People v. Marti, G.R. No.

81561, 193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991

"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

 Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland and contracted the services of
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
 When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the packages
simply contained books and cigars.
 However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they suspected that
the contents were illegal drugs.
 The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were marijuana.
 In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside.
 After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
 Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
NO.
 The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only to governmental action.
 This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
 In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him.
 Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
 The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in compliance with
SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and
seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
 Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of
the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals.
 The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of
the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another person’s right to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible; however the
violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991 193 SCRA 57

FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana
leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of search and
seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in the
process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs People’s Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under
the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellants
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused / appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection against
the STATE.

VERSION 2:

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to
send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused
and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes,
husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found
inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job
Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation
of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional
right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between
the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of
business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless
search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

VERSION 3:

Facts :

Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with them four gift wrapped packages to be
delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if she could inspect the packages,
however, Marti refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his friend.

Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom and he soon found out that the boxes
contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI who acknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was
convicted for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Constitutional Issues :

1. Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable seach and
siezure and privacy of communication.

Ruling :

1. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmental interference, the libertied
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

2. Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure. Merely to look at that which is plain sight is
not search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed is not search.

Commissioner Bernas :

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy...is a protection against the State. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between
a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder.

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

[20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967]

Facts:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors
— several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioners contentions are:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law —

Respondents-prosecutors contentions

(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;

(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and

(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality
of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue:

Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally.

Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally.

Held:

The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
__________________________

1
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G.
Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio
Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now
City) Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation
(Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American
Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and
Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation,
Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers
and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the
same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial
in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause,
the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The
description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the
subversive nature of the said items.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants to search the premises of of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum”. Various equipment, paraphernalia and written documents were searched. Written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of “We Forum” newspaper were seized.

The validity of these warrants were questioned through a petition for certiorari and so that the articles and equipment may be
returned to the petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the items.

Supreme Court Ruling:

The law provides that “…no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.”

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. In the case, the reason for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the specifications and the particularities of
the alleged subversive material that the petitioner has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because they are in the nature of general warrants.

The search warrants were declared null and void.

V2:

Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received information that Petitioner
had in his possession at his house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive
documents”, which were “used or intended to be used” for illegal purposes. The application was granted.

In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized “2 envelopes containing P14000, handset with
antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted papers and handset battery pack”. In
October, petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In
December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be
limited to the specified items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing that
pending the determination of legality of seizure of the articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant was legal.

Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described in the search warrants. The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion;
that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized.

TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE

[246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]

Facts:

In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in
his possession at his house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive documents”,
which were “used or intended to be used” for illegal purposes. The application was granted.

In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized “2 envelopes containing P14000, handset with
antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted papers and handset battery pack”. In
October, petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In
December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be
limited to the specified items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing
that pending the determination of legality of seizure of the articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the
petition.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant was legal.

Held:

Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described in the search warrants. The evident
purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion; that
unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.

Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized.

Placer vs Villanueva

G.R. Nos. 60349-62, December 29, 1983

Facts: Following receipt of informations from petitioners that probable cause has been established which necessitates the
issuance of warrants of arrest, respondent judge issued an order the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining
the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders
requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support
of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners

Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a
preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance
of warrants of arrest by the court.
Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates
respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the
court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: 1. No. 2. Yes.

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing
magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

“Warrant of arrest, when issued. – If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.”

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of
arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification
and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the reason for the
issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to
the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time
in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses is to enable the court to
determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require further proceedings.

SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]

Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review
by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March
30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary
of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated
by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving
his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal
case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation
of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that
respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish
that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence,
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the
status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26,
1988 is LIFTED.

SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988]
Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the President
FACTS: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself
filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president
would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be
consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be
a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defence to prevent the case from proceeding against such
accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President
may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.
CRIMPRO RULE 126
Title: GR No. 209387
DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE Date: January 11, 2016
Ponente: LEONEN, J
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming back and forth taking a vessel." At
around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a
ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then
proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the
x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.

Flores, the x-ray machine operator-on-duty, saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz's
bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Igot who was the baggage inspector then.
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot's
manual inspection of the bag.

Port Police Officer Abregana was called by Igot and was told that there were firearms in a bag owned by Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz
admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag was then inspected and the following items were found inside: three (3)
revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When
asked whether he had the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was then arrested
and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also informed of his constitutional rights.

In the Information, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms.
Subsequently, another Information was filed charging him with the violation of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.

After trial, RTC Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution
No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The trial court also finds the search conducted by the port
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused's constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of
the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions
obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment.

Petitioner’s Contention:
1. Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. In petitioner's case, it may well be said that,
with the circumstances attending the search of his luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his right against
warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that when his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination,
nothing incriminating would be recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his
luggage. He believed that no incriminating evidence would be found. He knew he did not place those items. But what is
strikingly unique about his situation is that a considerable time interval lapsed, creating an opportunity for someone else to
place inside his luggage those incriminating items.

Respondent’s Argument:
1. Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting
his conviction. Dela Cruz was caught in flagrante delicto. The firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the
port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure. According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless
searches and seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures. Records are also
clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and seizure.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures- YES
II. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case- YES
RATIO
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, the court examined three (3) points of alleged intrusion
into the right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the
baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the Port Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag
to search, retrieve, and seize the firearms and ammunition.

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port personnel—the x-ray
machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine station. The court held that the search WAS NOT
rendered unreasonable at the first point of intrusion.
With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state agents or
authorized government authorities. In People v. Marti, This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The
evidence obtained against the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized government
agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individual. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons are not covered by the
exclusionary rule. To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case was committed by private or public
persons, we revisit the history and organizational structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its ports.
While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port personnel are not
necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of
port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of
government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports.

In People v. Suzuki, the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal." He was "bound for Manila via
flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked 'Bongbong's piaya." The
accused "proceeded to the 'walk through metal detector,' a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the
presence of metallic substance or object." "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence
of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying." When the accused was asked to open the content of the
box, he answered "open, open." Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops were then found inside the box. Suzuki argued
that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the night before. He did
not know the contents of the box. This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception to
the prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security procedure.

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of
each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and,
therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against appellant.

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.

This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People where the court upheld the validity of the search conducted as part
of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic Airport. Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions
when it used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the
existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner's bag. Notably,
petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.

The second point of intrusion was when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the attention of the
port police officer. The court also held that the search WAS NOT rendered unreasonable at the second point of
 intrusion,

The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port.
At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning
machine. The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present
the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security
regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.

A third point of intrusion to petitioner's right to privacy occurred during petitioner's submission to port security
measures. This court should determine whether the requirements for a valid waiver against unreasonable searches
and seizures were met.

The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless search is presumed to
be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by the port authorities. He argues
that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against a warrantless search. In cases involving the waiver of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court's findings show that
petitioner presented his bag for scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms
were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities. It was after the port personnel's inspection
that Officer Abregana's attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's consent.

Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who permitted authorities to search their persons
and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search when he
voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition, petitioner's consent to the search at the domestic port
was not given under intimidating or coercive circumstances.

We also cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that there was no valid consent to the search because his consent
was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited items in his bag. The defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence would be found does not automatically negate valid consent to the search when incriminating items are
found. His or her belief must be measured against the totality of the circumstances. Again, petitioner voluntarily
submitted himself to port security measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures
since he had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.

Consequently, we find respondent's argument that the present petition falls under a valid consented search and during
routine port security procedures meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so
as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and the Resolution dated
August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016januarydecisions.php?id=3

MORANO VS. VIVO

[20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]

Facts:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel
Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors
in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau
Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and
after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino
citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah
and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31,
1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before
September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the
confiscation of their bond.

Issue:

Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.

Held:

Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted,
she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of
Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the appropriate
consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port
of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number
of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first
departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners'
argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not
particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah,
seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both
minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle
which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino
would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is
allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the
Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and
thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a
pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are
confident, is impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses.

Board of Commissioners (CID) v dela Rosa (1991)

Bidin, J.

FACTS:

 Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the SolGen for the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration
(formerly the CID) and Board of Special Inquiry to set aside two orders issued by different judges of RTCs and to enjoin
public respondent judges from acting on the ff. civil cases:
o 1st case: filed by Gatchalian in the RTC of Manila. Judge dela Rosa issued an order that denied the Motion to
Dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing with any proceedings that will lead to the
deportation of William Gatchalian
o 2nd case: filed by Gatchalian’s wife and minor children in the RTC of Valenzuela. Judge Capulong issued an that
enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against Gatchalian
 July 12, 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
born Filipino Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children with his wife Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco (William’s
father), Elena, and Benjamin.
  June 27, 1961: Then 12-year old William arrived in Manila from Hongkong with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson
Gatchalian with Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a
cablegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
 July 12, 1961: the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William and his companions as Filipino Citizens.
 July 6, 1962: Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry reversed the decision
of the latter and ordered the exclusion of respondent Gatchalian
o The 1967 case of Arocha v Vivo sustained the validity of said order.
 1973: Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry. Acting Commissioner Nituda later issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against Gatchalian.
 1990: acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending that Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of
exclusion be charged with violation of the Immigration act. The SOJ indorsed the recommendation and a mission order
was issued by Commissioner Domingo of the CID ordering the arrest of Gatchalian.
o Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being assailed in the case at bar.
 Petitioner’s arguments:
o The judges have no jurisdiction over petitioner and the subject matter;
o That assuming the judges had jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion by hearing the deportation
case and in effect determined Gatchalian’s citizenship;
o That respondent judges disregarded the cases of Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Acra which put to finality the order of
the Board of Commissioners
o Respondent committed forum-shopping
 Private respondent’s arguments:
o Petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts have resolved the issue of his
citizenship;
o Petitioners cannot fairly and judiciously dispose of the deportation case;
o Ground for deportation has already prescribed

ISSUES + RULING:

WoN the RTCs had jurisdiction over the cases. YES.

 Under §21 of BP 129, the RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with the SC and CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
 While §9(3) of BP 129 vests the CA with exclusive jurisdiction over “quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or
commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948”, the same does not provide that the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction extends to all quasi-judicial agencies.
o The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are those which
under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals.
o RA 5434 does not include the Bureau of Immigration. The decisions of the Bureau of Immigration are subject to
judicial review in accordance with §25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the Administrative Code:

 Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with
this chapter and applicable laws.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in
any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
 B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21,
(1) BP 129).
 While it is true that Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship and that a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to
divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings, the Court carved out an exception in
Chua Hiong v Deportation Board:
o When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
 Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct.
  Hence, Gatchalian’s petitions before the RTCs contained a proper and ripe controversy for the disposition of the courts.
He also presented sufficient documents and other evidence to his petitions.

WoN Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Arca already settled the respondent’s alienage (i.e., res judicata). NO.

 The party to the case was Pedro Gatchalian (William’s uncle). Moreover, the cases did not categorically make any
statement that William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen. Generally, res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship
except in the following case (stated in Burca v Republic):
o A person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
o The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
 Such elements are not present in the case at bar.

WoN the arrest of respondent based on the warrant of exclusion is valid. NO.

 Pursuant to §37(a) of the Immigration Act, an arrest can only be effected after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
 Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for purposes of investigation. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
 Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner Nituda issued a memorandum in 1973 that recommended
the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6,
1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants.
 Such was the last official act of the government that is the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of
respondent William Gatchalian.
 Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is that the cablegram issued by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines
entitles them to remain in the country.

WoN the ground for deportation already prescribed. YES.

 The warrant of arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of action arose in 1962. The warrant was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only in 1990.
 §37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises."
 In any case, the warrant of exclusion was already recalled by Acting Commissioner Nituda in 1973.
 §45 of the Immigration Act imposes the penalty of a fine not more than one thousand pesos, imprisonment for not more
than two years, and deportation if he is an alien. For such correctional penalties, the prescriptive period is 10 years.
 The Court also cited §1 of Act No. 3326 that states:
o "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less
than six years”
o No prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be
initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, it being a special law.
 Deportation actions are not imprescriptible. In Lao Gi v CA, the Court stated:
o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it
is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
o Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.
 Since his entry into the country, Gatchalian also contributed to the economy by providing jobs and investing.

WoN there is proof that Santiago’s children were born out of wedlock. NO.

 Following the principle of lex loci celebrationis: a marriage formally valid where it is celebrated is valid everywhere.
 Santiago’s attestation that the marriage was valid is competent evidence as statements or declarations regarding family
reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (§34, Rule 130 of the RoC).
  Since the marriage is valid, it follows that William’s father Francisco (Santiago’s son) follows the Filipino citizenship of his
father. And since William is also a legitimate child of Francisco, he is a Filipino citizen.

DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed.

Feliciano, J. Dissenting Opinion:

 The warrant of exclusion remains valid. Respondent and his co-applicants failed to substantiate and prove their claim to
Filipino citizenship.
 Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to his
application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and
supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
 The validity of Pedro Gatchalian’s citizenship, which was the controversy in Arocha v Vivo, included that of his other
co-applicants (William et al).
 The Court in that decision upheld that validity of the July 6, 1962 order. Since respondent William Gatchalian does not
claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must
accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen.
 The prescriptive period does not apply. Deportation may be effected at any time after entry. The NBI recommended the
filing of charges in 1990.
 Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of
time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from
the deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which
rendered them liable to deportation.
 Reliance on Act. No. 3266 is also misplaced. The Act refers to criminal prosecutions under special laws.
 The recall of arrests in the memorandum issued by Nituda has no effect. The Commissioner is not higher than the BOC
itself, hence the appellate proceedings vested in the BSI.
 Respondent’s petition for rehearing was filed more than 10 years after the 1962 order.
 In Arocha, the Court held that individual actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:
o Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The
Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and
in order that their views and Ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion.

Davide, J. Dissenting Opinion:

 The questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions, hence §9(3) of BP 129 is
applicable.
 Gatchalian committed forum shopping. Since he is a resident of Valenzuela, there is no reason for him to file the petition
with the RTC of Manila.
 Chua Hiong v Deportation Board is not applicable. The word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include
the regional trial courts because, as stated above, said courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case
was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
 The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is that the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, which is not the case in the present petition.
 The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not only
highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done without any semblance of authority.
o The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a Decision of the Board of
Commissioners rendered about eleven years earlier.
o Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the power or authority to approve the
recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry,
to reverse, and nullify, the Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of Commissioners, and to order the admission of
William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. His order is void ab initio.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]

Facts:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman
72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their
residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman
was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of
ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were
also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance
for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of
evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings.
On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of
Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed
11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable
cause.

Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.

Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held:

While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect
the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles
linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences
(Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view.
In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from
questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special
Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has
become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be
arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in
character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure
against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility
of the people.

G.R. NO.78596
July 13, 1989
Lucien Tan Van Nghia, petitioner
v.
Hon. Ramon J. Liwag, Acting Commisioner of the Commision on Immigration and Deportation(CID), and John Doer,
agents of the CID, respondents

FACTS:

Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national w/ temporary address in Sta. Ana, Mla.He was in the Phils. on Nov. 1, 1981
as a temporary visitor but his status was changed to an immigrant on Nov.16, 1984 based on his representation that he is
financially capable & will invest in the Phils. but has not made any investment & has engaged only in French tutoring & practice
acupressure.

On May 28, 1987, CID Commissioner Liwag recieved a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera. Jr. , as the
landlord of Lucien Tran allegedly accused the latter of being an undesirable alien for being hostile to public safety progress.

On June 1, 1987, Commisioner Liwag issued a mission order to a team of seven CID agents to locate & bring Lucien to
Intelligence Division for proper disposition & submission of report. But on the following day, as the CID went to the residence of
Lucien in Sta. Ana inviting him to the former’s headquarter for verification of his status but failed to obey instead lacked
themselves w/ his lady companion in their bedroom, refused indeed to talk to the agents. In such manner compelled them to
sought assistance of members of the Western Police District. But then again, Lucien adamantly refused to be taken in resulted to
the injury of both parties due to ensuing struggle until Lucien subdued & immediately taken to the CID intelligence office.The
warrant of arrest was issued on this day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest and detention of petitioner by the authority, the Immigration Commision is legal.

COURT RULING:

The petition was dismissed. Petitioner Lucien Tran Van is not similarly restrained with the condition in his bailbond is to
obey by appearing and answering the complaint with will hold himself, amenable to the court’s orders and processes & after
conviction will surrender in execution of such judgement. The records therein show that formal deportation proceeding have been
initiated against Lucien before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID.
The restrain has therefore become legal as well as the writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs Liwag

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Lucien Tran Van Nghia alleging that he was arrested without
warrant and deprived of his liberty by respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation (CID) and his agents.

Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitor and whose status was latter
changed to that of an immigrant based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.
However, petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure.

Respondent received a sworn complaint accusing the petitioner of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to
public safety and progress”. On June 1, 1987, Respondent issued a mission order to a team of seven (7) agents for them "to
locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report." On June 2, 19987, the aforementioned
CID agents went to petitioner's residence to invite him to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but petitioner and his
companion reportedly locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. Immigration agents sought the
help of the police, still refusing to talk and to be taken, a struggle ensued and the petitioner was subdued.
By reason of the injuries he allegedly sustained when he was "brutally seized" by the CID agents, petitioner, upon request of the
French consul, was transferred from his detention cell at the immigration office to the Philippine General Hospital for urgent
medical treatment. Petitioner's counsel also filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the "threatened removal" of
petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent Commissioner.

ISSUE: the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation
proceedings.

RULING: The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of
petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two
suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period
during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and police officers
at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint
of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.

But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his
petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. Firstly, petitioner is no
longer under confinement. Petitioner was released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond. The general rule in a
number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case
the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege
of the writ.

Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly restrained. The only condition in his bailbond is that ordinarily found in any other
analogous undertaking, which is "to appear and answer the complaint; will at all times hold himself ... amenable to the orders and
processes of the Court; and after conviction, he will surrender himself ... in execution of such judgment ... ."

Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special
Inquiry of the CID. 10 The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has
served its purpose. 11

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SORIANO MATA vs HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA

FACTS:

The contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on application for Search Warrant and a
joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully allegedly subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court.
Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of the respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinently under
PD 810, as amended by PD1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took, and arrangedvbets on the
Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets knows as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and Corporation
or from the government authorities concerned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Search Warrant is valid?

HELD:

No. The Search Warrant is declared as illegal.

RATIONALE:

Deposition, sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding
in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to property determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving if it will be found later his declarations are false.

V2:

FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him
alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao
tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could
be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the
City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied,
“it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a
motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section
4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact
that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying,
among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the
case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him?

HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules
provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We,
therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites
of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
SILVA V. PRESIDING JUDGE G.R. No. 81756 October 21, 1991

FACTS:

l RTC judge Nickarter Ontal issued a search warrant filed by M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, to be served against Petitioner Nicomedes Silva.

l The application was accompanied by “deposition of witness” executed by Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
l The search warrant stated that “You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the
room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers,
forthwith seize and take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said
property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.”
l During the raid, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.

l Petitioners alleged that the enforcement of the search warrant was illegal because it was issued on the sole basis of
mimeographed and the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and
answers.

l Antoinette Silva also filed a motion the return of the said amount because her name is not included in the search warrant. Thus,
her belongings shouldn’t be subject of the warrant.

l Acting on the said motion to return the money, Judge Ontal issued an order stating that the court “holds in abeyance the
disposition of the said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.
l RTC’s new judge, replacing judge Ontal, ruled against petitioners.
l MR was likewise denied by Judge Cruz (new judge).
l Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is validly issued by then Judge Ontal

HELD:

NO. In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search Warrant"
and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application
for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks
provided thereon.

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the
witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the
witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must
determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This
is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not
indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the
seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense
and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge
Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized
money.

Petition granted.
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE

[203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct 1991]

Facts:

Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for search warrant" and "Deposition of
witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of
Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972.
Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana
dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr.
Tama Silva at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to look
for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of
mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.

Issue:

Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.

Held:

Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and
answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their
answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva
seeking the return of her money.

The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva.
The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared
null and void.

*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court

Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits.

VEROY VS. LAYAGUE

[210 SCRA 97; G.R. No. 95630; 18 Jun 1992]

Facts:

Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao
City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System
sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently
residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who
had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the
salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of
the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her
access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms
were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house.

Police Officers had an information that the petitioner’s residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able
to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have
a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask
permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel
soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search
would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family
friend of the Veroys.

The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the
search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and
using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of
George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major
Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a
magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks
containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study
area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped
gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand,
containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag
containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by
Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house.

The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated
Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an
information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail was recommended.

Issue:

Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Held:

The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No.
83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph
of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a
possibility of a double jeopardy.
Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention
of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms.
The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as
to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be
applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the
prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole
circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them.

Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa
Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
"rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items
taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence against them.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search
incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No.
88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).

None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound,
he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he
himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys
to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain
the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a
search warrant but did not.

Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily
seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.
(Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita,
while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness
there is no crime.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms
is DISMISSED.

People vs. Joselito del Rosario – GR 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was
based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects
used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where
he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death
of some of the suspects.

After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was
only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge
Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the
authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.
ISSUES

(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

HELD

(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be apprised of his
Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In
fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations.

It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already considered as the
suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were
intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.

However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence
of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.

(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is
caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and © when the one
to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The
arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The
authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness.

Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because
the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality of
the warrantless arrest.

Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991

FACTS:

These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that their detention is unlawful on two grounds: (1) they
were arrested without warrant; and (2) no prior preliminary investigation was conducted.

Rolando Dural’s petition

Dural shot 2 CAPCOM Soldiers. He was charged with double murder without bail. Later, Bernardo Itucal was included as
defendant. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. Umil and
Villanueva were charged for violating the Anti-subversion Act but subsequently posted bail and were released. The double
murder case filed against Dural and Itucal proceeded to trial. The two were found guilty and were serving their sentences at the
time the petition was filed. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to Dural.

Amelia Roque’s petition

Rogelio Ramos was a former NPA member but surrendered to the authorities. He informed the military regarding Communist
Party’s operations in Manila. He even identified several NPA members and pointed to Renato Constantino’s house as a safe
house by the CPP-NPA. A search warrant was issued, where numerous firearms, ammunition, and other communications
equipment were found. Constantino was apprehended and brought to the CIS headquarters where he admitted being a member
of the CPP-NPA.

On the same evening, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s house to deliver letters to the rebels. He also had a piece of
paper with the jumbled telephone number of Amelia Roque’s sister. Buenaobra was also apprehended and upon questioning,
admitted to being a member of the CPP-NPA. Amelia Roque was also found using the leads the military got. Her house was
searched where subversive documents, ammunition and a fragmentation grenade were found. Roque and her companions were
taken to Camp Crame. However, Roque admitted that the articles belonged to her and her companions were consequently
released. Buenaobra and Roque were charged of violating the Anti- subversion Act. Roque was also charged of violating PD
1866. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on their behalf, but Buenaobra later withdrew his petition and preferred to stay in
Camp Crame.

Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple’s petition

Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were both members of the NUFC-CPP. They were apprehended at Constantino’s house
after having been caught carrying a bag of subversive materials. They also carried unlicensed firearms. They were charged of
violating PD 1866 where no bail was recommended. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed on their behalf of the two
alleging that they were unlawfully arrested and that there was no preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information. The
two, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. They also failed to request for a preliminary
investigation after the filing of informations against them.

Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera’s petition

The PC search the house of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. The PC found subversive documents and ammunition in Ocaya’s
car. She was charged with violation of PD 1866. No preliminary investigation was conducted because Ocaya refused to waive the
Provisions of Article 125. Rivera, however, was released since he committed no crime. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on
their behalf.

Deogracias Espiritu’s petition

Deogracias Espiritu was the General Secretary of PISTON. He was arrested without warrant in his home and brought
to Western Police District where he was detained. The respondents argued that Espiritu was lawfully arrested because of a prior
offense he committed. He allegedly urged drivers and operators to go on a nationwide strike to force the government to give in to
their demands in November 1988. He was invited for questioning. Later, an information was filed against him for violating Art 142
of the RPC. He filed for a petition for habeas corpus, which was denied because his warrantless arrest was in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Ramil Regala’s petition

Ramil Regala was one of the suspects in the killing of Romulo Bunye II for which he was arrested. Upon questioning, he identified
Narciso Nazareno as his conspirator in killing Bunye. Relying on this admission, the police, without warrant, invited Nazareno for
questioning. Later, an information charging Nazareno, Regala and two others for killing of Bunye was filed with the RTC Makati.
Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, which was denied. A petition for habeas corpus was then filed on his behalf, which was also
denied in light of the cases filed against him.

Arguments

Ocaya, Anonuevo, Caiple and Roque assert that the subversive documents found in their possession were planted by the military.
The People argued that they failed to substantiate their claim. There was also no evil motive on the part of the respondents to
falsely accuse the petitioners. The People also points out that the arrest of the petitioners was not a a “witch-hunt” but borne out
of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless arrests of the petitioners were valid – YES

RATIO:

In all the cases above, criminal charges have been filed against the petitioners. Hence, habeas corpus is not be allowed.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue.

The court refused to abandon its ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile, where it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed after an
information has been filed. The remedy would be that the Court inquires into every phase of detention and that all cases of
deprivation of liberty be brought to the courts for immediate scrutiny and disposition.

Umil vs. Ramos

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the
military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential information” that the authorities received. Except for one case
where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New People’s Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed
prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses
pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered
as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment
upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of
probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky
in their fishing expeditions.

2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that the
packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine
and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the
package and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right
against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of
the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution
PEOPLE VS. SUCRO

[195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]

Facts:

Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was
reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and
exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area.
While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was
intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of
marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4
teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Issue:

Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Held:

Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller). The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its
issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers
were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA

[205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]

Facts:

NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited
drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to
said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a
plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report,
based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused.
During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There
was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court,
considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.

Held:

The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer
must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after
the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall
in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by
invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place
had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and
ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence
against appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a
plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the
PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:

One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:

Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic
bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored
plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight
of seven grams then further wrapped
with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.

Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodrigueza’s
father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's
conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and
accused is acquitted.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA

[77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]

Facts:

Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of Dagupan City, Felipe
Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme
Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have
conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of
the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City
Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held:

Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary
investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation.
According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for
any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such
offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court
is lifted and set aside.

Posadas v. CA

Petitioner was walking within the premises of Rizal Memorial Colleges when he was spotted by 2 members of the INP. He was
spotted carrying a buri bag and, according to the INP members, was acting suspiciously. When he was approached by the
officers who duly identified themselves as members of the INP, petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped. The buri bag, when
checked, contained a calibre .38 gun, ammunitions for a .38 calibre and a .22 calibre gun, and a smoke grenade.

Facts:

1. Petitioner was caught during the surveillance of members of the Integrated National Police (Ursicio Ungab and Umbra
Umpar) on October 16, 1986 at about 10 in the morning. He was caught in Magallanes St., Davao Citym within the
premises of Rizal Memorial Colleges. Petitioner was carrying a buri bag and “was acting suspiciously,” as described
by the two members of the INP.
2. When they approached petitioner, they identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
was thwarted. The two officers checked the buri bag and found: 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with serial no.
770196, 2 rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke grenade, and 2 live ammunitions for a .22 caliber
gun.
3. Petitioner was brought to the headquarters and was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession, but correspondingly failed to do so. He was convicted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions.
4. Petitioner contends however that, there being no lawful arrest or search or seizure, the items which were confiscated
from his possession were inadmissible as evidence against him.
Ruling:

1. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, among others, an arrest is lawful even
without a warrant should a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of a peace officer or a private person. In the case at bar, the officers did not know what the petitioner had
committed or was actually committing; thus, it does not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, the search thereat in
the case at bar is more reasonable than warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints.
The search done by the officers was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag. There was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
2. It is too much to require police officers to search bags in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have
obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

People v. Mengote y Tejas

Unlawful warrantless arrest; violation of right against

illegal search and seizure

FACTS

August 8, 1987: Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were 3 suspicious-looking persons
at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard, Tondo Manila and because of it, a surveillance team of plainclothesmen
were then dispatched to the place.

Patrolmen saw 2 men “looking from side to side”, one of whom was holding his abdomen. The patrolmen approached these
persons and identified themselves as policemen where the 2 “suspicious-looking men” allegedly tried to run away but were
unable to escape because other lawmen surrounded them.

The suspects were then searched and one of them who turned out to be Mengote y Tejas was found with .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with 6 live bullets in the chamber. His companion, identified as Morellos had a fan knife secreted in his front right
pants pocket. The weapons were then taken and Mengote and Morellos were turned over police headquarters for investigation.
August 11, 1987: Mengote y Tejas was then filed before RTC for a violation of PD 1866 “Illegal Possession of Firearms”.

Aside from the policemen, the prosecution also presented Rigoberto Danganan who identified the .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver as among the articles stolen from him during a robbery in his house in Malabon. Danganan pointed at Mengote y Tejas
as one of the robbers.

The defense side however, Mengote, made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it
and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted" on him at the time of his arrest.

RTC: Mengote was convicted for violation of PD 1866 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

As appeal however by Mengote, it is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that:

-the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously
obtained.

-Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant.

-also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been
disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure was illegal?

Whether the warrantless arrest was illegal?

HELD:

Yes, the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. In fact, illegal search or seizure is an absolute prohibition of Article 3(2) of the Constitution. The Solicitor General,
however, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may without a warrant,
arrest a person: Cdpr

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

SC: Does not agree with the Solicitor General.

Par.c of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determine lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this
section.

Paragraphs a and b however, have not been established in the case.

At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote y Tejas was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

As to the argument actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the
accused-appellant had committed it."

SC: “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and in a place not exactly forsaken certainly do not
constitute sinister acts.

It would have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be,
like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after
alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day.
There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.

People v. Malmstedt (Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited
the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish) and People v. Claudio
(accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in
the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then
and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been
sufficiently established) do not apply to this case. These cases do not apply for there was nothing to support the arresting
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of imagination could
it have been inferred from these acts that an offense has been committed, was actually being committed or was at least
being attempted in their presence.

Instead, the case before us is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the
prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

SC: Moreover, Paragraph b is all the more not applicable for its requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not
shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.

As for the illegal possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. Before
these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was
unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house. (In short there was no investigation
done, policemen had no personal knowledge about Mengote)

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen,
even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. Without the evidence of the firearm
taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The
testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to him.

There is no need therefore to discuss the other issue in depth as the ruling is sufficient enough to sustain Mengote's
exoneration.

FINAL DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Decision is reversed and set aside. Mengote is acquitted.

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE

[210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]

Facts:

A telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and
North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw two men
“looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is violated

Ruling:

The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After he
has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of the arresting
officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has
not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
– ACQUITTED

PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN

[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]

Facts:

Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around
9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected
his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations.
The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue:

Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.

Held;

No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched
lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers.
It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police
officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT

[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]

Facts:

In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended.

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had
visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a
bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,
Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7)
NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole
foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to
bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two
(2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy
bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel
like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation.
At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative
samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of
marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available
in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other
at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his
personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.

Held:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph
(1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the
NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.
 PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN

[163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]

Facts:

Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found
to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her
after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was
carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while
he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches
and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and
that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue:

Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.

Held:

The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the
moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated
as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.

PEOPLE VS. SAYCON

[236 SCRA 325; G.R. NO. 110995; 5 SEPT 1994]

Facts:

On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel received information from NARCOM agent
Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was
arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed
them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO
Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the
gate of Pier 1. The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted
from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was
identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier
area. He willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly
obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the
suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected
"shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the
NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. The
PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the specimens and found out that the
specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as "shabu."

Issue:

Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid.

Held:

The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There was probable cause to believe that
the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine
hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics Command reported that the accused would be arriving on board the vessel and
carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with some external sign indicating
that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into account in determining probable cause.

PEOPLE VS. MUSA

[217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]

Facts:

A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani
was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani
to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani
proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga
could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana
and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents,
and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked
money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored
white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So
they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held:

Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and
seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It
will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the
object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and
moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the
plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.

Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO. 80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts:

On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police
Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and
Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their
agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of
the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure was illegal.

Held:

The Court ruled that the government authorities have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of
the literature. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides the following guidelines to be
observed:

1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in
order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present
danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a
case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
4. If in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it shall issue the search warrant prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the RPC (Obscene publications).
Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed obscene.

Valmonte vs. De Villa

THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area
of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part
of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search
warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in
such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which
all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect
its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.

BAGALIHOG vs. HON. JUDGE FERNANDEZ and MAJOR ROXAS

(1991, Cruz, J.)

FACTS:

 Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the
gunmen fled on a motorcycle.
 On the same day, petitioner's house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers had
sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless.
 2 days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioner's motorcycle and took
it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that
it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.
 After investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder for killing
Espinosa and 3 of his bodyguards

Petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the motorcycle with an application for a writ of replevin +
damages.
 Petitioner filed an urgent manifestation for the deposit of the motorcycle with the clerk of court of RTC Masbate, on the
ground that PC soldiers were using the vehicle without authority. The motion was granted by Judge Ricardo Butalid.
 Judge Butalid later inhibited himself and the case was transferred to Branch 45, presided by Judge Fernandez.
 A change of venue was ordered by this Court from Branch 45 of RTC Masbate to Branch 56 of RTC Makati.
 On October 12, 1990, Judge Fernandez dismissed Civil Case:
o The motorcycle, now in the possession of the Clerk of Court of Masbate, is to be used as evidence in Criminal
Case pending trial before Branch 56.
o This Court opined that it has no jurisdiction to release evidence impounded or surrendered to the PC Task Force
Espinosa.
o Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and cannot be replevied until such custody is
ended.
o The proper Court to order its release is that of Branch 56 of RTC Makati.
o Case DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner now asks this Court to reverse the said order.
ISSUES:
1. WON Replevin is proper to recover the possession of said motorcycle
2. WON the seizure of the motorcycle was valid, in acc. with the requirements of the Bill of Rights

PET: The motorcycle was invalidly seized and therefore, he has a right to its return. The proper remedy for this purpose is his
complaint for recovery and the issuance of a writ of replevin as authorized by ROC. In refusing to grant him relief and dismissing
the case instead on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court committed reversible error.

RESP: He admits the absence of a search warrant when the motorcycle was seized but stresses that the crime perpetrated is a
heinous offense. The motorcycle in question is an extremely mobile vehicle and can be easily dismantled or hidden, and the
situation existing at that time required him to place it in the custody of the PC Task Force without first securing a search warrant.
In doing so, he merely complied with the orders of his superior to preserve the vehicle for use as evidence in the criminal cases.

RULING: Decision of Judge Fernandez is SET ASIDE and reinstated for further proceedings.

1. For all his strong conviction about the guilt of the petitioner, the private respondent must still abide by the Constitution and
observe the requirements of the Bill of Rights (Article III, Sec. 2).
 The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous" and the victim was "a man of
consequence" did not authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the
omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.
2. The importance of the motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases is not an excuse for seizure without a warrant. The
authorities had enough time to comply with the required procedure but they did not do so, preferring the unconstitutional shortcut.
The crime was committed on March 17, 1989, and the motorcycle was seized two days later. During that period, the private
respondent had all the opportunity to apply for a search warrant and establish probable cause in accordance with the Bill of Rights
and the Rules of Court. He did not.
 The mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the search warrant redundant. The fear that it would be dismantled or
hidden was mere speculation that was not borne out by the facts. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the
motorcycle without the prior intention of a warrant has not been established.
 The private respondent maintains that by the petitioner's promise, he effectively waived the right to a search warrant and
so can no longer complain that the motorcycle had been invalidly seized. There was no such waiver. The petitioner
 merely agreed to cooperate with the investigators and to produce the vehicle when needed, but he did not agree to have
it impounded.
 The case at bar does not come under any of the instances when a search may be validly done without warrant and
articles validly taken as a result of that search. The warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative of
"the right to be let alone," The vehicle cannot even be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article the mere
possession of which is unlawful.
***3. Respondent judge said he had no jurisdiction over the motorcycle because it was in custodia legis and only the judge trying
the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co-accused could order its release.
 Property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the general rule applies only where the
property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures
or its accepted exceptions.
 Tamisin v. Odejar: “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of
a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ." Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
 The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the clerk of court on motion of the
petitioner did not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The respondent judge had no authority over it because it had not
been lawfully seized nor had it been voluntarily surrendered to the court by the petitioner.
 At that, the vehicle in the case at bar is not admissible as an exhibit even if offered as such because it is "the fruit of the
poisonous tree." (Article III, Sec. 3(2))
 The prosecution of the suspected criminal cannot be done with high-handedness or prejudgment, in disregard of the very
laws we are supposed to uphold. Zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC

[237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]

Facts:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary
disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then
instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a
checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms.
Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was
only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution
No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for
petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other
acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner,
Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered
moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of
the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor
placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up
the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was
not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his
right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against
him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

People v. de Gracia

There was a coup d’ etat staged from November 30 to December 9, 1989. A surveillance was conducted on the night of
November 30 till the early morning of December 1 on Eurocar Sales Office located in EDSA. The surveillance team was
attacked by five men coming from the Eurocar building. On December 5, the building was raided and de Gracia, together with
the janitors of the building, was caught. Found in his possession were high-powered firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
Facts:

1. From November 30 to December 9, 1989, there was a coup d’ etat staged by elements of the Reform the Armed Forces
Movement – Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP). Various government establishments and military camps in
Metro Manila were bombarded by the RAM-SFP with their “tora-tora” planes.
2. On the night of November 30, 1989 until the early morning of the next day, Major Efren Soria of the Intellience Division
conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Offices at EDSA, together with his team. They were informed that said
establishment were being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. One member of
Soria’s team (S/Sgt. Henry Aquino) conducted a surveillance on foot when the crowd gathered near the Eurocar Office
watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo and from said crowd, a group of five men walked towards the
car of the surveillance team. When the vehicle sped away, the group of five men fired at the team which resulted in the
wounding of a team member (Sgt. Sagario).
3. On December 5, 1989, a searching team led by F/Lt. Virgilio Babao, together with the elements of the 16 th Infantry
Battalion led by Col. Delos Santos, raided the Eurocar Sales Office and found ammunitions and explosives. A member
of the team, Sgt. Obenia, who was the first one to enter the building, saw de Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping through a door. de Gracia was arrested, together with the janitors of the building. They were made to sign an
inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much disorder considering that Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar
Office, aside from the fact that courts were consequently closed.
4. Rolando de Gracia was charged with two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosive in
furtherance of rebellion and for attempted homicide. Found in their possession were 5 bundles of dynamites, 6 cartons of
M16 ammunition at 20 per carton and 100 bottles of MOLOTOV bombs. de Gracia was convicted for the first crime
(furtherance of rebellion) but was acquitted of the second (of attempted homicide).
Ruling:

1. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at
that time. Said search was prompted by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM_-SFP. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was
fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar Office. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the military to break into the
office. The Eurocar Sales Office is neither a gun store nor an armory or arsenal; instead, it was primarily and solely
engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives
could not be justifiably or colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time. The
courts in the surrounding areas wre obviously closed with the building and houses deserted. Under said circumstances,
the case at bar falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed after taking into account the facts.
More so, there is more than sufficient probable cause warrant their action. Under the situation then prevailing, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The judge himself manifested
 that when the raid was conducted his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

As enunciated in Umil, et.al v. Ramos, “[t]he arrest of persons involved in the rebellion… is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest… Obviously, the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities.”

DEMAISIP VS CA

FACTS:
Petitioner was tried for and convicted of illegal possession of marijuana. The Court of Appeals admitted in evidence the marijuana
seized from him and affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner may object to the admissibility of the evidence against him during this appeal.

RULING:
NO. Objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby were deemed
waived when no objection to the legality of the search warrant was raised during the trial of the case nor to the admissibility of the
evidence obtained through said warrant.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SUBJECT:

Constitutional Law

TOPIC:

Due Process – Void for Vagueness

TITLE:

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO

ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

CITATION:

G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices
of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, are valid.

2. Whether or not PP 11017 is constitutional.

HELD:

1. No, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were not valid.

Searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration
of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it
cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a
perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Justice Mendoza further stated that
specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on
the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence

2. Partially. The Court rules that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared unconstitutional. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is constitutional, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.

The Court partially granted the petitions.

SILAHIS VS SOLUTA
FACTS: Petitioner Panlilio was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while
respondents Soluta, Santos, Edna, Vicenta, and Matilla were employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union
Chapter, the hotel employees union.

Petitioners’ version:
1. The General Manager of the security agency of Silahis Hotel allegedly received information of illegal activities including
sale of marijuana, dollars smuggling, and prostitution going on in the Union Office at the hotel.
2. GM with other security personnel allegedly entered the Union Office with the permission of the union officers and found
marijuana.

Respondent’s version:
1. Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the
hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but
she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office.
2. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what
she had witnessed at dawn.
3. Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in
barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed
Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office,
over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing
marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the
incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that they are not liable for damages under Article 32 and that their search of the union
office in the instant case was entirely reasonable under the circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.

HELD: YES. Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego
conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the
union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents,
being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together
with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and
exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in
relation to Article 2219(6) and (10).
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others,

(6) Illegal search and

(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

Doctrines:

 The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for
violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection
of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

 While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a PERSONAL right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication CANNOT be presumed. To constitute a valid waiver of the right, there
must be proof that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The waiver must be
voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made.

 A violation of one's constistution rights against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages under
CC Art. 32 in reln to CC Art. 2219(6) and (10) on MORAL DAMAGES, since the complaint filed was for damages due to
Malicious Prosecution AND violation of constitution right.

DISPOSTION: PETITION DENIED!

SECTION 3 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed
against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as
requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested
in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

The lower courtfound both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a
private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

HELD:

No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone
line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It
is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of
the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device
or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of listening, in order
to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995
“Recording of conversation through a tape recorder”
The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

 A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and humiliated
her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
 To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages.
 In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW for secretly taping
the confrontation.
Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense? YES.
 The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY
person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of
a tape recorder.
 The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
 The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication
by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
 Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as
in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."
 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent,
in the privacy of the latter's office.
 In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the
use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
 In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone,
Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an
offense.
 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A.
4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)

FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at
the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing.

The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The
accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.
Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the
NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced
him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was
thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in
his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.

Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or
invasion of the accused’s privacy?

HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through
unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo
Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really
self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his
(Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his
culpability.

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National Economic Development

Facts:

President Arroyo issued Executive Order 450 which requires all government agencies and controlled corporations to have a
uniform identification card; the director-general of the national economic development authority was tasked to implement this order.
The information required to be in the said identification card would be: name, home address, sex, picture, signature, date of birth,
place of birth, marital status, names of parents, height, weight, two index fingers and two thumb marks, any prominent
distinguishing features like moles and others, tax identification number (TIN). The petitioners argued that the said executive order
usurped legislative functions and violates the right of privacy. Petitioners alleged that EO 450 is contrary to law because it violated
the principle handed down by the Court in Ople v Torres and RA 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. The order according to the
petitioners was also going to use funds that are not appropriated by the Congress, it was also issued without a public hearing. The
order was also violating the constitutional provision of equal protection of the laws because it discriminates and penalizes those
who do not have an id. The petitioners also argue that the order violates the right to privacy by allowing for the access of the
personal data of the owner without his or her consent.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 450 usurped legislative functions and violated the citizen’s right to privacy.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition had no merit. The said order only applies to government agencies who are already
issuing identification cards even before the said order was implemented. The purposes of the order were to: reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability, convenience to the people served by the government entities and insure compatibility. Section 17 Article
VII of the Constitution also provides for the President to have control to all executive departments, bureaus and offices. This
constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not need implementing legislation. This power of course is limited
to executive branch of the government and does not extend to other branches or independent constitutional commissions. EO 450
does not violate the right to privacy since no citizen particularly government employee have complained upon the showing of
information on their identification cards, even the petitioners have not made any complaint about their own identification cards. EO
450 also issues identification cards that only have 14 data about the owner much less than what is issued upon Supreme Court
employees.

SECTION 4-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

NEAR VS. MINNESOTA

[283 US 697]
Facts:

A complaint alleged that the defendants, on September 24, 1927, and on eight subsequent dates in October and November, 1927,
published and circulated editions of “The Saturday Press”(published in Minneapolis) which were 'largely devoted to malicious,
scandalous and defamatory articles'(based on Session Laws of Minnesota). The articles charged, in substance, provides that a
Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and
agencies were not energetically performing their duties. Most of the charges were directed against the chief of police; he was
charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The county attorney was charged
with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take adequate measures to remedy them. The mayor was accused of
inefficiency and dereliction. One member of the grand jury was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury
and a special prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in particular, to investigate an attempt to
assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it appears from the articles, was shot by gangsters after the first
issue of the periodical had been published. Now defendants challenged the Minnesota statute which provides for the abatement,
as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory news paper, magazine or other periodical. The District Court
ruled against defendants. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein constitutes an infringement of the freedom of the press.

Held:

Yes. The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which tends to disturb the public peace and
to provoke assaults and the commission of crime is unavailing.

The reason for the enactment, as the state court has said, is that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in
'efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal.' In the present instance, the proof was that nine editions of the
newspaper or periodical in question were published on successive dates, and that they were chiefly devoted to charges against
public officers and in relation to the prevalence and protection of crime. In such a case, these officers are not left to their ordinary
remedy in a suit for libel, or the authorities to a prosecution for criminal libel. The statute not only operates to suppress the
offending newspaper or periodical, but to put the publisher under an effective censorship.

Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own
temerity.

The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse.' Public officers,
whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations in
actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers
and periodicals.

Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the constitutional
immunity against restraint. Nor can it be said that the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges are
made of derelictions which constitute crimes.

The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does not depend, as this court has said, on proof of truth.
 GONZALES VS. COMELEC

[27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]

Facts:

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech
and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time
of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation
that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and
convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the
absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without
effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be
looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its
enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for
national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the
Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions.
Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on
freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what
words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary
that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy
the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response
not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship,
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities
in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any
party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against
the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC

[201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]

Facts:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial
office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and
of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No.
66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression
with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the
election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b)
abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

Held:

Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special
provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity
to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly
an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute
a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as
to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b)
has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to
restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates,
their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or
commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed
to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or
unreasonable.

ADIONG VS. COMELEC

[207 SCRA 712; G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992]

Facts:

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the
May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and
print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
prohibition.

Issue:

Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional.

Held:

The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all
the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public
interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific
authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border
line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked
against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of
freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited
in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her
qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
constitutionally sanctioned objective.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished
citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his
car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it
placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by
the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.

The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

[178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts:

On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police
Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and
Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their
agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the
petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of
the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held:

Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is
offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However,
It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary
and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the
authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and
that;
 1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present
danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a
case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

US VS. BUSTOS

[37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]

Facts:

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed
affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who
have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous,
malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue:

Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press.

Held:

Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is
a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to
bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition
means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.
The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an
interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact
he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office
existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
 AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG

[160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]

Facts:

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987,
for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies
consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional
characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's
leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film
the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character
in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held:

Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion
pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films
is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor
the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and
present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus
relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking
place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression
and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events.

LOPEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

 [34 SCRA 116; L-26549; 31 JUL 1970]

Facts:

In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Lopez was the
publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a
distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American Army plane
dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized
it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since
Christmas of 1955. Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers. Upon
arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man named Fidel Cruz who merely wanted
transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.

This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15,
1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz’ story turned out to be false it brought attention to the government that people in
that most people in the area are sick sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.

The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published
were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the
photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle but
when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. However a correction was published
immediately.

Respondent sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory
character of the above publication of his picture. Defense interposed that they are beating the deadline. The court ruled in his
favor. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioners abused the freedom of the press.

Held:

No. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, since the error in this case could have
been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine and not a daily. The ruling: "there is no evidence in the record to
prove that the publication of the news item under consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was
intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the
public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and
reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused
the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to
race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

“No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized
as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with
the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press
enjoys.”
 ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[170 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 79690-707; 1 FEB 1989]

Facts:

The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving
Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as
Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised
in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow
on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the
undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases
against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens the people's
apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can
get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the
whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent
urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in
disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held:

There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by
respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a
"substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the
broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.

REYES VS. BAGATSING

[125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983]

Facts:

Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.
That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases
Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and
assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied.
Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt
any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may
be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and
the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that
there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.
However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of
rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court
resolves.

Issue:

Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.

Held:

Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal
objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still
be challenged.

A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.

[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]

Facts:
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of national security. The
radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process.
There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom
of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr.
Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who
is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer
interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for
the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issue:

Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held:

The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of
Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The
Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented.

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)

(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing

(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept
subordinate’s views

(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and
reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that
government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court
stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still
has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of
freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to
create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be
used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast
media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast
stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.
 David v. Arroyo

Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and
at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which
Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His
supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c
declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is
an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017
is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of
the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017,
with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed,
judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it
is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and
again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision
is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the
assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president
can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural
calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national
emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

1 There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out
power of the president by the president.

BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

[488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]

Facts:

Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured,
arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that
the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response”
(CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted
at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing
injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also
co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police
officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed,
causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4,
5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no
rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of
a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully
assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions
are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters
the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior
requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is
too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports
the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes
a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and
serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and
manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of
B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a
content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue:

Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held:

No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be
for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance 1 is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint,
since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would
purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance
with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of
advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.