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China v America

The end of engagement

How the world’s two superpowers have become rivals

Print e dition | Le ade rs

Oct 18th 2018

F
or the past quarter century America’s approach to China has been
founded on a belief in convergence. Political and economic integration
would not just make China wealthier, they would also make it more liberal,
pluralistic and democratic. T here were crises, such as a face-off in the
T aiwan Strait in 1996 or the downing of a spy-plane in 2001. But America
cleaved to the conviction that, with the right incentives, China would
eventually join the world order as a “responsible stakeholder”.

T oday convergence is dead. America has come to see China as a strategic

rival—a malevolent actor and a rule-breaker (see Briefing). T he T rump
administration accuses it of interfering in America’s culture and politics, of
stealing intellectual property and trading unfairly, and of seeking not just
leadership in Asia, but also global dominance. It condemns China’s record
on human rights at home and an aggressive expansion abroad. T his month
Mike Pence, the vice-president, warned that China was engaged in a
“whole-of-government” offensive. His speech sounded ominously like an
early bugle-call in a new cold war.

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Late st storie s
Is eco no mic wa r lo o ming between Sa udi Ara bia a nd America ?
T HE EC O NO MIS T EXPLAINS

T he Britis h Mus eum’ s new Is la mic wo rld g a llery is a triumph

PRO S PERO

Demo cra ts a re winning vo ters ’ wa llets —a nd perha ps their hea rts a s well
GRAPHIC DET AIL
 GRAPHIC DET AIL

See mo re

Do not presume that Mr Pence and his boss, President Donald T rump, are
alone. Democrats and Republicans are vying to outdo each other in bashing
China. Not since the late 1940s has the mood among American businessfolk,
diplomats and the armed forces swung so rapidly behind the idea that the
United States faces a new ideological and strategic rival.

At the same time, China is undergoing its own change of heart. Chinese
strategists have long suspected that America has secretly wanted to block
their country’s rise. T hat is partly why China sought to minimise
confrontation by “hiding its strengths and biding its time”. For many
Chinese the financial crisis of 2008 swept aside the need for humility. It set
America back while China thrived. President Xi Jinping has since promoted
his “Chinese Dream” of a nation that stands tall in the world. Many Chinese
see America as a hypocrite that commits all the sins it accuses China of. T he
time to hide and bide is over.

T his is deeply alarming. According to thinkers such as Graham Allison of

Harvard University, history shows how hegemons like the United States and
rising powers like China can become locked into a cycle of belligerent
rivalry.

America fears that time is on China’s side. T he Chinese economy is growing

more than twice as fast as America’s and the state is pouring money into
advanced technology, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing
and biotech. Action that is merely daunting today—to stem the illegal
acquisition of intellectual property, say, or to challenge China in the South
China Sea—may be impossible tomorrow. Like it or not, the new norms
governing how the superpowers will treat each other are being established
now. Once expectations have been set, changing them again will be hard.
For the sake of mankind, China and America need to come to a peaceful
understanding. But how?

Mr T rump and his administration have got three things right. T he first is
that America needs to be strong. It has toughened the rules on takeovers, to
give more weight to national security. It has extradited an alleged Chinese
intelligence officer from Belgium. It has increased military spending
(though the extra money going to Europe still dwarfs that going to the
Pacific). And it has just boosted foreign aid in order to counter lavish
Chinese investment abroad (see article).

Mr T rump is also right that America needs to reset expectations about

Chinese behaviour. T oday’s trading system fails to prevent China’s state-
backed firms from blurring the line between commercial interests and the
national interest. Government money subsidises and protects companies as
they buy up dual-use technology or skew international markets. China has
used its state-directed commercial clout in smaller countries to influence
foreign policy in, say, the European Union. T he West needs transparency
about the funding of political parties, think-tanks and university
departments.

T hird, Mr T rump’s unique ability to signal his disregard for conventional

wisdom seems to have been effective. He is not subtle or consistent, but as
with Canadian and Mexican trade, American bullying can lead to
dealmaking. China will not be so easily pushed around—its economy
depends less on exports to America than Canada’s and Mexico’s do and Mr
Xi cannot afford meekly to disavow his Chinese Dream in front of his people.
Yet Mr T rump’s willingness to disrupt and offend has already wrong-footed
China’s leaders, who thought they could count on America being unwilling
to rock the boat.

For what comes next, however, Mr T rump needs a strategy, not just tactics. A
starting point must be to promote America’s values. Mr T rump acts as if he
believes that might is right. He shows a cynical disdain for the values
America enshrined in global institutions after the second world war. If he
follows that course America will be diminished as an idea and as a moral
and political force. When America competes with China as a guardian of a
rules-based order, it starts from a position of strength. But any Western
democracy that enters a ruthless race to the bottom with China will—and
should—lose.

T he strategy should leave room for China to rise peacefully—which

inevitably also means allowing China to extend its influence. T hat is partly
because a zero-sum attempt at containment is likely to lead to conflict. But
it is also because America and China need to co-operate despite their
rivalry. T he two countries are more commercially intertwined than America
and the Soviet Union ever were. And they share responsibilities including—
even if Mr T rump denies it—the environment and security interests, such as
the Korean peninsula.

And America’s strategy must include the asset that separates it most clearly
from China: alliances. In trade, for example, Mr T rump should work with the
eu and Japan to press China to change. In defence Mr T rump should not only
abandon his alliance-bashing but bolster old friends, like Japan and
Australia, while nurturing new ones, like India and Vietnam. Alliances are
America’s best source of protection against the advantage China will reap
from its increasing economic and military power.

Perhaps it was inevitable that China and America would end up rivals. It is
not inevitable that rivalry must lead to war.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "China v America"

Print e dition | Le ade rs

Oct 18th 2018

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 China v America
The end of engagement
How the world’s two superpowers have become rivals

T HE ECO NO MIS T EXPLAINS

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