1. Collado V.
CA - The Trial Court held that from the testimony of the witnesses presented
G.R. 107764
October 4, 2002
Topic: Regalian Doctrine
Petitioners: Edna Collado
Respondents: Court of Appeals
Ponente: J. Carpio
DOCTRINE: Lands within the public domain can’t be validly disposed of unless there
is a positive act coming from the government in classifying such land as alienable
FACTS
- On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land
registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with
an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares
- The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620.
- Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the
Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, this survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed.
- On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended
Application to include additional co-applicants.
- Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as
petitioners for brevity).
- The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application.
- In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general
default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
- Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners.
- The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.
- Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the
corresponding real estate taxes. According to them, there are now
twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each.
- The land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient
evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot
by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and
notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial.
- On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for
brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity),
filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
- They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is
situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable.
- They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to
the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes.
- The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene
- Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the
decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court.
- The Court of Appeals later on held that the private respondents failed to
present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described
in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain
and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by
Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of
Lands, which was attached to the application of private respondents,
categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed."
- Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court alleging that such title was
valid
ISSUE
Whether petitioners have registerable title over the Lot.
HELD
No!
RATIO
The Supreme Court held that an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as
amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. Or, that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot is inside IN-12
preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141. Mariquina Watershed.

Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant
for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law
prevailing at the time petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25,
1985.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904,
Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have
not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they
submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners possession as of
the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years
counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change
even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from
1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more
because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to
then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the
MWR.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of
disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their
Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO
59179 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners application.

The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Lastly, the evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a
presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until
clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.

The Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as
original applicant] application is the technical description of the Lot signed by
 2. Legarda v Saleeby
G.R. No. L-8396
October 2, 1915
Topic: Purpose of Registration
Petitioner: Consuela Legarda, with her husband Muro Prieto
Respondent: N.M. Saleeby
Facts:
 Plaintiffs and defendant occupy, as owners, lots adjoining in the district of
Ermita in the City of Manila
 A stone wall had existed for a number of years located on the lot of the
plaintiffs
 Plaintiffs on March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot
 The court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate of title provided for under the torrens system
 The description of the lot given in the petition also included said wall
 On March 25, 1912, predecessor of the defendant likewise was issued
certificate of registration under the torrens system, including the wall
 On Dec 13, 1912, plaintiffs discovered and immediately presented a
petition for an adjustment and correction of the error by including said
wall in Court of Land Registration
 Lower court denied the petition ruling that the petitioners failed to make
any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall
Issue: W/N petitioner should be named owner of the said wall? (YES)
Held:
 Decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for
registration was a judicial proceeding, binding upon all parties who did
not appear and oppose it
 If the same theory is to be applied, then the defendant should have
already lost because the plaintiffs had already registered the lot more
than 6 years before
 To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding to again
litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of
the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law
 The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any
better title than he had
 If he does not already have a perfect title he cannot have it registered
 The certificate in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner
 The title once registered with very few exceptions, should not thereafter
be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished,
except in some direct proceeding permitted by law
 A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse, open and
notorious possession
 Registered title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by
prescription
 The primary fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title
 If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure on this registered title
then the purpose of the law is defeated
 If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then
nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred
thereby has been in vain
 If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method
adopted in the present case, he may lose it all
 Purchasers of land which has been included in a second original
certificate cannot be regarded as an innocent purchase
 The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry
 It is never issued until it is recorded
 The record is notice to all the world, all persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains
 In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the
court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by
the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land
in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the
appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued
 3. Albienda v CA
GR NO. 61416
March 18, 1985
Topic: Purpose of Land Registration
Petitioners: Felda Albienda
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Angeles Sumagpao, and Ruben Sumagpao
Ponente: Escolin, J.
FACTS:
 Respondents Sps. Sumapao were applicants for a free patent over a piece
of land designated as Lot No. 1548, Pls-67, in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur.
 Respondents are claiming an 8-hectare portion that was erroneously
included in the technical description of the certificate of title covering Lot
No. 1550, which is an adjoining land belong to Petitioner.
 Respondents then instituted in the CFI an action against Petitioner for the
correction of their certificate of title under TCT No. T-1718 and for
recovery of possession of said portion of the land with damages.
 The complaint alleged that Respondents acquired Lot No. 1548 under a
deed of sale on November 11, 1968, which was executed by Baldonase;
that Baldonase purchased it from Baterbonia; and that Baterbonia
bought it from the primitive owner, Ontua.
 That Respondents occupied, cultivated and paid the taxes since their
acquisition in 1968.
 That in 1973, Petitioner, claiming ownership over the adjoining lot
designated took possession of Lot No. 1550 but also usurped 8 hectares
of Lot 1548, which belongs to Respondents. Despite repeated demands
by the Respondents, Petitioner refused to vacate said portion and restore
possession to them.
 Petitioner argues in her answer that Lot No. 1550 has an area of 196,848
sqmtrs and it originally belonged to Goma, in whose name the same was
registered under the Torrens System on July 23, 1958.
 That on July 14, 1959, Goma sold the land to Senerpida who possessed it
continuously and peacefully until November 21, 1972, when Petitioner
acquired the same for value and in good faith; that upon registration of
the deed of sale, Petitioner was issued the TCT over the said lot.
 Petitioner alleged that even if we consider that the technical description
appearing in her certificate was erroneous, the action for correction and
for reconveyance was unavailable, considering that more than one year
had elapsed since the issuance of the original certificate of title in 1958 to
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Goma.
 Respondents argue that the technical description in the title is spurious in
origin because it does not tally or conform to the technical description in
the survey return submitted by the Bureau of Lands who conducted the
land survey.
 In a letter, the Director of Lands admitted that there has been a mistake
in the computation of the technical description of Petitioner’s lot.
 CFI: Judgment in favor of Respondents. Petitioner ordered to vacate the
encroached area.
 CA: Affirmed CFI.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondents may assail Petitioner’s title for correction despite the fact that
19 years have passed since the certificate was issued? NO
HELD/RATIO:
The primary purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land, to put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title except claims which were
noted in the certificate at the time of registration or which may have arisen
subsequent.
Sec. 38 of the LRA is relevant to this case. It states, “Every decree of registration
shall bind the land, and quiet title… it shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons… whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citations, or
included in the general description, ‘to all whom it may concern.’”
Even when the decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party
defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review
before the court, and such petition can prosper only if no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired interest in the land. Sec. 38 categorically declares that “upon
the expiration of the term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in
accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible.”
In this case, the original certificate covering Respondent’s lot was issued on July 23,
1958. The fact that Respondent’s predecessor-in-interest wrote the Director of
Lands for area recomputation is of no matter since up until the sale to Respondents
in 1972, not action had been brought before the court to correct the error.
The action to correct the title was filed on July 13, 1977 or 19 years after the
issuance of the certificate. The period allowed by law to set aside the decree had
long elapsed, the original certificate of title issued in the name of Petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest had become indefeasible. The TCT derived is likewise
unassailable for under Sec. 39 of Act 496, “every person receiving a certificate of
title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the
same be free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.”
Every person dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued and the law will no way oblige them to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Granting Respondents’ contention will defeat the purpose of the LRA and all its
provisions would be useless isasmuch as the holder and possessor of the title
would never be secure in his possession and enjoyment of his property, for he
would always be exposed to lose the right over the property despite the title he has
secured.
Concurring Opinion (Aquino, J.):
Petitioner is a purchaser in good faith and for value. The land assailed in this case is
considered as an unregistered land. It is risky to buy unregistered land because its
area has not been determined with finality. The remedy of Respondents is against
their predecessors, not against Petitioner who rightfully relied on the torrens title.
4. Capitol Subdivision v. Province of Negros Occidental
G.R. L-16257
January 31, 1963
Topic: Purpose of Land Registration
Petitioners: Capitol Subdivision
Respondents: Province of Negros Occidental
DOCTRINE:
The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and
to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry.
SUMMARY:
In this case, plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that
he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood
was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for
the hospital site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., and the mortgage duly registered, was not cancelled until Sept. 28, 1935. Prior
to this date, on Dec. 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor
of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings in 1934.
When the Bank agreed on Nov. 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos Benares and
Carlos subsequently conveyed his rights to Capitol Subdivision, as well as when the
bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff’s favor on Sept. 20, 1949, the
title to the property was in the name of the Bank.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Capitol Subdivision seeks to recover from defendant Province of Negros
Occidental the possession of Lot 378 in Bacolod, and a reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the said lot by the defendant.
CFI ruled in favor of Capitol Subdivision. SC set aside decision and ordered the case
remanded to lower court for further trial. After which, CFI dismissed plaintiff’s
complaint and ordered plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to defendant.
The case is before the SC once again, on appeal by the plaintiff.
Lot 378 is a part of Hacienda Mandalagan with originally registered in the name of
Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of 22,783 sq.m covered
by OCT No. 1776 issued on August 25, 1916.
On November 30, 1920, lot was sold to Jose Benares. TCT 6295 was issued in his
name.
On March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378 had been mortgaged by Jose
Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
On Dec 6, 1926, Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda on the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), subject to first mortgage held by Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. These
transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental.
Mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed in pursuance of a
decision of CFI. The Bank acquired the Hacienda as purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. A new TCT was issued but it got lost. It was reconstituted as TCT No. RT-1371.
Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos Bemares, son of Jose Benares, subject to
the condition that title shall remain with the Bank until full payment.
Despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the bank did not take
possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under
an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by
the Bank in favor of Carlos Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When
upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale by the Bank, plaintiff took steps to
take possession the Hacienda. It was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied
by the Province Hospital of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, plaintiff made
representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation and
brought the present action.
Defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot through expropriation
proceedings; that immediately after the commencement of proceedings and began
the construction of the provincial hospital; that since then it had occupied said lot
publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner; and that plaintiff had
acted in bad faith in purchasing such lot despite knowing that the provincial
hospital; was in the lot.
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve credence because Jose appears to
be strongly biased and his testimony is extremely contradictory.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise
agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had been reached
and that the expropriation had not been consummated. For instance, the property
was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co and the mortgage was duly registered
and annotated in the name of Jose Benares. Also, Jose Benares constituted second
mortgage in favor of the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had
Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor.
ISSUE: W/N defendant had acquired Lot 378 in the expropriation proceedings?
HELD:
There is no evidence, and defendant has not even tried to prove that the
expropriation case had ever been dismissed in so far as Lot 378 is concerned.
Hence, the lower court merely speculated about the chances that the expropriation
case was dismissed. The contrary was intimated by defendant’s witness Coscolluela
for he testified that the expropriation case was still pending in 1934, when he
ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and the record suggests that since the
Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925 and completed the hospital in
1926, there were no further proceedings in said case.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged
acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to be the
exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
Plaintiff must be considered as a purchaser in good faith and for value as plaintiff’s
president did not know until 1949 that the lot was occupied by the provincial
hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known to
Carlos Benares before 1949.
As regards the compensation that it may collect from the defendant, the SC held
that since the latter’s right to expropriate Lot 378 is not contested, the plaintiff may
demand what is due by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is
entitled to recover from the defendant. The case should be remanded, therefore,
to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking
and the amount of compensation collectible from the defendant.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated, with costs
against the defendant. It is so ordered.
 5. Traders Royal Bank v. CA
G.R. No. 118862
Sept. 24, 1999
Petitioners: Traders Royal Bank
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al.
Doctrine: There was nothing in the certificates of title of their respective
predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank
respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their
respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the
same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of the Torrens
system of the land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.
Summary: On April 26, 1994, Traders Royal Bank filed with this Court a petition for
review to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals decision holding said bank
in bad faith when it sold a property knowing that it was under litigation and
without informing the buyer of said fact. Meanwhile, the buyers of said property
moved for a reconsideration of the said decision. In a resolution dated August 10,
1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed
the complaint as against them. The complainants in the original action for recovery
of possession/ownership filed a petition for review seeking to set aside said
resolution. These two petitions for review were later consolidated.
Facts:
 A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and
subsequently extrajudiciallyforeclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To
prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for
preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they did
not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit
pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded
in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB
as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new
one was entered in TRB’s name without the notice of lis pendens carried
over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages.
Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for want of
consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s title and issued a new cert. of
title for the Capays.
 Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who
subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the
land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered
purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after
it became a subject in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis
pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day
Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with
adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon
selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays
were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay
damages to Capays.
Issues:
1. Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
2. Whether or not TRB is liable for damages
Ruling:
 The main purpose of the torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of
title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving
the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of
title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot
disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in
every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly
issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the
law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine
the condition of the property.
 The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed
to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk
of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would
not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,
public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would
be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than
 they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system,
should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once
the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied
 The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose
is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent
buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the
title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the
face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent
buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for
value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the
notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They
did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon
knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the
declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration,
the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as
the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already
been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the
property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty
bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time
they sold it to Santiago.
6. HERMOSO v CA
G.R. No. 166748
April 24, 2009
Petitioners: Laureano Hermoso, As Represented By His Attorney-In-Fact Florida L.
Umandap,
Respondents: Court Of Appeals And Heirs Of Antonio Francia And Petra Francia,
Namely: Benjamin P. Francia, Cecilia Francia, Amos P. Francia, Jr., Francisco F.
Villarica, Danilo F. Villarica, Rodrigo F. Villarica, Melchor F. Villarica, Jesus F.
Villarica, Benilda F. Villarica And Ernesto F. Villarica, Respondents.
TOPIC: Classification of Lands
FACTS:
1. The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan,
identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio
Francia.
2. Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag have been occupying and cultivating Lot
Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants thereof.
3. Banag filed before the DAR, an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
emancipation patent pursuant to P.D. No. 27 - Decreeing The Emancipation Of
Tenants From The Bondage Of The Soil, Transferring To Them The Ownership Of
The Land They Till And Providing The Instruments And Mechanism Therefor.
4. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted Banag’s motion. On March 21, 1997,
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that the lands
involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes in an Order dated
June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not
cover the subject parcels of land.
ISSUE: Whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27.
HELD:
No. Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. The classification of lands of the
public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however,
also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification
of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D.
No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of
R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land.
and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such
farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered
as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were
reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation
under P.D. No. 27.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The case is remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Bulacan for the proper computation of the disturbance compensation of petitioner.
7. Chavez v NHA
GR. NO. 164527
August 15 2007
TOPIC: Classification of Land
PETITIONERS: FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
RESPONDENTS: NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS INC (RBI),
HARBOUR CENTRE POINT
PONENTE: VELASCO, J
DOCTRINE: Third Issue: Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore
and submerged lands considered as inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly declare that the
reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the project proponent have become
alienable and disposable lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this
conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the enabling
component for the Project if such classification is not deemed made?
It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA,
does not convert alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial
lands. We ruled in PEA that alienable lands of public domain must be transferred
to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands (emphasis supplied).[75] To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with
a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of
public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and
dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to
Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA
is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter The
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by
law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over
reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the
Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of
the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of
which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not
converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to
transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public
domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it
can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective
buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.

From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has
been declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands
of NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.
FACTS:
● On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an
instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by
National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
● On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum
order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management
Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila,
are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
● As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the
dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA
6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects.
Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP,
among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in
the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by
the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
● Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP
were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI)
won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter
into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
● Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for
eventual development into a lowcost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the
development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at
the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be
built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.
If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no
fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate
of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on
a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
● To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of
the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction
of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and
levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration
area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
● Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done,
the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the
design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement
the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was
increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the
issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also
provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II
of the project.
● Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made
the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite
at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was
suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
● On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34
temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had
been turned over by RBI.
● On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this
Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus seeking to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement
and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project,
and all other agreements in relation thereto, for being
Unconstitutional and Invalid. The petitioner challenges the authority of
NHA to reclaim lands. He claims that the power to reclaim lands of public
domain is vested exclusively with the Public Estates Authority. He also
contends that NHA and RBI were not given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as required and that
there was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands
as alienable and disposable.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority
by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man
4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public
bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to
acquire lands of public domain
8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information
related to the SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
RULING:
1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and
on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall
be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation
project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs),
favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or
entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA
is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under
consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to
have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for
the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews
for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR
which are exercises of its power of supervision over the
project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the
reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.
3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415
issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.
4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed
to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39
that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore,
these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and
disposable lands under the BOT law.
5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire
property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them
as it may deem appropriate.
6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the
right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain
Project. It was noted that notices were published in national
newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee on May 18, 1992.
7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be
paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with
at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the
lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial
lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any
qualified person.
8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to
information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28,
and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated
by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in
question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the
project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was
formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did
not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.
[ALTERNATIVE ISSUE/RULING]
ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA has the authority to reclaim lands
RULING: Yes. While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by
petitioner, we find that the NHA had more than enough authority to do so under
existing laws. While PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention
“reclamation” in any of the listed powers of the agency, we rule that the NHA has
an implied power to reclaim land as this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically,
and successfully implement an urban land reform and housing program enunciated
in Sec. 9 of Article XIII of the 1987Constitution.Basic in administrative law is the
doctrine that a government agency or office has express and implied powers based
on its charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers
granted, allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express
provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be
inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair
implication in the enabling act.
When a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred by necessary implication. when the statute does not specify the
particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise
of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any
reasonable method to carry out its functions. The power to reclaim on the part of
the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A. Land
reclamation is an integral part of the development of resources for some of the
housing requirements of the NHA. Private participation in housing projects may
also take the form of land reclamation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The prayer for a writ of prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The prayer for a writ of mandamus is GRANTED. Respondent NHA is ordered to
allow access to petitioner to all public documents and official records relative to
the SMDRP including, but not limited to, the March 19, 1993 JVA between the NHA
and RBI and subsequent agreements related to the JVA, the revisions over the
original plan, and the additional works incurred on and the transactions made with
respect to the Project.
8. Republic V. CA
G.R. L–43105 & G.R. L-43190
August 31, 1984
Topic: Torrens Title
Petitioners: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Court of Appeals & Santos Del Rio
Ponente: J. Cuevas
DOCTRINE: Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership but only as a mean to trace the roots of his title.
FACTS
- The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of
17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about
twenty (20) meters therefrom in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna.
- It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909.
- The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the
Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
- The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the
realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948.
- When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned
his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as
the latter's share in the inheritance.
- Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application
for registration of said parcel on May 9, 1966.
- The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private
oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
- It is believed that sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained
permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in
question.
- Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them
had made voluntary payments to private respondent.
- In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed
residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file
an ejectment suit against the former in 1966.
- Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors
had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the
Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios application
for registration.
- The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for
registration.
 - Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals.
- The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
Petitions for Review of said decision before the Supreme Court alleging
that such land is not within the domain of man and thus can’t be
alienated (Government’s position) and that the oppositors have already
reclaimed such land through adverse possession (Oppositors’ position)
ISSUE
Whether the applicant-respondent has registerable title to the land
HELD
Yes!
RATIO
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition
of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over
the land. Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel of
land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of
sale in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land.
In addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations covering the land
since 1918 and also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property.
The then Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through his father
before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse
possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years, counted from
April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase. The
record does not show any circumstance of note sufficient enough to overthrow
said findings of facts, which is binding upon Us. Since applicant has possessed the
subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his
possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription
to set in.
amended by Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of said Act enumerates as among the
persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the following:
“(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide claim of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title x x x"
The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. NO. L-43190, that they have
reclaimed the land from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed
the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve their position. In the
first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies
belonging to the public domain without proper permission from government
authorities. And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land
does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be
subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted.
Private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged
reclamation. Therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. In the
second place, their alleged possession can never ripen into ownership. Only
possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a
title acquired by prescription.
As correctly found by the appellate court, the private oppositors-petitioners
entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the
applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay
rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their use of the land and their
nonpayment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these could
not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened
into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and
the registration in favor of applicant private-respondent of the land described in his
application is hereby ordered. Costs against private petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement. And even if the land
sought to be registered is public land as claimed by the petitioners still, applicant
would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also
satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
 9. Bureau of Forestry v CA
G.R. No. L-37995
August 31, 1987
Topic: Non-Registrable Properties
Petitioner: Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, Philippine Fisheries Commission
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Filomeno Gallo
Facts:
 On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land in IloIlo containing an area of
30.5943 hectares were subject of an application for registration by
Mercedes Diago
 She alleges she occupied the parcels having bought them from the
testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava, who in his lifetime, bough the
lands from Canuto Gustilo
 The Director of lands opposed said application on the ground that neither
the applicant nor predecessors-in-interest have sufficient tile
 The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his position on the
ground that some portions or 19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps and
are within Timberland Block “B”, a project of IloIlo
 On June 30, 1965, Filmeno Gallo, who purchased the land from Diago,
moved to be substituted attaching to his motion an Amended Application
for Registration of Title
 Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to be substituted
in place of Bureau of Forestry alleging said portion had been transferred
to them
 Trial Court rendered decision ordering the registration of 4 parcels of land
in the name of Filomeno Gallo
 Petitioners appealed to eh CA but the CA affirmed and subsequently
denied the MR
Issue: W/N the 19.4-hectare subject matter should be registered in favor of Gallo?
(NO)
Held:
 Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens
System, 11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the
disposable portion of the public domain
 The rest consisting of 19.4080 hectares is now the controversy of the
present appeal
 Petitioner contend that respondent court completely ignored the
undisputed facts that
o The controverted area is within Timberland Block “B”
o The certification of then Director of Forestry on Feb 18, 1956,
to the effect that the area in question is for forestry purposes
 Respondent court in affirming the decision, ruled that although the
controverted portions are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland
Block “B”, same cannot be considered part of the public forest not
susceptible to private ownership since petitioner failed to submit
convincing proof
 The contentions of respondents do not hold water
 Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block as
classification of the municipality and certified by the Director of Forestry
on Feb 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes hence they are
portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings
 Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the
Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proof that the land
in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes
 A s provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was
lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a
prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts
 With that, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain
into agricultural forest, but the Executive Branch of the Government,
through the office of the President
 Hence it was grave abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore
the uncontroverted facts that
o (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and;
o (2) as certified by then Director of Forestry, the area is needed
for forest purposes
 Respondents cannot claim to have obtained title by prescription because
the application necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied
for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by
prescription, unless law expressly permits
 It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership
 10. Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry
G.R. L-27873
November 29, 1983
Topic: Non-Registrable Properties
Petitioners: Heirs of Jose Amunategui
Respondents: Director of Forestry
DOCTRINE: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers may have stripped of its forest
cover.
FACTS
Roque and Melquiades Borre filed the application for registration. In due time, the
heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque and
Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot
885 of Pilar Cadastre be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of
Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition in so far as portion
containing 117,956 sq.m was concerned and prayed that the title to said portion be
confirmed and registered in his name.
During trial, Borre sold his rights and interests, 5/6 to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 to
Melquiades Borre.
CFI adjudicated 117,956 sq.m to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land
containing 527,747 sq.m (5/6 share to Alpasan, 1/6 to Melquiades). The Heirs and
DOF filed their appeal with the CA.
CA reversed the decision. The application as well as all the oppositions, except that
of DOF, are dismissed. CA held that it was evident that the Bureau of Forestry had
insisted on its claim all throughout that period of 30 years.
Heirs of Amunategui filed petition for review on certiorari contending that the lot
had been in possession of private persons for over 30 years, therefore said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act).
Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin filed petition for review on certiorari
contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
their complaint against the Heirs.
ISSUE
W/N Lot 885 is a public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of
private applicants
HELD: Yes
Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. The fact that no trees are found in Lot 885 does not divest such land of
its classification as forest land and public domain. The opposition of DOF was
strengthened when Jose Amunategui had to obtain timber licenses to cut timber
within the area.
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Sec. 48 of CA 141, as amended by RA
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from
old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least 30 years preceding the filing of application.
The decision of CA is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in CA 141 as
amended. The records show that Lot 885 never ceased to be classified as forest
land of the public domain.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petitions in GR No. L-30035 and GR No. L-27873 are DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.