Persons and Family Relations Summary | Eman Char
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1898 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
(OUTLINE)
Art. 2 – EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Bar Q-1990)
-When a law does not provide for its effectivity, it shall take effect after
the expiration of the 15-day period following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation (as amended by EO No. 200-June 18, 1987).
-The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” solely refers to the 15-day
period and not to the requirement of publication.
-If the law provides for a different period, shorter or longer than
the 15-day period, then such shorter or longer period, as the case may
be, shall prevail.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
146 SCRA 448
Must all laws be published and what must be published?
-Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. Non-publication
means violation of the due process clause guaranteed by the
Constitution.
-All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws or laws that name a public place in favor of a favored
individual or laws that exempt an individual from certain
prohibitions or requirement, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity. EO 200 allows the publication of laws in a
newspaper of general circulation due to erratic releases of the
Official Gazette and of its limited readership.
- The word “LAW” in Article 2 of the NCC includes
CIRCULARS and REGULATIONS which prescribe penalties.
Publication is required to apprise the public of the contents of
the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby.
Must decisions of the SC be published to be binding?
-The SC held in the case of De Roy vs. CA (157 SCRA 757)
that “there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme
Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court”. (As laid
down in the case of Habaluyas, Inc. vs. Japzon, 138 SCRA
46, the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In the case at bar, the
parties filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. At the time of the filing of the motion however,
the Habaluyas decision has yet to be published.)
-Ordinances are governed by the Local Government Code.
Art. 3 - IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (85, 96)
-Covers all domestic laws but only applies to mandatory or prohibitive
laws not on permissive or suppletory laws.
-Foreign laws are likewise excluded because we do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws as well as judgments/decisions rendered by their
courts. These are factual matters that must be pleaded and proved
before our courts in the absence of which it is presumed that their laws
are the same as our laws (principle of processual presumption).
-Not applied with equal force to minors, they occupy a privilege position
before our laws. Neither would this apply to laws susceptible of 2 or
more interpretations.
Art. 4- PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS as a general rule.
Reason: Retroactivity is frowned upon because 1) it imposes a new
duty; 2) creates a new obligation; and 3) attaches a new disability in
respect to transaction already past.
Exceptions: 1. If the laws are remedial in nature.
Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.
243 SCRA 32
Pa g e
Brillantes’ prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 without the requisite
license so when he married de Castro in Los Angeles, California in
1991, he believed in good faith that he was capacitated to marry.
Accordingly, Art. 40 does not apply as his prior marriage was governed
by the New Civil Code which does not require any court decree of nullity
if void ab initio.
SC held: Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages entered
into after the effectivity of the Family Code regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides Article 256 of the same Code is given retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of
procedure and Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Art. 40.
Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya
August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive
effect considering the well-settled rule that –
“ x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of the
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.”
CANCIO vs. ISIP
November 12, 2002
-The modes of enforcement of the
Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court
was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case
considering that statutes regulating the procedure of the court are
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL (expressly provides for prospectivity despite
being a rule of procedure) December 16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does not
apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so,
as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is
prospective in application.
CHENG vs. SY 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)
-The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’
rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws. Other exceptions:
2. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a habitual
delinquent.
3.Curative laws. 4. Emergency laws. 5. Laws creating new
rights. and 6. Tax laws.
Article 6. Waiver (04)
Requirements of a valid waiver: 1. the waiving party must actually have
the right he is renouncing or it must be in existence at the time of the
waiver;
2. he must have the full capacity to make the waiver;
3. the waiver must be clear and unequivocal;
4. the waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a 3 rd person with a
right recognized by law; and
5. when formalities are required for its validity such as an
express condonation of a debt the formalities must be complied with.
GUY vs. CA
502 SCRA 151 (September 15, 2006)
- To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver
may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In this case, there was no
waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver does not state with
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clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios
received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters
“by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all
claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim.” The document did not specifically mention minors’
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a
waiver of successional rights.
- Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary
rights of the children, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Any
inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
-Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of
their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property that must pass the court’s scrutiny
in order to protect the interest of the ward. - Furthermore, it must be
emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake
or misapprehension of fact.
Article 9- In case of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of laws – no
judge shall decline to render judgment. Applies only civil cases not to
criminal proceedings because of the principle that “there is no crime
when there is no law punishing it (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege).
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and
petitioned the court that his name be changed from Rommel Jacinto to
Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to
reflect the result of said surgery.
The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on
the ground of equity?
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “no judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage
in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to
do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted
are statute-based.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on
when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his
sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its coequal
branch of government, Congress.
Art. 15 –ADHERENCE TO NATIONALITY THEORY
(75,78,81,83,87,95,97,98,99,02,03,04, 05)
RENVOI DOCTRINE – where the conflict rules of the forum
(ex. Philippines) refer to a foreign law (ex.USA), and the latter refers it
back to the internal law, the law of the forum (Philippine law) shall apply
(Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).
TRANSMISSION THEORY – if the foreign law refers to a 3rd
country, the laws of said country should govern; this situation is a variety
of the renvoi doctrine (ex. If B, a nationality of Canada who is a resident
of the Philippines and has properties in Switzerland dies, his estate shall
be governed by the laws of Canada based on Article 15 but if the laws of
Canada states that it is the law of the place where the property is
situated that will be applied then the laws of the 3rd country will govern in
the distribution of his estate.)
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
39 SCRA 139
Is Article 15 applicable to aliens who are married to Filipino citizens?
Pa g e
-Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according
to their national law (Cf. Art. 26 (2) Family Code).
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
-Reiterated the Van Dorn decision.
-In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
in the matter of status of persons.
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by
a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code.
-But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce decree, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Under
Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document may be
proven as public record of a foreign country by either (1)
official publication of the writing or document or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document.
QUITA vs. CA – 300 SCRA 406
Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship
turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of
absolute divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate.
Fe is now claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse.
The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether the second marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of
the first marriage was contracted before or after her changed of
citizenship. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her 1st divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could
very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG
January 27, 2006
Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other
and upon advice of a friend obtained a divorce from the Dominican
Republic. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of
Virginia, USA. Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by
the court in the Dominican Republic dissolving the marriage of Tristan
and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to
Tristan was void under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured
her that he would obtain an annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001,
he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily.
Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she
has an interest in the matter in litigation that was granted by the lower
court.
Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case
between Tristan and Lily?
SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of
judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not
simply contingent and expectant.
The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of
Tristan for 17 years vests her the requisite legal interest, lacks merit.
Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her claim
of legal interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree obtained by Tristan
and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and
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duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married here or
abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code which took effect on
August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code
(RA No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign
decree of divorce, entitled to validity in
the country.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
February 6, 2007
Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. His 1st
marriage was terminated when his wife died leaving behind 6 children.
Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an American citizen with
whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced
Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce was granted in December
1973. He then contracted his 3rd marriage in June 1974 with Felicidad.
When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate and prayed
that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the children of the
1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others,
that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death
was still legally married to Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimo’s heirs)
cited Articles 15 and 17 (3) of the NCC in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. SC: In
resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions
of the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis to rule in the affirmative.
In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In
Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the foreign country
where the document is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized
in California, USA, she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
LAVADIA v. HEIRS of JUAN LUCES LUNA GR#171914 July 23, 2014
SC: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the 1st marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to
Pa g e
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the
death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
NOVERAS v. NOVERAS GR #188289, August 20, 2014
David and Leticia resided in California, USA after their marriage on
December 3, 1988 in Quezon City. They eventually acquired American
citizenship. During their marriage, they acquired properties in the
Philippines and in the USA. Upon learning that David had an extra-
marital affair, Leticia filed for divorce that was granted by the California
court plus custody of their 2 children and all their properties in
California. On August 8, 2005, Leticia filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the
laws that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA.
With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the
decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo on June 24, 2005. Under their law, the
parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. And since the parties did
not submit any proof of their national law re. the spouses’ property
regime, in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, then
Philippine law shall apply.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as
the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
SC: The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which
severed the bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas, the Court stated that: “The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our laws do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.” Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment my be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. CA, the Court relaxed the requirement
on certification where the Court held that “petitioner therein was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorced is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.” In this case
however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the
decree was obtained. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual
presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime
of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino
citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
Art. 16 -law governing real and personal property is the law of the place
where the property is situated exception – in cases of succession it is
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration
par. (2) (76,77,84,85,86,89,91,95,98,01,02,04).
Art. 17 par. (1) – Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis
(75,77,78,81,85,91,93,95,96,98,02,03)
(2) - Rule respecting Prohibitive Laws
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
15 SCRA 355
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May our courts recognize a decree of divorce validly obtained
abroad by spouses who are Filipino citizens?
-The SC applied par. 3 of Article 17.
-For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of
the State, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of
the Civil Code.
-The court also applied Article 15 of the same Code.
Article 19 – Golden Rule of the Civil Code (81)
Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. v CA 176 s 778
-This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner
in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom.
FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC), NOW BANK OF THE PHIL.
ISLANDS, vs. PACILAN, JR.
465 SCRA 372
Facts: Pacilan’s current account was closed by FEBTC on the ground
that his account was “improperly mishandled”. This was due to Pacilan’s
issuance of 4 checks to different persons with an aggregate of amount
of P7,410.00 but the balance of his current deposit was only P6,981.43
resulting to the dishonor of Check No. 2434886. Pacilan then
complained in writing to the bank about the closure of his account and
when he did not receive any reply from FEBTC he sued the bank for
damages. He alleged that the closure of his account was unjustified
inasmuch as he immediately deposited the following day an amount
sufficient to fund the check. Moreover, the closure exposed him to
criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The
indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently
malicious and intended to embarrass him. He alleged that he is a
prominent and respected leader in the civic and banking communities
(as cashier of Prudential Bank). The alleged malicious acts of the bank
besmirched his reputation and caused him “social humiliation, wounded
feelings, insurmountable worries and sleepless nights.”
Held: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad
faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good
faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of
another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or
with ill motive.
- Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence. It refers to a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or
ill will that partakes the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill
will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive.
- In the case at bench, the facts as found by the court a
quo and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the
exercise of this right, FEBTC committed an abuse
thereof. Specifically, the 2nd and 3rd elements for abuse of
rights are not attendant in the present case. The evidence
presented by the bank negates the existence of bad faith
or malice on its part in closing Pacilan’s account on April
4, 1988 because on said date the same was already
overdrawn. Further, it was shown that in 1986, the current
account of Pacilan was overdrawn 156 times due to his
issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the
said account was overdrawn 117 times for the same
reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several
instances when Pacilan issued checks deliberately using
a signature different from his specimen signature on file
with bank. All these circumstances taken together justified
Pa g e
the bank’s closure of Pacilan’s account on April 4, 1988
for “improper handling.”
UYPITCHING et al vs. QUIAMCO (December 6, 2006)
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso surrendered to Quiamco a red
Honda XL- 100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration as settlement of their civil liability. Quiamco asked for the
original certificate of registration but the 3 never came back to see him
again. He parked the motorcycle in an open space in his business
establishment – visible and accessible to the public. It turned out
however that Gabutero bought the motorcycle on installments secured
by a chattel mortgage from Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. that was
managed by Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. The mortgage
indebtedness was assumed by Davalan but stopped the payments in
1982 and told the corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had been
“taken by Quiamco’s men”. Nine years later, Uypitching accompanied by
policemen went to Avesco (the business establishment of Quiamco) to
recover the motorcycle. While the leader of the police team P/Lt.
Vendiola asked for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back and forth uttering
“Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle.” Unable to find Quiamco, and upon
Uypitching’s instructions and over the objection of Quiamco’s clerk, they
took the motorcycle. Uypitching then filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law but was
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Later, Quiamco filed an
action for damages against Uypitching.
SC: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to
enable to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is,
however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a
mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil
action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the
sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to
acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead Uypitching
descended on Quiamco’s establishment with his policemen and ordered
the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order.
Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure, Uypitching even mouthed a
slanderous statement. No doubt, the corporation, acting thru Uypitching
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its
right, to the prejudice of Quiamco. Their acts violated the law as well as
public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
This basic principle of human relations is embodied in Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Also known as the “principle of abuse of rights”, it prescribes
that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and
good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude
the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to
unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or
injure another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was
taken was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the
defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco. The
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly
ridicule Quiamco.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. (CCCI), DAPAT, et. al. vs.
ELIZAGAQUE
January 18, 2008
In 1996, Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary
membership. The price of a proprietary share was around P5 million,
Unchuan however, offered to sell a share for only P3.5 million but
Elizagaque bought the share of a certain Butalid for only P3 million.
Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership was deferred twice
by the board and eventually, disapproved his application. Elizagaque
wrote the Board thrice for reconsideration but no reply was ever made
by CCCI. In 1998, Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against
CCCI.
SC: A unanimous vote of the directors is required pursuant to the
amendment made in Section 3 © of its articles. Obviously, the board has
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the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary
membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions.
In rejecting respondent’s application for membership, the petitioners
violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of social order. Petitioners’ committed fraud and evident bad
faith in disapproving respondent’s application. The amendment to
Section 3 © of CCCI’s amended by-laws requiring the unanimous vote
of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed
on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What
was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3 © which was
silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an
applicant as a proprietary member. The explanation that the amendment
was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons, is
flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely
significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost 20 years before
Elizagaque filed his application. It cannot be fathomed why such a
prestigious and exclusive golf country club whose members are affluent,
did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated
application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering
why his application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a
unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a
letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection
to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. At the very least,
they should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in
accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily,
unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized by
bad faith as found by both the trial and appellate courts.
As to petitioners’ reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage without
injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy vs.
Gutierrez (351SCRA731), we held that this principle does not apply
when there is an abuse of a person’s right, as in this case.
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. vs. CLEMENTE, JR. 585 SCRA 300
(April 16, 2009)
Clemente became a delinquent member of the club due to his failure to
pay his monthly dues for more than 60 days. The demand letters that
were sent to his mailing address were returned with the postal note that
the address had been closed. A 3rd and final demand was again sent to
Clemente in the same postal address were the 1st 2 demand letters
were sent. Clemente’s share was later sold through auction.
SC: Bad faith on Calatagan’s part is palpable. As found by the CA,
Calatagan very well knew that Clemente’s postal box to which it sent its
previous letters had been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final
letter to the same postal box.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had
provided his residential address along with residence and office
telephone numbers.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code under the Chapter on Human Relations.
These provisions enunciate a general obligation under the law for every
person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock
corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its
treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every
person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or
members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to
perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock
cannot be the charter of dehumanization.
ARDIENTE v. JAVIER, et.al. GR# 161921 July 17, 2013 701 S 389
Water disconnection by Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) at the
instance of the former owner Ardiente without notice to the buyer
Pastorfide due to failure of the latter to pay the water bill and also the
transfer of the COWD account in their name in violation of their
Memorandum of Agreement.
SC: It is true that it is within petitioner’s right to ask and even require
Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former’s account with COWD to
the latter’s name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement.
However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
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disconnection of the spouse’s water supply. The exercise of a right must
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will
attach. In the present case, the intention to harm was evident on the
part of the petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent’s water supply without warning or informing the latter of
such request. SESBRENO v. CA, VISAYAN ELECTRIC CO. (VECO),
et.al. 720 S 57
FACTS: Sesbreno was one of VECO’s customers under the metered
service contract they had entered into in March 1982. One of the
stipulations found in paragraph 9 of the contract is the continuing
authority from its clients as consumers of the violation of contract (VOC)
inspectors employed by VECO to enter their premises at all reasonable
hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for
trespass to dwelling. On May 11, 1989, the VOC inspectors conducted
a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village including that of
Sesbreno. The inspectors found Sesbreno’s meter, which was located at
the garage, turned upside down. They took photographs of it and in the
presence of Sebreno’s maid Baledio, one Chuchie Garcia and one
Peter Sebreno, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new
one. Plaintiff was in his office at that time and no one called to inform
him of the inspection. The VOC team then asked and received Garcia’s
permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of
appliances and light and fixtures in the household and determine its
electrical load. Afterwards, Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report
with notice that it would be subjected to laboratory tests. She also
signed the Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of
Sebreno.
Sesbreno sued VECO and VOC inspectors for damages contending
that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was unreasonable
search for being carried out without a search warrant and for being
allegedly done with malice or bad faith. SC: The constitutional
guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended to as a
restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law
enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of State power. In People v. Marti (193 S
57,67) it said: If the search is made upon the request of the law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of the
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main
premises only after finding the meter turned upside down, hanging and
its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the
unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances
justified their decision, and their inspection of the main premises as a
continuation of the authorized entry.
Balicha’s (a member of the Philippine Constabulary) presence and
participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an
agent of the State within the ambit of the guaranty. He was part of the
team by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort
the team during its routine inspection. Consequently, the entry into the
main premises of the house by the VOC team did not constitute a
violation of the guaranty.
The CA correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on
Sesbreno’s residence because the other houses within the area were
similarly subjected to the routine inspection. This, we think, eliminated
any notion of malice or bad faith. Clearly, Sesbreno did not establish his
claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights.
Art. 20 – Acts Contrary to Law (78,03)
Art. 21 –Acts Contrary to Morals (75,81,82,96)
1) Wassmer vs. Velez
12 SCRA 648
-Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
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matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21.
2) Tanjanco vs. CA and Santos
18 SCRA 994
-No case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The
plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, for had
she been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because
of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less
for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA,
March 31, 2005
Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void
by reason of psychological incapacity of the other spouse
entitled to moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of
the New Civil Code?
SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the
individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There
is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete
freedom. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of
psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the
party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel
as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding
moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific
evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a
party who had knowledge of his/her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same.
ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COQUIA
559 SCRA 300 (July 14, 2008)
The appellate court’s citation of Article 21 is misplaced not only
because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
which bars the application of this provision, but more importantly
because we cannot deem ACI to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 22 – Unjust Enrichment
FILINVEST LAND v. NGILAY 684 S 119
The sale of a homestead before the expiration of the 5-year prohibitory
period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void.
The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is
void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in
which they were found before the execution thereof. Allowing
respondents to keep the amount received from the petitioner is
tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil
Code when 1) a person is unjustly benefited, and 2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment
when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment
has no right to receive it.
GONZALO v. TARNATE, JR. 713 S 224 (January 15, 2014)
Gonzalo and Tarnate were found to be in pari delicto by the court when
they knowingly entered into a void contract and as such no affirmative
relief of any kind will be given to one against the other.
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not
always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application
contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction public
policy is defined as “that principle of the law which holds that no subject
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or citizen can lawfully do that which has the tendency to be injurious to
the public or against the public good.”
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc. (532 S
74), when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” The
prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the
State. It is well to note that Article 22 “is part of the chapter of the Civil
Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as
basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of social order; designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides
for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to
the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and
dominance of justice.” Art. 26 – (77) – Acts though not constituting a
criminal offense but may produce a cause action for damages,
prevention and other relief.
CASTRO vs. PEOPLE
559 SCRA 676 (July 23, 2008)
Castro, assistant headmaster of Reedly International School (RIS), was
informed thru phone that Tan, the parent of the child dismissed by RIS
but whose dismissal was overturned by Dep-Ed, was planning to sue
the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up,
Castro told the caller: “Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to
[Tan], that’s dangerous.” Sued, he was found guilty by the MeTC of
Grave Oral Defamation.
The SC however, enunciated that “At most Castro could have been
liable for damages under Article 26 (3) of the Civil Code. As an educator,
he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should
always act with justice, give everyone his due and honesty and good
faith.” Art. 27 –Liability of Public Officers
Ledesma vs. CA and Delmo
160 SCRA 449
-Ledesma, then President of the West Visayas College, was
adjudged liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code
for failure to graduate a student with honors. Ledesma’s
behavior relative to Miss Delmo’s case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. It
cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal that was brought about by
Ledesma’s neglect of duty and callousness.
Art. 40 – 41 Civil Personality (81,86,91,99,03)
What determines personality (Art. 40) and its exception and
the requisites in order that the exception may apply (Art. 41).
QUIMIGUING v. ICAO GR No. 26795 July 13, 1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article of the Civil Code. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted), even if the child is only
“en ventre de sa mere,” even as yet unborn may receive donations
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the
parent is his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854,
Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil
Code (now Article 195 of the Family Code) declaring support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children “does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn,” violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears
in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it”
adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article” (i.e. that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the
first part of
Article 40 would entirely useless and ineffective.”
CONTINENTAL STEEL v. MONTANO GR No. 182836 October 13,
2009
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- While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil ARTICLES 50 – 51 DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
personality may be extinguished by death, it does 50 – Domicile of a natural person for the exercise of
not explicitly state that only those who acquired his civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations shall
juridical personality could die. be the place of his habitual residence.

- Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One - DOMICILE – means permanent home and has 2
need not acquire civil personality first before requisites:
she/he could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. If the unborn already has life, then 1. The fact of residing or personal
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being presence in a particular place.
delivered, qualifies as death. 2. The intention to remain in said place
- The CBA did not provide a qualification for the permanently (animus manendi).
child dependent, such that the child must have Distinction between DOMICILE and RESIDENCE:
been born or must have acquired civil personality, DOMICILE is a legal or juridical relation, which can
as Continental avers. Without such qualification exist without actually living in the place while RESIDENCE is a
then child shall be understood in its more general material fact, that is, connoting the physical presence of a
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the person in a place.
mother’s womb.
Art. 43 – If there is a doubt as to who died first involving persons who RESIDENCE however, when used in election,
are called to succeed each other; the person alleging the death of one suffrage and naturalization laws, means “DOMICILE” (political
prior to the other has the burden of proof and in the absence of proof it or legal residence) which imports not only intention to reside in
is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no a fixed place, but also personal presence in the place coupled
transmission of rights from one to the other. Applies only in cases of with conduct indicative of such intention (Arevalo vs. Quilatan
succession between two or more persons who are called to succeed 116 S 700).
each other, all other cases apply presumption of survivorship under the
Thus, a man may have a residence in one place and
Rules of Court. Ex. Between a parent and a child. (98,99,00)
a domicile in another (Koh vs. CA 70 S 298).
Ex. (2000 Bar) – Cristy and her late husband Luis had 2 children, Rose
51 – DOMICILE OF JURIDICAL PERSONS:
aged 10 and Patrick, 12 years old. One summer, her mother-in-law,
- are generally fixed in the law creating or recognizing them. If it is
aged 70, took the 2 children with her on a boat trip to Cebu.
not fixed then the domicile is the place where their legal
Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the 3 were
representation is established or where they exercise their
never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the
principal functions.
settlement of her mother-in-law’s estate, Cristy filed a claim for a share
of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by her children
from their grandmother in representation of their father, and she
inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? Ans. No, her
action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all
the 3 are deemed to have died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the
NCC. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does
not apply to the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue
involved is not succession.

(1998 Bar) – Jaime, aged 65, and his son Willy, 25 years old and
married to Wilma, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as to who
died 1st. Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his
son, Willy, as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that ½ of
the proceeds should belong to Willy’s estate? Ans. Yes, Wilma can
invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that ½ of the proceeds
should belong to Willy’s estate, as the dispute does not involve
succession. Under this presumption, the person between the ages of 15
and 60 years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60
at the time of their deaths. The estate of Willy endowed with juridical
personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as beneficiary.

ARTICLES 44 TO 47
44 – Who are juridical persons:
1. State and its political subdivision;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins
as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
and
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose.
45 – Law that governs these juridical persons:
a. 1 and 2 are governed by the laws creating or recognizing
them.
b. Private corporations are governed by laws of general
application.
c. Partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.
46 – Rights and obligations of juridical persons:
1. Acquire and possess property of all kinds.
2. Bring criminal or civil actions.
3. Enter into obligations.