EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y.
2018-2019
1) Armed Forces of the Philippines vs Republic of
the Philippines
KEYWORD:
AFP Land Registration; Authority of Witness
DOCTRINE:
There is no substantive or procedural rule which
requires a witness for a party to present some form
of authorization to testify as a witness for the party
presenting him or her. All that the Rules require of a
witness is that the witness possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of
Title over three parcels of land located in West
Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. The
said application was later docketed and raffled to
Branch 68 of the court a quo.
These three parcels of land constitute a land grant
by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218,
issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8,
1998.
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta
(Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was
duly authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of
the petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized
Secretary’s Certificate dated August 18, 2003.
After due posting and publication of the requisite
notices, and since no oppositor registered any
oppositions after the petitioner met the
jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued
an order of general default against the whole world,
and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence
ex-parte.
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms.
Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and
Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified,
inter alia, that: among her main duties is to ensure
that the properties and assets of petitioner,
especially real property, are legally titled and freed
of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties
were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant
under Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of
the Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation
of the subject properties in the concept of an owner
to the exclusion of the world since time immemorial;
1| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
petitioner, after the Republic of the Philippines
transferred ownership of the subject properties to it,
assumed open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and
peaceful possession and occupation, and exercised
control over them in the concept of owner, and
likewise assumed the obligations of an owner;
petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on
the subject properties; and the subject properties
are not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.
Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer
of Evidence, following which, the court a quo
granted the application in a Decision dated April 21,
2008.
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May
12, 2008, wherein it argued that the petitioner
failed to prove that it has personality to own
property in its name and the petitioner failed to
show that the witness it presented was duly
authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an
Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
the OSG on the ground that the petitioner failed to
prosecute its case.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s
application for land registration on the ground that
petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.
RULING:
YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provides only three
instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for
failure to prosecute.
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute
in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff
fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails
to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length
of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of
Court or any order of the court. Once a case is
dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits and is understood
to be with prejudice to the filing of another action
unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In other words, unless there be a qualification in
the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice,
the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication
on the merits and is with prejudice.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time
of the trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated
April 21, 2008 ordering the registration of
petitioner’s title to the subject lots shows that the
petitioner appeared before the Court and was
represented by counsel. Records would also reveal
that the petitioner was able to present its evidence,
and as a result, the RTC rendered judgment in its
favor.
Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the
subject case considering that it appeared during
trial, presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent
testimony as regards the titling of the subject lots,
and the court a quo never held petitioner liable for
any delay in prosecuting the subject case.
Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate
that the petitioner did not fail to comply with the
Rules or any order of the court a quo, as there is no
ruling on the part of the latter to this effect.
Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s
ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the
subject case, because none of the grounds provided
in the Rules for dismissing a case due to failure to
prosecute is present.
On the alleged lack of authority of the witness, Ms.
Aban, to testify on behalf of the petitioner. (Related
to Evidence Class)
The SC ruled that there is no substantive or
procedural rule which requires a witness for a party
to present some form of authorization to testify as
a witness for the party presenting him or her. No
law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion
that such omission can be considered as a failure to
prosecute on the part of the party presenting such
witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is
that the witness possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided therein.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific
disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who
are mentally incapacitated and children whose
tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of
being witnesses. Section 20 provides for
disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on
relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualifications
based on privileged communications. Section 15 of
2| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of
witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness
may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. As a general
rule, where there are express exceptions these
comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. The
Rules should not be interpreted to include an
exception not embodied therein.
Hence, Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness
for the petitioner since she possesses the
qualifications of being able to perceive and being
able to make her perceptions known to others.
Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.
The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
Verification/Certification of the application, and
neither did they question the authority of Mr.
Azcueta to file the subject application on behalf of
the petitioner. Case records would reveal that the
application was signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in
his capacity as the Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as
authorized by petitioner’s Board of Trustees. The
authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject
application was established by a Secretary’s
Certificate attached to the said application. The
asseveration that the subject case was not
prosecuted by a duly authorized representative of
the petitioner is thus unfounded.
2) Alvarez vs Ramirez
KEYWORD:
Arson by hubby
DOCTRINE:
The martial disqualification rule is not absolute and
admits of exceptions such as when the relationship
of the husband and wife is already strained that the
preservation of the marriage the two is no longer an
interest the State aims to protect.
FACTS:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the
complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN
for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo
Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to
the witness stand as the first witness against
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel
raised no objection.
Note (sa later part sa case nani gi discuss): Maximo
Alvarez set Susan Ramirez’ house knowing fully well
that his wife, Esperanza was there. Their relationship
was already strained and that they already
separated de facto six months prior to the incident.
ISSUE:
WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her
husband in the case for Arson
RULING:
Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions.
As a general rule, Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of
marriage. — During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may
testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests
between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against
the other, there is consequent
danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the
security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and
4. Where there is want of domestic
tranquility there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
3| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
But like all other general rules, the marital
disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal
cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed
by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule.
For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as
embodied in the Information for arson filed against
him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life
such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes.|||
It should be stressed that as shown by the records,
prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident.
Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner
and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims
to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being
interested in laying the truth before the courts so
that the guilty may be punished and the innocent
exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct
testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection
of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in
Francisco), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to
its necessity."
3) Guerrero vs St. Claire’s Realty and Co.
KEYWORD:
St. Claire
DOCTRINE:
Dead man’s statute applies only if the defending
party is sued in his representative capacity.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
FACTS:
Petitioners’ original and amended complaints
alleged that during their lifetime the spouses Isidoro
Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute
owners of the disputed property, which is a parcel of
land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal.
During their lifetime the land were conveyed to
Andres Geurrero, one of their son and took
possession over the property. Shortly after the
beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres
Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina
Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property
cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the
harvests.
Subsequently, Andres died, and his surviving heir
succeeded but, it was around this time that a
relative named Manuel Geurrero came forward and
told them the property they were supposed to
inherit from their father, Andres, was already owned
by Manuel Geurrero.
It was discovered by the heirs of Andres that Manuel
Geurrero supposedly bought the property from their
aunt Christina. So, the heirs of Andres went to court
and filed an action to recover the property.
At this time, the property was already owned by St.
Claire, who bought it from the relatives of Manuel
Geurrero, who in turn bought the property from
Manuel Gerrero himself. There were already series
of transfers, from Manuel Gerrero to St. Claire.
During trial, they presented witnesses(Laura and
Jose Cervantes) to prove that Manuel Geurrero did
not acquire ownership over the property, because,
Christina who purportedly executed a deed of sale in
favor of Manuel Geurrero, was not the real owner as
the real owner was Andres Guerrero. Also, they tried
to prove that the actual transaction entered into was
not a sale but a mortgage to guarantee the loan
obligation of Christina
Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to
disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis
of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules of
Court.
On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the
motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose
Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly
situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.
4| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and
Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded
on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court.
RULING:
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully
persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in
error.
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and
neither are they assignors of the parties nor
"persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They
are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the
plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the
disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to
Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not
really sell but merely mortgaged the property to
Manuel Guerrero.chanr
"Following this rule of construction, it may be said
that incompetency to testify established in the
provision above quoted, affects only the persons
therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only
parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are
neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are
not included in the prohibition.”
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or
demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel
Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the
executors or administrators or representatives of
such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of
ownership in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of
Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the
dead man’s rule.
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party
in interest is incompetent to testify where the
adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied
strictly in accordance with their express wording,
irrespective of their spirit.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The law uses the word ‘against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased
person.’ It should be noted that after the mention of
an executor or administrator the words or other
representative follows, which means that the word
‘representative’ includes only those who, like the
executor or administrator, are sued in their
representative, not personal, capacity.
4) Goni vs CA
KEYWORD:
Sale of Hacienda; Recovery of Property and Damages
DOCTRINE:
The adverse party is competent to testify to
transactions or communications with the deceased
or incompetent person which were made with an
agent of such person in cases in which the agent is
still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony
of the adverse party must be confined to those
transactions or communications which were had
with the agent.
FACTS:
The Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
[TABACALERA] owned the three (3) haciendas known
as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria
situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental.
Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva
negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of
said haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to
pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of
TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one
Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by
Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar Vicente
stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of
TABACALERA. Villanueva further contracted or
promised to sell to the latter (Vicente) fields nos. 3,
4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the
sum of P13,807.00.
Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit
from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as
payment for the balance of the purchase price.
However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was
actually needed to complete the purchase price,
only the latter amount was debited from private
respondent’s account. The difference was
supposedly paid by private respondent Vicente to
Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such
payment was presented.
Subsequent to the execution of the
contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise
5| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros
Oriental. He thus went to private respondent
Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the
contract/promise to sell. However, as the amount of
P12,460.24 had already been debited from private
respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and
13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would
merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a
period of five (5) years.
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a
formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in
favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter
registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile,
Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private
respondent Vicente.
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate
proceedings were instituted, among the properties
included in the inventory submitted to the court
were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria.
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for
recovery of property and damages. He sought to
recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the
contract/promise to sell executed by the late
Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24,
1949.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein
defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field
no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields
nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed
lower Court.
ISSUE:
1. May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of
fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes T. Villanueva, which
constitutes a claim or demand upon his
estate, in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20
par. (a) ?
2. May not a written promise to sell dated
October 24 1949 be novated into a
verbal agreement of lease during the
lifetime of the promisor, whose death
occurred on November 12, 1951, by
facts and circumstances substantiated
by competent oral evidence in this case?
RULING:
1. YES. Gaspar Vicente is qualified to testify on
matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes Villanueva. Under ordinary circumstances,
private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by
reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on
Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man
Statute. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20
par. (a) is to guard against the temptation to give
false testimony in regard to the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party and
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party
plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the surviving
party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility
of fictitious claims against the deceased.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs
of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter
had been distributed to them, remains within the
ambit of the protection. The reason is that the
defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives"
of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to
the decedent’s right by descent or operation of law,
but more importantly because they are so placed in
litigation that they are called on to defend which
they have obtained from the deceased and make the
defense which the deceased might have made if
living, or to establish a claim which deceased might
have been interested to establish, if living.
HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was
effectively waived when counsel for petitioners
cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A
waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by
the representatives of the estate or when counsel
for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as
to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime." It
must further be observed that petitioners presented
a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente.
When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in
a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery
of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for
accounting and surrender of fields nos. 13 and 14.
Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was
not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva,
said action not having been brought against, but by
the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased
person.
Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse
party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent
person which were made with an agent of such
person in cases in which the agent is still alive and
competent to testify. But the testimony of the
adverse party must be confined to those
transactions or communications which were had
with the agent. The inequality or injustice sought to
be avoided by Section 20 (a) of Rule 130, where one
of the parties no longer has the opportunity to
6| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other
because death has permanently sealed the former’s
lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the
reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate
the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell.
Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified
that the same was subsequently novated into a
verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of
the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
2. YES. The contract was validly novated. Novation
takes place when the object or principal condition of
an obligation is changed or altered. In order,
however, that an obligation may be extinguished by
another which substitutes the same, it is imperative
that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that
the old and the new obligations be on every point
incompatible with each other.
The novation of the written contract/promise to sell
into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly and
convincingly proven not only by the testimony of
petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the acts and conduct
of the parties subsequent to the execution of the
contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the milling
season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and
13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente.
Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently registered
in Villanueva's name. Villanueva likewise executed a
deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of
Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to private
respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps
toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over
fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during
the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a
similar document in his favor, or causing notice of his
adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of
title of said lots.
5) Tongco vs Vianzon
KEYWORD:
“Widow asked for annulment of decrees of lots
issued in the name of the conjugal partnership after
husband’s death”
DOCTRINE:
Dead Man’s Statute; the suit must involve a claim
against the estate of the deceased; the law was
designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth.
FACTS:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted
marriage on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on July 8,
1925, leaving Anastacia as his widow. Shortly before
the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in a
cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to
certain properties in the name of the conjugal
partnership. Corresponding decrees for these lots
were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership.
After the death of Marcelino, the Judge of First
Instance in a cadastral case rendered a decision
annulling decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925,
as well as the original certificates of title Nos. 3247,
3298, and 3297 and ordering that in lieu thereof
new decrees and certificates of title be issued as the
exclusive property of Anastacia. A motion for new
trial by counsel for the losing party was denied.
In an action for recovery of specified property filed
by the administratrix of the estate against Anastacia
on July 19, 1926, a judgment was rendered by Judge
Rovira couched in the following language:
"Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving
the defendant from the complaint in this case, and
only declares that one-half of the value of the shares
in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de
Orani, to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to
the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-
half interest must appear in the inventory of the
property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino
Tongco." The motion for new trial was denied.
From both of the judgment, the administratrix of the
estate of Marcelino Tongco has appealed. As
pursuant to the agreement of the parties the two
cases were tried together.
ISSUE:
Whether the property in dispute should be assigned
to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it
should be set aside as belonging exclusively to the
widow.
(This was not state in the case but to answer Atty
Torreg’s question, “so tell me, why should we be
interested in this case?” the evidence related issue I
think is: WON the widow’s testimony should be
disqualified pursuant dead man’s statute)
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of Vianzon and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
7| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
It is true that by reason of the provisions of article
1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the
property of the spouses is partnership property in
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on
this assumption, we still think that the widow has
proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the
property in question belonged exclusively to her,
that is, it would, unless we are forced to disregard
her testimony.
The administratrix of the estate attack the ruling of
the trial judge to the effect that the widow was
competent to testify. Counsel relies on that portion
of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an
action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an
action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person . . .,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person . . ."
Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the
object and purpose of this statute is to guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in regard to
the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party. He has, however, neglected the
equally important rule that the law was designed to
aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to
suppress the truth. The law twice makes use of the
word "against." The actions were not brought
"against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were
they brought upon claims "against" the estate.
In the first case at bar, the action is one by the
administratrix to enforce a demand "by" the estate.
In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds
true for the claim was presented in cadastral
proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff
and there is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was
accomplished when the adverse party undertook to
cross-examination the interested person with
respect to the prohibited matter.
6) Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf
KEYWORD:
Pacific war, settlement of estate, claim against the
estate, self-serving statement
DOCTRINE:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
A self-serving declaration is a statement favourable
to the interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible.
A declaration against interest of the person making
it is admissible in evidence notwithstanding its
hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and
the declarant has died, become insane, or for some
other reason is not available as a witness.
FACTS:
Fitzsimmons was a president of a corporation. He
held 1000 shares of stock in a corporation, 545
shares of which were not fully paid which was
evidenced by a promissory notes in favor of the
corporation. Soon after the Japanese invasion,
Fitzsimmons died in an interment camp in Santo
Tomas. A special proceeding was for the settlement
of the estate was instituted. The corporation of
Fitzsimmons filed a claim of 63,000 pesos of which
Fitzsimmons owed to the corporation. The claim was
evidenced by the testimony of the chief accountant
and assistant accountant of the corporation. Aside
from the accountant, the also presented the vice-
president-treasurer and the president but was
objected to by the administrator of the estate for
being violative of the Rule 123.
The administrator of Fitzsimmons denied the claim
and presented the Exhibit 1 which was an inventory
made by Atty. Linchauco in the settlement of the
conjugal partnership brought about by the divorce of
Fitzsimmons and his wife. In the inventory there was
no mention of any liabilities pertaining to the
corporation.
Complainant Contention: The testimony of the vice-
president and president are not violative of the Rule
123. Plaintiff also argues that the Exhibit 1 is self-
serving.
Respondent Contention: That the vice-president and
treasurer of the corporation were incompetent
under Section 26 (c) of the Rule 123, they being not
only large stockholders and members of the board of
directors but they are also vice-president-treasurer
of the claimant corporation. Respondent also argues
that the Exhibit 1 is not self-serving
ISSUES:
1. Whether the vice-president-treasurer and
president of the corporation which are a party to
8| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
an action against the executor or administrator
are disqualified from testifying under the Rule
123, section 26 (c) of the rules of court?
2. Whether the Exhibit 1 is be admitted as
evidence?
HELD:
1. NO. We are constrained to hold that the officers
and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying, for or against the
corporation which is a party to an action upon a
claim or demand against the estate of a
deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased
person.
2. YES. A self-serving declaration is a statement
favourable to the interest of the defendant. It is
inadmissible. The vital objection to the
admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay
character. On the other hand, a declaration
against interest of the person making it is
admissible in evidence notwithstanding its
hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant
and the declarant has died, become insane, or
for some other reason is not available as a
witness. “The true test in reference to the
reliability of the declaration is not whether it
was made ante litem motam, as is the case with
reference to some classes of hearsay evidence,
but whether the declaration was uttered under
circumstances justifying the conclusion that
there was no probable motive to falsify.
In this case, there was no probable motive on the
part of Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1
by not including therein the claim of the corporation
to be deducted from the assets of the conjugal
partnership. On the other hand, if Mr. Fitzsimmons,
who was the president and one of the largest
stockholders of the claimant corporation, really
owed the latter around P63,000, and had not paid it
before he liquidated his conjugal partnership as a
consequence of the decree of divorce he obtained
against his wife, we see no reason why he did not
include such obligation in said liquidation.
Judging from the high opinion which the officers and
stockholders of the corporation entertained of
Fitzsimmons as shown by their resolution
hereinafter quoted, they cannot impute bad faith to
him in not acknowledging the claim in question. We
find, therefore, that Exhibit 1, insofar as the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
omission therefrom of the claims in question was
concerned, far from being self-serving to, was a
declaration against the interest of, the defendant
Fitzsimmons. He having died and therefore cannot
be made as a witness, said document was correctly
admitted by the trial court in evidence.
7) Razon vs IAC
KEYWORD:
Dead Man’s Statute rule does NOT apply in a case
filed by the administrator.
DOCTRINE:
Failure to object timely to oral testimony on the basis
of DMS rule is a WAIVER.
Mere oral testimony is NOT enough to prove valid
transfer of shares of stocks.
FACTS:
In 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc.
for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in
South Harbor, Manila. On April 23, 1966, stock
certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock was
issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian. This was
registered under his name in the books of the
corporation. No one questioned his ownership of the
stocks. He was even elected as a director. When he
died intestate, his estate was administered by his son
Vicente. Razon refused to deliver the stock
certificate to Vicente, prompting the latter to file
this case.
Alleging that Chuidian is a mere nominal investor,
Razon asserts that he himself paid for the stocks,
making him the true owner thereof. He claims that
he and the late Chuidian had an understanding that
Razon would possess the stock certificate until and if
Chuidian will pay for the same. The CFI (now RTC) of
Manila ruled in favor of Razon. However, this was
reversed by the IAC (now CA), which applied the
Dead Man’s Statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. Razon argues that the rule
does not apply because Vicente did not object to his
oral testimony regarding the oral agreement
between him and Chuidian.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Dead Man’s Statute rule applies in this
case.
2. W/N Razon’s oral testimony is enough to prove
that he owns the stocks
9| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
RULING:
1. NO, the Dead Man’s Statute rule does not apply.
Razon’s testimony is admissible.
The DMS rule applies only to a case filed AGAINST
the administrator of an estate upon a claim against
the estate. This case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate. Rather, it is the
administrator Vicente who is filing this case.
Furthermore, he did not object to the oral
testimony. A failure to make a timely objection is
deemed to be a waiver the rule.
2. NO, mere oral testimony is insufficient to prove
ownership over stocks.
Several evidence shows that Chuidian was
considered a valid stockholder of the corporation:
the stocks were registered under his name in the
books, he was elected as a director. In the case of
Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that, to be effective, the
transfer of shares of stock must follow the mode and
manner prescribed by law. Razon must show that
the transfer satisfied all the requirements under the
corporation's by-laws. Since he failed to present any
by-laws, the provisions of the Corporation Code
apply.
Under the Corporation Code, a stock certificate must
be properly indorsed. The title to such certificate of
stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of
the duly indorsed certificate of stock. Since the stock
certificate was no indorsed, the inevitable
conclusion is that the shares of stock belong to
Chuidian. Furthermore, preponderance of evidence
shows that the stocks were given to Chuidian for
value, since he was the legal counsel who handled
the legal affairs of the corporation.
The decision of the IAC is AFFIRMED. All cash and
stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that
have accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E.
Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the
estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
8) Mendezona vs Viuda de Goitia
KEYWORD:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
DOCTRINE:
Dead Man's Statute does not apply if what is being
testified against the executor is a denial of
something that happen before the deceased passed
away.
FACTS:
Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been
duly appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband Benigno Goitia in special
proceeding No. 30273 of this court.
Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-
in-fact of the plaintiffs in the joint-account
partnership known as the "Tren de Aguadas" and
located in the City of Manila, of which the plaintiff
Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia,
owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff
Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth
P7,200. Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time
the manager of the aforesaid co-partnership,
collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he
remitted to them every year.
Prior to 1915, the usual dividends which Benigno
Goitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona
each year were P540, and to plaintiff Valentina
Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216, that from 1915 until his
death in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia failed to remit
to the dividends upon their shares in the "Tren de
Aguadas".
That some time before his death, more particularly,
in July, 1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the
manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-
fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend
upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares, and P36
upon Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal's stock, that from
1915 to 1926, the "Tren de Aguadas" paid dividends
to the share-holders, one of them, Ramon Salinas,
having received the total amount of P1,155 as
ordinary and special dividends upon his 15 shares'
that calculating the dividends due from 1915 to 1926
upon Leonor Mendezona's 180 shares at P540 per
annum, and at P216 yearly upon the 72 shares held
by Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal.
Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the
committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of
Benigno Goitia, and, upon their disallowance,
appealed from the committee's decision by means
of the complaints in these two cases.
10| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
One of the assignment of errors raised by defendant
relates to Exhibits A and B, being the appellees'
depositions made before the American consul at
Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with section 356 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the appellant
was notified of the taking of these depositions, and
he did not suggest any other interrogatory in
addition to the questions of the committee. When
these depositions were read in court, the defendant
objected to their admission, invoking section 383,
No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection
referred mainly to the following questions:
1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of
your partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" — Yes,
until the year 1914.
2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send
you any report or money on account of profits upon
your shares? — He sent me nothing, nor did he
answer, my letters.
3. did you ever ask him to send you a statement of
your account — Yes, several times by letter, but I
never received an answer.
The first of these questions tends to show the
relationship between the principals and their
attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914.
Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it
would not be reversible error, for that very
relationship is proved by Exhibits C to F, and H to I.
As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that
the deponents deny having received from the
deceased Benigno Goitia any money on account of
profits on their shares, since 1915.
ISSUE:
WON the deposition violates Dead Man's Statute
RULING:
No.
We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a
certain fact occurred before the death of their
attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come
within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7,
Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a witness
directly interested in a claim against the estate of a
decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which
took place before the death of the deceased. The
underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect
the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

protection should not be treated as an absolute bar for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for Valentina
or prohibition from the filing of just claims against Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by
the decedent's estate the deceased to the plaintiffs.

The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9
Phil., 390), differ from those in the case at bar. In
that case, the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his
accounts with the deceased Tabotabo during his
lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in
his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican
currency. The liquidation was signed by both
Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years
later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a claim against the
estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37, Mexican currency,
alleging that P750 which included the 1899
liquidation had not really been received, and that
therefore instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that
liquidation should have shown a balance of
P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in
view of the prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not
testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate,
so as to alter the balance of the liquidation made by
and between himself and the decedent. But in the
case before us there has been no such liquidation
between the plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They
testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to
them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of
one of the parties, the law seals those of the other,"
would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against
the testamentary estate. We do not believe that this
was the legislator's intention.
The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which
took place before their representative's death, but
on the contrary denied that it had taken place at all,
i.e. they denied that a liquidation had been made or
any money remitted on account of their shares in
the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their
claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove
by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition
was true, either by bringing into court the books
which the attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to
keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by
the banks which drew them, as was the decedents's
usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other
similar evidence.
9) Garcia vs Dominga Robles
KEYWORD: Leasehold Agreement which excluded 2
heirs.
DOCTRINE: The Dead Man’s Statute provides that "if
one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted
and unexplained account of the transaction."
FACTS: Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare
farm being tilled by Eugenio as agricultural lessee
under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed
away and was succeeded by her nephews and niece,
namely Amanda, Justo and Augusto. On the other
hand, Eugenio’s children – Garcia, Salamat and
Pedro – succeeded him.
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed
Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died,
Amanda and Pedro entered into a leasehold
agreement, “Kasunduan sa Buwisan”, which
installed and recognized Pedro as the lone
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land.
Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, Dominga,
took over as agricultural lessee.
Learning that the “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” excluded
Pedro’s heirs - Amanda, Justo and Augusto, and
Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat, entered into a
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby Garcia
and Salamat were acknowledged as co-lessees of
Pedro.

The appellant admits having found a book of Thereafter, petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a
accounts kept by the decedent showing an item of Complaint for nullification of the first leasehold
P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and agreement.
another of P36 for the account of Valentina
Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of
Ruperto Santos, who succeeded Benigno Goitia in Garcia and Salamat claimed that:
the administration of said partnership, to the effect
1) they entered into an agreement with their
that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the
brother Pedro to farm the land on a "per-
amounts due the plaintiffs as dividends on their
season basis";
shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90

11| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
2) that Pedro reneged on this agreement and
cultivated the land all by himself;
3) that as a result, Amanda was deceived into
installing him as sole agricultural lessee;
4) that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s
misrepresentations, she executed an
Affidavit stating among others that Pedro
assured her that he would not deprive
Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory
rights"; and
5) that in order to correct matters, Amanda,
Justo and Augusto executed in their favor
the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa",
recognizing them as Pedro’s co-lessees.
In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed
that:
1) that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even
date between her and the petitioners are
self-serving and violate the existing 1979
Agricultural Leasehold Contract;
2) Dominga further claimed that Pedro has
been in possession of the land even while
Eugenio lived;
3) that petitioners have never cultivated nor
possessed the land even for a single
cropping; that Pedro has been the one
paying the lease rentals as evidenced by
receipts;
4) that when Pedro died in 1984, she
succeeded in his rights as lessee by
operation of law, and that she had been
remitting lease rentals to the landowners
since 1985; and
5) that petitioners had no right to institute
themselves as her co-lessees.
Ruling of the PARAD
The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the
July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan
ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s
landholding and rights without cause
Ruling of the DARAB
Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa" between the landowners and
petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural
Leasehold Contract and his rights as the sole tenant
over the land; that for sleeping on their rights,
12| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming
that they are co-lessees
ISSUE: WON Amanda’s Affidavit stating that “(the
late) Pedro assured her (Amanda) that he would not
deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory
rights” is admissible.
RULING:
No. Violation of the Dead Man’s Statute.
Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering
Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the
alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a
violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides
that "if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to
the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and
Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the
leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan
sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered
into with petitioners, and which is now the subject
matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s
surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest
Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and
used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair
situation by reason of her being unable to contradict
or disprove such declaration as a result of her
husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a
right, under their supposed mutual agreement with
Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate
farming scheme, then they should have confronted
Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss
the possibility of their institution as co-lessees of the
land; and they should have done so soon after the
passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it
was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was
installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in
1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s
succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the
PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus
precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979
agricultural leasehold contract.
Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro
deceived her into believing that he is the sole
successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the
landowner’s representative or administrator was to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
know the personal circumstances of the lessee
Eugenio; more especially so, when Eugenio died. She
was duty-bound to make an inquiry as to who
survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or
she as representative – could choose from among
them who would succeed to the leasehold. Under
Section 9 of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda – as
Makapugay’s duly appointed representative or
administrator – was required to make a choice,
within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would
succeed as agricultural lessee.
There is no other logical conclusion than that the
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda
and petitioners, which is grounded on Pedro’s
inadmissible verbal admission, and which agreement
was entered into without obtaining Dominga’s
consent, constitutes an undue infringement of
Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-in-interest
under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such
rights and dispossess her of the leasehold against
her will. Under Section 732 of RA 3844, Dominga is
entitled to sennity of tenure; and under Section
16,33 any modification of the lease agreement must
be done with the consent of both parties and
without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure.
10) People v. Carlos
PRINCIPLE: If documents were obtained from the
addressee by voluntary delivery, they are privileged;
but if they were obtained surreptitiously or
otherwise without the consent, the privilege should
cease.
FACTS:
Dr. Pablo Sityar was a victom of an alleged
murder. He performed surgery on defendant
Carlos’ wife for appendicitis. There after, the wife
was required to go to the Doctor’s clinic several
times to dress the wounds. Carlos had always
accompanied his wide. On one vistit, Dr. Sityar
asked Carlos to do an errand and buy medicine.
While he was away, the Doctor outraged his wife.
Nevertheless, Carlos went a week after to his
clinic to consult his lung problem. Several months
after, he was admitted to PGH where he remained
under the care of two other Physicians. While he
was there, Dr. Sityar billed him for professiona
services he had rendered for his wife. A few days
later, Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar, found
him there alone, and without any preliminary
quarrel, attacked the Doctor and stabbed him
twice.
13| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Carlos surrendered himself to police, admits he
killed the deceased but argues that it was in self-
defense. He says that he went over the clinic to
protest the charges of the doctor and asked for an
extension. He was allegedly insulted by the doctor,
and a quarrel ensued. The deceased took a
pocket knife from his desk, attached Carlos, but
carlos was able to take away the knife from him,
and stabbed him.
The defendant's testimony as to the struggle
described is in conflict with the evidence presented
by the prosecution. But assuming that it is true, it is
very evident that it fails to establish a case of self-
defense and that, in reality, the only question here
to be determined is whether the defendant is guilty
of murder or of simple homicide.
The court found that there was premeditation that
constituted murder. A letter written to Carlos made
by the wife was presented where the wife feared
that Carlos would result to physical violence with
the Doctor. Carlos argued that such letter was a
privileged communication and not admissible as
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was a admissible as
evidence
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that it was not.
The letter was a privileged communication and not
admissible. Where a privileged communication from
one spouse to another comes into the hands of a
third party, whether legally or not, without collusion
and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
spouses, the privilege is extinguished and the
communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible.
“Professor Wigmore states the rule as
follows:
For documents of communication
coming into the possession of a third
person, a distinction should obtain,
analogous to that already indicated
for a client's communications (ante,
par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were
obtained from the addressee by
voluntary delivery, they should still
be privileged (for otherwise the
privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written
communications); but if they were
obtained surreptitiously or
otherwise without the addressee's
consent, the privilege should cease.”
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
However, if the letter was obtained through a
search with no warrant, the documents are
considered as obtained through illegal search and
thus inadmissible as evidence in a criminal case. The
letter must be excluded for reasons not discussed in
the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the
letter might have been admissible to impeach her
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand
and the letter was therefore not offered for that
purpose. If the defendant either by answer or
otherwise had indicated his assent to the
statements contained in the letter it might also have
been admissible, but such is not the case; the fact
that he had the letter in his possession is no
indication of acquiescence or assent on his part.
The letter is nothing but pure hearsay and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional
right of the defendant in a criminal case to be
confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution
and have the opportunity to cross-examine them.
The question is radically different from that of the
admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
conversation between a husband and wife
overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
character is admissible on the ground that it relates
to a conversation in which both spouses took part
and on the further ground that where the defendant
has the opportunity to answer a statement made to
him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence
implies assent. That cannot apply where the
statement is contained in an unanswered letter.
Defendant is only guilty of homicide and not
murder.
11) Uy Chico v. Union Life
KEYWORD: Attorney compromised
FACTS:
The father of the plaintiff Uy Chico died in 1897, at
which time he was conducting a business under his
own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother
took over the business and continued it under the
same name, "Uy Layco." The plaintiff purchased his
brother's interest in the business and continued to
carry on the business under the father's name. A fire
engulfed the business premises. At the time of the
fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent
to the fire, the creditors of the estate of the
plaintiff's father.
14| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
During the course of these proceedings, the
plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of
insurance to the administrator of the estate, who
compromised with the insurance company for one-
half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid
into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The
plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the
policies and goods insured belonged to him and not
to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that
he is not bound by the compromise effected by the
administrator of his father's estate.
Defendant showed that plaintiff had agreed to the
compromise and his had surrendered the policy to
the administrator. To prove this, the
defendant introduced evidence showing that the
plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to
the administrator with the understanding that such
a compromise was to be effected.
The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand,
if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying
concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he
replied in the negative. The attorney was then called
for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the
plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously
given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony
of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
ISSUE: Was the testimony privileged?
RULING: The communication was not privileged.
The evidence in question concerned the dealings of
the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. The very
essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds
communications made between attorney and client
is that such communications are not intended for
the information of third persons or to be acted upon
by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as
to his rights.
It is evident that a communication made by a client
to his attorney for the express purpose of its being
communicated to a third person is essentially
inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the
attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be
delivering the communication to the third person for
whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a
legal sense as a privileged communication between
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it
was intended at least, is a communication between
the client and a third person, and that the attorney
simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
The testimony was to the effect that when the
attorney delivered the policies to the administrator,
he understood that there was a compromise to be
effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of
the surrender of the policies for that purpose the
plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence
is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in
the compromise settlement of the policies. Having
agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow
it and maintain an action for the recovery of their
face value.
12) Regala v Sandiganbayan
KEYWORD: Who’s your client?
PRINCIPLE:
As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the
attorney-client privilege and refuse to identify the
identity of his client. However, such rule is qualified
if revealing the client’s identity would implicate the
client in the very activity for which he sought legal
advice for, if disclosure would open client to civil
liability or if revealing the client’s name would
establish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual and as
such, refuse to give the client’s identity in invoking
the privilege.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by PCGG before the
Sandiganbayan for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, among the defendants named in the case
are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio
A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA
Law Firm).
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033**, and in
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
Respondent PCGG then filed a "Motion to Admit
15| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
Complaint" which excluded respondent Raul S. Roco
from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant, he in turn undertaking that he will reveal
the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" with Counter-
Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the
following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity
of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in
PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with
the conditions required by respondent PCGG
ISSUE:
W/N the revelation of the client’s identity is within
the ambit of the attorney-client privilege
HELD:
Under the circumstances of this case, yes.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity
of his client. The reasons advanced for the general
rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood; Second, the privilege
begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established, privilege does not
attach until there is a client; Third, the privilege
generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship. Finally, due process considerations
require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary.
The general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions.
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged
3. Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating
to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
of the privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences.
The circumstances in this case would reveal that the
instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the
general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's
name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case,
which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance. Furthermore, under the
third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists.
Compelling disclosure of the client's name in
circumstances such as the one which exists in the
case at bench amounts to sanctioning 􏰾fishing
expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which
we cannot and will not countenance. The logical
nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case that it would be di􏰾fficult to
simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense,
the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the transaction
in question itself, a communication which is clearly
and distinctly privileged.
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches
upon the question of the identity of their clients but
also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-
client privilege but also of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
(back story)
**In Civil Case No. 0033, defendants therein,
including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through
the use of coconut levy funds the fi􏰾nancial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and
that through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder
of approximately fi􏰾fteen million shares.
16| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as
dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument
in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
government concessions, etc., which acts constitute
gross abuse of offi􏰾cial position and authority,
􏰾flagrant breach of public trust.
13) Barton v Leyte Asphalt
PRINCIPLE:
The privilege which protects communications
between attorney and client does not extend to a
copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney
which comes to the hands of the adverse party.
Where the authenticity of such a document is
admitted, the court will take no notice of the
manner in which it was obtained.
FACTS:
James Barton, a US citizen residing in Manila sough
to recover $318,563.30 in damages for breach of
contract from Leyte Asphalt, a Philippine company
with principal office in Cebu. Leyte Asphalt is the
owner of Lucio mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of
bituminous limestone and other asphalt products.
William Anderson, president and general manage of
Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Barton authorizing
him to sell the products in the Commonwealth of
Australia and New Zealand. Barton also eventually
entered into subagency agreement in San Francisco
and Australia.
There was a large order from Ludvigsen and
McCurdy for 6,000 ton of bituminous limestone.
However, Anderson told Barton that the company
was behind construction so it could not make big
contracts at the moment. Despite Anderson’s
response, Barton wrote a notification to Leytre
Asphalt for the company to be prepared to ship
5,000 tons.
There were six causes of actions for various
agreements that Barton filed with the CFI. Howeber,
CFI only allowed Barton to recover from two.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Among the evidences present in the case was a
carbon copy of a letter written by Barton to his
lawyer, Atty. Ingersoll. He wrote that his profit from
the San Francisco contract would have been at the
rate of 85 cents per ton. When the letter was offered
in evidence by Leyte Asphalt, Barton’s lawyer
announced that he had no objection to the
introduction of the letter evidence if counsel for the
company would explain where the letter was
secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant
informed the court that he received the letter from
the former attorneys of the defendant without
explanation of the manner in which the document
had come into their possession.
Upon this Barton’s lawyermade this announcement:
"We hereby give notice at this time that unless such
an explanation is made, explaining fully how this
carbon copy came into the possession of the
defendant company, or any one representing it, we
propose to object to its admission on the ground
that it is a confidential communication between
client and lawyer."
No further information was then given by the
attorney for the defendant as to the manner in
which the letter had come to his hands.
Trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on
the ground that it was a privileged communication
between client and attorney.
RULING:
CFU ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that
the letter was within the privilege which protects
communications between attorney and client, this
privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands
of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how
the adversary acquired possession. The law protects
the client from the effect of disclosures made by him
to his attorney in the confidence of the legal
relation, but when such a document, containing
admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a
third party, and reaches the adversary, it is
admissible in evidence.
Since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client's hands,
and since the privilege is derogation from the
general testimonial duty and should be strictly
17| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
construed, it would be improper to extend its
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge
of the communications. One who overhears the
communications, whether with or without the
client's knowledge, is not within the protection of
the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one
who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a
document in original or copy.
14) Orient Insurance Company vs. E. P. Revilla
ONE LINER: Insurance Company only read the part
of the letter which is advantageous to it. Deemed
waiver of privileged communication.
FACTS:
The object of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition
for writs of certiorari and mandamus is to require
respondent judge to permit Orient’s counsel to
examine a letter, part of which has already been read
into the record in the course of the examination of
one of the witnesses testifying for private respondent
Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC).
TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for
the purpose of recovering upon 2 fire insurance
policies issued by the latter over TMC’s stock
merchandise. The policy contained a clause
stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be
forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be
rejected by the insurer and action is not commenced
within 3 months after such rejection. Orient’s
defense alleges that the claim was rejected on April
15, 1929, and that notice of such rejection was given
to plaintiff by letter on the same day. However, suit
was not instituted by TMC until August 3, more than
3 months after rejection of the claim.
According to TMC, on the day they were notified of
the rejection, Orient representative E. E. Elser
expressly requested TMC to defer judicial action until
after July 31 for possibilities of compromise between
the parties. TMC relied on the request and delayed
institution of action.
However, during the trial of the civil case, witness
TMC president E. M. Bachrach made an oral
statement as to the substance of part of a letter
received by TMC from its attorneys, saying that he
waited for about a week longer and not having heard
anything about it, he received a letter on July 13
from our attorneys urging me to file these cases.
When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the
letter, Bachrach only offered in evidence part of the
letter supporting his testimony (relating to the urging
of the filing of complaints) but refused to reveal the
other part as it contained private matter privileged in
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
nature between the attorneys and TMC (relating to
contract of fees, retaining of counsel’s services in
connection with the cases, alleged to be matters
entirely distinct from the issue).
Orient demanded for the production of “the best
evidence,” it being well-known a rule of law that a
witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony
as to the contents of a paper writing which can be
produced in court. In response, only a portion of the
letter referred to by the witness was read into the
record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the
letters refers to the case then in court, the entire
document should be exhibited pursuant to the rule
that when part of a document is offered in evidence,
the entire document must be presented.
ISSUE: Does presentation of part of the letter
constitute waiver to present the whole document?
Yes.
Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment
between attorney and client privileged in nature? No.
RULING:
The excerpt in question must be considered as proof
submitted by TMC, and there can be no question
that, part of the letter having been introduced in
behalf of the plaintiff, the whole of the letter could
properly be examined by Orient, in accordance with
the express provision of section 283, Code of Civil
Procedure.
As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of
employment between attorney and client as
contained in other portions of the letter, the court
found it difficult to consider a contract for fees as
privileged. However irrelevant under the
circumstances, it cannot be privileged in nature.
Contracts between attorneys and clients are
inherently personal and considered as private
matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation,
and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of
privileged nature.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter
contained privileged matters, such was waived by
the introduction in evidence of part of the letter.
Section 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, making
the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing
admissible when part has been given in evidence by
one party, makes no exception as to privileged
matter; and neither do jurisprudence on the subject
recognize any exception. Hence, Orient was entitled
to examine the whole of the letter, with a view to the
introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may
be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent
judge was in error in refusing to permit the
inspection by Orient.
18| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
But, even supposing that the matter contained in
the letter and withheld from the inspection of the
adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the
privilege was waived by the introduction in
evidence of part of the letter. The provision in
section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making
the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing
admissible when part has been given in evidence
by one party, makes no exception as to privileged
matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does
not recognize any exception.
15) People v Sandiganbayan
KEYWORDS: Congressman falsified his arraignment;
Counsel testified against him; Privileged
communication does not apply
FACTS:
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial
Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the
same province, and then the Congressman.
Respondent Sansaet was the counsel for Paredes in
several instances pertinent to the criminal charges
involved in the present case.
Paredes applied for a free patent over a land which
was approved and was granted an original certificate
of title in his favor. However the Director of Lands
filed an action for the cancellation of respondent
Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land
had been designated and reserved as a school site.
The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said
patent and title after finding that Paredes had
obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet served
as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
An information for perjury was then filed against
respondent Paredes in the MCTC. However, the
proceedings were terminated on the ground of
prescription. In this criminal case, Paredes was
likewise represented by Sansaet as counsel.
After that, the Tanodbayan recommended the filing
of a criminal case against Paredes for violation of the
provisions of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. It was alleged that by using his former position
as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the
Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Sansaet
was Paredes’ counsel of record therein.
By way of defense, Paredes alleged that double
jeopardy has already attached since the second
complaint filed in court arose from the same set of
facts and same evidence of the earlier perjury case
which, after its arraignment, was ordered dismissed
by the court upon recommendation of the
Department of Justice. To support such defense the
accused presented court records and transcripts as
proof that he was arraigned in the perjury case.
Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury
and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a
letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation
of the 3 respondents herein for falsification of public
documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada,
the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, in conspiracy with
his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as
true copies certain documents purporting to be a
notice of arraignment, and transcripts of
stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter
a certification that no notice of arraignment was
ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification
of the Presiding Judge that said perjury case in his
court did not reach the arraignment stage since
action thereon was suspended pending the review
of the case by the Department of Justice.
To avoid responsibility, Sansaet revealed in an
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed
on the ground of double jeopardy by making it
appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by
the trial court after he had been arraigned. He
further revealed that the documents were prepared
and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the
house of Paredes. He claimed that he participated in
the scheme upon the instigation and inducement of
Paredes. This was to pave the way for Sansaet’s
discharge as state witness.
The proposal for Sansaet to be a state witness was
rejected by the Ombudsman since it was difficult to
believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly
induced by another to commit a crime.
19| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Sandiganbayan ruled that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between Paredes and Sansaet
during the relevant periods so the facts and other
confidential matters involved in this case must have
been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to respondent
Sansaet, as his lawyer. Because of this, Sansaet
cannot be presented as a witness against accused
Paredes without the latter’s consent.
ISSUE:
W/N the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet,
as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-
client privilege.
RULING:
No, the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet
is not barred by the attorney-client privilege.
The facts of the case constitute an exception to the
rule on privileged communication made during
lawyer-client relationship.
In the American jurisdiction from which our present
evidential rule was taken, the privilege is not
confined to verbal or written communications made
by the client to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means.
In the present case, it may correctly be assumed that
there was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with falsification,
and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes
was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein.
The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed
fact that said documents were filed by Sansaet in
behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of
the graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts
and words of the parties during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily
confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the
same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
However, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes
already committed, and future crimes intended to
be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is
admitted that the announced intention of a client to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
For the application of the attorney-client privilege,
the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client
to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In other
words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with
respect to a crime that the former has committed,
he is given the protection of a virtual confessional
seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the
client’s consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of
which he seeks the lawyers advice.
In the present case, the testimony sought to be
elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time
he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in
the process of falsifying, the documents which
were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes
to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to
the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a
future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in
the commission of that crime of falsification which
he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted
upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order
that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain circumstances may
20| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice.
To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed
pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice
in the noble profession of law.
16) US v. GORDON-NIKKAR
KEYWORD: lawyer’s advise to commit perjury; not
protected by the attorney-client privilege)
PRINCIPLE: A communication divulged to "strangers"
or outsiders can scarcely be considered a
confidential communication between attorney and
client.
The attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications regarding an intended crime. .
FACTS:
Appellant Gordon-Nikkar was convicted after trial
by jury of the crime of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute approximately four kilograms of
cocaine, and the possession with intent to distribute
and distribution of cocaine. On appeal, she contends
her conviction should be reversed because the
district court permitted a Government witness,
Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding
allegedly privileged conversations between
appellant's attorney and his clients
Brenda Marchand was charged as a co-defendant
with the crimes for which appellant was convicted.
Marchand subsequently pled guilty and testified at
trial for the Government. Prior to entering her plea,
Marchand had two meetings in the office of
appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa. Marchand,
however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is
unclear whether all the other persons in these
meetings were Estrumsa's clients.
Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the
second was the subject of thorough cross-
examination by Estrumsa. The second conversation
involved Estrumsa's alleged recommendation that
Marchand leave the country and go to Venezuela.
On redirect, the Government inquired, over defense
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
objection, into the substance of the conversation
during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at
this meeting the participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's
suggestion, agreed to give perjured cover-up
testimony at trial to the effect that none of them
had possessed the cocaine, but instead merely
happened to be at a party where the cocaine was
discovered.
ISSUE:
Whether the statements in Attorney Estrumsa's
office were protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
HELD:
No.
There were at least five persons present at
Estrumsa's office on this occasion; at least one of the
persons, Brenda Marchand, and perhaps others,
were not clients of Mr. Estrumsa. A communication
divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be
considered a confidential communication between
attorney and client. Therefore, this communication
is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
But even if it appeared that the communication in
question were otherwise privileged (i.e., that the
communication was considered confidential despite
the presence of a stranger), the testimony was
nonetheless admissible. The conversations in
question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to
hide the criminal activity of appellant and others. It
is beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege
does not extend to communications regarding an
intended crime. The policy underlying the attorney-
client privilege is to promote the administration of
justice. It would be a perversion of the privilege to
extend it so as to protect communications designed
to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to
conceal past misdeeds.
17) US v. MCPARTLIN
KEY WORDS: bribery, sludge-hauling contract,
attorney-client-privilege
PRINCIPLE: Communications by a client to his own
lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer
subsequently shares them with co-defendants for
purposes of a common defense. Waiver is not to be
inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-
party's attorney for a common purpose.
21| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The privilege protects communications to the
attorney's . . . agents . . for rendering his services.
FACTS:
The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with
primary responsibility for disposing of sewage from
Chicago and surrounding areas. The Sanitary District
operates a sewage treatment plant in Stickney,
Illinois. The District announced plans to have the
sludge from its treatment plant be transported to
Fulton County, Illinois, and solicited bids on the
project.
During the week before the bids were to be
submitted, Bull (president of a towing company, and
of the alleged intermediaries through whom many
of the bribe payments were made) visited Robert
Howson (vice president of Ingram Contractors, Inc.),
and told Howson that if Ingram Corporation
expected to secure the contract, it would have to
make a "political contribution." Howson responded
that he was not in that sort of business, but then
took Bull to meet William J. Benton (vice president
of Ingram Corporation and president of Ingram
Contractors, Inc.) Benton then telephoned
defendant Frederick Ingram (chairman of the board
of Ingram Corporation) to inform him of Weber's
"political contribution" proposal. Ingram agreed,
provided that the contribution could be added to
the cost of the contract. These was the beginning of
a series of transactions between the defendants
which are the basis of the charges in this case.
The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B.
Ingram, had paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an
Illinois legislator (introduced by Weber to Benton as
the man who handled all political contributions for
the Democratic Party in Illinois), defendant Valentine
Janicki, a trustee for the Metropolitan Sanitary
District, and others more than $900,000 to secure
for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million dollar
sludge-hauling contract with the District.
Defendants Franklin H. Weber, a businessman, and
Edwin T. Bull, were alleged to be intermediaries
through whom many of the payments were made.
William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram
Corporation) was an unindicted co-conspirator who
played a major role in the conspiracy and testified as
a witness for the prosecution.
Sometime later, a federal grand jury commenced an
investigation of the events surrounding the sludge-
hauling contract. Later, the government granted
immunity to Benton (vice president of the Ingram
Corp).
Evidence showed that Benton, acting with the
knowledge and complicity of Frederick Ingram and
through intermediaries Bull and Weber, bribed
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
McPartlin and Janicki to cause the sludge-hauling
contract to be awarded to Ingram Corporation and
one of its subsidiaries, and later bribed the same
officials to secure favorable treatment under the
contract and modifications of the contract.
At trial, Ingram contended that he did not learn until
the February, 1972 meeting with Benton that his
company had secured a multi-million dollar contract
by paying more than $300,000 to Chicago officials.
Ingram testified that he protested against paying the
bribes, but reluctantly agreed when Benton
informed him that if he refused to pay, the Sanitary
District would not pay the additional $2,100,000 for
the pipeline and would use the liquidated damages
clause to penalize Ingram Corporation.
Throughout the period covered by the indictment,
Benton kept diaries, or appointment calendars, in
which he made notes concerning meetings and
telephone conversations, naming the persons
involved and often recording the substance of the
conversations.
The defendants were convicted of numerous
violations of the Travel Act,18 U.S.C. § 1952, and the
Wire, Radio, Television Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
and of conspiring to violate those acts in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371.
Destroying Benton's credibility was important to
Ingram, as it was to the other defendants, even
though Ingram's defense was based, in part, on the
argument that he had made the payments in
response to the threats Benton had reported to him,
because Ingram's account of events in issue
differed materially from Benton's, and because the
government's case hinged largely on Benton's
testimony. Since Benton's diaries corroborated so
much of his testimony, it was imperative from the
standpoint of all defendants that an effort be made
to discredit them.
Such an effort was made, and Frederick Ingram and
McPartlin cooperated in that effort.
An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's
counsel twice interviewed McPartlin with the
consent of the latter's counsel for the purpose of
determining whether there was a basis for
challenging the truth of some of the diary entries.
In the second of these interviews McPartlin made
certain statements, which Ingram argues tend to
support his defense. At trial, when Ingram offered
evidence of these statements, McPartlin's counsel
objected on the ground of the attorney-client
privilege, and the court, after an in camera hearing,
sustained the objection on this ground.
ISSUES:
1. Whether statements made by McPartlin are
22| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
covered under the lawyer-client privilege
communication.
2. Whether the statement was covered by the
privilege since it was made to an investigator
rather than an attorney.
HELD:
1. YES, the statements made by McPartlin cannot be
disclosed because they remain protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the
attorney-client privilege, because his statements
were made in confidence to an attorney for a co-
defendant for a common purpose related to both
defenses. They were made in connection with the
project of attempting to discredit Benton, a project
in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys
were jointly engaged for the benefit of both
defendants.
Ingram acknowledges that communications by a
client to his own lawyer remain privileged when
the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-
defendants for purposes of a common defense. This
is known as the common-defense rule which has
been recognized in cases. Uninhibited
communication among joint parties and their
counsel about matters of common concern is often
important to the protection of their interests. In
criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair
opportunity to defend. Therefore, waiver is not to
be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a
co-party's attorney for a common purpose.
In the case at bar, the judge found, as a preliminary
question of fact, that McPartlin had made the
statements to the investigator in confidence. That
finding is not clearly erroneous.
Ingram even argued that the co-defendants'
defenses must be in all respects compatible if the
joint-defense privilege is to be applicable. The cases
do not establish such a limitation, and there is no
reason to impose it. Rule 503(b)(3) of the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by the
Supreme Court, stated that the privilege applies to
communications by a client "to a lawyer
representing another in a matter of common
interest." The Advisory Committee's Note to
proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that the joint-
interest privilege is not limited to situations in which
the positions of the parties are compatible in all
respects.
In this instance the US SC followed such
recommendation. The privilege protects pooling of
information for any defense purpose common to
the participating defendants. Cooperation between
defendants in such circumstances is often not only in
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
their own best interests but serves to expedite the
trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation.
NOTE: The exclusion of the McPartlin statements
would not be reversible error even if he had not been
entitled to claim the privilege. The Court was
satisfied from their examination that the statements
merely corroborated facts which were admitted in
evidence and which the jury obviously found to be
true. The Court did not disclose the contents of the
statements because they remain protected by the
attorney-client privilege, on which they alternatively
based their ruling on this point.
2. The argument of Ingram that the communication
was not privileged because it was made to an
investigator rather than an attorney will not
prevail. The investigator was an agent for Ingram's
attorney, however, so it is as if the communication
was to the attorney himself. It has never been
questioned that the privilege protects
communications to the attorney's agents for
rendering his services.
It was also not fatal to the privilege that McPartlin
made the statement to Ingram's attorney rather
than his own. When the Ingram and McPartlin
camps decided to join in an attempt to discredit
Benton, the attorney for each represented both for
purposes of that joint effort. The relationship was
no different than it would have been if during the
trial the Ingram and McPartlin attorneys had decided
that Ingram's attorney would cross-examine Benton
on behalf of both, and during cross-examination
McPartlin passed Ingram's attorney a note
containing information for use in the cross-
examination. The attorney who thus undertakes to
serve his client's co-defendant for a limited purpose
becomes the co-defendant's attorney for that
purpose.
18) Lim v. Court of Appeals
KEYWORD:Annulment of Marriage; physician-
patient relationship; wife is allegedly schizophrenic
PRINCIPLE: The physician may be considered to be
acting in his professional capacity when he attends
to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by
the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is
not stated."
23| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Facts:
Nelly and Juan Lim are lawfully married to each
other. Juan filed a petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground that Nelly has been
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present."
Juan’s counsel announced that he would present as
his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of
the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a
Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
Said counsel orally applied for the issuance of
a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado
to testify. Nelly's counsel opposed the motion on the
ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from
the witness is privileged since Dr. Acampado had
examined Nelly in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued.
Nelly's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to
quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings
pending resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the
court heard this urgent motion. Nelly’s counsel
argued that having seen and examined Nelly in a
professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from
testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a
physician-patient relationship. Juan’s counsel
contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not
testify on any information acquired while attending
to Nelly in a professional capacity. The trial court
denied the motion and allowed the witness to
testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
was qualified by Juan’s counsel as an expert witness
and was asked hypothetical questions related to her
field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness
she examined and treated Nelly for nor disclosed the
results of her examination and the medicines she
had prescribed.
Nelly filed with CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to annul the order of respondent Judge
allowing Dr. Acampado to testify on the ground that
the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him
from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
Acampado's testimony.
CA denied the petition ruling that Nelly failed in
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
testified. Hence, the respondent Judge committed
no grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
W/N the information given by the physician (Dr.
Acampado) in her testimony in open court a
privileged communication? NO.
HELD:
Paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence which reads:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice
or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient."
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is
intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may
form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public
policy and is for the general interest of the
community.
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the
patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is
made to the physician's testimony.
In order that the privilege may be successfully
claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while
he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."
24| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
These requisites conform with the four (4)
fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of
certain communications, to wit:
1. the communications must originate in
a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation."
The physician may be considered to be acting in his
professional capacity when he attends to the patient
for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment.
Thus, only disclosures which would have been made
to the physician to enable him "safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the
privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is
the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as
the subject communicated is not stated." One who
claims this privilege must prove the presence of
these aforementioned requisites.
In this case, Nelly failed to establish the presence of
the requisites.
Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an
expert witness. She did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview
and treatment of the petitioner. The facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did
not refer to and had no bearing on whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained while
attending to the patient. There is, as well, no
showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to the
questions propounded to her relating to the
hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise
stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever
information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
physician-patient relationship existing between
them. As an expert witness, her testimony before
the trial court cannot then be excluded.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
While it may be true that Nelly’s counsel opposed
the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal
motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day
before the witness was to testify, Nelly makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had
objected to any question asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate
the privilege, despite the trial court's advice that
said counsel may interpose his objection to the
testimony "once it becomes apparent that the
testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule." The particular
portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony
of Dr. Acampado quoted in Nelly's Petition and
Memorandum, and in Juan's Memorandum, do not
at all show that any objections were interposed.
Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.
Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a
waiver thereof.
19) Krohn vs CA
KEY WORDS: annulment, psychiatric evaluation
report
PRINCIPLE: The person against whom the privilege
(physician-patient) is claimed is must be one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics.
FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were
married in Manila on June 14, 1964 and had three
children. Their blessings notwithstanding, the
relationship between the couple developed into a
stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological
testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital
strain. The effort however proved futile. Later, they
finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz.
Presenting the report among others, he obtained a
decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church
marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." This decree was eventually confirmed
and pronounced “Final and Definite”.
On 1993, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage with the RTC. In his petition, he cited the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma.
Paz merely denied in her Answer as “either
unfounded or irrelevant”.
25| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Petitioner’s arguments: She argues that since Sec.
24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits
a physician from testifying on matters which he may
have acquired in attending to a patient in
professional capacity, with more reason should a
third person (like respondent-husband) be
PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting
any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared
by a physician which the latter has acquired as a
result of his confidential and privileged relation with
a patient.
She further argues that to allow her husband to
testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation
report will set a very bad and dangerous precedent
because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to
the relation of physician and his patient. Her thesis is
that what cannot be done directly should not be
allowed to be done indirectly.
Respondent’s arguments: Edgar Krohn, Jr., however
contends that the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus, the
legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the
case at bar where the person sought to be barred
from testifying on the privileged communication is
the husband and not the physician of the petitioner.
In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his
testimony considering that a husband may testify
against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the
other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged
communication may be waived by the person
entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did
when she gave her unconditional consent to the use
of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was
presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account among
others in deciding the case and declaring their
marriage null and void.
Private respondent further argues that petitioner
also gave her implied consent when she failed to
specifically object to the admissibility of the report
in her Answer where she merely described the
evaluation report as "either unfounded or
irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely
objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence
presented on privileged matters may be construed
as an implied waiver.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: WoN the psychiatric evaluation report is
admissible.
RULING: YES.
Statutes making communications between physician
and patient privileged are intended to inspire
confidence in the patient and encourage him to
make a full disclosure to his physician of his
symptoms and condition. Consequently, this
prevents the physician from making public
information that will result in humiliation,
embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. For, the
patient should rest assured with the knowledge that
the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his
feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by
their subsequent disclosure. The physician-patient
privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to
preclude the humiliation of the patient that may
follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain
types of information communicated in the context of
the physician-patient relationship fall within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, including
a patient's interest in keeping his mental health
records confidential. Thus, it has been observed that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded
upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial
behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in
need of treatment for emotional problems to secure
the services of a psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however
misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down
the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a
civil case; (b) the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such
person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional
capacity; (d) the information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the
information was confidential and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character)
of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify
on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and
effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.
26| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting
to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation
before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he
invoked the rule on privileged communications but
never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a
fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
counsel waived his right to make such objection
and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.
20) Blue Cross Health v. Olivares Gr. No. 169737
PRINCIPLES: Presumption; more specifically
Disputable presumption; presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
However there are exceptions, one of which when
“suppression is an exercise of a privilege.” As such,
the presumption that an evidence wilfully supressed
is adverse when produce does not apply.
FACTS:
Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program
with Blue Cross for the amount of 12,000 pesos. 38
days after she applied, she suffered from a stroke.
Ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were
excluded from the coverage. She was confined in
Medical City and discharged with a bill of Php
34,000. Blue Cross refused to pay unless she had her
physician’s certification that she was suffering from a
pre-existing condition. When Blue Cross still refused
to pay, she filed suit in the MTC. The
health care company rebutted by saying that the
physician didn’t disclose the condition due to the
patient’s invocation of the doctor-client privilege.
The MTC dismissed for a lack of cause
of action because the physician didn’t disclose the
condition. In the RTC, the spouses were awarded
the amount of the hospital bills plus 60,000 in
damages. This was under the ratio that
the burden to prove that Neomi had a pre-existing
condition was under Blue Cross. The CA denied the
motion for reconsideration of the
health care company.
ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that
respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-
existing condition and therefore was excluded from
the coverage of the health care agreement.
RULING: No. Petition dismissed.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The contract of insurance as in this case is a contract
of adhesion. If there is ambiguity in the terms must
be interpreted and enforced stringently against the
insurer which prepared the contract.
The agreement defined a pre-existing condition as:
“a disability which existed before the
commencement date of membership whose
natural history can be clinically determined,
whether or not the Member was aware of
such illness or condition. Such conditions
also include disabilities existing prior to
reinstatement date in the case of lapse of
an Agreement.”
“Under this provision, disabilities which
existed before the commencement of
the agreement are excluded from its
coverage if they become manifest within
one year from its effectivity.”
Petitioners:
averred that the non-disclosure of
the pre-existing condition made a
presumption in its favor.
Respondents:
Maintained that the petitioner had
the duty to prove its accusation.
(This is the one relevant in the subject of evidence)
Petitioner never presented evidence to prove its
presumption that the Doctor’s report would work
against Neomi. They only perceived that the
invocation of the privilege made the report adverse
to Neomi and such was a disreputable presumption.
They should have made an independent assessment
of Neomi’s condition when it failed to obtain the
report. They shouldn’t have waited for the attending
physician’s report to come out.
Under Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
states:
27| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Disputable presumptions. ― The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.
The exception on presenting evidence applies when
the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Hence, Neomi had the privilege not to present the
Doctor’s report under the doctor-client privilege.
21) Chan vs. Chan
KEYWORDS: Nullity of Marriage Case; Wife
requested subpoena duces tecum for the medical
records of husband before trial, latter objected
under Privileged Communication Rule
PRINCIPLES:
• Objections to evidence must be made after
the offer of such evidence for admission in
court.
• Physician-Patient Privileged Communication
does not only cover the hospital records, but
also the examination of the physician at the
trial. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient's records.
Disclosing them would be equivalent to
compelling the physician to testify on
privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter's prior
consent.
FACTS: Josielene Chan filed with the RTC a Petition
for the Declaration of Nullity of her marriage to
Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her. She claimed that Johnny failed
to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due
to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited
drugs. She had convinced him to undergo hospital
confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny claimed that it was Josielene who failed in
her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene
got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. The
marriage relations got worse when the police
temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
crime and released her only after the case against
her ended. By then, their marriage relationship
could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-
marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The
form carried a physician's handwritten note that
Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse."
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnny's medical records
when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit
in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the
medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege.
RTC: sustained the opposition.
CA: denied Josielene's petition. If courts were to
allow the production of medical records, then
patients would be left with no assurance that
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made
to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also
affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. Although Johnny can waive the privilege, he
did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth
form to his answer for the limited purpose of
showing his alleged forcible confinement.
ISSUE:
WON the denial of the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnny's hospital records on the
ground that these are covered by the privileged
character of the physician-patient communication is
correct
28| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
RULING:
Yes.
The time to object to the admission of evidence,
such as the hospital records, would be at the time
they are offered. The offer could be made part of
the physician's testimony or as independent
evidence that he had made entries in those records
that concern the patient's health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to
evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial,
Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to
object, not just to their admission in evidence, but
more so to their disclosure.
It is possible to treat Josielene's motion for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
hospital records as a motion for production of
documents, a discovery procedure available to a
litigant prior to trial. But the right to compel the
production of documents has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of
this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of Rule 130
states that the physician "cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined"
regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital
records, but only the examination of the physician at
the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery
procedure of the hospital records — the results of
tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the
patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
him — would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patient's consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient's records. Disclosing them would be the
equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
privileged matters he gained while dealing with the
patient, without the latter's prior consent.
Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his
answer to the petition before the RTC that he had
been confined in a hospital against his will and in
fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form
covering that confinement, he should be deemed to
have waived the privileged character of its records.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun.
Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
already presented the Philhealth claim form in
evidence, the act contemplated above which would
justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the
details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not
yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his
hospital records would again be premature.
22) NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
DOCTRINE:
The confidentiality of the President’s conversations
and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses
the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens
and more, because it is dictated by public interest
and the constitutionally ordained separation of
governmental powers.
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions
directing Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations of the Senate
(popularly known as the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee), among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the
head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. Petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for about
eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the
National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a
project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").
He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on what
29| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular,
he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the
NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear
before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. On November
22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the
show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s
explanations unsatisfactory, citing petitioner in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not there is a recognized
presumptive presidential communications privilege
in our legal system;
(2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to
hold that the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) Whether or not respondent Committees have
shown that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of
their functions;
RULING:
(1) There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential
Communications Privilege
The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,
affirmed that the presidential communications
privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution.
“There are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public". There is
a "governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters".
"The right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may
of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke
the privilege on her behalf, in which case the
Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
"By order of the President", which means that he
personally consulted with her. President may not
authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
In this case, it was the President herself, through
Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive
privilege on a specific matter involving an executive
agreement between the Philippines and China,
which was the subject of the three (3) questions.
(2) There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that
the Communications Elicited by the Three (3)
Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement
is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid
down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the
privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch"
is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the
term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego
and a member of her official family.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not
merely based on a generalized interest; and in
balancing respondent Committees’ and the
President’s clashing interests, the Court did not
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic
and economic relations with another sovereign
nation as the bases for the claim. It is easy to discern
the danger that goes with the disclosure of the
30| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
President’s communication with her advisor. The
NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to
the agreement. It was actually a product of the
meeting of minds between officials of the
Philippines and China. Whatever the President says
about the agreement - particularly while official
negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China
will surely view with particular interest.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were
seeking information from the President’s
representatives on the state of the then on-going
negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
The Court denied the petition, stressing that
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is
not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information."
No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional
functions in the face of intense and unchecked
legislative incursion into the core of the President’s
decision-making process, which inevitably would
involve her conversations with a member of her
Cabinet.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed
Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees
from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is
expected from them is to respect matters that are
covered by executive privilege.
(3) Respondent Committees Failed to Show that the
Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
In U.S. v. Nixon, Court ruled that the President's
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial.
In this case we must weigh the importance
of the general privilege of confidentiality of
Presidential communications in
performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such
a privilege on the fair administration of
criminal justice. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a
criminal trial would cut deeply into the
guarantee of due process of law and gravely
impair the basic function of the
courts. A President's acknowledged need
for confidentiality in the communications of
his office is general in nature, whereas
the constitutional need for production of
relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding
is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in
the administration of justice. Without
access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated.
The President's broad interest in
confidentiality of communication will not
be vitiated by disclosure of a limited
number of conversations preliminarily
shown to have some bearing on the
pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of criminal
justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a
court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a
criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for
information in relation to its legislative functions.
This leads us to consider once again just how critical
is the subject information in the discharge of
respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to
show this is on the respondent Committees, since
they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence
of the President in order to gather information
which, according to said respondents, would "aid"
them in crafting legislation.
Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this
Court, the counsel for respondent Committees
impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come
up with legislations even without petitioner
answering the three (3) questions. In other words,
the information being elicited is not so critical after
all.
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are
not subject to the exacting standards of evidence
essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to
which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation provides that "technical rules of
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do
31| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
not affect substantive rights need not be observed
by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit
leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or
questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a
few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every
person, from the highest public official to the most
ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings
by a competent court or body.
23) Lee vs. CA
KEY WORDS: cheater Chinese husband; 1st
family(KEH) vs 2nd family (Tiu)
ONE LINER/PRINCIPLE: The parental and filial
privilege rule applies only to “direct”
ascendants/descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. It has no application to a
stepdaughter who has no common ancestry to her
stepmother.
FACTS:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng
(Keh) came to the Philippines as immigrants from
China. They has 11 children (Lee-Keh children).
Lee then brought from China Tiu Chuan (Tiu), a
young Chinese woman to serve as housemaid. The
respondent Leh-Keh children believes that Tiu left
the Leh-Keh household and move into another
property of Lee and had an illicit relation and made
8 children
After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that
Tiu’s children with Lee (Lee’s other children) claimed
that they were too children of Lee and Keh.Leh-Keh
children then requested the NBI to investigate.
NBI’s Findings
NBI concluded that the mother of the 8 children is
obviously not Keh, but most probably Tiu. Upon
further evaluation, this could be Lee’s grand design
in order to elevate the status of his 8 children as
legitimate children and secure their future. NBI also
found out from the hospital records that the eldest
among the Lee’s other children (who was recorded
as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17
yo mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the
time and so forth. IOW, by the hospital records of
the Lee’s other children, Keh’s declared age did not
coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering 8.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
On the basis of this report, the respondent Leh-Keh
children file two separate petitions for the deletion
from the certificate of live birth of Petitioner Emma
Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and
replace the same with Tiu to indicate her true
mother’s name.
Lee-Keh children then filed a request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel
Tiu, petitioner’s presumed mother, to testify in the
case. RTC granted it. Tiu moved to quash the same.
Tiu’s contention
The subpoena issued on Tiu are:
1. Oppressive considering her advanced age; and
2. It violates Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the rule parental privilege, compelling
her to testify against her stepdaughter
RTC – granted the quashal for being oppressive
considering Tiu’s old age and the purpose of the
subpoena is to badger her to admit the she was
petitioner’s mother.
CA- set aside the order of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN
THE CORRECTION OF ENTRY CASE TO SHOW THAT
PETITIONER EMMA LEE IS NOT KEH’S DAUGHTER
RULING:
YES, TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY.
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may
be compelled to testify against his parents, other
direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants,
a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
against petitioner
24) ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Estrada (Erap) was elected president while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) was elected as his VP. 10
million Filipinos voted for petitioner believing he
would rescue them from lifes adversity. They were
32| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
both to serve a 6-year term commencing June 30,
1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly
but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent
from power started on October 4, 2000. Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of petitioner, went on air
and accused the petitioner, his family and friends, of
receiving millions of pesos from juteng lords. The
next day, Senator Teofisto Guingona then took the
floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled
“I Accuse”. He accused the petitioner of receiving
P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from 1998-2000. He also charged that the
petitioner took from Governor Singson 70 million on
excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The
privilege speech was referred by then Senate
President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon
Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint
investigation.
The HREP did no less. The House Committee on
Public Order and Security decided to investigate the
expose of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Alvarez, Herrera, and Defensor
spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the
air. The church and former Presidents Cory Aquino
and Fidel Ramos joined the cry for resignation.
Respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Services and later
asked for the petitioner’s resignation. However,
petitioner held on to his office and refused to sign. 4
economic advisers resigned, as well as Secretary Mar
Roxas II of DTI.
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a
tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the HREP to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both house of the Congress.
Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as
Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by
Fuentebella. On November 20, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with SC CJ Justice
Hilario Davide presiding.
In December, the impeachment trial started. They
day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its
course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. The
dramatic point of the hearings was the testimony of
Clarissa Ocampo, senior VP of Equitable-PCI Bank.
She testified that she was one foot away from
petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
“Jose Velarde” on documents involving a P500
million investment agreement with their bank.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
On January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that the petitioner held a 3.3 billion secret
bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The
prosecutors walked out in protest. This led to
protests all over Metro Manila demanding petitioner
to resign.
On January 19, the fall of petitioner seemed
inevitable. At 2:30pm petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
growing crisis. At 3pm, the AFP withdrew their
support for the government. A little later, PNP Chief
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders
gave a similar announcement. Rallies for resignation
exploded around the nation. To stem the tide of
rage, petitioner announced that he was ordering his
lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly
controversial second envelope.
January 20 was the day of surrender. At 12 noon,
Chief Justice Davide, after negotiations in the
Malacañang, administered the oath to respondent
GMA as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left the Palace. He
then issued a press statement stating that:
At twelve o'clock
noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not
wish to be a factor that will
prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I
now leave Malacañang Palace, the
seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities
given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any
future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters
and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive
33| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless
our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY !
ISSUE:
(daghan nig issue but I’ll just include the ones
related to evidence)
WON the use of the Angara Diary as evidence was
proper - YES
WON the use of the Angara Diary to determine the
state of mind of petitioner violates the rule against
the admission of hearsay evidence – NO it does not
violate hearsay evidence rule
RULING:
To begin with, the Angara diary is NOT an out of
court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the
pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara
Diary. The said diary was frequently referred to by
the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the
diary were attached as Annexes A-C of the
Memorandum of private respondents. In fact,
petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental
Reply Memorandum both the second part of the
diary, and the third part. It was also extensively used
by the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity
to contest to the use of the Diary but unfortunately
failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was
an out of court statement, still its use is not covered
by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when
its probative force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness.
There are 3 reasons for excluding hearsay evidence,
namely: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2)
absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of
oath. Not all hearsay evidence however is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge
body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by the
courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness, and
necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires
that we further determine whether the hearsay
evidence is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our
rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs
to this class.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of
petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of
a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election
where he would not be a candidate, his statement
that he would leave by Monday if the second
envelope would be opened by Monday and “pagod
na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just
want to clear my name then I will go”. The reason for
the meltdown is obvious – his will not to resign has
wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Diary is not the diary
of the petitioner, hence, not binding on him. The
argument overlooks the doctrine of Adoptive
Admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s
reaction to a statement or action by another person
when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction
as an admission of something stated or implied by
the other person. In the Angara Diary, the options of
the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed
forces withdrew its support from him as President
and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary
Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the option of a
dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object
to the suggested option but simply said he could
never leave the country. Petitioner’s silence on this
and other related suggestions can be taken as an
admission by him.
Petitioner further contends that the use of the
Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res
inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in Section 28
of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: The rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, except as herein otherwise
provided.
Petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios
acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is
provided in Section 29 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court with respect to admissions by a co-partner or
agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego
of the petitioner. He was the little president. Indeed,
he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in
the critical hours and days before he left the Palace.
Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner
told Secretary Angara: “Since the start of the
campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve
listened to. And now, at the end, you still are.” True
to this trust, petitioner has to ask Secretary Angara if
he already had to leave the Palace after their final
lunch. Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner
cannot deny that Angara headed his team of
negotiators that met with the team of respondent
Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer
of power after his relinquishment. The Diary shows
that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary
34| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Angara on the progress of their negotiations.
Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently,
petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of
Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, the ban on hearsay
evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are
relevant independently of whether they are true or
not. They belong to 2 classes: (1) those statements
which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those
statements which are circumstantial evidence of
the facts in issue. The second class includes the
following:
(a) Statements of a person showing his
state of mind, that is his mental
condition, knowledge, belief, intention,
ill will and other emotions;
xxx
As aforediscussed, the Angara Diary contains
statements of the petitioner which reflect his state
of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his
intent to resign. It also contains statements of
Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably
deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rules on
hearsay.
Petitioner also contends that the rules on
authentication of private writings and best evidence
were violated. It is true that the Court relied not
upon the original but only a copy of the Angara
Diary. In doing so, the Court did NOT, however,
violate the best evidence rule.
The Court held that with regard to the Best Evidence
Rule, the production of the original may be
dispensed with whenever in the case in hand the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production. Secondary evidence
of the content of the writing will be received in
evidence if no objection is made to its reception.
With regard to the authentication, it is no longer
required because the genuineness of such was not
denied.
25) PEOPLE v GODOY (Teacher falsely prosecuted
for rape)
PRINCIPLE: No implied admission can be drawn from
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the
court, where the accused did not take part in any of
the negotiations
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two
separate informations filed before the RTC of
Palawan with rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention.
According to complainant Mia Taha, at
around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to
the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is
near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot
Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that
the house was dark, she decided to pass through the
kitchen door at the back because she knew that
there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the
door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife
on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her
not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the
floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the
moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant
Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor,
appellant removed her panty with one hand while
holding the knife with the other hand, opened the
zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private
organ inside her private parts against her will. She
felt pain because it was her first experience and she
cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a
word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight
back nor plead with appellant not to rape her
because he was her teacher and she was afraid of
him. She was threatened not to report the incident
to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her
panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with
blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the
house and she then proceeded alone to the
boarding house where she lived. She did not see
where appellant went after she left him at the gate.
When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw
her landlady but she did not mention anything about
the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994,
complainant went home to her parents' house at
Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her
parents about the incident for fear that appellant
might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of
that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if
complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot."
When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go
with appellant because she did not want her parents
to get into trouble.
35| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
She was forced to ride the jeep because
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not
board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset
Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they
alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in
and brought her to a room where they stayed for
three days. During the entire duration of their stay at
the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She
was continuously guarded and constantly raped by
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or
unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have
sex with appellant because the latter was always
carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994,
appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him
three times. She was likewise detained and locked
inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant.
After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the
place because appellant came to know that
complainant had been reported and indicated as a
missing person in the police blotter. They went to
see a certain Naem from whom appellant sought
help. On that same day, she was released but only
after her parents agreed to settle the case with
appellant.
Early the next morning, Helen (mother of
Mia) and her husband went to the PNP station at
Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded
in the police blotter. When she returned home, a
certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her
that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed
appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he
could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen
Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her
daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she
went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to
fetch complainant. She testified that when Mia
arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was
raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to
kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because
of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital
where the latter was examined and then they
proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint
for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha
executed separate sworn statements before the PNP
at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant,
went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the
settlement of the case. On their part, her husband
insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them,
Adjeril(father), Helen and Mia Taha, went to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
with the mother of appellant who gave them
P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance for the case of
kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office.
The defense presented a different version of
what actually transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha
sometime in August, 1993 at the PNS. Although he
did not court her, he fell in love with her because she
often told him " Sir, I love you". What started as a
joke later developed into a serious relationship
which was kept a secret from everybody else.
He stated that there was no rape and
kidnapping that was done as they were in a serious
relationship. The defense presented witnesses that
corroborated their alleged relationship (will be
discussed in the ruling). The appellant also said that
whenever she wanted to leave the complainant, she
threatened to commit suicide.
While appellant was already on his way out
of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of
Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police
station. Appellant waited at the police station the
whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents
and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not
given the chance to talk to any one of them. That
afternoon of January 2 7, 1994, appellant was no
longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the
police station after Mia and her parents lodged a
complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna
Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different
occasions two letters from complainant. As Mia's
teacher, appellant is familiar with and was,
therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said
letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to
know, through his mother, that an affidavit of
desistance was reportedly executed by complainants.
However, he claims that he never knew and it was
never mentioned to him, not until the day he
testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to
Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade
them, neither did he request his mother to talk to
complainants in order to settle the case. However,
pursuant to a joint resolution issued on March 11,
1994 by the Prosecutor, two separate informations
for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention were nevertheless filed against appellant
Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
charges.
ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise is an
admission of guilt of the appellant
RULING: NO.
In the case at bar, several circumstances
exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
36| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
convince this Court that there was no rape
committed on the alleged date and place, and that
the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress
of an actual wrong.
The prosecution has palpably failed to prove
beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had
sexual congress with complainant against her will.
According to complainant, when she entered the
kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already
inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite
perplexing how appellant could have known that she
was going there on that particular day and at that
time, considering that she does not even live there,
unless of course it was appellant's intention to
satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened
to come along. But then this would be stretching the
imagination too far aside from the fact that such a
generic intent with an indeterminate victim was
never established nor even intimated by the
prosecution.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that
on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house
upon the invitation of complainant because the
latter requested him to help her with her monologue
for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not
able to go inside the house because it was locked
and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench
outside the house and talked. This testimony of
appellant was substantially corroborated by defense
witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the
evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant
and complainant seated on a bench outside the
boarding house.
It was further alleged by complainant that
after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty
and then appellant openly accompanied her all the
way to the gate of the house where they eventually
parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the
natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the
side of the woman he had raped, and in public in a
highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that
accompanies it and the anxiety to end further
exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident
impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his
victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid
discovery and apprehension.
Complainant's professed reason for going to
the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first,
she asserted that she was at the boarding house
talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was
her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and
said that she was not able to talk to her cousin.
Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21,
1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding
house conversing with her cousin. Then in the
course of her narration, she gave another version
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
and said that when she reached the boarding house
it was dark and there was nobody inside.
Complainant testified that appellant raped
her through the use of force and intimidation,
specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However,
the element of force was not sufficiently established.
The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as
corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use
of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings
of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, we find that said findings neither support
nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed
through forcible means by appellant against
complainant on January 21, 1994.
In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we
repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be
corroborated by physical evidence showing use of
force.
There is likewise no evidence on record that
she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to
lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the
zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside
her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that
appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected
her to any force of whatever nature or form.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her
alleged ravishment can only be described as
paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be
abnormal. It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon
seeing allegedly raped her only the day before, she
did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show
rage, revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly
went with appellant despite the presence of her
parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only
for such facts, would naturally have deterred
appellant from pursuing any evil design.
The main defense proffered by appellant is
that he and complainant were sweethearts. While
the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor
with this Court, such is not always the case if the
hard fact is that the accused and the supposed
victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as
is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit
or the victim's parents are against it. It is not
improbable that in some instances, when the
relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her
parents for that matter would rather take the risk of
instituting a criminal action in the hope that the
court would take the cudgels for them than for the
woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And
this, as the records reveal, is precisely what
happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant
were lovers is fortified by the highly credible
testimonies of several witnesses for the
37| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
defense, viz.: (daghan ni pero ang significant ra ako
gi-include para di na kaayo taas)
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the
night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house
where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and
the couple were talking intimately. She had warned
Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of
appellant and owner of the house at Edward's
Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she
decided to have an affair with appellant who is a
married man. Mia answered that she really loves
him. He heard her call appellant "Papa". The couple
looked happy and were sweet to each other.
3. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant,
saw the couple the day before the alleged rape
incident, inside one of the classrooms and they were
holding hands, and she heard Mia tell
appellant "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang
iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." She tried to dissuade
complainant from continuing with her relationship
with appellant.
The positive allegations of appellant that he
was having an intimate relationship with
complainant, which were substantially corroborated
by several witnesses, were never successfully
confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant
merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the
positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions
of appellant. Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight
greater than the declarations of credible
disinterested witnesses.
(TOPIC) The prosecution insists that the
offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed
to be an admission of guilt. This inference in the
instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence
against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which
assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to
penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which
directly affect the public interest, no compromise
whatever may be entered into as regards the penal
action. It has long been held, however, that in such
cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer
was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment
or for some other reason which would justify a claim
by the accused that the offer to compromise was not
in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to
avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the
evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves
appellant's innocence of the offense charged.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not
come from appellant but was actually suggested by a
certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and
who likewise informed appellant that he could be
converted into a Muslim so he could marry
complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer
was first made to appellant, he declined because of
the fact that he was already married. On top of
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial
proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for
the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own
mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the
negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and
appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never
present in any of said meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was
not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise
would not save the day for the prosecution. In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied
admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at
a settlement outside the court, where the accused
did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices
and traditions, in an effort to prevent further
deterioration of the relations between the parties.
In the cases at bar, the letters written by
complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most
probably written out of desperation and
exasperation with the way she was being treated by
her parents, complainant threw all caution to the
winds when she wrote. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako
sa iyo pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga
magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban obviously
referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping
appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore,
be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely
an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the
intimate relationship between her and appellant. In
order to avoid retribution from her parents, together
with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her
mother, she was forced to concoct her account of
the alleged rape.
(Re: Kidnapping) When they left the house,
appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her
parents and their neighbors witnessing their
departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one
could deduce from these normal and innocuous
arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to
deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in
vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed
under such inauspicious circumstances as described
by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the
house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing
38| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
with her a plastic bag which later turned out to
contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia
at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and
was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio.
Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation
where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare
and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for
a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with
the knowledge and consent of her parents who
passively looked on without comment.
26) People vs Gener de Guzman
FACTS:
Gilda Ambray filed with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a
complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman with
the crime of rape. On even date, de Guzman was
arrested and detained but was later released upon
the filing and approval of his bail bond.
Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC
forwarded the record of the case to the Provincial
Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary
information with the appropriate court. A case for
rape was then filed. Trial followed.
Testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
established the following facts:
Homeward bound from a Department Store where
she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda
Ambray was at the gate of Meadow Wood
Subdivision waiting for a tricycle ride toward her
residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When
she noticed the accused, sitting at the guardhouse,
she approached him and asked him some questions.
He answered in a stammering manner. The
complainant recognized the accused very well
because it was summertime and the gate of the
subdivision was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his
tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to
which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda
noticed that the accused took a different route. The
accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and
tell her that it was not in good condition.
When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision
near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and
told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the
tricycle and paid him, which he did not accept. Gilda
then walked away, but after she had taken about ten
steps, the accused embraced her from behind,
covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. The
accused then dragged her to a vacant lot 10 meters
away from the unfinished house. Afterwards, the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
motherfucker consummated his ill intention. The
accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody,
otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her
family. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear
and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking
back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and
her husband, Aquilino Ambray, that she was raped
by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to
retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's
mother.
Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one
Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners'
Association. The accused was then brought to the
municipal jail which ultimately resulted to the filing
of the instant case.
Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi.
According to him, he had a drinking session with his
friends. In its decision, the trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. The accused appealed hence the case
at bar.
The upshot of the accused's stance in the errors
assigned is that he was not positively identified and
that neither force nor intimidation was proven
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape – YES oy
RULING:
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not
generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from prying eyes, and the
crime usually commences solely upon the word of
the offended woman herself and conviction
invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's
single witness of the actual occurrence.
The determination of the guilt of the accused
depends primarily on the credibility of the
complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the
accused witnessed the incident when it happened.
Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the
accused's conviction inevitable.
A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony
demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her
story, which she narrated in a categorical,
straightforward and candid manner. Further
strengthening her credibility in recounting her
ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct
immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home
without looking back, and upon her arrival she
reported the rape to her husband and her mother.
Immediately thereafter, she reported it to the
39| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
President of the Homeowners' Association who then
sought police assistance.
All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within 24
hours after the commission of the crime. The
quickness and spontaneity of these deeds
manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous
woman who had just undergone sexual molestation
against herself.
We likewise agree with the trial court that the
accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda.
In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from
behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her
mouth. As she struggled to free herself, she
sustained her injuries. Moreover, the accused also
threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to
his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted
intimidation.
The accused's contention that it was highly
incredible that there was force or intimidation since
the assailant committed three acts of sexual
intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant
consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in
her re-direct examination that the three hours
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the
time which elapsed from the moment she was at the
gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she
reported the incident to the President of the
Homeowners' Association.
The principal object of re-direct examination is to
prevent injustice to the witness and the party who
has called him by affording an opportunity to the
witness to explain the testimony given on cross-
examination, and to explain any apparent
contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an
opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him
during cross-examination. The re-direct examination
serves the purpose of completing the answer of a
witness, or of adding a new matter which has been
omitted, or of correcting a possible
misinterpretation of testimony.
In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda
categorically declared that the accused tried to
thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in
the first and second attempts because she struggled,
but succeeded on the third because she was already
weak. While it may be true that on cross-
examination she testified that she was raped once,
yet on re-direct examination she said that she was
raped three times, no inconsistency at all may be
deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as
to the legal qualifications of the three separate
acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A
witness is not permitted to testify as to a
conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility
is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no
matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
to testify as to whether or not a party is responsible
to the law. The accused is guilty of rape.
27) San Miguel vs Kalalo
KEYWORD: Inumin ng Tagumpay, San Miguel Beer
FACTS:
Kalalo was a dealer of San Miguel Corp. In the course
of the dealings of Kalalo, an agent of SMC requested
her to issue several postdated checks to secure her
credit overdraft for the delivery of SMC beer
products over the Christmas season. After making
several cash payments and returning a number of
empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed she still
owed SMC a substantial amount. She insisted a
detailed statement of account but SMC failed to do
so. To protect her rights, she ordered her bank to
stop payment on the last seven checks she had
issued to SMC totaling 921,215. SMC sent demand
letters. Kalalo’s counsel made in return an Offer of
Compromise which SMC did not accept but instead,
it filed a case for violation of the Bouncing Check
Law. During trial and after the prosecution rested its
case, SMC now complied with the statement of
account showing that she owed SMC 71,009. Kalalo
recanted her Offer of Compromise stating that at the
time she prepared the letter, she was threatened by
SMC for imprisonment and that she does not know
how much she owed. She was acquitted by the
MeTC. The appeal before the RTC by SMC on the
issue of civil liability (arguing that SMC is entitled
921,215) and a subsequent Petition for Review
before the CA was likewise dismissed. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Offer of Compromise may be considered in
evidence against Kalalo?
SMC argues that her Offer of Compromise
unequivocally admitted her liability while being
assister by her counsel.
RULING: No
Contrary to SMCs contention, the aforequoted letter
does not contain an express acknowledgment of
liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged
was the receipt of the statement of account, not the
existence of her liability to SMC. Furthermore, the
fact that Kalalo made a compromise offer to SMC
cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In
40| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Pentagon Steel vs CA, the reason why compromise
offer may not be considered as evidence against the
offerror:
1. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could
be used as evidence against a person who
presents it, many settlements would be
prevented and unnecessary litigation would
result, since no prudent person would dare
offer or entertain a compromise if his or her
compromise position could be exploited as a
confession of weakness.
2. A true offer of compromise does not, in
legal contemplation, involve an admission on
the part of a defendant that he or she is
legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff,
that his or her claim is groundless or even
doubtful, since it is made with a view to
avoid controversy and save the expense of
litigation.
SMC argues that Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt pursuant to Sec. 27 Rule 130 ROC.
RULING: No
The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the
filing of the criminal complaint against her for a
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of
Compromise was clearly not made in the context of
a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an implied admission of guilt. Finally,
during the testimony of Kalalo and after her receipt
of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted
the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She
explained that, at the time she had the letter
prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing
threats of imprisonment from SMCs agents.
28) PEOPLE v YPARRAGUIRRE
PRINCIPLE:
An offer to compromise does not require that a
criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can
be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
required is that after committing the crime, the
accused or his representative makes an offer to
compromise and such offer is proved.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
FACTS:
Rosita Bacaling, a 17 year old barrio lass, who was
not yet deflorated, was working as a housemaid with
accused-appellant Yparraguirre and his wife. While
she was cooking porridge for the Yparraguirres,
appellant arrived from work. Finding out that the
children were sleeping, he gave Rosita a white
envelope with 15 tablets inside, allegedly for the
skin disease of Rosita’s thigh. The latter took all the
tablets as instructed. However, she became weak
and fell down. She later on found herself on the bed
of the appellant who pointed a hunting knife at her
neck and succeeded carnal knowledge against her
will. She was later on punched on the stomach and
lost consciousness. She was threatened by the
appellant should she report the incident. After one
month, she went home to her mother where her
mother found her helpless, not being able to talk
and eat, which resulted to her confinement in a
mental hospital in Davao. When Rosita finally
revealed to her mother the incident, a case of rape
was filed against appellant who pleaded not guilty.
He was later on convicted.
Note: Prior to the filing of the case, the wife of the
appellant went to the house of Rosita and offered
compromise with her mother so as to drop the case.
Not discussed in the facts.
ISSUE:
WON the offer of compromise made before filing of
a criminal complaint should be admitted as
evidence.
RULING:
There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape
to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann, offered
the mother, Merlyn P15,000.00 to dissuade her from
filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary
Ann increased the offer to P25,000.00. Still Merlyn
refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no
criminal complaint had been filed at the time the
compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape
incident was already known to appellant's wife. Wife
herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on the
day when wife first offered the money. An offer to
compromise does not require that a criminal
complaint be first filed before the offer can be
received in evidence against the offeror. What is
required is that after committing the crime, the
accused or his representative makes an offer to
compromise and such offer is proved.
41| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The prosecution’s evidence, which rests mainly on
the testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and
trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward,
spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered
even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The
inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which
tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion
that her testimony was not contrived. Appellant's
allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for
hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There
is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets.
They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her
from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.
The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way
affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of
appellant's threat to her life.
Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a
high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner
of the family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would
fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to
public trial and place her family, who depended on
her, in a very humiliating and compromising
situation for no reason at all. She had been working
for the Yparraguirres for two months and the
spouses actually found her to be a good worker.
Rosita's psychological condition could not have been
the product of ill-motive and fabrication.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as
the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was
not physically impossible for appellant to have been
at the scene of the crime. The public market was
merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room
and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes
go home to bring food to his children.
29) Bank of Commerce v Manalo
KEYWORD: (Spouses purchased Lot 1 & 2, Block 2 in
installments)
PRINCIPLE: Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did the same or similar thing at another
time, although such evidence may be received to
prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent
of the parties.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
FACTS:
In 1967, Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) through a "Deed of
Sale of Real Estate" Lot 1, Block 2 and Lot 2, Block 2
in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM.
In 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos
contracted the services of Engr. Manalo who works
for Hurricane Commercial for the installation of a
water pump at the former's residence for
P34,887.66. Engr. Manalo proposed to XEI, through
Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville
subdivision, and offered as part of the downpayment
the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through
Ramos, agreed. The Manalo spouses chose both
abovementioned lots for reservation which was later
on confirmed by Ramos. Eventually, the respondent
spouses took possession of the lots and constructed
a house thereon.
In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to
pay their monthly installments until they were
assured that they would be issued Torrens titles over
the lots they had purchased. The spouses were
notified of XEI’s resumption of selling operations.
However, they did not pay the balance of the
downpayment because XEI failed toprepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to
them for their signature. XEI furnished Manalo
spouses with a statement of their account showing
that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34 on the
downpayment of the two lots after deducting the
account of Ramos plus interests.
The spouses Manalo received another statement of
account from XEI, inclusive of interests on the
purchase price of the lots. In reply, Manalo Jr. stated
they had not yet received the notice of resumption
of XEI's selling operations, and that there had been
no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence,
they should not be charged with interest on the
balance of the downpayment on the property.
Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional
sale over the two lots be transmitted to them for
their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands.
Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the
balance of the downpayment of the purchase price.
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo constructed a
business sign in the sidewalk near his house. XEI
informed Manalo that business signs were not
allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he
remove the same, on the ground, among others,
that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he
had purchased on installment basis from XEI.
42| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations
to OBM. OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up
of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their
contract of conditional sale" and that his failure to
comply with its demand would impel it to avail of
the remedies as provided in their contract of
conditional sale.
The Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) subsequently
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM
requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such
construction. Perla informed them that her husband
had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase
the property. She promised to send CBM the
documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
spouses. Butlater on, CBM moved to withdraw its
complaint because of the issues raised.In the
meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of
the Philippines.
Respondent Spouses then fileda complaint for
specific performance and damages against the bank.
alleged therein that they had always been ready,
able and willing to pay the installments on the lots
sold to them but no contract was forthcoming; they
constructed their house worth ₱2,000,000.00 on the
property in good faith; Manalo informed the
defendantthat he would abide by the terms and
conditions of his original agreement with the OBM;
during the hearing of the ejectment case, they
offered to pay ₱313,172.34 representing the balance
on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of
payment was rejected, so that the subject lots could
be sold at considerably higher prices to third parties.
Both RTC and CA upheld the respondent spouses.
ISSUE: W/N XEI impliedly granted the respondent
spouses the option to pay in 120 or 180 monthly
installments when it did so for the other lot buyers.
RULING:
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a
perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist
in law, there must be an agreement of the parties,
not only on the price of the property sold, but also
on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code x x x In a
contract to sell property by installments, it is not
enough that the parties agree on the price as well as
the amount of downpayment. The parties must,
likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the
balance of the purchase price and on the other
terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof,
such payment cannot be considered as sufficient
proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale
between the parties.
We reject the submission of respondents that they
and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of
payment contained in the three contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers
in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale,"
which would later be signed by them. We have
meticulously reviewed the respondents’ complaint
and find no such allegation therein. Indeed,
respondents merely alleged in their complaint that
they were bound to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the property "in installments." When
respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked,
on direct examination or even on cross-examination,
whether the terms of payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the lots under the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers
would form part of the "corresponding contract of
conditional sale" to be signed by them
simultaneously with the payment of the balance of
the downpayment on the purchase price.
We note that, in its letter to the respondents which
was sent to them almost three years from the
execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972
letter agreement, XEI stated, in part, that
respondents had purchased the property "on
installment basis." However, in the said letter, XEI
failed to state a specific amount for each installment,
and whether such payments were to be made
monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also,
respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a
shred of evidence to prove that they were obliged to
pay the ₱278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or
annually. The allegation that the payment of the
₱278,448.00 was to be paid in installments is, thus,
vague and indefinite. Case law is that, for a contract
to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and
explicit, not vague or indefinite.
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in
their complaint that the terms of payment of the
₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the
"corresponding contract of conditional sale" were
those contained in the contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. They
likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to
pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI
also agreed to give the respondents the same mode
and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one
43| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
time is not admissible to prove that he did the
same or similar thing at another time, although
such evidence may be received to prove habit,
usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the
parties.
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or
did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in
the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage,
habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot
buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase
price in installments of 120 months of fixed
amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI
and the respondents had intended to adopt such
terms of payment relative to the sale of the two
lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in
evidence the three contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to
prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the
subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired
said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of
conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in
the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase
price of said lots in 120 months. It further failed to
prove that the trial court admitted the said deeds as
part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be
proved like any other facts. Courts must contend
with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of
usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering
party must establish the degree of specificity and
frequency of uniform response that ensures more
than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but
rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature.
The offering party must allege and prove specific,
repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence
of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove
habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous
enough to base on inference of systematic conduct.
Mere similarity of contracts does not present the
kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to
outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous
enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are
adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response.
After all, habit means a course of behavior of a
person regularly represented in like circumstances. It
is only when examples offered to establish pattern of
conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an
inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of
reaction to situations.
There are cases where the course of dealings to be
followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade
or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice
Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme
Court: "Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will
someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the
moulds which have taken form and shape from life."
Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement of
many of the rights and acts of men. It is also well-
settled that parties who contract on a subject matter
concerning which known usage prevail, incorporate
such usage by implication into their agreement, if
nothing is said to be contrary.
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to
adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove
usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify
the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of
the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the
right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120 months,
presumably because of respondents’ belief that the
manner of payment of the said amount is not an
essential element of a contract to sell. There is no
evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in
the subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of
the downpayment of the property purchased by
them in the form of service, had executed contracts
of conditional sale containing uniform terms and
conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the
contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and
three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to
grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of
the purchase price to two of them, but granted one
180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record
that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or
more lots.
30) The Learning Child v Ayala Alabang
(TAKE NOTE: 3 CONSOLIDATED CASES)
FACTS:
Ayala Land, Inc. (herein known as “ALI”) sold a parcel
of land to Spouses Yuson. Spouses Yuson in turn sold
it to spouses ALFONSO. In the TCT, there was a
“Deed of Restrictions” which stated that the lot shall
be used exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance of a preparatory school
(KINDERGARTEN and NURSERY) with playground and
garage. ALI turned over the right and power to
enforce the restrictions to Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA).
44| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The spouses Alfonso opened a preparatory school
named The Learning Child, Inc. However,
subsequently the spouses decided to include a
GRADE SCHOOL program in violation of the Deed of
Restrictions, and did not hear the cries of AVAA to
cease from such. Hence, AAVA filed a case for
injunction in the RTC against the school and the
spouses.
AAVA reasoned before the RTC that the construction
of grade school rooms is contrary to (1) the Deed of
Restrictions and also contrary to the (2)
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of NCR and its
related Barangay ordinance. The ordinance stated
that Block 3 (where the school is located) is a
“residential area” and the ordinance allows only
preparatory schools with TWO classrooms. Hence,
RTC ruled in favour of AAVA.
However, when the spouses filed a motion for
reconsideration, the Municipality of Muntinlupa
corrected the ordinance and stated that Block 3 is an
“institutional area” and no longer a “residential
area” (hence NO MORE limit as to classrooms). This
was because of a typographical error since what
should’ve been residential was Block 1 and NOT
Block 3 (where school was located). Because of this,
RTC granted the MR and ruled in favour of spouses.
CA however reinstated the earlier decision of RTC.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Before the Supreme Court, the spouses alleged that
AAVA should be now estopped since it seems to
have abrogated the agreed Deed of Restrictions due
to the ff. acts:
1. AAVA Manager admitted that the
construction of a school building with 24
rooms was approved in a “Site Development
Plan” with his signature
2. AAVA President authorized via letter the
construction of a “new school building
extension”
3. ALI (NOT AAVA) impliedly requested the
reclassification of the property as
“institutional”, and
4. ALI subsequently assented to the
reclassification of the property via letter
ISSUE:
1. WON acts 1 & 2 constitute estoppel by
deed?
2. WON acts 3 & 4 comes under the rule of res
inter alios acta, it being done by a third
party?
RULING:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
AAVA is not estopped, and the acts do NOT come
under the rule of res inter alios acta.
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party
from asserting as against the other party and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or
from denying the truth of any material facts asserted
in it. We have previously cautioned against the perils
of the misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel.
ACT#1 and #2
The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of
additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with
the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions, which
merely limit the use of the subject property
exclusively for the establishment and maintenance
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and
kindergarten) school which may include such
installations as an office for school administration,
playground and garage school vehicles. The deed did
not limit the number of buildings or rooms. The
construction of more rooms and building extensions
is contrary to the ORDINANCE, but NOT to the Deed
of Restrictions.
ACT#3 and # 4
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by
ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot be
considered in the case at bar under the res inter
alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case.
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies
said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, IF
DAMAGING to AAVA, would be binding on the latter.
The terms attached to the Deed of Restrictions on
the title of the subject property, expressly state that
“compliance with the said restrictions…. and
conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by
Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala
Alabang Village Association, their respective
successors and assigns”. [52] As such, it appears that
Ayala Corporation is JOINTLY INTERESTED with AAVA
in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and
is therefore covered under the following exception
to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within
the scope of his authority and during the existence of
the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence
against such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or OTHER
45| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
PERSON JOINTLY INTERESTED with the party.[53]
(Emphasis supplied.)
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to
the position of AAVA. Since although ALI indeed
“assented” to the reclassification and expansion, the
assent stated that: “we interpose no objection as
long as the conditions are met” which are (1) the
approval of the Board and (2) the approval of the
residents. None of these were met based on the
records. Hence, in other words, the conditions for
the assent were NOT met.
IN OTHER WORDS (author’s own understanding),
although Ayala Land Inc. (AYALA) is a party jointly
interested in the case and falls under the exception
to res inter alios acta rule, the required conditions to
its assent to the changing/alteration of the terms of
the Deed of Restrictions were not met.
Hence, the acts enumerated above cannot prejudice
AAVA. In fact, records show that AAVA has
consistently insisted upon the compliance with the
Deed of Restrictions by: consistently denying the
requests and letters of the spouses, and by
immediately asking the spouses to cease and desist.
Hence, AAVA is not estopped.
SC ruled in favour of AAVA in upholding the Deed of
Restrictions since such Deed may be harmonized
with the ordinance in this way: there could be
construction of MORE rooms provided it is used for
preparatory schools. However, since this will
prejudice the grade school students already
enrolled, they were allowed to graduate elementary.
However, the school was not anymore allowed to
accept grade school enrolees.
OTHER TOPICS NOT RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
I. Intervention:
Motion for Intervention was denied since
intervention was done during appeal and not before
judgment as required by the rules.
II. The spouses cited Ortigas case
Ortigas case ruled that the ordinance could change
the contract owing to police power. However, the
Ortigas case does not apply here since 1.) the factual
antecedents are not the same and 2.) harmonization
with the law can still be done.
31) Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated
KEYWORD: Admission by Co-partner or agent as
exception to Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
FACTS:
Respondent Redmont, domestic corp organized
under Phil Laws, took interest in mining certain
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
areas of Palawan. After inquiring with DENR, it
learned that said areas were already covered by
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners. Later, Redmont filed
before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of DENR 3
petitions for the denials of the said applications. It
argued that at least 60% of the capital stocks of
petitioners are owned and controlled by MBMI
Resources, a Canadian corp, hence disqualified since
mining activities are reserved only for corporations
deemed Filipino Citizens. In their Answer,
petitioners averred that 60% of the capital stocks
are owned by Filpinos, POA has no jurisdiction, and
Redmont has no standing to sue since it has no
present application over the areas.
POA issued a resolution disqualifying
petitioners, since they are not qualified being
foreign corporations effectively controlled by MBMI.
Aggrieved, appealed to the Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB), again stressing that they are qualified
and that they had their MPSAs converted to
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements
(FTAAs). Pending resolution, Redmont filed a
complaint before the SEC for the revocation of the
petitioners’ respective certificates for registration.
Later, Redmont filed with the RTC a complaint
praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings
pending resolution by the SEC. Before the RTC can
decide, MAB issued a resolution finding the appeals
meritorious.
` Later, RTC issued an order granting the
injunction prayed for by Redmont for MAB to defer
ruling. Nevertheless, MAB, ruling on the
reconsideration of Redmont, denied such.
So, Redmont went to the CA assailing the
MAB orders. It reversed the MAB orders and upheld
the POA decision that petitioners are disqualified.
Reconsideration was likewise denied. The decision is
premised on the doubt as to the nationality of
petitioners because they had a common major
investor, MBMI. Also, the conversion of their MPSAs
to FTAAs were suspicious. Moreover, POA was
declared to have jurisdiction over petitioners, with
the capacity to ascertain their nationality.
Prior resolution by the CA, Redmont also
filed with the Office of the President a petition for
the cancellation of petitioners’ FTAAs. The OP
canceled and revoked the same because they
misrepresented that they are Filipino corporations.
It held that the filing of the conversion to FTAA by
petitioners while the case was still pending is
indicative of their lack of qualification.
Hence, the present petition assailing the
orders of the OP and CA.
46| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ISSUES:
1) WON CA erred in not dismissing the case on
the ground of mootness coz the MPSAs
were already converted to FTAAs
2) WON petitioners are Foreign corps
3) WON CA correctly applied the exceptions to
res inter alios acta rule (RELEVANT TO
EVIDENCE)
4) WON POA had jurisdiction
RULING: PETITION WITHOUT MERIT
1. NOT MOOT
➢ Exception to Mootness principle (all must
concur)
a. grave violation of the Constitution –
misrepresented that they are Filipino corporations
b. exceptional character and paramount public
interest involved – the intricate corporate layering
made by MBMI greatly affects the exploitation of
our resources
c. to guide the bench, bar, and the public – a ruling
on this case will guide the bbp
d. capable of repetition yet evading review – MBMI
can keep utilizing dummy Filipino corporations
All requisites are present.
➢ Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA
applications
The CA’s analysis of the actions of
petitioners after the case was filed against them by
respondent is on point. The changing of applications
by petitioners from one type to another just
because a case was filed against them, in truth,
would raise not a few sceptics’ eyebrows. What is
the reason for such conversion?
The filing of the Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreement application is a clear
admission that the respondents are not capable of
conducting a large scale mining operation and that
they need the financial and technical assistance of
a foreign entity in their operation that is why they
sought the participation of MBMI Resources, Inc.
The participation of MBMI in the corporation only
proves the fact that it is the Canadian company
that will provide the finances and the resources to
operate the mining areas for the greater benefit
and interest of the same and not the Filipino
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
stockholders who only have a less substantial
financial stake in the corporation.
In their last attempt to prove that they are
Filipino corporations, they alleged before the Court
that they have already sold/assigned their shares
and interest to DMCI Mining Corp, a Filpino Corp.
This only proves that they were in fact not Filipino
corporations from the start.
2. GRANDFATHER TEST APPLIES SINCE THE 60-40
FILIPINO-FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS
ARE IN DOUBT (NOT FILIPINO NATIONALS)
2 Acknowledged Tests in determining the
Nationality of a Corporations: NATIONALITY TEST
and GRANDFATHER TEST
CONTROL TEST (LIBERAL RULE):
shares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality, (1st par. DOJ Opinion 020)
GRANDFATHER TEST (STRINGENT RULE):
If the percentage of the Filipino ownership
in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality
(2ND par. DOJ Opinion 020). Under this rule, the
combined totals in the Investing Corporation and
the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e.,
"grandfathered") to determine the total percentage
of Filipino ownership.
In other words, this rule applies ONLY when
the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in
doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture
corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders
with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%]
invests in other joint venture corporation which is
either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino).
Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign
equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather
Rule will not apply.
While corporate layering is allowed under
FIA, if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and
pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the
pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather
rule has already been abandoned must be
discredited for lack of basis.
Revisiting the intent behind Art. XII of the
Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony,
vis-à-vis corporate layering , it was the intention of
the framers to apply the grandfather rule in cases
47| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
of corporate layering. Applying the statutory
construction, when there is a conflict between the
Constitution and a statute (FIA), the former prevails.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier,
Grandfather rule applies when the 60-40 Filipino-
foreign ownership is in doubt. In this case, this rule
should be applied based on the rulings of the POA
and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists
in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as
found by the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40
Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra,
McArthur and Tesoro, since their common investor,
the 100% Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded
them.
IN THIS CASE, grandfathering” the
petitioners, it was established that petitioners
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since
MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or
more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is
derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate
owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going
further and adding to the picture, MBMI’s
Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
statement– –regarding the "joint venture"
agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic"
and "Alpha" groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro,
PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership of the
"layered" corporations boils down to MBMI,
Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group
wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with,
practically exercising majority control over the
corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking
at the capital structure or the underlying
relationships between and among the corporations,
petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must be
considered foreign since 60% or more of their
capital stocks or equity interests are owned by
MBMI.
3. EXCEPTION TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
APPLIES – Sec. 29 Rule 130 ROC – ADMISSION
BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT and ADMISSION BY
PRIVIES
Contention of Petitioners vis-à-vis the application of
Sec. 29 Rule 130:
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in
applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating
that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a
joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
They challenged the conclusion of the CA which
pertains to the close characteristics of
"partnerships" and "joint venture agreements."
Further, they asserted that before this particular
partnership can be formed, it should have been
formally reduced into writing since the capital
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

involved is more than three thousand pesos

(PhP3,000).Being that there is no evidence of
written agreement to form a partnership between
petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created.
A partnership is defined as two or more
persons who bind themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
On the other hand, joint ventures have been
deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is
difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and
partnerships.
4. POA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS
The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes
over rights to mining areas. This refers to any
adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an
application for mineral agreement. The POA
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse
claim, protest, or opposition to a pending
application for a mineral agreement filed with the
concerned Regional Office of the MGB.

The relations of the parties to a joint DENIED

venture and the nature of their association are so
similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is
ordinarily held that their rights, duties, and liabilities
are to be tested by rules which are closely analogous 32) People V. Bokingo & Col
to and substantially the same, if not exactly the
same, as those which govern partnership. In fact, it
has been said that the trend in the law has been to KEYWORD: Res inter acta alio; Construction workers
blur the distinctions between a partnership and a killed boss; Conspiracy; Confession of one of the
joint venture, very little law being found applicable accused
to one that does not apply to the other.

Though some claim that partnerships and FACTS:

joint ventures are totally different animals, there are
The victim, Noli Paison, was the owner of several
very few rules that differentiate one from the other;
apartment units which were being constructed by
thus, joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to
the accused. Prosecution’s witness who was the
a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements,
victim’s brother in law testified that he saw the
rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are
accused (Bokingo) mauled and killed the victim. On
applied.
the other hand, the victim’s wife saw the other
accused(Pol) who sprayed tear gas to her and hit her
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and
with a sharp object. Upon hearing Bokingo shouting
records of this case, it can be assumed that the
“Tara, patay na sya”, Pol fled the scene with him.
relationships entered between and among
Subsequently the accused were caught and during
petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture
the Preliminary Investigation, accused Bokingo
agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited
admitted to the crime and that they planned the
from entering into partnership agreements;
killing days ahead. On such extrajudicial admission,
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture
an information was filed against the accused for
agreements with other corporations or partnerships
murder. In addition, on the basis of the statement of
for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo
Paison’s wife, conspiracy was alleged to be present
partnerships." Obviously, as the intricate web of
in the commission of the crime.
"ventures" entered into by and among petitioners
and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal
prohibition against corporations entering into
partnerships, then the relationship created should ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession is
be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on admissible?
partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture
agreement between and among corporations may
be seen as similar to partnerships since the RULING: No. The extra judicial confession is
elements of partnership are present. inadmissible for it violated his constitutional
rights. Section 12. (1)Any person under
Considering that the relationships found investigation for the commission of an
between petitioners and MBMI are considered to offense shall have the right to be informed
be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying of his right to remain silent and to have
Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by competent and independent counsel
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint preferably of his own choice. If the person
interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. cannot afford the services of counsel, he

48| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga, we held that "the
right to counsel applies in certain pretrial
proceedings that can be deemed 'critical
stages' in the criminal process. The
preliminary investigation can be no different
from the in-custody interrogations by the
police, for a suspect who takes part in a
preliminary investigation will be subjected to
no less than the State's processes,
oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of
pursuing those who might be liable for
criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga
made an uncounselled admission before the
police. He later acknowledged the same
admission before the judge in a preliminary
investigation. Sunga was thrust into the
preliminary investigation and while he did
have a counsel, for the latter's lack of
vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights,
he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
Thus, the uncounselled admission was held
inadmissible. In the instant case, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against Bokingco because he was not
assisted at all by counsel during the time his
confession was taken before a judge.
MAIN TOPIC (CONFESSION OF A the land from his brother Lorenzo Del Rosario.
CONSPIRATOR AS TO THE CONSPIRACY)
Since the extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible against the confessor Bokingo,
the same may not be used against accused
Pol.
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission
of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet.Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant,
is not admissible against his or her co-
accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them. An exception to the res inter
alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that the act or
declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator
provided that the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than by such act or
49| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
declaration. In order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first,
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence
other than the admission itself; second, the
admission relates to the common object;
and third, it has been made while the
declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed,
we did not find any sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of conspiracy.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has
no probative value and is inadmissible in
evidence against Col.
Since no sufficient evidence was given to
show col’s guilt and conspiracy was not
established, Col is acquitted.
33) City of Manila vs. Del Rosario
KEYWORDS: “City of Manila seeking recovery of a
parcel of Land”
FACTS:
Petitioner(plaintiff) sought the recovery of a parcel
of land in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of
Tondo. This parcel of land was registered in the
name of and was in possession of
respondent(defendant) Jacinto Del Rosario.
Jacinto Del Rosario alleged that he bought
Lorenzo Del Rosario in turn bought the land from a
certain Cipriano Roco.
Petitioner alleged that it was the owner of
such land, and to prove his claim, he presented
documentary evidence consisting of a document
containing an offer by the City of Manila to
purchase the land and another document
establishing the transfer of such land to respondent
Jacinto. A map was also presented as evidence.
1st document – offer to purchase by City of
Manila
2nd document – evidence of the transfer of
the land to respondent Jacinto
It was however established that Lorenzo del
Rosario signed the first document (the offer by the
city of manila to purchase the land) before he
acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of
the land referred to therein, the second document
being signed after he had transferred the land to the
defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession
of the same and had it registered.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Further, petitioner offered the testimonies
of several witnesses including the ones who vouched
for the authenticity of the documentary evidence
presented by the petitioner:
1st witness - testified that he did not know of his own
knowledge if the land in question belonged to the
city.
2nd witness - testified that the land included in Calles
Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza
Divisoria, which belonged to the Central
Government (not the city), and that he did not
know to whom it now belongs.
3rd witness - testified that the land in question was
formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all
the land included in it belonged to the city.
4th witness - testified merely that Lorenzo del
Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her brother Cipriano
Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory
information as to the property abutting on Calle
Clavel.
Lorenzo Del Rosario – testified as to the authenticity
of the documents but he made a statement that the
President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera,
advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with
the city, and such was not contradicted. (it was thus
akin to a compromise agreement)
At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the
defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish
the allegations in the complaint. This motion was
overruled by the court.
ISSUE: WON the court was correct in overruling the
motion of defendant.
HELD: No, the court was wrong in overruling the
motion. The case was remanded to the Trial court
for further proceedings.
As to the testimony of the third witness.
Villega's [third witness] testimony was
merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned
from some of the oldest residents in that section of
the city. His testimony was introduced by the
plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that
the city was generally considered the owner of the
land, drawing from this fact the presumption of
actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334,
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony,
however, does not constitute the "common
reputation" referred to in the section mentioned.
"common reputation," as used in that section, is
equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of
50| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
this witness is not sufficient to establish the
presumption referred to.
As to the testimony of Lorenzo
We accordingly hold that the provisions of
section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare
that an offer of compromise is not admissible in
evidence.
Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first
document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y
Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein,
the second document being signed after he had
transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del
Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it
registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the
complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is
so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might
have made in the documents mentioned, they are
not binding upon the defendant, because, under
section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where
one derives title to real property from another, the
declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation
to the property, is evidence against the former only
when made while the latter holds the title."
The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of
the city of Manila. This map is not before us. It is
sufficient to say, in order to show that it has no value
as evidence, that the reliability of the map was not
proven at the trial. The map identified by the
witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the
plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location
of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in
establishing the right of possession claimed by the
plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant
had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
establish the allegations in the complaint, and the
court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss.
34) GEVERO VS IAC
FACTS:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of
the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of
20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City. Said Lot was acquired by purchase from
Luis Lancero in Sept. 15 1964 whom in turn issued
TCT 4320 to plaintiff (DELCOR). Luis Lancero
acquired such parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on
Feb 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610
covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in
the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and
her children the other undivided share of the whole
area. Teodorica Ddief long before WW2 and was
survived by 6 children namely Maria, Restituto,
Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquiop and Ursula all surnamed
Gevero.
The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October
17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha,
consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition
executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha,
Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land
Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others,
was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then
alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and
partition in 1966.
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action
with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet
title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices
the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
RTC rendered judgement declaring the plaintiff
corporation as the true and absolute owner of that
portion of Lot. 2476. From said decision, defendant
heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein)
appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the
decision appealed from.
ISSUE: 1.)WON the deed of sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero to Lancer is valid, 2.) WON the ½ interests of
Teodorica Babangha in one of the lots under Lot
2476 is included in the deed of sale and 3.) WON the
respondents action is barred by Laches
RULING:
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely
invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that the
signature of Ricardo was forged without his
knowledge of such fact and that Lancero had
recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale
when he signed the document in 1968 entitled
"Settlement to Avoid the Litigation. However, it will
be observed that the deed of sale in question was
executed with all the legal formalities of a public
document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged
by both parties before the notary public, yet
petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal
presumption of the regularity of the notarized
document. It has the presumption of regularity and
51| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
to contradict all these, evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had
recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when
he signed the document in 1968 entitled
"Settlement to Avoid Litigation", it is a basic rule of
evidence that the right of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This
particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section
31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title
to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
relation to the property is evidence against the
former." It is however stressed that the admission
of the former owner of a property must have been
made while he was the owner thereof in order that
such admission may be binding upon the present
owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of
executing the 1968 document have no binding effect
on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed
to DELCOR in 1964.
Lastly, Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is
barred by laches considering that the petitioners
have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted
and adverse possession thereof until at present. ).
The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to
the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal
delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a
sufficient delivery of the property. Besides, the
property sold is a registered land. It is the act of
registration that transfers the ownership of the land
sold. If the property is a registered land, the
purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the
certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind
it to look for flaws.
The Court of Appeals found that it had first
investigated and checked the title in the name of
Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision
Plan, the corresponding technical description and
the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor
of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It
even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to
be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any
other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good
faith in purchasing the land in question.
35) US v. Pineda
KEYWORD: Barium Chlorate instead of Potassium
Chlorate
PRINCIPLE: Evidence is admissible in a criminal
action which tends to show motive, although it
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
tends to prove the commission of another offense
by the defendant."
FACTS:
Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist and
was an owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos,
having some sick horses, presented a copy of a
prescription (obtained from Dr. Richardson) to
Pineda to buy medicine for his sick horses. The
prescription specifically read “POTASSIUM
CHLORATE”. After it was prepared he used it on 2
horses which were sick. Shortly thereafter they died.
When he had the medicine checked with the Bureau
of Science, they found out that the medicine
contained “BARIUM CHLORATE”. At the instance of
Santos, two chemists also went to the drug store
and and the same happened. Dr. Buencamino, a
veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses,
and found that death was the result of poisoning.
They were given Barium Chlorate. (Barium chlorate
is a poison, potassium chlorate is not.)
ISSUE:
Whether the court may admit the testimony of Drs.
Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium
chlorate which turned out to be poison. (Four issues
here as this is for the most part a torts case, but this
is the issue relevant to evidence)
HELD:
The lower court in admitting the testimony of the
chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of
potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused,
which substance proved on analysis to be barium
chlorate. What appellant is here relying on is the
maxim res inter alois acta. As a general rule, the
evidence of other offenses committed by a
defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has
confused this maxim and this rule with certain
exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the
accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt
to draw the mind away from the point at issue and
thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to
ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to
fix his negligence is intensified, and fraudulent
intent may even be evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents.
The United States Supreme Court has held that:
"On the trial of a criminal case where the
question relates to the tendency of certain
testimony to throw light upon a particular
fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular
person, there is a certain discretion on the
part of the trial judge which a court of errors
will not interfere with, unless it manifestly
appear that the testimony has no legitimate
bearing upon the question at issue, and is
calculated to prejudice the accused.
52| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
"Whenever the necessity arises for a resort
to circumstancial evidence, either from the
nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct
proof, objections to the testimony on the
ground of irrelevancy are not favored.
"Evidence is admissible in a criminal action
which tends to show motive, although it
tends to prove the commission of another
offense by the defendant."
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the
quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And
finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him
to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent
name."
Where a customer calls upon a druggist for a
harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by
mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence,
placing the burden on him to show that the mistake
was under the circumstances consistent with the
exercise of due care. The druggist cannot, for
example in filling a prescription calling for potassium
chlorate give instead to the customer barium
chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package
labeled "potassium chlorate", and expect to escape
responsibility on a plea of mistake. His mistake,
under the most favorable aspect for himself, was
negligence.
A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for
they cannot take place unless there be wanton and
criminal carelessness and neglect. How the
misfortune occurs in unimportant, if under all the
circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable
to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering
the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the
law imposes on druggist and the position of the
made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the
drug asked for.
36) People vs Irang
KEYWORD: The pockmark on his face
PRINCIPLE: Res inter alios acta rule, second batch.
FACTS:
The accused is charged with robbery with homicide.
On the night of November 9, 1935, 7 armed
individuals with white stripes on their faces went to
the house of spouses Perfecto Melocotones and
Maximiniana Vicente. Some went upstairs, ordered
Perfecto to bring out his money, and was attacked
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

with bolos and fell to the floor. Some also went up,
approached Maximinia, struck her in the face with
the butt of the gun, and lost consciousness.
When she regained consciousness she saw her
husband already dead. Maximinia turned over to the
man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70
and jewelry valued at P200. She looked at the man's
face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on
his left eyelid.
and dressed in a maong colored suit, who later
turned out to be the herein accused-appellant,
opened her box, indirectly corroborates
Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of
the same description was the one who went to her
house and demanded delivery of her money and
jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein
accused-appellant.

That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was

37) PEOPLE v. BABIERA
assualted by malefactors. All of them had white
stripes upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed
that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the
left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. KEYWORD: Doctrine of Ratification

Maxima Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman

Alejandre of the Constabulary that a person who PRINCIPLE: A statement made under circumstances
struck her with the butt of his gun and taker her which would not render it admissible as a dying
money and jewelry was a man of regular stature, declaration becomes admissible as such, it is held, if
with a lead body and pockmarked face. approved or repeated by the declarant after he had
abandoned all hope of recovery.
Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them
to Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter
FACTS:
might identify. She identified the herein accused-
Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio
appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck
Copreros with the right of repurchase, but having
her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery
failed to repurchase them within the period
of her money and jewelry. Juana de la Cruz also
stipulated, the title thereto was consolidated in the
recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks
purchaser, who leased them to Severino Haro. Justo
and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who
Babiera resorted to every lawful means to regain
had gone up her house that same nght.
possession of said two parcels of land, but he failed.
ISSUE:
The prosecution’s version:
Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz
On the day of the incident, Severino visited his land
may me admitted as evidence to prove the identity
with three companions. When he arrived, he was
of Benjamin Irang as the perpetrator of the crime
told by Fermin Bruces, Severino’s copartner, that he
charged.
had found Clemente Babiera’s, son of Justo Babiera,
cow grazing on the land. Severino informed
HELD:
Clemente of what his cow had done and told him to
Yes, the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me
take better care of his animal and not to let it run
admitted as evidence to prove the identity of
loose. Severino then ordered Fermin to take the cow
Benjamin Irang as the perpetrator of the crime
where the Babiera family lived. Severino and his
charged.
companions made use of a torch when they were
making their way back to town because it was
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not
already dark. When they were on the road near
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
Rosendo Paycol’s house, Clemente suddenly sprang
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it
from the cogon grass, went after Severino and
tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the
struck him with his bolo in the back. When Severino
robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at
turned to see who attacked him, Severino received
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time
another bolo blow in the forehead.
charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
Then, Dominga Bores, Clemente’s partner, and Justo
appeared, and pinned down Severino. Severino’s
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that
companions were not able to help him because of
her house, situated only about one hundred meters
the threat from Clemente. When the assailants
from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted
already departed, Severino’s companions were
that same night by some malefactors with white
directed to bring him to town. They were able to
stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with
bring Severino to the hospital. Severino made a
pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid
sworn statement before the deputy fiscal about the
53| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
incident. This sworn statement was ratified by him
before the same deputy fiscal when he was near
death.
The defense’s version:
Clemente was in the house of one Oper, when Justo
arrived, and later on, Severino, who at once said to
him, “Clemente, why do you leave your cow loose?”
Clemente denied the imputation, but Severino
insisted and the latter added that the cow had
damaged his plantation. Severino charged him of 2
pesos for the damage, however Clemente told him
that he had no money. Clemente told Severino that
he will pay on the following day. At about 7pm,
Clemente saw Buenaventura Cabalfin leading his
cow, and Severino and his companions followed.
Clemente asked them why they are taking the cow
away when they already have an agreement with
regards the payment of the damaged plantation. A
commotion then happened wherein Clemente was
allegedly struck by one Margarito Mediavilla, and
Severino was hit in the back by a bolo blow. The
defense attempted to prove that Severino was of a
quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and
fond of starting quarrels in the municipality.
The RTC adjudged Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera,
and Dominga Bores guilty of the crime of murder,
the first as principal, and the last two as
accomplices.
ISSUE:
Whether the ante mortem declaration of the
deceased is admissible in evidence.
RULING:
YES. while the first affidavit could not be admissible,
the second affidavit which confirms the first is now
admissible. When a witness made a certain
statement unconscious of impeding death and
reiterates at the time he is already conscious, is
deemed to have ratified the earlier statement.
Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as
an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is
nothing to show that at the time he made it
Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at
the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its
contents a week later when he was near death as a
result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible
as a part of that which he made ante-mortem. “A
statement made under circumstances which would
not render it admissible as a dying declaration
becomes admissible as such, it is held, if approved or
repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned
all hope of recovery.”
38) US vs Mercado
54| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
KEYWORD: “He has a Pugnacious Disposition”
PRINCIPLE:
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against
whom he has been called, except by showing
(a) that he has made contradictory
statements; or
(b) by showing that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
342, Act No. 190.)
FACTS:
The defendants in this case were charged with the
crime of coaccion (translates to coercion):
That the said accused on December 22,
1911, in the municipality of Baliuag,
Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and
criminally, without legitimate authority
therefor, and by means of violence or force
employed upon the person of Claro
Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering
aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago
Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the
said Maria R. Mateo, in violation of law."
They were then found guilty of the crime charged.
During trial, Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for
the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the
defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is
mentioned in the complaint presented in said cause,
the following question:
"How many times have you been convicted
of assault upon other persons?"
To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado
objected on the ground that the question was
impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his
question by saying:
"I wish to demonstrate that he has a
pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion
to defend him in various causes for assault."
The defendants contended that the character of the
witness, Santiago Mercado, has an intimate relation
or may have a strong relation with the facts being
investigated in the present cause,” but this objection
was overruled.
The only argument which the appellant presents in
support of his assignment of error is that the
question had no relation to the question which was
being discussed by the court and did not tend to
show that the defendants were either guilty or not
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending
to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial.
In reply to the argument of the appellant, the
Attorney-General contends that the question was a
proper question, because it tended to impugn the
credibility of the witness and that such questions
were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will
be remembered that the complaint charged that on
the occasion when the alleged crime was committed
Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault
and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said
question, the witness admitted that complaint had
been presented against him for the offense of
assault and battery.
ISSUE: Whether the witness should be impeached
due to the character of the witness.
HELD:
The prosecution, to show the circumstances under
which the crime charged here was actually
committed, showed that this witness, Santiago
Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R.
Mateo, under the circumstances described in the
complaint. That was an important fact. If the said
assault did not actually take place, then the theory
of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault
or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the
alleged interference on the part of the said Claro
Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the
guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened.
If the witness who had committed the alleged
assault, had assaulted other persons and had been
prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by
the court in weighing the proof and in testing the
credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to
prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place
mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or
attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, to
show that there was occasion for the interference of
Claro Mercado.
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against
whom he has been called, except by showing
(a) that he has made contradictory
statements; or
(b) by showing that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
342, Act No. 190.)
The question to which the defendant objected
neither attempted to show that the witness had
made contradictory statements nor that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad.
While you cannot impeach the credibility of a
55| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
witness, except by showing that he has made
contradictory statements or that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet,
nevertheless, you may show by an examination of
the witness himself or from the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of a high
crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
In the present case, the other offense to which the
question above related was not a high crime, as that
term is generally used, and we assume that the
phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used
in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally
defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are
nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies.
We believe that the objection to the above question
was properly interposed and should have been
sustained. If there was proof enough adduced during
the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof
brought out by this question to show that the
defendants are guilty of the crime, then the question
and answer and the ruling of the court upon the
same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the
defendants. Errors committed by the trial court,
which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties,
should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion
the evidence clearly shows that the witness
committed the assault to which reference is made in
the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had
committed other assaults or not was a matter of no
importance in the present action. The admission or
rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such
question related could in no way prejudice the rights
of the defendants.
After a careful examination of the record, we are
persuaded that the same shows, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of
the crime charged and that the sentence of the
lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
39) Gonzales v. People
FACTS:
Gonzales was charged with arson for allegedly
burning two-storey residential building to which he
pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C.
Canlas, owner of the two-storey building testifying
that at about 9:30 p.m. he was watching television in
his room when his daughter called his attention to
check the commotion in an adjacent room. On his
way to the room rented by Gonzales, he smelled gas.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it on a pile
of clothes in the middle of the living room where
Gonzales had also placed an LPG tank. Fire quickly
spread to the other parts of the building.
The prosecution also presented two tenants,
Villaflor and Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified
that he heard Gonzales and his aunt quarreling
before the fire. He said he heard Gonzales yell
"Susunugin ko itong bahay na ito!" Alarmed, he went
to the Barangay Hall to report the incident but
immediately went back to his place when someone
informed him his house was on fire. Simpao testified
that he saw the fire coming from Gonzales's room.
He added that Gonzales was laughing while the
building was burning.
The testimonies were corroborated by P01 Mendoza,
who testified that when he and his fellow officer
arrived at the crime scene, Gonzales admitted
responsibility for the fire.
On the other hand, Gonzales averred that the fire
was caused by faulty electrical wiring. He testified
that he was napping inside his room when he was
awakened by heat beside his bed. The room was on
fire. He shouted for help and Canlas tried to help
him but they failed to extinguish it. Gonzales denied
he and his aunt were quarreling that evening before
the fire started. As his aunt was partly deaf, he said
he had to speak in a loud voice. He averred that he
merely asked his aunt to buy food because they ran
out of LPG. Gonzales said that when he met PO1
Mendoza, he explained that he noticed the fire had
started in his room. He sought police protection
from his neighbors who accused him of starting it.
The defense presented a Physical Science Report
prepared by a Police Inspector showing that the
ashes obtained from the burnt premises were
negative of any flammable substance.
RTC convicted petitioner. The CA sustained the
conviction holding that the denial of Gonzales
cannot prevail over the positive identification of a
witness, that the prosecution established
circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
and that although there were discrepancies in the
testimony of Canlas and his affidavits, the
discrepancies did not necessarily discredit him
because affidavits taken ex parte are generally
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in
56| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
open court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held
that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor
matters negated any suspicion that the testimony
was perjured and rehearsed.
In this petition for review, petitioner argues that the
trial court and the appellate court erred in giving
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness
Canlas. He claims that the sworn statements of
Canlas before the investigating officer of the fire
department and before the city prosecutor were
inconsistent.
Petitioner cites People v. Salik Magonawal, where
the material discrepancies between the court
testimony and prior statements of a witness at a
preliminary investigation made the testimony
incredible.
The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the
testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn
statements were not substantial to warrant a review
of the findings of fact of the trial court. The OSG
asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court
clarified, corroborated and complemented his
affidavit. Likewise, the testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses corroborated Canlas's
testimony
ISSUE:
Whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the
court testimonies of a witness are sufficient to
exculpate Gonzales of the crime of arson.
HELD:
NO. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime
charged is complete where the evidence establishes
the corpus delicti and the identity of the defendant
as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the
corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare
fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally
caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a
single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the
corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these
are present, the only issue is the credibility of the
witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between
the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight considering
that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to
testimony in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the
aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected circumstances necessary for his accurate
recollection of the subject.
The eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the
culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and
appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness
Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings
of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not
reverse their findings of fact.
The findings of the Physical Science Report is a
negative evidence and taken together with the bare
denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies
of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against
the circumstantial evidence coupled with the
positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness..
40) Republic v Kenrick Developent
KEYWORD: Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of
paper; Adoptive admission constituting judicial
admission
PRINCIPLES:
• By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it.
• Only the signature of either the party himself or
his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading
from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
FACTS:
Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around
parcels of land behind the Civil Aviation Traininger
Center of the Air Transportation Office. As a result of
this, ATO was dispossessed of huge tracts of land.
Kenrick, on the other hand, claimed that the land
was theirs, showing a TCT issued in its name which
was sold to it by Alfonso Concepcion.
The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT
nor of its ascendant TCT. ATO verified the
authenticity of Kenrick's titles with the Land
Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report.
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of the
TCT and its ascendant title. The land allegedly
covered by Kenrick's titles was also found to be
within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of
57| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
certificates of title against Kenrick and an Answer
was filed by the latter which was purportedly signed
by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee conducted a hearing in aid of
legislation on the matter of land registration and
titling. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos (former
counsel of Kenrick) testified that he prepared
Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft
to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s President). He further stated
that the signature in the answer was not his and he
authorized no one to sign in his behalf and he did
not know who signed the answer.
When the Republic found out about this, they
promptly filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick
in default for failure to file a valid answer since it
was an unsigned pleading which in effect is a mere
scrap of paper and produced no legal effect pursuant
to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found
Kenrick's answer to be sham, false and intended to
defeat the purpose of the rules. It ordered the
answer stricken from the records, respondent in
default and allowed the Republic to present its
evidence ex parte.
CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and
directed the lifting of the order of default against
respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to
trial with dispatch. It found that Atty. Garlitos'
statements in the legislative hearing were unreliable
since they were not subjected to cross-examination.
It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos' acts after the filing
of the answer and concluded that he assented to the
signing of the answer by somebody in his stead
which supposedly cured whatever defect the answer
may have had.
ISSUE:
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default
RULING: YES
Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer
was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly
declared in default and the Republic was rightly
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily
adopt or ratify another's statement. Where it
appears that a party clearly and unambiguously
assented to or adopted the statements of another,
evidence of those statements is admissible against
him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive
admission.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a
statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the
other person.
By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it. This may occur when a party:
a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral
statement made by another
b) Hears a statement and later on essentially
repeats it
c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the
assertions of another
d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific
points raised by another but ignores further
points which he or she has heard the other
maker
e) Reads and signs a written statement made by
another
Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
Garlitos and built itscase on them. At no instance did
it ever deny or contradict its former counsel's
statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty.
Garlitos' testimony as well as its implications, as
follows:
1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer,
the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence,
the pleading could not be considered invalid for
being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the
person who signed it was neither known to Atty.
Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was
immaterial. The important thing was that the
answer bore a signature.
2) While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading
must be signed by the party or his counsel, it
does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general
authority for any person to sign the answer for
him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The
person who actually signed the pleading was of
no moment as long as counsel knew that it
would be signed by another, similar to
addressing an authorization letter "to whom it
may concern" such that any person could act on
it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the
answer; he never disowned its contents and he
resumed acting as counsel for respondent
subsequent to its filing. These circumstances
show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified
the signing of the answer by another. Kenrick
completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its
own.
58| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The adoptive admission constituted a judicial
admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading
is one that is signed either by the party himself or
his counsel. (Section 3, Rule 7)
Only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel's
authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to
him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The
signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him
that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay.
Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters. The preparation and. signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving practice of law which
is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor
of one who is not.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing. Moreover, a signature
by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by
unqualified persons something the law strongly
proscribes.
The blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act
taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void.
There was no way it could have been cured or
ratified by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998
Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented
to the signing of the answer by another "as long as it
conformed to his draft." We give no value
whatsoever to such self-serving statement. No
doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given
blanket authority for just anyone to sign
the answer.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the
rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its
answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the
defect was a mere technicality that could
be set aside.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Procedural requirements which have often been
disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have
their own valid raison d' etre in the orderly
administration of justice. To summarily brush them
aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed
except only when, for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. Respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted
from strictly abiding by the rules.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts
committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics
of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to
account for his possible misconduct. Decision is
furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
commencement of disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional
41) Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan
PRINCIPLE: When the credibility of a witness is
sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation,
it is necessary that the reputation shown should be
that which existed before the occurrence of the
circumstances out of which the litigation arose, or at
the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit.
This is because a person of derogatory character or
reputation can still change or reform himself.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate
complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz,
founder/directress of the "Mother and Child
Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school
teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged
respondent with sexual indignities and harassment,
while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances
MAGDALENA:
Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DECS
Office in Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-
school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the
permit was the inspection of the school premises by
the DECS Division Office. Respondent and
complainant visited the school. In the course of
59| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
inspection, while both descending the stairs,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around
complainant's shoulders and kissed her cheek.
Fearful that her application might be
jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the
DECS Division Office and asked respondent about
the status of her permit. His reply was "Mag-date
muna tayo." She declined, explaining that she is
married. She then left and reported the matter to
DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena
read from a local newspaper that certain female
employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging
a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment.
Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being
complained of was respondent. She then wrote a
letter-complaint for sexual indignities and
harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed
under suspension.
LIGAYAN:
On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched
her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind, pulled her close to him
with his organ pressing against her. Aside from this,
Ligaya charged him with delaying teachers' salaries,
failing to release differentials to substitutes, refusing
to release teachers' uniforms and allowances, and
failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion
Board, as required by the DECS rules and
regulations.
DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities
and ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges
of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty
CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that
which requires a high degree of moral uprightness
Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has
never been charged of any offense in his thirty-
seven years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was
charged with several offenses before the MTC of
Baguio City. (Respondent listed all the cases; there
were A LOT)
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed
against Magdalena cast doubt on her character,
integrity, and credibility, MR was denied
CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an
unreliable witness, her character being questionable
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: W/N the complaining witness, Magdalena , is
Credible
RULING:
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as
legally irrelevant in determining a integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has
controversy. 15 One statutory exception is that relied
upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote
here:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions. —
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved if it tends
to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the
offense charged."
It will be readily observed that the above provision
pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule
of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot
sustain respondent's posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved under this provision.
Only those which would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. This means
that the character evidence must be limited to the
traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape —
character for chastity, on a charge of assault —
character for peaceableness or violence, and on a
charge of embezzlement — character for honesty. In
one rape case, where it was established that the
alleged victim was morally loose and apparently
uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction
of the accused doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual
harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that
has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he
presented are charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the
above provision because they do not establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to
tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a
person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy
of belief. 19A witness may be discredited by
60| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
evidence attacking his general reputation for
truth, 20 honesty 21 or integrity. 22 Section 11, Rule
132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's
witness. — A witness may be impeached by
the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or
made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except
that it may be shown by the examination of
the witness,
or the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of an
offense."
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals
is correct in holding that the character or reputation
of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a
proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the
ultimate question — is Magdalena's derogatory
record sufficient to discredit her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative
answer.
1) Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT
sufficient to discredit her credibility. Evidence
of one's character or reputation must be
confined to a time not too remote from the
time in question. What is to be determined is
the character or reputation of the person at the
time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the
suit. Most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed
with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
committed in the 70s and 80s and one was in
1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no
longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character
or reputation. Every person can change
2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena
was convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is
not permissible to show that a witness has
been arrested or that he has been charged with
or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or
confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his
credibility
42) People vs Noel Lee
FACTS:
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph,
were in the living room of their house. They were
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
watching a basketball game on television. Herminia
was seated across, Joseph, who sat on a sofa against
the wall and window of their hous. When Herminia
casually glanced at her son, she saw a hand holding
a gun coming out of the open window behind
Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant
Noel Lee peering through the window and holding
the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him,
Joseph turned his body towards the window, and
simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting
Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-
appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three
shots more, two hit the sofa and one hit the cement
floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran
to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a
blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house.
Joseph was then brought to the MCU Hospital where
he later died.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder
against accused-appellant. The trial court ruled
against accused-appellant and sentenced him with
the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review
by the Supreme Court.
Accused-appellant points out inconsistencies
in the eyewitness testimony. In her affidavit before
the police officers, Herminia declared that the hand
holding a gun pointed at her son came out of a hole
in the window, i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-
examination, Herminia stated that she saw a hand
holding a gun in the open window, i.e., bukas na
bintana. According to accused-appellant, this
inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be
repaired by her statement on the witness stand.
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s
bad reputation in their community. He alleges that
the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other
crimes and he may have been shot by any of the
persons from whom he had stolen. As proof of
Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented
Herminia’s letter to the mayor of Caloocan City
seeking his assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation
from drugs.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the trial court should not have
accepted Herminia’s testimony because it is
inconsistent.
2) Whether or not the character evidence is
admissible in this case.
RULING:
61| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
1) Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in
open court that she saw the hand and the gun
coming out of the open window, not from a hole in
the window. Between Herminia’s testimony in open
court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency
therein does not necessarily discredit the witness.
Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open
court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-
parte and are almost always incomplete and
inaccurate.
2) Character is defined to be the possession by
a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
distinguishing him from others; his reputation. Good
moral character includes all the elements essential
to make up such a character; among these are
common honesty and veracity. The rule is that the
character or reputation of a party is regarded as
legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so
that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of
Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused
may prove his good moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character
of the accused except only in rebuttal and when
such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved
in the offense charged. Both sub-paragraphs (1) and
(2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character
evidence of the accused. And this evidence must be
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged, meaning, that the character evidence must
be relevant and germane to the kind of the act
charged.
Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said
Rule refers to the character of the offended party.
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral
character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-
appellant has not alleged that the victim was the
aggressor or that the killing was made in self-
defense. There is no connection between the
deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his
violent death in the hands of accused-appellant.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral
character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. In
People v. Soliman, a murder case, the Supreme Court
held: “While good or bad moral character may be
availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense, such
is not necessary in the crime of murder where the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
killing is committed through treachery or
premeditation. The proof of such character may only
be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary.”
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is
charged with murder committed through treachery
and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that
there was treachery. There was no opportunity at all
for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against
his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack ensured his death without risk to the
assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman,
where the killing of the victim was attended by
treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not
necessary. The presence of this aggravating
circumstance negates the necessity of proving the
victims bad character to establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged and, at the
same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to
murder.
Supreme Court affirmed but reduced the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
43) Primo Miro v Porferio Mendoza
FACTS:
Mendoza is the Director of LTO Cebu, Erederos is his
niece and secretary, Alingasa was an LTO Clerk and
Peque is the OIC of the Operation Division of LTO.
They were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct for the alleged selling of confirmation
certificates supposed to be issued by the LTO for
free.
The affidavits of the respondents read:
“3. That in doing my job, I have noticed
and witnessed the following anomalies
concerning the processing of vehicle
registration, . . ., as follows:
a. That in order to secure the forms
of Confirmation of Certificates, you have
to buy the same at the present price of
P2,500.00 per pad from Catalina
Alingasa, an LTO personnel, who will
remit her collections to a certain Marilyn
Mendoza Vda. [de] Erederos, a niece and
62| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
the Secretary of the Regional Director,
Porferio Mendoza; EACIcH
b. That Confirmation Certificates
processed during previous
administration would not be honored
and under such situations, they would
require that the same be reprocessed
which means that we have to buy and
use the new forms supplied by the
present administration[.]”
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO
Manila also revealed that the confirmation
certificates were given to the representatives of car
dealers, who were authorized to supply the needed
data therein. Pertinent provision of said report
reads:
“06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms.
MARICAR G. HUETE, a resident of Lahug,
Cebu City and liaison Officer of GCY Parts,
Kabancalan Mandaue City and Mr. ERNESTO
R. CARTILLAS a resident of Basak, Mandaue
City and liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc. in
Jagobiao, Mandaue City stated among
others and both attested that: Annexes "E-E-
1."
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation
of Certificates, you have to buy the same at
the present cost of P2,500.00 per pad from
CATALINA ALINGASA, an LTO Personnel, who
will remit her collections to a certain
MARILYN MENDOZA Vda. De EREDEROS, a
niece and secretary of the Regional Director,
PORFERIO MENDOZA.”
Deputy Ombudsman’s Ruling:
Found Mendoza, Erederos, and Alingasa guilty of
grave misconduct, and found Peque guilty of simple
misconduct, relying largely on the NBI/ Progress
Report.
CA: Reversed the Deputy Ombudsman’s decision,
ruling that the finding of grave misconduct was not
supported by substantial evidence.
Found that affiants failed to categorically specify
that the respondent’s personally demanded from
them the payment of P2,500.00 — an allegation that
the appellate court deemed material in establishing
their personal knowledge.
Held that the statements in the affidavits were
hearsay.
ISSUE:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
whether the CA committed a reversible error in
dismissing the administrative charge against the
respondents
RULING: NO.
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative
findings of fact is not absolute.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive except when not supported by substantial
evidence.
In the present case, the CA found no substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that the
respondents are guilty of the administrative charges
against them. Mere allegation and speculation is not
evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. 15 Since
the Deputy Ombudsman's findings were found
wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same
shall not bind this Court.
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in
administrative cases
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The only pieces of evidence presented by the
complainants to establish the respondents' guilt of
the act charged are: (1) their complaint-
affidavits and the (2) NBI/Progress report. As
correctly found by the CA, these pieces of evidence
do not meet the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases.
i. Private complainants' affidavits
These affidavits indicate that the complainants have
commonly "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous
sale transaction concerning the confirmation
certificates.
While the payment to Alingasa might be considered
based on personal knowledge, the alleged
remittance to Erederos and Mendoza — on its face
— is hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the
witness knows himself but, of what he has heard
from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony
or statements but likewise applies to written
statements, such as affidavits.
The records show that not one of the complainants
actually witnessed the transfer of money from
Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Further, There is
no averment relating to any "personal demand" for
the amount of P2,500.00.
63| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
That the complainants alleged in the preface of their
affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the
anomalous act complained of does not take their
statements out of the coverage of the hearsay
evidence rule.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
Non-hearsay Legal hearsay
fact that utterances consists of the truth
or statements were of the facts asserted
made in the statement
is offered as an are offered as
assertion to prove evidence of the truth
the the fact of the of the fact asserted
utterance made
Not covered by the Covered by hearsay
hearsay rule rule
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them
inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn
statements, and considering the seriousness of the
charges filed, their affidavits must not be accepted
at face value and should be treated as inadmissible
under the hearsay evidence rule.
ii. NBI/Progress report
-should not be given any weight
It was based on complainant Huete's and Cantillas'
affidavits. It constitutes double hearsay because the
material facts recited were not within the personal
knowledge of the officers who conducted the
investigation.
Reports of investigations made by law enforcement
officers or other public officials are hearsay unless
the three requisites for admissibility under the rule
just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by
the public officer in the performance of his duties,
or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
Conclusion
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman
failed to establish the elements of grave
misconduct.
Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly
anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
affidavits of the complainants and the NBI/Progress
report, which are both hearsay.
44) GERALDO & ARIATE vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife,
daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other
persons, on being informed of the shooting of Arthur
Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he was, not
far from his residence, and found him lying on his
side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he
was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing
distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing and
Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the
"Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for the shooting
of the victim were subjected to paraffin tests at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in
Butuan City. However, the qualitative examination
conducted gave NEGATIVE results for powder
residue.
In documents denominated as affidavits,
Arnel and Mirasol separately gave a statement that
the petitioners were the one who shot his father. At
the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's
declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado" shot him.
Arnel substantially corroborated Mirasol's
statement.
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod, raised as
a defense that at 3 am of July 1, 2002, a barangay
kagawad woke him up and informed him that the
victim was shot. He and the barangay kagawad
proceeded to the crime scene and brought the
victim to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival. Petitioner Geraldo declared that he
slept in his house and at 6:30 am he saw many
people in the vicinity where the victim’s body was
found and learned that the victim was shot.
Policemen subsequently went to his house and
advised him to take a paraffin test.
The Trial Court ruled against the petitioners.
It was convinced of Mirasol’s testimony which was
corroborated by her brother Arnel Ronquillo and it
gave weight to the dying declaration of the victim.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
trial court's decision. It found that the trial court
erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating
circumstance.
ISSUE:
64| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Whether or not the trial court and the Court
of appeals erred in relying on the dying declaration
of the victim as recounted by Mirasol and
corroborated by Arnel.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled on the negative.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence
if the following circumstances are present: (a) it
concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the
declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d)
the dying declaration is offered in a case in which
the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death.
There is no dispute that the victim's
utterance to his children related to the identities of
his assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of
impending death, it is not necessary to prove that he
stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices
that, judging from the nature and extent of his
injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so
apparent to him that it may safely be inferred that
such ante mortem declaration was made under
consciousness of an impending death. The location
of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for
breath, and his eventual death before arriving at the
hospital meet this requirement.
It has not been established, however, that
the victim would have been competent to testify had
he survived the attack. There is no showing that he
had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among
other things, there is no indication whether he was
shot in front, the post-mortem examination report
having merely stated that the points of entry of the
wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and the
"right iliac area".
(RULING NOT RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
At all events, even if the victim's dying
declaration were admissible in evidence, it must
identify the assailant with certainty; otherwise it
loses its significance. In convicting petitioners, the
trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the testimony
of the victim's daughter Mirasol, which was
corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the
"Badjing" and "Amado" mentioned by the victim as
his assailants are herein petitioners whom they
claimed to know because they live in the same
barangay. The Court of Appeals believed too the
siblings' testimonies.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Contrary, however, to the immediately-
quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the
prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden
of proving that petitioners were, at the material
time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such
nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to
discharge.
When there is doubt on the identity of the
malefactors, motive is essential for their
conviction.The Court notes that in their affidavits
supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife
and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not
knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot
the victim. 34 At the trial, no evidence of any motive
was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners'
defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance
45) PEOPLE VS DE JOYA
FACTS:
A case regarding the crime of robbery and homicide
committed by a stabbing of an 88 year old woman in
Bulacan and the taking of her jewelries and other.
Accused Paquito De Joya allegedly committed the
crime, when the other companions – her daughter,
her son in law, both school teachers, and their child -
were away from the house. The RTC ruled the
accused guilty of reasonable doubt but sentenced
him only to life imprisonment because he was
already 72 years old.
The conviction of the accused was based on the ff.
evidence:
1) The testimony of Alvin, the grandson of the
deceased, that the latter was still able to
utter “si paqui” to him when he found her
bloodied and asked her what happened.
2) A quarrel that ensued earlier between the
accused and the deceased regarding the
former taking a bike without the latter’s
permission.
3) A step in sandal found inside the house that
was alleged to belong to the wife of the
accused and sister of the deceased.
4) The accused’s evasive nature during the
wake, which was evidenced by his attending
only once.
5) A neighbor saw the accused looking at the
house a few moments before the event took
place.
6) Attempt of the accused to settle amicably
the criminal charge.
65| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The accused questioned the ruling of the RTC finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the
evidence adduced against him.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC’s ruling was correct finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that the RTC erred on convicting
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based
on the evidence adduced.
1) The dying statement “si paqui” while referring to
the accused is not a sensible sentence in itself. It can
either be: a) a subject of a sentence or (b) an object
of a verb; if it was a subject then there was no
predicate uttered by the deceased and if it was an
object of a verb then there was also no verb uttered
by the deceased. Aside from that the statement
must be related to the question asked by the child
which was: “Apo, Apo what happened?” instead of
“Apo, Apo who did this to you?”
It has been held that a dying declaration to be
admissible must be complete in itself. It does not
mean that the declarant must recite everything that
constituted the res gestae of his statement, but that
his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as
converying his meaning in respect of such fact.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are
generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or
no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented
(by death or other circumstance) from saying all that
he wished to say what he did say might be qualified
by the statements which he was prevented from
making. Such incomplete statement is thus not
entitled to the presumption of truthfulness, which
constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations
are received.
Basically the SC held here that the RTC assumed that
the uttered words pointed out the accused as the
one who committed the crime but the deceased
never said such and so the SC said that such should
not be speculated.
2) The quarrel is insufficient to prove a credible
motive for the commission of such a violent and
gory death especially with the failure of the
prosecution to properly identify the perpetrator.
3) The slipper even if proven to belong to accused
wife has no relevant connection to the commission
of the crime.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
4) Failure to attend to the wake is not enough
indication of guilt as the accused was able to explain
that he was busy in his profession as a tailor and that
he had already viewed the body at the night the
murder took place. Such behavior is not contrary to
the common experience of man despite the fact that
respect for the dead is common cultural trait for
Filipinos.
5) Mere sighting by her neighbor of the accused in
the yard of the house of the deceased, in itself, is not
proof of any act or circumstance that the accused, a
72 year old man, committed such act.
6) In regards to the attempt to compromise the SC
ruled that such fact was not considered by the RTC
and so it inferred that the RTC either did not believe
of such fact and that a greater degree of explicitness
and detail that the accused impliedly admitted his
guilt to a crime as serious as Robbery with Homicide.
Thus the SC concluded: That the totality of the case
made against the accused consisted of an aborted,
incomplete dying declaration, and a number of
circumstances that does not necessarily give rise to a
compelling inference that the accused indeed
committed the crime. The sum total of all the
evidence was insufficient to induce that moral
certainty of guilt that characterizes proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
46) Fuentes vs. CA
FACTS:
Alejandro Fuentes has been convicted for murder by
the RTC. On appeal, he argued that he is innocent
and only a victim of mistaken identity.
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989
Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames,
Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit
dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur.
Fuentes, the petitioner, called Malaspina and placed
his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying,
"Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have
a short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed
Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife.
Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions
rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim
succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he
muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician
who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on
24 July 1989, reported that death was due to "stab
wound at left lumbar region 1-1⁄2 in. in length with
extracavitation of the small and large intestines."
66| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his
cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed
Malaspina. Zoilo allegedly confessed to petitioner
and Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and
Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt.
Benjamin Conde, Jr., that he (Zoilo) killed Malaspina.
Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he
was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation";
that he even showed him the knife he used and
asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail
and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the
relatives of the deceased. The following day however
he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone
and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he
did not commit.
RTC found Fuentes guilty of Murdering Malaspina.
CA also affirmed RTC’s decision.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued the following
contentions:
1. Appellate court erred when it held that
petitioner was positively and categorically
identified as the killer of Malaspina.
2. That there is an inconsistency between
testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the
effect that they saw petitioner stab
Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and
the testimony of the attending physician
that the victim was stabbed on the left
lumbar region.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the alleged declaration of Zoilo
against his penal interest, (that he killed
Malaspina and not petitioner) can be
accepted by the court.
2. Whether or not the argument of petitioner
of alleged inconsistency of the witnesses can
be given credence.
RULING:
1. No. Zoilo was not presented in court to
testify and they were not able to prove that
Zoilo is “UNABLE TO TESTIFY”.
Here, petitioner is claiming that Zoilo killed
Malaspina based on the alleged confession Zoilo
made to him and to Felicisimo. But this is only
hearsay as when Zoilo is not presented in court. One
of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that pertaining to declarations made against
interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest
and against third persons." The admissibility in
evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the
admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In this case, DECLARANT IS NOT “UNABLE TO
TESTIFY”. There is no showing that Zoilo is either
dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates.
His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not
make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For
it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each
and every piece of evidence that can break the
prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-
appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo
admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show
that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be
misunderstood, the Court is always for the
admission of evidence that would let an innocent
declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can
be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial
statement is not even authenticated thus increasing
the probability of its fabrication; it is made to
persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and
it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is
unable to testify.
Furthermore, even petitioner’s own witness, Nerio
Biscocho, who claimed he also saw the killing,
testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner,
and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same person.
2. No. The discrepancy in inconsequential.
Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency
between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that
they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right
lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending
physician that the victim was stabbed on the left
lumbar region.
This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material
is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that
67| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified
petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed
that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite
some time and never had any personal
misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as
to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill
motives to falsely implicate him.
47) DANILO L. PAREL vs. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO
KEYWORD: two-storey residential house
FACTS:
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio
(respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner with the
RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-
storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes
Park National Reservation near Department of Public
Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property
was constructed solely from his own funds and
declared in his name under Tax Declaration No.
47048; he commenced the construction of said
house in 1972 until its completion three years later;
when the second floor of said house became
habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner’s parents,
Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move
therein and occupy the second floor while the
construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the
materials; when the construction of the second floor
was finished in 1975, respondent allowed
petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and
temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer
magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house
of their own and since respondent’s wife is the older
sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November
1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them
to vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement and he needed the place to which
petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to
U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent’s
knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully
entered and took possession of the ground floor of
respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to vacate
the house despite repeated demands prompted
respondent to file the instant action for recovery of
possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a
monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and
every month thereafter until the latter vacates the
said premises and surrender possession thereof; and
for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and cost of suit.
Petitioner filed his Answer with
Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-
owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper
story belongs to respondent while the ground floor
pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is occupying the
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ground floor upon the instruction of his father,
Florentino, with respondent’s full knowledge; his
parents spent their own resources in improving and
constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners
thereof; the late Florentino was an awardee of the
land on which the house stands and as a co-owner
of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof;
the demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to
deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-
owner of the said house; that respondent had filed
ejectment case as well as criminal cases against
them involving the subject house which were all
dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s
fees.
Petitioner concedes that while his former
counsel failed to make a formal offer of his
documentary evidence before the trial court and
that the court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered, he maintains that the said
rule is not absolute, citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v.
Borja; that his documentary evidence which were
not formally offered in evidence were marked during
the presentation of the testimony of petitioner’s
witnesses and were part of their testimonies; that
these evidence were part of the memorandum filed
by him before the trial court on July 12, 1993.
Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the
documentary evidence, his testimony as well as that
of his witnesses substantiated his claim of co-
ownership of the subject house between his late
father and respondent as found by the trial court.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding
the affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring
respondent as owner of the subject house as
conclusive proof that respondent is the true and
only owner of the house since the affidavit should
be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
which it was executed.
Petitioner further contends that since he
had established his father’s co-ownership of the
subject house, respondent has no legal right to eject
him from the property; that he could not be
compelled to pay rentals for residing in the ground
floor of the subject house; that respondent should
bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for
damages which petitioner sustained for being
constrained to litigate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that his father
was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential
house.
RULING:
NO. The respondent had shown sufficient evidence
to support his complaint for recovery of possession
68| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
of the ground floor of the subject house as the
exclusive owner thereof. Section 38 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 38. Declaration
against interest. – The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to the
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest
and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations
against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of
such evidence advisable and, further that the
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which
are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989
was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge
with respect to the subject covered by his
statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the
residential building, he is not the owner of the same
as it is owned by respondent who is residing in
Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not
have made such declaration unless he believed it to
be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his
children’s interests as his heirs.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts
and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The
house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his
late father had been consistently declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and
this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-
mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that
respondent is the sole owner of the house subject
matter of the litigation.
In this case, the records show that although
petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to
offer his documentary evidence in writing, he,
however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did not
consider the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a
judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties to the suit. It is a settled rule that the mere
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence
of a party.
Petitioner insists that although his
documentary evidence were not formally offered,
the same were marked during the presentation of
the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be
taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we
allowed evidence on minority by admitting the
certified true copy of the birth certificate attached to
a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered
in evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth
certificate was properly filed in support of a motion
for bail to prove petitioner’s minority which was
never challenged by the prosecution and it already
formed part of the records of the case. The rule
referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule
133 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section
7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on
facts not appearing of record, the court may hear
the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by
the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions; and not Section 34 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable
to the present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the
documentary evidence of petitioner should be
considered in his favor, the evidence showing that
respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against
petitioner which were dismissed as well as the
alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioner’s
parents whereby they authorized petitioner to stay
in the ground floor of the house, did not establish
co-ownership of Florentino and respondent of the
subject house. The testimonies of petitioner and his
witnesses failed to show that the subject house is
co-owned by petitioner’s father and respondent.
48) People v. Alfredo Alegado y Delima
KEYWORD: Pedigree testimony is an exception to
Hearsay Rule; Statutory Rape
FACT:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted
of two counts of rape, narrated as follows:
1. On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, complainant was playing at
the Freedom Square inside the public
market of San Carlos City when appellant, a
170-pound, 53-year old, market watchman
at the time, held her by the hand and took
69| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
her upstairs to the second floor of the public
market building which houses some
government offices and which at the time
was expectedly deserted. When they
reached the upper floor of the building,
appellant ordered complainant to hold his
penis and masturbate it. After, appellant
ordered complainant to lie down, and when
she refused he pushed her down on the
floor. Appellant then tried to insert his penis
into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully
before he ejaculated.
Thereafter, appellant gave complainant
P2.00 and left. Complainant stood up and
went down the building but never told
anybody about it because she was afraid
appellant would kill her.
2. On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening complainant was sitting at the
Freedom Square when appellant
approached her and told her to go with him
upstairs. Complainant refused but appellant
shoved her towards the stairs, held her by
the left arm, and brought her to the upper
floor. Appellant inserted his penis into
complainant's vagina but it took sometime
before his organ could penetrate the girl.
When it did, complainant felt excruciating
pain and begged appellant to stop.
Appellant just ignored her and continued on
without saying anything. And after appellant
had withdrawn his sex organ, complainant
discovered that her vagina was bleeding.
Appellant then stood up and told her not to
tell anybody about it. Then appellant gave
her P 2.00 and left.
As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by
Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the
San Carlos City INP assigned at Precinct No. 1, a
police outpost near the main entrance of the public
market. Pat. Alfaro knew appellant well because he
was the public market watchman at the time. A
minute later, Pat. Alfaro saw complainant coming
down the same stairs. Pat. Alfaro noticed that
complainant was pale, with blood flowing to her
thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy.
Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what
happened to her. Complainant answered that she
was taken upstairs and raped by appellant.
Immediately, Pat. Alfaro brought complainant to the
city hospital where she was examined by Dr. Oscar
Jagdon Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported the incident
to the Station Guard by phone then took
complainant to the police station after the medical
examination. When they reached the station,
appellant who had already been taken into custody
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
was readily identified by complainant as the rapist.
Complainant was then investigated and she
rendered her statement to the police.
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape punished under Article 335 paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code. (Statutory Rape)
Complainant’s Contention: CRISTINA DEANG y
VILLAROSA alleged that the accused raped her twice
“against her will and without her consent”, and that
she was below twelve (12) years of age on both rape
instances.
Accused’s Contention: The accused-appellant
contends that the offended party's actual age at the
time of the alleged incidents of rape was not
established with certainty, hence, it was error on the
part of the trial court to convict the him of Statutory
Rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 3,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The
testimonies of complainant and complainant’s
grandfather do not come from their personal
knowledge of the fact of birth of the complainant.
Hence, their testimony to that fact constitutes
Hearsay. Also, the accused-appellant contends that
the RTC erroneously found that the rapes were
committed with force and intimidation, as the victim
even accepted payment of P2.00 each time.
ISSUES:
1. Do the testimonies of complainant and
complainant’s grandfather constitute
Hearsay?
2. Was there force and intimidation in both
rape instances?
3. Did the acceptance of the victim of P2.00 on
both instances amount to tacit consent on
her part?
RULING:
1. No. Their testimonies do not constitute
hearsay, as they are exceptions to the
hearsay rule as provided under sections 39
and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: (1)
the offended party herself and (2) her maternal
grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that
the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not
constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the
accused-appellant but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under
sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is
70| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
provided, in part, that:
SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. ...
The word “pedigree” under Section 39 of the same
Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred and the names of the
relatives.
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261
[1979], we stated that:
…Declarations in regard to pedigree, although
hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are
natural expressions of persons who must know the
truth (See Sec. 39, Rule 130 under the new Rules).
Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best
that the nature of the case admits and because
greater evil might arise from the rejection of such
proof than from its admission.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130,
Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove
the victim's age is beyond question. The said
provision contains three requisites for its
admissibility, namely:
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the
pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the
reputation or tradition regarding the
pedigree of the person must be a member of
the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at
bar considering that the date of birth of the rape
victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of
the victim's grandfather relating to tradition
(sending a child to school upon reaching the age of
seven) existed long before the rape case was filed;
and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is
the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Pertinent part of the transcript:
Q The complainant in this case is a certain
Cristina Deang. Do you know her?
A: Yes,
sir. She is my granddaughter.

Q Who is the mother of Cristina Deang? A:
My daughter, Angelita Villarosa.

Q Is she here?
A: No, she is not here.

Q Where is she now?
A: I don't know
where she works now, because she did not
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

send a letter to me.
My last knowledge 2. Yes, there was force and intimidation found
about her whereabouts was that she was in by the Trial Court, although for conviction
Manila. under Article 335 paragraph 3 of the Revised
Q With whom is this Cristina Deang living Penal Code, such finding is no longer
now?
A: In our residence.
 necessary.
Q How did it happen that Cristina Deang has
been living with you?
A: The mother left
Time and again we have held that the gravamen of
her to me.

the offense of statutory rape as provided under
Q When was it that the mother left her to
Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is
you?
A: In 1983.
 the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve
Q How old was Cristina Deang at the time years old. It is not necessary to prove that the victim
her mother left her to you?
A: The mother was intimidated or that force was used against her
of Cristina Deang told me that she was born because in statutory rape the law presumes that the
in 1976 and please let her go to school.
 victim on account of her tender age, does not and
ATTY. BRIONES:
I would like to make it of cannot have a will of her own. Hence, the only
record that the information gathered by the elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender
mother, Angelita, is a hearsay your Honor. had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such
PROSECUTOR FABROZ:
I would like to woman is under twelve (12) years of age.
prove the fact about the birth of the
child..
 Considering that in the instant case there is clear
COURT: Let it stay in record. and competent evidence that the victim was under
PROSECUTOR FABROZ:
Q By the way, did twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape
you have a talk or conversation with your incidents complained of, the second argument
daughter, Angelita, the mother of the purported by the accused-appellant that the alleged
complainant Cristina Deang, about when rapes were not attended by any force or intimidation
Cristina Deang was born?
A: We did not must also fail. Proof of carnal knowledge of the
talk about the birth of Cristina, but she told victim in this case who was only eleven (11) years
me to let her daughter Cristina go to school old on the two separate occasions reported (April 14
because she is already 7 years old.
 and 20, 1988) is overwhelming while unnecessary
Q Did you ask her about the birth of Cristina force and intimidation also appear in the records.
Deang? The offended party’s testimony regarding the
ATTY. BRIONES:
I think that is misleading abominable and wicked acts of the accused-
your Honor.
 appellant against her chastity on the two occasions
COURT:
Witness may answer.
 indicated in the separate informations filed by the
WITNESS: That is what she told me, she was victim herself was given in a straightforward manner
born on September 5, 1976.
 without any indication that the same was motivated
by any ill-feeling toward the pinpointed perpetrator.
Moreover, the offended party herself categorically The fact of rape on the said occasions related by the
stated in open court that she was born on offended party was corroborated by the examining
September 5, 1976. It is long-settled, as early as in physician whose medical finding revealed the
the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino, that the testimony of presence of sperm cells inside the victim's sexual
a person as to his age is admissible, although organ due to partial penetration of the male organ
hearsay, and though a person can have no personal into it. It is axiomatic in rape cases that the slightest
knowledge of the date of his birth as all the penetration of the female's private organ is
knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from sufficient to consummate the crime.
what he is told by his parents– he may testify as to
his age as he had learned it from his parents and There is no merit in the accused-appellant's
relatives and his testimony in such case is an contention that the trial court abused its discretion
assertion of family tradition. in concluding that there was force and intimidation
since the information did not contain any allegation
Hence, inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to to that effect simply because the phrase "against her
present contrary evidence to dispute the will and without her consent" contained in both
prosecution's claim that the victim in this case was informations charging the accused-appellant of rape
below twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape connotes the attendance of force and intimidation.
incidents under consideration, the SC affirmed the
trial court's finding that the victim in these rape
3. No. It did not amount to tacit consent.
cases was under twelve years of age.

71| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The accused-appellant's act of giving the offended
party the sum of P2.00 after each instance of
"forcible copulation" apparently as "full atonement
for his dastardly act" smacks of "insult a hundred
times compounded." The accused-appellant, despite
the trial court's strong words, even had the gall to
reiterate before us his claim that the acceptance of
the said measly amount of P2.00 was tantamount to
a tacit consent on the part of his victim. We deplore
such a highly offensive and depraved argument for
we cannot allow the innocent and helpless victims of
unsolicited and forcible defloration to be brutally
insulted while yet nursing their irreparably wounded
sexual purity.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the amount of civil indemnity which the
accused shall pay to the offended party in each of
the two rape cases is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.

49) Tison vs CA
FACTS:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are
niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller
Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their
father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only
by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on
October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed
an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating
unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in
dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT
was issued in the latter’s name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming
that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of
Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller
Tison was presented as the lone witness, with
documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners’
filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners
thereafter rested their case and submitted a written
offer of the exhibits.
72| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer
to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners
failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for
reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals upheld
the dismissal, declaring that the documentary
evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as
the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint
affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a third person (private
respondent), not the father nor an heir, may
attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not petitioners failed to meet the
quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the
Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation
3. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by
right of representation.
RULING:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party
to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
NO. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even
his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount to an insult to his memory.
2. YES. With regard to legitimacy, both the trial
court and CA overlooked the universally
recognized presumption on legitimacy. Well
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Even assuming that the issue is
allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden
of proof rests not on herein petitioners who
have the benefit of the presumption in their
favor, but on private respondent who is
disputing the same. The presumption of
legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its
effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the
party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to
destroy the presumption, the party against
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
whom it operates must adduce substantial and
credible evidence to the contrary. Where there
is an entire lack of competent evidence to the
contrary, and unless or until it is rebutted, it has
been held that a presumption may stand in lieu
of evidence and support a finding or decision.
When private respondent opted not to present
countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly
admitted the truth of such fact.
With regard to their filiation to Teodora
Guerrero, the primary proof to be considered in
ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered
a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the ROC, subject
to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that
the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than
the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was
made ante litem motam, that is, not only before
the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon. Of the four, only
(3) remains disputable, so the question remains
if the evidence was enough to corroborate w/
each other. Court holds that all the evidence
presented, can be deemed to have sufficiently
established the relationship between the
declarant and herein petitioners. This is in
consonance with the rule that a prima facie
showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of
the relationship is required.
(SUCCESSION TOPIC BUT JUST IN CASE)
3. The following provisions of the Civil Code
provide for the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
“Art. 975. When children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate
descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse
shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice
73| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, should there be any, under Article
1001.”
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.”
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero,
one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein
petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in
their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could
only validly alienate his total undivided three-
fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to
herein private respondent. Resultantly,
petitioners and private respondent are deemed
co-owners of the property covered by the
Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of
an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths
(3/4) share thereof, respectively.
50) Mendoza vs. CA
FACTS: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981,
in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista
Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent,
alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to
Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant
Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized
her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such
and according her the rights and privileges of a
recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old,
specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set
up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that
it was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with
her mother because Casimiro was married but she
used to visit him at his house. When she married
Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck
and engaged him to drive it so he could have a
livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In
1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to
build a house on his lot and later he gave her money
to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring.
On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint
savings account with her as a co-depositor at the
Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate,
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook
from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her
after admonishing Margarita.1
Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he
considered Casimiro his grandfather because
Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever
they saw each other and Casimiro would give him
money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and
give him jackfruits. when his grandfather learned
that he was living on a rented lot, the old man
allowed him to build a house on the former's land.2
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely,
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both
relatives of Casimiro.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and
knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with
him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him
she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a
go-between for their liaison, which eventually
resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and
giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00
to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro
also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to
Brigida.3
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father
of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's
brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so
informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and
whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would
also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00
to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that
Casimiro intended to give certain properties to
Teopista.4
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his
advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to
resist Teopista's claim.
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied
in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been held
to be applicable not only to natural children but also
to spurious children.7 The said article provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the
father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of
his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father.
74| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
(4) When the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
This article has been substantially reproduced in the
Family Code as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children
is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:l
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge
Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s claim
that she was in continuous possession of the status
of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter or of his family.
On appeal, however, the respondent
8
courts disagreed and arrived at its own conclusion
as follows:
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a
quo, We find that appellant has sufficiently
proven her continuous possession of such
status. Although the court a quo did not
pass on the credibility of the various
witnesses presented, We consider the
witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and
unbiased. No proof was shown to render
them otherwise. There is no showing that
Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely. They
were disinterested parties with no axe to
grind against the appellee or the people
actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the
court a quo conceded to the truthfulness of
some of their testimonies.
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an
interested party who was claiming to be the sole
recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to
lose much inheritance if Teopista's claim were
recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges against
his own sister and libel charges against her husband.
As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it
difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
although both of them have been living in the same
barangay since birth.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated on August 11, 1988. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the
opposition thereto of the private respondent that
Casimiro's counsel learned that his client had died
on May 1986. He immediately informed the
respondent court build the motion for
reconsideration was denied without any substitution
of parties having been effected. The said counsel,
now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court
to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro
Mendoza in the present petition.
We hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro
Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente
Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate
son, pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. This disposes of the private
respondent's contention that the lawyer-client
relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and
that Vicente has no personality now to substitute
him.
Now to the merits.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to
comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not
be of an intermittent character while it
continues.10 The possession of such status means
that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through others, spontaneously and
without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate).11 There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care.12
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the
trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous
possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate
child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the
defendant although they were both residents of
Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent
court observed, that this could have been because
defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not
unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into
his house to live with him and his legitimate wife,
especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In
fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an
illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter
and his wife, apparently without objection from the
latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the
surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
75| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the
regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the
plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The
trial court correctly concluded that such instances
were "off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent.
Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is
tenuous as in one breath she said that her mother
solely spent for her education and in another that
Casimiro helped in supporting her.13
But although Teopista has failed to show that she
was in open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she
has nevertheless established that status by another
method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court
did not take into account is that an illegitimate child
is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is
her father," according to the Family Code. Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting
his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's
parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that
Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing
as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about
pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word "pedigree" includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
It was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this
question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's
father. His testimony was that he was informed by
his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and
Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that
Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter. 15
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Such acts or declarations may be received in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
because "it is the best the nature of the case admits
and because greater evils are apprehended from the
rejection of such proof than from its admission. 16
Commenting on this provision, Francisco
enumerates the following requisites that have to be
complied with before the act or declaration
regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant
and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other
than such declaration.17
All the above requisites are present in the case at
bar. The persons who made the declarations about
the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of
Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito,
were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The
declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and
the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues
involved in the complaint for compulsory
recognition. The declarations were made before the
complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally,
the relationship between the declarants and
Casimiro has been established by evidence other
than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in
which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. 18
The said declarations have not been refuted.
Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he
was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the
case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated
under oath by the private respondent and her
witnesses, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is
hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring
Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late
Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights
appurtenant to such status. Costs against the
petitioner.
51) Solinap v Locsin
PRINCIPLE: Birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained
76| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
where there exists strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity.
FACTS:
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December
11, 1990, pursuant to this, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC of Iloilo, a Petition for
Letters of Administration praying that he be
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he
is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin; (b) that during his; and (c) that he is the only
surviving legal heir of the decedent.
Petitioners in this case which are the nephews and
nieces of Juan Sr. claims to be the lawful heirs of the
deceased. They averred that respondent is not a
child or an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed
"Sr." in his name.
Evidence of Respondent, Juan Jr.:
1. Machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the
bound volume of birth records in the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
2. Presented as witness: Rosita J. Vencer, the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City to prove the
existence and authenticity of Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477.
3. Photograph (Exhibit C”) showing him and his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a
coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead
body. TN: Respondent claims that such
shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the
deceased.
Evidence of Petitioners:
1. Certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General,
Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit
"8", indicating that the birth of respondent
was reported by his motherand does not
contain the signature of the late Juan Sr.
TN: While respondent was born on October 22,
1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30,
1957his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit
"D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958
revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8"
appears on a July, 1956 form, already used
before respondent's birth.
2. Presented as witness: Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a
handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G.
Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City)
appearing in (Exhibit "D") are forgeries
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
TC Decision: Granted Petition of Juan E. Locsin, Jr as
administrator fidning Exhibit "D" and “C” as
sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation
with the deceased.
Court of Appeals: affirmed in toto the order of the
trial court
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: WON Respondent presented sufficient
evidence that he is an acknowledged natural son of
the deceased thus entitling him for the issuance of
letters of administration?
RULING:
NO. Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court states that if no executor is named in the will,
or are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
Undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C.
Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition
for issuance of letters of administration, respondent
alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of
the deceased, implying that he is an interested
person in the estate and is considered as next of
kin.
SC held that:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgement;
or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to
Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from
all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are
officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil
Registrars.
Facts which made SC decide that Exhibit D was a
spurious document thus making Juan Jr. not illegible
as administrator:
a. The testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City - She testified about
an event which took place 37 or 38 years
77| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
ago which made knowledge of respondent’s
birth record based merely on her general
impressions of the existing records in that
Office.
TN: (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1,
1958 revised form. When Vencer was asked how
a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered
that maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had
requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958
Revised Form.
b. The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in
the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is
torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the
bound volume, not sewn like the other
entries.
c. Exhibit "D" is a typewritten carbon copy of
the alleged original while the records of all
other certificates are handwritten.
d. Exhibit "D" does not indicate important
particulars, such as the alleged father's
religion, race, occupation, address and
business. The space which calls for an entry
of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the
back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father,
but the blanks calling for the date and other
details of his Residence Certificate were not
filled up.
SC As to Exhibit 8:
a. Found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro
Manila on Municipal Form No. 102, revised
in July, 1956.
TN: It is logical to assume that the 1956 forms
would continue to be used several years
thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in
1957 is unlikely.
b. Shows that respondent's record of birth was
made by his mother.
c. Does not show signature and name of Juan
C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and
the entry that he and respondent’s mother
were married in Oton, Iloilo.
A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil
Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the copy
being kept by the latter. In this case, Exhibit "8", as
transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records
of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Also as to Exhibit “C” of respondent, such cannot
and will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
can have a picture taken while standing before a
coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming
the estate of the deceased.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exist strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case,
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry has
all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the
authentic copy on file in that office was removed
and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live
Birth.
It also bears stressing the provision of Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies
between the two Certificates of Live have overturned
the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local
Civil Registry. Thus, what is authentic is Exhibit "8"
recorded in the Civil Registry General.
52) Jison v CA 
 evidence were presented from witnesses to
KEYWORD: Proof of paternity filiation, wala gi
angkon ni Daddy Francisco
PRINCIPLE: Circumstantial Evidence & Hearsay
exception Rule
Note: This case was really loaded and had several
issues related to evidence, I just followed the notes
to guide me in pinpointing which issues to include.
FACTS:
Monina Jison (respondent) alleges that she is the
daughter of Francisco (petitioner) who had been
married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. She
further alleges that her mother Esperanza F. Amolar
(who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco's
daughter, Lourdes), was impregnated by petitioner
At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar and
that since childhood she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate
child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family.
MONINA further alleged that Francisco gave her
support and spent for her education, such that she
obtained a Master's degree, became a certified
public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central
78| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Bank examiner. Monina filed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that
Francisco support and treat her as such.
Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in
his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then; further, he never
recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his
illegitimate child.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of
eleven (11) witnesses: herself, Ruben Castellanes,
Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro
Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy
Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and
Lope Amolar.
CA ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the Certificate issued by the Local
Civil Registrar & baptismal certificate to prove
filiation is admissible.
2. Whether or not various notes and letter written
by Francisco’s relatives attesting to Monina’s
filiation is admissible.
RULING:
1. Court ruled in favor of respondent but disagreed
with respondent regarding this issue: (Note: Several
documents like school records, birth and baptismal
certificates) Respondent’s reliance on the
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
concerning her birth is clearly misplaced. It is
settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates, and the Local
Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person. Simply put, if the
alleged father did not intervene in the birth
certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself,
the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor
or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by
the registrar without the signature of the father is
not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the
latter's part. In like manner, Francisco’s lack of
participation in the preparation of the baptismal
certificates and school records renders the
documents incompetent to prove paternity, the
former being competent merely to prove the
administration of the sacrament of baptism on the
date so specified.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Furthermore, the certificates issued by the Local
Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates cannot
be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove
respondent’s filiation. Since they are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation,
they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
2. As to the various notes and letters written by
FRANCISCO's relatives, allegedly attesting to
MONINA's liation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA witnessed
the authors signing the documents, nevertheless,
under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no
showing that the declarants-authors were dead or
unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and MONINA shown by
evidence other than the documents in question. As
to the admissibility of these documents under Rule
130, Section 40, however, this requires further
elaboration. We hold that the scope of the
enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is
limited to objects which are commonly known as
"family possessions," or those articles which
represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its
belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have
been described as objects "openly exhibited and
well known to the family," or those "which, if
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a
family tradition." Other examples of these objects
which are regarded as reflective of a family's
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin
plates.
Plainly then, the various letter as private
documents not constituting "family possessions" as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis
of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits
be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation.
Their inadmissibility not withstanding, the various
letters of Francisco’s relatives inclusive, may, in like
manner as MONINA's school records, properly be
admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen
her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO
recognized her as his daughter.
EXTRA INFO: Ratio for why the court ruled in favor
of respondent:
Under Family Code provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
79| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
To prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations
of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such
a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and
in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
While it has been observed that unlawful
intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof
of an opportunity for such indulgence, this does not
favor Francisco. Akin to the crime of rape where, in
most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are
the participants in the sexual act themselves, in
deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to
the victim's or mother's word, as against the
accused's or putative father's protestations. In the
instant case, Monina's mother could no longer
testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had,
unfortunately, passed away long before the
institution of the complaint for recognition. But this
did not mean that Monina could no longer prove her
filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may
be established by evidence other than the testimony
of her mother. The paramount question then is
whether Monina's evidence is coherent, logical and
natural.
The complaint stated that Francisco had carnal
knowledge of respondent’s mom "by about the end
of 1945." This was broad enough to cover the fourth
quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August
1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations
between Francisco and Monina’s mother. The
evidence in this case established that respondent’s
mother was still in the employ of petitioner at the
time respondent was conceived as determined by
the date of her birth, sexual contact between
petitioner and respondent’s mother was not at all
impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
evidence, that indeed Francisco fathered Monina,
has recognized her as his daughter and that Monina
has been enjoying the open and continuous
possession of the status as Francisco’s illegitimate
daughter.
53) Ferrer, et. al. v. de Inchausti, et. al.
PRINCIPLE: Evidence may be given upon trial of
monuments and inscriptions in public places as
evidence of common reputation; and entries in
family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as
evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in
the said booklet be made at the same time as the
occurrence of those events.
FACT:
This is an action by the third generation
parties traced from their alleged common ancestors
filed on 1916 on the accounts of events that
transpired somewhere in the 1800s.
Plaintiffs allege that they are the children of
a certain Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzales
(Rosa) – the alleged daughter of a certain Isabel.
They filed the complaint to recover the share of
their mother in the estate of Isabel at the rate of
1/5. (the whole estate to be shared with the other 4
siblings of Rosa allegedly)
They further alleged that Isabel Gonzales
had a first marriage with a Ramon Viademonte, Sr.
who had two children, one Ramon, Jr., the other is
their mother. Ramon, Sr. died and Isabel contracted
another marriage with Don Jose Joaquin de
Inchausti who, then, had three children who are the
respondents in this case. Thus, according to the
plaintiffs, there are five (5) siblings in total. They
claimed that Rosa’s siblings called her as sister and
them as brothers/sisters. (mostly in the school)
Upon death of Isabel, Don Jose executed an
extrajudicial partition dividing the estate of Isabel
with the four (4) siblings giving them ¼ of the estate
to the exclusion of Rosa.
The common defenses of the respondents
are as follows:
1. Rosa was not married to the father of
the plaintiffs (making them illegitimate);
2. Rosa’s surname is not Viademonte y
Gonzales;
3. Rosa is not a daughter of Isabel;
4. As per Rafael (who is now dead), Rosa is
not their sister but a protégé of her
mother Isabel;
5. That the action has prescribed.
ISSUES:
80| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
1. WON the plaintiffs are legitimate
children of Rosa?
2. WON Rosa is a legitimate daughter of
Isabel?
3. WON testimony of Joaquin Jose as to
the declaration of Rafael is a heresay.
4. WON entries in family books be entered
should be made at the same time it
occurred?
5. WON Rosa can inherit if she will be
considered as natural child of Rosa?
RULING:
1. No. In different proceedings, Rosa made
contradicting statements where on some
occasions, she claimed that she was not
married to Ferrer (father of plaintiffs) and
on some occasions, she is a widow of Ferrer.
it is undeniable that she could not duly
justify the marriage contracted by her with
Benigno Ferrer.
2. No. From all the evidence adduced, the
slightest indication cannot be inferred that
Rosa Matilde was born during the marriage
of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., with
Isabel Gonzalez or within the 300 days after
the dissolution of their marriage by the
death of the husband, nor has the said
Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., in his
lifetime recognized said Rosa Matilde as his
daughter. If Rosa Matilde is a legitimate
daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, it follows that
she was also a daughter of Isabel's husband,
Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, under the
assumption that she was born in the
marriage of both or at a time prior or
subsequent to that of the celebration of the
marriage, as fixed by law.
It was established that Ramon, Sr. died
on 1836 (tho death certificate was not
presented, conclusion was based on
consequential evidence). However, it was
established that Rosa was born after such
date, around 1850s. The evidences are as
follows:
a. Baptismal certificate which provides
that on September 1, 1862, a child three
days old, born of unknown parents, was
baptized in the Cathedral Church of this
city, and given the name of Rosa
Matilde Robles which Rosa (in another
proceeding against Rafael) admitted
that such might be hers;
b. On page 9 of the day-book which Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept
during his lifetime, appears a
memorandum which says: "On
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
September 1, 1852, at seven o'clock in
the evening, a child three days old,
named Rosa Matilde Robles, according
to the baptismal certificate issued by the
acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of
the Cathedral Church of Manila, was
delivered to my mother; this child was
baptized by the priest Don Remigio
Rodriguez with the authority of said
rector, and according to the baptismal
certificate, it was a child of unknown
parents.
c. Joaquin Jose de Inchausti stated that
one day he was assured by his half-
brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte
that Rosa Matilde was not his sister, but
that she was only a mere protegee and
that her true name was Rosa Matilde
Robles, and that on that occasion the
said brother showed him the certificate
of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a copy,
which he took from the parochial
church.
3. No. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez
Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of
Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the
said deceased is admissible, for they are
members of the same family, in accordance
with the provisions of section 281 of Act No.
190 (now Rulem 130, Section 39, The
declaration, act, or omission of a member of
a family who is not living, or is outside the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands, is
admissible as evidence of pedigree or
relationship, or family genealogy in cases
where pedigree, relationship, or family
genealogy are questions at issue.)
4. No. The law does not require that the
entries in the said booklet be made at the
same time as the occurrence of those
events.
5. No. The hereditary rights of the successors
of the Isabel should be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time
of her death (Law of Toro), which provides,
among other things, that natural children
have no right to succeed to their natural
mother when, on her death, the latter
leaves legitimate children, as in the present
case, and for this reason it is useless to
inquire as to whether Rosa Viademonte or
Robles was a natural or even an
acknowledged natural child of Isabel
Gonzalez.
81| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
6. The action has prescribed. Libog siya coz ang
basis is the Old Civil Procedure. 10 years
prescription from the date of enactment of
Old Civil Procedure which was August 7,
1901, this was filed on 1916.
54) In Re: Florencio Mallare | 1968
Case: Disbarment on the ground of citizenship
FACTS:
• Florencio Mallare (Florencio) is a practicing
lawyer.
• Acting Commissioner of Immigration
Martiniano P. Vivo denounced Florencio as
a Chinaman and prayed for his disbarment.
FLORENCIO’S CONTENTIONS
(1) His parents are Filipinos.
• Florencio’s father Estaban is Filipino citizen by
choice (election) because Esteban was only an
illegitimate son (as opposed to legitimate) of a
Chinese father and a Filipina mother named
“Ana.”
• Florencio’s mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed
the citizenship of her husband Esteban upon
their marriage, thereby making her a Filipina.
(2) Res Judicata.
• Florencio, and his siblings, have been declared
Filipino citizens in a final judgment in a Civil
Case.
• Florencio’s birth record, wherein he was
originally registered as a Chinese, has likewise
been ordered corrected to Filipino, by final
judgment in a Special Proceeding.
ISSUES:
I. W/N FLORENCIO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
HELD: NO. The evidence is clearly preponderant, if
not overwhelming that Florencio's father, Esteban,
was and remained a Chinese until he died;
consequently, Florencio's mother, admittedly a
Chinese, retained her original citizenship, and their
offspring are likewise Chinese.
EVIDENCE THAT FLORENCIO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
(1) Testimonial Evidence
(a) Testimony of Catarroja, an ex-municipal
president
o Catarroja met Florencio’s grandmother
Ana and her son Esteban (Florencio’s
father) when the latter was 8 years old in
1902, but he had not seen her actually
deliver or give birth to the baby boy
Esteban.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
o HELD: There was no evidence that Ana
was an "inhabitant of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein who
was a Spanish subject on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine" as required by the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 (en masse
Filipinization) and she cannot, therefore,
be considered a Filipina.
(b) Testimonies of the Mallare children
o The Mallare children testified that their
grandmother Ana had NOT actually
married her Chinese husband, therefore
she remained a Filipina.
o HELD: Insufficient to overcome the
presumption that persons living together
as husband and wife are married to each
other.
(2) Documentary Evidence
(a) Landing Certificate of Residence
• Te Na, Florencio’s Chinese mother, was
described in a landing certificate of
residence issued to her as "wife of P.I.
(Philippine Islands) citizen" and as wife of
Esteban, P.I. citizen".
• HELD: A landing certificate of residence
issued under Section 7, Act 702 by the
Collector of Customs is based upon an
administrative ex parte determination of
the evidence presented and the facts as
stated by the applicant and, therefore,
carries little evidentiary weight as to
citizenship. The truth of Te Na's
declarations when she applied for the
landing certificate could have been
inquired into had she been presented as a
witness in these proceedings, but this was
not done.
(b) Affidavit of Election of Citizenship
• Esteban executed an affidavit stating
therein that when he reached the age of
majority he had "definitely elected to be a
Filipino citizen following the citizenship of
my mother."
• HELD: Self-serving and not a substitute for
a duly recorded election of Philippine
citizenship. When Esteban executed it, he
was already thirty-six (36) years old and he
executed it for the purpose of making a
change in a miscellaneous lease
application wherein he had previously
stated that he is a citizen of China.
(c) Voter’s registration
• Esteban was a registered voter in
Macalelon, Quezon.
• HELD: Esteban’s registration as a voter
indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens
but this does not alter his real citizenship,
82| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
which, in this jurisdiction, is determinable
by his blood ( jus sanguinis).
EVIDENCE THAT FLORENCIO IS A CHINESE CITIZEN
(1) All children of Esteban and Te Na were
registered at birth as children of a Chinese
father and a Chinese mother and with the added
detail that their parents were born in China.
(2) The birth certificate of one of the Mallari
children bears the Esteban’s own signature as
the father. If Esteban was indeed a Filipino by
choice, then he should have so stated in this
birth certificate, instead, he admits, against his
own interest, that he is a Chinese.
(3) Esteban’s own death certificate, signed by his
son, shows that Esteban was a Chinese, born in
Fookiang, China.
• The affidavit of said son denying that the
signature is his is inadmissible as it was
offered in evidence for the first time after
trial was closed.
(4) The entire family, consisting of the father,
mother and their children were registered
as aliens in the then Division of Alien Statistics.
(5) Florencio himself was again registered as an
alien in 1950, his application thereto bearing his
thumbprints and stating therein that he is
a Chinese; that he belongs to the yellow race and
that he had used these other names: "Tan Jua
Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gac."
• His explanation that it was his mother who
registered him as an alien is flimsy; and, as
stated hereinbefore, he did not present his
mother as a witness.
II. W/N THE JUDGMENT IN THE CIVIL CASE AND THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED RES JUDICATA.
HELD: NO. The Civil Case and Special Proceeding are
not modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship;
neither is the Chinese citizenship of Florencio
converted to Filipino because certain government
agencies recognized him as such. He remains, by jus
sanguinis, a Chinese until he is naturalized.
(a) The civil case was instituted by the vendor of a
certain parcel of land to rescind the sale and
recover the land sold from the the Mallari
siblings on the ground that they are Chinese.
Thus, their citizenship was not the thing
adjudicated in the judgment and the
declaration that they are Filipinos was but a
necessary premise for the court to arrive at a
conclusion that the sale of the realty was valid.
Not being the thing directly adjudicated, their
declared citizenship is not res judicata, and
cannot become conclusive.
(b) Florencio’s claim for citizenship was never given
adequate publication so as to apprise all
concerned and give them opportunity to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
contest it. Hence, neither decision
constitutes res judicata on the issue of
respondent's alleged Filipino nationality.
(c) The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its
inherent and constitutional authority, may not
be precluded from inquiring into the citizenship
of persons admitted to the practice of law,
independently of any other court's findings in
the cases or proceedings brought or instituted
therein.
55) DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies v
Radio Mindanao Network, Inc
FACTS: Radio Mindanao Network Inc owns several
broadcasting stations in the country. It contracted a
fire insurance policy with Provident Insurance
Corporation covering its various equipment while
Petitioner covered its other equipment under
another fire insurance policy.
On July 27, 1988, Radio Mindanao’s radio station in
Bacolod was razed by fire so it sought recovery
under the two insurance policies. The insurance
companies denied its claim on the ground that the
cause of loss was an excepted risk under their
contract (loss caused by war, invasion, hostilities,
military or popular uprising, insurrection, rebellion,
mutiny and the like). It maintained that the evidence
showed that the fire was caused by NPA members.
So, Radio Mindanao sued petitioner and Provident.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Radio Mindanao since it
found the insurance companies’ evidence were
insufficient to prove that the cause of the loss was
due to such excepted risk. The testimony of its
witnesses, Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3 Rochar was only
based on the bystanders’ statements during their
investigation that heavily armed men entered and
started the fire shouting, “Mabuhay ang NPA!” since
both were admittedly not present when the fire
occurred. The persons who were investigated and
actually saw the burning were not presented as
witnesses. Also, the documentary evidence
presented consisting of the police blotter,
certification from the Bacolod Police Station and Fire
Investigation report also did not categorically state
that the 20 armed men were members of the NPA.
Petitioner argues that the testimonies of Torres and
Rochar be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule as part of res gestae
ISSUE:
(1) WON testimonies are considered res gestae
(2) WON petitioner’s documentary evidence was
sufficient to prove the cause of the fire was due to
an excepted risk
83| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
RULING:
(1) NO, not considered as res gestae. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge (derived from his
perception). A witness may not testify as to what
he merely learned from others because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth. The problem with hearsay
evidence is its trustworthiness and reliability due
to its lack of oath or affirmation and cross-
examination by the adverse party (to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness
of the out-of-court declarant or actor).
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
refers to those exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement
of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. The rule in res gestae applies
when the declarant himself did not testify and
provided that the testimony of the witness who
heard the declarant complies with the following
requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
The Court is not convinced to accept the
declarations as part of res gestae for lack of
requisite #2. Both Rochar and Torres received
the bystanders' statements while they were
making their investigations and it can be
reasonably assumed that the bystanders already
had enough time and opportunity to mill
around, talk to one another and exchange
information, not to mention theories and
speculations. It cannot therefore be ascertained
whether these utterances were the products of
truth.
At best, these testimonies may be considered as
independently relevant statements and are
admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to
the fact that they had been thus uttered.
However, even if admitted, it would not be
sufficient proof. The declarations should be
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
considered alongside other evidence on record.
(2) While the documentary evidence presented may
be considered as exceptions to the hearsay rule
being entries in official records, none of these
documents categorically stated that the
perpetrators were members of the NPA. They
were merely believed to be members or
suspected to be members.
56) TALIDANO VS. FALCON MARITIME
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer
by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private
respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix
Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu
Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. His
one (1)-year contract of employment commenced
on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the monthly
wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of
$270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean,
always discriminated against and maltreated the
vessel’s Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a
letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the
International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
measure that allegedly was resented by the chief
officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on
21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal on 27 October 1999.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had
voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been
warned several times of dismissal from service for
his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and
insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an
incident involving petitioner’s incompetence
wherein the vessel invaded a different route at the
Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner
who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As
proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to
it on the date of incident, reporting the vessel’s
deviation from its course due to petitioner’s neglect
of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the report
of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V
Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
relying merely on fax messages to support the
validity of his dismissal from employment. He
maintains that the first fax message containing the
information that the vessel encroached on a
different route was a mere personal observation of
the ship master and should have thus been
corroborated by evidence, and that these fax
84| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
messages cannot be considered as res gestae
because the statement of the ship master embodied
therein is just a report. He also contends that he has
not caused any immediate danger to the vessel and
that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident
would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he
posits that the failure to produce the logbook
reinforces the theory that the fax messages have
been concocted to justify his unceremonious
dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that
his dismissal from employment stemmed from his
filing of the complaint with the ITF which his
superiors resented.
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is
correct in considering the fax messages as res gestae
statements. It likewise emphasizes that non-
presentment of the logbook is justified as the same
could no longer be retrieved because Hansu has
already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it
refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was
dismissed because he filed a complaint with the ITF
in behalf of his fellow crew members. It claims that
petitioner’s allegation is a hoax because there is no
showing that the alleged complaint has been
received by the ITF and that no action thereon was
ever taken by the ITF.
Private respondent also asserts that petitioner was
not dismissed but that he voluntarily asked for his
repatriation. This assertion, however, deserves scant
consideration. It is highly illogical for an employee to
voluntarily request for repatriation and then file a
suit for illegal dismissal. As voluntary repatriation is
synonymous to resignation, it is proper to conclude
that repatriation is inconsistent with the filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid.
RULING:
The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges on the
satisfaction of two substantive requirements, to wit:
(1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes
provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and
(2) the employee was accorded due process, basic of
which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner’s absence
during his watch duty when an emergency call was
received from the Japanese port authority that M/V
Phoenix Seven was "invading other route"
constituted neglect of duty, a just cause for
terminating an employee. Records reveal that this
information was related to private respondent via
two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V
Phoenix Seven.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997
pertained to a report of crew discharge essentially
containing the same information as the first fax
message. The Court of Appeals treated these fax
messages as part of the res gestae proving neglect
of duty on the part of petitioner.
Section 42 of Rule 13040 of the Rules of Court
mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal
acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is
the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the
res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. We find that the fax messages cannot
be deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it
is required that: (1) the principal act be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which
allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its
course—is the startling occurrence, there is no
showing that the statements contained in the fax
messages were made immediately after the alleged
incident. In addition, no dates have been
mentioned to determine if these utterances were
made spontaneously or with careful deliberation.
Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax
messages cannot be admitted as part of the res
gestae of the first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The
requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the principal
act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the
equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the
statement must accompany the equivocal act; and
(4) the statements give a legal significance to the
equivocal act.
Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is
simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be
one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the
equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied
by any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or
time has been mentioned to determine whether
the fax messages were made simultaneously with
the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax
messages are unclear. The matter of route
encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship
master, who is the author of the fax messages, did
not witness the incident. He obtained such
85| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
information only from the Japanese port authorities.
Verily, the messages can be characterized as double
hearsay.
Private respondent’s sole reliance on the fax
messages in dismissing petitioner is clearly
insufficient as these messages were addressed only
to itself. No notice was ever given to petitioner
apprising him in writing of the particular acts
showing neglect of duty. Neither was he informed of
his dismissal from employment. Petitioner was
never given an opportunity to present his side. The
failure to comply with the two-notice rule only
aggravated respondent’s liability on top of
dismissing petitioner without a valid cause.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the NLRC
is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that in
addition to the payment of the sum equivalent to
petitioner’s three (3) months’ salary, the full amount
of placement fee with 12% legal interest must be
refunded.
57) Canque VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing
business under the name and style RDC
Construction. At the time material to this case, she
had contracts with the government for
the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road;
(b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and
(c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City.
In connection with these projects, petitioner
entered into two contracts with private respondent
Socor Construction Corporation.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent
petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised
computation, for P299,717.75, plus interest at rate
of 3% a month, representing the balance of
petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for
materials delivered and services rendered by private
respondent under the two contracts. However,
petitioner refused to pay the amount, claiming that
private respondent failed to submit the delivery
receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of
the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by
the government.
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent
brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75,
plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its
decision ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at
12% per annum, and costs. It held:
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff's Book of Collectible
Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. "K") this
Court is convinced that the entries (both payments
and billings) recorded thereat are credible.
Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of
SOCOR's commercial transactions with RDC which
were entered therein in the course of business. We
cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded
under Exhibit "K" because the fact of their having
been made in the course of business carries with it
some degree of trustworthiness. Besides, no proof
was ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of
the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason
for us to doubt their authenticity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible
Accounts constitute competent evidence?
2. May the entries be admitted under Rule 132, 10
of the Rules of Court?
RULING: NO.
Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court - Entries in the
course of business. Entries made at, or near the time
of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate
books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead,
outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious;
and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
First, Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was
presented by private respondent to testify on the
86| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
account. There was, therefore, neither justification
nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as
the person who made them was available to testify
in court.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal
knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She
said she made the entries based on the bills given to
her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity
of the facts stated in the bills.
Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum.
— A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or
under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other
time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he
knew that the same was correctly stated in the
writing; but in such case the writing must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So,
also, a witness may testify from such a writing,
though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly
stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
Thus, the memorandum used to refresh the memory
of the witness does not constitute evidence, and
may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason
that the witness has just the same to testify on the
basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where
the witness has testified independently of or after
his testimony has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such
memorandum is not admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not
be corroborated by any written statement prepared
wholly by him.
However, the entries recorded under Exhibit “K”
were supported by Socor's Billings under the
account of RDC Construction. These billings were
presented and duly received by the authorized
representatives. The circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar clearly show that for a long period of
time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its
dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated
billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did
defendant immediately protest to plaintiff’s alleged
incomplete or irregular performance.
58) Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC &
Macatuno
FACTS:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired
by Wallem Shipmanagement Limited thru its local
manning agent, Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., as
an able-bodied seaman on board the M/T Fortuna,.
Under the employment contract, Macatuno was
employed for ten (10) months, with a monthly salary
of two hundred seventy-six US dollars (US $276)
On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at
the port of Kawasaki, Japan, an altercation took
place as with private respondent and fellow Filipino
crew member, Julius Gurimbao, on one hand, and
Mr V.S. SASON, a cadet/apprentice officer (of the
same nationality as the captain of the vessel), on the
other. The master entered the incident in the
tanker's logbook.
As a consequence, private respondent and
Gurimbao were repatriated to the Philippines where
they lost no time in lodging separate complaints for
illegal dismissal with the POEA. The pertinent facts
are as follows:
At the wee hours of June 24, 1989, private
respondent was on duty along with Gurimbao,
checking the manifold of the vessel and looking for
oil leakages, when a cadet/apprentice (Mr. Sason)
approached them. Sason ordered Gurimbao to use a
shovel in draining the water which was mixed with
oil and dirt. Gurimbao explained to the
cadet/apprentice that the throwing of such at sea
was prohibited by the laws of Japan; Hearing this,
the cadet/apprentice got mad and shouted at
Gurimbao, which the latter took offense to, but to
avoid trouble, did as he was ordered.
Gurimbao then complained to private respondent
about the incident. The two then went to the
cadet/apprentice and reminded him that as a mere
apprentice and not an officer of the vessel, he had
no right to order them around. However, the
cadet/apprentice reacted violently, as if challenging
the two to a fight. Private respondent pushed twice
the cadet/apprentice's chest while Gurimbao "mildly
hit" his arm. Frantic and shouting, being not so
tough after all, the cadet/apprentice cried daddy to
the captain who coincidentally happened to witness
the incident.
As a result, the captain told them to pack up their
things as their services were being terminated. The
two attempted to explain their side of the incident
but the captain ignored them and firmly told them
to go home.
To make matters worse, they were made to pay
their own way back to the Philippines.
87| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Upon arriving in the Philippines, private respondent
took no time in filing a case for illegal dismissal with
POEA.
In their defense, petitioners alleged that the
incident was not the first infraction committed by
the two, and to prove that the dismissal of the
respondent was in fact not illegal, it presented
copies of the entries of captain’s the log book
stating the facts of the alleged incident which
occurred in Japan.
The POEA Deputy Administrator ruled in favor of the
Private Respondent, not giving credence to the
evidence submitted, the same appearing to be
dubious. The CA likewise affirmed the decision of
the POEA.
ISSUE:
WON, the copies of the entries of the captain’s
logbook was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
herein private respondent.
RULING:
No. The respondent was illegally dismissed by the
petitioner.
It is undisputed that the ship captain's logbook is a
vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of
Commerce, as the same requires him to keep a
record of the decisions he had adopted as the
vessel's head.
In fact, in Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, the Court
held that a copy of an official entry in the logbook is
legally binding and serves as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not
find unqualified application in the case at bar. In
that case, an investigation of the incident which led
to the seaman's dismissal was conducted before he
was dismissed. Consequently, the facts appearing in
the logbook were supported by the facts gathered at
the investigation.
However, in this case, because no investigation was
conducted by the ship captain before repatriating
private respondent, the contents of the logbook has
to be duly identified and authenticated lest an
injustice result from a blind adoption of such
contents which merely serve as prima facie evidence
of the incident in question.
Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton
Shipping case was a copy of the official entry from
the logbook itself.
In this case, petitioners did not submit as evidence
to the POEA the logbook itself, or even
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof,
which could have been easily xeroxed or
photocopied considering the present technology on
reproduction of documents. What was offered in
evidence was merely a typewritten collation of
excerpts from what could be the logbook because
by their format, they could have been lifted from
other records kept in the vessel in accordance with
Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.
Moreover, the aforequoted entry in the logbook is
so sketchy that, unsupported by other evidence, it
leaves so many questions unanswered. Although
private respondent candidly admitted in his affidavit
having hit Sason on the chest twice, he did not
admit using a spanner. The conflicting versions of
the incident rendered it impossible to determine
whether it was private respondent or Gurimbao who
wielded said tool. In the absence of a more detailed
narration in the logbook entry of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged assault, the same cannot
constitute a valid justification to terminate private
respondent's employment. 19
Hence, as the typewritten excerpts from the
"logbook" were the only pieces of evidence
presented by petitioners to support the dismissal of
private respondent, have no probative value at all,
petitioners' cause must fail. Their failure to
discharge the onus probandi properly may have no
other result than a finding that the dismissal of
private respondent is unjustified.
Thus, the petition at bar is DISMISSED.
59) Northwest Airlines, Inc vs. Steven P. Chiong
FACTS:
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull
Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized
Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean),
hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of
TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia bound for San Diego,
California.
For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a
Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with
a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. So
the time had come for Chiong to head off to the U.S.
Arriving 3hrs ahead of his scheduled flight and with
his family to see him off, he pro was met by Marilyn
Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the
departure gate, and the two proceeded to the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present
Chiong's seaman service record book for clearance.
Chiong's passport was duly stamped, after
88| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
complying with government requirements for
departing seafarers.
However, when Chiong's proceeded to check-in, the
Northwest personnel informed him that his name
did not appear in the computer's list of confirmed
departing passengers. Chiong was then directed to
speak to a "man in barong" standing outside
Northwest's counters from whom Chiong could
allegedly obtain a boarding pass. To his surprise, the
"man in barong" demanded US$100.00 in exchange
therefor.
Having failed to pay such an amount and as a result,
Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight
No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and,
consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia
by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time).
It was later on found out that Chiong's name was
crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in
Northwest's Air Passenger Manifest. 6
Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for
breach of contract of carriage before the RTC. The
RTC ruled that the evidence adduced by the parties
supported the conclusion that Chiong was
deliberately prevented from checking-in and his
boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to
accommodate an American passenger by the name
of W. Costine.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the
RTC. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: WON, Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3," the
Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record,
respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be
excluded from the records.
RULING:
The petition must fail.
Exception to Hearsay Evidence: Entries Made in the
Official Course of Business
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest's
Exhibits "2" and "3" need not detain us long. Suffice
it to state that the RTC and CA correctly excluded
these documents as hearsay evidence. We quote
with favor the CA's holding thereon, thus:
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43,
Revised Rules of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as
entries in the course of business, it is necessary that:
(a) the person who made the entry must be dead or
unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at or
near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made
in his professional capacity or in the performance of
a duty; and (e) the entries were made in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest
and passenger name record to be mere hearsay
evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into
court all the employees who individually made the
entries, it is sufficient that the person who
supervised them while they were making the entries
testify that the account was prepared under his
supervision and that the entries were regularly
entered in the ordinary course of business. In the
case at bench, while MENDOZA was the supervisor
on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal
knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he
did not supervise the preparation thereof. More
importantly, no evidence was presented to prove
that the employee who made the entries was dead
nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the
circumstances that would show the employee's
inability to testify. 38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
60) Patula v. People
KEYWORD: Estafa, ledgers and receipts
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case was charged with estafa
filed in RTC Dumaguete City to which she pleaded
not guilty. Upon trial, the prosecution presented
two witnesses.
The first witness was Lambert Go who was the
branch manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores
where petitioner works. He alleges that petitioner
was a sales representative who was authorized to
take orders from customers, collect payments and
issue and sign official receipts for them. It came to a
point that he noticed a drop of volume in sales but
petitioner merely says the business was slow.
Eventually, it prompted him to summon an
accounting clerk to verify the sales. The accounting
clerk found out that there were some erasures on
the collection receipts. Go also asked an audit from
the company auditor Karen Guivencan. At that time,
89| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
he learned some other discrepancies such as the
fact that a customer had already paid his
outstanding balance but it appeared unpaid in the
records of Footlucker’s.
The other witness of the prosecution was Karen
Guivencan who was asked by Go to audit petitioner
based on what he learned from the customers of
balances being recorded as unpaid in the office
ledgers. She discovered in her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of the
receipts in the possession of around 50 customers
varied from the amounts written on the duplicate
copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the
office. For this information, she submitted a written
report to Go marked as Exhibit A.
As to the other evidence presented by the
prosecution, the ledgers of the petitioner’s various
customers allegedly with discrepancies were marked
as Exhibits B to YY and their derivaties inclusive.
During Guivencan’s direct examination, petitioner’s
counsel objected that the Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives inclusive were hearsay because the
persons who made the entries were not presented
in court.
On January 28, 2004, RTC rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Petitioner now comes to the Court with the
following issues:
1. WON the failure of the information for estafa to
allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts
issued by petitioner to her customers violated
petitioner’s right ro be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation
- (Petitioner, in the main attacks RTC’s
adverse decision because the
prosecution’s charge was estafa but her
conviction was based on evidence for
falsification without it being alleged in
the information)
2. WON the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY
and their derivatives inclusive) were admissible
as evidence despite not being authenticated
3. WON the testimony of Karen Guivencan on the
ledgers and receipts were inadmissible as
hearsay to prove petitioner’s guilt
RULING:
I. As to the first issue
There was no need to allege the act of falsification
by petitioner in the information because falsification
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
is not an element of estafa. Further, the theory of
the prosecution hinges on conversion of petitioner
of sums paid by customers and later the duplicates
of the receipts were falsified, then prosecution can
prove her acts of falsification as a means of
establishing her misappropriation and conversion.
Thus, her right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation was not violated.
II. As to the second issue
The nature of documents as either public or private
determines how the documents may be presented
as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of
its o cial or sovereign character, or because it has
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a
notarial will) or a competent public o cial with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public
record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence
in court. Lacking the official or sovereign character
of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court
before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient
one within the context of Section 21,Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not
been speci cally denied under oath by the adverse
party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of
the document have been admitted; or (d) when the
document is not being offered as genuine.
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court governs
authentication of private documents:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. —
Before any private document offered as
authenticis received in evidence, itsdue
execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or
(b) B y evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be
identi ed as that which it is claimed to be.
Exhibits B to YY and their derivates were private
documents because private individuals executed or
generated them for private or business purposes or
uses.
90| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate
petitioner’s signature in various receipts. One of
them was a machine copy of a receipt used for
purposes of the testimony, the original was
promised to be presented on a later date. As
matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go
authenticate both the machine copy of the receipt
with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the
signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful
because the machine copy was inexplicably
forgotten and was no longer even included in the
Prosecution's Offer of Documentary Evidence.
As to Guivencan, she could not honestly identify
petitioner's signature on the receipts either because
she lacked familiarity with such signature, or
because she had not seen petitioner affix her
signature on the receipts. Guivencan exclusively
relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgers
to support her audit report on petitioner's supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack
of independent knowledge of the veracity of the
entries,
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not
themselves seen the execution or signing of the
documents, the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably
bereft of probative value as evidence.
III. As to the third issue
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states
that a witness can testify only to those facts that she
knows of her personal, that is which are derived
from her own perception. The personal knowledge
of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the
truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her
as a witness presently testifying but from the
veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information. In case a witness is permitted to
testify based on what she has heard another person
say about the facts in dispute, the person from
whom the witness derived the information on the
facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be
examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony then depends not upon the veracity of
the witness but upon the veracity of the other
person giving the information to the witness
without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a
witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The prosecution presented two witnesses - Go and
Guivencan. Go, on his part described the various
duties of petitioner. Guivencan on the other hand,
admits that she has no personal knowledge of tha
amounts actually received by petitioner from
customers. She based her testimony on the entries
found in the receipts issued by petitioner to various
customers, the ledgers held by Footluckers and the
unsworn statements from customer, with her being
the only witness who can testify on the entries. Her
being the only witness deprive RTC to test and
validate the veracity of the entries as evidence of
petitioner’s guilt and thus rendered her testimony
hearsay. Moreover, Exhibits B to YY and their
derivates inclusive were also rejected as proof by
the Court.
61) Africa v Caltex
FACTS: A fire broke out at a Caltex service station.
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring
houses including the house of petitioners. The fire
started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted.
There were reports presented for evidence; Police
Department Report, the Fire Department Report and
by a certain Capt. Tinio of the AFP. According to the
Police Department Report, an unknown Filipino
lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick
near the main valve of the said underground tank.
According to the Police department Report, that in
the premises there was a coca-cola cooler and a rack
which contained cigarettes and matches, installed
between the gasoline pumps and the underground
tanks.
The report of Capt. Tinio reproduced the
information given by a certain Benito Morales
regarding the history of the gasoline station and
what the chief of the Fire Department had told him.
Court of Appeals:
The reports were ruled as double hearsay, hence
inadmissible.
Petitioner’s Contention:
1. The reports were admitted by the trial court
without objection on the part of Caltex.
2. The police report which was signed by
detective Zapanta allegedly “for Salvador
Capacillo”, Capacillo was presented as
witness but respondent waived their right to
cross examination.
3. The reports are admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule under Section 35 of Rule
91| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
123 now Rule 130. The report without
further testimonial evidence on their
contents, fall within the scope of Section 35
of rule 123.
ISSUE: Whether the reports are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule
RULING:
1. The reports in question when offered were
objected on the ground that they were
hearsay and that they are “immaterial,
irrelevant and impertinent”.
2. Detective Capacillo did take the witness
stand but he was not examined and he did
not testify as to the facts mentioned in his
alleged report. All he said was that he was
one of those who investigated the location
of the fire gather witnesses. Therefore there
was no need to a cross examination and the
contents of the report in which he did not
testify did not become a competent
evidence. Even if he testified, the
information gather by him from third
persons is still objectionable.
3. Section 35, Rule 123, provides that “entries
in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.”
The three requisites for admissibility under Section
35, Rule 123:
1. That entry was made by a public officer, or
by another person specially enjoined by law
to do so
2. That it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duty, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law
3. That the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official
information
The third requisite is not present in the case. The
material facts recited in the reports as to the cause
and circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted
the investigation. The sources of some facts were
not identified while some facts were attributed an
employee of Caltex, the driver of the tank truck, and
respondent. To qualify their statements as “official
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
information acquired by the officers who prepared
the reports”, the persons who made the statements
not only must have personal knowledge of the facts
but must have the duty to give such statements for
record. THE REPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUE AN
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. The facts stated
in the reports were not given by informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
(under Torts, Res Ipsa Loquitor, just in case sir asks)
Where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation by defendant, that the accident arose
form want of care.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of
respondent. A fire occurred therein and spread. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were respondents and their employees but
can give no explanation. It is a fir inference that the
incident happened because of want of care.
62) People v San Gabriel
FACTS:
RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL was charged with murder
in an Information alleging that on 26 November
1989, armed with a bladed weapon, in conspiracy
with "Ramon Doe," with treachery, evident
premeditation and intent to kill, he assaulted and
stabbed to death Jaime A. Tonog. The prosecution
witness positively identified the suspects, thus the
conviction.
Accused only used alibi as his defense. Tried to prove
that it was Ramon Doe, and some person named
“Mando” who killed the victim.
The accused also leans his defense heavily on the
Advance Information Sheet (blotter) prepared by
police office Casimiro. The accused contends that
entries in the Advance Information Sheet did not
mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as
the principal suspect. Such blotter however contains
information acquired by said police officer only after
his interview of Camba, an alleged eyewitness of the
crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Advance Information
Sheet falls under the Hearsay Rule Exception, for
being an ‘Entry In Official Records’.
92| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
RULING: The Advance Information Sheet does not
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence,
inadmissible.
Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. But
to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites
must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in
the performance of his duties or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
The public officer who prepared the document had
no sufficient and personal knowledge of the
stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him
was acquired from Camba which therefore could not
be categorized as official information because in
order to be classified as such the persons who made
the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the
duty to give such statements for the record. In the
case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give
such statements.
Supreme Court sustained findings of Trial Court.
63) Barcelon v. CIR
PRINCIPLE:
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. For this presumption to apply, the following
must be present:
a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or
by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
FACTS:
Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP
Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the
trading of securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner
filed its Annual ITR for taxable year 1987. After an
audit investigation conducted by the BIR, CIR issued
an assessment for deficiency income tax since
petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and
allowances to withholding taxes. This assessment
was covered by a Formal Assessment Notice dated 1
February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent
to petitioner through registered mail on 6 February
1991. However, petitioner denies receiving such.
Petitioner alleges that it only knew about it when it
was served with the Warrant of Distraint and Levy on
17 March 1992. The respondent presented the BIR
record book where the name of the taxpayer, the
kind of tax assessed, the registry receipt number and
the date of mailing were noted. Respondent offered
(1) the entry in the BIR record book and (2) the
testimony of its record custodian as entries in official
records in accordance with Section 44, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, 24 which states that:
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.
CTA: unnecessary to decide the issues on the validity
and propriety of the assessment since the right of
the BIR to assess petitioner has already prescribed.
CA: reversed the CTA decision;
ISSUE:
WON the evidence offered by respondent, Versola’s
testimony, qualifies as an exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence? NO
WON the right of the BIR to assess petitioner has
already prescribed? YES
RULING:
Under Section 203, NIRC, respondent is given 3 years
from the last day prescribed by law for the filing of
the return, or from the day of actual filing,
whichever is later. An assessment is made within the
prescriptive period if notice to this effect is released,
mailed or sent by the CIR to the taxpayer within said
period. Receipt thereof by the taxpayer within the
prescriptive period is not necessary. But the rule
does not dispense with the requirement that the
93| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
taxpayer should actually receive, even beyond the
prescriptive period, the assessment notice which
was timely released, mailed and sent.
While a mailed letter is deemed received by the
addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still
merely a disputable presumption subject to
controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt
thereof, as what happened in this case, shifts the
burden upon the party favored (CIR) by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was
indeed received by the addressee (Barcelon). In this
case, CIR intended to show that all assessments
made are entered into a record book in
chronological order outlining the details of the
assessment and the taxpayer liable thereon.
However, all entries thereon appear to be
immaterial and impertinent in proving that the
assessment notice was mailed and duly received by
Barcelon. What is essential to prove the fact of
mailing is the registry receipt issued by the Bureau
of Posts or the Registry return card which would
have been signed by the Petitioner or its authorized
representative. And if said documents cannot be
located, Respondent at the very least, should have
submitted to the Court a certification issued by the
Bureau of Posts and any other pertinent document
which is executed with the intervention of the
Bureau of Posts.
Furthermore, presenting as witness their records
custodian still proved to be insufficient. There are
three requisites for admissibility under the rule
mentioned in Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information . . . .
In this case, the entries made by Versola were not
based on her personal knowledge as she did not
attest to the fact that she personally prepared and
mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in
the transcript of stenographic notes how and from
whom she obtained the pertinent information.
Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she
acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty
to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44
finds no application in the present case. Thus, the
evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as
an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Since the evidence offered by the respondent fails to
convince that FAN was released, mailed, or sent
before 15 April 1991, it is insufficient to give rise to
the presumption that the assessment notice was
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

received in the regular course of mail. Consequently, the Complainant asserting that he was right cannot
the right of the government to assess and collect the be sustained by this Arbitration Branch. The fact
alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription. that there was an emergency call from the Japanese
port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was invading
other route simply means that Complainant
64) Juanito Talidano vs. Falcon Maritime & Allied neglected his duty. The fax message stating that
Services, Inc. Complainant was not at the bridge at the time of the
emergency call was likewise not denied nor refuted
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a second marine
by the Complainant. Under our jurisprudence, any
officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc.
material allegation and/or document which is not
(private respondent) and was assigned to M/V
denied specifically is deemed admitted. If not of the
Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and operated by
Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. timely call [sic] from the port authority that M/V
Phoenix Seven invaded other route, the safety of the
His one (1)-year contract of employment
vessel, her crew and cargo may be endangered. She
commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the
could have collided with other vessels because of
monthly wage at $900.00 with a fi􏰾xed overtime pay
complainant's failure to render watch duty.
of $270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.
The NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter.
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean,
always discriminated against and maltreated the The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of
the alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by
vessel's Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a
petitioner have no probative value and are self-
letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the
serving. It added that the ship's logbook should have
International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
been submitted in evidence as it is the repository of
measure that allegedly was resented by the Korean
all the activities on board the vessel, especially
chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed
those affecting the performance or
on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal on 27 October 1999. attitude of the officers and crew members, and,
more importantly, the procedures
preparatory to the discharge of a crew member.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had
voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been
The CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
warned several times of dismissal from service for
The appellate court relied on the fax messages
his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and
issued by the ship master shortly after petitioner
insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an
incident involving petitioner's incompetence had committed a serious neglect of his duties. It
noted that the said fax messages constitute the res
wherein the vessel invaded a different route at the
gestae.
Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner
who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to
relying merely on fax messages to support the
it on the date of incident, reporting the vessel's
validity of his dismissal from employment. He
deviation from its course due to petitioner's neglect
of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy of the report maintains that the 􏰾fax message containing the
information that the vessel encroached on a
of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V
different route was a mere personal observation of
Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
the ship master and should have thus been
corroborated by evidence, and that these fax
The labor arbiter held that petitioner was validly
messages cannot be considered as res gestae
dismissed for gross negligence of duty.
because the statement of the ship master embodied
The Labor Arbiter relied on the fax messages
therein is just a report. He also contends that he has
presented by private respondent to prove
petitioner's neglect of his duties, thus: not caused any immediate danger to the vessel and
that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident
would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he
. . . The fax message said that the Master of M/V
posits that the failure to produce the logbook
Phoenix Seven received an emergency warning call
reinforces the theory that the fax messages have
from Japan Sisan Sebo Naika Radio Authority calling
been concocted to justify his unceremonious
attention to the Master of the vessel M/V Phoenix
dismissal from employment.
Seven that his vessel is invading other route [sic].
When the Master checked the Bridge, he found out Private respondent insists that the appellate court is
correct in considering the fax messages as res gestae
that the Second Officer (complainant) did not carry
statements. It likewise emphasizes that non-
out his duty watch. There was a confrontation
presentment of the logbook is justified as the same
between the Master and the Complainant but the
could no longer be retrieved because Hansu has
latter insisted that he was right. The argument of
94| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it
refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was
dismissed because he 􏰾led a complaint with the ITF
in behalf of his fellow crew members. It claims that
petitioner's allegation is a hoax because there is no
showing that the alleged complaint has been
received by the ITF and that no action thereon was
ever taken by the ITF.
Records reveal that this information was related to
private respondent via two fax messages sent by the
captain of M/V Phoenix Seven. The fax message
dated 18 January 1997 is reproduced below:
JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N
C/OFFICER THAT THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE
2/OFFICER AT OSAKA PORT.
DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL
ORDER.
CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL
FROM JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY
THAT SHIP IS INVADING OTHER ROUTE.
SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N
FOUND 2/O NOT CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.
MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS
ERROR BUT HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND
THEN SAID THAT HE WILL COME BACK HOME.
ACTESI
FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM
I.T.F. WAGE SCALE. MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY
ASKED US HIS REPATRIATION WITH I.E.U.
PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING.
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997
pertained to a report of crew discharge essentially
containing the same information as the fax message.
The Court of Appeals treated these fax messages as
part of the res gestae proving neglect of duty on the
part of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fax messages constitute the res
gestae?
RULING:
No.
Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court
mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal
acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is
the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the
res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. 41
The SC ruled that the fax messages cannot be
deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under res gestae of the first kind it
is required that:
95| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
(1) the principal act be a startling
occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise
a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which
allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course
— is the startling occurrence, there is no showing
that the statements contained in the fax messages
were made immediately after the alleged incident.
In addition, no dates have been mentioned to
determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent
the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages
cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the
􏰾first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The
requisites for its admissibility are:
(1) the principal act to be characterized
must be equivocal;
(2) the equivocal act must be material to
the issue;
(3) the statement must accompany the
equivocal act; and
(4) the statements give a legal significance
to the equivocal act.
Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is
simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be
one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the
equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by
any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or
time has been mentioned to determine whether the
fax messages were made simultaneously with the
purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax
messages are unclear. The matter of route
encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship
master, who is the author of the fax messages, did
not witness the incident. He obtained such
information only from the Japanese port authorities.
Verily, the messages can be characterized as double
hearsay.
Private respondent's sole reliance on the fax
messages in dismissing petitioner is clearly
insufficient as these messages were addressed only
to itself.
Talidano is illegally terminated.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
65) Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs Alberto & Alberto
Reyes,
PRINCIPLE: Exception to the hearsay rule are the
entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines.
Failure to make a timely objection to the police
report’s presentation in evidence is a waiver of right.
FACTS: At around 5 o’clock in the morning, an
accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala
Avenue involving four (4) vehicles: (1) a Nissan Bus,
(2) an Isuzu Tanker, (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck, and (4) a
Mitsubishi Galant. Based on the Police Report issued
by the on-the-spot investigator SPO1 Alfredo
Dungga, the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the
Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right
side shortly before the incident. All three (3) vehicles
were at halt when the Fuzo Cargo Truck
simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the
Galant and the rear left portion of the Bus. Due to
the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved
forward and the Galant rammed into the Tanker.
Previously, Malayan Insurance issued a car insurance
policy insuring the Mitsubishi Galant against third
party liability, own damage and theft, among others.
Malayan paid the damages and maintaining that it
has been subrogated to the rights of the assured, it
sent several demand letters to respondents, the
registered owner and the driver, respectively of the
Cargo Truck. Respondents refused forcing petitioner
to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence
against respondents.
Respondents asserted that the proximate cause of
the accident was the reckless driving of the Nissan
Bus driver alleging that that the speeding bus,
coming from the service road of EDSA, maneuvered
its way towards the middle lane without due regard
to Reyes' right of way. When the Nissan Bus abruptly
stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the
braking action could not cope with the inertia and
failed to gain sufficient traction. As a consequence,
the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of
the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the
other hand, sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck,
causing damage to the latter. They also controverted
the result of the Police Report, asserting that it was
based solely on the biased narration of the Bus
driver.
At the trial, Malayan Insurance presented the
testimony of it lone witness, motor car claim
adjuster, who attested that he processed the
insurance claim of the assured and verified the
documents submitted to him. Respondents, on the
other hand, failed to present any evidence.
96| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and
declared respondents liable for damages. CA
reversed and set aside the decision. It noted that the
police report was not properly identified by the
police who conducted the on-the-spot investigation
of the subject collision. It thus, held that an
appellate court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand
genuineness of an unverified and unidentified
document, much less accord it evidentiary value.
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the
presentation of the police investigator who prepared
the police report, said report is still admissible in
evidence, especially since respondents failed to
make a timely objection to its presentation in
evidence. Respondents counter that since the police
report was never confirmed by the investigating
police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the
evidence on record.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the police report is admissible
2) Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to
support the claim for gross negligence
3) Whether or not subrogation is valid in the instant
case
RULING:
1) Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify
only to those facts which the witness knows of his or
her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived
from the witness' own perception. Concomitantly, a
witness may not testify on matters which he or she
merely learned from others either because said
witness was told or read or heard those matters.
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not
be received as proof of the truth of what the witness
has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, 21 "Hearsay
is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the
general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence
applies to written, as well as oral statements."
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule
under the Rules of Court, among which are entries in
official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
“Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.”
In Alvarez v PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated
the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official
records, thus:
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
(a) that the entry was made by a public
officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in
the performance of his or her duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
or her stated, which must have been
acquired by the public officer or other
person personally or through official
information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even
if the police investigator who prepared it was not
presented in court, as long as the above requisites
could be adequately proved. Here, there is no
dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot
investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in
the performance of his duty. However, what is not
clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient
personal knowledge of the facts contained in his
report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the
police report's presentation in evidence; thus, they
are deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a
result, the police report is still admissible in
evidence.
2) Even if we consider the inadmissibility of the
police report in evidence, still, respondents cannot
evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
To reiterate, res ipsa loquitor is a rule of necessity
which applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available. The requisites are the ff.:
(a) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
(b) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged
with negligence; and
(c) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person
injured
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not
have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant
unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo
Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver,
Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting
the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this
allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded.
97| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to
the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all
the requisites for the application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a
reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of
respondents.
Just like any other disputable presumptions or
inferences, the presumption of negligence may be
rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the
contrary. It is unfortunate, however, that
respondents failed to present any evidence before
the trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence
remains.
3) Malayan Insurance contends that there was a
valid subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced
by the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim
and Subrogation Receipt presented by it before the
trial court. Respondents, however, claim that the
documents presented by Malayan Insurance do not
indicate certain important details that would show
proper subrogation.
As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all
the opportunity, but failed to object to the
presentation of its evidence. Thus, and as We have
mentioned earlier, respondents are deemed to have
waived their right to make an objection.
The rule is that failure to object to the
offered evidence renders it admissible, and
the court cannot, on its own, disregard such
evidence.
XXX
Note also that when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, it must
so state in the form of a timely objection
and it cannot raise the objection to the
evidence for the first time on appeal.
Because of a party's failure to timely object,
the evidence becomes part of the evidence
in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are
considered bound by any outcome arising
from the offer of evidence properly
presented (ACDC v COMFAC Corp).
Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and
the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt
presented by Malayan Insurance are already part of
the evidence on record, and since it is not disputed
that the insurance company, indeed, paid
PhP700,000 to the assured, then there is a valid
subrogation in the case at bar.
66) PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA &
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp.
KEYWORDS: collision of vessels; price quotations
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
PRINCIPLES: The price quotations presented as
exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the persons who issued them were
not presented as witnesses.
FACTS:
In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the
M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating
the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas
on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided
with the vessel Petroparcel, which at the time was
owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an
investigation and rendered a decision finding the
Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the
Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,
private respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel
captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of
First Instance of Caloocan City. Meanwhile, during
the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted
in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership
of the Petroparcel.
PR later sought for the amendment of its complaint
on the following grounds:
1. Original complaint failed to plead for the
recovery of the value of the lost hull;
2. Vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00
and that, after deducting the insurance
payment of P200,000.00, the amount of
P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed;
3. Inflation resulted to the devaluation of
Philippine peso and had affected the value
of replacements, thus there should be a
reasonable determination thereof; and
4. Due to the sinking of the vessel, PR incurred
unrealized profits and lost business
opportunities
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended
to include petitioner as a defendant which the lower
court.
During trial, PR presented evidences: (1) testimony
of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto
del Rosario, and (2) documentary evidence to prove
actual damages:
(you can just skip this part…)
Exhibit B — a document titled "Marine
Protest" executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on
September 22, 1977 stating that as a result
of the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV
sustained a hole at its left side that caused it
98| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
to sink with its cargo of 1,050 bañeras
valued at P170,000 00;
Exhibit C — a quotation for the construction
of a 95-footer trawler issued by Isidoro A.
Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and
Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing that construction of such
trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
Exhibit D — pro forma invoice issued by E.D.
Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on
January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing
that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine
Engine model would cost P1,160,000.00;
Exhibit E — quotation of prices issued by
Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno
Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D,
would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of
Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501
would cost P45,000.00 so that the two units
would cost P145,000.00;
Exhibit F — quotation of prices issued by
Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to
Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of
nylon rope would cost P140,000.00; two (2)
rolls of nylon rope, P42,750.00; one (1)
binocular, P1,400.00, one (1) compass,
P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or
a total of P197,150.00;
Exhibit H — price quotation issued by
Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to
Del Rosario showing the cost of poly
nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x
100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts
100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of
400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P146,500 and bañera
(tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total of
P414,065.00.
Except for Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050
bañeras of fish were pegged at their September
1977 value when the collision happened, the pieces
of documentary evidence proffered by private
respondent with respect to items and equipment
lost show similar items and equipment with
corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately
ten (10) years after the collision.
Petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering
Corporation, who testified that the price quotations
submitted by private respondent were "excessive"
and not proved by competent and admissible
evidence, and that as an expert witness, he used the
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
However, he failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not
produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as
it was "a sort of secret scheme."
CFI – rendered its decision in favor of the PR and
against the defendant PNOC.
CA – affirmed decision of CFI in toto. It further ruled
that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an
expert witness because as the owner of the lost
vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and
competency to identify and determine the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the
vessel
ISSUE: Whether the price quotation exhibits
presented should be admitted as evidence to prove
actual damages
RULING:
NO. As stated at the outset, to enable an injured
party to recover actual or compensatory damages,
he is required to prove the actual amount of loss
with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence available.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course
of Del Rosario's testimony. Private respondent did
not present any other witnesses especially those
whose signatures appear in the price quotations that
became the bases of the award. We hold, however,
that the price quotations are ordinary private
writings which under the Revised Rules of Court
should have been proffered along with the
testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could
not have testified on the veracity of the contents of
the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one
who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
witness can testify only to those facts that he knows
of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private
respondent incurred losses in the total amount of
P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme
caution considering that, because it was a bare
assertion, it should be supported by independent
evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of
private respondent corporation, whatever testimony
he would give with regard to the value of the lost
vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed
in the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the
vessel should be given credence considering his
familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to
99| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment,
cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as
gospel truth. We must, therefore, examine the
documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake
of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that
the persons who issued them were not presented
as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but
on the knowledge of another person who is not on
the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not
fall under any of the exceptions provided under
Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under
Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a
document is a commercial list if:
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of
persons engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by
persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, Exhibits B, C, D, E, F
and H are not "commercial lists" for these do not
belong to the category of "other published
compilations" under Section 45. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned." The exhibits mentioned are mere price
quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment
similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
periodical or other compilation on the relevant
subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or
quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists"
as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals,
containing data of everyday professional need and
relied upon in the work of the occupation." These
are simply letters responding to the queries of Del
Rosario.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in
evidence but these are, however, subject to the
general principles of evidence and to various rules
relating to documentary evidence. Thus, a letter may
be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its
evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of
the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the
letter should be presented as witness to provide the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being
mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author
of the letter renders its contents suspect.
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may
not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits
does not mean that it totally deprives private
respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel.
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded.
Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "the
adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
further contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the parties to the
suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
Considering the fact, however, that (1) technically
petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately,
was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this
case has dragged on for almost two decades, an
award of P2,000.000.00 in favor of private
respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
67) Tan v CA
KEYWORD: “Unable to testify” – what does it
mean?
PRINCIPLES: The testimony of a witness, given in a
former case between the same parties, the same
matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity
to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence,
when said witness is: (a) deceased; (b) out of the
Philippines; or (c) unable to testify [such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to
death, as when the witness is old and has lost the
power of speech].
FACTS:
• July 22, 1955 – petitioner, through their mother
Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued
respondent Francisco Tan in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for acknowledgement and
support, alleging respondent to be the
100| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
illegitimate father of the minors Carmelita and
Rodolfo [Civil Case 26909].
• March 26, 1956 – after petitioners had presented
oral and documentary evidence and were about
to rest their case, they moved to dismiss the
foregoing civil case upon the ground that the
parties had come to an amicable settlement.
On the same day, Celestina Daldo subscribed
before the clerk of court an affidavit
categorically stating that respondent Francisco
Tan “is not the father of my said minor children
named Carmelita and Rodolfo, but another
person whose name I cannot divulge”
As prayed for by plaintiffs, on the ground of
amicable settlement between the parties, the
aforementioned civil case was dismissed by the
court with prejudice.
• November 25, 1957 – one year and eight months
after Civil Case 26909 was dismissed,
petitioners, this time through their maternal
grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad
litem, commenced the present action (Civil Case
00855) for acknowledgement and support,
involving the same parties, causes of action, and
subject matter.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial
were subpoenaed by the Court a number of
times – these witnesses, however, never
appeared to testify.
The plaintiffs presented evidence, among others,
“EXHIBIT H and I,” testimonies of plaintiffs’
witnesses in the former case (basically,
testimonies of witnesses from Civil Case 26909
was exhibited as evidence in the present action,
Civil Case 00855).
➢ The Court of First Instance in Manila DISMISSED
the present case on the ground of res judicata.
➢ Upon a motion for reconsideration, the decision
was REVERSED and a decision against
respondent Francisco Tan.
➢ On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the
lower court’s decision and DISMISSED the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not EXHIBITS H and I (testimonies
of plaintiffs’ witnesses from the past case) is
admissible in the present case?
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
RULING:
No. The controlling statute is Section 41, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, viz:
“SECTION 41. Testimony at a former trial. –
The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former
case between the same parties, relating to the same
matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity
to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence.”
The aforesaid rule allows testimony from a former
trial to be admissible in evidence. In the present
case, however, the witnesses whose testimonies
(from the former trial) were offered into evidence,
were neither dead, nor were they outside of the
Philippines. Can they then be categorized as
witnesses of the class ‘unable to testify’? The Court,
in construing this term held it to mean: “subsequent
failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or
hostility since testifying at the first does not amount
to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding
from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as
when the witness is old and has lost the power of
speech.”
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only
they refused to testify – they do not come within the
legal purview of those ‘unable to testify.’ In the
situation here presented, petitioners are not bereft
of remedy. They could have urged the court to have
said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt –
petitioners however failed to avail of said remedies,
went ahead and submitted their case.
EXHIBITS H and I thus being inadmissible, the instant
case must fail. The evidence for the plaintiffs fall
short of the requirement of strong and convincing
evidence – such evidence is necessary whether to
prove legitimate or illegitimate paternity and
filiation, considering the seriousness of the
relationship and its far-reaching consequences.
68) Manliclic vs. Calaunan
PRINCIPLE: Hearsay evidence alone may be
insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.
FACTS:
At around 6-7am, respondent Calaunan, together
with Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from
Pangasinan on board his jeep. The Bus was likewise
101| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. The two
vehicles collided. Respondent suffered minor
injuries while his driver was unhurt. By reason of
such collision, a criminal case was filed charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners Manliclic and
Philippine Rabbit Bus Line (PRBL).
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case
in as much as these witnesses are not available to
testify in the civil case. Then, the trial court
subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Bulacan,
the court where Criminal Case was tried, to bring
the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in said case,
together with other documentary evidence marked
therein.
Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent
Calaunan, left for abroad and has not returned since
then. Rogelio took the stand and said that his
brother, Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
Rosalia testified that her husband, Mendoza, left
their residence to look for a job but has not returned
home yet.
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs
and documents from the said criminal case to be
adopted in the instant case, but since the same were
not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners
compromised that said TSNs and documents could
be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal
evidence.
Respondent further marked, among other
documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the
testimonies of Ganiban, Buan and petitioner
Manliclic in Criminal Case.
Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and
Ramos should not be admitted in evidence for
failure of respondent to comply with the requisites
of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present
case, although on different causes of action; (d) the
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case; and (e)
the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the
concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the
Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
Criminal Case, had no opportunity to cross-examine
the 3 witnesses in said case. The criminal case was
filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic,
petitioner PRBLI’s employee.
Second, Petitioners contend that the documents in
the criminal case should not have been admitted in
the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130
refers only to "testimony or deposition.”
Lastly, petitioners contend that the version of
petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred
is more credible than respondent’s version. They
anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.
ISSUES:
1. WON the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Mendoza and Ramos in the Criminal Case
should be admitted in evidence in the Civil
Case
2. WON the documents in the criminal
case should be admitted in the instant civil
case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers
only to "testimony or deposition.”
3. Can Manliclic still be held liable for the
collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court
of Appeals that there was an absence of
negligence on his part?
RULING:
1. Yes. An objection shall be made at the time when
an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated
as waived, since the right to object is merely a
privilege which the party may waive.
102| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but
on account of failure to object thereto, the same
may be admitted and considered as sufficient to
prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence
alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit
but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like
any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, it is too late for petitioner PRBLI
to raise denial of due process in relation to Section
47, Rule 130 as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSNs. And the fact that
petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal
case, the testimonies of the 3 witnesses are still
admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI
failed to object on their admissibility.
And if petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal
case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
in the civil case which was given in the criminal
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have
its cake and eat it too. To disallow admission in
evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan,
Mendoza and Ramos in the criminal case and to
admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be
unfair.
2. Yes. Though said section speaks only of testimony
and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be
admitted. Said documents can be admitted they
being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have
been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the
same weight as that to which the testimony may be
entitled.
3. Yes. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not
the author of the act complained of. But the
extinction of civil liability referred to refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.
In this civil case, it was petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence that caused the smash up and so there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
family. But due to lack of supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.
69) Ernesto Francisco vs. People
FACTS:
Jovita Rodriguez (Jovita for brevity) and her husband
acquired several pieces of jewelry which were placed
inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their
main house. Jovita hid the key to the cabinet inside
the room. They hired Pacita Linghon (Pacita for
brevity), as one of their household helpers sometime
in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the
room periodically. In May 1991, she left the employ
of the Rodriguez family.
Sometime in October, Pacita contacted his brother,
Macario, and asked him to sell some jewelries (two
rings, one bracelet, and a pair of earrings). She told
Macario that a friend of hers owned the jewelry.
Macario obliged and sold them to Ernesto Francisco
(Ernesto for brevity).
After sometime Jovita found out that her jewelries
were gone and accused Pacita for stealing the same,
which was then proved by the court. Later on, Jovita
filed against Ernesto Francisco for violation of PD
1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.
RTC ruled against him which was affirmed by the CA.
Accused then petitioned that the court erred in
proving him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that
he was liable for PD 1612.
ISSUE:
WON there is sufficient evidence for the accused to
be liable under PD 1612.
RULING:
No, there is no sufficient evidence to hold the
accused liable under PD 1612.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as
follows:
1. a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
2. the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime
of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
103| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
3. the accused knew or should have shown
that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; and,
4. there is, on the part of the accused, intent to
gain for himself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612
creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes
a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
The stolen property subject of the charge is not
indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely
corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence
adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of
fencing.
With respect to the first element of the crime:
The court ruled that the conviction of Pacita of theft
does not constitute proof against him. There is no
showing that the said decision was already final
and executory when the trial court rendered its
decision in the instant case.
Anent the second element, the Court find and
hold the following:
First. Jovita’s testimony in the criminal cases
against Pacita, that Pacita had confessed to her that
she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner,
is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to
prove the truth of the said admission. It bears
stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the
said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that
only parties to a case are bound by a judgment of
the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by
the judgment of said case. Furthermore, the
prosecution did not present Pacita as witness;
hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine
Pacita. The rule is that the acts or declarations of a
person are not admissible in evidence against a
third party.
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the
preliminary investigation in the criminal case filed
against Ernesto, as well as her supplemental
affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible against the
petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a
quo. The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his right
of cross-examination.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that
Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the person who
bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed
admissible in evidence against the petitioner.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
However, such testimony is admissible only to prove
such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner as
the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it
is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas
declaration to the policemen, that the petitioner
was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It
must be stressed that the policemen had no
personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more
importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a
quo.
Fourth. The testimony of Macario during the
preliminary investigation of this criminal case is
admissible in evidence against the petitioner since
he testified for the prosecution and was cross-
examined on his testimony during the preliminary
investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to
prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry
from Macario and Pacita are the following: the
testimony and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the
testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation and trial in the court a quo, which is
found by the court as dubious.
During the preliminary investigation in this
criminal case, Macario admitted that on October 10,
1991, he and his sister Pacita sold two rings and one
bracelet to the petitioner, while in November 1991,
he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings to the
petitioner. On direct examination in the court a quo,
Macario testified that he and Pacita sold the earrings
to the petitioner in May 1992. On cross-examination,
Macario testified that he and his sister Pacita went
to the petitioners shop and sold the subject jewelry
on both occasions. On further cross-examination,
Macario changed his testimony anew. Further,
Macario testified during the preliminary
investigation that when he transacted with the
petitioner for the second time, he was with a friend,
and not with his sister Pacita. On redirect
examination, Macario declared that in October 1991,
he and Pacita sold four (4) pieces of jewelry contrary
to his testimony on direct examination. Such
inconsistencies pertained to material points and not
merely to minor matters.
Assuming that the petitioner purchased the
said jewelry from Macario, there is no evidence on
record that the petitioner knew that they were
stolen. Even Macario did not know that the jewelry
was stolen. He testified that Pacita told him before
he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they
belonged to a friend of hers. Macario only learned,
after the case against Pacita had already been filed
in court, that the jewelry was owned by
Jovita. However, he failed to inform the petitioner
that the said jewelry was stolen.
The prosecution cannot even validly argue that
the petitioner should have known which pieces of
104| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
jewelry were stolen. This is so because the
prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent
evidence to prove the value of the said stolen
articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare
and uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they
were worth P655,000. It is a well-entrenched rule
that an ordinary witness cannot establish the value
of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial notice
of the value of the same. The trial court can only
take judicial notice of the value of goods which are
matters of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of
jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it
capable of unquestionable demonstration and in
the absence of receipts or any other competent
evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by
the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for
the stolen jewelry.
In the absence of direct evidence that the
accused had knowledge that the jewelry was
stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts
and circumstances from which it can be concluded
that the accused should have known that the
property sold to him were stolen; which in this case,
the prosecution failed to establish. Hence, petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612
for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
70) Gen. Avelino Razon v. Tagitis, et. al
KEYWORD: KASIM EVIDENCE (hearsay; based on an
informant) Writ of Amparo
Flexibility is necessary under the unique
circumstances that enforced disappearance cases
pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy,
the standard of evidence must be responsive to
the evidentiary difficulties faced.||| The court
reduce its rules to the most basic test of reason
— i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.||
FACTS: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant
for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
Scholarship Programme, together with his student
Kunnong, an IDB scholar,arrived in Jolo by boat
from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House.
Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for
his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
was no longer around. The receptionist related
that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30
in the afternoon and even left his room key with
the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even
sent a text message to the latter's secretary who
did not know of Tagitis' whereabouts and activities
either. He then reported Tagitis disappearance to
the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later the respondent, Tagitis
wife filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with
the CA. The petition was directed against Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine
Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP);Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG);Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel
Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
The petition alleged that Engr. Tagitis went out of the
pension house to take his early lunch but while out
on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be
police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and
boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped
away. That when Kunnong reported the matter to
the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately
given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have
been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other
groups known to be fighting against the
government. And when the wife filed a complaint
with the PNP in the ARMM, she was told of an
intriguing tale by the police that her husband was
not missing but was with another woman having
good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of
the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband.
In their verified Return filed, the petitioners denied
any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a
cause of action against them; were baseless, or at
best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence.
CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command
of the area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE
TAGITIS. On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an
ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not
appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in
resolving Tagitis' disappearance.
(relevant to the topic on hearsay evidence): In
her direct testimony, respondent pointed to two
sources of information as her bases for her
allegation that Tagistis had been placed under
105| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
government custody. The first was a friend in
Zamboanga Col. Ancanan, who occupied a high
position in the military and who allegedly
mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands.
(Nothing came out of this claim, as both the
respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin,
failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them
any information that Tagitis was in government
custody.)
The second, more specific and productive source
of information was Col. Kasim, (high ranking PNP,
mistaken to be a military man) whom the
respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin,
met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. ||The
respondent and Talbin testified that Kasim (Kasim
Evidence) read to them a "highly confidential
report" that contained the "alleged activities of
Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her
husband was abducted because "he is under
custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I.
or Jema'ah Islamiah". The report indicated that
her husband met with people belonging to a
terrorist group. She then told Col. Kasim that her
husband was a diabetic taking maintenance
medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to
the persons holding him the need to give him his
medication.
Kasim never denied that he met with the
respondent and her friends, and that he provided
them information based on the input of an
unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony
that the "informal letter" he received from his
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was
in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that
the information he provided the respondent was
merely a "raw report" from "barangay
intelligence" that still needed confirmation and
"follow up" as to its veracity.
CA: confirmed that the disappearance of Tagitis
was an "enforced disappearance" under the UN
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. The conclusion that the
CIDG was involved was based on the respondent's
testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs.
Talbin. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw
report" from Col. Kasim's asset, pointing to the
CIDG's involvement in Tagitis' abduction. The CA
held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried
"great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim's subsequent and
belated retraction of his statement that the
military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in
the abduction of Tagitis.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: Whether hearsay evidence is admissible in a
petition for writ of Amparo.{evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs.
Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge
of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant)}
RULING:
YES. Based on these considerations and the unique
evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance
cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim
informed the respondent and her friends, based on
the informant's letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison
for the JI and who had been under surveillance since
January 2007, was "in good hands" and under
custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after
he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain
"Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism. The respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's
testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col.
Kasim's plain denial and his claim that he had
destroyed his informant's letter, the critical piece of
evidence that supports or negates the parties'
conflicting claims. Col. Kasim's admitted destruction
of this letter — effectively, a suppression of this
evidence — raises the presumption that the letter, if
produced, would be proof of what the respondent
claimed. For brevity, we shall call the evidence of
what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be
the "Kasim evidence".
Given this evidence, our next step is to
decide whether we can accept this evidence, in
lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the
disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with
government participation, knowledge or consent
and that he was held for custodial
investigation. We note in this regard that Col.
Kasim was never quoted to have said that the
custodial investigation was by the CIDG
Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies
government intervention through the use of the
term "custodial investigation", and does not at
all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis'
custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with
a classic case of hearsay evidence —
i.e., evidence whose probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the
witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col.
Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some
other person not on the witness stand (the
informant).
To say that this piece of evidence is
incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what
106| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
it substantively states is to acknowledge — as
the petitioners effectively suggest — that in the
absence of any direct evidence, we should
simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an
immediate dismissal for this reason is no
different from a statement that the Amparo Rule
— despite its terms — is ineffective, as it cannot
allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that
are unavoidably present inAmparo situations,
particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not
promulgated with this intent or with the intent
to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. It was promulgated to
provide effective and timely remedies, using and
profiting from local and international
experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet
the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced
disappearances with the flexibility that these
difficulties demand.
To give full meaning to
our Constitution and the rights it protects, we
hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least
take a close look at the available evidence to
determine the correct import of every piece of
evidence — even of those usually considered
inadmissible under the general rules of evidence
— taking into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason that we can
use as basic minimum admissibility requirement.
In the present case, we should at least
determine whether the Kasim evidence before
us is relevant and meaningful to the
disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably
consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis' personal
circumstances surrounded him with an air of
mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the
World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for
the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga
and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight
stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the
purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the
day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the
records indicates the purpose of his overnight
sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof.
Matli, early on informed the Jolo police
that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in
trust for IDB scholars. Prof. Matli later on stated
that he never accused Tagitis of taking away
money held in trust, although he confirmed that
the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds
of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis' personal
account. Other than these pieces of evidence,
no other information exists in the records
relating to the personal circumstances ofTagitis.
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional
murky as his personal circumstances. While Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports
the Amparo petition recited that he was taken merely reiterated the open-ended initial report
away by "burly men believed to be police of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a
intelligence operatives", no evidence search in all of its divisions with negative results.
whatsoever was introduced to support this These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the
allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is exhaustion "of all possible efforts". PNP-CIDG
that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part,
October 30, 2007 — the day he arrived in Jolo — also reported negative results after searching
and was never seen again. "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for
a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and
The Kasim evidence assumes critical
after a diligent and thorough research, records
materiality given the dearth of direct evidence
show that no such person is being detained in
on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies
the CIDG or any of its department or divisions."
the gaps that were never looked into and
PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina
clarified by police investigation. It is the
and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing
Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in
person report into an enforced disappearance
their affidavits-returns, as they essentially
case, as it injects the element of participation by
reported the results of their directives to their
agents of the State and thus brings into question
units to search for Tagitis.
how the State reacted to the disappearance.
The extent to which the police
Denials on the part of the police
authorities acted was fully tested when the CA
authorities, and frustration on the part of the
constituted Task Force Tagitis, with specific
respondent, characterize the attempts to
directives on what to do. The negative results
locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police
reflected in the Returns on the writ were again
informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been
replicated during the three hearings the CA
taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting
scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned
the government. No evidence was ever offered
"retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his
on whether there was active Jolo police
accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust
investigation and how and why the Jolo police
for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his
arrived at this conclusion. The respondent's own
testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any
inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was
knowledge or complicity in any abduction and
not missing but was with another woman
said that there was no basis to conclude that the
somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this
CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with
explanation was arrived at based on an
the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise
investigation. As already related above, the
considered it premature to conclude
inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded
that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in
ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary
his custody. As already noted above, the Task
purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col.
Force notably did not pursue any investigation
Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim's
about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his
story, however, confirmed only the fact of his
background in relation to the IDB and the
custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest
background and activities of this Bank itself, and
or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s
the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists
or the party holding him in custody. The more
and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No
significant part of Col. Kasim's story is that the
attempt appears to have ever been made to look
abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking
into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in
with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan,
trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are
a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs.
indispensable in investigations of this nature.
Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being
These omissions and negative results were
held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police
aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as
agencies participating in the investigation ever
late as January 28, 2008 or three months after
pursued these leads. Notably, Task
the disappearance that the police authorities
Force Tagitis to which this information was
requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim
relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to
could not attend the trial because his subpoena
pursue these aspects of the case. DICSaH
was not served, despite the fact that he was
More denials were manifested in the designated as Ajirim's replacement in the latter's
Returns on the writ to the CA made by the last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then
petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino questioned. No investigation — even an internal
I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent one — appeared to have been made to inquire
107| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
into the identity of Col. Kasim's "asset" and what
he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of
evidence and developments a consistency in
the government's denial of any complicity in
the disappearance ofTagitis, disrupted only by
the report made by Col. Kasim to the
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim,
however, eventually denied that he ever made
the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another
distinctive trait that runs through these
developments is the government's dismissive
approach to the disappearance, starting from
the initial response by the Jolo police to
Kunnong's initial reports of the disappearance,
to the responses made to the respondent when
she herself reported and inquired about her
husband's disappearance, and even at Task
Force Tagitis itself.
Based on these considerations, we
conclude that Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an
unguarded moment, unequivocally point to
some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot
but point to this conclusion. For why would the
government and its officials engage in their
chorus of concealment if the intent had not
been to deny what they already knew of the
disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the
government's cap under the circumstances of
the disappearance? From this perspective, the
evidence and developments, particularly the
Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete
case of enforced disappearance that
the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the
UN Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted, the evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the
enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent
and unfounded government denials and
haphazard handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection
of the law — a situation that will subsist unless
this Court acts.
Disappearances Cases
These characteristics — namely, of being
summary and the use of substantial
evidence as the required level of proof (in
contrast to the usual preponderance of
evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt
in court proceedings) — reveal the clear
108| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to
have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
addressing Amparo situations. The standard
of diligence required — the duty of public
officials and employees to observe
extraordinary diligence — point, too, to the
extraordinary measures expected in the
protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of
extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings,
the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly
comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as
discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has
been proven, the respondents must then
respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable
case, of course, must show that an enforced
disappearance took place under circumstances
showing a violation of the victim's constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure
on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
In the seminal case of Velasquez
Rodriguez, the IACHR — faced with a lack of
direct evidence that the government of
Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez'
disappearance — adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established
the rule that presumes governmental
responsibility for a disappearance if it can be
proven that the government carries out a
general practice of enforced disappearances and
the specific case can be linked to that
practice. The IACHR took note of the realistic fact
that enforced disappearances could be proven
only through circumstantial or indirect evidence
or by logical inference; otherwise, it was
impossible to prove that an individual had been
made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international
and domestic courts shows that
direct evidence, whether
testimonial or documentary, is not
the only type of evidence that
may be legitimately considered in
reaching a
decision. Circumstantial evidence,
indicia, and presumptions may be
considered, so long as they lead
EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

to conclusions consistent with the The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is
facts. to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence
131. Circumstantial or otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
presumptive evidence is be admissible if it is consistent with the
especially important in admissible evidence adduced. In other
allegations of disappearances, words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
because this type of repression is test of reason — i.e.,to the relevance of the
characterized by an attempt to evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
suppress all information about with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus,
the kidnapping or the even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
whereabouts and fate of the satisfies this basic minimum test.
victim. [Emphasis supplied]

In concluding that the disappearance of

Manfredo Velasquez (Manfredo) was carried out
by agents who acted under cover of public
authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial
evidence including the hearsay testimony of
Zenaida Velasquez, the victim's sister, who
described Manfredo's kidnapping on the basis of
conversations she had with witnesses who saw
Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes
in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a
former Honduran military official had
announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a
special military squadron acting under orders of
the Chief of the Armed Forces. The IACHR
likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a
second witness who asserted that he had been
told by a Honduran military officer about the
disappearance, and a third witness who testified
that he had spoken in prison to a man who
identified himself as Manfredo.

Velasquez stresses the lesson that

flexibility is necessary under the unique
circumstances that enforced disappearance
cases pose to the courts; to have an effective
remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced.
On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the
admission and appreciation of evidence, as
arbitrariness entails violation of rights and
cannot be used as an effective counter-measure;
we only compound the problem if a wrong is
addressed by the commission of another wrong.
On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in
our evidentiary rules and cannot consider
evidence the way we do in the usual criminal
and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings
before us are administrative in nature where,
as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not
strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow
the substantial evidence rule, we must observe
flexibility in considering the evidence we shall
take into account.

109| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS