SIMNY G. GUY vs. GILBERT G.

GUY
G.R. No. 189486
September 5, 2012.
Perez, J.
Indispensable party

FACTS
With their eldest son, Gaspar G. Guy (Gaspar), having entered the Missionary in spouses
Guy put the future of the Guy group of companies in Gilbert’s hands. Gilbert G. Guy (Gilbert)
practically owned almost 80 percent of the 650,000 subscribed capital stock of GoodGold Realty &
Development Corporation. GoodGold’s remaining shares were divided among Francisco Guy
(Gilbert’s Father) with 130,000 shares, Simny Guy (Gilbert’s Mother), Benjamin Lim and Paulino
Delfin Pe, with one share each, respectively.
In 1999, the aging Francisco instructed Benjamin Lim, a nominal shareholder of GoodGold
and his trusted employee to collaborate with Atty. Emmanuel Paras, to redistribute GoodGold’s
shareholdings evenly among his children while maintaining a proportionate share for himself and his
wife, Simny.
Five years after the redistribution of GG’s shares of stock, Gilbert filed with the RTC of
Manila, a Complaint for the to declare the distribution null and void and prayed for injuction against
his mother, Simny, and his sisters.
Gilbert alleged, among others, that no stock certificate ever existed; that his signature at the
back of the spurious Stock Certificate Nos. 004014 which purportedly endorsed the same were
forged, and, hence, should be nullified. It was later withdrawn by Gilbert after the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) submitted a report to the RTC of Manila authenticating Gilbert’s signature in
the endorsed certificates.
Gilbert again filed another case, now with the RTC of Mandaluyong alleging the same that
he never signed any document which would justify and support the transfer of his shares to his
siblings and that he has in no way, disposed, alienated, encumbered, assigned or sold any or part of
his shares in GoodGold. Gilbert added that the Amended General Information Sheets (GIS) of
GoodGold for the years 2000 to 2004 which his siblings submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) were spurious as these did not reflect his true shares in the corporation which
supposedly totaled to 595,000 shares; that no valid stockholders’ annual to 595,000 shares.
Gilbert’s siblings filed a manifestation claiming that the complaint is a nuisance and
harassment suit, which was granted by the RTC. Hence, a petition for certiorari.

RULING
The court cannot proceed without the presence of indispensable party before the court. Settled is
the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power, and, it is precisely “when an indispensable party is not before the court that the
action should be dismissed” for such absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The
said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be
included in the title of the case. Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the
rules on venue as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would abrogate the meaning of a
“real party in interest”, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-à-vis Section
3 of the same Rule.
OPOSA et.al vs. HON. FACTORAN
G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993
Davide, Jr. ,J.
CLASS SUIT

Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged
the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining
forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to: Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
Ruling:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: The petitioners have the right to bring action to
the judicial power of the Court.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely
identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a
class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by
citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
SUN INSURANCE V ASUNCION
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
J. Gancayco
Payment of Docket Fees

Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint
for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case
against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however,
the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it
can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in
docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-
assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.

Issue:
Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or
sufficient docket fees?
Ruling:
YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the
docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
VLASON ENT. CORP. vs. CA
G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999.
When execution shall issue
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Omega Sea Transport Company, through local agent Poro Point Shipping Services,
requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and
to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority compound in La Union while awaiting transhipment to
HK. The request was approved by the Bureau of Customs. Despite the approval, the customs
personnel boarded the vessel on suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med
Line Philippines Co. The district customs collector seized said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the
Tariff and Customs Code. A notice of hearing of was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading
Co., and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd.
While seizure proceedings were ongoing, the vessel ran aground and was abandoned when
La Union was hit by typhoons. Afterwards, Omega entered into a salvage agreement with private
respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel.
Finding that no fraud was committed, the District Collector of Customs Quiray lifted the
warrant of seizure. However, then Customs Commissioner Mison declined to clear Quiray’s
Decision and he orders the forfeiture of the vessel and its cargo. Accordingly, acting District
Collector of Customs Sy issued a decree of forfeiture and the sale of the cargo in favor of the
government.
To enforce its preferred salvor’s lien, private respondent Duraproof filed with the RTC-
Manila a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, assailing the actions of Commissioner
Mison and District Collector Sy. Also impleaded as respondents were PPA representative
Mangaoang and Med Line Philippines Inc.
In 1989, private respondent Duraproof amended its Petition to include former District
Collector Quiray; PPA Port Manager Amor; Petitioner Vlason Enterprises; Singkong Trading
Company; Banco Du Brasil; Dusit International Co., Inc.; Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-
United Trading Co., Ltd. In both Petitions, private respondent plainly failed to include any allegation
pertaining to petitioner, or any prayer for relief against it.
Summonses for the amended Petition were served on Med Line Philippines: Vlason Ent. president
Angliongto, Singkong Trading representative Atty. Tamondong and Customs Commissioner Mison.
Upon motion of the private respondent Duraproof, the RTC allowed summons by publication to be
served upon the alien defendants who were not residents and had no direct representatives in the
country.
In 1990, Duraproof moved to declare respondents in default, but the trial court denied the
motion, because Mangaoang and Amor had jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss, while Mison and Med
Line had moved separately for an extension to file a similar motion. Later the RTC rendered two
Orders, granting the motions to dismiss filed by Mangaoang, Amor, Med Line, Commissioner
Mison and District Collector Sy on the ground of litis pendentia and lack of jurisdiction.
Duraproof again moved to declare the following in default: petitioner Vlason, Quiray, Sy, Mison,
Banco Du Brazil, Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United Trading
Co., Ltd., however, there is no record that the trial court acted upon the motions. Thereafter,
petitioner filed another Motion for leave to amend the petition, impleading Omega Sea Trans Co.
(represented by Cadacio) and Omega’s M/V Star Ace represented by Capt. Rada.
In 1991, the RTC declared the following in default: Singkong Trading Co., Commissioner
Mison, M/V Star Ace and Omega. Private respondent filed, and the trial court granted, an ex parte
Motion to present evidence against the defaulting respondents. Only private respondent, Atty.
Tamondong, Commissioner Mison, Omega and M/V Star Ace appeared in the next pretrial hearing;
thus, the trial court declared the other respondents in default and allowed private respondent to
present evidence against them. The general manager of Duraproof testified and adduced evidence
against the other respondents, including petitioner Vlason, alleging that petitioner Vlason, thru
harassment and intimidation, caused damage costing millions to private respondent Duraproof.
RTC RULING: The RTC Manila ruled in favor of Duraproof and against petitioner Vlason.
Subsequently, Vlason filed MR on the grounds that it was allegedly not impleaded as a defendant,
served summons or declared in default; that private respondent was not authorized to present
evidence against it in default; that the judgment in default was fatally defective, because private
respondent had not paid filing fees for the award; and that private respondent had not prayed for
such award. Private respondent opposed the Motion, arguing that it was a mere scrap of paper due
to its defective notice of hearing. Bureau of Customs also filed an ex parte Motion to recall the
execution, and to quash the notice of levy and the sale on execution. Despite this Motion, the
auction sale was conducted, with private respondent submitting the winning bid. The trial court
ordered the deputy sheriffs to cease and desist from implementing the Writ of Execution and from
levying on the personal property of the defendants. Nevertheless, Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale.
APPEAL TO CA: Duraproof filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA in
1991, to nullify the cease and desist orders of the trial court. This was granted and the CA issued a
TRO against the RTC.
In the same year, petitioner Vlason received from TC Sheriff Camagon a notice to pay
Duraproof to satisfy the RTC decision. Not having any knowledge of the CA case to which it was
not impleaded, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss ex abutandi ad cautelam on
the grounds that (1) the Petition of private respondent stated no cause of action against it, (2) the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, and (3) litis pendentia barred the suit.
Petitioner also filed a special appearance before the CA. It prayed for the lifting of the levy on its
properties or, alternatively, for a temporary restraining order against their auction until its Motion
for Reconsideration was resolved by the trial court. Acting on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the trial court reversed its initial Decision.
Thereafter, The CA granted private respondents Motion to file a Supplemental Petition impleading
petitioner. Thereafter, CA ruled that the RTC Decision has long become final and executory, and
that Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute to a lapsed appeal.
PETITION TO SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing CA’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that Vlason’s period to file MR lapsed, thus
making the RTC decision final and executory.

Ruling:
NO, The CA was incorrect to rule that Vlason’s period to file and MR lapsed. This Court
disagrees. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Notice.Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned,
at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of
any affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may
hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its
own motion.
 SEC. 5. Contents of notice.The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.
Ideally, the foregoing Rule requires the petitioner to address and to serve on the counsel of private
respondent the notice of hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The case at bar, however, is far
from ideal. First, petitioner was not validly summoned and it did not participate in the trial of the
case in the lower court; thus, it was understandable that petitioner would not be familiar with the
parties and their counsels. Second, Atty. Desierto entered his appearance only as collaborating
counsel, who is normally not entitled to notices even from this Court. Third, private respondent
made no manifestation on record that Atty. Concepcion was already dead. Besides, it was Atty.
Concepcion who signed the Amended Petition, wherein petitioner was first impleaded as
respondent and served a copy thereof. Naturally, petitioner’s attention was focused on this pleading,
and it was within its rights to assume that the signatory to such pleading was the counsel for private
respondent.
The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of
court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a
motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions
fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These
exceptions are as follows:
xxx Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1) where a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is
not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of
substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely
to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
The present case falls under the first exception. Petitioner was not informed of any cause of action
or claim against it. All of a sudden, the vessels which petitioner used in its salvaging business were
levied upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it. To allow this to happen
simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement which, as already said, was satisfactorily
explained would be a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended
to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through
such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied procedural due
process, and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been served. On the day of the
hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion for lack of notice to him; in fact, he was
furnished in open court with a copy of the motion and was granted by the trial court thirty days to
file his opposition to it. These circumstances clearly justify a departure from the literal application of
the notice of hearing rule. In other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks such notice,
the prompt resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is held to have cured the defect.
Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is not
based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal.
Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining
a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding. For the foregoing
reasons, we believe that Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the Motion
for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper.
LEACHON CORPUZ vs. PASCUA
A.M. No. P-11-2972 September 28, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Execution

FACTS:
Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 for violations of BP 22 were instituted against Juanito Corpuz
(spouse of Yolanda) before the MTCC by a certain Alicia Panganiban. A judgment was rendered
based on the compromise agreement made by the parties in which Juanito promised to pay
Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00
When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under the Compromise Agreement,
Panganiban filed Motions for Execution. MTCC acted favorably on Panganiban’s Motions and
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff of the MTCC
Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolanda’s office and demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota
Town Ace Noah registered in Yolanda’s name. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, Yolanda
surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua
Yolanda was compelled to file the present administrative complaint against Sheriff Pascua

ISSUE:
Whether Sheriff Pascua is guilty of simple misconduct in levying upon Yolanda’s vehicle even
though the judgment and writ he was implementing were against Juanito?

RULING:
Yes, Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and
is SUSPENDED for TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY. Despite the undisputed facts that the
MTCC Judgment and Writ of Execution in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 were against Juanito
only, and the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471 was registered in Yolanda’s name solely,
Sheriff Pascua proceeded to levy upon the vehicle, invoking the presumption that it was conjugal
property. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the
judgment debtor not that of a third person.
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito
and Yolanda.
Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “[a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.” However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. There is no such proof in
the records of the present case.
Sheriff Pascua’s assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from administrative
liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was registered in
Yolanda’s name only. This fact should have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more
information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the
vehicle, which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could already presume
that the said vehicle is conjugal property.
SPOUSES MAGTOTO VS CA
GR NO. 175792 NOVEMBER 21, 2012
Del Castillo J.

Rule 65 not a remedy for lost appeal

Facts:
Private respondent Leonila sold her 3 parcels of land located in Pampanga to herein
petitioners as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale which was paid by the latter partially in cash and
the balance by postdated checks. Upon its due and presentment, said checks were dishonored by the
bank which prompted Leonila to send demands to make good the same. However, no action was
taken on the part of spouses Magtoto compelling private respondent to file a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court. After receiving summons, petitioners failed to file their answer causing a
court’s judgement by default.
Issue:
Whether or not the default judgement is valid.
Ruling
Yes. The spouses Magtoto are unable to show that their failure to timely file an Answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and, more importantly, that they have a
meritorious defense pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, viz:
(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set
aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. Certainly, this is not the kind of negligence committed by the spouses Magtoto in
this case. More significantly, a review of the records does not convince the court that the Spouses
Magtoto have a meritorious defense. At most, the allegations in their answer and the attached
affidavit of merit. To wit: that the agreed purchase price is only P10,000,000 that they provided
financial support to Leonila for the settlement of the estate of the latter – the latter’s predecessor-in-
interest and for the transfer of title in her name and that they already paid the total amount of
P4,500,000 are mere allegations not supported by evidence they, at the outset supposed to present.
We agree with the CA that the RTC correctly declared the spouses Magtoto in default. The records
show that after receipt of the summons, the spouses Magtoto thrice requested for extensions of
time to file their Answer. The RTC granted these requests. For their final request for
extension, the RTC gave the spouses Magtoto until August 2, 2003 within which to file their
Answer. But still, no Answer was filed. Instead, on August 4, 2003, or two days after the deadline
for filing their Answer, the spouses Magtoto filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Despite its
belated filing, the RTC acted on the motion and resolved the same, albeit not in favor of the said
spouses. Thereafter, Atty. Canlas, petitioners’ former counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his
appearance since he could no longer effectively defend spouses Magtoto because he had lost
communication with them.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Petitioners’ remedy from the
adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As such,
this petition should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. Even if the
petition is to be treated as filed under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for late filing and there
being no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records show that petitioners received a copy of
the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on October 30, 2006. They therefore
had 15 days or until November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court. However, they filed their Petition for Certiorari on December
29, 2006, after the period to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had
expired. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost
appeal which is not allowed.