Ibn Khaldun Critique PDF

Ibn Khaldun's Critique of the Theory of "al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah"
Author(s): Şenol Korkut

Source: Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 36, No. 3/4, SPECIAL FOCUS: Ibn Khaldun
(2008), pp. 547-570
Published by: Brill
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Asian Journal
of Social Science
BRILL Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570 www.brill.nl/ajss
Ibn Khaldun's Critique of the

Theory of al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah1
§enol Korkut
Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey, Department of Foreign Affairs
Abstract
In this paper the method proposed by Ibn Khaldun in the political and social fields, will be
examined in its original dimensions. The political philosophy that started with al-Farabi as a
systematic style of thought in Islamic thought used deduction as a mandatory part of the tradi
tion belonging to the philosopher. In one sense, this is a journey from 'description' to 'depiction'.
Ibn Khaldun stated that this method remains insufficient in order to explain social phenomena
and events, and widening this perspective indicated that political philosophy, in one sense, is
compelled to present a Utopian social model, and departing from this point criticised al-Farabi
as not being a philosophical realist. At this point, the accusations made against the philosophers
and his approach to the criticism of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah are investigated as to whether or
not Ibn Khaldun approached political philosophy from a universal point of view, and if, while
making these accusations, the theories of the philosophers were taken into account. Accordingly,
Ibn Khaldun's theory of prophethood and happiness and the falasifa's influences on Ibn Khaldun
are investigated.
Keywords
Ibn Khaldun, falâsifa, Islam, political philosophy, political science, al-Farabi
The Science of Umrân and al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah
The criticisms levelled by Ibn Khaldun against the epistemology of the falasifa
(i.e., the Muslim philosophers of the peripatetic tradition), based on the
impossibility of acquiring objective knowledge of certitude especially in the
1 There are different approaches among scholars of Islamic philosophy as to the English
translation of the Arabic phase al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah. F. Rosenthal translated the phrase in
Muqaddimah (1958:[II]127) as "political utopianism", M. Mahdi (1969:130) rendered the term
"madani" as "political", C.E. Butterworth (2005:266) as "political regime", and, finally, D. Gutas
(2004a:269) asserted, based on philological evidence, that the phrase should be translated as "gov
ernance of the city". In this article, since I primarily focus on the comparison between the falâsifa's
and Ibn Khaldun's methodologies in political and social fields, I preferred to use the phrase in its
original form (al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah), without delving into the discussion on translation.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156853108X327074
548 §. Korkut I Asian Journal ofSocial Science 36 (2008) 547—570
field of metaphysics, led him to adopt a differing approach in social and polit
ical thought, as well as in physics and metaphysics, thus his self-developed
science of umran and the method and themes of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah,
imperatively differed from each other. Ibn Khaldun hence construed the falas
ifas views regarding such central themes in political philosophy as the virtu
ous city, prophethood, and happiness as incoherent, effectively subjecting the
issues to a review.
The pertinent methodology of Ibn Khaldun, dubbed in the history of

Islamic thought as the epistemological transformation, has made considerable
contributions to Islamic political thought and the history of political philoso
phy alike. This essay will seek to analyse the independent position imparted by
Ibn Khaldun to political thought, occasionally comparing it to the falasifas
views, particularly to those of al-Farabi. Together with conceding the palpable
inadequacy a comparison between Ibn Khaldun and the falasifa that fails to
take heed of the enhancement of the peripatetic epistemology in the hands of
al-Ghazzali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi will inevitably harbour in the field of
logic, metaphysics and physics, we nevertheless consider vital such a compari
son focused on practical philosophy, inasmuch as it is bound to manifest the
uniqueness of Ibn Khaldun.
Essentially, a visible variance exists in the style of Ibn Khaldun's investiga
tion and explanation of social events, as compared to the method of approach,
interpretation and scrutiny espoused by the previous philosophers, historians
and jurists. Having developed a social doctrine concerning the structure of
social events, Ibn Khaldun eventually developed an investigative method for
their analysis. In effect, Ibn Khaldun (1958: [III]269) propounded first of all
that each social event differs from another, concomitantly averring the blatant
error of applying a solution to a certain social problem as remedy for another,
advocating the innate difference of each social or political occurrence from
others. No social event could be comprehensively elucidated through likening
to other social events, each preponderantly varying from one another, despite
the possibility of mutually sharing minor resemblances (Bayraktar, 2004:157).
As, according to Ibn Khaldun, social phenomena are dynamic and subject to
change and progress, as opposed to being static, a method ascertained for a
certain social event is inapplicable for others. In tandem, each social event is
circumscribed by the moral, psychological, and physical atmosphere of the
society from which it spurts; and indeed, the relevant causes of each society are
distinctive (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[I]44—45).
With these presuppositions, Ibn Khaldun argues that, irrespective of their
superficial similarities, there exist essential differences in the crux of social
phenomena and, thus, there can never be a general and common principle
$. Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570 549
conducive toward pinpointing their causes and that explaining them with
static social and political principles is ultimately unfeasible. In keeping with
Ibn Khaldun, social occurrences are only exposed to single common and natu
ral law, namely the laws of progress and transformation (e.g., Bayraktar,
2004:159). In the given circumstance, a historian or a social scientist investi
gating a social or a political event must personally implement a method in
concordance with the relevant phenomenon. Right at this point, Ibn Khaldun
senses an insufficiency in methods such as induction, deduction, and analogy,
endorsed by the former philosophers, historians, religious scholars and social
scientists, in amply exposing the nature and incentives behind social phenom
ena, appraising them on the whole as incompetent.
Similarly, as it abounds in abstraction and remoteness from feelings and as
it, moreover, concentrates on the second intelligibles, one cannot afford to
render logic infallible in matters of politics. The second intelligibles consist of
matter, produced from the first intelligibles (images) that correspond with the
foundational structure of objects, and the furthest universals for which sec
ond, third or even further abstractions remain impossible (e.g., Ibn Khaldun,
1958:[III] 108-110). Upon a desire to obtain knowledge of certitude, there
could be found, in these intelligibles, matters hindering judgment derived
from principles. Ibn Khaldun accordingly avows that the concepts that serve
as predicates of being, which together with constituting a theme of logic, is
predominantly perused by philosophers within the spectrum of metaphysics,
do not contribute providing a basis for practical philosophy, as is the case with
the entirety of philosophical sciences, in that conceptions compatible with a
given can only be afforded by their material content, vis-à-vis their content
according to reason. Inasmuch as Ibn Khaldun is thus concerned, the neces
sity, possibility and impossibility of premises are dependent on their matter,
and once the essence, type, form, quantity and force (i.e., the potentialities it
comprises) are known, the impossible, contingent or necessary qualities it will
spawn, along with the impossible, contingent and necessary sphere in relation
to it would be ascertained. Ibn Khaldun's conception of science, therefore,
eschews the area dubbed the second intelligibles, in addition to the refusal of
utilising concepts that are not perfectly compatible with external objects,
emphasising their proclivity of deterring away from developing true concep
tions of certain objects (Türker, 2006:257). The deliberation of Ibn Khaldun
advocating against the use of second intelligibles in scientific research, can be
seen most in his attacks regarding the natural philosophy endorsed by the
falasifa-, though embarking from that verity, it can be asserted that the same
applies for the social and political sphere, and that Ibn Khaldun banishes
the very idea of applying the second intelligibles, in a science oriented in
550 5. Korkut /Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570
examining social life. This bestows upon Ibn Khaldun a dynamic, changing
character with a heavy slant toward experience, from the vantage point of
appraising historical and social phenomenon, or the science of umran, uni
formly granting a greater terminological plane in elucidating political and
social facts.
Ibn Khaldun, it could be asserted, had embraced proceeding from the exist
ent itself in delineating the borders of concepts like necessary, contingent and
impossible, concurrently accentuating the imperativeness of determining the
necessary, contingent and impossible states impending upon the real social
area of existence. Ibn Khaldun (1958:[III]214—215), however, reminds that
the case of the first intelligibles, more easily deduced from matter, differs from
the case of the second intelligibles, in that being imaginative, the first intelli
gibles, thus, deposit in the imagination matters known through emotions,
consequently informing the degree of compatibility of these images to reality.
And this triggered Ibn Khaldun to develop an experimental science primarily
concerned with the structure and causes of social occurrences. Hence accord
ing to Ibn Khaldun, the nature of the scientific methods investigative of social
phenomena must be empirical and positive, or scientific put briefly; and
imperatively a method needs to be developed entrenched in observation and
empirical, sensory data, at the detriment of rational methods proposed by the
prior philosophers, jurists, and historians (e.g., Bayraktar, 2004:160). Thus,
Ibn Khaldun (1958: [III]268—270) argues that chances of stumbling into fal
libility of sharp witted philosophers, religious scholars, and bureaucrats, who
made a career of distancing their thoughts and feelings from matter and
endowing it with profound meanings and strive to interpret each social occur
rence with broad methods like analogy, remains higher than persons possess
ing an average wit, intelligence, albeit with a robust character, unaccustomed
to regulating action in line with analogy and other general principles, who
endorse the method which appraises and seeks to solve each event within its
own terms and do not bifurcate their perspective and thought from what is
intertwined with the senses.
Speaking from the vantage point of al-Farabi, and contrary to Ibn Khal
dun's related conception, it can be stated that the method utilised by philoso
phers in the field of practical philosophy are evaluated within the framework
of logical premises, such that the first intelligibles essentially progress forth
from the second intelligibles. Al-llm (knowledge), in al-Farabi's view, is com
prised of general and certain premises fundamentally embedded in the princi
ple of identity; thus a reality of whose knowledge is acquired corresponds to a
true premise (Kiiyel, 2005:13-14). The pertinent knowledge defines this real
ity. If a definition is impossible, then in politics, as is the case in medicine and
£ Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570 551
astronomy, the reality is described through law or expert knowledge; the sci
ence of politics, therefore, is a concoction, foundationally harbouring each
persons morals and nature, of the definition or description of the volitional acts
of societies across the world. Al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, in view of that, exam
ines society form the perspective of the ruler and the ruled, and harbouring, in
essence, the principle of identity, is comprised of a group of universal and
certain premises. Hence state, in al-Farabi's opinion, is the reality that defines
or describes the science christened as al-ilm al-madani and al-Siyasah al
Madaniyyah (e.g., Küyel, 2005).
In his Kitab al-Millah, al-Farabi articulates that the science of politics, a
part of philosophy, is contended merely with universals and their descriptions
in what it investigates through acts, behaviour and volitional faculties, simi
larly illustrating how, with what and in what amount the descriptions should
determine the particulars, although refraining from determining them in
exactitude. Keeping with al-Farabi, the situations and events potentially regu
lative by such a determination can be incessant and unfathomable and, thus,
an actual determination belongs to an expertise other than philosophy (al
Farabi, 1986b:59). Al-Farabi asserts that the task of determining the things
left untouched by the science of politics, bearing in mind the exigencies of
space, time and conditions, belongs to the first premier (al-rais al-awwat), a
status attained through political virtue (ta'aqqul) (Aydinh, 2005:36-37).
All things considered, we can maintain that in al-Farabi's view, al-Siyasah
al-Madaniyyah describes what is real, bequeathing the scrutiny of the details
to a sub-branch of expertise. Simply put, al-Farabi is well aware of what Ibn
Khaldun had so inveterately emphasised; but inasmuch as his conception of
knowledge was concerned, he entrusted particular events and predicaments to
be resolved through political and deliberative virtue, with the first premier,
thus al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah restricts itself with defining the events to be
described by the first premier, more precisely, limits itself with general princi
ples. Ibn Khaldun, alternately, is cognisant of the exact incompatibility of
these definitions with social reality. Observing the subject matter from another
angle, we may say at this point that the method for the science of umran
proposed by Ibn Khaldun commences at the point where al-Siyasah al
Madaniyyah ceases, and the theory of the latter begins where the realm of
research of the former stops and hence, in spite of being extirpated from the
systems of the pertinent thinkers, the two seemingly conflicting theories none
theless form an inherently synthesised unity. While al-Farabi stipulates that
the first premier be a just, sane and healthy person distanced from the pleas
ures of the world, Ibn Khaldun (1958: [I] 349, [II] 86-87) specifies supplemen
tary requirements aimed toward the economic life and practical politics, such
552 §. Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547—570
as staying aloof from engaging in trade to not blemish a balanced observation

of market prices, the same incentive for keeping a distance from agricultural
ventures, trade, and so forth. Moreover, while the judgments and theories of
al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah led by a chain of logical premises proceed especially
from the second intelligibles, it seems unfeasible to maintain that the science
of umrân is appraised around such fixed and universal laws, and that politics
is but a manifestation of a metaphysical area in practical philosophy. Such a
situation would render al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah a normative character, while
depicting the science of umran as descriptive. In Ibn Khaldun's relevant atti
tude, as above mentioned, the theory developed by the falasifa regarding the
epistemology of the metaphysics is prevalent. Holding metaphysical knowl
edge as permanently based in supposition and thus incapable of acquiring
certitude, Ibn Khaldun (1958:[III]214—215) breaks from the notion of cer
tainty endorsed by the falasifa by asserting that certainty is such that is verified
by data derived from experience, or in other words, tested against the reality
of matter. Hence Ibn Khaldun recoils from founding the science of umran on
a theoretical and metaphysical basis, forming instead a metaphysics based on
society itself. The falasifa however, singularly headed by al-Farabi, regarded the
science and theory of politics virtually as an extension, in the scope of practical
philosophy, of Neo-Platonic metaphysics. Taking into account their areas of
investigation, we may declare that metaphysics and politics, in a sense, inter
twine on the aspect of human existence, and that metaphysics will equally
investigate the principles of certitude obtained by theoretical philosophy,
which will sequentially provide a convenient source.
In light of these premises, Ibn Khaldun had naturally criticised the falâsifa's
political philosophy, both epistemologically and from the perspective of real
politics, perhaps transpiring most prodigiously in the following passage:
"We do not mean here that which is known as 'political utopianism' (al-Siyasah al
Madaniyyah). By that, the philosophers mean the disposition of soul and character
which each member of a social organisation must have, if, eventually, people are com
pletely to dispense with rules. They call the social organisation that fulfils these require
ments the 'ideal city'. The norms observed in this connection are called 'political
utopias' (siyasah madaniyah). They do not mean the kind of politics (siyasah) that the
members of a social organisation are led to adopt through laws for the common inter
est. That is something different. The 'ideal city' (of philosophers) is something rare and
remote. They discuss it as a hypothesis." (Ibn Khaldun, 1958: [II] 127)
Making mention of sages and philosophers, Ibn Khaldun does not cite any
specific names, although considering that his enquiry focuses not only on
ancient Greek philosophers but particularly on the concepts of al-Siyasah
al-Madaniyyah and al-madina al-fadila, his allusion of the emulators of the

tradition of political philosophy inaugurated by the likes of al-Farabi, Ibn
Bajja and Ibn Sina is patently evident (Arslan, 2002:414; Butterworth,
2005:267).
It should immediately be raised that the words of Ibn Khaldun in relation
to the political philosophy of the falasifa excerpted above is not exactly
reflective of their theory of politics and displays a piecemeal mentality perme
ated with a reductive mentality. Above all, centralising each soul's individual
journey, the falasifa had thus not pursued a Utopian city of virtue, whose
inhabitants possess the same level of maturity, thus impervious to the need of
being ruled; conversely, there developed a conception of city governed by a
prophet or a philosopher, in line with which theories were propounded per
taining to cities falling outside the periphery of the virtuous city (monarchy,
oligarchy, democracy, etc.) and their inhabitants as mentioned in classical
political philosophy (e.g., Arslan, 2002:414-415).
In light of these premises, we may highlight a difference in the espoused
approach to social phenomena between Ibn Khaldun and the falasifa, occa
sioning a methodical and thematic split of the science of umran from al
Siyasah al-Madaniyyah as implied by the falasifa, culminating in the distinctive
emergence of the former in a cluster of diverse fields. Ibn Khalduns view of
the theory of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah noticeably transpires in another sec
tion comparing the science of umran with other disciplines. We may pro
nounce that the focal point of Ibn Khalduns critique of the falasifa in areas
like logic, divinity, and rhetoric is rooted in epistemology and its reflections in
politics (Górgün, 1999:553). Separating initially the science of umran from
rhetoric, al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, and ethics, Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I]62) bol
sters his differentiation by the fact that rhetoric is essentially among the logical
sciences, comprising beneficial words conducive toward public persuasion or
encouragement; and that the science of ethics impinges not on the society but
rather on the individual, hence its difference from umran. Conceding that
although the Persian style conception of politics and their Islamic versions as
developed by Ibnu'i-Muqaffa (or such as Kitab Siraj al-Muluk, the work of
Abu Bakr al-Tartushi), roam around the essential aim, Ibn Khaldun
(1958:[I]65—66) holds that they ultimately miss the target, dissociating from
them the science of umran, due to their lack of evidence and a system. On the
difference between umran and al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, Ibn Khaldun affords
the subsequent comments:
"It (umran) is also not politics, because politics is concerned with the administration
of home or city in accordance with ethical and philosophical requirements for the
5 54 S- Korkut I Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570
purpose of directing the mass toward a behaviour that will result in the preservation
and permanence of the (human) species." (Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[I]62)
Hie limited data bequeathed by the short extractions pertaining to Ibn Khal
dun's conception of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah may be further enriched via its
comparison with the characteristics of the science of umran. In hindsight,
perceptible is the fact that Ibn Khaldun defines umran as a theoretical disci
pline per se vis-à-vis al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, depicted as boasting the aim of
implementing practical principles contributing toward the individual and
society, rather than mere theory (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958). According to Ibn
Khaldun, as for as its objectives are concerned, umran is theoretical, not prac
tical; its subject matter is umran with the aim of explicating events occurring
in the umran. The science of umran examines notions and phenomena that
arise in the umran, in pursuit of propounding necessary principles and deter
mining the required guidelines imperative in investigating historical events.
Al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, by contrast, seeks not the scrutiny of occurring
facts and events, it rather inquires into what ought to happen. Consequently,
on the word of Ibn Khaldun, rather than examining the nature of society and
social occurrences therein, al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah instead aims to set prin
ciples in relation to the individual and society, and thus holds a practical goal.
Put more simply, it investigates not the occurrence, but what ought to occur
(e.g., Arslan, 2002:417). Therefore, in terms of objectives, methods, and rel
evant paraphernalia, the sciences of umran and al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah are
entirely distinct (e.g., Arslan, 2002). In a sense, Ibn Khaldun had desired to
liberate a science which supposed to investigate social and political incidents
occurring within the umran from metaphysical and ethical extensions and
make it an independent discipline concentrating on social facts and occur
rences. This, however, does not entail an absolute segregation of umran from
metaphysics; contemporary interpretations have established that from the ver
ity examining society for what it is, umran, of its own accord, constitutes a
specific social metaphysics. But the subject matter and reference of the perti
nent metaphysics promulgated by Ibn Khalduns science of umran are not the
Neo-Platonic conceptions or philosophical terminologies of existence, uni
verse, human, and God. Umran is in fact a metaphysics construed by readings
in history, and in preference of cleaving to a Neo-Platonic core, it is a social
metaphysics in that it proceeds from and focuses on society and its history
(e.g., Gôrgiin, 1999:544-555). Thus, while it remains possible to speak of a
metaphysics that investigates being from its aspect of existence, in the case of
Ibn Khaldun, one is dealing with a metaphysics, investigative of political,
social occurrences taking place in the umran, or more precisely, of society due
to its being a society.
§. Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570 555
Prophethood
From the perspective of the totality of the system he defended, Ibn Khaldun
appraised the metaphysical and ethical aspects prevalent in the social sphere
of the falasifas political philosophy, by which he attacked the style adopted
by the falasifa in explicating the cornerstones of their political philosophy
such as happiness and prophethood. The issue of prophethood occupies a
pivotal place in Ibn Khaldun's umran as it does in the falasifas al-Siyasah al
Madaniyyah.
As is also indicated by Muhsin Mahdi, because Islamic society owes its very
existence, character, and jurisprudence to prophethood and revelation, it is
only natural for such a matter to form a central problem of practical or politi
cal philosophy, thrusting it to ultimately toil at once to elucidate the phenom
enon of prophethood, and rationally explicate the source and nature of
prophetic knowledge (Mahdi, 1957:84). From this standpoint, prophethood
absorbs a particular function, role and task in Islamic thought (Ahmad,
2003:9-10). Ibn Khaldun equally acknowledges prophethood as the source of
vital social values, institutions and actions, and in that insofar as prophethood
is appraised the nucleus of civilisation in the thought of Ibn Khaldun,
infiltrating into the phenomenon that is prophethood is rendered an impera
tive of comprehending umran (e.g., Ahmad, 2003).
Opposing the inherent proclivity of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah of reading
prophethood with political intent, setting off from Ibn Sînâ, Ibn Khaldun
(1958: [I] 70-71) equally launches a bitter criticism of their view regarding the
attributes of prophets and the nature of miracles. To the demise of the falasifas
contentions, Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I]72) argues the impossibility of the neces
sity of prophethood anchored in the need of imposing laws for the governance
of societies. Neither the observation of historical events nor reason can attest
to the requisite of prophethood and divine law, strictly on the implementation
of adequate power and laws for sustaining the existence of social life; the Mag
eans, for instance, had formed a social community, established a state and have
moreover bequeathed many books, despite not having access to divine texts
(e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958). Reason, Ibn Khaldun contends, suffices to allude to
the need of having a prudential discourse, albeit it doesn't stipulate that the
prophet per se be the source of this discourse. Hence, as per Ibn Khaldun
(1958:[I]73), the premises established by philosophers as the prerequisites of
creating a society, carry no corroboration of being in line with general laws and
principles. Further elaborating on the matter, Ibn Khaldun rebuffs the falasifiis
conception of the necessity of prophethood for human nature, similarly
endowing political authority not with the prophets but with divine law (Mahdi,
1991:202), thus giving precedence to the notions of caliphate and imamate.
556 §. Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570
It may be accentuated at this point that Ibn Khaldun is particularly critical

of the views of Ibn Sina, who in his Kitab al-Najat attempted to illustrate the
necessity of prophethood for human society (e.g., Arslan, 2002:420). In stat
ing that the prophet and the philosopher had a similar duty for the realisation
of the virtuous city, al-Farabi held the irrepressible need for a prophet or a
philosopher to impart to the residents of the virtuous city within a specific
educational discipline, the ideas and actions pertaining to the eliciting of per
fection and true happiness; the inevitability of accomplishing a city as such.
Based on his construal of al-Farabi, it can be maintained that at this point
Ibn Khaldun undertook an insufficient reading of the falasifa, in that they had
never, in fact, stipulated prophethood as an imperative for erecting the city; or
at least they never developed such a conception of non-virtuous cities. We may
assume that Ibn Khaldun did not take into consideration, or was unaware of,
the various theories depicted as belonging to the non-virtuous cities in relation
to the necessity for human beings to establish a social order.
Alternately, Ibn Khaldun endorsed an approach distinct from the falasifa in
explicating the nature of prophetic knowledge and its acquirement. Envisag
ing prophethood as a phenomenon of humankind, he defines prophetic
actions, knowledge, and power as human aspects. First and foremost, prophet
hood is received not through human desire, but by the grace of God. Prophets
possess special God-given knowledge of some future occurrences and holy
beings. Ibn Khaldun equally appraises the knowledge acquired by prophets as
a natural condition, illuminating it via his classification of human cognisance
of existence according to which human souls are classified into three: the first
group is unable to attain to the level of spiritual cognisance. Members of this
group, compared to others, are naturally capable of cognising a lesser of exist
ence. The second group of humans, by virtue of preserving their natural state
of creation, can obtain some knowledge of the unknown, through intuition
and assistance of angels. As for the third group, it is comprised of humans of
greater maturity, whose physical existence amidst the masses is no hindrance
for their interaction with God and angels. The relevant group consists of
prophets, upon whom God has bestowed a capacity at birth to attain to such
knowledge (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[I] 177—178). During revelation, proph
ets delve into the spiritual world, enter the realm of angels, where they become
acquainted with knowledge pertaining to faith, practice, and ethics, after which
they return from the angelical to humanity. As all prophets possess a physical
body, this capacity, or the nature of reception of revelation by prophets, in
keeping with Ibn Khaldun, gains a slow activation at the initial phase, gradu
ally obliterating relevant predicaments in due course and thus becomes com
paratively easier. This is an argument which Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I] 178—181)
Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570 557
sustains by citing the revelation process of Prophet Mohammed wherein the

revealed verses proceeded from short to long. Hence according to Ibn Khal
dun, the knowledge of prophets constitutes the highest form of knowledge
possessed by the privileged human beings (e.g., Ahmad, 2003:10). Ibn Khal
duns exposition of prophetic knowledge in such a manner, breaks significantly,
at least on epistemological terms, from the falasifas explanation of the obtain
ment of prophetic knowledge with the intellects passage from stages of poten
tial, actual, and acquired intellect, culminating in its unity with the active
intellect. It could be concluded that the criticisms of Ibn Khaldun of the falas
ifas notion of prophethood are articulated with the intent of proving the shari
necessity of prophethood at the expense of establishing its rational necessity,
thus the falasifas classification of the intellect into theoretical and practical
and the respective perfection in both, insofar as Ibn Khaldun is concerned, is
proven to be of no avail (Kurtoglu, 1999:255-256).
Happiness
Yet another aspect which the falasifa manage to elicit the disparagement of Ibn
Khaldun, interconnected with what has been mentioned above, is their con
ception of happiness. In Ibn Khaldun's words (1958:[III]212), philosophers
hold that happiness, whether it be emotional or beyond emotions, is com
prised of the perception of the entire beings through contemplation and evi
dence of certitude. Ibn Khaldun argues that happiness based on contemplation
and perception is not acquired in such a way. A human being consists of two
parts, namely matter and spirit, each of which harbours its own perceptive
faculties. The spirit perceives the spiritual through its essence without a
medium, while the brain and five senses perceive the material. Ibn Khaldun
claims that the perception of the spirit without an intermediary and of the joy
subsequently felt is more enhanced and intense than that felt by the brain and
the five senses, hence the impossibility of procuring of such happiness through
contemplation. Evidence of certitude and various scientific knowledge and
proofs (Ibn Khaldun, 1958: [III]216—217) insists on the incoherence of the
alleged method of perception the falasifa claim to have reached through
rational evidence and certitude, with which peace, joy, and happiness are pur
portedly acquired, since being a harvest of imagination and thinking, regarded
as mental faculties, rational evidence, and proofs of certitude are physical per
ceptions. To obtain such happiness, initially and as a requisite, the relevant
powers of the brain must be eradicated. In parallel, Ibn Khaldun writes off the
rare possibility, vehemently defended by the falasifa, of acquiring happiness
558 §. Korkut I Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547—570
through unity with the active intellect achieved by virtuous humans after hav
ing surpassed certain stages of knowledge, and attaining its knowledge, as the
active intellect is spiritual, while the process expounded of reaching that level
is incongruously physical.
Ibn Khaldun, moreover, explains that the falasifa argue that even in the
absence of revelation, humans, as dictated by their ability to think, have the
ability to discern between good and evil and refraining from evil, to do what
is good, thus achieve virtue and happiness. The falasifa, in keeping with Ibn
Khaldun (1958:[III]218—219), believe that all beings are capable of converg
ing on the good, through consulting their knowledge and the natural disposi
tion of reason; thus the falasifa have effectively identified happiness, predicated
upon knowledge and the disposition of reason to discern right from wrong,
with the promised happiness of the afterlife and the ignorance with the tor
ment in the grave. However, they averred the impossibility for humans of
fathoming the entire area of being; even if there existed such happiness, it
would not have much to do with that of the afterlife.
Unity with divine beings, Ibn Khaldun (1958:[III]219) states, will only
become possible after the physical death. Happiness, serenity, and joy there
fore may transpire only as a result of the spirit perceiving with its essence,
without an intermediary; thus real happiness is a state that transcends percep
tive and rational faculties. In fact, it may be inferred that the most central
theme of the practical philosophy of the falasifa, based on the conception of a
prophet or a philosopher who, having accomplished unity with the active intel
lect, conveys to their followers the beliefs and practices, which lead to the estab
lishment and maintenance of the virtuous city, is regarded by Ibn Khaldun
as mere fiction.
Having touched upon Ibn Khaldun's criticism of the theory of al-Siyasah
al-Madaniyyah, based on his assumption of its being an incoherent and fictive
system vis-à-vis social and historical reality, we may now proceed to presenting
his conception and classification of political regimes from the standpoint of
their emergence from umran.
Living socially, Ibn Khaldun holds, is imperative for human beings. In turn,
a social organisation requires a political authority for the implementation of
security and justice within the society. Political authority must promulgate
publicly accepted and enforceable laws that entail punitive ramifications to
provide for the flow of social life and to govern mutual relations between the
individual, the society, and the state. At this point, Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I]342
343) recognises the feasibility of two political orders, from the standpoint of
founding purpose, administrative structure, function and their realisation
in the umran. If the laws regulative of a certain state are propounded by the
£ Korkut I Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570 559
vanguards of society, men of prudence, and intellectuals, then that is rational

politics; while provided they are divine decrees transmitted by a prophet pos
sessing divine law, it is called shar'i politics (Rosenthal, 1962:100-101).
Rational politics, Ibn Khaldun states, is also of two types. Comprising the
first, is the political order that regulates the governing laws of the state and
society by subordinating administrators' benefit to public gain. Ibn Khaldun
states the congruence of the establishment of this order with reason and wis
dom, according to which, cites Ibn Khaldun, the Sassanid state was struc
tured. As was mentioned, the second political order involves the enforcement
of laws involving the subordination of public benefit to the benefit of the
administrators, wherein the helms of political authority, avows Ibn Khaldun,
lies in the violent and ferocious hands of the sovereign. Ibn Khaldun refers to
all orders of state in his own era, whether Muslim or not, as having been
formed around the pertinent structure, albeit the implementation of the state
of affairs is nonetheless dissociated from others. Although in both types of
rational orders laws are coercively enforced from above, Ibn Khaldun men
tions that they tend to be more just and compassionate in the former, as
opposed to the rigidity and injustice of the latter.
Yet Muslim sovereigns who opt for the second style of ruling, divulges Ibn
Khaldun, have a penchant to rule their subjects and lands through ostensibly
adjusting these laws to the Islamic shctr. As it aims toward securing peoples
happiness only in this world, governance by reason (siyasa 'aqliyya), Ibn Kha
ldun argues, cannot be spiritually internalised by people; contrary to shar'i
politics, which can become internalised in the souls and the spiritual world of
the community, as it aims at this world as well as the afterlife, in line with
which it structures public benefit (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958). It is thus accen
tuated that the shar'i order, testified by Ibn Khaldun as having been imple
mented during the respective eras of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs, is thus
superior to both types of governance by reason. The shar'i order is the ideal
order for Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I]345), who believes that the order could be
resuscitated through the Caliphate and the sovereignty of a ruler who governs
worldly affairs with a religious politics, despite its spell in hiatus owing to the
relinquishment of tribalism following the Four Caliphs era.2 As much as the
2 Ibn Khaldun (1958: [I] 349) had purported the shari'a necessity of the perpetuation of the
conceptions of caliphate and imamate as determinants of political authority, the vitality of the
maintenance of the former with its characteristics of tribalism, justice, strength and power, advo
cating ummah activity through election in upholding the caliphate. Ibn Khaldun had similarly
emphasised the caliphate's need of clutching to tribalism, a circumstance on which race, tribe or
geography has no bearing. For instance, despite accepting the hadith declaring that the caliph
560 £ Korkut I Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570
necessity for humans to live socially, Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I]345,378) equally

defends the exigency for mankind of constructing the world and abiding by
the beneficial stipulation the process entails, benefits whose accomplishment
is only viable through conduct in accordance with shar'i laws. In addition to
these requirements, Ibn Khaldun initially affirms the shar'i laws for the crea
tion of public ethics, followed by an approval of the literature containing
advises to the sultan al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah of Mawardi, the latter attested to
by his lauding excerpt, preceded by his criticisms of governance by reason and
al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah theories, of a letter he had written to Abdullah ibn
Tahir, in which he imparts primacy to the pertinent literature in the ground
ing of public ethics (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[II] 129-142). Thus, nurturing
only praises for the traditional concept of politics of Islamic thought, Ibn
Khaldun nonetheless breaks from tradition with the method he proposes.
We stumble on a rather peculiar block once we glance at the aforementioned
observations of Ibn Khaldun on the subject of al-Siyasah al-Madaniyyah, from
the vantage point of classical political philosophy, bearing in mind the pre
dominant Neo-Platonic character of the said theory. A quick recollection of
the history of political thought will reveal that the censures afflicted by Ibn
Khaldun on the political philosophy of the falasifa invariably call to mind the
disapproval of Aristotle, located in the third chapter of the second book of
Politics, and of Plato's political philosophy and his conception of the ideal
state. Disparaging Plato's ideal state for its withholding private ownership and
the status it dispenses to women and children, Aristotle somewhat envisages
the state as an unrealisable utopia (Aristotle, 1998:3,6). Well accepted in our
times is Aristotle's essential rejection of the ideal state, entrenched beyond his
condemnation of it on the grounds aforementioned (Mayhew, 1997:7-8).
But while Aristotle's criticism of Plato manifests itself through the grounds
of political and sociological realities, Ibn Khaldun's criticism of the falasifa is
launched, at once, from the angles of epistemology and public benefit. That
Ibn Khaldun was not drawn to the Aristotelian position in articulating
his ideas we know, except for a few passages of the first book, Politics had
not been translated into Arabic. Furthermore, the traces of Aristotle's concep
tion of appraising ethics as a prolegomena to politics or as its branch is not
must be of Qurayshi stock, Ibn Khaldun interprets it in relation to his concept of tribalism; thus
what the hadith essentially amplifies, is the centrality of tribalism in political order and stability.
Hence in effect, the pertinent stipulation is not motivated by their Prophetic lineage, rather from
the incentive of possessing the tribalism required to offer security, protection and demand right
(e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[I]354). Appropriately in such a reading, the purposes of the hadith
take precedence over its ostensible racial incentive (Kôktaç, 2003:318-320).
perceptible in Ibn Khaldun, who separates ethics and the science of umran}
On the other hand, we are aware of Ibn Khalduns knowledge of Kitab Sin
al-Asrar, a Hellenistic work composed in the name of Aristotle, consequently
enjoying centuries of fame in the realm of Islamic thought as Aristotle's
magnum opus in politics (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[I]64—65). Although in
the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun sporadically refers to Kitab Sin al-Asrar under
the pretext of its supposed lineage to Aristotle, he accredits its content as
insignificant. Ibn Khalduns classification of the types of governance by reason
and evaluation from the perspective of the sovereigns benefits, however, could
especially serve to show the influences of that work.
Under the shade of these premises, Ibn Khaldun may have just about elabo
rated the most fundamental critique, in the history of Islamic thought, of the
falasifa's conception of politics. A further allusion to Ibn Khaldun is also needed,
for being the first critical thinker of Neo-Platonic political philosophy, a post
Aristotelian synthesis of the political theories of Plato and Aristotle emphasis
ing the individual journey of the soul, for being irreconcilably Utopian.
In the Neo-Platonist tradition of political philosophy, into which we can
partially incorporate the falasifa, the systematic reading has been ascertained
of the blend between the Platonist political legacy and the Aristotelian theory
of ethics, with the purpose of divinising the individual soul and the state.
With the incentives of divinising the soul through political virtue and divinis
ing the state through the science of politics, to render it a means for the
transcending and mystification of the soul, the Neo-Platonist school had prom
ulgated a political philosophy, which virtually is an amalgamation of Platonist
politics and Aristotelian conception of the soul and metaphysics (O'Meara,
2003:5,17,52,66-67,199). Ibn Khalduns censure of the Neo-Platonic con
ception of politics, destructive of social layers, that moreover advocates a
3 Except for some extracts, the Politics of Aristotle had not been translated into Arabic.
S. Pines holds that despite the absence of an entire translation, certain sections of the first and
second books of Politics had been translated with the aid of selections, summaries and doxogra
phy, possibly compiled in the Hellenistic period. Embarking from the insinuation of al-Farabi of
a lengthier explanation in Politics, of the relationship between city-neighbourhood-village in Ara
and Siyasch, and of the slave-master bond in Kitâb al-Millah, Pines concludes that al-Farabi had
drawn heavily from the mentioned compilation. Thus, the source of al-Farabi's relevant opin
ions, keeping with Pines, is more Aristotelian than Platonic. Pines likewise compares al-Amiri's
allusion to Aristotle, in his Kitâb al-Sa'âdâ wa'l-Is'ad, with particularly the relevant sections in
the first book of Politics, deducing that al-Amiri had either masterfully abridged Aristotle's text
or the abridgement had already been made before al-Amiri in a source beyond our knowledge.
Al-Amiri's work, in spite of minor differences, corresponds with the relevant parts of Politics,
from which Pines confidendy reiterates the factuality of the indicated partial translation (Pines,
1975:153-158). D. Gutas, conversely, ruminates on the probability of the translation of the
seventh book, as opposed to the second (Gutas, 2004a:262,266-269).
562 §. Korkut I Asian Journal ofSocial Science 36 (2008) 547—570
political order jettisoning the need for a ruler after the accumulation of virtue
of its residents and excelling of their souls, on the basis of its incongruence
compared versus social and political reality, is indeed a significant observation.
It should be stressed however that the political philosophy of the falasifa had
not exactly developed along the relevant Neo-Platonic lines.
There have erupted a cluster of interpretations in modern literature
surrounding the authenticity of the criticisms enunciated by Ibn Khaldun,
broadly of the conception of being and particularly of the al-Siyasah
al-Madaniyyah theory, the exact line of tradition in Islamic thought he emu
lated, plus his philosophical knowledge, especially of the area of political phi
losophy.4 But we may concede that owing to his adoption of the terminology
4 We notice an inadequacy of Ibn Khaldun's knowledge of the extant philosophical legacy of

his era, falling short at least of encompassing the entire legacy. Discussing, in Muqaddimah,
whether the science of umran had been propounded by preceding thinkers, Ibn Khaldun
(1958:[I]63) confesses his lack of knowledge pertaining to the sciences of other nations excludes
his conversance with Greek sciences, with which he professes having an acquaintance through
the translations in the period of Caliph Ma'mun. The same limitation applies to his knowledge
of the literature on political philosophy, attested to by his silence concerning the Republic, States
man and Laws, works of Plato that had been translated into Arabic, and his ignorance of the
Politics of Aristotle. As aforementioned, however, he does refer, in various parts of Muqaddimah,
to Kitâb Sin al-Asràr, a work modelling in itself on the Persian style of political literature pro
duced in the Hellenistic era (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[II]42). Despite of not mentioning al
Farabi's works on politics, his cognisance with some core aspects of his views is discernible.
Together with actual citations, Ibn Khaldun nevertheless seems oblivious to the political writings
of Ibn Bajjah and Ibn Rushd's annotation of the Republic, with no proof of validating a possible
conversance with Tehafut, Faslu l-Maqal and Kashf (Rosenthal, 1955:75-85). Declarable, how
ever, is his knowledge of Ibn Sina's as-Shifa, an-Najat and Mebde wa Mead. He, moreover, is
familiar with al-Ghazzali's Tehafut, which he advises to seekers of knowledge. Ibn Khaldun's
criticism of philosophy verifies the undertaking of numerous works in this context, by the school
which he emulated, or the reservation of sections pertaining to the issue, on works focusing on
Ibn Khaldun (Rosenthal,1955:75-85; Hassan, 1977:114-116). Three inclinations transpire in
modern works focusing on the attitude of Ibn Khaldun vis-à-vis philosophical thought and leg
acy, and the exact tradition and line of thought to which he adhered. According to the first, Ibn
Khaldun strictly abided by the disposition of al-Ghazzâlî in relation to philosophy. H.A.R. Gibb
testifies the emulation by Ibn Khaldun of Ibn Taymiyyah, in preference to the philosophers, and
that his articulations on the subject contain Islamic references; thus more than being a philo
sophical thinker, Ibn Khaldun is a jurist and a scholar of divinity with a strict allegiance to the
Maliqi school of thought (Gibb, 1933:26,28). Majtd Fakhri affords a similar comment, labelling
Ibn Khaldun's attitude towards philosophy as religious, and cites as his mentor al-Ghazzâlî in the
relevant subject, as opposed to Ibn Rushd, the prime critic of Neo-Platonic philosophy (Fakhri,
1992:293). Rosenthal (1955:77-79) highlights the dominance of two aspects in Ibn Khaldun's
attitude in relation to the legacy of thought he had been an heir to, namely empiricism and his
traditional education. Owing to his approval of the philosophical sciences of logic and mathe
matics, his acquiescence in physics so long it corroborates the teachings of the Qur'an, and
conversely augmenting the tone of criticism with regard to philosophical divinity, Rosenthal
deems Ibn Khaldun a follower of the al-Ghazzalian line (Gezer, 1997:116-119,259). Lacoste,
$. Korkut I Asian Journal ofSocial Science 36 (2008) 547-570 563
of the Ibn Sînâ philosophy as assembled by Fakhr al-Din al-Râzî, subsequently

leading to an acceptance of the Ashari metaphysics and the Peripatetic mode
of thinking, he has providentially imparted to the science of umran a changing
and unique character (e.g., Turker, 2006:264). In effect, the attitude Ibn Kha
ldun developed concerning the falasifas political philosophy is an original
exposition in its entirety.
proceeding from Ibn Khaldun's words regarding the science of umrân and self-accent on his
historiographer identity, has inferred Ibn Khaldun's observance of a rational philosophy, con
cluding he was an adamant al-Ghazzalian. Ibn Khaldun effectively gives concession to philoso
phy in some areas, albeit taking the criticism, at other times, even further than al-Ghazzali
(Lacoste, 1993:214). Another interpretation of his traditional allegiance is to the effect of brand
ing him as the continuation of the Greek philosophical tradition, particularly Ibn Rushd, over
tones predominant in the Ibn Khaldun research undertaken by Richard Walzer and Muhsin
Mahdi. Accounts of Ibn Khaldun's reading of the works of Ibn Sînâ and Ibn Rushd, specifically
his supposed annotations to certain works of the latter, are the force behind Mahdi's construal of
Ibn Khaldun's adherence to Ibn Rushd, stressing that although Ibn Khaldun had censured the
Neo-Platonic notion of philosophy endorsed by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, no such criticism was
made against Ibn Rushd and, therefore, he was simply seeking to unfetter Aristotelian philoso
phy from the shackles of theology and mysticism (e.g., Mahdi, 1957:33,72,89,109,225,289;
Gezer, 1997:123). On the word of Mahdi (1957:8,285), therefore, Ibn Khaldun is but a tradi
tional pupil of classical and Islamic philosophy. Besides hinting at the imprints of Greek phi
losophy on the political theory of Ibn Khaldun, Walzer maintains that, beyond imitating
al-Farabi, by expanding the political arguments verbalised by the virtuous and non-virtuous
social organisations, Ibn Khaldun had implemented them on to the explanatory forms of
nomadic and settled lives of the time (Rosenthal, 1955:77,84; Walzer, 1963:40-41), challeng
ingly, cannot justify the influence of Ibn Rushd on Ibn Khaldun, in that had Ibn Khaldun been
aware of Ibn Rushd's annotation to Plato's republic, he would not have appraised the virtuous
city of the falasifa as merely a hypothesis and offered casual remarks in passing; as in the annota
tion, Ibn Rushd refers to the states of Maghreb of the time, as cases in point for types of non
virtuous cities, condemning them for being unethical from a realist angle. As the chief impetus
behind Ibn Khaldun's founding of the science of umrân, Rosenthal pinpoints his embracement
of the empirical method and his rearing in traditional education. Rosenthal confirms the
influence of al-Ghazzali in Ibn Khaldun's criticism of philosophical and rational sciences, and
brands the latter as a al-Ghazzali an thinker for recommending his works, particularly Tehafut.
The proclivity toward envisaging Ibn Khaldun as a member of a certain current in philosophy
and history of Islamic thought has currently made way, as illustrated by contemporary works, to
his originality, noticeable among others, in the works of Ahmet Arslan and Umit Hassan (e.g.,
Arslan, 2002:507) asserts that as regards philosophy, Ibn Khaldun advances from an entirely
certain and coherent outlook, palpably thriving to reduce philosophy to a science, concomi
tantly compelling him to reject disciplines he regards as harbouring unscientific premises, and to
accept other. Ibn Khaldun's criticism of philosophy is thus devoid of religious anxieties and
objectives; it is rather a purely philosophical criticsm rooted in philosophical-scientific argu
ments, premises and principles (e.g., Gezer, 1997:128,129; Arslan, 2002:514,512). Reflecting
on Ibn Khaldun's political theory, Omit Hassan (1997:115,117,122) argues that Ibn Khaldun
had developed a realist rationalism based on observation and objectivity, in the face of a specula
tive rationalism based purely on reason; he had established a synthesis between reason and rev
elation and that his philosophical criticisms bore religious concern.
564 .J. Korkut I Asian Journal ofSocial Science 36 (2008) 547-570
Influences
The epistemological and methodological nature of Ibn Khalduns criticism of

the philosophers has not obviated a convergence of the two parties on the
contents of some issues, particularly as regards political theories. Expounding
general theories concerning the umran and its contents, Ibn Khaldun has fol
lowed the trail of the falasifa tradition, especially that of al-Farabi. We shall
now touch upon the similar aspects shared by Ibn Khaldun and al-Farabi,
delineating the traces of distinction in the process.
Modern commentaries have stressed Ibn Khalduns ultimate debt to al
Farabi, in his usage of the term umran and belief in the inevitability for humans
of social organisation. Rosenthal purports that in enunciating the existence of a
worldwide state home to all humankind, al-Farabi had used the term ma mura,
from which umran could originally have been derived (e.g., Rosenthal, 1955:81).
Moreover, al-Farabi states in his Summary of Plato's Laws, "Plato had expli
cated that all types of principles are subject to becoming, deterioration and
regeneration, including the growth of cities, development of arts, source and
expansion of governments " (al-Farabi, 1985:44-46). As is also attested by
Mahdi, al-Farabi employs the terms umran and al-asabiyya, pivotal compo
nents of the innovative science of Ibn Khaldun, on a contextually similar plane
(e.g., Mahdi, 1991:185). Perhaps a more penetrating undertaking of a com
parison between the concept of millah, propounded by al-Farabi, specifically
in the context of virtuous and non-virtuous millah, with Ibn Khalduns notion
of umran, could yield striking results with regard to the appraisals of the legacy
of humanity of the these thinkers respectively.
Ibn Khaldun (1958:[I]69) confers with the philosophers in accepting
humans as social beings. Uniformly acknowledging accommodation, coopera
tive work and intellectual progress as prime incentives for instituting a society,
Ibn Khaldun ( 1958:[I]71) nonetheless minimises the above catalysts at the
expense of accentuating security as the chief concern. Evaluating humans
as social beings is an attitude leaning more towards the falasifa vis-à-vis
al-Ghazzali, in that while al-Ghazzali explains the sociality of humans with
God's creations of them as social beings, Ibn Khaldun alternately lays the stress
on the human nature; the predominant imprints of a theological cause in al
Ghazzali as regards sociality are alleviated in Ibn Khaldun to make room for
a natural cause, albeit the theological cause still retains its centrality (e.g.,
Kurtoglu, 1999:252).
There is a further congruency of Ibn Khalduns belief in the determining
nature of climate, nature and environment of societies' moral values and char
acters, with al-Farabi's pertainingopinion (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958: [I] 149,165).
Al-Farabi for instance, had purported that dwellings made out of hair and skin
in the desert engender in their inhabitants the states of character of alertness
and resoluteness. Sometimes the matter intensifies to the point that courage
and boldness are engendered. Inaccessible and fortified dwellings engender in
their inhabitants states of character of cowardice, security, and fright (al
Farabi, 1986a:40, 2001:22)
Testified by recent works and comparisons is the substantial input of
al-Farabi towards classical political philosophy, amplified by the incorpora
tion, in his ideas propounded on the qualities of non-virtuous cities, their
structure and opinions, of significant information denoting real political
concepts (Khalidi, 2003:388-394). It is possible to observe, as an example,
al-Farabi's more upbeat envisioning of the democratic city as compared to
Plato, a replacement of Plato's rather derisive attitude concerning the perti
nent subject with profound evaluations, as well as an enumeration of well nigh
twenty types, albeit with mutual forms, of non-virtuous cities. One may addi
tionally see a detailed appraisal of such types of governing as the monarchy,
oligarchy, tyranny, democracy, virtuous city, and the Persian monarchy, by the
likes of al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Ibn Rushd.
Together with similarities between the view approving of the expansion of
the strong against the weak, promulgated by al-Farabi as the articulation of the
inhabitants of the ignorant city, and the enunciations of Ibn Khaldun of the
growth of tribalism, visible divergences also exist. Tribalism, as said by Ibn
Khaldun (1958:[I]252), is formed by the convergence of men around the
incentives of protection from enemy attacks, repelling of the assailants and
procurement of wealth; an organisation soon attaining a leader who exercises
power through supremacy and predominance. The main aim of tribalism is to
gain enough power to institute a state, after which it would truly fulfil its role,
imperatively involving the overpowering of adjoining tribes and clans, fol
lowed by the devouring of distant tribes and clans as part of the scheme of
attaining adequate power. If their strength is on similar par with the opposing
tribe, a temporary and clandestine agreement will be made, by which both
parties will preserve their borders. The incapacitation and subsequent annex
ing of one by the other, however, means the augmentation of the strength of
tribalism for the appropriation of other tribes (e.g., Ibn Khaldun, 1958:[I]253).
One of the two clashing forces in such an instance, according to Ibn Khaldun
(1958:[I]254), may be enjoying the peak of their tribalism, while the other
may be in the pitfalls of their life of settlement.
The above mentioned reflections of Ibn Khaldun are in concordance with
the subsequent passage excerpted from al-Farabi, quoted as the opinion of
many residents of the ignorance city:
566 Korkut / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547—570
"Some maintained that association should be brought about by force, the man who
is in need of helpers gaining mastery over people by force and enslaving them, and
with their help gaining mastery over others and enslaving them in turn; and that his
helpers should not be his equals but people overcome by him in battle. For instance,
he who has the greatest physical strength and the best weapons will prevail over some
man and will, then, when the other one has been overcome and with their help over
man or a small group of people, and with their help over others, so that a number of
helpers will be gathered round him gradually; once he has brought them together, he
employs them as his tools and makes use of them in everything he desires." (al-Farabi,
1998:293)
Despite Ibn Khaldun's similar exposition of the growth of tribalism, some

divergences from the situation spoken of by al-Farabi may be highlighted.
Al-Farabi s enunciation of expansion follows the trail of the reciprocal clash of
opposite and hostile forces, which does not entirely accord with tribalism,
signifying at least a healthy, positive and just expansion, contrary to the mate
rial expansion of al-Farabi engrained in brute force. The scene depicted by
al-Farabi is a display of physical force, and thus in a sense pervaded by hedon
ism, in that accordingly the authority wielding power is in constant tendency
of growth at the detriment of enslaving the adversary, irrespective of whether
it is beneficial or not. Tribalism, however, sketches an assenting portrait where
various forces unite under the relevant umbrella, for their security, protection,
and accommodation (al-Farabi, 1998:291-293).
Ibn Khaldun's nomadic umran conception and the city of necessity, deemed
by al-Farabi as the first of the ignorant cities, bear many resemblances, albeit
remaining fundamentally different, since the nomadic umran is known for its
rudimentary life and the absence of various crafts and trades, while the resi
dents of the city of necessity lead a life catering merely for the basic physical
needs. In addition, while Ibn Khaldun charges the nomadic umran with
potentialities of occasioning in due course the settled umran, al-Farabi s city of
necessity is deficient of such potentialities with no talk whatsoever of its pro
gression towards maturity (e.g., al-Farabi, 1993:88, 1998:255).
Underlining the constant transformation of many ignorant cities, al-Farabi
thus says their people foster a contention that there can never be general social
laws and principles; in that in his opinion, once we form in our minds the
universals we acquire from physical objects, even if they undergo formal
changes henceforth, the universals in our minds will unaffectedly remain the
same. Thus irrespective of their change, we may still ascertain in our minds
their equivalents and essences by virtue of the universals we possess in relation.
According to these people, however, external changes of these beings necessi
tate a transformation of their essences we have of them in our minds, hence
the constant need to afford new judgments in relation (e.g., al-Farabi, 1998:287).
£ Korkut I Asian Journal ofSocial Science 36 (2008) 547-570 567
The social and political expansion of this fact develops as follows: as being
changes, its mental counterpart changes with it, entailing the pertinent resi
dents to espouse the notion that social principles of the city and state are
compelled to abide by external change, such that, there exists no definite order
in the universe (e.g., al-Farabi, 1998). It goes without saying that the dialectic
and progressive method of Ibn Khaldun displays many variances from the
above viewpoint of al-Farabi. Whereas the issues articulated by al-Farabi ulti
mately bear sophistic aspects, Ibn Khaldun's campaign for the unfeasibility of
dictating general laws pertaining to social phenomena, under exposure to
change enforced by place and time, holds value in view of public benefit.
Al-Farabi speaks of a general relativity pertaining to being, while the inherent
attitude of Ibn Khaldun is a study into the flow of history, from the vantage
point of social facts and occurrences. As al-Farabi had predicated practical
philosophy upon a fixed metaphysical and cosmological background, he con
sidered the political area of the pertinent relativity changeable. The dialectic
of Ibn Khaldun, conversely, does not progress within such a metaphysical
background.
On the other hand, there are similarities between many of the situations
occurring in the settled umran, and many attributes of cities evaluated by
al-Farabi as being non-virtuous, such as the cities of richness, profanity, hon
our, democracy, corruption, digression, and change.
Conclusion
Finally, a word must be said in relation to contemporary readings of Ibn Khal

dun's political philosophy. In his article The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the
Twentieth Century, Dimitri Gutas enumerates the erroneous approaches in con
temporary studies of Arabic philosophy as orientalist, ishraqi, and political.
Gutas stresses the intrinsic methodological error in implementing the herme
neutic method, first propounded by Leo Strauss and emulated by many, in the
political aspect of Arabic philosophy. Although conceding there has been a
sufficient accentuation of the political philosophy of the falasifa, Gutas nonethe
less laments the long spanning neglect of Ibn Khaldun's political theories in
these studies, at least their outright disregard in the work Medieval Political Phi
losophy, edited by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, long esteemed as a seminal
reference in the English language in the field of Islamic political philosophy
(Mahdi and Lerner, 1995). Though Gutas believes that Ibn Khaldun's inferences
in Muqaddimah regarding the political philosophy of the falasifa are open to
question, the science and philosophy of politics in Islamic thought, he states, in
its truest sense of the term, begins with Ibn Khaldun (Gutas, 2004b: 180).
568 §. Korkut I Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 547-570
Proceeding from what has been stated thus far, stemming from his proposal
of an empirical method we may acquiesce in Ibn Khaldun being the inaugura
tor in Islam of political science, although accepting him as the founder of a
full-fledged political philosophy seems unfeasible. Political philosophy-wise,
Ibn Khaldun, it could be construed, had proposed a more realist, empirical
and scientific political theory, in comparison to Aristotle. Thus a compilation
of Islamic political thought may begin with al-Farabi, though it must not
overlook Ibn Khaldun. The cogitations of al-Farabi with reference to non
virtuous cities are preponderantly illuminative of real politics. Elaborating on
the characteristics of one of the non-virtuous cities, for instance, al-Farabi
argues that the relevant city's first premier may transfer the economic resources
of other cities to his own to provide for the financial proliferation of his sub
jects, a circumstance whose actuality is so vivid especially in the modern world.
Although as necessary components of his system al-Farabi incidentally touches
on the particular matters, he leaves them precisely undetermined. Returning
to Ahmet Arslan's comments, we may infer that the falasifa have proceeded
from Ibn Khaldun's point of departure and Ibn Khaldun from the falasifas.
Thus contrary to being entirely expulsive of each other, the viewpoints per
taining to politics defended by Ibn Khaldun and the philosophers bear unify
ing aspects. The anguish of political philosophy under the sword of political
science has been reiterated of late, concomitantly leading to the questioning of
the veracity of a political science as such, precisely where the political theories
of Ibn Khaldun and the philosophers, singularly from the perspective of the
philosophical legacy we possess, may characteristically impart a constructive
point of view and material of similar stock. Thus the following conclusion
may be reached: in spite of his innately critical approach, insofar as his endorsed
methodology and entailed inferences are concerned, we may affirm that Ibn
Khaldun had ultimately depicted, by help of a different method and expert
knowledge, the laws and social principles described by the falasifa. This, on its
own, may disclose us cogitative inspirations to the effect of revivifying the two
undividable spheres, as revealed in the flow of history, of Islamic political
thought, by taking reference at once the falasifa and Ibn Khaldun; the former
precisely in the theoretical and metaphysical arena, and the latter in the practi
cal field. Thus destiny may just have it that, as a thinker read and studied in
times of crisis in Islamic history, Ibn Khaldun will continue to be regarded as
an overall enlightener in social sciences in the broadest sense, especially in
political science and philosophy.
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Ibn Khaldun's Critique of the Theory of "al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah"

Author(s): Şenol Korkut

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