Mendiola v. CA et al.

, 190 SCRA 421

FACTS: Carlos Mendiola died on December 28, 1984 and was survived by his
spouse, Florentina and his children namely, Reynaldo (herein petitioner), Redentor,
Ernestina, Edgardo, Manuel, Enrico, Ricardo, and Marilou all surnamed Mendiola
(herein private respondents). A petition for probate of the decedent's will was filed
on March 30, 1987 with the RTC-Pasig. Said court allowed the will and issued letters
of testamentary in favor of the petitioner who was declared executor in the will.
Later on, private respondents moved for the removal of the executor and
subsequently moved for the appointment of Redentor. The motion was granted and
petitioner was removed. Redentor was declared as excecutor. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but it was denied by the court. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence,
petitioner filed this petition for review. The latter averred that his removal was not
supported by evidence and he was not given his day in court.

ISSUE: Was the removal of the petitioner as executor proper?

RULING: Yes. There was sufficient evidence to support his removal namely, his
failure to pay the estate tax and to render an accounting of the estate and settle the
same according to law, and has involved the other heirs in a suit because of his own
deeds. Thus, his removal was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court which states that "[i]f an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment
of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign." Under this provision, the
court which appointed the executor has the discretion to remove the same. Also the
determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to
a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the
said court is clearly in error.

Nilda Gabriel vs CA

F: 9 months after the death of Domingo, his illegitimate son Roberto was appointed
by the probate court as administrator of his estate. Domingo’s widow, Felicitas,
together with their legitimate daughter wanted to recall the appointment arguing
that they should be preferred since they are next of kin compared to Roberto who is
only an illegitimate child. Roberto argued that the court has the discretion in
choosing the administrator and that the oppositors neglected their duty to file for
appointment within 30 days from death of Domingo as provided by the Rules.

I: WON Roberto should be removed as administrator due to the preference under

the rules?

R: NO. Roberto and Felicitas were appointed co-administrators.

We feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent Roberto as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal
unless the said court is clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and
corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the
legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal
of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to
justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of
the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the
court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator.

In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there
being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the
removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in
appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply
therefor within a given time. 21

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable
that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel.

Vda de Bacaling vs Laguda (please refer to handwritten digest from Ate Devie)

Munsayac v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 148597

Facts:

The present controversy stems from a Special Proceeding Case entitled In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta
Munsayac. The said case was filed by Grace De Villa, Lily Sunga and Roy Munsayac,
3 of the 5 children of the late Spouses Gelacio and Vicenta Munsayac for letters of
administration nominating Grace de Villa as administratrix of the intestate estate of
their parents. Grace de Villa’s nomination was opposed by the 2 other children of
the late Munsayac Spouse, namely, Gelacio Munsayac, Jr. and the late Nora
Visperas, who nominated Gelacio Jr. as administrator. Gelacio, Jr. was eventually
appointed administrator. Subsequently, De Villa and Sunga filed for a Request to
Inhibit respondent judge. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus questioning, among others, respondent Judge’s Order
directing/ordering Grace de Villa to produce certain bank time deposit
certificates/documents and the order of arrest of Grace de Villa for failure to
produce the said bank certificates/documents. Acting on the Omnibus Motion filed
by the administrator of the estate, respondent Judge issued an order for de Villa,
Sunga and Munsayac to surrender in custodia legis, under pain of contempt, (a) the
amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the late Vicenta, de Villa
and Sunga made with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, (b) as well as the
surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late Vicenta to De Villa and
Sunga, subject of the freeze order with the China Banking Corporation. For their
failure to comply with the order, the petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter
Munsayac were ordered arrested. Thereafter, appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals. In its resolution of the case, it set aside the Order of Arrest issued by
respondent judge but as to the issue of inhibition, it held that there was no
convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge had put him under suspicion,
especially in the light of their clear display of contumacious behavior toward the
court and that said request was unacceptable, because they had come to court with
unclean hands. Furthermore, the CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his
discretion when he disallowed the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the heirs of the
Munsayac spouses which lead to the approval the said extrajudicial partition.

Issue:

Whether the properties in custodia legis must be released?

Held:

Yes. The main case from which this Petition arose has already been decided by the
Court of Appeals. The Decision is now final and executory. Already terminated in that
main case was Special Proceedings No. 704-R, which had given rise to a number of
incidents and petitions including the herein matter. As such, any and all incidents
relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China
Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to
deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in the
probate court. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither
he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject of
his Orders in the special proceedings. Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order
and the return of any property previously deposited with the court should be
effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the
property deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any
property in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates
the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property should be
included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is
only provisional, not conclusive, in character and subject to the final decision in a
separate action that may be instituted by the parties. Neither are we unmindful of
the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court that has jurisdiction over the
estate proceedings and that the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on
the person raising the questions and on the heirs. In a train of decisions, this Court
has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle – generally, a probate
court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement or
the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties
are not impaired. These principles, however, have no more application in this case,
since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. To be sure, this Court
is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered
frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither
can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated
by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The
former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final,
complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left
to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property
originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.

Heirs of Miguel Franco v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Faustina Cabading

G.R. No. 123924 December 11, 2003
FACTS
Quintin died intestate. His brother, Miguel Franco (Miguel,), filed a Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, before the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte, praying that he be appointed as administrator of Quintins
estate. This Petition was opposed by Faustina Franco Vda. De Cabading (Faustina),
the sister of the decedent, on the ground that Miguel was unfit to be the
administrator.
On 27 August 1973, the intestate court issued an Order declaring inter alia that,
based on the evidence, Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject property. This
finding was subsequently used by the intestate court as one of the grounds for
granting the motion to remove Miguel as special administrator, stating the intestate
court said that since Miguel was claiming ownership over half of the subject
property, his conflicting interest rendered him incapable of rendering a true and
faithful account of the estate.
ISSUE
Is the finding of the court with regard to the ownership of the subject property in the
present case is conclusive?
HELD
No. The intestate court in its Order dated 27 August 1973 declared that Quintin was
the absolute owner of the property and accordingly denied Miguel’s claim of
ownership over half the subject property. The Order was apparently issued for the
purpose of determining which properties should be included for the inventory of the
estate of Miguel. While the intestate court does not have the authority to rule with
finality on questions of ownership over the property of the decedent, it is not
precluded from making a provisional determination over such questions for
purposes relevant to the settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to
include properties in the inventory of the estate.
However, Miguel can no longer question the determination of ownership by the
intestate court. Miguel did not file a motion for the reconsideration of the 27 August
1973 Order of the intestate court which denied Miguel’s claim of ownership. It was
the 1 September 1973 Order of the intestate court, by virtue of which Miguel was
removed as special administrator that he contested. While the 27 August
1973 Order is a provisional determination of ownership over the subject property,
yet conformably to ordinary experience any prudent claimant is expected to dispute
such an order which rejects his claim of ownership. Miguel’s inaction unmistakably
bolsters the unshakeable weight that should be accorded the statement as a
declaration against interest and a judicial admission.

De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96107 (June 19, 1995) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership >
Actions Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Accion Publiciana and
Accion Reinvindicatoria

Facts:

Balbuena, owner of a parcel of land, entered into a lease agreement with Inayan in
1970, who bound himself to deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as rental. The
ownership of the land was then transferred to Balbuena's daughter, De Leon.

In 1983, Inayan stopped paying the agreed rental. In 1984, Balbuena filed a
complaint for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of Posession; Recovery of
Unpaid Rentals and Damages" with the RTC against Inayan.

The RTC ruled in favor of De Leon. On appeal to the CA, Inayan questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA, in Inayan's motion for reconsideration, dismissed
the civil case filed by De Leon for want of jurisdiction. It ruled that De Leon's
complaint was based on accion interdictal, a summary action for recovery of
possession that should have been brought before the MTC. It found that the 1-year
period had not yet elapsed from the time when the civil case for the recovery of
possession was filed.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint filed by De Leon involves on issue of ownership?

Held:

No.

A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue of physical possession. The case filed
by De Leon was not an unlawful detainer since it involved more than the issue of
possession. De Leon prayed that Inayan be ordered to vacate the premises, pay
back rentals, unpaid irrigation fees, moral and exemplary damages and litigation
fees.

Where the issues of the case extend beyond those commonly involved in unlawful
detainer suits, such as for instance, the respective rights of parties under various
contractual arrangements and the validity thereof, the case is converted from a
mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation," thereby placing it
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Santera v. CFI of Cavite

G.R. No. L-61700-03
September 14, 1987

Facts:
Private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed
Santero, thru their guardian Anselma Diaz filed a petition for support with the CFI of
Cavite, including educational expenses, clothing and medical necessitites. This was
opposed later on by the petitioners, stating that the private respondents are no
longer schooling and have attained the majority age, thus are no longer under
guardianship. The guardian, Anselma, admitted that some of them are already of
age and not enrolled in the first semester due to lack of funds but they will enter
school again as soon as the funds were given. The court granted the petition.
*the petitioners, Princesita, Federico, Willy are children of Pablo (deceased) and
Felixberta; Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel are 4 of the 7 children of Pablo
and Anselma Diaz. All of them are natural children because neither of the mothers
were married to Pablo.
Issue:
Are the private respondents entitled to support, granting that some of them
are not minors and gainfully employed?
Held:
Yes. The controlling provision of law is not rule 83, sec. 3 of the New Rules of
Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code. The fact that private respondents are
of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded
as the determining factor of their right to allowance under 188. While the Rules of
Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the new civil code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction. Hence the private respondents are entitled to allowances as advances
form their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo. Since the provision of
the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the
right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such
right cannot be impaired by Rule 83, sec. 3 of the ROC which is a procedural rule.

Estate of Hilario Ruiz v. CA 252 SCRA 541

ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ v. CA

Doctrine:

Facts:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz.
The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties
and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.

When Hilario died, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond
and private respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will. However, Edmond
did not take any action for the probate of his father’s holographic will.

Four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar who filed
a petition for the probate and approval of the will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond but the latter opposed the petition on the ground that the
will was executed under undue influence.

One of the properties of the estate - the house and lot which the testator
bequeathed to his granddaughters was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.

The probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease
of the Valle Verde property.

In compliance, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the

balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance
expenses on the estate.

Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the
real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.

Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in
the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court.

Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for
Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments
to the grandchildren and for the distribution of the testator’s properties, specifically
the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
provisions of the holographic will.

The probate court denied petitioner’s motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes’ motion in view of petitioner’s lack of opposition. It thus ordered
the release of the rent payments to the decedent’s three granddaughters. It further
ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to
the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of
P50,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to
respondent Montes’ motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court
failed to consider.

Petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle Verde property
had been renewed for another
year.

Despite petitioner’s manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993,

ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be
necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator’s three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in
abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of First publication of
the notice to creditors

Issue:
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment
of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority:
(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the
testator’s grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and
(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Ruling:
(1)No
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law."
Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and
children" and does not extend it to the
deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It
was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court’s
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.

(2) No
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first
publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate
amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the
following conditions:
"Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending
controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court
may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit
that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be
distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules."

And Rule 90 provides that:

"Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-

mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can

only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of
said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed
by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the
lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The
questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his
estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of
those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid,
the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate
had not yet been inventoried and appraised.

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles
six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as
to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated.

(3) No
Petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"

Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:

"Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to
administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall have the right to
the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration."

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of
court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for
repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of
the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of
additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the
probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for
administration before releasing any further money in his favor.

It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it
only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner
did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render
an accounting of such funds.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his
father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father’s estate. The funds of the
estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of
a trustee of the highest order.

He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and
the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and
personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration,
the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of
which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.

Dispositive:

Those portions of the order granting an allowance to the testator’s grandchildren

and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to
creditors are annulled and set aside.