THE FEASIBILITY OF ENACTING AN ANTI-POLITICAL DYNASTY LAW: A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 2649.

A Thesis Proposal

Submitted to the College of Law

Central Philippine University

In partial fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Juris Doctor

By:

Mayen Mar E. Gulmatico JD-3

May 2017

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 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the Philippines, it can be observed that most of the citizens are involved in

politics. It is evident through the people’s active participation and involvement during

election. Politics has been a playground for both the candidates and electorates

every election period. It is the period where political aspirants are giving promises,

which are incumbent upon them to be fulfilled upon assuming the office incase

elected, and where the voters are electing, on what basis they may have. Politics

has been already a part of every Filipino’s life. Life is becoming thrilling during

election period; from local positions to national posts, people are most likely to get

involved in the practice of right to suffrage.

What is right to suffrage?

Right to Suffrage is a right granted by our constitution, which specifically

provides that it may be exercised by all the citizens of the Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, who shall have resided in

the Philippines for at least one year, and in place wherein they propose to vote, for

at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other

substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. With such

definition, it can be said that such right is fully granted and protected by law and can

be freely exercised by those people absolutely qualified.

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 However, with the kind of right given to the electorates, the constitution also

provides restrictions as to the aspirants vying for certain elective positions. The

constitution laid down several of such limitations. Some of which are strictly imposed

and some of which are loosely executed because of constitutional lapses, in which

until now are inoperative. One of the constitutional provisions which can be cited is

the Article II Sec. 26 of the said constitution which states that “ The State shall

guaranty equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political

dynasty as maybe defined by law”. The provision itself is trying to prohibit Political

Dynasty, however, cannot be executed since no law has been passed to define it.

The provision itself requires an implementing law that would able to define Political

Dynasty in order to strictly execute such prohibition. In which until now, no law has

been passed by legislators.

Since the promulgation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which includes the

provision on Anti-Political Dynasty, the legislators up to date were not able to pass a

law defining such as required by such provision to absolutely implement the

prohibition. Actually, some of the members of the legislators have taken initiative to

pass a law through filing several bills but are still pending in the both chambers.

Since most of the members of the legislators are coming from a family that could be

classified as Political Dynasties as defined by the bills pending. Some of the

legislators are reluctant in discussing and passing such bills because, technically,

they will be affected.

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 One of the bills filed which is still pending in the Senate is the bill filed by

Senator Mirial Defensor-Santiago. The bill No. 2649, entitled “AN ACT TO

PROHIBIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL DYNASTIES”.

This bill aims to give force and effect the provision of the Section 26 of the

Article II of the 1987 Constitution. The bill also aims to disqualify some local elective

officials and candidates in running and holding office especially if a member of a

political dynasty as defined under the bill. As the bill defines Political Dynasty, it

could be observed that most of the local government officials are prohibited in

holding local elective positions. Three separate bills are also filed in the House of

Representatives with the same objectives as of the former bill; however these bills

were lately agreed to be consolidated into a House Bill No. 3587.

Some of the provisions of these bills are the prohibitions of the candidates

from running local government positions: 1.) “if relatives of an incumbent elected

official running for re-election up to the second degree of consanguinity and are

planning to run in the same province in the same as elected officials.” 2.) ”if relatives

of an incumbent elected official that holds a national position up to second degree of

consanguinity and are planning to run in the province of origin of the elected official.”

If ever the bill will pass the three readings as required by the law and be

signed by the Chief Executive, one of the provinces which will be greatly affected is

the Province of Iloilo.

Iloilo is one of the provinces that can be found in Region VI and it is located

on the southern part of the said region. The province is well known for its vast land

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area and large population, that is why during election the said province becomes the

central campaign area even for national election aspirants. The province has

1,257,607 voters as of the record. People in the said province are known also to be

active when it comes to Politics evident by some known political personalities such

as Franklin Drilon and Miriam Defensor-Santiago.

In the field of Politics, especially in the locality, the province is well

known to be governed by prominent families, north to south, and east to west. Most

of the elective positions are occupied by members of renowned families; from

Barangay up to Provincial political posts are dominantly occupied by these people.

Since the establishment of local government, these families are already in the

picture of local government. These families are being repeatedly elected by the

voters, as if it is already a practice during election. No doubt that the electorates are

convinced of their presence for it can be proved by their landslide victory every

election.

Based on the records, there are 4 families that are identified to be part of the

practice. They are the TUPAS( 5th District), DEFENSOR(3RD District),BIRON(4th

District) and GARIN(1st District).

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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Feasibility of enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty Law: A critical analysis of

Senate Bill No. 2649.

OBJECTIVES

GENERAL OBJECTIVES:

To conduct a study in order to determine the feasibility of enacting an Anti-

Political Dynasty Law through critical analysis of Senate Bill No. 2649.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

This study aims to determine:

1. The need of enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty Law

2. The lapses of senate bill 2649 why is it still pending in the Senate.

3. The factors that hinders the passage of the Anti-Political Dynasty Bill.

4. The possible solution to enact the senate Bill No. 2649.

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THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The 1987 Philippine Constitution specifically provides under Article II, Section

26 that “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for Public Service

and prohibit Political Dynasty as maybe defined by Law”. Moreover, the same

constitution also provides the prohibition of the appointment of the Spouse and

relatives by consanguinity or affinity within fourth civil degree of the president to

certain positions in the Government. Likewise under the rule of nepotism in the

Administrative Code of 1987 which prohibits appointments in the national

government made in favor of relatives within third degree of consanguinity or affinity

of either appointing authority, recommending authority, chief of bureau or office or

persons exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. The Local

Government also provides that nepotism exists when an appointment is made within

the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the appointing or recommending

authority.

The constitutional prohibition together with the other pertinent provisions of

laws as cited above, especially regarding the Political Dynasty aims to prevent the

establishment of the latter in the system of the government especially those elective

positions to be occupied by members of the family related with each other to a

certain degree as maybe directed by the enabling law. The provision of the

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Constitution gives the congress the authority to enact a law to specifically define

such prohibition in order to implement it.

One of the major points why the study is being conducted is that despite the

clear mandate of the highest of law of the land in empowering the congress to pass

a law to strictly implement the Anti-Political Dynasty clause, still up to date, no law

has been passed, where in fact, several bills are still pending on the both chambers

of the congress.

The drafters of the constitution should have made such clause to be self-

executing if they have defined Political Dynasty themselves. Instead they have let

the legislatures delimit such prohibition which until now unresolved as to its passage.

ASSUMPTION OF THE STUDY

It is feasible to enact an Anti-Political Dynasty Law through passing the

Senate Bill No. 2649.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The feasibility of enacting the Anti-Political Dynasty Law

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INDICATORS

1.) The response/attitude of the senators/legislatures towards the passing of

the Senate Bill 2649 into law

2.) The response/attitude of the electorates/voters in the presence of the

Political Dynasty in the locality of Iloilo.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. "Political Dynasty - shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an

incumbent elective official or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity

or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office

simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same province or

occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent

elective official. It shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who

are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity

run simultaneously for elective public office within the same province, even if neither

is so related to an incumbent elective official”.

2. "Spouse - shall refer to the legal and common-law wife or husband of the

incumbent elective official.”

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 3. "Second Civil Degree of Consanguinity or Affinity - shall refer to the

relatives of a person who may be the latter's brother or sister, whether of full or half-

blood, direct ascendant or direct descendant, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

adopted, including their spouses.”

4. "Running for an Elective Office - shall be deemed to commence upon the

filing of the certificate of candidacy by a candidate with the Commissions on

Elections.”

5. "Holding an Elective Office - shall be deemed to commence from the

moment the public official takes his oath of office.”

6. "COMELEC - shall refer to the Commission on Election”

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is contemporarily important since it addresses the need of passing

the bill 2649 in to a law in order to define Political Dynasty to strictly implement the

prohibitions mandated by the 1987 Constitution. It is important since the study could

tell whether it is already the right time to pass the bill in order to implement the clear

mandate of the Constitution regarding such prohibition. Moreover, the said bill is

already long overdue to be passed as law which is still pending in the senate.

This study will benefit those political aspirants other than a member of political

dynasty as maybe defined by the law to be given a chance to hold elective positions

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in the government who were deprived of those due to the presence of Political

Dynasty. Moreover, this study will benefit other students who will having interest on

the same study and be used as reference in the future.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study focuses only in the analysis of the Senate bill 2649 pursuant to the

need in defining the term Political Dynasty and enacts a law regarding the

prohibitions clearly mandated by the Constitution.

The study limits itself in the review of the Senate bill 2649 and its lapses why

the member of the senate are not amenable in passing such bill into a law. It

concerns only to the response of the members of the senate on why they prefer not

to enact it as a law.

The study also limits in the attitude and response of the sample population of

voters in the Province of Iloilo by conducting a survey through a questionnaire that

will be given to them which will be answered by 5 voters per district in the said

province where Political Dynasty is present as maybe defined by the Senate Bill

2649.

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 CHAPTER II

REVIEW AND RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter reviews more on related literature of the said study. This review

and related chapter provided known origin of Political Dynasty. This chapter reviews

also tackles on the definition of Political Dynasty which is related to the definition

provided by the bill itself, related steps made by the legislatures and the attempts to

prohibit the establishment of Political Dynasty inside the country as well as outside.

It also tackles the history of Political dynasty in the Philippines especially on how it

emerges.

II.A ORIGIN OF POLITICAL DYNASTY

Several scholars have explained some reasons behind the emergence of

political dynasties in a democratic society. By utilizing historical records from the

U.S. Congress, Dal Bó et al. (2009) argue that “the period of an incumbent’s

occupying office is positively correlated with the probability of the creation of political

dynasty of the incumbent’s family. They argue that this phenomenon is an example

of “power begets power.”

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 The research is also supported and expanded by Feinstein (2010) on the

electoral origins of American dynasties in Congress, Crowley and Reece (2013) on

American governors; and Kurtz (1995) on the Justices of the U.S. and Louisiana

Supreme Courts; and (2009) on Argentinian political dynasties. “According to this

group of scholars, the main reason behind dynastic politicians’ success is their

“brand name advantage”.”

“Dynastic brand name advantage is not only beneficial for attracting voters,

but it may also help dynastic politicians to occupy minor positions in their party

organization, and their family name provides a wider access to financial contributors

for their political campaigns.”

“The underlying assumption of scholars who believe in “brand name

advantage” as the primary source of dynastic success is that family name serves as

quality assurance of a politician’s accountability.” Following the theory of elite

socialization, these scholars believe “that members of political dynasties are more

exposed than others to a conducive environment for internalization of particular

political values, education on how to run political strategies, and familiarization with

life as a politician. Thus, members of political dynasties naturally want to follow the

career path of their predecessor.”

In some societies, family becomes a primary channel for elite selection and

recruitment.

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 “In Kurtz’s (1989, 332) words “politics has become something of a ‘family

business’.” Additionally, given that name recognition is an important part of winning

an election, and it is costly to create name recognition from nothing, the candidates

have an immediate advantage over their non-dynastic competitors. And if the name

has positive connotations from the past, “the candidate with a recognized name

enjoys an opportunity to piggyback on the “symbolic identity” associated with the

family name.”

In the electoral market, “voters have a tendency to vote for “good” politicians

with proven accountability.” Furthermore, “dynastic politicians are assumed to have

a long-term strategic calculation.”

“If dynastic politicians want their family members to succeed their position or

to get elected for other office, then these politicians must maintain their

accountability and deliver their campaign promises to the electorate. Additionally,

this line of argument suggests “that dynastic privilege can be an effective

mechanism to deter the incumbents from pursuing private interests that may harm

public interests.”

Implicitly, this group of scholars assumes that dynastic politicians work under

a well-established and institutionalized democratic framework wherein: “1) voters

have (almost) perfect information about politicians’ behavior;” and “ 2) the rule of law

works effectively to punish any misconduct by politicians.”

Although these theories are useful in explaining why political dynasties

appear in well-established democracies, their generalizability is limited. Their basic

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concepts do not explain the rise of political dynasties in consolidating democracies

settings where: “1) voters lack basic information for assessing politicians’

performance;” and “2) the rule of law is weak and politicians may exploit state

resources illegally for their personal interests without concern for any repercussion

from the state.”

Research on political dynasty in uniting democracies has offered some more

useful views on how dynastic politicians are able to consolidate and expand their

power base in developing countries. Some scholars argue that an “economic factor

contributes to the emergence of political dynasty in these countries.”

“Studies by Camp (1976) in Mexico and Mendoza (2012) on Philippine

dynastic politics suggest that the rise of political dynasties can be attributed in part to

traditional societies and poor economic conditions under which voters with lower

economic status tend to vote for dynastic politicians. Poor electorates present a

conducive environment for dynastic politicians—who are mostly local or national

level oligarchs—to exploit their material wealth for patronage politics.”

“Another explanation for the rise of political dynasties in consolidating

democracies is the theory of weak central government vis-à-vis powerful local and

national oligarchs. Scholars who propose this theory posit that the state’s inability to

enforce the law and the national elite’s dependency on local oligarchs provide a

fertile ground for local strongmen to build their dynasties.”

“In the Philippines, for instance, the colonial legacy privileged local landed

oligarchs such that they became highly powerful; the resulting power was further

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strengthened through a series of political reforms, including the introduction of local

direct elections and elections for national legislatures including the senate. Two

consequences emerged from this change in institutional arrangement. First, political

parties were never institutionalized; and second, national government became

dependent on the power of local oligarchs. Furthermore, the failure of political

parties in establishing democratic intra-party selection and promotion mechanisms

has provided fertile ground for dynastic politicians to dominate the decision making

within the party organization, including nurturing, promoting, and selecting the

party’s candidates for elections. Studies by Chhibber (2013) in India; Harjanto (2011)

in Indonesia; and Amundsen (2013) in Bangladesh propose the similar argument

that poor party institutionalization is the culprit that paves a way for dynastic

politicians to capture nomination of the party’s candidate for elections. This paper

extends the arguments by scholars who study political dynasties in consolidating

democratic. The main problem with these arguments is an inability to explain

variations within a country. If the situation at the national level is similar to that at

local levels— weak state, strong local oligarchs, and poor party institutionalization—

then why do political dynasties occur only in some provinces or districts throughout

the country rather than in all of them? Additionally, these lines of argument are

unable to explain why some dynastic politicians are able to consolidate and expand

their power, while others—who theoretically have the same opportunity—fail.”

“Finally, most of these arguments put too much emphasis on a normative

vision of democracy, i.e., formal democratic institutions functioning as expected by

democratic ideals. In fact, many countries that experience regime transitions may or

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may not become consolidated democracies. Some of them may return to

authoritarian regimes, while others may become stuck in the two regimes. The latter

arrangement includes some functioning formal democratic institutions and

simultaneously, some informal institutions. This research aims to fill the gap by

proposing that variations within countries can be explained by looking at how

incumbents who want to build a political dynasty exploit their family networks and

material wealth, as well as how such incumbents manage to engineer an “uneven

playing field” at the subnational level, favoring the incumbent’s family members.”

“Creating an uneven playing field can be accomplished through various

strategies (mostly illegal), such as controlling the local elections management and

supervisory body, exploiting an informal coercive-repression mechanism, conspiring

with local law enforcement agencies, mobilizing local government apparatuses and

physical resources, exploiting the local government budget for targeted social aid,

and many more. The range of approaches highlights the importance of the dynastic

incumbent’s ability to control local “territorial politics”.”

(“The Rise of Political Dynasties in a Democratic Society” Yoes C. Kenawas 2014

Arryman Fellow May 16, 2015)

II. B POLITICAL DYNASTY AS DEFINED

“Political dynasties refer to family units with members involved in government

activities. In the Philippines, political dynasties refer to groups of politicians who

come from the same family.”

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 “The group in question is usually associated with a certain province or city,

which members of the family have led or represented for successive generations.

This can occur in two ways. One way is for members of a family to occupy a same

certain government position in every term. Once the term of the member of a

political dynasty runs out, a relative of the incumbent will run in his stead, thus

ensuring political dominance. The second way is for a number of family members to

occupy government positions at the same time. As of the moment, there are no legal

documents or laws that officially define a political dynasty in the Philippines. There

have been bills that attempt to define a political dynasty such as the Anti-Dynasty

Bill.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_dynasties_in_the_Philippines#Definition,

2016)

“A dynasty is a succession of rulers of the same line of descent. Political

dynasties are groups whose members occupy the same elective position for many

successive elections.” (Meriam-Webster Dictionary, 2017)

The COMELEC “defined political dynasty as a situation where people related

to each other within the third civil degree of affinity hold elective office

simultaneously or some offices successively in a region, legislative district, province,

city or municipality.”

Political dynasties started a long time ago even before Magellan went to our

country.

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 “In a book by Renato Constantino entitled “Making of a Filipino”, he explained

that communities in this era were accustomed to an early form of government and

politics. They had the datu, raja and the maharlika as their leaders in the tribal

community.”

“Recently, the Philippines started using the automated election system in May

2010 for the first time nationwide and it was seen in a study done my CenPEG that

there are even more political dynasties in both of the national and local levels.”

It was in 1987 when Commissioner Vicente Foz proposed that “political

dynasties should be prohibited because he believed that the idea of restricting this is

to prevent one family from controlling political power as against the democratic idea

that political power should be given among our people.”

“Commissioner Teodulo Natividad, with the support of Commissioner

Christian Monsod, objected to Foz' proposal because he thinks that this would

diminish the power of the people to elect who they would want to be in position.”

However, Commissioner Jose Nolledo agreed with Foz saying that “if political

dynasties were to be restricted, we would have more political opportunities on the

part of the poor but deserving people to run for a position with a better chance of

winning.”

“Despite their good arguments, the proposal was rejected.”

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 “Nolledo fought for his stand in the debate and so the government heard his

plea. In the Philippines Constitution, Article II, Section 26 says that "The State shall

guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibits political

dynasties as may be defined by law." This excludes the accident birth or marriage.

The definition of political dynasty must not contradict the provision of guaranteed

equal access for the opportunity of public service and the essence of democracy

should prevail.”

(http://filipinopoliticaldynasties.blogspot.com/p/what-is-political-dynasty_2.html)

II. C. POLTICAL DYNASTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

‘It Runs In the Family’ the Making of Political Dynasties in the Philippines

“Causing an uproar in the thick of the 2013 election is the buzzword “political
dynasty.” Political dynasties are “more blatant and active today,” said Center for
People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) director for policy studies Prof.
Bobby Tuazon, “since the conditions to form ‘more of the same’ are more
encouraging than ever under a current administration that also came from political
patronage.”

“It is interesting to note how political dynasties today make every region,
municipality, town and city family turf. For instance, we best remember Batanes with
the Abads who have served the legislature since 1965; the charm of Northern Ilocos
is attributed mostly to the Marcoses who became prominent in public service in

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1925; and of course, Tarlac where the Aquinos-Cojuangcos, considered as the most
powerful dynasty today, originated.”

Supreme Court (SC) Justice Antonio Carpio in a ruling in 2011 defined “the
term political dynasties in the case of “Navarro v. Ermita (GR No. 180050; April 12,
2011)” as a “phenomenon that concentrates political power and public resources
within the control of a few families whose members alternately hold elective offices,
deftly skirting term limits.”

“The reasons for the apparent salience of political dynasties in the country
today can be drawn from the country’s political and economic history. It has already
been in place for the past six centuries. There are three notable periods in history
that pertain to the evolution of the political dynasty. The first period dates as far back
as the pre-colonial period; the second commenced during the Spanish regime; and
the third in 1898 when US colonization began.”

Emergence of political dynasties

The occurrence of political dynasties was believed to be first recorded in the

pre-Magellanic period. In his book “The Making of a Filipino”, Renato Constantino
pointed out that “communities at this time were already accustomed to an early form
of government and politics.”

“During the Spanish colonial period, the term principalia was introduced. The
principalia embodied the new kind of local elite. To Constantino, the principalia “was
composed of the wealthy landowners, many of whom were descendants of the early
datus and maharlikas.” This time, the former datu “has been entrusted with fiscal
and administrative duties and became adjuncts of Spanish power. From mere
administrators of socially-owned land during the pre-Magellanic period, the
principalia eventually became formal owners of these lands.” The principalia, along

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with the mestizos, illustrados, mestizo-sangley, creole, and Chinese mestizos
constituted the local oligarchs of the country.”

“In Landlords and Capitalists, political scientist Temario Rivera revealed that
about 87 families controlled the top 120 manufacturing companies from 1964-1986.
Sixteen of these families—about 20 percent—were involved in politics. Most of them
were members of the landowning elite that emerged during the 19th century,
including the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals, and the Yulos.”

“Through government influence,” writes Rivera, “landed capitalists caused the

diversion of state resources to traditional elite economic activities like sugar and
coconut milling, limiting further industrial diversification.”

The third period was highlighted by “the introduction of education

and suffrage by the US that catapulted the elites in the first local elections in 1903
and the first national elections in 1907,” Tuazon explained.

“The elites capitalized on education to acquire new knowledge and

information. Through education, both the local and national elites obtained a new
form of mechanism, which the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called “cultural
capital.””

“Education was the ticket to election participation and a prerogative of wealth.

In history, the first elections only catered to the propertied class, which comprised
less than one percent of the population. William Howard Taft directed this first-ever
election limiting the number of participation only to the local and national elites.”

“A CenPEG study on familial membership in public offices (1907 -2004), that

is, from the 1st Philippine Assembly to the present Congress of the two Houses
found that Congress is home to 160 families that have continuously served each
house with two or more family members. In the 1946 Congress, out of the 98

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congressmen elected, 61 came from families with members in elective positions
from 1907 to 1941. The development of both the local and national elites enhanced
their monopoly over the landowning system, and businesses such as mining,
logging, sugar, tobacco, real estate, media, links to banks, and others.”

Political dynasties as ideology

“According to Tuazon, “nearly 50 percent of the country’s current political

dynasties owe their ascendancy to post-Marcos (1986) political deals when most
elective positions were filled up by appointees of then President Corazon C. Aquino,
“including the Ampatuans of the infamous Maguindanao massacre.”” In the entry of
political appointees, it is understood that more families were allowed to establish
their respective dynasties in the political arena.”

A CenPEG study in 2011 showed that the “May 2010 elections—during which
the automated election system was used nationwide for the first time—increased
even more the number of political dynasties both at the national and local levels.
Political dynasties have been thriving with memberships increasing through
horizontal and vertical expansion. For instance, in the 15th Congress, vertical and
horizontal expansion included local and national positions, covering legislative
districts, provinces, and regions, and even penetrating the party-list system.”

The rampant political dynasty building today was described by Tuazon as

tactics of “self-preservation and expansion, which are means for a continuing rule of
political dynasties.”

The continuing phenomenon of political dynasties today reflects the

encompassing influence of traditional politics. Recent studies reveal that “since 1903

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to present, dynastic candidates have had about thirty percent greater chance of
winning over non-traditional rivals,” according to Tuazon.

It has become customary for citizens to base their decisions on personality-

based campaigns backed by familial or dynastic support. While an ideology is in
place, for Tuazon, “such dynasties perpetuate and enjoy various advantages in
traditional kinship networks, political machineries, wealth, property, access to
government sources, weak political party system, weak electoral system, culture of
powerlessness among the people, and warlordism.”

(Retrieved: from http://www.up.edu.ph/it-runs-in-the-family-the-making-of-political-

dynasties-in-the-philippines/)

Influence and Power of Political Dynasties Politics

“The political dynasty undoubtedly plays an influential role in Philippine

society. Families of political dynasties are sitting side by side to deliberate on

important legislations that will affect the future of more than 80 million Filipinos both

young and old for generations to come (PHILIPPINEPOLITICS.NET., 2000).”

“It has been often contended that political dynasties go against the values upheld by

democracy since it does not provide an equal opportunity for people to hold offices

of power and service. With the set-up of the political dynasty, it seems as if positions

of power are exclusively dominated by a particular clan or family. Arguably, the

political dynasty is said to monopolize the system of governance since it limits the

chances of other common Filipinos to serve the people. It creates a brain drain in the

sense that the new and capable leader who could possibly perform better than those

currently in office, would not be given an opportunity when running against someone

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with a name. Former Mayor, and now DILG Secretary Jesse Robredo of Naga City,

who has firmly stood against political dynasties”, he believes, "The right to serve

does not belong to one family alone. Ordinary people who deserve to be empowered

should be given the opportunity to serve the community."

Negative Sides to Political Dynasties

"The very excess of the violence employed is one of the elements of glory:

the fact that the guilty man should moan and cry out under the blows is not a

shameful side - effect, it is the very ceremonial of justice being expressed in all its

force. Hence no doubt those tortures that take place even after death: corpses burnt,

ashes thrown to the winds, bodies dragged on hurdles and exhibited at the roadside.

Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain" (Focault, 1977)

Similar to what Foucault had studied about power relations, “this paper uses

the same theory but relates it to the phenomenon of political dynasties in the

Philippines.”

Throughout Philippine history, “the political dynasty has taken on a negative

connotation. Often linked to problems like graft, corruption, and abuse of power, it

has taken on a detrimental role to society. Perhaps the most infamous of all would

be the political dynasty of the Marcos family. Alleged to have embezzled between

US$5 billion and US$10 billion from the Philippines, Transparency International has

ranked Ferdinand Marcos at second on a list of the world's most corrupt political

leaders of the past two decades; surpassed only by former Indonesian President

Suharto” (Ferdinand Marcos: Killer File, 2000).

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 “Families linked to political dynasties flood the news with allegations of all

sorts of crime ranging from corruption, theft, murder and even rape. Regardless of

whether these are proven or unproven, it all translates into the tarnished and dirty

image that the political dynasty holds in today's society. This is exactly what Michel

Foucault talks about in the spectacle of the scaffold wherein there is a display of an

excessive use of power through torture. As Foucault mentions, there are three

criterions where punishment must follow in order to fall under the category of torture.

The first being, that it must manifest pain on a certain degree that could be seen in

the example of Francois Damiens' torture.”

“The second being that such pain is regulated in a way that suffering is

maximized rather than imposing death immediately because this suffering would

insure a more effective notice of change on the offender's part. Last but not least,

perhaps the most important would be that torture marks the individual and that it

should serve as a spectacle. Torture marking the individual means that there is a

reclaiming of the sovereign by the ruler and that the making of the execution as a

spectacle would serve as a public display of the ruler's sovereignty. Such a public

execution seeks to reach out to the whole of the society by letting the thought of

punishment run through their consciousness making them aware of the total power

of the sovereign, them serving as his subjects.”

“The context of the logic of torture is that there is contempt for body, wherein

the body serves a possession of the sovereign. There is a political need for the

sovereign to display his power which will serve as recognition of his dominance over

his subjects. In addition, this display of power actually runs through an internal

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organization of politicization and serves as a disciplining factor towards order. As

Foucault mentions how the Enlightenment period called torture as an atrocity,

atrocity is one of those that best designates the economy of public torture in the old

penal practice.”(Focault, 1977)

“Further, he states that insofar as being the crime before everyone's eyes in

all its severity, the punishment must take responsibility for this atrocity: it must bring

to light by confessions, statements, inscription that make it public, it must reproduce

it in ceremonies that apply it to the body of the guilty person in the form of

humiliation and pain. Atrocity is that part of the crime that the punishment turns back

as torture in order to display it in the full light of day.” (Focault, 1977)

“In light of Michel Foucault's study of power, he shows how the display of

excessive power can serve as a negative connotation towards disciplining society. In

relation to the existence of political dynasties, their display of excessive power by

means of running private armies or reliance on coercion in order to establish and

maintain their power, could very well serve as a detriment to public order as well as

to their own existence. This is where Vladimir Lenin's theory on organization can

come into play because power alone in a democratic society, especially excessive

power, can clash with the values of democracy while power coupled with proper

organization could compromise with the said values. Organization, furthermore,

would tweak how power is distributed, dispersed and used on the sovereign's

subjects. In the case of political dynasties where power is seen to be a tool used for

political domination, power alongside organization can produce an effective dynasty,

which operates on behalf of and for the public rather than for itself and its interests.”

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Good Sides to Political Dynasties

In his book, "What is to be done?", Vladimir Lenin “talks about the importance

of organization to serve as a focusing of all efforts towards a certain goal.

“An organized exercise of power would mean that there is a proper system

that is undergone where it is both regulated and directed towards achieving a goal

rather than just a spectacle. In the case of political dynasties, despite the

weaknesses that they are prone to, it also has its strengths. Political dynasties

provide continuity and political stability - which is particularly obvious in provinces

such as those held by the Josons of Nueva Ecija, Ortegas of La Union, and Dys of

Isabela. There is minimal political risk and this plays a huge role when it comes to

investments. With the continuity offered by political dynasties, investors can be

assured that laws do not change mid-stream of an investor's project and that

business agreements made in the past would still be upheld in the succeeding

generations. This sparks an interest in terms of foreign corporations doing business

in third world countries since it takes out premium on political instability insurance”

(PHILIPPINEPOLITICS.NET., 2000).

“Furthermore, this continuity assures that the desired goal is achieved

overtime and will be implemented throughout a long-term establishment made by

these dynasties. In addition, their continued existence help promote continued

progress and development, so long as the succeeding leader is actually capable and

not just voted for his namesake.”

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“For example, a son who is to take the place of his father's position in office would

be able to benefit from the experience and guidance of his father. Assuming that the

succeeding leader has been trained from early on by the example of good leaders

who have also lead from his dynasty, he would be able to emulate the good qualities

and learn from mistakes made in the past as well as assure the constant upholding

of the good qualities taught by his predecessors. By this process of learning from the

example of the previous generations, they would have a huge advantage in terms of

leadership and experience.”

“An example of a prosperous region, which has been ruled under a political

dynasty for over a century, is La Union.”

"The family of Ortegas have occupied elective and appointed positions in the

province since the 20th century. In 1901, Joaquin Ortega was appointed governor by

the US colonial administration. In 2006, ten Ortegas were holding various elective

posts in La Union" (Medel, 2007).

“The prosperity of the region speaks clearly, of how well the dynasty has

managed. Boasting a 97% literacy rate and a 94.77% employment rate, La Union is

classified as a first class province (La Union, 2007). The City of San Fernando is

now the seat of national government agencies in Region I and center of trade,

commerce, financial and educational institutions, among others. From a "deep

rooted potential of stable community governance, to international shipping, an airport

with viable capacity to accommodate international air traffic, natural terrain

conducive to tourism development and a people endowed with cultural and virtuous

heritage of industry, spirituality, nationalism and aspiration for growth, peace and

29
prosperity, the City of San Fernando has emerged as the booming Metropolis of the

North." (San Fernando City). In response to issues raised regarding the continued

existence of a political dynasty in the region, Mayor Mary Jane C. Ortega replies, "It

is not an issue. Why punish people who deliver? Like in Frankfurt, they have a

Mayor for 25 years and she keeps delivering. Look how developed Frankfurt is. It is

not an issue if you are in power for a long time. It is not actually the length of service.

It is the quality of service that you give. If the leader delivers, why punish him/ her?

On the other hand, if you have a term limitation, three years is too long kung hindi

naman nagdedeliver,” (Medel, 2007).

“Another respectable leader belonging to families with a background in

political dynasties include Senator Mar Roxas, son of the illustrious Senator Gerry

Roxas, and the grandson of the venerable President Manuel Roxas whose public

service careers have greatly benefited the country. Mar's public service life began in

the House of Representatives in 1993.”

“After his congressional stint, he was appointed as Secretary of the

Department of Trade and Industry; and then in 2004, he was elected to the Senate

with a staggering 20 million votes - the largest ever obtained by a candidate in any

Philippine election. Mar's stint in the House is most noted for his principal authorship

of RA 7880, also known as the Roxas Law, which ensures fair distribution of the

education capital budget among all the provinces. This gave life to his advocacy for

fair and equitable access to education, free from regional bias and political

patronage considerations. Owing to his record of accomplishments as a public

servant and political leader, the international community described Mar as "one of

30
the young leaders in politics and business who will bring Asia and the Pacific to the

forefront of world affairs." (Senator Mar A. Roxas)

“At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Mar was named as

"one of the Global Leaders of Tomorrow who is expected to shape the future."

(Senator Mar A. Roxas) Recently, the Singapore Government has awarded him as

the 16th Lee Kuan Yew Fellow (Senator Mar A. Roxas).”

“Another example of a leader who has chosen to stick by his principles

despite the temptations offered by that of a political dynasty is Governor Barbers.

Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers is the eldest son of Senator Robert "Bobby" Z.

Barbers and Vergie Smith of Makati City. The family has a deep-rooted background

in politics. His brother was second district Rep. of Surigao del Norte and was

succeeded by other family members who ran for governor in the province. Despite

his family's involvement in a political dynasty, Lyndon Barbers has made a clear

stand against nepotism; relatives are banned from benefiting from any project on

account of his position as Governor. This has been proven on several instances. A

relative of his was once caught operating a sand-gravel quarrying business without a

license or permit and was brought to court. In another instance, a cousin of his was

arrested for illegal gambling operations.” (Medel, 2007).

“In addition, there are many other families belonging to political dynasties that

have also contributed a great deal into building the nation and serving its people.

Families like the Magsaysays, Osmenas, Biazons, Cayetanos, Villars, Duavits,

Escuderos, Espinas, Gordons, Madrigals, Mitras Plazas, and Rectos have done a

31
good job of keeping a clean image. These are the leaders who prove that the

political dynasty can be beneficial to society so long as it does not abuse its power.”

“It cannot be discounted that one will not practice the use of power, although,

there can be ways wherein this power can be diverted into good reasons to achieve

societal order and development. This is what Vladimir Lenin is stresses when he

mentions in his work that, "Such workers, average people of the masses, are

capable of displaying enormous energy and self-sacrifice in strikes and in street,

battles with the police and the troops, and are capable (in fact, are alone capable) of

determining the outcome of our entire movement - but the struggle against the

political police requires special qualities; it requires professional revolutionaries.”

(Lenin, 1902). In this quotation, Lenin stresses that organizing a mass of people

requires a strategic use of power as opposed to a fueling of the mobs emotions.

“The political dynasty has its own share of pros and cons. There are

examples of good political dynasties as well as bad ones. However, it is usually the

faults of the political dynasty that are highlighted and scrutinized. More often than

not, the news is filled with reports about charges of theft, plunder and whatnot. As a

result of which, many have turned to the solution of trying to ban political dynasties

completely.”

Laws Regarding Political Dynasties

In terms of the legality of political dynasties, Art. II, Sec. 26 of the Constitution

says, "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service,

and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."

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 “However, there is no clear definition of political dynasties and therefore the

provision is none self-executing. It is the most ignored policy by Congress due to

certain reasons. The framers left it to the congress to define political dynasties -

which it has not done.” (Cruz, 2007).

“This loophole in the law has allowed the political dynasty to continue up to

the present day even if it is technically not allowed. The only law being actively

enforced to prevent the abuse of power is the term limits on elective positions.

However, providing a term limit for elective officials is easily countered by having

families pass on their power. To retain political hold on his constituents, a forcibly

retired official arranges to have his wife, a mistress, one of his children, his own

siblings, or a parent to occupy his position for one term. After which, he will be

qualified again to run for office” (Cruz, 2007).

In an effort to ban political dynasties, there was an anti-dynasty bill that was

filled by Majority Floor Leader Arthur Defensor of Iloilo. Section Five of House Bill

783, which reads, "Any person who has a political dynasty relationship with an

incumbent elective official is disqualified from running for any elective public office

within the same city and/or province where the elective public official is running."

“This bill will only be proactive. It will not affect those who are already

currently holding positions. The bill also limits the definition of a political dynasty

relationship as existing only among relatives up to the second degree of affinity or

consanguinity. Thus, only the spouse, children, siblings or parents of the incumbent

are deemed disqualified and similar in-law relationship. The bill disallows a relative

of an incumbent from running for a position like governor, vice governor, mayor, vice

33
mayor, as these positions are vested executive power. Another distinct feature of

this bill is that it allows relatives of the incumbent to run for posts such as board

member or councilor where power is shared owing to the collegial nature of the

office. The idea of the bill is to bar relatives from holding positions where power is

concentrated in an individual, but not from positions where decision-making is made

through deliberation and consensus” (Bordadora, 2007).

Solution to Problems Regarding Political Dynasties

“Although this new bill seems like a good and effective idea for countering the

negative effects of the existence political dynasties, it has yet to have been decided

by legislators whether this will be fully implemented or not. It is up to the Congress to

decide whether this bill will be passed and it seems highly unlikely that they will do

so. This is partly due to the fact that political dynasties have become so much a part

of the current system of governance that it is almost impossible to change. "I don't

think it has much of a chance under the present Congress," stated Defensor

regarding his opinion on possibility of the bill being passed” (Bordadora, 2007).

“Like it or not, the emergence of political dynasties in the Philippines still

operate well within the framework of so-called democracy.”

(PHILIPPINEPOLITICS.NET., 2000).

“No matter how much effort is put against the political dynasty, it is here to stay. It is

simply futile to hope for any change regarding the current laws on political dynasties.

Instead of looking at something that is simply out of reach, people should realize that

there lies a much simpler solution. It would be impossible to ban all political

34
dynasties in general; however, it is possible to put an end to the bad political

dynasties. People should realize that they are the ones who elect their leaders into

office. No matter how strong a political dynasty may be, sovereignty is held by the

people. At the end of the day, it will be the people to decide whether or not a dynasty

will be succeeded. "Absolute power is when you have a dictatorship. We still have to

go through an election. The electorate will be the ones to dictate who the ones who

will lead are. The people have the power, not the officials” (Medel, 2007).

“All this talk about outlawing political dynasties and its bad effects would not

even be necessary if people were to vote more responsibly. What is happening in

today's society is that the people are the ones choosing to make themselves

powerless. They are quick to find faults in the system and demand for change, yet

they do nothing to actually work for change. People need to realize that as much as

the bad political dynasties are to blame, they are also responsible for allowing these

dynasties to remain in power. Ultimately, people have the power to put a stop to

political dynasties if the need arises. If they see that a certain dynasty abuses their

power, they possess the power and responsibility to vote towards a change in

leadership. On the other hand, if a dynasty is doing a good job, then they have the

option to allow the dynasty to continue in the succeeding generations. According to

then Representative of Tarlac and now President Benigno Aquino, the issue of

whether a member of a political family should continue in office or not is a matter of

public choice. "At the end of the day, people deserve the government they get," he

said.” (Cusi, 2004)

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 “That being said, these traditional political dynasties, that which do not ground

their resources based on their economic stance, are still existing up to this day

because they don't just merely exercise power on behalf of their families but rather

they direct this power towards an ordered use to improve the public's welfare which

is the way it's supposed to be in a democratic society. While progress continues to

be delivered by these political clans to their constituents, then their dominance and

relevance in the Philippine political arena and society will be here to stay. On the

other hand, if one lacks or exceeds in either their organization or exercise of power,

then that dynasty is bound to fail.”

“All in all, it is difficult to make a generalization whether the political dynasty is

in fact good or bad since this would differ on a case-to-case basis. It can be

detrimental to Philippine society on some instances, yet beneficial on other cases.

There are both good political dynasties and bad ones. Each political dynasty has its

own strengths and weaknesses and it is the duty of the people to be the judge. The

political dynasty, like any other system of leadership, is prone to error. After all, no

system of government is truly perfect; problems will always arise. What are needed

are the unified efforts of each and every individual to continually strive in building the

nation into a better place.”

(https://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/influence-and-power-of-political-

dynasties-politics-essay.php)

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 CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

III.A RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design that will be used in this study is Feasibility Study.

Feasibility study As the name implies, a feasibility study is an analysis of the viability

of an idea. The feasibility study focuses on helping answer the essential question of

“should we proceed with the proposed project idea?” All activities of the study are

directed toward helping answer this question.

(https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/html/c5-65.html)

This design is much applicable in my study especially it tackles on the

question of the feasibility of enacting the Anti-Political dynasty law in the Philippines

as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, however lack of legislative intervention in

order to define such term as directly tasked to. This method in conducting the study

will able to determine the advantages and at the same time its disadvantages in

case that it will be implemented. It will also help the study to conclude whether the

passing of the bill will make significant changes in the political arena of the country in

accordance with the gist of the said constitutional provision.

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 III. B. TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE

The target population to be the subject of the study will be the20 voters per district of

the Province of Iloilo where Political Dynasty is present as defined by the Senate Bill

2649.

III. C. DATA COLLECTION

There are two types of method to be used in this study. First is the Content

Analysis. Content Analysis is important in this study since the main topic is the

feasibility of enacting the Senate Bill 2649 or the Anti-Political Dynasty Bill proposed

by Sen. Miriam Defensor -Santiago, in which case the bill itself will be examined and

analyzed. Moreover, the minutes of the reading of the proposed bill will be inquired

for the purpose of analyzing the attitude of the senators towards the said bill. Other

relevant and similar bills will also be analyzed. Second Method is by conducting a

survey over the needed sample population through a questionnaire. Through this

survey, the response and the attitude of the voters in the locality in Iloilo regarding

the presence of the Political Dynasty in the vicinity will be gathered and be

considered in the feasibility of passing the Anti-Political Dynasty Law.

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39