FINAL EXAM

Strategic Decision Making and Negotiation

MM5009

Ariq Wynalda
YP59C
29118031

Master of Business Administration

Institut Teknologi Bandung

2019
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 2 Analysis of Issues ................................................................................................................... 2
A. Theoritical Basis ......................................................................................................................... 2
i. Distributive Negotiation.......................................................................................................... 2
ii. Integrative Negotiation ........................................................................................................... 3
iii. BATNA ................................................................................................................................... 4
iv. ZOPA ...................................................................................................................................... 5
v. Dilemma .................................................................................................................................. 6
B. Case Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 7
i. Stakeholders ............................................................................................................................ 7
ii. Issues Negotiated .................................................................................................................... 7
iii. Positions for each Player ......................................................................................................... 8
iv. Dilemmas Present ................................................................................................................... 8
C. Negotiation Process .................................................................................................................... 9
i. Chronology ............................................................................................................................. 9
ii. Proposals and Counter Proposals .......................................................................................... 10
iii. Dilemmas Elimination .......................................................................................................... 10
iv. Result .................................................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER 3 Recommended Solutions ................................................................................................ 12
A. Solutions ................................................................................................................................... 12
B. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 12
 Chapter 1
Introduction
Negotiation is a method by which people settle differences. Its a process of compromise or
agreement is reached while avoiding argument and dispute. If there was disagreement between
both parties, the individuals understandably will try to aim or to achieve the best possible
outcome for their own position (or perhaps an organisation they represent). However, the
principles of fairness, seeking mutual benefit and maintaining a relationship are the keys to a
successful outcome.
In real life cases we often faced with negotiations, both with the people we are closest to and
colleagues. Negotiation is something inevitable and is done to achieve something we want in
order to reach consensus.
In this final assignment I will provide one of my negtioation experience that I had back in July
2017. I had this negotiation experience back in 2017 when I had the chance to participate in a
world cup of a game competition in Spain after winning the Asia qualifier. There were several
organizations that are willing to take me and my team as their team under the agreement of
sponsorship. As I was the captain of the team my teammates entrusted this issue to me to find
the best organization which has good connection to good sponsors and also with the best
agreements for us to accept.
This report will be prepared by discussing the types of negotiations from academic perspectives
and also some terminology related to the negotiation process. There will be an explanation
regarding the role of the case to be presented both from the background, the issues to be
discussed, the position of each stakeholder and the dilemma they face. Furthermore, there will
be an analysis abaout how the proposals and counter proposals also elimination of dilemmas
would be made until the settlement will be concluded. After the analysis has been done, there
will be a future suggestion for related case.

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 Chapter 2
Analysis of Issues
A. Theoritical Basis
The study groups classify two types of negotiations, namely distributive diplomacy and
integrative diplomacy. These two groupings of negotiations have been in the spotlight of many
parties. The results to be achieved in negotiations are usually analogous to pie, even though
each of the studies has its own terms and views regarding both.
i. Distributive Negotiation
Distributive negotiation involves haggling over a fixed amount of value—that is, slicing up the
pie. In a distributive negotiation, there is likely only one issue at stake, typically price. When
you are negotiating with a merchant in a foreign bazaar, or over a used car closer to home, you
are generally involved in a distributive negotiation, as it may be difficult to add issues other
than price to the mix. So that distributive negotiation is also called 'Win - Lose', or 'Fixed-Pie
negotiation' because one party gets more profit when the other party actually decreases. Some
theorists argue that distributive bargaining is not necessary, because conflict can be resolved
cooperatively through integrative negotiations. With creativity, disputing parties can almost
always work together to expand the desired "pie" and create results that benefit both parties
(Fisher & Ury in Spangler, 2003). However, in cases where the negotiator wants to maximize
the results obtained in an agreement and does not attach importance to relations with other
parties, distributive bargaining may be very useful. Based on Air Force Negotiations Center
(2018), there are pros and cons about distribution negotiation as explained below :
PROS:
1). Usually quick, because there is no attempt to build a relationship, explore needs and interests
or come up with alternatives (options). Depending on the conditions, it can be as short as a
demand, followed by either an acceptance from the other side or rejection and the other side
walking away.
2). A winner and a loser. Often we define the winner as the party that got what they wanted
(not necessarily what they needed). If it is a “one shot” deal and the loser has no recourse in
the execution of the agreement, then the winner clearly comes out ahead.
3). A process lacking imagination. Bargaining doesn’t require much new thought or innovative
solutions. Since the resources are seen as fixed, the only process needed is to determine a way
to obtain as much off the table as possible.
CONS:
1). A loser. As mentioned above, sometimes the loser in a distributive negotiation has little
recourse. However, if there will be follow-on negotiation opportunities, the loser may have
recourse. If there is another negotiation, they could try to “make up” for previous losses by
insisting they get it “their way” in the next engagement. To the loser, this is fair, since they are
only trying to even the score. Similarly, in the execution of the current agreement, for example
a delivery contract, the loser could psychologically “even the score” by creating problems
during execution. In the extreme, they could refuse to do anything contained in the agreement,
and walk away.
2). Tremendous psychological buy-in to the established demand/solution. Many strong
Distributive Bargainers attach tremendous ego to their demand/solution. In short, they are very
proud of their idea. Listening to other ideas is virtually out of the question.

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3). Tough to adjust to overwhelming evidence that is against your demand/solution. When an
effective counterproposal is raised, one that clearly is better than the original demand/solution,
it is tough for the negotiator to adjust, since so much ego is invested in their demand/solution.
4). Can lead to mistrust and suspicion if the loser has been ignored, disrespected, and/or been
taken advantage of.
ii. Integrative Negotiation
The second type of negotiation is Integrative Negotiation. It is explain a negotiation strategy
that makes a party disagree to work together to find a "win-win solution". This strategy focuses
on developing mutually beneficial agreements based on disputed interests. Interests include
needs, desires, worries, and important fears for each party because these are the underlying
reasons why people are involved in conflict (Spangler, 2003).
There are several technique of integrative negotiations that buyer and seller used to reach an
agreement. Those techniques are can seen below.

Fig. 2 Techniques of Integrative Approach

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 Non-Specific Compensation In this method, proposal of the other side will
be accepted if your proposal of compensation
is also accepted (Trading)
Cost Cutting You will accept the other side’s proposals, if
your proposals about payment methods,
discounts, and taxes are also accepted.

Bridging Creating a new proposal based on new issues

based on understanding about interests of
partners.
Log Rolling Negotiator will yield on not important issues,
but defend on important issues.
Contingency Contract If you have different perception/expectation
about issues in the future, then you can
propose a contract: if the other side is true
then he/she receives amount of money rebate
from you; if not, the other side pays amount
of money surcharge to you.

Integrative refers to the potential interests of the parties to become (combined) in a way that
creates a "pie" together or enlarges "pie". The potential for integration only exists when there
are several issues involved in negotiations. This is because parties must be able to make an
agreement on the issue so that both parties are satisfied with the results. There are pros and
cons of integrative negotiation as explained below (Air Force Negotiations Center, 2018) :
PROS:
1). Because Integrative Negotiations are a cooperative problem-solving effort, neitherside its
solution over the other. Also, a mutually agreed upon solution is usually more durable, has
more buy-in, and any problems that arise during execution are usually more easily resolved.
2). Integrative Negotiations usually strengthens relationships as parties get to know each other
and each other’s issues.
CONS:
1). This process takes considerable skills. Effective critical thinking, empathetic listening and
creative brainstorming of ideas are paramount for success.
2). This process requires participants to check their ego at the door. One’s initial conclusions
on a possible solution might be all wrong. A solution isn’t fought over, a solution is selected
from a range of mutually developed options that satisfy both side’s top interests.
3). This process takes time.
iii. BATNA
A best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is the course of action that a party
engaged in negotiations will take if talks fail and no agreement can be reached. Negotiation
researchers Roger Fisher and William Ury coined the term BATNA in their 1981 bestseller
"Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In." A party's BATNA refers to what
a party can fall back on if a negotiation proves unsuccessful.

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Parties may tailor BATNAs to any situation that calls for negotiations, ranging from
discussions of a pay hike to resolving more complex situations like mergers. While a BATNA
may not always be easy to identify, Harvard researchers have outlined several steps to help
clarify the process:
1. List all alternatives if your current negotiation ends in an impasse.
2. Evaluate your alternatives, based on the value of pursuing it.
3. Select the alternative action that would have the highest expected value for you.
4. After you have determined your BATNA in Step 3, calculate your reservation value or
the lowest-valued deal you are willing to accept.
If the value of the deal proposed to you is lower than your reservation value, you should reject
the offer and pursue your BATNA. However, if the final offer is higher than your reservation
value, you should accept the offer.
BATNA is not a number or a term sheet in your current negotiation, but instead the course of
action that you would take rather than ultimately accepting a proposed deal in the talks at hand.
You should never take a deal that does not serve your interests at least as well as that alternative
course of action (Sebenius, 2017)

Fig. 2 BATNA & ZOPA Diagram Illustration

iv. ZOPA
Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) is the blue sky range where deals are made which both
parties to a negotiation find acceptable. The process in finding this zone requires a little bit of
detective work in order to make it work. It begins with a proposal by a person, commercial
entity or organisation known as a ‘Proponent‘. Essentially, this is the person who puts an offer
on the table. The receiving end of a proposal is known as a ‘Prospect‘. This is the person or
entity who considers the merits of the offer or proposal. The prospect will accept the proposal,
make a counter proposal/offer, or outright reject it.
The proponent is trying to sell us something. This can be a product, a business idea, services,
an organisational concept or a combination of these things. The proponent is more commonly
called the ‘seller‘. The prospect, on the other hand, is more commonly called the ‘buyer‘.
The seller wants to get the maximum amount possible for their proposal, but generally may
also set a limit for the least amount they will accept. The least amount they are willing to accept,

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is known as the seller’s ‘Reservation Price‘. This is the amount where they draw the line,also
know as the ‘walk away‘ from the deal point. The buyer, on the other hand, wants to pay the
least amount possible, but may consider a higher amount that they might be prepared to pay as
well. The maximum amount they are prepared to pay is also known as the buyer’s ‘Reservation
Price‘ or ‘walk away‘ from the deal point.
The differences between these respective lows and highs of both the seller and buyer, are their
range of expectations. When you have a common ground or overlap between these two
different ranges, this is known as ZOPA or the Zone of Possible Agreement. Sebenius (2017)
said, as very a first resort, we should estimate how well each side’s BATNA serves its interests.
This is essential to determine the minimum acceptable threshold for any proposed deal. The set
of agreements that are better for each side than its BATNA, as measured by its interests, defines
the ZOPA.
v. Dilemma
Dilemma is a condition if someone feels there is an obstacle to achieving the goals that he
wants, because of the factors that exist on his own or factors that come from other parties
(Putro, et al 1994). The purpose of each party is reflected in the form of a position (i.e., a future
scenario offered by the party openly by another party), and he tries to convince the other party
to accept the position, if necessary by promise or by threats.
In conflict situations there will be dilemmas that will be faced by the parties involved, which
will hinder the resolution (Bryan, 2003). There are two groups of dilemmas that occur in the
conflict process:
a. Confrontation dilemma
This dilemma occurs in conditions where all parties do not have the same position (or at least
one party proposes a different position / is not compatible with the other parties position),
which causes the party that has the dilemma to be not credible in applying the threat, as
explained below :
 Threat of dilemma
Party 1 faces a threat dilemma against party 2 if the threat of party 1 is considered not serious
(unreliable / credible) by party 2, because party 2 knows that there is a future (other future
scenarios) other than the position of party 2 which is preferred by party 1 rather than threat
position. Party 1 is only considered bluffing by another party. In these conditions, Party 1 needs
to make the threat more credible by others, with negative emotions such as anger or hatred.
 Rejection dilemma
Party 1 will face rejection dilemma against party 2 if party 1 has an obstacle to convince the
other party that he is serious about his rejection of the position of party 2, because 1 party is
doubtful prefering the position of threat compared to party position 2. In this condition, party
1 needs to make the threat more credible by party 2 with negative emotion.
 Positioning dilemma
Party 1 faces a positioning dilemma against party 2, if party 1 prefers party position 2 compared
to its own position. However, party 1 can reject the position of party 2 in the hope of getting a
better offer, or because the position of party 2 is considered unrealistic, or party 1 prefers the
position of threat compared to the position of party 2, or party 1 does not trust the party 2.

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  Persuasion dilemma
Party 1 will face persuasion dilemma against party 2 if party 1 prefers party position 2
compared to threat position, so party 1 experiences obstacles to convince party 2 to accept its
position. This happens in "Chicken game".
b. Collaboration dilemma
If the confrontation dilemma is successfully eliminated, the interacting parties will have a
shared position, but they can still face the collaboration dilemma, that is, they still have the
possibility not to each other for commitment to the shared position.
 Trust dilemma
Party 1 faces a trust dilemma against party 2 if party 1 is not sure that party 2 will commit to
the joint position, in this case party 1 can also move to another position, or find a way for him
to believe in the party's commitment 2.
 Cooperation dilemma
Party 1 has cooperation dilemma against party 2 if party 1 is also tempted not to commit to this
joint position, there may be other futures that are more attractive than the joint position. And if
party 1 wants to eliminate this dilemma, then party 1 can move to another position, or party 1
can convince party 2 that he remains committed to the shared position.
B. Case Analysis
i. Stakeholders
The team (Seller):
Ariq Wynalda graduated from Bina Nusantara University majored in International Business
Management in June 2016, worked as a Quality Control staff in PT.Clariant Kujang Cikampek
for 6 months (July – November). Then he quit his job to pursue his passion which to become a
professional gamer. He saw the opportunity as there was a new game that was growing vastly
through the year, both in the communities and the competitive scene. He managed to achieve
that when he won the first Asia Qualifier back in March 2017 and then proceeded to the world
cup stage in Valencia, Spain at 15th July 2017. There were several of organizations approached
the team for sponsorship, from within the country and abroad.
The organization (Buyer):
Ogi Lastio works in Telkomsel for 8 years and 2 months now (September 2011 – Present). He
got appointed to be the Marketing Manager of Arena Gaming Evolution (Telkomsel’s Gaming
Division/Organization) with the aim of developing and leading a marketing team that will
develop and execute new concepts, business models, channels and partners to position business
as innovator and leader.
ii. Issues Negotiated
First things first, Ariq and his team discussed all kind of benefits that they want to get from a
sponsorship. The team agreed to prioritize their benefits as follow: 1. No money cut from
tournament prizes 2. No change in our team name (Team FearUs) 3. Decent monthly wage
($400~$500) through paypal for 6 months at minimum (since there are 3 people from the team
that is not Indonesian) 4. Free Gaming Gears (Mouse, Keyboard, Headset) for all 5 of us in the

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team 5. Team Jersey design that is up to our standard (No exaggeration in the sponsor name on
the jersey).
On the other hand, besides having a team that compete in an international scale, Mr.Ogi also
wants to impress his higher ups (for not only having a good advertising on the team but to
actually look good on the paper as he wants Arena Gaming Evolution to be attractive to reach
other sponsor for his organization) which means having some money generated from our
tournament winnings.
iii. Positions for each Player
The team:
The team will approve the deal if the majority of the benefits are met. The benefit number 1 is
the only thing that we can’t give out because as of that day we already secured 10k USD for
our team (we just have to be there in Valencia to get paid from the previous tournaments) and
the fact that some of us really needed the money for our own needs. The benefits number 4 and
5 was only serve as an extra for the team.
The organization:
Mr.Ogi said he really wants the team to be part of his organization. One of his objective is that
Arena Gaming Evolution gets some recognition internationally. But it does come with several
conditions that needs to be discussed between the team and Mr.Ogi. The conditions are: 30%
cut for tournament winnings, team re-branding (changing team’s name), he will handle the
jersey design.
iv. Dilemmas Present
The team (Ariq):
 Rejection Dilemma: As far as I could remember I had this kind of dilemma when I was
doing the negotiation with Mr.Ogi. This was about the benefit number 1, our interest
are contrast to each other, Mr.Ogi wants some cut from tournament winnings for his
organization and there was me defending me and my teammates number 1 priority. I
am a passive speaker and also personally I didn’t really want to push Mr.Ogi any
deeper. We had a heated argument on this topic but at the end of the day Mr.Ogi
understood that we couldn’t give out this topic and it will have to come with a price in
other benefits.
 Persuasion dilemma : I think this dilemma also stands for my rejection dilemma because
if Mr.Ogi wont flinch out from the money-cut topic then we wouldn’t have an
agreement at all.
The organization (Mr.Ogi):
 Trust Dilemma: To be honest I don’t know for sure if Mr.Ogi is actually having this
kind of dilemma or not but logically its only natural that Mr.Ogi are having this because
the price in other benefits I mentioned above means me and the team having an almost
50% cut for monthly wage from what I proposed beforehand ($400~$500) and shorter
contract (3 Months), then it affect the benefits number 4 and 5 as well, we didn’t get
any of the gaming gears and we have to put everything of the jersey design on Mr.Ogi.
Knowing all this, I believe its only logical that Mr.Ogi sensed a hunch that our team
wont commit 100% to this deal because the team just lost 2.5 (0.5 because my team
also believe that the monthly wage is fair) of the team benefit points.

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C. Negotiation Process
i. Chronology
 March 2017
Someday in March 2017 Mr.Ogi approached me through line message to congratulate
on our team’s victory on the Asia Qualifier for the upcoming global tournament in
Spain. Yes, we are already friends months before this, I first met him at a game event
before the Qualifier. In the message he immediately told me that he might be interested
to take my team into his organization. At the end of the message he said he will be back
with further details regarding this topic.

 June 2017
At early June 2017, Mr.Ogi cameback with further details on the agreement but at that
time me and the team already discussed the benefit points prioritization that we need to
hold upon signing to any contract of agreement from any organizations. From March
2017 to June 2017 there were several organizations that contacted us and gave us their
proposals for the agreement, we tried to discuss the agreements to the respected
organizations but so far nothing matched our interest since almost all of them hold their
money-cut from winnings policy. So after Mr.Ogi read our priorities, he demanded a
meet up in Bandung to seriously having a talk regarding this topic. 2 days after this, we
met at his office in Arena Gaming base in Bandung. We negotiated the top priority that
my team had at first, he knew the prioritization because I sent him through line message
clearly that we couldn’t give out the money-cost point at all cost. At first he tried to
explain his organization details, value and vision and the reason why he also needed
the 30% cut from our team winnings. I tried to understand them but still I told them that
this money-cut topic was the only thing we couldn’t let go, because some of us really
needed the money for their own concerns. He tried to lower the money cut to 20% and
revealed the $400 usd monthly wage we gonna receive for a 3 months contract plus
gaming gears for all of us in the team. At this point I still insisted on having No money
cut from tournament winnings/prizes, with the same explanation. Mr.Ogi tried to lower
the money cut again to 10% but with no gaming gears attached on the string. I explained
my reasonings again, boldly and better this time that to begin with I didn’t want to push
Mr.Ogi any deeper, but since 3 of my teams voted that they really that specific money
on that time untouched, I really couldn’t say anymore to Mr.Ogi and just told him that
we might not be able to make the deal because of this. After that Mr.Ogi told me that
he might accept this term but with several penalties on the other benefits, he told me to
go back home and he will contact me again after having a discussion with his
organization.

 At late June 2017, Mr.Ogi told me through line messanger that we might had a deal
with some adjusting in the other benefits. He will spread the contract letters through
email. And he had the followings as their last offers: 1. No money cut from tournament
winnings/prizes. 2. No change in the team name. 3. $200 monthly wage for 3 months
contract. 4. No gaming gears at all. 5. Mr.Ogi’s team will handle the jersey design. I
contacted all my teammates and we discussed it a little bit and at the end of the day we
all agreed on the terms that Mr.Ogi just sent us. After that I immediately shared the
contract letters to my teammates to get them signed.

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 ii. Proposals and Counter Proposals
Proposals
Ariq offered 1. No money cut from
tournament winnings/prizes. 2. No change in
our team name (Team FearUs) 3. Decent
monthly wage ($400~$500) through paypal
for 6 months at minimum 4. Free Gaming
Gears for all 5 of us in the team. 5. Team
Jersey design that is up to our standard.
Ariq insisted on having No money cut from
tournament winnings/prizes.
Ariq still insisted on having No money cut
from tournament winnings/prizes.
No counter proposal. Consensus reached.
Counter Proposals
Mr.Ogi offered 1. 20% money cut from
tournament winnings/prizes. 2. No change in
our team name. 3. $400 monthly wage for 3
months contract. 4. Gaming Gears for all 5 of
us in the team. 5. A no to begin with.
Mr.Ogi lowered the money cut to 10%. No
gaming gears attached.
Mr.Ogi accepted the proposal but it came
down with several penalties on other benefit
points. 1. No money cut from tournament
winnings/prizes. 2. No change in the team
name. 3. $200 monthly wage for 3 months
contract. 4. No gaming gears at all. 5.
Mr.Ogi’s team will handle the jersey design.

iii. Dilemmas Elimination

Seller (Ariq):

 To eliminate this rejection dilemma, Ariq may adapt his position by becoming
compatible with Mr.Ogi by positive emotion or compromise when the proposals and
counter proposals are going back and forth. Ariq also can compromise since their
relationship might be ended up in long-term period so it may be good for keeping a
good relationship with Mr.Ogi.
 As for persuasion dilemma, Ariq needs to reaffirm belief in his own position. He needs
to realize that he can makes a proper proposal to reach an agreement with Mr.Ogi and
not afraid with the failure and consequences if the negotiations did not reach consensus.
Buyer (Mr.Ogi):
 For Mr.Ogi to Eliminate trust dilemma, I think he should put more faith to the team
regardless he just lost one of his priority in making the deal. Because like I said before,
I believe that Mr.Ogi and the team already reached their optimal value of fairness, they
both lost 2.5 of their benefit points and won 2.5 of their benefit points.

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 iv. Result
Ariq and Mr.Ogi reached their consensus in two weeks with conclusion that the buyer (Mr.Ogi)
will buy the team at the cost of 1. No money cut from tournament winnings/prizes. 2. No change
in the team name. 3. $200 monthly wage for 3 months contract. 4. No gaming gears at all. 5.
Mr.Ogi’s team will handle the jersey design. I believe both parties has reached their optimal
value of fairness, they both lost 2.5 of their benefit points and won 2.5 of their benefit points.
I think that there should be alternative agreement that might be used as a bridging on this case
but to be honest I cant think of anything else.
But one thing for sure that Ariq didn’t have his BATNA prepared, best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) is the course of action that a party engaged in negotiations
will take if talks fail and no agreement can be reached. Ariq can only hold his ground based on
the same reasoning with giving alternative to the topic. Ariq and Mr.Ogi almost reached to zero
deal at all if Mr.Ogi didn’t back out of the money-cut topic. So I believe that the deal dropped
somewhere in ZOPA but with both of the parties not feeling that satisfied of the outcome.

There are some technique of integrative negotiations that were used in this case, they were
will be explained at the table below :
Non-Specific Compensation There are proposal and counter proposal
happen back and forth between Ariq and
Mr.Ogi until they reach the consensus.
Cost Cutting Mr.Ogi cut the cost of the monthly wage of
the team to 50% because he didn’t get
anything from the money-cut topic.
Bridging -
Log Rolling Ariq yield on the Gaming Gear and the Jersey
design.
Contingency Contract There are no contingency contract presented
from the benefit points, but there was a
penalty information if the team disband
before the contract ended, or if there was bad
behavior from the players in the contract.

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 CHAPTER 3
Recommended Solutions

A. Solutions
Solutions than can be offered are explained below :
 A bridging solution that comes from both parties especially for the heated argument
money-cut topic.
 Both seller and buyer should have prepared BATNA for alternative solutions to
problems so there is no need to impose an agreement on both sides, because it is better
for a sustainable but good agreement for the long term.
 Especially Ariq should have be more prepared on his BATNA and be more vocal about
it.
 I believe that they should have a better deal based on integrative negotiation, because
the cooperative relationship will be a long-term one. So, establishing a good
relationship and a good foundation will reduce threats and tension in the face of a
dilemma between the two parties. The deal they were having then was 50:50 beneficial
to each party. But I strongly believe that even though its equal to each party it didn’t
maxed out their satisfactory level on the deal result.

B. Conclusion
The negotiations went well for both of the parties, Ariq was tough on certain topic and
Mr.Ogi was also giving his best to defend his interest on the same topic. Even though
both of them didn’t able to give a bridging solution at that time, but both of the parties
still get the other 1.5 out of 5 benefit points to their hands. Mr.Ogi is a more experienced
negotiator than Ariq, but the reason he lost the crucial money-cut topic is because I
believe that he prioritize the good future relationship by having the team under his
organization. Getting the team under his organization meaning that the organization is
getting a recognition boost on social media because it was the first global tournament
coming from the game, and the team was the first winner of the Asia Qualifier . All in
all, I believe that the negotiation process went well and can be still considered as good
and can be categorized as an integrative negotiation.

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