INTRODUCTION TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INCIDENT

EXPERIENCE AND LESSON LEARNED

FROM THE CRISIS
SEPTEMBER, 2012
CABINET COUNSELLOR,
G OV E R N M E N T O F JA PA N
K AT S U R O N A G A I
AGENDA OF TODAY’S PRESENTATION

The context of the crisis

Emergency preparedness and contingency management

The media reaction and strategic communication

*This presentation partly contains personal opinions/observations.

 UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE FOR JAPAN
The Great East Earthquakes
Earthquakes
Fukushima Dai-ni NPP Main shock
•Magnitude : 9.0 (Mar. 11th 2011)
Aftershocks
•Magnitude 7 or greater : 6 times
•Magnitude 6 or greater : 97 times
•Magnitude 5 or greater : 594 times
Source:
(As of Feb 28th 2012)
www.tepco.co.jp

Casualties
•Dead : over 15,800
•Missing: over 3,200
•Injured: over 6,000 (As of Feb 2012)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP

Enormous earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident

Source: 3
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
www.tepco.co.jp
SATELLITE VIEW OF FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NPP
＃4 R/B ＃3 R/B ＃2 R/B
＃1 R/B

＃4 T/B ＃3 T/B ＃2 T/B ＃1 T/B

Before the earthquake

Source: Google Earth
Many structures
After the earthquake (before explosion) facing the bay are
destroyed

4
Source: Google Earth
 MAJOR ROOT CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE
Grid Line
Note:
-All operating units when
earthquake occurred were
automatically shut down. ① Loss of offsite power
-Emergency Diesel Generators due to the earthquake
(D/G) have worked properly
until the Tsunami attack.

Tsunami (estimated more than 10m) Reactor

Building
Turbine
Building

D/G

Elevation: ② D/G Inoperable due to Tsunami flood

about 10m
Seawater level ①＋② ⇒ Station Black Out

All Motor Operated pumps (including ECCS

1 5
Seawater Pump pumps) became inoperable
 HYDROGEN EXPLOSIONS IN THE OPERATION FLOORS

Unit 1 Unit 4
Unit 3

Photo: Fukushima Central Television

Source: TEPCO
Accumulation of
Plaster
board

Hydrogen Explosion
Reinforced
Concrete

6
Reactor building Reactor building
 MAJOR CHRONOLOGY (MARCH 11TH TO 14TH)
m/d Time Situational developments and Public messaging
14:46 Earthquake
15:42 Report to the government
19:03 Declare the Nuclear Emergency 6,000 people
3/11
Establishment of the Emergency government HQ evacuated
20:50 Fukushima Governor Instruction(2km Evac) in 3hours.
21:23 Prime Minister Instruction(1F 3km Evac)
00:30 Completion of 3km Instruction
05:44 Prime Minister Instruction(1F 10km Evac)
07:45 Prime Minister Instruction (2F 3km Evac)
3/12
15:36 Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 1 78,200people
evacuated
17:39 Prime Minister Instruction (2F 10km Evac)
about 4days.
18:25 Prime Minister Instruction (1F 20km Evac) (3/15 23:30)
3/13 11:01 Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 3
3/14 06:00 Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 4

7
Chief Cabinet Secretary Press conference：7times/2Days
 CURRENT STATUS OF FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI RESTORATION
Step 2 targets have been achieved
 A condition equivalent to cold shut down
 More stable cooling fuel pool
 Reduction of total amount of accumulated
radioactive water
 Prevent contamination in the ocean
 Prevent scattering of radioactive materials
 Sufficient reduction of radiation dose
 Prevent further disasters
 Enhancement of Environmental
Improvement / Healthcare
 Systematic staff training and
personnel allocation

Source: December 16, 2011 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Government-

TEPCO Integrated Response Office
AGENDA OF TODAY’S PRESENTATION

The context of the crisis

Emergency preparedness and contingency management

The media reaction and strategic communication

 THE CBRN EQUATION

Differences in Four Dimension

Big city Rural areas

○ Preparation
○ Preparation
△ Specialist
Nuclear power plant ○ Specialist
○ Evacuation
location area × Evacuation
＜Accident of
Fukushima Daiichi＞
× Preparation
△ Specialist × Preparation
Non-Nuclear power
× Evacuation × Specialist
plant location area ＜possible nuclear △ Evacuation
terrorism case＞
10
 MODEL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

MEDIA
Cabinet Information Center
Prime Minister
Report Chief Cabinet Secretary

MINISTRIES Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries

Report
/AGENCIES
Deputy CCS Press
Direction
Assistant CCS Office
Gathering
Cabinet Councilor Report
Direction Report
Delivering information
Crisis Management
Center Call center
Medical office
Emergency responders
Emergency Assembly Team Responses
From
Emergency residents

Residents
11
Evacuation
 Experience of Fukushima-daiichi
(Planned Communication)

Flow of information to the public

Alert
Local government

J-Alert 3km
Telephone
FAX
Police cars
Off-site center
Office staff Evacuation site

Government HP, Twitter, Facebook Evacuees

General public
Media TV, Radio 12
 Experience of Fukushima-daiichi
(Actual Communication)

Flow of information to the public

Alert
Local government

J-Alert 20km
Telephone
FAX
Police cars
Off-site center
Office staff Evacuation site
Newsletter
Handbook
Government HP, Twitter, Facebook Evacuees
General public
Media TV, Radio 13
International community
 EXPERIENCE OF FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI
(EVACUATION)
Deliberate area
22/April Restricted area
22/April

Deliberate area
Restricted area 20km Evacuation
18:25 12/March

10km Evacuation
5:44 12/March
2F 8km Reduction
21/April 3km Evacuation
21:23 11/March
2F 10km Evacuation
17:39 12/March

2F 3km Evacuation
14
7:45 12/March
 EXPERIENCE OF FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI
(EVACUATION)
An extraordinary evacuation coordination was conducted.
Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism National Police Agency
Ministry of Health, labour Ensuring Buses.
and welfare Bus drivers
Check road conditions Coordinating transport
Receiving Hospital
Adjustment and facilities
instruction
Fire and disaster
Ministry of Finance Emergency management agency
Receiving Facility Assembly Team Coordinating transport
and facilities

Adjustment Ministry of Defense

Requests
instruction Bus drivers
Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications ERC (Headquarters) Coordinating transport
Population survey Check the evacuation facilities and facilities

Local Headquartes
(Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency)
Check the evacuation facilities 15
Allocation of work
 CONCLUSIONS ON “EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
AND CONTINGENCY MANAGEMENT”

• Info Delivery: Redundancy is a virtue!!

• Civilian/Government coordination is vital

• Mitigation: asset management crucial

⇒ “Practice Makes Perfect.”

“The world is a dangerous place,
not because of those who do evil,
but because of those who look on and do
nothing.” by Einstein
16
AGENDA OF TODAY’S PRESENTATION

The context of the crisis

Emergency preparedness and contingency management

The media reaction and strategic communication

 NEGATIVE PROSPECTS HIGHLIGHTED BY MEDIA
AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE
AMOUNT OF MEDIA COVERAGE OVER TIME SINCE THE QUAKE
Catastrophic damage clearly highlighted Media coverage significantly decreased
over bright prospects after a week of the incident
(Frequency index)
Negative

Effect of radiation 256

Collapse/damage to nuclear reactor 235 180
Death/missing 175 Negative1)
Disrupted business 122
Loss of infrastructure (lifeline) 93
160 Positive2)
Collapse/damage to houses 87
Psychological trauma 68 140
Injury 63
Loss of infrastructure (other) 63 120
Inconveniences 58
Collapse/damage to office/factory 38
Damaged reputation 22 100
Rescue 114
Positive

Evacuation 101 80
Cooperation (among people) 82
Temporary housing 65
Volunteering service 64 60
Material aid (water, food etc) 53
Dignity 44 40
Recovery of infrastructure (other) 35
Donations (individual) 28
Recovery of infrastructure (lifeline) 25 20
Reduced level of radiation 23
Donations (corporate) 13
0
(Frequency Index) 3/11 3/18 3/25 3/30

Earthquake related news got quickly replaced with

others before recovery takes place
18
1. Includes death/missing, effect of radiation, collapse/damage to houses/offices, disrupted business; 2. Rescue, material aid, recovery of infrastructure, reduced level of radiation, temporary
housing
Source: Press Search (10 newspapers selected from US, UK, Germany, France, China)、Boston Consulting Group
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES BY PMO OF JAPAN
Information IN RESPONSE TO 3.11
Dissemination
through Press Briefing /Interview Social Media
3/11 The Great East Japan Earthquake

3/13 Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Affairs

Shikata starts interviews with foreign
media(Over 60 TV & Radio Interviews in
March) 3/16 Launched
Twitter(@JPN_PMO)
3/16 Simultaneous interpreting introduced for Chief Cabinet
Secretary announcements (in addition to those by PM) Followers: Over 46,000
Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano starts foreign media in a short period after
3/20 interviews, holding interviews with 11 media 3.11
agencies (*about 80,000
as of Aug.2012)
3/21 Start of Daily Foreign Press Briefings by gov’t officials
• PMO, Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency, Nuclear Safety
Commission, MEXT, MHLW, MAFF, MOFA
• Daily until April 25
Upgraded Homepage 3/23 Launched
Facebook(Prime
Translation of transcript for Chief Cabinet Secretary Minister’s Office of
3/11 Japan)
announcements/briefing became available on HP (in addition to
those by PM)
Set up Special Page for Reconstruction following the Great East Over 9500 Like this
Japan Earthquake in a short period after
3.11
(*over 10,000
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/index.html
as of Aug. 2012) 19
EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNICATION
IN TIMES OF CRISIS
Need to demonstrate leadership in
front of the public

Time is limited for top leaders

Need for trained effective

spokespersons

Need for effective communication

skills and divisions of labor inside
the government
20
 CONCLUSIONS ON “THE MEDIA REACTION AND
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION”
Challenges
Obtain all the facts under crisis
Put facts into context
Transparency & Accountability : send out
as much info as possible quickly
Integrated information release:
Separate press conferences at initial
stages resulted in discrepancies in
explaining the evolving situation
Critical views :“Gov’t must be hiding
something”
Need for...
Better basic communication
infrastructure
Redundancy is a virtue
Inter-agency sharing of info
Effective science communicators who
can explain the situation in plain
language
Informing well international voices, such
as foreign country experts, international
organizations
(otherwise counter-productive)
21
 COMMENTS/
QUESTIONS?
( K AT S U R O . N A G A I @ C A S . G O . J P )

22