JACINTO TANGUILIG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE HERCE JR.

G.R. No. 117190

JANUARY 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Jacinto M. Tanguilig proposed to respondent Vicente Herce Jr. to construct a windmill system for him. After some
negotiations they agreed on the construction of the windmill for a consideration of P60,000.00. On 14 March 1988, due to the refusal and
failure of respondent to pay the balance, petitioner filed a complaint to collect the amount. Respondent denied the claim saying that he
had already paid this amount to the San Pedro General Merchandising Inc. (SPGMI) which constructed the deep well to which the
windmill system was to be connected. According to respondent, since the deep well formed part of the system the payment he tendered
to SPGMI should be credited to his account by petitioner. Moreover, assuming that he owed petitioner a balance of P15,000.00, this
should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which caused the structure to collapse after a strong wind hit their place.

Petitioner refused to pay and argued that private respondent was already in default in the payment of his outstanding balance of
P15,000.00 and hence should bear his own loss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in his contention that respondent is already in default thus he should bear the loss
of the windmill.

RULING:

Petitioner's argument that private respondent was already in default in the payment of his outstanding balance of P15,000.00
and hence should bear his own loss, is untenable. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is
not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. When the windmill failed to function properly it became
incumbent upon petitioner to institute the proper repairs in accordance with the guaranty stated in the contract. Thus, respondent
cannot be said to have incurred in delay; instead, it is petitioner who should bear the expenses for the reconstruction of the windmill.
Article 1167 of the Civil Code is explicit on this point that if a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at
his cost.

OBLIGATION; NATURE AND EFFECTS; EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY BY REASON OF FORTUITOUS EVENTS; REQUISITES. — This Court
has consistently held that in order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art. 1174 of the Civil
Code the event should be the sole and proximate cause of the loss or destruction of the object of the contract. In Nakpil vs. Court of
Appeals, Nos. L-47851 and L- 47896, 3 October 1986, 144 SCRA 596, four (4) requisites must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulHll his obligation in a normal manner; and, (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

CHAVEZ VS GONZALES
G.R. No. L-27454. April 30, 1970FACTS: In July, 1963, Rosendo Chavez delivered to Fructuoso Gonzales, who is a typewriter repairer,
aportable typewriter for routine cleaning and servicing. Gonzales asked from Chavez P6.00 for thepurchase of spare parts. Gonzales was
not able to finish the job after some time despite repeatedreminders made by the Chavez.After getting exasperated with the delay of the
repair of the typewriter Chavez got the typewriter fromGonzales and found out that the same was in shambles. Chaves demanded the
return of the missingparts and the sum of P6.00, which Gonzales returned.Chavez had his typewriter repaired by Freixas Business
Machines, and the repair job cost him a total ofP89.85, including labor and materials. Chavez then commenced this an action before the
City Court ofManila, demanding from the Gonzales the payment of P90.00 as actual and compensatory damages.The Court rendered a
decision in favor of Chavez, ordering Gonzales to pay him P31.10. Chavezcontended that he should be awarded the whole cost of labor
and materials as provided for in Article1167 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to the whole cost of labor and materials that went into therepair of the typewriter?
HELD: Article 1167 of the Civil Code states: If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the sameshall be executed at his cost .This
same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenorof the obligation.Gonzales claims that he is not liable at all because
his contract with Chavez did not contain a period.The inferences derivable from these findings of fact are that the Chavez and the
Gonzalez had aperfected contract for cleaning and servicing a typewriter, intended to be completed at some futuretime although such
time was not specified, that such time had passed, and that the typewriter wasreturned cannibalized and unrepaired, which in itself is
a breach of his obligation. The time forcompliance had evidently expired and there being a breach of contract by non-performance. It is
clearthat the Gonzales-appellee contravened the tenor of his obligation.The cost of the execution of the obligation in this case should be
the cost of the labor or serviceexpended in the repair of the typewriter, which is in the amount of P58.75. because the obligation
orcontract was to repair it.In addition, Gonzales is likewise liable under Article 1170 of the Code for the cost of the missing parts forin his
obligation to repair the typewriter he was bound, but failed or neglected, to return it in the samecondition it was when he received it.The
appealed judgment is modified. Gonzales to pay Chavez the sum of P89.85 with interest.
Telefast v. Castro Digest G.R. No. 73867
Telefast v. Castro
G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988

Facts:
1. The petitioner is a company engaged in transmitting telegrams. The plaintiffs are the children and spouse of
Consolacion Castro who died in the Philippines. One of the plaintiffs, Sofia sent a telegram thru Telefast to her father and other
siblings in the USA to inform about the death of their mother. Unfortunately, the deceased had already been interred but not one
from the relatives abroad was able to pay their last respects. Sofia found out upon her return in the US that the telegram was
never received. Hence the suit for damages on the ground of breach of contract. The defendant-petitioner argues that it should
only pay the actual amount paid to it.
2. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory, moral, exemplary, damages to each of the
plaintiffs with 6% interest p.a. plus attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling but modified and eliminated the
compensatory damages to Sofia and exemplary damages to each plaintiff, it also reduced the moral damages for each. The
petitioner appealed contending that, it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crouch for the
telegram that was never sent to the addressee, and that the moral damages should be removed since defendant's negligent act
was not motivated by "fraud, malice or recklessness.
Issue: Whether or not the award of the moral, compensatory and exemplary damages is proper.

RULING: Yes, there was a contract between the petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch whereby, for a fee, petitioner
undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram. Petitioner failed to do this despite performance by said
private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its and is thus liable
for damages. This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would
result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.

Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages." Art. 2176 also provides that "whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done."

Award of Moral, compensatory and exemplary damages is proper.

The petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had
to undergo. Art. 2217 of the Civil Code states: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission."

Then, the award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the expenses she incurred when she came to
the Philippines from the United States to testify before the trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there
would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony.

The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram
companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.

BSP Cir No. 799 s. of 2013

Rate of Interest in the absence of stipulation amending Sec.2 of Circular No. 905,s of 1982 - 6% per annum eff July 1, 2013

Security Bank and Trust Company vs. R.T.C MAKATI BR. 61 MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO AND LEILA VENTURA
G.R.No. 113926 23October1996

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed 3 Promissory Notes from different dates in favor of petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) in the amounts of 100,000, 100,000, and 65,000. Respondent bound himself to pay the said amounts
in six (6) monthly installments plus 23% interest per annum.On all the abovementioned promissory notes, private respondent Leila
Ventura had signed as co-maker. Upon maturity there were still principal balance remaining on the notes. Eusebio refused to pay the
balance payable, so SBTC filed a collection case against him. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of SBTC, although the rate of interest
imposed by the RTC was 12% p.a. instead of the agreed upon 23% p.a. The court denied the motion filed by SBTC to apply the 23% p.a.
instead of the 12% p.a.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Did the RTC err in using 12% instead of the 23% as agreed upon by the parties?
- Yes, the rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties freely. Significantly, respondent did not question that rate.
- P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment
in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
- It is not for respondent court a quo to change the stipulations in the contract where it is not illegal. Furthermore, Article 1306 of the
New Civil Code provides that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
- The 12% shall be applied for obligations arising from loans, or forbearance of money in the absence of express stipulations

HELD:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent court a quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of
interest that should be imposed be 23% per annum.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

PROMISSORY NOTE - A written document in which a borrower agrees (promises) to pay back money to a lender according to specified
terms. A written promise to pay a certain sum of money, at a future time, unconditionally.

A promissory note differs from a mere acknowledgment of debt, without any promise to pay, as when the debtor gives his creditor an I 0
U. In its form it usually contains a promise to pay, at a time therein expressed, a sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to
his order, for value received. It is dated and signed by the maker. It is never under seal.

He who makes the promise is called the maker, and he to whom it is made is the payee.

SPS. GUANIO v. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL

GR No. 190601, February 7 2011

FACTS:

For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the
Shangri-la Hotel Makati.Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial and final food tasting.
The parties eventually agreed on a final price ─ P1,150 per person.On July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and signed their contract.

Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondent’s representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager
Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the delay in the service of the
dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted
about the delay; and despite Alvarez’s promise that there would be no charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight,
they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day. They further claim that
they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these were not served to the guests who were forced
to pay for their drinks.

Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.and received an apologetic reply from Krister
Svensson, the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and Beverage. They nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of
contract and damages before the RTC of Makati City. Respondents averred that it was the increase in number of the unexpected guests
that led to the shortage claimed by the petitioners.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and was reversed by the CA, upon appeal, the latter holding that the
proximate cause of petitioners’ injury was an unexpected increase in their guests.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly held that the proximate cause of petitioners’ injury was an unexpected increase in their guests.

HELD:

The Court finds that since petitioners’ complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds no application to it,
the latter applicable only to actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the
failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract. The appellate court, and even the
trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the change in the expected number of
guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused respondent
from liability for “any damage or inconvenience” occasioned thereby.

General Milling Corp. vs. Spouses Ramos, GR 193723, July 20, 2011
 Article 1169 of the Civil Code states that: those obligated to deliver or to do somethingincur in delay from the time the obligee judicially
or extrajudicially demands from them thefulfillment of their obligation. Demand is necessary for delay to exist unless the contract states
thatno such demand is needed.
Facts:
General Milling Corporation (GMC) entered into a Growers Contract with spouses Librado andRemedios Ramos (Spouses Ramos). Under
the contract, GMC was to supply broiler chickens forthe spouses to raise on their land. To guarantee full compliance, the Growers
Contract wasaccompanied by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a piece of real property and a surety bond.Spouses Ramos eventually
were unable to settle their account with GMC. The property wasextrajudicially foreclosed and GMC was the highest bidder. Spouses
Ramos questioned the validityof the foreclosure proceedings. The CA found that GMC made no demand to spouses Ramos forthe full
payment of their obligation. A perusal of the letters presented and offered as evidence bydefendant-appellant GMC did not “demand” but
only request spouses Ramos to go to the office ofGMC to “discuss” the settlement of their account.
Issue:
WON GMC made sufficient demand to the spouses Ramos to fulfill their obligation - NO
Held:
No. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandableand liquidated; second, the debtor
delays performance; and third, the creditor judicially orextrajudicially requires the debtor's performance.According to the CA, GMC did
not make a demand on Spouses Ramos but merely requested themto go to GMCs office to discuss the settlement of their account. In spite
of the lack of demandmade on the spouses, however, GMC proceeded with the foreclosure proceedings. Neither wasthere any provision
in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage allowing GMC to extrajudicially foreclosethe mortgage without need of demand.Article 1169 of the
Civil Code states that: those obligated to deliver or to do something incur indelay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially
demands from them the fulfillment oftheir obligation. However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that
delaymay exist, when the obligation or the law expressly so declares. The Deed of Real EstateMortgage (contract) in the instant case has
no such provision stating that demand is not necessaryfor delay to exist. GMC should have first made a demand on the spouses before
proceeding toforeclose the real estate mortgage.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Company March 15, 2016 No. 12191, October 14, 1918

FACTS Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company. He used to travel by trade to the office located in Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on his way home by
rail and when the train drew up to the station in San Mateo, he rose from his seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped off
from the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to slip off from under him and he fell
violently on the platform. He rolled and was drawn under the moving car. He was badly crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized
which resulted to amputation of his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against defendant in CFI of Manila founding his action upon
the negligence of the employees of defendant in placing the watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having found negligence on the part of defendant,
adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering, hence
this appeal.

ISSUE Is the negligence of the employees attributable to their employer whether the negligence is based on contractual obligation or on
torts?

HELD YES. It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the
manner stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred
by the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence. It is to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage. However
Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not
accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the master from liability fro the latter’s
act. The fundamental distinction between obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the fact that in
cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into
the contractual relation. When the source of obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is suffient prima facie to warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve the employer from
liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune from damages arising from breach of their contracts. Defendant was
therefore liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or
contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or
omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains.
Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked by defendant is untenable. In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act- that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and physical condition of
the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. It is to be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his daily routine. Our conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by
imprudence and therefore was not guilty of contributory negligence. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED.
 Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation 21 SCRA 279, G.R. No. L-21749 (September 29, 1967)

Facts:

1. Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant, LSC for brevity) was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats
belonging to the same corporation.`
2. The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bright to list. The
river, at that time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces.
3. Republic of the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and consequential damages caused by its employees.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or
force majeure.

Ruling:

1. No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertibly provided with adequate
openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively
controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees
manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper case is used. Res
ipsa loquitur.

NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its
barge, and (2) that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, (3) had the towlines, engines and
equipment double-checked and inspected; (4) that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions. These very precautions, completely
destroy the NLS’defense.

Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more difficulty to foresee the happening is not
impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by NSC prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but
actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen steam and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving
obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be
insufficient.

Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA

G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966
FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline wasbeing hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of thereceiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread to
andburned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects insidethem. The owners of the houses, among them
petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).Trial court and CA found that petitioners
failed to prove negligence and that respondentshad exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of
theiremployees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
on the groundsthat “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not
prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case atbar, however, we find no practical use for suchdocrtrine.”
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the
part of the appellees.
RULE:
Res ipsa Loquitur
is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injurycomplained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or
his servants andthe accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those whohave its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, inabsence of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want
of care.The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is applicable in this case. The gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment andemployees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
andburned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the firestarted were the appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because
of want of care. The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statementof the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who
was transferring the contents thereof intothe underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence.
Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often passthrough or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a
car barn for around 10taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smokecigarettes is located one
meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) theconcrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 . meters high at most
andcannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable

RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in
the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant
has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560
pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent
them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to
that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about
the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In
two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that
not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking
by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or
the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that
a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer
where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

Fabre vs. Court of Appeals

259 SCRA 426
G.R. No. 111127
July 26, 1996
Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a
bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.

On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the
transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.

The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner
Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it
was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the
left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side,
coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and
smashed its front portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio.

Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand
contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?

Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.

The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the
business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art.
1732, Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment
of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.

PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC. vs. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958)

FACTS:

A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front
wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son
sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the heirs of the mother.
Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in
regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code)

HELD:

Yes.

While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the
agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s
liability is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against
him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not
measure up to the “utmost diligence of a very cautious person” as “far as human care and foresight can provide” and therefore the
knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.