Republicanism
Separation of powers
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R.
Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
Doctrine: Separation of Powers; The issuance of
subsequent resolutions by the Court setting time
frames be set for the executive agencies to perform
their assigned tasks pursuant to earlier decision of
the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power
under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the
execution of the Decision is but an integral part of
the adjudicative function of the Court, not an
encroachment by the Court over executive powers
and functions.
FACTS: This was a Resolution of the SC for the
enforcement of its Decision on the environmental
case filed by the concerned residents of Manila Bay,
ordering various government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay, and restore
and maintain its water to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
The defendant government agencies failed to
appeal on such decision, hence, it became final and
executory. The final and executory decision provide,
among others, that: (1) DENR is the primary agency
to implement its operational plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy, (2) DILG shall exercise the
general supervision and will formulate the waste
management program, (3) MWSS and LWUA to
install and maintain waste water treatment,
sewerage and sanitation facilities, (4) DA to restore
marine life, (5) PNP Maritime Group to prevent
marine pollution, (6) PPA to adopt a measure to
prevent discharge and dumping of ship-generated
wastes, (7) MMDA as the lead agency and
implementor of program and projects including the
establishment and maintenance of sanitary landfill,
(8) DOH for health concerns and (9) DBM for
appropriation of funds. Further, the Manila Bay
Advisory Committee was created to receive and
evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on
the activities undertaken by the said agencies
and to monitor the execution phase. In the
absence of specific completion periods, the
Committee recommended that time frames be
set for the agencies to perform their assigned
tasks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the setting of time frame for
the concerned government agencies to perform
their assigned task is an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch
headed by the President of the Philippines?
Ruling: No. The case is now in the execution phase
of the final and executory December 18, 2008
Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory
Committee was created to receive and evaluate the
quarterly progressive reports on the activities
undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the
absence of specific completion periods, the
Committee recommended that time frames be set
for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks.
This may be viewed as an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch
headed by the President of the Philippines. This
view is misplaced. The issuance of subsequent
resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution,
because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the
Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the
power of the Court to implement the December 18,
2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the
alleged encroachment by the Court over executive
functions. While additional activities are required of
the agencies like submission of plans of action, data
or status reports, these directives are but part and
parcel of the execution stage of a final decision
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013 (November 11 in SC website)
FACTS: Before the Court are consolidated petitions2
taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Due to the complexity of the subject
matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the
system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge. The
Facts I. Pork Barrel: General Concept. "Pork Barrel"
is political parlance of American -English origin.3
Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with
pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast
their famished bodies into the porcine feast to
assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the
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generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice
was later compared to the actions of American
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor
of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration
has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists
in reference to political bills that "bring home the
bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.6 In
a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to
bring money to a representative's district.7Some
scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.8 In the
Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be
later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference
to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the
Philippines. While the term "Pork Barrel" has been
typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of Congress, the present cases
and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term‘s usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund. On the one hand, the Malampaya
Funds was created as a special fund under Section
880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on
March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos
recognized the need to set up a special fund to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government
efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital
to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related
activities of the government in the Malampaya
natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya
Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently
labeled as Malampaya Funds. On the other hand the
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section
12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos
on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993
on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of
the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility
managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
III. Controversies in the Philippines. Over the
decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have
increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part
to previous Presidents who reportedly used the
"Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional
support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy
surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former
Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo
(Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid
on the huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the
form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks
were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a
high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which
could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that
Candazo identified were public funds intended for
medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale
of the money trail became the banner story of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93
"The publication of the stories, including those
about congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens
sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in
the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition
was dismissed.95 Recently, or in July of the present
year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by
sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for
Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions
of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
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decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the
ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-
blowers declared that the money was diverted into
Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98 On
August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99covering the use of legislators' PDAF
from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years
of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the
audit was to determine the propriety of releases of
funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures
including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the
application of these funds and the implementation
of projects by the appropriate implementing
agencies and several government-owned-and-
controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374
Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total
PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have
been made nationwide during the audit period.102
Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its
Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),"
were made public, the highlights of which are as
follows:103 ● Amounts released for projects
identified by a considerable number of legislators
significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of
legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House. ● Total VILP releases for the period
exceeded the total amount appropriated under the
2007 to 2009 GAAs. ● Infrastructure projects were
constructed on private lots without these having
been turned over to the government. ● Significant
amounts were released to implementing agencies
without the latter‘s endorsement and without
considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects. ● Implementation of most
livelihood projects was not undertaken by the
implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs
endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the
Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite
of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance. ● Selection of the NGOs were not
compliant with law and regulations. ● Eighty-Two
(82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven
hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to
₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or
submitted questionable/spurious documents, or
failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization
of the Funds. ● Procurement by the NGOs, as well
as some implementing agencies, of goods and
services reportedly used in the projects were not
compliant with law. As for the "Presidential Pork
Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900
Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent
CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the
process of preparing "one consolidated report" on
the Malampaya Funds.105 IV. The Procedural
Antecedents. Spurred in large part by the findings
contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount,
the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases
are as follows: On August 28, 2013, petitioner
Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the
Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition
of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining
respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S.
Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the
House of Representatives, from further taking any
steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for
the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by
whatever name it may be called, and from
approving further releases pursuant thereto.106
The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208493. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco
Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben
M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et
al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an
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Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that
the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013
which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and
void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a
TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V.
De Leon, in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM),
and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court
order the foregoing respondents to release to the
CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their
PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or
activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and
all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from
2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the
"inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the
Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
discretionary funds including, but not limited to,
proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M.
Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated
August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking
that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow
their release to fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development Councils in
consultation with the executive departments, such
as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the
Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the
National Economic Development Authority.111 The
Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-
14951.112 On September 10, 2013, the Court
issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all
cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment
on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO
(September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM,
National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any
of the persons acting under their authority from
releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to
Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and
(2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not
for the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government‖ under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for
Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013. On September
23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even
date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the
alternative, the partial lifting with respect to
educational and medical assistance purposes, of the
Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
merit.113 On September 24, 2013, the Court issued
a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to
reply to the Comment. Petitioners, with the
exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective
replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013,
Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27,
2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013,
Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30,
2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013,
Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013. On
October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory
providing for the guidelines to be observed by the
qwould be able to competently and completely
answer questions related to, among others, the
budgeting process and its implementation. Further,
the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus
curiae and thereby requested to appear before the
Court during the Oral Arguments. On October 8 and
10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within a period of
seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the
parties subsequently did.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all
other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers RULING: 1. Separation
of Powers. a. Statement of Principle. The principle
of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice
Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government."163 To the
legislative branch of government, through
Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to
the executive branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws;
and to the judicial branch of government, through
the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by
constitutional design, ordained in this respect,
"each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe
the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy
and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch;
the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-
equal branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising their
respective mandates. Lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government
to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of
another or others.170 Broadly speaking, there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle
when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme
Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2)
ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere
impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and
"alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when
one branch assumes a function that more properly
is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there
is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department‘s functions. The
enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function
both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government.
In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.),
the Court explained that the phase of budget
execution "covers the various operational aspects
of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as
well as all "other related activities" that comprise
the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the
principle that the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive
department should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the implementation of
the national budget as provided under the GAA as
well as any other appropriation law. In view of the
foregoing, the Legislative branch of government,
much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget
since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the
Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when
it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the
President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of
its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law."
Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘
law -making role necessarily comes to an end and
from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the
national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress
must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive.
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively
enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that
"from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus
5
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however,
that since the restriction only pertains to "any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law,"
Congress may still exercise its oversight function
which is a mechanism of checks and balances that
the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made
clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere
oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing
legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of
any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of
executive functions. As the Court ruled in
Abakada:178 Any post-enactment congressional
measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following: (1)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation;
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. (Emphases supplied) b. Application.
The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various
operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds"
in violation of the separation of powers principle.
The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment
the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the
said authority is treated as merely recommendatory
in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor
since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned
the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as
such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether. Besides, it must be pointed out that
respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory
import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through
the statements of the Solicitor General during the
Oral Arguments – have admitted that the
identification of the legislator constitutes a
mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be
tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192 Thus, for all the foregoing
reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment.
That such informal practices do exist and have, in
fact, been constantly observed throughout the
years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral
Arguments of these cases:193 Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of
both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if
we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I
had seen the extent of this research made by my
staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress
frontally faced the question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were engineering the
budget process. In fact, the words you have been
using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both
Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise;
surprised that all of these things are now surfacing.
In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF
provisions did was to codify in one section all the
past practice that had been done since 1991. In a
certain sense, we should be thankful that they are
6
all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Ultimately,
legislators cannot exercise powers which they do
not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices
institutionalized in government agencies, else the
Executive department be deprived of what the
Constitution has vested as its own.
Principle of checks and balances
Gonzales III v Office of the President
FACTS:
There are two petitions that have been
consolidated because they raise a common thread
of issues relating to the President's exercise of the
power to remove from office herein petitioners
who claim the protective cloak of independence of
the constitutionally-created office to which they
belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
1st case G.R. No. 19621:
Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011
rendered by the Office of the dismissing petitioner
Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, upon
a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
2nd case G.R. No. 196232:
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
annul, reverse and set aside the undated
Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to
submit a written explanation with respect to alleged
acts or omissions constituting serious/grave
offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into with Major General Carlos
F. Garcia; and the April 7, 2011 Notice of
Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office
of the President the administrative case initiated
against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The petition likewise seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving
the President the power to dismiss a Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Facts of 1st case
A hostage drama involving Rolando Mendoza and
Hong Kong nationals in a tourist bus. Rolando
Mendoza demanded his reinstatement. Sometime
in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct
(robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
physical injuries) was filed against him and other
police officers
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police
Commission turned over, upon the request of
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication.
The administrative case against Mendoza was
dismissed upon a finding that the material
allegations made by the complainant had not been
substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner
Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp.
Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by
a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.
The pleadings mentioned and the records of the
case were assigned for review and recommendation
to Graft Investigation and was endorsed for final
approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
in whose office it remained pending for final review
and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-
load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August
23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC):
found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
7
serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish
for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases
within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is
gross, considering there is no opposition thereto.
The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate
resort to hostage-taking.
Case was elevated to OP (Office of the President).
OP instituted a Formal Charge against petitioner
Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty
under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other
pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations,
and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
OP Dismissed Gonzales from his office.
2nd case
The Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl
Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia
and several unknown persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan
Issues:
1. Whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman.**issue based
on syllabus
2. Whether or not Gonzales is liable for his acts and
therefore be removed from office.
Held: (Based on the syllabus principle)
1.YES.The Ombudsman's
administrative
 disciplinary power over a petitioner's request; that administrative liability
Deputy
 Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is
not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to
discipline administratively is extensive and covers
all government officials, whether appointive or
elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A
harmonious construction of these two apparently
conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended
the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners
as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to
provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government
officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern
that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to
protect one another from administrative liabilities.
2. Petitioner Gonzales may not be
 removed from
office where the
 questioned acts, falling short
of
 constitutional standards, do not
 constitute
betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing
the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to
the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor
cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of
his undue interest in the case that would amount to
wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned
agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people."
The factual circumstances that the case was turned
over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon
was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant verifying the truth
of his statements; that the decision was
8
immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more
than nine months cannot be simply taken as
evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal
grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of
the parties to the case that could have impelled him
to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at
all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt
intention or questionable motivation. The OP's
pronouncement of administrative accountability
against petitioner and the imposition upon him of
the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be
reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of
duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a
betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while
he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there
being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and
serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
As to the second case: The Office of the President is
vested
 with statutory authority to
proceed
 administratively against
petitioner
 Barreras-Sulit to determine
the
 existence of any of the grounds for
 her
removal from office as provided
 for under the
Constitution and the
 Ombudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of
the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment
of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the
Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the above
case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We
AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-
003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-
Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to
culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal
of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
Two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making.
BELGICA vs. OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Justice Bernabe
FACTS:
HISTORY”: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a
term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of the Legislature
(“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also
come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The
“Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act
3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for
Local Development Projects during the Marcos
period, the Mindanao Development Fund and
Visayas Development Fund and later the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the
Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the
Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno
Aquino III administrations.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically
associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of Congress, the present cases and the
recent controversies on the matter have, however,
shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to
include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been
defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10
years by a syndicate using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
(6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer
than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara
(Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society,
filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under
9
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional xxxxx in whatever form and by
whatever name it may be called, and from
approving further releases pursuant thereto. The
Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious
Beda B. Belgica, xxxx filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual
"Pork Barrel System," xxxxx and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund
be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The Malampaya Funds was created as a special
fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 910, issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. Petitioners
contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used.
ISSUE (based on the syllabus):
Whether or not Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioners’
submissions.
Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to
apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same
section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" to refer only to other purposes related
"to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."
While the designation of a determinate or
determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to
exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive
either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of
the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.
TWO (2) FUNDAMENTAL TESTS
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that
the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making
are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate. On the other hand, the second test is
called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence
holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as
it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s
authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the
said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use
the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law. That the subject phrase may be confined only
to "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government" under
the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include
– or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically
10
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the
phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase "for
such other purposes" may be limited; second, the
said phrase also exhausts the class it represents,
namely energy development programs of the
government; and, third, the Executive department
has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-
energy related purposes under the subject phrase,
thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position
that it is limited only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed
the completeness test since the policy of energy
development is clearly deducible from its text, the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be
stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the
rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is
but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would
be used – as it should be used – only in accordance
with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
Civilian supremacy clause (Art. II, Sec. 3)
GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012
FACTS:
Major General Carlos F. Garcia was tried by the
Special General Court Martial No. 2 (Military Court).
Two days after his arraignment, petitioner, having
reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily
retired from military service.
MG Garcia (ret) was convicted for violations of the
96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and Gentleman) and 97th Article of War
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline) for knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
fail to disclose/declare and make untruthful
statements under oath of all his existing assets in his
Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net
worth (SALN) for the years 2003 and 2002 as
required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA
6713.
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive
confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner
was released from the Camp Crame Detention
Center.
On September 9, 2011, The Office of the President,
or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP
and acting as the Confirming Authority under the
Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by
the Court Martial against petitioner. The
Confirmation of Sentence further states that
pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War the
sentence on MG Carlos Flores Garcia, AFP shall not
be remitted/mitigated by any previous
confinement.
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained,
and continues to be detained at the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari and petition for
habeas corpus, alternatively. Garcia argued that the
confirmation issued by the Office of the President
directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary
had already been fully served following his
preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the
RPC (Revised Penal Code).
ISSUE:
1) Whether the Office of the President acted with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of
Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
2) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable
in Military Courts.
HELD:
11

1) The Court upheld the authority of the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, to confirm the sentence. It
held that the General Court Martial had jurisdiction
over the case since it was indisputable that Garcia
was an officer in the active service of AFP when he
committed the violations until his arraignment.
Garcia’s mandatory retirement on November 18,
2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its
jurisdiction. Having established the jurisdiction of
the General Court Martial over the case and the
person of the petitioner, the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the
jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's sentence as
mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War
The Court stressed that Article 48 of the Articles of
War vests on the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, the power to approve or disapprove the
entire or any part of the sentence given by the court
martial, also Article 49 of the same grants the
President the power to mitigate or remit a
sentence.
“Thus, the power of the President to confirm,
mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority
of civilian authority over the military. However,
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred
those powers to the President is silent as to the
deduction of the period of preventive confinement
to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is
also the right of an accused provided for by Article
29 of the RPC.”
2) Yes. The Court ruled that applying the provisions
of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period
of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of
imprisonment), the time within which the
petitioner was under preventive confinement
should be credited to the sentence confirmed by
the Office of the President, subject to the conditions
set forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a
court within the strictest sense of the word and acts
as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of
the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in
the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-
Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any
provision as to the application of a criminal concept
in the implementation and execution of the General
Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be
applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s period
of confinement to his sentence has been
recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
The Court further held that the application of Article
29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance
with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution. “[T]he concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and
it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective. It, however,
does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction.
What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification.” held the Court.
The right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16)
Oposa vs Factoran
Facts:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan
Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises.” They alleged
that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
12
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the
government.
Issue:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in
filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for
the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore
areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to
come.
Academic Freedom (Art. XIV, Sec. 5[2])
Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs The Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362
Facts:
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014.
On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson
examination in their Operations Research (OR)
subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to
3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia
made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher,
then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied
and as a result, he was late for his next class
(English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia
for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late
because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The
tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter
concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their
OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher
said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia
was meted with demerits and touring hours
because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked
the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of
the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty
he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The
TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was
out of his control because his OR class was
dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at
3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record,
and based on the interview with the teachers
concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them
(the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started
at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules,
once a student submitted his examination paper, he
is dismissed from said class and may be excused to
leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact
dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia
to state that the class was dismissed late because
again, on that day in the OR class, each student was
dismissed as they submit their examination, and
were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was
ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because
such transaction was initiated by the teacher,
rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his
query to the teacher), although there were at least
two students with Cudia at that time querying the
teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a
“class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead
13
of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late,
hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the
TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor
Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor
Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal
when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as
a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum
standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any
violation thereof may be a ground to separate a
cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC.
Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9)
cadets, conducted an investigation. After two
hearings and after the parties involved were heard
and with their witnesses presented, the HC
reconvened and the members cast their vote. The
initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1
acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System),
a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia.
However, they also have a practice of chambering
where the members, particularly the dissenter, are
made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the
“tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering,
the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not
guilty vote” was improper, hence he changed the
same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia
was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding
center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal
was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the
PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent
letters to various military officers requesting for a
re-investigation. It was their claim that there were
irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As
a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA
(CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was
alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated
Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling
was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the
other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best
recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it
argued that the same is not proper as a matter of
policy and that the court should avoid interfering
with military matters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia
based on its findings.
HELD:
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom
to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be
part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia.
In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code
violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the
Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report against
him. He was informed about his options and the
entire process that the case would undergo. The
preliminary investigation immediately followed
after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating
team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was
assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the
charge against him and given the right to enter his
plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront
the witnesses against him, and present evidence in
his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC
voting members, he was found to have violated the
Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level
– from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge
Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to
the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation
was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters
14
Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-
GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate
the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA
senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had
the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for
him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is
no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts
by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing
that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the
PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a
cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is
not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code
and the Honor System (manner which PMA
conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do
not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express
provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority
to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further,
there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1)
authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such
power by the President may be delegated to the
PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is
well within its academic freedom. Academic
freedom or, to be precise, the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the
part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to
study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to
exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that
a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss
said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia
lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from
the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between
a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of
lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In
fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what
penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at
PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the
Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not
arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due
process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet,
must have known all of these.
The right of the states to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials and
employees (Art. XI, Sec 15)
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE
ON BEHEST LOANS v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 130140; October 25, 1999
FACTS: On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued AO No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued MO
No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to include in its
investigation, inventory, and study all non-
performing loans which shall embrace both behest
and non-behest loans. It likewise provided for the
following criteria which might be utilized as a frame
of reference in determining a behest loan, to wit:
a. It is undercollateralized.
b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized.
c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high
government officials like presence of marginal
notes.
d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower
corporation are identified as cronies.
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the
purpose intended.
f. Use of corporate layering.
15
g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing
is being sought.
h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release
was made.
In its report on behest loans to President Ramos,
the Committee reported that the Philippines Seeds,
Inc. was one of the twenty-one corporations which
obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the
Committee, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn
complaint against the Directors of PSI for violation
of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
In the resolution, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the
complaint in on the ground of prescription. Relying
on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of
Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned
transactions were evidenced by public instruments
and were thus open for the perusal of the public,
the prescriptive period commenced to run from the
time of the commission of the crime, not from the
discovery thereof. Reckoning the prescriptive
period from 1969, 1970, 1975, and 1978, when the
disputed transactions were entered into, the
OMBUDSMAN ruled that the offenses with which
respondents were charged had already prescribed.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the OMBUDSMAN, the Committee filed this case
to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the right of the Republic to recover
behest loans unlawfully acquired by PSI
imprescriptible
RULING: The Republic of the Philippines has the
right to recover behest loans unlawfully acquired
by PSI although may be barred by prescription. The
Court explains that behest loans are part of the ill-
gotten wealth which former President Marcos and
his cronies accumulated and which the Government
through the PCGG seeks to recover. Furthermore,
the ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to the case at
bar. First, it is a decision of the Court of Appeals;
hence, it does not establish a doctrine and can only
have a persuasive value. Second, it involved a
prosecution for estafa in that the accused disposed
of his property claiming that it was free from any
lien or encumbrance despite the fact that a notice
of lis pendens was registered with the Registry of
Deeds. Third, Dinsay involved private parties, while
the instant case involves the Government and
public officers. Fourth, the ruling is not absolute.
The Court held that under Section 15, Article XI of
the Constitution the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees as
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel. The consequence of the
foregoing discussion is that the prosecution of
offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or
involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section
15, Article XI of the Constitution may be barred by
prescription. Since the law alleged to have been
violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3,
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy. This simply means that if the commission
of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
In the present case, the Court explained, it was well-
nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the
time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the
loans. Thus, the Court agrees with the Committee
that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents were charged should be
computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from the day of such commission.
However, the Court held that Section 15, Art XI of
the Constitution only applies to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal
cases.
The case was remanded to the OMBUDSMAN
finding upon grave abuse of discretion on their part.
16
Regalian Doctrine (Art. XII, Sec. 2 relate with Art. XII,
Sec. 5 and Art. II, Sec. 22)
ISAGANI CRUZ V. SEC. OF NATURAL RESOURCES
(G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
REGALIAN DOCTRINE – all lands of the public
domain as well as all-natural resources
enumerated therein, whether on public or private
land, belong to the State. (Section 2 of Article XII)
FACTS:
This suit for prohibition and mandamus filed by
petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
The Solicitor General, representing the Sec. of DENR
and DBM is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous
people. The CHR, through Intervention, asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are
at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the
Regalian Doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution, as follows:
1. Section defining the extent and
coverage of ancestral domains, and
ancestral lands;
2. Section which provides that
ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;
3. Section which defines the
composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
4. Section which recognizes and
enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains, and over the
ancestral lands;
5. Section which provides for priority
rights of the indigenous peoples in
the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources
within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of
natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25
years; and
6. Section which gives the indigenous
peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to
be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or reforestation.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution being violative of the Regalian Doctrine
RULING:
Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petition, while
seven other members of the Court voted to grant
the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to
7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the
case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Separate Opinion of J. Puno
The provisions of the IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution.
17
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the
private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain.
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by Native Title over both ancestral lands
and domains; or (2) by Torrens Title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to
lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish
Conquest. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are not part of the lands of the public domain. This
is concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
The option to register land under the Public Land
Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a
limited period. This option must be exercised within
twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date
of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of
the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b)
forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national
parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions
ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does
not classify them under any of the said four
categories. To classify them as public lands under
any one of the four classes will render the entire
IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the
distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the
ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of
vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs.
B. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and
Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains
Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the
Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in
their Development and Exploitation.
There is nothing in IPRA that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners
and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in
their large-scale development and exploitation.
The ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take
the form of management or stewardship.
NOTE:
Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining
all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7
(a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA.
18
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
Utilization of natural resources (Art. XII, Sec. 2)
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Sec. Angelo Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
FACTS:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which
allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon
Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between
the islands of Negros and Cebu.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally
converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic
surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-
channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
determine the area's underwater composition
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well
during the second sub-phase of the project. Since
the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon
Strait was declared a protected seascape in
1988,[10] JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a
depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in
the western Cebu Province.[15] This drilling lasted
until February 8, 2008
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that
petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two
separate original petitions both dated December
17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that
respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46
for, among others, violation of the 1987
Constitution
Petitioners' Allegations: Petitioners maintain that
SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or
paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-
owned.[60] Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-
46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial
assistance agreement validly executed under
paragraph 4 of the same provision.[61] The
petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos[62] laid down the
guidelines for a valid service contract, one of which
is that there must exist a general law for oil
exploration before a service contract may be
entered into by the Government. The petitioners
posit that the service contract in La Bugal is
presumed to have complied with the requisites
of (a) legislative enactment of a general law after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as
Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law
of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b)
presidential notification. The petitioners thus allege
that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining
contracts under Republic Act No. 7942, does not
apply in this case.[63] The petitioners also argue that
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify
SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed by the
1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which
enunciate new policies concerning the
environment.[64] In addition, petitioners in G.R. No.
180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the
exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our
natural resources,[65] and paragraph 4 does not
speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial
Technical Assistance Agreements.
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations: claims
and asseverate that SC-46 does not violate Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that
SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph
1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They
also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to
the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are
not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not
grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it
otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's right to
19
preferential use of communal marine and fishing
resources
ISSUE:
WON Service contract 46 is constitutional?
RULING:
NO. In summarizing the matters discussed in the
ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with
the safeguards in place, is the exception to
paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following
are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La
Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only
with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in
accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to
law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement,
the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over
the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.[69]
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this
Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by
then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the
discovery and production of indigenous petroleum
through the utilization of government and/or local
or foreign private resources to yield the maximum
benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to
the Philippine Government.[70]
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential
Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to
be a valid law unless otherwise repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential
Decree No. 87, it would have been done expressly
by Congress.
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners'
contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground
that there is no general law prescribing the standard
or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for
service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general
law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, as
will be discussed below, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present
case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS[75] area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the
same was not submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No.
87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a
general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-
46, and that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires that the President himself
enter into any service contract for the exploration
of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered
into and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said
constitutional requirement. Moreover, public
respondents have neither shown nor alleged that
Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.
20
While the requirements in executing service
contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities,
they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we
have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards
put in place by the framers of the Constitution to
"eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during
the martial law regime." As this Court has held in La
Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President
himself be the signatory of service agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This
power cannot be taken lightly.
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement
in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987 Constitution with
the aforementioned provision of Presidential
Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the
government agency or subordinate official has been
authorized by the President to enter into such
service contract for the government. Otherwise, it
should be at least shown that the President
subsequently approved of such contract explicitly.
None of these circumstances is evident in the case
at bar.
(Just an FYI in case tanungin)
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases
of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens,
as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Franchise, certificate and authority for public
utilities (Art.XII, Sec.11)
Roy III vs. Chairperson Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246,
22 November 2016
Ownership / acquisition of lands (Art. XII, Secs. 7
and 8)
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) vs.
Keppel Philippines Holdings, Inc., G.R. No.
202050, 25 July 2016
(Ownership/acquisition) Art. XII, Sec. 7&8
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.
Philippine National Oil Company and PNOC
Dockyard & Engineering Corporation vs. Keppel
Philippines Holdings, Inc.
FACTS:
Almost 40 years ago or on 6 August 1976,
the respondent Keppel Philippines Holdings,
21
Inc. (Keppel) entered into a lease agreement (the
agreement) with Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(Lusteveco) covering 11 hectares of land located in
Bauan, Batangas. The lease was for a period of 25
years for a consideration of P2.1 million. At the
option of Lusteveco, the rental fee could be totally
or partially converted into equity shares in Keppel.
At the end of the 25-year lease period,
Keppel was given the "firm and absolute option to
purchase the land for P4.09 million, provided that it
had acquired the necessary qualification to own
land under Philippine laws at the time the option is
exercised. Apparently, when the lease agreement
was executed, less than 60% of Keppel's
shareholding was Filipino-owned, hence, it was
not constitutionally qualified to acquire private
lands in the country. If at the end of the 25-year
lease period and Keppel remains to be unqualified
to own lands, their lease would automatically be
renewed for another 25 years. They are allowed to
exercise the option to purchase the land up to the
30th year of the lease, also on the condition that, by
then, it would have acquired the requisite
qualification to own land in the Philippines.
Together with Keppel's lease rights and
option to purchase, Lusteveco warranted not to sell
the land or assign its rights to the land for the
duration of the lease unless with the prior written
consent of Keppel. Accordingly, when the petitioner
Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired
the land from Lusteveco and took over the rights
and obligations under the agreement, Keppel did
not object to the assignment so long as the
agreement was annotated on PNOC's title. With
PNOC's consent and cooperation, the agreement
was recorded as Entry No. 65340 on PNOC's
Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-50724.
Keppel, then at least 60% Filipino-owned,
wrote to Keppel to exercise its option to purchase
the land and its readiness to purchase. However,
despite demand, PNOC did not favorably respond.
Keppel filed a complaint for specific performance
which was countered by PNOC stating that Keppel's
claims by contending that the agreement was illegal
for circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against aliens holding lands in the Philippines. It
further asserted that the option contract was void,
as it was unsupported by a separate valuable
consideration. It also claimed that it was not privy to
the agreement. RTC rendered in favor of Keppel and
PNOC was ordered to execute a deed of absolute
sale upon payment of Keppel. PNOC elevated the
case to the CA which affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Failure to secure a reconsideration, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the terms of the Agreement
amounted to a virtual sale of the land to
Keppel that was designed to circumvent
the constitutional prohibition on aliens
owning lands in the Philippines.
(2) Whether Keppel's equity ownership meets
the 60% Filipino-owned capital
requirement of trie Constitution, in
accordance with the Court's ruling
in Gamboa v. Teves.
RULING:
(1) The Court affirms the constitutionality of
the Agreement.
The agreement was executed to enable
Keppel to use the land for its shipbuilding and ship
repair business. The industrial/commercial purpose
behind the agreement differentiates the present
case from Lui She where the leased property was
primarily devoted to residential use. Undoubtedly,
the establishment and operation of a shipyard
business involve significant investments. Keppel's
uncontested testimony showed that it incurred P60
million costs solely for preliminary activities to
make the land suitable as a shipyard, and
subsequently introduced improvements worth
P177 million. Taking these investments into account
and the nature of the business that Keppel conducts
on the land, we find it reasonable that the
agreement's terms provided for an extended
duration of the lease and a restriction on the rights
of Lusteveco.
We observe that, unlike in Lui She, Lusteveco was
not completely denied its ownership rights during
the course of the lease. It could dispose of the lands
or assign its rights thereto, provided it secured
Keppel's prior written consent. That Lusteveco was
able to convey the land in favour of PNOC during the
pendency of the lease should negate a finding that
the agreement's terms amounted to a virtual
transfer of ownership of the land to Keppel.
22
(2) In Gamboa v. Teves (2011) the Court declared
that the "legal and beneficial ownership of 60
percent of the outstanding capital stock must
rest in the hands of Filipino nationals." Clarifying
the ruling, the Court decreed that the 60%
Filipino ownership requirement applies
separately to each class of shares, whether with
or without voting rights.
As of November 2000, Keppel's capital is 60%
Filipino-owned. However, there is nothing in the
records showing the nature and composition of
Keppel's shareholdings, i.e. ,whether its
shareholdings are divided into different classes, and
60% of each share class is legally and beneficially
owned by Filipinos - understandably because when
Keppel exercised its option to buy the land in 2000,
the Gamboa ruling had not yet been promulgated.
The Court cannot deny Keppel its option to buy the
land by retroactively applying the Gamboa ruling
without violating Keppel's vested right. Thus,
Keppel's failure to prove the nature and
composition of its shareholdings in 2000 could not
prevent it from validly exercising its option to buy
the land.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot completely
disregard the effect of the Gamboa ruling; the 60%
Filipino equity proportion is a continuing
requirement to hold land in the Philippines. In this
case, Keppel must be allowed to prove whether it
meets the required Filipino equity ownership and
proportion in accordance with the Gamboa ruling
before it can acquire full title to the land.
SC affirms the RTC decision and REMANDS the case
to the Regional Trial Court for the determination of
whether the respondent Keppel Philippines
Holdings, Inc. meets the required Filipino equity
ownership and proportion in accordance with the
Court's ruling in Gamboa v. Teves, to allow it to
acquire full title to the land.
V. Legislative Department
Lagman vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, 4
July 2017
Houses of Congress
Senate; Composition (Art. VI, Sec. 2)
Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel, Sr.
Facts: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of AFP
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national
officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Trillanes was charged with coup detat.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has
remained in detention, threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year
term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Trillanes sought from the Makati RTC leave
to attend Senate sessions and to convene his staff,
resource persons and guests and to attend to his
official functions as Senator. He anchored his
motion on his right to be presumed innocent, and
claims that the Jalosjos ruling should not be
applied to him, because he is a mere detention
prisoner and is not charged with a crime involving
moral turpitude. The Makati RTC denied the
motion.
Issues: 1. WON the petition of trillanes be granted.
2. WON the Jalosjos ruling is applicable in this case.
Held: 1. No. The SC denied Trillanes’ petition on
the ground that Sec. 13, Art. Ill of the Constitution,
explicitly provides that crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is
strong are nonbailable. The Court further said that
the presumption of innocence does not necessarily
carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political
rights.
2. Yes. In People v. Jalosjos, the SC denied the
motion of Congressman Jalosjos that he be allowed
to fully discharged the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee hearings despite his having been
convicted by the trial court of a non-bailable
offense. The denial was premised on the following:
[i] membership in Congress does not exempt an
accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons; [ii] one rationale
behind confinement, whether pending appeal or
after final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it
23
is the injury to the public, not the injury to the
complainant, which state action in criminal law
seeks to redress; [iii] it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without justification
in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered
immune from arrest during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the
same; and [iv] accused-appellant is provided with
an office at the House of Representatives with a
full complement of staff, as well as an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, where
he attends to his constituents; he has, therefore,
been discharging his mandate as member of the
House of Representatives, and being a detainee,
he should not even be allowed by the prison
authorities to perform these acts.
In this case, petitioner posits that his election
provides the legal justification to allow him to serve
his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign
capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to
removing him from office, depriving the people of
proper representation, denying the peoples will,
repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.
In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held
that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election to office does not obliterate
a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected
him to the Senate, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and]
x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison.
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement
argument, it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful
restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may
be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the
mandate of the people yields to the Constitution
which the people themselves ordained to govern all
under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and
even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the
24 members
of the Senate, charged with the
duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by
law (People v. Jalosjos).
House of Representatives
Representation of cities and provinces (Art. VI, Sec.
5[3], 2nd sentence)
Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, 7 April 2010
Facts:
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled
“An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment. Province of Camarines Sur was
estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts,
following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716,
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district.5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first
24
district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province
Ruling:
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it
the presumption of constitutionality. Before a law
may be declared unconstitutional by this Court,
there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been
violated or transgressed. When there is neither a
violation of a specific provision of the Constitution
nor any proof showing that there is such a
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain. There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district,
each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet
a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision
of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province
Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 8 December 2008
DOCTRINE: A plebiscite is not required. Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province,
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place.
FACTS: Rogelio Bagabuyo filed an action to prevent
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground
that Republic Act No. 937 “An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of
the City of Cagayan De Oro." 12 - the law that
Resolution No. 7837 implements - is
unconstitutional.
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the
petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot
implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the
rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of
a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division
or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed
for the issuance of an order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from implementing
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837,
and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No.
7801 which provided for a single legislative district
for Cagayan de Oro.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, argued
that:
1. R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House
of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution;
2. The criteria established under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is
a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place;
and
3. R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that:
1. Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment
under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning
of creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
25
 under Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution;
2. the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common
denominator - the material change in the
political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected, as well
as of the people therein.
ISSUE:
1. Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the
legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de
Oro City, or does it involve the division and
conversion of a local government unit?
2. Whether or not a plebiscite was required in
the case at bar.
HELD: R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the
legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City.
Reapportionment, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the
1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this
section.
The creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of local government units,
i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local
Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article
provides:
No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political unit directly affected.
In contrast with the equal representation objective
of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10
expressly speaks of how local government units
may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units' corporate
existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of
two specific standards that must be observed in
implementing this concern, namely, the criteria
established in the local government code and the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population
and land area are specified as verifiable indicators
of viability and capacity to provide services.24 The
division or merger of existing units must comply
with the same requirements (since a new local
government unit will come into being), provided
that a division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the unit affected to less
than the minimum requirement prescribed in the
Code.25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI,
Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and
the Local Government Code expressly require a
plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a
local government unit.26 In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a
case that arose from the division of the
congressional district formerly covering San Juan
and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we
confirmed this distinction and the fact that no
plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up
because one was ordered and held for
Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city, while none was held for San
26
Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court
ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan
because the objective of the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local
Government Code; the creation of a new legislative
district only followed as a consequence. In other
words, the apportionment alone and by itself did
not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for
San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
The Party-list System
The four parameters in the Party-List election
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203766, 02
April 2013
This constitutes 54 Petitions filed by 52 party-list
groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
FACTS:
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups
and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections.
 On 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc
issued a Resolution affirming the COMELEC
Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido
ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However, PBB was
denied participation in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections because PBB does not
represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group;
and PBB failed to establish its track record as
an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
 On 7 January 2013, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution and excluded the names of 13
petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. The 13 petitioners were (ASIN,
Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN,
AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB).
 The COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether
the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong
Bayani). Then, the COMELEC disqualified
some groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
 39 petitioners were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from the Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names
of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether the criteria for participating in the party-
list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court declared that it would not
be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT in determining who are qualified to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. Thus, the Court remanded all the present
petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in
the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
27
2. National parties or organizations and bona-fide members of such parties or
regional parties or organizations do not organizations.
need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any "marginalized and 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
underrepresented" sector. organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified,
3. Political parties can participate in party- provided that they have at least one
list elections provided they register under nominee who remains qualified.
the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A **************
political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district ARTICLE VI
elections can participate in party-list
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987
elections only through its sectoral wing that
Constitution to include in the party-list system both
can separately register under the party-list
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
independent sectoral party, and is linked to
Constitution, which states:
a political party through a coalition.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may
composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
either be "marginalized and
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
be elected from legislative districts apportioned
defined political constituencies." It is
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
enough that their principal advocacy
Manila area in accordance with the number of their
pertains to the special interest and concerns
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
of their sector. The sectors that are
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
"marginalized and underrepresented"
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
list system of registered national, regional, and
poor, indigenous cultural communities,
sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis
handicapped, veterans, and overseas
supplied)
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-
professionals, the elderly, women, and the clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
youth. registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations." The commas after the words
5. A majority of the members of sectoral
"national," and "regional," separate national and
parties or organizations that represent the
regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national
belong to the "marginalized and
and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
underrepresented" sector they represent.
they would have stated "national and regional
Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it
sectoral parties or organizations that lack
was never their intention to make the party-list
"well-defined political constituencies" must
system exclusively sectoral.
belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or What the framers intended, and what they
organizations that represent the expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
"marginalized and underrepresented," or clearer: the party-list system is composed of three
that represent those who lack "well-defined different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to
political constituencies," either must belong only one of the three groups. The text of Section
to their respective sectors, or must have a 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and
track record of advocacy for their respective regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be

28
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three
different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations;
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need
not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for
sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly
negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class
or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the
age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he or she seeks
to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a
bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track
record of advocacy for such sector.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and

party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

SEC. 9 OF R.A. NO. 7941

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the

qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the
nominee from the youth sector.

29
30