HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH vs. HON. RENATO C.

CORONA
G.R. 131457 August 19, 1999

FACTS:
Respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to SC En Banc. A careful reading however,
reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, "decided" referring to cases and
"resolved" referring to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. (referring each to each)

The issue presented by the respondents is whether the power of the LGU to reclassify lands is subject to
the approval of the CAR is no longer novel, this having decided in Camarines Sur vs CA case that the
LGU need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.

Intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farm workers at the
plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not intervenors may be real parties in interest over the case.

HELD:
Intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farm workers, have no legal or actual and
substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their
right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.
VICTORINO TORRES v. LEON VENTURA
G.R. No. 86044 July 2, 1990

FACTS:
In the first case the plaintiffs alleged that Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in their favor a chattel
mortgage on his drug store at Calle Rosario, known as Farmacia Henson, to secure a loan and in the
second case the plaintiffs alleged that they were the heirs of the late Don Florentino Torres; and that
Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in favor of Don Florentino Torres a chattel mortgage on his
three drug stores known as Henson's Pharmacy, Farmacia Henson and Botica Hensonina, to secure a
loan.

In both cases the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated the terms of the mortgage and that, in
consequence thereof they became entitled to the possession of the chattels and to foreclose their
mortgages thereon.

Subsequently, the court issued in each case an order directing the sheriff of the City of Manila to take
immediate possession of said drug stores. The defendant filed practically the same answer to both
complaints. He denied generally and specifically the plaintiffs' allegations, and set up the following
special defenses that the chattel mortgages are null and void for lack of sufficient particularity in the
description of the property mortgaged; and that the chattels which the plaintiffs sought to recover were
not the same property described in the mortgage.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the mortgage is valid.

HELD:
Since mortgage is not a prohibited transaction, it follows that it is not tantamount to selling, disposing
of, or conveying the awarded land, which are prohibited transactions. Moreover, the framers of the law,
in not expressly prohibiting mortgage, may have anticipated circumstances in which the farmer-
beneficiary is left with no alternative but to mortgage his land in order to respond to emergency
situations such as sickness in the family
53. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

FACTS:
The Governor of Camarines Sur filed two (2) separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto and Efren
San Joaquin pursuant to Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 129 authorizing the Governor to
purchase or expropriate properties owned by the San Joaquins for the establishment of a pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered. The motion was denied and a writ of possession was issued in favor of the province. On appeal
with the CA, the San Joaquins asked the appellate court to, among others, nullify the resolution issued
by the Sanggunian. The CA asked the Office of the Solicitor General to comment to the petition. The
Solicitor General stated that the approval of the Office of the President is not needed but the province
must first secure the approval of the DAR of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners. The CA set
aside the order of the trial court allowing the province to take possession and ordered the suspension of
the expropriation proceedings until after the submission of the DAR approval to convert the property.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not DAR approval is still necessary before an LGU can expropriate agricultural lands for
conversion to non-agricultural use.

HELD:
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
54. FELlX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 36213 June 29, 1989

FACTS:
October 1988, Lucia Sison filed a motion to be substituted in lieu of Andres and Leonora as she inherited
the unsold lots of the deceased spouses. The court granted her motion.

Spouses are owners of parcels of land in Bulacan at the time of the purchased of the spouses, Maximo
Cruz was the tenant who was planting palay thereon. Maximo continued as tenant until he died and was
succeeded by his son Fidel Cruz. After 4 years as tenant, Fidel was succeeded by Pascual Gonzales,
father of Felix Gonzales. In 1954, Pascual ceased to be a tenant because the land was proposed to be
converted into residential subdivision.

Since 1956, spouses offered to pay rental and acted as agents for the sale of the subdivision lots. While
they are renting, the spouses requested that they may be allowed to plant palay on the lots that have not
yet been sold. No specific agreement was concluded with regards of harvest, but spouses delivered part
of the yield to Federico Mateo, defendants overseer.

When spouses defaulted in paying the rentals, the owner demanded for payment of rental or to vacate.
Spouses then filed to elect the leasehold system and pray for a reliquidation of past harvest embracing
the agricultural years. Before summons were served, owners initiated an action against the spouses for
recovery of possession. CFI-Bulacan, favored Gonzales, the owner.

CA upheld the decision of the court saying that the property ceased to be an agricultural or farmland,
having been converted as residential subdivision.

ISSUE(S):
Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created over land embraced in an approved
residential subdivision.

HELD:
Agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has been converted to residential use.
Agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or
farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.
55. LOPE MACHETE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995

FACTS:
Private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages
before the Regional Trial Court against the petitioners. The complaint alleged that the parties entered
into a leasehold agreement with respect to the private respondent's landholdings in Bohol. Petitioners
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of RTC over the subject matter.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the subject matter of the complaint falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DAR in
the exercise of its quasi- judicial powers.

HELD:
Section 17 of EO 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law.
Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the powers and functions with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
56. NINA M. QUISMUNDO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95664 September 13, 1991

FACTS:
On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial court
praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system,
pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, their request therefor having been denied
by petitioner.

On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an order authorizing
the supervision by the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the 1987-1988
sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the trial court in an order dated March 3, 1988.

On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the
law that should allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. The trial court denied the
motion for lack of merit in an order dated June 2, 1988.

On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order, invoking as an
additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case under the authority and by reason of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act
No. 6657.

HELD:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the case at bar
considering that the exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has already been vested
in the Department of Agrarian Reform

ISSUE(S):
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988,
contains provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the Department
of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The resolution by the DAR is
to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the
proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in
a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
57. MODESTO T. UALAT v. JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS
AM No. MTJ-91-567 December 6, 1996

FACTS:
Complainants filed an administrative case against respondent Judge Ramos for taking cognizance of the
illegal detainer case filed by their landowner against them. It was shown that the respondent judge had
knowledge of a previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the complainants containing
allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent judge took cognizance of the illegal detainer
case.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the action of Judge Ramos proper.

HELD:
The Supreme Court in finding the respondent Judge liable for ignorance of the law opined: "As can be
readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil case, they alleged the
existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship between themselves and the landowner. Additionally, in
the proceedings before respondent Judge, complainants were even represented by a lawyer from the
DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants
were claiming protection under our agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there
existed a genuine issue involving agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject
property. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject,
together with an ordinary degree of prudence would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case
to the DAR for preliminary determination of the real nature of the parties' relationship, as required by
law.
58. REMIGIO ISIDRO v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105586 December 15, 1993

FACTS:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985, Aniceta
Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio
Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to
the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without
paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the
overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the
land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spenteffort
and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by
civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On
appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence cannot be cognizable by civil courts.

HELD:
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,
or lessor and lessee
59. TEOFILA DE LUNA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97788 May 11, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner Teofila de Luna had been in peaceful and continuous possession of four (4) hectares of land
located at Barangay Masinao, Sta. Maria, Laguna. Petitioner and her father, Martin de Luna, had worked
for many years on this and as agricultural tenants thereof.

After the demise of petitioner’s father, she continued to cultivate the subject parcels of land. Petitioner’s
name appears in the master list of agricultural tenants in the Province of Laguna issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") as a full-fledged tenant of landholder Atty. Francisco Redor.

On 21 May 1986, petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against her two (2) brothers, private respondents
Casiano and Flaviano de Luna, who allegedly had turned petitioner out of her possession of the parcels
of land through stealth. The complaint for forcible entry was filed with the MCTC of Mabitac, Sta. Maria,
Laguna and there docketed as Civil Case No. 245.

The complaint was initially dismissed by the MCTC on 30 September 1986 on the basis that the case fell
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316
in relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 583. However, after considering an Omnibus Motion of
petitioner, the MCTC set aside its earlier order and instead referred the case to the DAR.

After the referral to the DAR and acting upon the certification issued by DAR that the case was proper
for trial in the municipal court, the MCTC proceeded to hear the complaint for ejectment. In due
course, the MCTC rendered a decision requiring private respondents to vacate the premises and to pay
petitioner.

Dissatisfied, respondent de Luna brothers appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the issue of
jurisdiction of the MCTC over the dispute.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondents may be deemed as “third persons” under Section 21 of RA 1199 thereby
bringing the dispute within the ambit of authority of the RTC as an agrarian court.

HELD:
The 'third party' mentioned in the said sec. 21 of RA 1199 should be construed to mean a person who is
neither landholder nor tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for the landholder. For
instance, a sheriff enforcing an execution sale against the landholder; or a purchaser or transferee of
the land, or a mere dummy of the landowner
60. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996

FACTS:
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del
Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).
Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to
farmer-beneficiaries. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings
("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated. Private respondent rejected the
government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher
price. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who,
sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP. Private respondent filed a Petition for Just
Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be
ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that
private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be
had. In addition, the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had
been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD. Private respondent
moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied Private respondent therefore filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No.
6657 §§56-57 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was
sustained by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657, an appeal from the
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to
the RTC.

HELD:
Any effort to transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR adjudicators and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 of RA 6657
and therefore would be void.
61. AGAPITO ROM VS. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 169331 September 5, 2011

FACTS:
On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga,
Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. The application was docketed as DAR ADM Case No. A-
9999-014-98.

Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land
which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the
effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as
part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC
Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands
already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which
ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from
the DAR.

Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation, the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-
II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of
rights of bona fide occupants.

To comply with the directive, respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted
to obtain the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject
parcels of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement as regards
the amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent filed on September 28, 2001 a Petition to
fix disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of
Batangas.

In its Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application. From this Order, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order dated
December 12, 2003.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. In a Decision dated April 29, 2005,
the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that petitioners
should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Even if the
certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss the same as
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the assailed Orders.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the property can be exempted without payment of disturbance compensation.

HELD:
Respondent's application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensation or
by petitioners' waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the subject parcels of land whenever
required. However, this Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with this requirement
found under Section III (B) of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990. Records show that upon being required by
CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide
occupants after an evaluation of its application for exemption revealed that it was not accompanied by
the same,58 respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement. It offered to pay
petitioners their disturbance compensation but they failed to agree on the price. Petitioners also
refused to execute a waiver/ undertaking. Respondent thus filed a Petition to fix disturbance
compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the DAR a (1) Certification dated
September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there was
failure to reach an amicable settlement on the matter of disturbance compensation between the parties;
and (2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance compensation duly received by the PARAD on September
28, 2001.59 To us, these constitute substantial compliance with the said particular requirement of Section
III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such payment later proved to be of
no consequence since the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR was nevertheless made subject
to the condition of payment of disturbance compensation to petitioners. In fact, the Order likewise
states that 10 days from such payment, proof of payment of disturbance compensation must be
submitted to the DAR.
62. FRANCISCO SORIANO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184282 April 11, 2012

FACTS:
Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo, Maco,
Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by TCT No.
(T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-
2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the value of the
subject lands. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter before the
DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation.

On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBP’s preliminary
determination. Notices of the decisions were duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners
belatedly filed a petition before the RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just compensation. Thus, the
DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that the DARAB Rules of
Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code. The DAR
sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the DAR lodged a petition for
certitorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The CA granted
the petition.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the
purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
It is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction
of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void.
63. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. RENATO L. MATEO
G.R. No. 175485 July 27, 2011

FACTS:
In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank the land in question which was previously sold by the
mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China
Bank as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and consolidated its ownership of the
property after Rodolfo failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in the name of China Bank. In 1991, CDC
brought an action for unlawful detainer against the respondent’s siblings. Respondent counters that
CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith because it had actual knowledge of the
possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not CDC was an innocent purchaser for value.

HELD:
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the certificate of
title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims as are annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT’s was a clean title, that is, it was free from any
lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of
the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. The respondent’s siblings’ possession did not translate
to an adverse claim of ownership. They even characterized their possession only as that of mere
agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a
defect or inflict a law in the title of the owner. CDC having paid the full and fair price of the land, was an
innocent purchaser for value. The TCT in the name of CDC was declared valid and subsisting.
64. RENE ANTONIO V. GREGORIO MANAHAN
G.R. No. 176091 April 24, 2011

FACTS:
On 16 November 1993, Manahan, the owner of 2 parcel of agricultural land located at San Mateo, Rizal
and Antonio entered into a Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan” (Leasehold Agreement) whereby the
latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and
good quality palay, each weighing 44 kilos. The Leasehold Agreement provided, that the land shall be
exclusively planted to rice; that Antonio shall neither expand the 12x12 square meter portion on which
his house stands nor allow others to construct their homes on the lands in litigation; that the planting
and harvest on both parcels shall be simultaneously accomplished by Antonio; and, that Manahan shall
be entitled to a three-day prior notice of the harvests done on the property. In 1994, 1996 and 1997,
Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) against Antonio,
for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement on the ground that Antonio persisted with the foregoing
violations. Manahan filed on16 September 1997 a Complaint for Ejectment before the Rizal Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD). Antonio, however, specifically denied the material
allegations of the foregoing complaint. On 4 October 1999, Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision
for Manahan based on the following ascertained violations of the Leasehold Agreement committed by
Antonio: (a) failure to pay the stipulated rental in full from 1993 to 1998; (b) failure to give Manahan prior
notification of impending harvests; and (c)utilization of 3,000 square meters of the property to the
planting of kangkong, despite Manahan’s objections. As a consequence of the foregoing findings, the
PARAD ordered the ejectment of Antonio from the landholding, payment of the unpaid lease rental and
to surrender the subject land. On appeal, the foregoing decision was initially reversed and set-aside in
the 8 January 2004 decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) however, based on the ocular inspection conducted by the DARAB the motion for
reconsideration filed by Manahan was granted and DARAB issued the 28 December 2004 Resolution
reinstated the PARAD’s 4 October 1999 decision. On 10 February 2005, Antonio filed a petition for review
with the CA arguing that the DARAB gravely erred in finding that he violated the leasehold agreement.
The CA rendered the herein assailed 31 October 2006 Decision, dismissing the petition and affirming the
DARAB’s 28 December 2004 Resolution. Antonio’s motion for reconsideration of said decision was
denied for lack of merit in the CA’s 4 January 2007 resolution, thus, this petition.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not ca erred when it applied section 36 (paragraphs 3 and 4) of RA 3844 as authorized causes
for dispossession of petitioner.

HELD:
Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowner's rights
to his land" or "authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation
of the landowner's rights"49 impels us to uphold Antonio's dispossession as ordered by the PARAD, the
DARAB and the CA. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away
from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty
demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited
by them.
65. JUAN GALOPE V. CRESENCIA BUGARIN
G.R. No. 185669 February 1, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. In Barangay Case No. 99-6,
respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she
receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on
her own. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it
for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest.
The case was not settled.

Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and
payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as
DARAB Case No. 9378.

The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to
security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not
a de jure tenant. The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed that the
elements of consent and sharing are not present.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD:
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Contrary also
to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land
and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An
agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone.
Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. Thus, all the
elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is
her tenant.
66. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FEDERICO SUNTAY
G.R. No. 188376 December 14, 2011

FACTS:
Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total area of
3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of
Suntay’s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a
total valuation of P4,251,141.68. Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD)
of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was assigned to
RARAD Miñas.

After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Miñas rendered a decision fixing the total just
compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for reconsideration, but
RARAD Miñas denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court,
impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. The petition essentially prayed that the total just compensation
for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the
ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11,
Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank
appealed to the CA, which sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No.
157903)

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank’s petition for the determination of just
compensation.

HELD:
The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as summarized in
Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the
value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their 84 taking under the
voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land Bank’s
determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the
landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the
land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of
the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring
the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just
compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
67. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESTATE OF J. AMADO ARANETA
G.R. No. 161796 February 8, 2012

FACTS:
At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which
was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
7924 of the Rizal Registry. On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out
a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for
townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be.

In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla
property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform
Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted to
occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings,
the OSG moved for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case. Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J.
Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court
litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No.7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of1988.

HELD:
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall ‗cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred
to as ‗land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands
and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Indeed, lands not devoted to
agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.
68. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA
G.R. No. 168105 July 27, 2011

FACTS:
Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that
price, so the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an administrative
proceeding determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land Bank
of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was issued by PARAD to that effect but
it was apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by Listana with the
PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt
and ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction
from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order against
Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the
order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S):
Whether the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.

HELD:
Neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.
Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent’s "Motion for Contempt," specifically
the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are
null and void.
69. LUCIA RODRIGUEZ V. TERESITA V. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011

FACTS:
On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
petitioners Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title issued by virtue of Free Patent in the name of the Heirs of
Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador and that petitioners acquired possession of the
subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest, and that despite several verbal and
written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. Petitioners interposed the
defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the
subject land with the consent and permission of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, siblings
Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to
agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy
relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. On September 10,
2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship
between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved,
respondent filed an appeal, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu. On January 12, 2004, the
RTC rendered a Decision remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether
tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the
purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the parties’ submission of their respective position
papers and other supporting evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and
affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. Respondent sought for reconsideration but was
denied. Thus, respondent filed a Petition for review with the CA. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered
judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties
because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in- interest consented to the
tenancy relationship. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners-defendants are not tenants of the subject land.

HELD:
Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. Agricultural tenancy exists when all
the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. As correctly found by the CA, the element of
consent is lacking. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner;
independent evidence is necessary. Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of
harvest. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an
agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by
substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. In the instant case, petitioners failed to
prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant
case. No error can therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of
respondent’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the
determination of the amount of damages due respondent is proper. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed August 24, 2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA are AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
Dalaguete, Cebu, to determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by reason of the refusal
and failure of petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject land, with utmost dispatch
consistent with the above disquisition.
70. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000

FACTS:
PVB owned 4 parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, and these lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to
landless farmers pursuant to CARP. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by LBP and DARAB,
PVB filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for the properties. The petition was
dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period.

CA affirmed this decision. CA added that the jurisdiction over the land valuation is lodged in the DARAB.
PVB filed for reconsideration but was denied too.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the jurisdiction over the fixing of just compensation is under DARAB.

HELD:
There is nothing contradictory between the "agrarian reform matters" under the jurisdiction of DAR and
the "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" [which includes just compensation]
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The first is an administrative proceeding while the second is judicial.
71. GERARDO RUPA SR, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80129 January 25, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Rupa Sr. filed an action for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot claiming
that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu
Lim for more than twenty (20) years now, sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. Also, that he is the
overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. However, without any prior
written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for P5,000.00 in January
1981. Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and that he sought
assistance with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the questioned property and
even deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court.

However, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the
ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and thus, not entitled to a right of
redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals finds, in substance, that there is no clear
and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is
bound by his admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines. vs. Mariano
Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that he was the overseer and
administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses. Thus, negating his claim of tenancy.
The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land.

HELD:
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce
or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it
is necessary that: 1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2. The subject is agricultural land; 3.
There is consent; 4. The purpose is agricultural production; 5. There is personal cultivation; and 6.
There is sharing of harvests. In the case at bar, the fact that RUPA has been planting coconut seedlings
and minor crops in the vacant portions of the subject land as well as cleaning and gathering coconuts to
process them into copra is borne out by the records.
72. RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO v. ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE
G.R. No. 3808 February 2, 2000

FACTS:
This is a case of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct of a lawyer’s professional responsibility.
Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. In 1991,
he conducted dialogues with squatters — among them respondent — living on said land and offered to
relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused and they filed a complaint against
complainant before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming that they are
tenants and thus could not be forcibly ejected.

This is a case of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct of a lawyer’s professional responsibility.
Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. In 1991,
he conducted dialogues with squatters — among them respondent — living on said land and offered to
relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused and they filed a complaint against
complainant before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming that they are
tenants and thus could not be forcibly ejected.

ISSUE(S):
Whether the respondent committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping violating his professional
responsibility as a lawyer.

HELD:
Respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.2 He was, indeed, less than sincere in asserting two
conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his. What made
matters worse was his participation in bringing such claims to court, knowing them to be contradictory
and therefore cannot both be true, though both could be totally false. In this he is guilty of consenting to
if not actual commission of a falsehood before a court, again in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
73. EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133507 February 17, 2000

FACTS:
Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685-hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan
being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application
for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total
properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T.
Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an
Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings
were that the Affidavit was merely issued under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs)
were issued to the respondents.

Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No. 6657. DAR
Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject riceland but denied the
application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to prove actual tillage or direct
management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on
appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again reversed this Decision and ordered the
reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite the
fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and executor.

HELD:
It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the
same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent
institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia
Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the
same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. The right of retention is a
constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to
mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the
tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against
the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the
landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to
return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. The issuance of EPs and
CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby.
Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is
later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.
74. BAYANI BAUTISTA v. PATRICIA ARANETA
G.R. No. 135829 February 22, 2000

FACTS:
In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of land
owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards, allegedly, were
sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to
vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments
against his person, for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the
case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land.
Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged
to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for
the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the establishment of a training center for
bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fall under
CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the
presence of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to
leave the premises. However, the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation
did not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff. The PARAD
ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB
affirmed the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence,
this Appeal. Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio
Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly delivered to
Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner likewise relies on the
certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding.

HELD:
The Appeal lacks merit. "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they
do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only
show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and why he
became a tenant." In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural
leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled
that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is
either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and
not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. To rule
otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice
of the true and lawful landholder." Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by
virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the
certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In
Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that
a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not
necessarily bound by these findings especially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by
substantial evidence.
75. HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000

FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the
Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction
on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his
widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. Private respondent Exequiel
Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period. On April 1, 1992,
respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed
as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent
from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless". The Provincial Adjudicator
Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing
that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private
respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to
redeem his land. The petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a
Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party
who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season". On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a
complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Saleand Document, Redemption with Damages and
Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for
intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed
with the DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and
intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with
intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the land. The Court of Appeals
affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question
of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts.

HELD:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties.
In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
76. GAVINO CORPUZ v. Spouses GERONIMO G.R.OSPE
G.R. No. 135297 June 8, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a
total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and formerly owned by a
certain Florentino Chioco. On January 20, 1982, petitioner mortgaged the subject land in favor of
Virginia de Leon to pay for his wife's hospitalization. Upon the expiration of the contract, petitioner
again mortgaged the property to herein respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a
period of four years (from December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The
parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the
respondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Petitioner instituted
an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB in Cabanatuan City against the respondents
averring that the latter entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991
and destroyed the palay planted on the land. Respondents in their answer claimed that the petitioner
himself allowed them to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter has paid
his loan. However, instead of paying his loan, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a
"Waiver of Rights" over the landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied
waiving his rights and claimed that he and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were
forgeries.

The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon
ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27
recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most qualified
farmer(s)-beneficiaries". The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise, petitioners ‘appeal and subsequent
reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the waiver executed by the petitioner null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws.

HELD:
The court had already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of
Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through
hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which
the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the government's program of freeing the
tenant from the bondage of the soil.
77. JAIME P. CORPIN v. AMOR S. VIVAR
G.R. No. 137350 June 19, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan covered by
TCT No. T-299732 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Private respondent Amor S. Vivar is in
possession of said parcel of land. Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private
respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure to timely file his Answer
with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision
ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute. Private respondent appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court and submitted documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the
petitioner's lot. The Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals. The
latter upheld the Regional Trial Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties.

HELD:
In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan circuit
trial court, which dismissed defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the case
based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded defendant's Answer and should
have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction
over the case. What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1)
Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2) Affidavit
of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated
April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996. Considering the
foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may present
evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship
between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private respondent
to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and were not previously presented to the
municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.
78. KSMP, INC. vs. DARAB
G.R. No. 139051 June 26, 2000

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella granting
the request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in Nasugbu, Batangas into
residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes. In essence, the Order stated that the
subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there are any tenant-
tillers, disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with law. Fifteen (15) occupants
assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a forty-four (44) hectare
portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior to such, former President
Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27, 1975 declaring the Municipalities of
Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist zones more suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial and urban uses. In December 1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders
and presidential proclamation, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of
Acquisition dated December 14-27, 1989. Private respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their
objections to these Santiago notices. Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who
succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the validity of the questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and
denied the Motion for Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, Maragondon,
Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as tourist zones. On May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a
Petition with the DARAB docketed as DARAB Case No. 0335 for the purpose of implementing the
Conversion Orders which in effect suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was
contrary to the Leong Order of January 22, 1991. Petitioner KSMP filed a complaint-intervention on the
aforementioned case. This was dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently, KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 47813 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the DARAB.
The CA dismissed the same. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene and is a proper party-in-interest in the subject
controversy.

HELD:
The Supreme Court find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering
that the Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no more case
to which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed
pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition
yet of the conversion case, as in fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is
untenable. A perusal of the records reveals that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private
respondents for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final
disturbance compensation to the legitimate farmer-occupants. The complaint-in-intervention,
however, puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB
does not have any jurisdiction. Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the
instant petition to intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who
were not even recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR,
"members of petitioner are merely holding on to expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries
assuming that the land is still capable." The fact, however, remains that the land in question has already
been excluded from the purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and
Leong Orders which had long become final and executory.
79. REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJAS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108941 July 6, 2000

FACTS:
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact,
having power of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a
new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a term of one year. On
December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of one year. After the aryenduhan expired,
despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give
any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or share harvest. On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of
leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, and
the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas.

HELD:
The elements of the tenancy relationship are: (1) There are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject
is agricultural land; (3) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and the Bejasas, between them, there is
no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as land owner never gave her consent. Even assuming that the
Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is
no proof that they did.
80. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP
G.R. No. 152640 June 15, 2006

FACTS:
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) seeks the nullification of the Order of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting PHILCOMSAT's application for the exemption of its 700-
hectare land being subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The controversy involves a
parcel of land owned situated within the area which had been declared a security zone under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848.

A Notice of coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in
question shall be place under CARP compulsory acquisition scheme PHILCOMSAT sought an exemption
of the subject property from CARP coverage insisting that the land will be utilize for the expansion of its
operations. Respondent's application was rejected by the Sec. Garilao citing the reason among others
that the term "security zone" is not embraced within the definition of lands used for national defense
under Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under
P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. no. 1848, can be subjected to CARP

HELD:
The SC agree with the CA when it stated that the subject property is clearly within the scope of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law had it not been decreed by P.D. No. 1845 that it is a security zone.
The very purpose by which P.D. 1845 was passed declaring the area within a radius of three kilometers
surrounding the satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal a security zone is to protect and insure the safety
and interrupted operation of the modern media of international communications in the said property,
as indicated in the whereas clause of said law. Thus, to subject said security zone to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program of the government would negate the very purpose by which P.D. 1845, as
revised by P.D. 1848 was decreed. These laws have never been repealed. P.D. 1848 is also specific in that
occupation of the area, either by the owners or their bona fide tenants, require a prior written
permission or authority from the Ministry of the National Defense, now Department of National
Defense. It is therefore the Department of National Defense which will determine [x x x] who can occupy
the subject property, and not the Department of the Agrarian Reform.
81. ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. v. LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 159089 May 3, 2006

FACTS:
On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for Islanders
Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. with Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation. Almost three years after, petitioner, represented by its alleged chairman
Manuel K. Asta filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended
complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract, were not authorized
by it. Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) has primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction.

On August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's fees. The DARAB decided the
case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding. The RTC
then issued its decision of October 18, 1999 dismissing the case. Finding the relationship between the
parties to be agricultural leasehold, the CA held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. Hence, the appellate court rules that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by
petitioner. Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the
parties this case does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the controversy.

HELD:
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform. Through Executive Order 129-A the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and
authorized it to assume the powers and function of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases.
82. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE BERNARDO V. SALUDANES
G.R. No. 146581 December 13, 2005

FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from twenty – one (21) petitions for just compensation filed on April 6, 1999
by several landowners with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner and the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) was impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land forming part
of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein respondents. Pursuant
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of
land to the government.

The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of Commissioners to receive and
evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After trial, the Special
Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the Commissioners. On February 7,
2000, the said court rendered its joint Decision fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just
compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these above
– captioned docketed agrarian cases.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court. The LBP
filed with the same court a Notice of Appeal. A few days after, the DAR also filed its Notice of Appeal.
Both notices of appeal were denied by the SAC.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari is exempted from the operation of
Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity.

HELD:
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides; SEC. 4. When and where
petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty-day period shall be counted notice of the denial of said motion. The
petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi – judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
recognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
83. HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ AND LEONORA TALARO v. HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ
G.R. No. 162890 November 22, 2005

FACTS:
Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian Dela Cruz, herein
petitioner, who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot No. 778 with an area of 3.362
hectares, subsequently, In September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold the said to Julian Dela
Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell.

On September 27, 1960, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor as the
qualified tenant of the landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortizations over the
land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property and made payments to the government for a
period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and
their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.

In May 1980, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document, with the consent of her children, sold the
land in favor of Alberto, who took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10
years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to purchase the
property with the DAR.

On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750 over the property in favor of
Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0- 3035
over the landholding in favor of Alberto Cruz. The title contained an annotation prohibiting the
beneficiary from selling or transferring the landholding within a period of 10 years from issuance,
except to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and
TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz.

On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the
recommendation of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julian’s CLT and declared that whatever
rights Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the government under the
Agreement to sell were forfeited.

After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision dated July 9, 1997. It declared that
the petitioners were the rightful allocates of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No.
51750 and TCT No. CLOA -0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to
vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said
title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners.
Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD on June 19, 2000.
The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners as farmers-beneficiaries could not be transferred or
waived except through hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with agrarian reform
laws and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her children 109 by Julian,
who were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that in executing the private document, Leonora
failed to comply with DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8

In a Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the petition
of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there was no
tenancy relationship between respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful ownership
over the landholding.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the DAR adjudication board has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases,
they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been
issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs
by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to
parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the
DARAB. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court
from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of
the complaint or petition.
84. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) V. THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private corporations,
partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing
development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services
in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development
financing.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR
whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform
issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, and then subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous rules on land use
conversion.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR
AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further amended
DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The
aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural
uses or to another agricultural use, thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily
suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.

Petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65] of
Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to
nonagricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas
that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. According to petitioner,
there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the
DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted
to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slowdown of housing projects, which, in turn,
aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial
prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE(S):
Whether the DAR Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion by
issuing and enforcing DAR AO # 01-02, as amended which regulate reclassified lands as some provisions
of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done
in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never
made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised
any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions.
85. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. DELIA T. SUTTON
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

FACTS:
Respondents inherited a land in Masbate which has been exclusively devoted to cow and calf breeding,
the respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to DAR to avail of certain incentives under the
law. When CARP took effect, it included to its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.

Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the definition of
agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to withdraw their
offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.

Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the definition of
agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to withdraw their
offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.

In 1995, DAR partially granted the application of the respondents for exemption applying the retention
limits (1hectare:1head of animal) with such, some portion of respondent's land were exempted, some
portion were segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for
reconsideration saying that the entire portion of the land must be exempted because it was solely
devoted to cattle-raising, their motion was denied.

They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing the constitutionality of CARL and
pushing their application for exemption. The President affirmed the order of DAR. On appeal, CA
declared the DAR Administrative Order (retention limits) null and void, favoring the respondents.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not DAR A.O prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising constitutional.

HELD:
The Court finds that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine
and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill
with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds
and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons
and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.
86. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. ROBERTO J. CUENCA
G.R. No. 154112 September 23, 2004

FACTS:
Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City and
devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and sent a
NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under the compulsory
coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. Private
respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of
Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding
is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced
and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that Executive Order No. 405 amends,
modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then President
Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation
of PD 399.

Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio. The
respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado’s motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from
implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value
of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the power to issue
writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.

HELD:
Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed
for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but
to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the
propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments. The main subject
matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation. Note that
no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke
the courts function of determining just compensation. To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of
Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the
CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is
under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority
by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is
clearly agrarian.
87. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 140847 September 23, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organization created as a body
corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made by
Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that
two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-
two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as
legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It
argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general
law, or by the latter's general repealing clause.

The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in an Order held that P.D. No. 27 was a
special law, as it applied only to particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and
corn lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn lands, provides no exemptions based
on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner. The Order of the 91 | P a g e DAR Secretary
was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals which the latter, the Court of
Appeals and hereby, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. It sustained the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 was expressly
repealed not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both laws being explicit in mandating the distribution of
agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands
did not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657. The appellate court
brought into play the aims of land reform, affirming as it did "the need to distribute and create an
economic equilibrium among the inhabitants of this land, most especially those with less privilege in
life, our peasant farmer.

Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision, petitioner filed Petition for Review.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not provision in Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to
the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian
reform laws as regards said properties.

HELD:
Under Section 4 of the CARL, place under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, subject to the exempted lands listed in
Section 10 thereof. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL exempts
the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Ultimately, the result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonetheless, both the DAR
Secretary and the appellate court failed to appreciate what to this Court is indeed the decisive legal
dimension of the case.  Agrarian reform is justified under the State's inherent power of eminent
domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. It has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of
eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
88. JOSE LUIS ROS v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 132477 August 31, 2005

FACTS:
The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Regional Office of Dar Region
7 disallowing the application for conversion filed by petitioners, owners/ developers of several parcels of
land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. The application was based on Municipal Ordinance No. 101
passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lands. Said
ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995. Because of such disapproval,
petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for Injunction with application of TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR
which has jurisdiction citing section 20 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the same and the Court of Appeals
ordered the Public respondent to file their comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from
Public respondents, one from DAR provincial Office and another form the office of the solicitor general,
were submitted, to which petitioners filed their consolidated reply. Petitioners claim that local grants
have the power to reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in
Section 20 of the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified by the local
government is one which has already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or which has
been distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its
authority under Section 65 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective, that if the
land sought to be classified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no confirmation
from DAR is necessary.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction
against the DAR.

HELD:
The petition lacks merit. The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by
Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local
Government Code. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of RA no 6657. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform case, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform, more specifically, in the DARAB.
89. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 127198 May 16, 2005

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of
the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just
compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents’ properties under the land reform
program.

On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just
compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the
government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR
and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as correspondents the
registered tenants of the land.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the just compensation that was provided was proper.

HELD:
Landbank’s contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21,
1972, the time of effectively of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In office of the
President, Malacanang Manila vs CA, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on
the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. In this case,
the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into
account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors’ value and the
volume and value of its produce. This court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the
amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED, Costs against petitioner.
90. PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142359 May 25, 2004

FACTS:
Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
49363,which set aside and reversed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board(DARAB) and reinstated the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAD) of Trece Martirez City, which, in turn, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance
for Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc.
(PBFAI).

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL).

HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands
refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land.
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private
lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. In executing the said deeds, the
members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they
have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same. DAR has jurisdiction over all
controversies involving the implementation of agrarian reform program.
91. VICENTE ADRIANO V. ALICE TANCO
G.R. No. 168164 July 5, 2010

FACTS:
A Complaint was filed by Vicente before the regional office of DARAB in Region III averring that he is a
tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation of a land owned by respondent and has been
performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango
trees which were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve
and establish his home within the premises. However, respondents denied having instituted any tenant
on their property. They stressed that Vicente is not a tenant but only a mere regular farm worker of the
respondent for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees. The decision of PARAD was rendered
in favor of Vicente which was then affirmed by the DARAB. Respondents filed a Petition for Review to
the CA contending, among others, that Vicente was hired as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of
their relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties
share in the harvest. Furthermore, respondents insisted that the agreed engagement of services of
Vicente for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees was made upon the intercession of the
MARO, who emphasized that the same would not ripen into tenancy relationship. CA rendered a
Decision in favor of the respondents. Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB that Vicente is a bona fide tenant is supported
by substantial evidence.

HELD:
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a
result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the
land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do
not automatically give rise to security of tenure.[24] For tenancy relationship to exist, the following
essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests
between the parties.[25] All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.[26] The SC affirm the findings of the CA
that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
92. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD
G.R. No. 175200 May 4, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Mateo Villaruz, Sr. (Villaruz) was asked to work as a tenant of an Estate’s seven-hectare rice
field in order to prevent the land from falling into the hands of squatters. It had a house constructed on
the lot for Villaruz and engaged his daughter and son-in-law to serve as co-tenants. As it later turned
out, the Estate mortgaged Lot 916 to a bank, resulting in its foreclosure when the loan could not be paid.
Petitioner National Housing Authority (NHA) bought the lot. Later that year, the Department of Public
Works and Highways constructed roads and bridges that passed through a portion of the lot. As a result,
some plants and crops had to be cut down, prompting respondent Villaruz to demand payment of their
value. When the demand was not heeded, respondent Villaruz filed an action for damages and
disturbance compensation against petitioner NHA and the Estate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
who as well dismissed the same. Later on, respondent Villaruz filed a complaint with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking recognition as tenant beneficiary of the lot he tenanted
and praying that his possession of its three-hectare portion be maintained. After hearing, the PARAD
ruled in Villaruz’s favor with respect to such portion provided he paid 25% of his net harvest to
petitioner NHA until a fixed rental could be set. But he could not be declared owner of the lot since it
had ceased to be private agricultural land, having been bought by the government. Petitioner NHA then
appealed the PARAD decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
which affirmed the same. Undaunted, the NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered a
decision, affirming the questioned decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB. Hence, the present petition
for review.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not all lands acquired by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for its resettlement and
housing efforts is beyond the scope of agrarian laws.

HELD:
This Court ruled that P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that petitioner NHA acquired for
its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect or
afterwards. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers "lands or property acquired x
x x or to be acquired" by NHA. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the land petitioner
NHA acquired is tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made. In
addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that petitioner NHA shall not be liable for disturbance
compensation. Since only tenants working on agricultural lands can claim disturbance compensation,
the exemption assumes that NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land for its housing program. If the
exemption from payment of disturbance compensation applied only to untenanted lands, then such
exemption would be meaningless or a superfluity.
93. HEIRS OF LORENZO AND CARMEN VIDAD AND AGVID CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. V. LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166461 April 30, 2010

FACTS:
A parcel of land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Of the entire area, the government only acquired
490.3436 hectares. LBP who has the primary responsibility to determine the valuation and compensation
for all lands LBP computed the initial value of the land at P2,961,333.03 for 490.3436 hectares. The owners
rejected the valuation and filed Petition for Review to Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) who dismissed said petition. As second petition for review asking for re-evaluation was
filed to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who issued to LBP and Order re-compute
the value of the land. LBP revalued the land atP4,158,947.13 for 402.3835 hectares andP1,467,776.34 for
43.8540 hectares. Still, such was rejected by the petitioners. Case was then instituted before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao (RARAD) for the purpose of determining the just
compensation for their land. In a decision dated 29 March 2000, the RARAD fixed the just compensation
for the land at P32,965,408.46. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof. LBP moved for
reconsideration but was denied by RARAD. Thus, filed a petition for determination of just compensation
with the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Petitioners moved to dismiss LBPs petition on
the ground of res judicata. SAC rendered a decision, based on LBPs evidence alone, fixing the just
compensation at P5,626,724.47 for the 446.2375 hectares of the land. Petitioners filed an appeal to the CA
questioning the authority of the SAC to give due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that the RARAD
has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation but was denied.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not SAC can assume jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation
filed by respondent after the RARAD had rendered its decision of 29 March 2000 and a writ of execution
is issued.

HELD:
The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, commences with LBP
determining the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using LBPs valuation, the DAR
makes an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA
6657. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative
proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees
with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the
PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation
cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature
94. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 173085 January 29, 2011

FACTS:
In late 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government corporation,
filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
Project. Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court 1 and it is these that are the concern of
the present petition.

The defendants in Branch 58 cases were respondents Armando Simbillo, Christian Marcelo, Rolando
David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube Castro, Carlito
Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez. They were the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they
acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Another defendant was Land
Bank of the Philippines, the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their
acquisition. The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga.

On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) filed
motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints-in-intervention, a remedy that it adopted
in similar cases with the other branches. PVB alleged that the covered properties actually belonged to
Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB had since
foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the same at public auction in 1982. Unfortunately, the bank had
been unable to consolidate ownership in its name.

But, in its order of August 18, 2004, Branch 58 denied PVB's motion for intervention on the ground that
the intervention amounts to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that
the intervention would delay the proceedings in the cases before it.

PVB filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same, prompting the bank to file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 26, 2006, the CA rendered a decision,
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It also denied in a resolution dated June 2, 2006 5 PVB's motion
for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on April 3, 2006 Branch 58 issued separate decisions in all 10 cases before it, granting the
expropriation of the subject properties. The court noted the uncertainty as to the ownership of such
properties but took no action to grant BCDA's prayer in its complaint that it determine the question of
ownership of the same pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation
cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.
HELD:
The Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 2006
and its resolution dated June 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP 88144. PVB's point regarding the authority of the
court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands
involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reason, (1)
At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries
who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City
RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority to preempt Branch 62
of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it.
95. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP.
G.R. No. 178895 January 10, 2011

FACTS:
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of
Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently
placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).

On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao
Oriental, and an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from
CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land
are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for
grazing and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads
of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). That the presence
of livestock has already existed in the area prior to the Supreme Court decision on LUZ FARMS vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform. We were surprised however, why the management of the corporation did
not apply for Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD) before, when the two years reglementary period
which the landowner was given the chance to file their application pursuant to R.A. 6657, implementing
Administrative Order No. 16, Series of 1989.

However, with regards to what venture comes first, coconut or livestocks, majority of the farmworkers
including the overseer affirmed that the coconut trees and livestocks were simultaneously and all of
these were inherited by his (applicant) parent. In addition, the financial statement showed 80% of its
annual income is derived from the livestocks and only 20% from the coconut industry.

On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its
President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent Secretary
requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they
needed the additional area for its livestock business.

The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying
the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that
the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application,
petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for
exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.

In the assailed Decision dated 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition
and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T-12637 and T- 12639)
located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the "Lopez lands") from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld
the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption
with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T-12635) in Barrio Limot (the "Limot
lands"). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(RP T-16356).

The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied in the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated 08 June 2007.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's
livestock business.

HELD:
The Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. are
dismissed, and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby affirmed.
On the other hand, the Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are
thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL, while, the Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and
directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL. In contrast, the Limot lands
were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to
exemption from CARP coverage.
96. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., vs. DAMBA-NFSW
G.R. No. 149548 December 14, 2010

FACTS:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987,
the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President.
This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s
effectivity, on May 6, 1988, Roxas & Co. filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 Roxas &
Co., through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.

As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN
CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which
declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending
application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three Haciendas including CLOA No. 6654
which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas &
Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6,
Series of 1994 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential
before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone
to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.

HELD:
PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including
Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities
as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted
their use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain
areas in the sector comprising the three Municipalities that have potential tourism value" and mandated
the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its
purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those
potential tourism areas are. In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, the Court made it clear that
the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law lies with the Department of 124
Agrarian Reform, not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied,
by Order, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not
automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. A
proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area
declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the
zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable
lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural. Moreover, to view
these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces,
municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic
and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also
undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with
pertinent agencies of government. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said
proclamations/issuances, assuming took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis for
exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coverage. To reiterate, PP 1520
merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as
tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. A mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that
process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.
97. JOSE MENDOZA v. NARCISO GERMINO
G.R. No. 165676 November 22, 2010

FACTS:
On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry.

The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad,
Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime in 1988,
respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth, and
without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs repeated demands, respondent Narciso
refused to vacate the subject property.

On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that his brother,
respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiff’s agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in
the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.

After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent
Narciso. Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narciso’s objection, the MTC issued an
order on October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further proceedings.
On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional defendant.

The PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, PARAD ordered the
respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages.

Not satisfied, the respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing that the case should have
been dismissed because the MTCs referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316.

The DARAB held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently alleged
an agrarian dispute, not the MTCs referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision. The CA
found that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material allegations of the
complaint and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that the
subsequent filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the DARAB. Thus, the CA
set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer,
this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the
authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment
suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of the defendant. In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary
conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules.
Besides, Section 2 of P.D. No. 316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department
of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy
relationship, has indeed been repealed by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988. The CA, therefore,
committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time
this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute
between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of administrative
agencies.
98. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

FACTS:
Hacienda Maria Inc. herein private respondent requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be
placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefore, HMI allowed
petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under
Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved.
From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) covering the entire 527.8308
hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD
petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008
hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn,
that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefore. RARAD rendered a
decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not
devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the
CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the
expiration of one year from their registration.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Emancipation Patents (EPs) have become indefeasible one year after their issuance.

HELD:
After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of
title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the
TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs.
The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no
longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.
99. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

FACTS:
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified
farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners questioned P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation. They contended that President Aquino usurped
legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small
landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid
appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be
made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. In considering the rentals as
advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights
as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the
burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the argument that EO No. 228, now EO No. 229, should be invalidated because it did not
provide for retention limits is tenable.

HELD:
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution
is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact
is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. — Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm,
such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case, shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to
the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling
the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder,
further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
100. PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

FACTS:
The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988" The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of
1,400 planter members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to
enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have
to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal
protection. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not it is correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP.

HELD:

Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as
the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to
redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in
reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.