the airline’s employees. The first cause of action was covered by the Warsaw
Convention which prescribes in two years, while the secondwas covered by the provisions of the
Civil Code on torts, which prescribes in four years.In the case at hand, Singapore Airlines barred
private respondent from boarding the Singapore Airlines flight because PAL allegedly failed
toendorse the tickets of private respondent and his companions, despite PAL’s assurances to
respondent that Singapore Airlines had already confirmedtheir passage. While this fact still
needs to be heard and established by adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these
allegations will notfall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the part
of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract ofcarriage but days before the
scheduled flight. Thus, the present action cannot be dismissed based on the statute of limitations
provided under Article29 of the Warsaw Convention.These claims are covered by the Civil Code
provisions on tort, and not within the purview of the Warsaw Convention.

Hence, the applicableprescription period is that provided under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code:Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:(1) Upon an injury to
the rights of the plaintiff;(2) Upon a quasi-delict.

Griño’s Complaint was filed with the RTC on 15 August 1997, which was less than four years
since PAL received his extrajudicial demand on 25January 1994. Thus, Griño’s claims have not
yet prescribed and PAL’s Motion to Dismiss must be denied.

Edna Diago Lhuillier vs British AirwaysGR 171092 March 15, 2010

FACTS:

On February 28, 2005, petitioner Lhuillier took respondent British Airways’s flight 548 from
London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy.Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday,
one of the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage inthe
overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically
remarked that "If I were to help all 300passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another
flightattendant, Nickolas Kerrigan, singled her out from among all the passengers in the business
class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly,Kerrigan made her appear to the other
passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and
regulations ofthe plane.Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent’s ground
manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flightstewards were
"only doing their job;” prompting petitioner to file herein complaint for damages. On April 28,
2005, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against respondent before the RTC of Makati
City. Respondent filed a Motion toDismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and
over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London,United
Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the
Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides that:“An action for damages must be
brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his
principalplace of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has
been made, or before the court of the place of destination.

”Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the
tortious conduct committed by airline personnel ofrespondent in violation of the provisions of
the Civil Code on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract
ofcarriage, petitioner asserts that she has the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction
pursuant to Philippine laws. In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioner’s claim for damages
fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such, thesame can only be
filed before the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.The RTC dismissed the case
hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed
against a Filipino citizen and resident by an airlinepersonnel of a foreign carrier.

HELD: NO. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country. In Santos III v. NOA we held that: The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation byAir,
otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The
Convention was concurred in by the Senate,through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The
Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino onOctober 13, 1950,
and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to thePhilippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formaladherence thereto, “to the end that
the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by
theRepublic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.”The Convention is thus a treaty
commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and
effect of law in thiscountry. The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the
alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom andItaly, which are both
signatories to the Warsaw Convention. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:“1. This
Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by
aircraft for reward. It applies equally togratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air
transport undertaking.“2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international
carriage" means any carriage in which, according to the contract madeby the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a
transhipment, aresituated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within
the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is anagreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even
though thatPower is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping
place between territories subject to the sovereignty,suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same
High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this
Convention.(Emphasis supplied)”Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination
in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High ContractingParties, said
carriage is deemed an "international carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to herein
(UK and Italy) were the signatories to theWarsaw Convention and those which subsequently
adhered to it. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the
actionfor damages before –1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;

3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London,
United Kingdom with London as its principal place ofbusiness. Hence, under the first and second
jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United
Kingdom.In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and
respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy.Consequently, under the third
jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in
Italy. Finally, both thepetitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy,
which is properly designated given the routing presented in the saidpassenger ticket and baggage
check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus
find that the RTC ofMakati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by
the petitioner.

Cheesman vs. IAC

(1991)
FACTS: Thomas Cheesman (an American) was married to a Filipina, Criselda. The spouses later separated; but
Thomas brought this action to annul the sale of real property made by Criselda in favor of Padilla. He alleged
that the sale is void for lack of his consent. The property sold was bought by Criselda using her personal funds,
and was registered in her name only.

HELD: The sale was valid. He has no capacity to question the sale of the property by his wife on the theory that
in doing so he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. This would
permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord to the alien husband an interest and right over the land, which is not granted to him under
the Constitution.