Ayala Land Inc. vs. Tagle, G.R. No.

153667

FACTS: Civil Case No. 931-94 for nullification of Contract to Sell Real Properties, Cancellation of
Annotations on Transfer Certificates of Title and Damages was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite City, by ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON)
against Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI), Emerito B. Ramos, Jr., et al.

In its complaint, ASB alleged that on 21 May 1994, EMRASON, a real estate company which owns real
estate properties in Dasmariñas, Cavite City, with a total area of 372 hectares, whose chairman and
president is Emerito M. Ramos, Sr., with his wife, Susana B. Ramos, and children as stockholders,
entered into a Letter-Agreement with ASB for the conditional sale of sixty-five percent (65%) of the
said land for a consideration of P400,000,000.00 payable in five installments. However, ASB, through
its president, Mr. Luke C. Roxas, received a letter from the children of Emerito Ramos, Sr., informing
him that on 18 May 1994, they entered into a Contract to Sell said real estate properties with ALI. ASB
confirmed the contract of the Ramos children with ALI when it found out that the same was annotated
on the Transfer Certificates of Title of the real estate properties in dispute. This prompted ASB to file
the Complaint dated 13 June 1994 before the trial court. ALI, thereafter, filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim. Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take
testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., citing Section 4(c), Rule 24 of
the Revised Rules of Court stating that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and although he
was of sound mind there is always the possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff’s behalf
in the course of the trial on the merits. The motion was granted, however this was questioned by ALI
sought rulings on its objections to leading questions, violations of the best-evidence rule, rule on
presentation of secondary evidence, incompetence of the deponent, opinion rule, manner of presentation
of evidence, and testimonies not forming part of the offer.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged deposition of the witness Emerito Ramos Sr. is admissible under the rules.

RULING: YES. In this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr’s deposition
chiefly because of his advance age which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of
Court.

This Court has observed that the trial court has painstakingly gone over every objection of ALI
contained in its Motion dated 30 January 1995 and ruled on every single objection in the Order dated 05
May 1995 and these objections were again taken up in the Order of the trial court dated 07 September
1995. On this point, we find no compelling reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at by the trial court.
It has been repeatedly held that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired
into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made ingood faith and within the
bounds of the law, as in the case at bar.
 Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing vs. Ley Construction and Devt. G.R. No. 147143

FACTS: Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages with the RTC of Makati against Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation
(Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real
property in Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price of
P2,634,000.00; and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC’s
payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. LCDC filed amended complaints impleading Princeton
Development Corporation (Princeton) and Yu He Ching (Yu) President of Hyatt as additional
defendants claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC and alleging that
LCDC paid the purchase price of P2, 634,000.00 to Hyatt through Yu.

LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer of Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take
deposition of Manuel Ley, President of LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of
Manuel and Janet Ley. The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed. However, at the scheduled
deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial
be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case. The RTC
agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place. LCDC moved
for reconsideration which the RTC denied due to the following reasons 1) said depositions will only
delay the early termination of the case; 2) had the Court set the case for pre-trial conference and trial
thereafter, the case would have been terminated earlier; 3) what the parties would like to elicit from their
deponents would probably be elicited at the pre-trial conference; 4) no substantial rights of the parties
would be prejudiced, if pre-trial conference is held, instead of deposition.

On the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to
Pendency of Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (12th Division), which sought to annul the
order regarding the cancellation of the deposition-taking. RTC denied plaintiff’s motion to suspend
proceedings and gave LCDC two (2) options: enter into a pre-trial conference, advising plaintiff that
what it would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference; and, terminate
the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on.

The pre-trial proceeded as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enter into pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and
Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited which the RTC granted. For LCDC’s failure to enter into
pre-trial conference without any valid reason the complaint and the counterclaims were dismissed by the
RTC. LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied compelling it file an appeal with
CA (7th Division). CA’s 12th Division denied LCDC’s petition for certiorari declaring that the granting
of the petition and setting aside of the RTC Orders are manifestly pointless considering that the
complaint itself had already been dismissed. Meanwhile CA’s 7th Division finds the appeal meritorious
and remanded the case to the RTC for further hearing and to proceed with the deposition taking. Hyatt
and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and order the deposition-
taking to proceed.

RULING: No. A deposition should be allowed; absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any
party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-
nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is
made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and
usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an
answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists (Section
4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the
advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of
litigation would be defeated.
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.---- By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the
action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person,
whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance
with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave
of court on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).

LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take depositions after the
answers of the defendants have been served, thus, erred in canceling the previously scheduled
depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in bad
faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the
inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.

The taking of depositions would not cause unnecessary duplicity even though the intended deponents
shall also be called as witnesses during trial, as explained in Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals:

The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute “good cause” to
justify the court’s order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to
attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court
during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his
deposition.
x x x Under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a
method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarily contemplated - and a method of presenting
testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the
taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of
oral testimony wherever practicable.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court held:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in
the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, “the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.

The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from the options given by the trial court and in
dismissing the complaint upon LCDC’s refusal to choose either of the two. The information LCDC
seeks to obtain through the depositions, may not be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said
deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference. As also pointed out by the CA:

x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the very purpose for which it
is intended, as a pre-trial device. By then, the issues would have been confined only on matters defined
during pre-trial. The importance of the modes of discovery cannot be gainsaid in this case in view of the
nature of the controversy involved and the conflicting interest claimed by the parties.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings
for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate
factual basis during the preparation for trial.

In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are
necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such
information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark --- the very situation
which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a
game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent.

Petition is denied for lack of merit.

 Fortune Corporation vs. CA, G.R. No. 108119

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of
the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was
the chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. An action for breach of contract was filed by
the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them
with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9,
February 12 and April 22, 1992. On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that petitioner would take the deposition of
the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to
Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no
sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c) such taking would cause
annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no intention
of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the
trial on the merits. Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the
deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded
to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court. The
petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further
adjudication on the merits. CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to
direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling. This
is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party to take
depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier
responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; c)to
allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question. With
the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.

ISSUES:
1.WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not
certiorari is the proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts
which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a deposition,
which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done because there was
nothing yet to offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen because there was nothing
to reject as nothing was offered.

2. WON the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the
absence of good cause therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot be
considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the
proposed deponent had earlier responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had
signified his availability to testify in court; and (c) that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial
court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital witness.
RULING: The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute
immensely to the attainment of the judiciary’s primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases.
The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation
theretofore performes primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are
meant to serve 1) as a device, along with the pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the
basic issues between the parties and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The
evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried
on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is
as broad as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial.

I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination,
upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the
deposition shall not be taken. This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the
deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority to exercise discretion in connection
therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must
be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance
with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders
made prior to trial. 11 This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule
24 are interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding
or of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary
acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably
cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be
inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered opinion that on
the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be discussed,
certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC ruled that certiorari
may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court.

II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and
efficacious, Rule 29 imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the
modes of discovery, such as dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment
by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party;
payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery;
taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses;
striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings.
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court
may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the
court in the exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a
protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for
the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements,
is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. 16 What constitutes good
cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought.

The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting
the taking of the deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product
doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought in the course of the
examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. 18 In the
present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the
order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken.

1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the
courts took a relatively liberal view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this
question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that: "Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has
been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a proper case should exercise, discretion to permit
an oral examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that the relevant subject matter will not
involve the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon which he was examined by
interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a
party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery
devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress
the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and
depositions in one or the other sequence.

2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify
the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is
one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. 25 But the
same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The
utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of
the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly
committed to the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses
— whose demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to the use of
written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the
limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was originally
conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the
limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the
double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a
method of presenting testimony.
Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of
depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral
testimony wherever practicable.

3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court
could not observe the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the
interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no
deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike.
Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or
oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if
the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the
person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown;
and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.

4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or
oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if
the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the
person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown;
and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. Inconvenience to the party whose
deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. 32 No doubt, private
respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties
when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery
process. On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that
respondent court erred in affirming the same. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
 People vs. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215

FACTS: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled
in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and theCollective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A
letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the
Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.

RULING: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar). This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to
"be compelled to be a witness against himself.”It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should
know. He must claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda
v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1) He shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right.
2) Nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him.
3) Any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make
a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
 Cabal vs. Kapunan Jr. 116 Phil 1361

FACTS: Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a
letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and
gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other
equally reprehensible acts". On 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5)
members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit
its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, the
Committee, upon request of complainant Col. Maristela for the petitioner to take the witness stand.
Thereupon, petitioner objected invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to
answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to
be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. Hence, the Committee referred the matter to
respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" with contempt under section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. This charge was assigned to the branch presided over by respondent Judge who
issued an order requiring petitioner to show cause and/or answer the charge filed against him within ten
(10) days. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or order to show
cause, upon the ground, among others, that the Committee had no power to order an require petitioner to
take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter,
inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-incrimination. Respondent
Judge denied said motion to quash.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings in the Committee is civil or criminal in character.

RULING: In this connection, it should be noted that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to
apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law,
which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of
proper are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the
obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. Such proceedings are criminal in
nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it,
the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. The rule protecting a person from being
compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally
to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a forfeiture. The
possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness
is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a
blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.
 Pascual Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 138 Phil 361

FACTS: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio
Pascual Jr.for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he
would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be
exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but
scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining
order from a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower
court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of
the matter. Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be
well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness
for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board
appealed.

ISSUE: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

RULING: Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while
administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in
the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take
the witness stand. The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and
refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the
right against self incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that
while a crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective
should not be accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded to the human personality.
 Galman vs. Pamaran, G.R. No. L-71208-09

FACTS: On 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the
premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all
aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later
became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the
Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
documentary and other evidence. Upon termination of the investigation reports were submitted and
thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the
necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan two Informations for
murder— one for the killing of Aquino and Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac
not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private
respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon
arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution
represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the
individual testimonies of respondents before the Agrava Board. Respondents filed a formal "Motion to
Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in
the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886, and thus prayed that his testimony
be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. The Tanodbayan opposed said a motion contending that the
immunity relied upon by respondent was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against self incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other
evidence produced by respondent. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886.

ISSUE: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in
the proceeding before the Agrava Board.

RULING: Yes. Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth
and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of
determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination
of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of
justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the
ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and
ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to
testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing
environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned
to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants
in the tragic killing. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leaves them no choice.
They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so.
Necessity to invoke right against self-incrimination: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into
two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional
immunity." The distinction between that "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony
and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other
hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which
his compelled testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs
to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before
the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
producing evidence do not render the witness immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation
of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement
and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right
against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that
Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all
statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense
that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, the right
against self-incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given
statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
 Vda. De Mangeura vs. Risos, G.R. No. 152643

FACTS: Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the
RTC as Criminal Case that arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged
property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Concepcion, who was a
resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her
freedom of mobility. The motion was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondent filed a special civil
action for certiorari before the CA. At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the
respondent’s petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This
notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate
court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule
119, Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is
pending and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the
RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in
requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet
the witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied
suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of
criminal procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 23 of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of the petitioner?

RULING: It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence
of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they
deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly,
this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor. This rule, however, is not absolute. As
exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may
be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses. In the case at bench, in issue is the
examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and
appear before the trial court. The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus
required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending.
 Go vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185527

FACTS: Sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused Harry L. Go, Tonny
Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. represented by Li Luen Ping. All said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations that they made to said Li Luen
Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials
installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export
Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan. They executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration
of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML
Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. They represented that the said deed is a first mortgage when in
truth and in fact, the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and
foreclosed by China Bank Corporation as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage to Highdone
Company Ltd. Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessperson from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September
9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13,
2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping. He
alleged that the private respondent was Harry L. Go, et. al vs. People of the Philippines & Highdone
Company Ltd., et. al. | 2 treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia
and that upon doctor’s advice; he could not make the long travel to the country. The petitioners’ opposed
the said motion; however, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the
directive to submit a Medical Certifcate of Li Luen Ping. They sought reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the MeTC. Thus, they file a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null
and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases
cannot apply to the case. Deposition of prosecution witness in criminal cases is governed by a specific
provision in the Rules of Court. Upon denial by the RTC of the motion for reconsideration through an
Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, which held that no grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition taking of Li Luen Ping. It stated
that there is no rule of procedure that expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases.
Petitioners would still have opportunity to cross-examine the witness and make timely objections during
the taking of the oral deposition, either through counsel or through the consular officer. Petitioners’ filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition,

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the deposition taking of the
complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia is an infringement of the Constitutional right of the Petitioners
to confront the said witness face to face.
RULING: The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of petitioners. SC declared that the examination of
witnesses must be done orally before a judge in an open court. The Constitution secures to the accused
his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Accordingly, this is the
“safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. However, the Rules of Court recognizes
the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence instead
of direct court testimony. Deposition in criminal cases, of a prosecution witness who is foreseen to be
unavailable for trial, should be made before the court, at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as mandated in Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. Since the conditional
examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is
pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

The Court noted that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial
proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. However, the prosecution failed to get
his deposition or testimony taken, before the MeTC pursuant to Section, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The prosecution should have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping’s testimony given
that the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date
of return. Therefore, the loss of the prosecution’s case is attributable to them. The SC emphasized that
while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses
that are material to his defense to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory
process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of
violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face.
 People vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-41166

FACTS: In the case of "People of the Philippines versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused", of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel
manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and
material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected
to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and
subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted
the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated.

RULING: We grant the petition. The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and
testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The
opponent", according to an eminent authority, demands confrontation for the purpose of cross-
examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers. There is also the advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness
before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is
produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true
idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of litigants
and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to
the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to
prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness in testify only on those facts
which he knows of his own knowledge. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the
orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to
adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the
Rules of Court.