G.R. No.

113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and
HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.

FACTS:

To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of
Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and
became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective
requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. The Treaty adopts a "non-
list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between
the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows
extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes
were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the
imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request
for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of
either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a
copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both
Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty." For the
purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place
the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall
be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to
the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government
of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul
Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen for:

a. 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 because he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson
and Round Solicitors, secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven
Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the
relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b. 13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes
Act of 1958 because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission
(including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life
insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through
the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an insurance agent

c. 1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68
commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for
Life Insurance to the AMP Society based on an inexistent policy-holder

d. 1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr.
Craker's signed and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal
Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent
Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was
initiated on April 6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court on June 14,
1993 granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that
the extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed. The extradition
proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision was sustained and Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Wright filed a review on certiorari to set aside the
order of deportation contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he argues that the trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on
evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition
proceeding.

b. Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive
application of offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity

c. Whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post
facto law

HELD:

a. NO.
Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and
for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the
time they were alleged to have been committed. The trial court correctly determined the offenses
under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and
false testimony/perjury, respectively.

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with. The signature and official seal of the Attorney-
General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the
Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. The last requirement was accomplished by the
certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the
arrest of the person sought to be extradited.” It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution"
to a person charged with an information or a criminal complaint as it will render the Treaty ineffective
over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. Moreover, the
“Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets” shows that he is not only wanted for prosecution but has
absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is
required only when appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent court
in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not
required if the offender has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

b. YES.

Article 18 states: “ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have
notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty
have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to
be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.”

The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph
pertains to its termination. There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.

Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: “4. Extradition may be granted
pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is
requested was committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the
offense; and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at
the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in
force in that state.”

c. NO.

Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded by the
Court of Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a
crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified."
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States attached with the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant
of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents
on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged with the following:

i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum
Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1
year)

The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based
on the following:

i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall
be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D. No.
1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely determines the compliance of the Requesting
Government with the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing
of the petition for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition.

ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine
Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request of the United States Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.

iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition
presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents
ii. certiorari to set aside Department’s letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed
to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction

Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with the
request of the United States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial
court and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a period of 20 days from service of the
order.

Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion
to cease and desist from enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court brushed
aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684 and the
TRO and proceded on the issues.

ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
on the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and
the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is
dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under
Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is violated

HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence.

i. NO.

Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the
executive authority to conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings
proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power:
1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in
form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.

The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an

administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution. The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial finding of
whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has the power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary
investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c]
of PD 1069) at 2 stages:
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the
provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he can
be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in
court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration

The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition
against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and
hearing.

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999
(the following day the Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the Department of Foreign
Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.

Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice,
the latter shall designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5,
PD 1069). The attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial court, with
a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The
presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the
petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).

Extradition Hearing
The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary
nature of the proceedings, shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The
attorney may represent the Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD 1069). The Court’s decision on whether the
petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be final
and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).

ii. YES.

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a
prospective extradite. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. Petitioner contends that United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such argument, however has been overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable
during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of
the extradition proceedings. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or
by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in
an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers (such
as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent. Therefore, notice and hearing requirements of
administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet
been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the
extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then
shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.