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PART I.

TORTS Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by


Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
I. QUASI-DELICT (Arts. 2176-2194, NCC) or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
a. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
a.1 Nature, scope and coverage In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married was living with his father and getting
ELCANO V. HILL, 77 SCRA 98
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
FACTS: question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father.
Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was charged
criminally for the killing of Agapito Elcano, son of “It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
plaintiffs Elcano spouses. At the time of the killing, reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents
Reginald was a minor, married and was living with his with their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is
father Marvin and receiving subsistence from him. the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his act was children in order to prevent them from causing damage
not criminal because of lack of intent to kill coupled with to third persons. On the other hand the clear implication
mistake. Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
action for damages against Reginald and his father marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without
arising from the killing of their son. The case was the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
dismissed by the lower court and plaintiffs appealed to does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions
the Supreme Court. One of the questions raised was or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And
whether the father of the minor who was already married surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
but living with, and receiving subsistence from said Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child, while
father was liable in damages for the crime committed by still a minor, does not relieve the parents of the duty to
the minor. see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the
ISSUE: parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot
W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the be done by their minor married child without their
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in our
considered view, Article 2170 applies to Atty. Hill
RULING: notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability
while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to that of his son.”
having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Culpa aquiliana GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA, GR NO.97336,
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be FEB. 19, 1993
punishable by law. It results that the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case has not extinguished his FACTS:
liability for quasi-delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him. On October 27, 1987, private respondent filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the Article petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to
2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20
liability arising from negligence under the RPC. But the years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or character and reputation duly respected in her country;
omission of the defendant. petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City,
Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence covers and is an exchange student. Before August 20, 1987,
not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary accepted his love on the condition that they get married;
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments.
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality her. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the asked her not to live with him anymore and that the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City.
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand,
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict agreed to be married with the private respondent and
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a denied all allegations against him. After trial, the lower
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent
charged has not happened or has not been committed damages.
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes ISSUE:
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 1
W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at HELD:
bar.
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of
HELD: action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore,
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the
se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which
21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts makes reference to the reckless and negligent
and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs sold for public consumption."
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under
of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based
thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to true that the pre-existing contract between the parties
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. the Philippine Islands, this Court stated:

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We have repeatedly held, however, that the
the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in existence of a contract between the parties does not
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by bar the commission of a tort by the one against the
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor.
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise presence of contractual relations. The liabilities of a
was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be
inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other
sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.Quasi-delict, as defined in Article
to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of
2176 of the Civil Code, is homologous but not identical
marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, to tort under the common law, which includes not only
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as
followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy. NAVIDA V. DIZON ET. AL G.R. NO. 125078, MAY 30,
2011
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA, GR
FACTS:
NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were
FACTS:
filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint foreign countries, including the Philippines. The
for damages against petitioner. She alleges in her thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they
complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten allegedly sustained from their exposure to
Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill
of soft drinks and other goods to the students of nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. Some foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred
parents of the students complained to her that the Coke to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the
and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases
matter and other foreign substances or particles. She therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were
brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,"
the DOH for examination; subsequently, the DOH which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and
informed her that the samples she submitted "are "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which
adulterated”. Due to this, her sales of soft drinks was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The
severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the
as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses; not dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum
long after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless non conveniens.
and destitute. In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the
Federal District Court conditionally granted the
ISSUE: defendants' motion to dismiss.
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive
drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach systems which they allegedly suffered because of their
of implied warranty against hidden defects or exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that
merchantability pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil they were exposed to this chemical during the early
Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same
respondent, which can be filed within four years in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or
pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code. when they resided within the agricultural area where
such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 2


their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or CHILD LEARNING V. TAGORIO, GR NO.150920, NOV.
negligence of each of the defendant companies in that 25, 2005
they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream
of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to FACTS:
NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the
said products, which the defendant companies knew, or Timothy Tagario entered the boy's comfort room at the
ought to have known, were highly injurious to the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of
former's health and well-being. nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and
The RTC of General Santos City issued an Order unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he
dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because help. When no help arrived, he decided to open the
the acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the window to call for help. In the process of opening the
manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, window, Timothy went right through and fell down three
their distribution through sale or other disposition, stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. An action
commerce which occurred abroad. under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by
respondents against the Child Learning Center. The trial
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that court found in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the
the tort alleged by NAVIDA, et al., in their complaint is a decision in toto.
tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws.
ISSUE: ISSUE:

W/N DOLE Inc., should be held liable for damages due W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
to exposure of the nematocides.
HELD:
HELD:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint- Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., evidence:
attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides
containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said other person for whose act he must respond
chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,
specifically to their reproductive system. (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi-delict,
which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or Difference between fault and negligence:
omission which causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the o FAULT
Civil Code provides:
Article 2176.Whoever by act or  voluntary act or omission which causes damage
omission causes damage to another, to the right of another giving rise to an obligation
there being fault or negligence, is on the part of the actor to repair such damage.
obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no  requires the execution of a positive act which
pre-existing contractual relation causes damage to another
between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the o NEGLIGENCE
provisions of this Chapter.
 failure to observe for the protection of the
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et interest of another person that degree of care,
al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from precaution and vigilance which the
their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the circumstances justly demand.
banana plantations located in the Philippines or while
 Consists of the omission to do acts which result
they were residing within the agricultural areas also
in damage to another.
located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows
action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao sufficiently points that something was wrong with the
City obviously have reasonable basis to assume door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
jurisdiction over the cases. loquitor. There is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of
liability on petitioners' part. Our pronouncement that
a.2 Requisites Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not
get out using the door, negates petitioners' other
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
contention that the proximate cause of the accident was
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
Timothy's own negligence. The injuries he sustained
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
from the fall were the product of a natural and
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
cause that originated from CLC's own negligence.
provisions of this Chapter.
b. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM:

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 3


b.1. culpa criminal JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, GR NO.L-41423, FEB. 23,
1989
BARREDO V. GARCIA AND ALMARIO, GR NO.
48006, JULY 8, 1942 FACTS:

FACTS: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo


truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January
and a carretela occurred. The carretela was overturned 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo
and one of its passengers, a son of Garcia and Almario, Villa was on its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded
died as a result of the injuries which he received. The the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of
driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While
prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa
reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the
damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck
civil action for damages against Barredo. supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
ISSUE: Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was
then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of
against Fausto Barredo thus making him primarily and the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
directly responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
HELD: respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo
truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
The same negligent act causing damages may produce
against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro
civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the
Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi- delito
pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondents
or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of
Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a
the Civil Code.
"Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and
Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that
Civil Code are: respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P
7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi- alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva,
delitos are only of private concern. Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by
way of amicable settlement. The trial court decided in
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or favor of respondents
corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the ISSUE:
damage.
Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, cause of action.
because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, HELD:
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
The argument that there are two causes of action
fault or negligence intervenes. However, it should be
embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce
on the compromise agreement under the cause of action
civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention
based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action
of ordinances, violation of the game laws, and
for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable. If only
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no
separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on
under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is his person. That vested in him a single cause of action,
a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal albeit with the correlative rights of action against the
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and different respondents through the appropriate remedies
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 allowed by law.
to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that
act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
there was only one cause of action involved although the
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the
defendants therein were not necessarily identical since
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce
the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal
However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in
under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law
concretely the authorities above cited render it
against double recovery for the same act or omission
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case
which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule
the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable
against unjust enrichment.
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 4


Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under  Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct cases, the aggrieved party has the choice
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the between:
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION V. Code [civil liability ex delicto]; and (2) a separate
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL. GR action for q u a s i d e l i c t under Article 2176 of
NO.129029, APR. 3, 2000 the Civil Code [civil liability quasi delicto].

FACTS: Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail
himself of any other remedy because he may
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic not recover damages twice for the same negligent act
corporation engaged in the business of transporting or omission of the accused (Article 2177 of the Civil
beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC). Code). In other words, "the same act or omission can
Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender,
trailer driven by Romeo Dunca. At around 4:00 o’clock that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
in the morning while the truck was descending at a delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the
slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
the road which was uneven because there were damages under both types of liability."
potholes about five to six inches deep. The left lane
parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. Before In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file
approaching the potholes, Dunca and his truck helper a separate civil action for damages against Reyes
saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the Trucking as employer of Dunca, based on quasi delict,
opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
road by taking the left lane but at that particular
moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to Under the law, the vicarious liability of the employer is
run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. founded on at least two specific provisions of law:
Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved
to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. The Nissan Art. 2176 in relation to Article 103 of the
was severely damaged, and its two passengers, Art. 2180 of the Civil Revised Penal Code
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. Code
Reyes Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita.
The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the criminal action but  Preponderance of  Proof Beyond
did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they Evidence Reasonable
filed against Reyes Trucking. They also withdrew their Doubt
reservation to file a separate civil action against  Liability of employer
Dunca and manifested that they would prosecute the is Direct and  Liability of
civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. TC Primary subject to employer is
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and the defense of due subsidiary to the
conducted a joint trial of the same. TC held diligence in the liability of the
Dunca guilty of the crime of Double Homicide through selection and employee.
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor supervision of the
Vehicle Law and liable to indemnify the heirs of Dy for employee.
damages and the dismissal of the complaint in the
 Employer and  Liability attaches
separate civil case. TC rendered a supplemental
employee are when the
decision ordering Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for
solidarily liable, employee is
all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy,
thus, it does not found to be
Jr., in the event of insolvency of the Dunca.
require the insolvent.
ISSUES: employer to be
insolvent.
May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the
damages awarded to the heirs of Dy in the criminal
action against Dunca, despite the filing of a separate
civil action against Reyes Trucking? SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL., GR
NO.151452, JUL. 29, 2005
HELD:
FACTS:
No.
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide
been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a
imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus
of the filing of the separate civil action based on q u a s i driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which
d e l i c t against it. However, Reyes Trucking, as claimed the lives of the van's driver and three of its
defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
against it, based on q u a s i d e l i c t , may be held liable caused physical injuries to five of the van's passengers.
thereon. Sibayan was convicted and sentenced due to the said
crime. There was a reservation to file a separate civil
action.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 5


In the filing of the separate civil action, the trial court ISSUE:
dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the
cause of action had already prescribed. Petitioners filed What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil
a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the case?
same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.
HELD:
ISSUE:
Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclic’s
W/N the trial court is correct in dismissing the case on acquittal does not affect the case. MANLICLIC AND
the ground of prescription based on quasi delict and not PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
on ex delicto.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
HELD: institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
An act or omission causing damage to another may give independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil contractual. The same negligence causing damages
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now
31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.Either In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on
of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code from the crime may be proved by preponderance of
that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on
same act or omission of the defendant and the similar the basis that he was not the author of the act or
proscription against double recovery. omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to
this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue second instance, there being no crime or delict to
the remaining avenue opened for them by their speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the instituted on grounds other than the delict complained
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an of.
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or
reserved. culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt
MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO.150157, JAN. 25, or that accused was not the author of the act or
2007 omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
FACTS: might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising
from fault or negligence in quasi-delict is entirely
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
of Respondent Calaunan.Because of the collision, the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
petitioner was criminally charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property with b.2 CULPA-CONTRACTUAL
physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a
damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI.According to Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to performance of every kind of obligation is also
70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the
expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook courts, according to the circumstances.
the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was If the law or contract does not state the diligence
to overtake another jeep in front of it.Petitioner was which is to be observed in the performance, that which is
then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer,
PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent. OCHOA V. G&S TRANSPORT G.R. NO. 170071,
MARCH 9, 2011

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 6


W/N PSBA is liable for civil damages through quasi-
delictdue to negligence.
GUTIERREZ V. GUTIERREZ, 56 PHIL 177 (1913)
HELD:
FACTS:
No.
A passenger truck and an automobile of private
ownership collided while attempting to pass each other Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil
on the Talon Bridge on the Manila South Road in Las Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had
Pinas, Rizal. As a result of the collision a passenger in been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides
the truck, Narciso Gutierrez, suffered a fracture in his that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
right leg. The truck was owned by the defendant pupils or students of the educational institution sought to
Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was operated by be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while
Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was in its custody. However, this material situation does not
owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. & Mrs. exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
Manuel Gutierrez, also defendants in this case. At the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the whose acts the school could be made liable.
mother together with several other members of the
Gutierrez family, seven in all, were in the car. The court When an academic institution accepts students for
found that both drivers of the truck and the car were enrollment, there is established a contract between
negligent. them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with. Because the circumstances
ISSUE: of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on
Who among the passenger truck and the automobile is quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article
liable for damages due to negligence? 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or
tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
HELD: only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of whether express or implied. However, this impression
the bus driver on which he was riding and of the driver of has not prevented this Court from determining the
another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
as concerns the Gutierrez family, it may be explained between the school and Bautista had been breached
that the youth Bonifacio was an incompetent chauffeur, thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same
head and so contributed by his negligence to the could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the negligence
the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In
made the father responsible for the acts of his son. fact, that negligence becomes material only because of
Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
caused by the minor. school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless
the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out
in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, ET.AL. V. CA, GR NO. 84698, JAN It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
4, 1992 anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures
FACTS: installed, the same may still fail against an individual or
group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos school premises and environs. Should this be the case,
Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) breach of its contractual obligation to the students was
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit for not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be
damages against the said PSBA and its corporate the omission of that degree of diligence which is required
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was circumstances of persons, time and place.
established that his assailants were not members of the
school's academic community but were elements from AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
outside the school.
FACTS:
The respondent trial court, however, overruled
petitioners' contention and denied their motion to Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
dismiss. The respondent appellate court affirmed the trial pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30,
court's orders. 1958. Air France issued a “first class” round trip ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
ISSUE: passenger Carrascoso traveled in first class but
at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to
vacate the first class seat because a white man had a

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 7


better right to it. The purser wrote in his record book campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance
“First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the
class against his will, and the captain refused to construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts.
intervene” which was written in French. Petitioner The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing
contends that damages must be averred that there was students who purchased tickets with additional points in
fraud and bad faith in order that claim for damages their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied
should set in. the opportunity to take the final examinations. At the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and
ISSUE: statistics, respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
W/N passenger Carrascoso was entitled to damages.
ISSUE:
RULING:
W/N respondents are liable for tort.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed HELD:
his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat,
made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another humiliation, mental agony and “demoralization of
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith and 26 of the Civil Code.
has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state Art. 26.Every person shall respect the dignity,
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior neighbors and other persons. The following and
purpose." similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of damages, prevention and other relief:
its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in
law.For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the residence;
Civil Code says:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or or family relations of another;
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
compensate the latter for the damage. from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account


In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal
of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article
birth, physical defect, or other personal
2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
condition.”
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution,
this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an
with the public its business is mainly with the travelling existing contract with its students, since the act that
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and violated the contract may also be a tort. In sum, the
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public of action against respondents, and that it should not
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts
complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a
course by the court a quo.
passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence
of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was MANILA RAILROAD CO. V. LA
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, COMPANIATRASATLANTICA, GR NO. 11318, OCT
though the language used was not insulting and she was 26, 1918
not ejected." Although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" FACTS:
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort". A steamship belonging to the Compañia Transatlantica
de Barcelona, arrived at Manila with two locomotive
REGINO V. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE boilers aboard, the property of The Manila Railroad
AND TECHNOLOGY, GR NO. 156109, NOV 18, 2004 Company. The equipment of the ship for discharging
heavy cargo was not sufficiently strong to handle these
FACTS: boilers, and it was therefore necessary for the
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year Steamship Company to procure assistance in the port of
computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Manila. Atlantic Company was accordingly employed by
Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). She was the Steamship Company.
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, Upon the arrival of the steamship, the Atlantic company
respectively, as teachers. PCST held a fund raising sent out its crane in charge of one Leyden. The crane

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 8


and the boiler were however damaged when discharging passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when
the cargoes. It was found to be so badly damaged that it an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by
had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result,
afterwards was returned to Manila. The Railroad Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against
Company made expenses for the damage; to recover Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed
these damages the present action was instituted by the a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held
Railroad Company against the Steamship Company. Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of
The latter caused the Atlantic Company to be brought in another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and
as a codefendant. The trial court gave judgment in favor Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals
of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but the reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga
absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint. for violation of contract of carriage.

ISSUE: ISSUE:

W/N Atlantic Company is liable for damages. Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

HELD: HELD:

It is desirable to bring out the distinction between Yes.


negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
(culpa contractual) and negligence considered as an The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
independent source of obligation between parties not culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence
previously bound (culpa aquiliana). This distinction is of the tort feasor.
well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully
recognized in the provisions of the Civil Code. As The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
illustrative of this, we quote the following passage from premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
the opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the
vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., and in this quotation we negligence or fault should be clearly established
reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a more because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach
correct English version of said passage. of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
The acts to which these articles are applicable are obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
understood to be those not growing out of transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case
preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
where relations already formed give arise to duties, Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
then breaches of those duties are subject to articles they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause
senses, either as culpa, substantive and independent, of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
between two person not formerly bound by any other proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
obligation which already existed, and which increases doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
the liability arising from the already existing obligation. where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
If there had been no contract of any sort between the relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
Atlantic company and the Steamship Company, an who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
action could have been maintained by the Railroad
merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to
recover the damages sustained by the former. Such CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
damages would have been demandable under article OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESTRELLA, ET.AL., GR
1103 of the Civil Code and the action would not have NO.147791, SEPT. 8, 2006
been subject to the qualification expressed in the last
paragraph of article 1903. It is equally obvious that, for FACTS:
lack of privity with the contract, the Railroad Company
can have no right of action to recover damages from the Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her
Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which constituted granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded a BLTB bus
the violation of said contract. The rights of the plaintiff bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their
can only be made effective through the Compañia destination because their bus was rammed from behind
Trasatlantica de Barcelona with whom the contract of by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway.
affreightment was made. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and
pinned their knees to the seats in front of them. They
CALALAS V. CA, GR NO. 122039, MAY 31, 2000 regained consciousness only when rescuers created a
hole in the bus and extricated their legs from under the
FACTS: seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical Center.
Private respondent Eliza Sunga took a passenger Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and
Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of
Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of Manila. The trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP
the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 9
and BLTB and their employees liable for damages. The provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified apply.
the amount of damages.
Art. 3, (RPC). Definitions. — Acts and omissions
ISSUE: punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit
solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents. (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

HELD: There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate


intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article skill.
2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180
provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is GAID vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 171636, Apr. 7, 2009
demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons
for whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action FACTS:
based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the
employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a
for the negligent conduct of the subordinate two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High
is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due School is At the time several students were coming out
diligence in the selection and supervision of the of the school premises. Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old
employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision store on the left side of the road. From where he was at
of Payunan, Jr. the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to
flag down petitioner's jeepney which was traveling on
It is well-settled that the owner of the other vehicle which the right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw
injured passenger of the same. The same rule of liability anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.
was applied in situations where the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was pinned
with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat
another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. on the ground behind the jeepney. Dayata was then
Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. seen lying on the groundand caught in between the rear
Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit tires.Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.
driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over,
the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim.
injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of
allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of the victim. Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle
Appeals, thus: and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought
to the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed.
Nor should it make any difference that the Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital.
liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from Upon advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was
contract while that of respondents [owner and brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where
driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi- he was pronounced dead on arrival.
delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in
Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the Laguindingan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held
driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the
owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the
liable for damages. point of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his
vehicle after noticing that the jeepney's left rear tire
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right."On
tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto
of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the the decision of the MCTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed
whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly the trial court's judgment with modification in that it found
liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in
sued alone, that the others who participated in the homicide.
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor
is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort ISSUE:
was insignificant as compared to that of the others.
W/N petitioner is negligent for the accident resulting to
II. ACT OR OMISSION the death of Dayata.

Art. 1173, NCC.The fault or negligence of the obligor HELD:


consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds The presence or absence of negligence on the part of
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading
the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two
phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata
flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 10
side of the road and ended when he was run over by the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
jeepney. The second stage covered the span between entertains doubt as to his guilt. Clearly then, the
the moment immediately after the victim was run over prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate
and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt. cause of the victim's death was petitioner's alleged
negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the
FIRST STAGE: Petitioner cannot be held liable during incident.
the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, GR NO.161803, FEB. 4,
the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and 2008
the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence
in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a FACTS:
ride. In the instant case, petitioner had exercised
extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by
the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National
having seen the victim who came from behind on the left Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going
side. to Surigao City. A Joana Paula passenger bus was
cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover
for the protection of the interests of another person that with a trailer that suffered a tire blowout, owned by
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. The driver, private
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover
person suffers injury. The elements of simple askew occupying a substantial portion of the national
negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked
part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road
to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and
clearly manifest. The standard test in determining the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the
whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby highway which was not equipped with triangular,
injury or damage results to the person or property of collapsible reflectorized plates. To avoid hitting the
another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming
the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the
harm to the person injured as a reasonable approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the glaring headlights and the approaching passenger
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to
course or to take precautions to guard against its avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by of the prime mover.
the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for
exist. damages against private respondents prime mover
owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan City. The
SECOND PART: The Court of Appeals found petitioner Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as
guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for defendant in the complaint. The RTC rendered a
failing to stop driving at the time when he noticed the decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc.
bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way
referring to the second stage of the incident. Assuming vehicular collision was improper parking of the prime
arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be mover on the national highway and the absence of an
shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of early warning device on the vehicle. The CA reversed
the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, the RTC decision. The CA held that the proximate cause
in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan
any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and van to give way or yield to the right of way of the
without which the result would not have occurred. In passenger bus.
order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent
operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a ISSUE:
direct causal connection between such negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence W/N Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle.
that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
HELD:
causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of
an injury. Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on
the national highway; he failed to prevent or minimize
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of
the risk to oncoming motorists.
impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death,
as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by
crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner act or omission causes damage to another, there being
immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
were fatal. Mere suspicions and speculations that the contractual relation between the parties, is called
victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can never a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case. The Court the following requisites must concur:
must be satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.Conviction must rest (a) damage suffered by plaintiff;
on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the
accused. The overriding consideration is not whether the (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 11


(c) connection of cause and effect Daywalt claims that because of the interference of the
between the fault or negligence of Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with
defendant and the damage incurred another person for the sale of the property and its
by plaintiff. conversion into a sugar mill.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the ISSUE:


protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the Whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt for damages.
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. The test by which to determine the HELD:
existence or negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged No.
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could
which an ordinary person would have used in the same
not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act which they may have given was prompted by no mean
or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary or improper motive. Teodorica would have surrendered
reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as the documents of title and given possession of the land
applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the but for the influence and promptings of members of the
prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution defendant’s corporation. But the idea that they were in
which an ordinary reasonable person would have used any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the
in the same situation. desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of
grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff can’t be
prime mover askew on the right side of the national credited.
highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of
the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It The stranger who interferes in a contract between other
was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left parties cannot become more extensively liable in
wheels still on the cemented highway and the right damages for the nonperformance of the contract than
wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. Hence, in
It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to isfirst a need to consider the liability of Endencia to
oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt
take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least fromEndencia cannot be recovered from her, first,
minimize it. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was because these are special damages which were
also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in notwithin the contemplation of the parties when the
ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition. contract was made, and secondly, these damagesare
too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia
DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS is not liable for damages to Daywalt,neither can the
RECOLETOS, 39 PHIL587 Recoletos be held liable.

FACTS: NEGLIGENCE, defined

In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract NEGLIGENCE – conduct that creates undue risk of
whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree
Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4,000. They of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.
Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of (Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja,
Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name. G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002)
When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out
that the property measured 1,248 hectares instead of - want of care required by the circumstances. It
452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its
she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to application depends upon the situation of the parties,
Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so and the degree of care and vigilance which the
large an amount and that she had been misinformed as circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is
to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure
performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, the La Corporacion circumstances. (US v. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, Oct. 3,
de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a 1912)
religious corporation, which owned an estate
Elements:
immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to
Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the  Reasonable foresight of harm
representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence
and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of  Failure to take necessary precaution
little force and easily subject to the influence of other
people. Father Sanz knew of the existence of the PICART V. SMITH, 69 SCRA 809
contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from
conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for FACTS:
damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it
unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the
performance of her contract for the sale of the land in Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the
question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 12


blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse in the place not to go near the wire for they might get
to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that hurt. He also told an employee of the electric plant of the
he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. broken line and asked him to fix it. The employee replied
Defendant continued to approach, and when he had that he could not do it but he was going to look for a
gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse lineman to fix it. Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8
was frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. months old whose house was just opposite the road,
His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got went to the place where the broken line was and got in
injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and
against the defendant. subsequently died. Fidel Saynes father of the boy
brought an action for damages against Teodoro Umali
ISSUE: the owner and manager of the electric plant. One of
Umali’s defenses was that as owner and manager of the
W/N the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner electric plant he was not liable on a quasidelict or tort
above described was guilty of negligence such as to give because the boy’s death was not due to any negligence
rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done. on his part but to a fortuitous event which was the storm
that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric
HELD: line.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the ISSUE:
right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over
to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of W/N Alcala Electric can be liable for TORT.
the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have HELD:
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of Alcala Electric is LIABLE under TORT
things this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were
moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident
to escape being run down by going to a place of greater standing on an elevated ground which were about 30
safety. The control of the situation had then passed feet high and which were higher than the electric post
entirely to the defendant. supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of
the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have
The test by which to determine the existence of easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: electric line would be endangered by banana plants
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use being blown down, did not even take the necessary
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the
prudent person would have used in the same situation? electric line.
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric
tort feasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to Plant were already aware of the possible damage the
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his storm of May 14, 1972, could have caused their electric
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and
consequences. property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had
free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent been cut.
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is the morning of the incident because even if he was
to discover which agent is immediately and directly already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the have the foresight to realize that the same posed a
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the danger to life and property, and that he should have
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left
circumstances the law is that the person who has the the premises because what was foremost in his mind
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without unattended to it could endanger life and property.
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of
UMALI V. BACANI, 69 SCRA 263 the victim's death could be attributed to the parents'
negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of
FACTS: the house alone, We could readily see that because of
the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of
On May 14, 1972 a storm with strong rain hit Alcala, defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying on
Pangasinan. During the storm banana plants standing the premises without any visible warning of its lethal
on an elevated ground along the barrio road near the character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or
transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the
down and fell on the electric wire. As a result the live same fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the
electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence
on the electric post and the other fell on the ground of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the
under the fallen banana plants. At about 9:00 o’clock the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on
following morning the barrio captain who was passing by the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place
saw the broken electric wire and he warned the people cut wire was very near the house (where victim was

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 13


living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular inspection by
might mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor
agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the
negligence constituted the proximate cause of the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping,
victim's death because the real proximate cause was expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila
the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and International Airport.
property on that morning due to the series of
negligence adverted to above committed by Responsibility of CAA
defendants' employees and which could have killed any
other person who might by accident get into contact Pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the
with it. obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of
negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in
case) was only contributory, the immediate and maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but using it. As these people come to look to where the
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look
This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the
not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for CAA should made sure that no dangerous obstructions
injury caused by his employees negligence is well or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, undue harm to the public.
which states:
Contributory Negligence
The owner and manager of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a
caused by their employees in the service of the negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff,
branches in which the latter are employed or on tile which although not the proximate cause of his injury,
occasion of their functions. CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the considering the following test formulated in the early
negligence of the employer because the employer is case of Picart v. Smith:
supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the
employees. This liability of the employer is primary and The test by which to determine the existence of
direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in
father of the family to prevent damage not only in the the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
selection of his employees but also inadequately negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
supervising them over their work. This defense was not standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its law. The existence of the negligence in a given case
finding. is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION V. CA, The law considers what would be reckless,
ET.AL., GR NO. L-51806, NOV 8, 1988 blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
FACTS: that.

Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was The question as to what would constitute the
Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
went to Manila International Airport to meet his future of course be always determined in the light of
son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his human experience and in view of the facts involved
companions went to the viewing deck to watch the in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot
arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an be here of much value but this much can be
elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3- conduct by the circumstances which are before them
hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for or known to them. They are not, and are not
damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they
(CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the can be expected to take care only when there is
airport. something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
ISSUE: consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to
W/N CAA was negligent take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
HELD:
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a always necessary before negligence can be held to
legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was exist....
never intended to trip down people and injure them. It
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case
was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the
before the lower court, could not have reasonably

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 14


foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the check with the said bank in the amount of P101,000.00
attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private which was added to his original deposit. The check was
respondent had been looking where he was going, duly entered in his bank record and upon advice and
the step in question could not easily be noticed because instruction of the bank that it was already cleared and
of its construction. backed up by sufficient funds, Tan, on the same date,
withdrew the sum of P240,000.00. A day after, Tan
RAKES V. AG & P, 7 PHIL 359 deposited the amount of P50,000.00 making his existing
balance in the amount of P107,793.45, because he has
FACTS: issued several checks to his business partners.
However, his suppliers and business partners went back
Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While to him alleging that the checks he issued bounced for
transporting iron rails from a barge to the company’s insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Tan, thru his lawyer,
yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes broke his leg informed the bank to take positive steps regarding the
when the hand car toppled over and the rails fell on him. matter for he has adequate and sufficient funds to pay
It appears that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion the amount of the subject checks. Nonetheless, the bank
of the track that gave with the weight of the rails. Atlantic did not bother nor offer any apology regarding the
knew of the weak state of the rail but did nothing to incident. Consequently, Tan filed a Complaint for
repair it. When Rakes filed an action for damages, Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
Atlantic’s defense was that Rakes’ injuries were caused City.
by his own negligence in walking alongside the car,
instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers were told The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
to do. respondent and against the petitioner. It was shown that
respondent was not officially informed about the debiting
ISSUES: of the P101,000.00 from his existing balance and that
the bank merely allowed the respondent to use the fund
1. Whether Rakes was negligent.
prior to clearing merely for accommodation because the
2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes. bank considered him as one of its valued clients. It ruled
that the bank manager was negligent in handling the
HELD: particular checking account of the respondent stating
that such lapses caused all the inconveniences to the
1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his respondent. Affirming the trial court, the CA ruled that
superiors when he walked alongside the car instead of in the bank should not have authorized the withdrawal of
front or behind it. the value of the deposited check prior to its clearing.
Having done so, contrary to its obligation to treat
2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of Rakes respondents account with meticulous care, the bank
will not totally bar him from recovering anything from violated its own policy. Without such notice, it is
Atlantic, although the liability of the latter will be estopped from blaming respondent for failing to fund his
mitigated as a result of Rakes’ contributory negligence. account.
This is because although Rakes contributed with his own
negligence, the primary cause of the accident was still ISSUE:
the weak rails which Atlantic refused to repair.
W/N petitioner, which is acting as a depository bank and
Distinction must be made between the accident and the a collecting agent, has properly exercised its right to set-
injury, between the event itself, without which there off the account of its client for a check deposit which was
could have been no accident, and those acts of the dishonored by the drawee bank.
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. HELD:

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one 1. Obligation as a depositor bank


of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to The banking business is impressed with public interest.
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the "Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such expected, and high standards of integrity and
injury, less a sum deemedequivalent for his own performance are even required of it. By the nature of its
imprudence. functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. The
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or degree of diligence required of banks is more than that
negligence, may be understood in two different senses: of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of
either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on their relationship with their depositors is
account of its origin arises in an obligation between two concerned. Indeed, the banking business is vested with
persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or the trust and confidence of the public; hence the
as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as "appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if
already existed, which cannot be presumed to exist not the highest, degree of diligence." The standard
without the other, and which increases the liability arising applies, regardless of whether the account consists of
from the already existing obligation. only a few hundred pesos or of millions. The fiduciary
nature of banking, previously imposed by case law, is
ASSOCIATED BANK v. TAN, GR No. 156940, Dec 14, now enshrined in Republic Act No. 8791 or the General
2004 Banking Law of 2000. Section 2 of the law specifically
says that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of
FACTS: banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance."
Vicente Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of the
Associated Bank. He deposited a postdated UCPB

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 15


The respondents did not treat the account of the W/N respondent is negligent for the death of Alfred
petitioner with highest degree of care. It is undisputed -- Dennis Pacis.
nay, even admitted -- that purportedly as an act of
accommodation to a valued client, petitioner allowed the HELD:
withdrawal of the face value of the deposited check prior
to its clearing. That act certainly disregarded the Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under
clearance requirement of the banking system. Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article
2. Obligation as a collecting agent 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a
person’s own negligence.
As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or
tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
within the course and scope of their employment. Due to damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
the very nature of their business, banks are expected to is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
and supervision of their employees. Jurisprudence has relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict
established that the lack of diligence of a servant is and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
imputed to the negligence of the employer, when the
negligent or wrongful act of the former proximately A higher degree of care is required of someone who has
results in an injury to a third person; in this case, the in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
depositor. The manager of the banks Cabanatuan extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous
branch, Consorcia Santiago, categorically admitted that weapons or substances. Such person in possession or
she and the employees under her control had breached control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to
bank policies. They admittedly breached those policies take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being
when, without clearance from the drawee bank in done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or
Baguio, they allowed respondent to withdraw on October business which involve little or no risk, a business
1, 1990, the amount of the check deposited. dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise
of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner,
respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a
PACIS v. MORALES, GR NO. 169467, Feb 25, 2010 loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to
FACTS: ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old, died due to a ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-
gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted
was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely
located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun because they are defective and may cause an accidental
store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome discharge such as what happened in this case.
Jovanne Morales. The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the
Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without
the gun store for repair which was left by defendant ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
Morales, who was in Manila that time, in a drawer of a defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before
table located inside the gun store. It appears that accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent
Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent
the drawer and placed it on top of the table to which any untoward accident. For failing to ensure that the gun
Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet and diligence required of a good father of a family, much
hitting the young Alfred in the head. less the degree of care required of someone dealing with
dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability
The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred in this case.
which caused his death was partly due to the negligence
of respondent’s employee Aristedes Matibag (Matibag). S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK, GR No. L-5691, Dec 27,
Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were 1910
employees of respondent even if they were only paid on
a commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is FACTS:
liable for the damages caused by Matibag on the
occasion of the performance of his duties, unless The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a carromata when a delivery wagon belonging to the
good father of a family to prevent the damage. The Court defendant which was attached a pair of horses, came
of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly along the street in the opposite direction to that the in
liable since there was no employer-employee which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon
relationship between respondent and Matibag. The the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that
Court of Appeals found that Matibag was not under the the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great
control of respondent with respect to the means and speed, crowded close to the sidewalk and stopped, in
methods in the performance of his work. Even if no order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity
employer-employee relationship existed, it found that no to pass by, but that instead of passing by the
negligence can be attributed to respondent. defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata
occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
ISSUE: severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut
upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and
the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 16


The cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon, was a burying them. Deciding to help his colleague, private
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered some of his pupils
cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver aged ten to eleven after class dismissal to to dig beside
some forage and for the purpose of delivery the cochero a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
driving the team as defendant's employee tied the wherein the stone can be buried. As teacher-in-charge,
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery he called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael
wagon and then went back inside of the wagon to unload Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, to dug until the excavation
the forage; that while unloading the forage and in the act was one meter and forty centimeters deep. When the
of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete
driver of which cracked a whip and made some other block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got
noises, which frightened the horses attached to the out of the hole. He then left the students to level the
delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was loose soil around the open hole while he went to see
thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear Banez to get some Rope. Three of the four kids, Alonso,
upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then,
the horses then ran up and on which street they came without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped
into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding. towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to
scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately
ISSUE: fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence. which caused him several injuries and later on died.
Petitioners filed a suit for damages against both private
HELD: respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court
dismissed the complaint and was affirmed by the CA.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not
negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described ISSUE:
by the evidence in this case. It appears from the
undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the 1. W/N both private respondents can be held liable for
damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was damages.
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the
horses several years and the other for five or six months; 2. Were there acts and omissions on the part of private
that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence
leaving them in the condition in which they were left on which have direct causal relation to the death of his
the day of the accident; that they had never run away up pupil Ylarde?
to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident
due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist HELD:
in unloading the merchandise in the manner described
on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero 1. Soriano cannot be made responsible for the death of
who delivered merchandise of the character of that the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic
which was being delivered by the cochero of the school and not a school of arts and trades.
defendant on the day in question, which custom was
sanctioned by their employers. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the
teacher and not the head of an academic school who
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that should be answerable for torts committed by their
it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver students. This Court went on to say that in a school of
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can
time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then be held liable. However, respondent Aquino can be held
being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in
the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It his supervision over them and his failure to take the
has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has persons.
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public
now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, 2. YES, Aquino is liable for damages.
to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and
thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct
under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left
custom of a people? We think not. by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play
around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had
YLARDE, ET. AL., V. AQUINO, ET.AL., GR NO. L- to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven
33722, JUL 29, 1988 by their playful and adventurous instincts and not
knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped
FACTS: into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone.
Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that
the Gabaldon Primary School wherein private the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury
respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. that on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight.
time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks Everything that occurred was the natural and probable
which were remnants of the old school shop that was effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino.
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died
stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, were it not for the unsafe situation created by private
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 17


pupils concerned to real danger. A truly careful and There is negligence indeed on the part of petitioner’s
cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the driver Margarito Avila. To be negligent, a defendant must
way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not reasonable man would have realized that certain
have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be interests of certain persons were unreasonably
alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In this
to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of
Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years. the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of
the road before the collision. However, he did not take
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on
the injuries which resulted in the death of the child and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger
Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence. It jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the
should be remembered that he was only ten years old at bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to
the time of the incident. As such, he is expected to be hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy
his age. The degree of care required to be exercised Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or
must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of
degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be a good father of the family in the selection or supervision
judged according to the average conduct of persons of of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
his age and experience. The standard of conduct to committed by his employee, an employer must
which a child must conform for his own protection is that overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
experience under the same or similar circumstances. employee.
Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde
with reckless imprudence. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent,
PHIL. HAWK CORP. V. VIVIAN TAN LEE, GR NO. since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
166869, FEB. 16, 2010 the family in the selection and supervision of its bus
driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently
FACTS: inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the
road. Indeed, petitioner's tests were concentrated on the
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did
and a bus which was owned by petitioner Philippine not know that Avila had been previously involved in
Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by sideswiping incidents.
Margarito Avila. Respondent testified that she was riding
on their motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who REGALA V. CARIN G.R. NO. 188715 APRIL 6, 2011
was on the wheel. They were on a stop position at the
side of the highway; and when they were about to make FRANCISCO V. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS G.R.
a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming NO. 193577 SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the
roadside, and their motorcycle as well. She lost III. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER (See discussion on
consciousness and was brought to the hospital but her Damages, infra.)
husband died due to the vehicular accident.
IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR
The driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident OMISSION AND DAMAGE
testified that his jeep was parked on the left side of the
highway. He did not notice the motorcycle before the TISON ET AL V. SPS POMASIN, G.R. NO. 173180
accident. But he saw the bus dragging the motorcycle AUGUST 24, 2011
along the highway, and then the bus bumped his jeep
and sped away. The driver of petitioner's bus testified FACTS:
that he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a
the Maharlika Highway. When a motorcycle ran from his
vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay
left side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the
Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni
motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he
Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the
turned the bus to the right. From his side mirror, he saw
direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven
that the motorcycle turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did
by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite
not stop to help out of fear for his life, but drove on and
lane going towards Naga City.
surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped the
motorcycle. The trial court rendered judgment against Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay
petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila which affirmed Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter,
by the CA. Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin
Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot.
ISSUE:
His other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and
W/N negligence may be attributed to petitioner's driver, granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired
and whether negligence on his part was the proximate at the hospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another
cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky
Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent. Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo
Sesista, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained
HELD: injuries. On the other hand, Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 18


They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident In the instant case, no causal connection was
was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of established between the tractor-trailer driver's
petitioners. restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision.
Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that
ISSUE: the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not
including restriction code 8 in his license.
Who is the negligent part or the party at fault?
OCEAN BUILDERS V. SPS CUBACUB G.R. NO.
HELD: 150898, APRIL 13, 2011
This interplay of rules and exceptions is more FACTS:
pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which,
according to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken
act or omission causes damage to another, there being pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage (Hao), the company's general manager, to rest for three
done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the days which he did at the company's "barracks" where
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered he lives free of charge.
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by about his usual chores of manning the gate of the
the plaintiff. These requisites must be proved by a company premises and even cleaned the company
preponderance of evidence. The claimants, vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a
respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany
their claim or cause of action by preponderance of him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest.
evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more Informed by Silangga of Bladimir's intention, Hao gave
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead
bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic
regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado,
legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga
the mishap, a person was violating any traffic Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care
regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. hospital around one kilometer away from the office of
Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection the company.
must exist between the injury received and the violation
of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the
violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or hospital. He was then confined, with Narding keeping
legal cause of the injury or that it substantially watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to
in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is talk to Bladimir's parents, hence, on Silangga's request,
without legal consequence unless it is a contributing their co-workers June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched
cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Bladimir's parents from Tarlac. AIcaDC
Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that
negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, April
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in 13, 1995, Bladimir's parents-respondent spouses
establishing liability for damages. In said case, Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias),
Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt "to arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir
establish a causal connection between the safety to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he
violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the was placed in the intensive care unit and died the
accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative following day, April 14, 1995.
presumption that these violations in themselves
sufficiently established negligence appreciable against The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded
the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to Bladimir's immediate cause of death as cardio-
conclusively prove the link between the violations and respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as
the accident, we can deem him as having failed to pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate
discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' s issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as
own liability." We took the occasion to state that: cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure,
septicemia and chicken pox.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications
that may arise from the logical consequences of the ISSUE:
facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article
W/N Hoa’s negligence is the proximate cause of the
2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial
death Bladimir.
guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute
culpability arising from the failure of the actor to HELD:
perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But
the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is
deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation one for damages based on torts, the employer-
between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. employee relationship being merely incidental. To
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts,
intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2)
all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed
compensation for the harm suffered by those whose decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty
interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance
other.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 19


to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, ISSUE:
failing which a breach is committed.
W/N Davao City is liable.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot
HELD:
be considered as the proximate cause of the death of
Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and No. We find no compelling reason to grant the petition.
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient We affirm.
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which,
the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage While it may be true that the public respondent has
is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that annually, such negligence was not a continuing one.
the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing Upon learning from the report of the market master
about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that about the need to clean the septic tank of the public
the injury or damage was either a direct result or a toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent
reasonably probable consequence of the act or immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for
omission. such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the
lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public
Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up
nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise
court's findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's
pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in
bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or the market have been using the public toilet for their
isolating him as well. This finding is not, however, borne personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
by the records. Nowhere in the appellate court's or even
the trial court's decision is there any such definite finding In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an
that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank
At best, the only allusion to another employee being is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers.
afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he The accident in the case at bar occurred because the
knew it to heal within three days as was the case of victims on their own and without authority from the
another worker, without reference, however, as to when public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering
it happened. the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years,
a. Doctrine of Proximate Cause an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be
aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in
FERNANDO V. CA, 208 SCRA 714
this kind of service, who is presumed to know the
FACTS: hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his
men to take precautionary measures for their safety
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of was the proximate cause of the accident.
the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with
the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, supra.
the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An
ISSUE:
invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito
Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio W/N prime mover driver Limbaga’s negligence was the
Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order.
However, before such date, specifically on November HELD:
22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto SC held that the skewed parking of the prime mover
Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside (negligence of the driver) was the proximate cause of the
the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. collision.
One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his
uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
but he expired there. The City Engineer's office natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
investigated the case and learned that the five victim efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from without which the result would not have occurred. More
it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting
master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City and continuous chain of events, each having a close
Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body as natural and probable result of the cause which first
working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five acted, under such circumstances that the person
victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
the septic tank. Petitioners, children of the deceased, injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
file a complaint for damages. TC: Dismissed. CA: In
favor of petitioners, based on social justice. CA on MR: There is no exact mathematical formula to determine
Reversed, in favor of Davao City. proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 20
must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act result would not have occurred.' And more
or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will acting first and producing the injury, either
attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
probable result of the act or omission. constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with
Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As and probable result of the cause which first acted,
discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover under such circumstances that the person
posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the that an injury to some person might probably result
passenger bus and the Nissan van. The skewed parking therefrom.
is the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the
BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181 proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for
the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its
FACTS: side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by response to the call for help, made not only by the
Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to (about 2:30 am), the rescuers had to carry a light with
escape by themselves or with some help, while there them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came was more natural than that said rescuers should
about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected
Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call
from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus
the CA forwarded the case to the SC due to the amount can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
involved. carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to
the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the
ISSUE:
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and should and must have known that in the position in
the other passengers? which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area
HELD: in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree that to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
there was negligence on the part of the defendant, negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come
through his agent, the driver Saylon. At the time of the under the codal provisions above-reproduced,
blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according
to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the MANILA ELECTRIC CO V. REMOQUILLO, 99 PHIL
defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst 117
up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-
zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The FACTS:
chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the
Efren Magno went to repair a “media agua” of the house
brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
of his brother-in-law on Rodriguez Lanuza Street,
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
Manila. While making the repair, a galvanized iron
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters
roofing which he was holding came into contact with the
before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung
There is no question that under the circumstances, the parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2-1/2 feet
defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof.
degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is The electric wire was already in the premises at the time
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American the house was built. This distance of 2-1/2 feet of the
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. “media agua” from the electric wire was not in
It is as follows: accordance with city regulations which required a
distance of 3 feet but somehow or other the owner of the
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous building was able to have the construction approved. In
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno
cause, produces the injury, and without which the against the Manila Electric Co. the CA awarded

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 21


damages holding that although the owner of the house in injury because of prior defection condition,
constructing the “media agua” exceeded the limits fixed such subsequent act or condition is the
in the permit, still after making that finally approved proximate cause.
because he was given a final permit to occupy the house
and that the company was at fault and guilty of TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT
negligence because although the electric wire had been CO., 16 PHIL 8
installed long before the construction of the house the
electric company did not exercise due diligence nor take FACTS:
other precautionary measures as may be warranted.
Said decision was appealed to the SC. The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps
used for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the
HELD: premises behind its power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15
years of age, in company with another boy 12 years of
SC held that the real cause of the accident or death was age, entered the premises of the defendant, saw the
the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon reaching
home they made a series of experiments with the caps.
When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light
“media agua” just below the third story window, it is to be socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break
presumed that due to his age and experience he was the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of
qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff
So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match
wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to
in the instant case, his training and experience failed the boys. This action was brought by the plaintiff to
him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length,
evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and ISSUE:
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his
arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the
own electrocution. petitioners

But even assuming for a moment that the defendant HELD:


electric company could be considered negligent in
installing its electric wires so close to the house and No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident
‘mediaagua’ in question, and in failing to properly which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in
insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that
claim of said company it was impossible to make the having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one
insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the of its determining factors, he cannot recover."
defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno,
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon
such supposed negligence of the company must have
defendant's property without defendant's express
been the proximate and principal cause of the accident,
invitation or permission would not have relieved
because if the act of Magno in turning around and
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury
the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution,
were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we
then his heirs may not recover.
are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was
of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of
iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length and putting match to its contents was the proximate
of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
find the following citation helpful: therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
nothing more than furnish the condition or give was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
rise to the occasion by which the injury was mentally and physically than the average boy of his
made possible, if there intervened between age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to
such prior or remote cause and the injury a earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient days after the injury was incurred; and the record
cause of the injury, even though such injury discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
would not have happened but for such injury qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record
would not have happened but for such leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on
condition or occasion. If not danger existed in the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character
the condition except because of the of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
independent cause, such condition was not series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
the proximate cause. And if an independent produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who
negligent act or defective condition sets into was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt
operation the circumstances which result in to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 22


by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, 1. W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory
and the final success of his endeavors brought about negligence due to violation of traffic rules and
by the application of a match to the contents of the regulation which added to the proximate cause of
caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. the accident or such was based solely on the
Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had negligence of the panel truck driver.
reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years 2. W/N petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the
of age, who was within him at the time when he put the selection and supervision of its employees.
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and ran away. HELD:

True, he may not have known and probably did not 1. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of
know the precise nature of the explosion which might the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between
be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, the vehicles. Petitioner has the burden of showing a
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries causal connection between the injury received and the
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, must show that the violation of the statute was the
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
the explosion. It would be going far to say that substantially contributed thereto. Petitioner says that
"according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning
such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be headlight during night time certainly increases the risk of
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else accident," that because the Cimarron had only one
should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the
by him under such circumstances. fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be convinced that no maneuvering which the Cimarron
said to have the necessary capacity to understand and driver could have done would have avoided a collision
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the events.
acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of immaterial.
such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the
things the question of negligence necessarily depends accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the
on the ability of the minor to understand the character trial court noted, the swerving of petitioners panel truck
of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners
which a minor can be said to have such ability will driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but
necessarily depends of his own acts and their that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be as well.
said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite 2. With respect to the requirement of passing
variety of acts which may be done by him. psychological and physical tests prior to his employment,
although no law requires it, such circumstance would
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. CA, 300 SCRA 20 certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence. As the trial court said:
FACTS:
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and
This case involves a collision between a truck owned by emotional, were conducted on their would-be
petitioner and a cimarron which caused the death of employees. No on-the-job training and seminars
three persons and injuries to several others. Petitioner’s reminding employees, especially drivers, of road
truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped on courtesies and road rules and regulations were
the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused done. There were no instructions given to
his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of
portion of the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioner’s emergency nor what to do after an emergency
driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded occurs. All these could only mean failure on the part
damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it
contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of of a good father of a family in the selection and
contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of supervision of its employees. Indeed, driving exacts
traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only one a more than usual toll on the sense. Accordingly, it
headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that behooves employers to exert extra care in the
sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver selection and supervision of their employees. They
stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by
further argued that the driver should be exonerated law. But petitioner did not show in what manner
based on the doctrine of last clear chance, which states drivers were supervised to ensure that they drove
that the person who has the last clear chance of their vehicles in a safe way.
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts
of his opponent, is solely responsible for the MERCURY DRUG V. BAKING, GR NO. 156037, MAY
consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that 25, 2007
the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an
accident. FACTS:

ISSUE: Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy


for a medical check-up. Respondent was given two
medical prescriptions Diamicron for his blood sugar and

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 23


Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is
proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation to buy caused by the negligence of an employee, there
the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has
misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription been negligence on the part of the employer, either in
for Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. On the third day the selection of his employee or in the supervision over
of taking the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular him, after such selection. The presumption, however,
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
one Josie Peralta due to falling asleep while driving. He employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of
could not remember anything about the collision nor felt a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a of his employee. Thus, petitioner's failure to prove that it
bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Dr. in the selection and supervision of its employee will
Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. The
trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent BPI V. SUAREZ, GR NO. 167750, MAR 15, 2010
and this was affirmed by the CA in toto.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether who used to maintain both savings and current accounts
such negligence was the proximate cause of with petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
respondents accident. Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several
parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not to deal
HELD: directly with the land owners. They agreed that the client
would deposit the money in Suarez’s BPI account as
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: payment for the Tagaytay properties and then, Suarez
would issue checks to the sellers. An RCBC check was
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes then deposited to Suarez’s current account in BPI.
damage to another, there being fault or Suarez instructed his secretary, Garaygay, to confirm
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing already credited to his account that same day it was
contractual relation between the parties, is called a deposited. It was alleged that BPI confirmed the same-
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this day crediting of the RCBC check. With this, Suarez
Chapter. issued on the same day five checks for the purchase of
the Tagaytay properties. Days after while in the U.S. for
Requisites under Art. 2176: vacation, he was informed by Garaygay that the checks
issued were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
with penalties despite an assurance from RCBC that it
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, has already been debited in his account and fully
funded. Claiming that BPI mishandled his account
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault through negligence, Suarez filed with the Regional Trial
or negligence of the defendant and the damage Court a complaint for damages. The TC rendered
incurred by the plaintiff. judgment in favor of respondent which was affirmed by
CA.
Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to
respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed ISSUE:
Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a
matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn against
employee should have been very cautious in dispensing insufficient funds), instead of DAUD (drawn against
medicines. She should have verified whether the uncollected deposit)on the checks,is the proximate
medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one cause of respondents injury.
prescribed by his physician. The care required must be
HELD:
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the superior knowledge In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his
of the business which the law demands. claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous
marking of DAIF on the checks. Proximate Cause has
Proximate Cause
been defined as any cause which, in natural and
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken intervening cause, produces the result complained of
by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result and without which would not have occurred. There is
would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is nothing in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows
determined from the facts of each case, upon a that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks
combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, proximately caused his alleged psychological or social
and precedent. injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered
humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred titles to Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to
had petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys the dishonor of his checks, not due to the erroneous
prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the
asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision. unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same directly caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. In
Code.The employer of a negligent employee is liable for
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 24
short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages assuming of course that the contributory negligence
for his own negligence. was the proximate cause of the injury of which
complaint is made.
RAMOS V. C.O.L. REALTY, GR NO. 184905, AUG. 28,
2009 Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant
case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via
FACTS: Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause
A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any
Sedan, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, damages suffered by respondent from the
and driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford accident.Proximate cause is defined as that cause,
Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty) any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the without which the result would not have occurred. And
Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
came from. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. Ramos denied which first acted, under such circumstances that the
liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence person responsible for the first event should, as an
of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah an injury to some person might probably result
Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed therefrom.
thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the
intersection. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for accident would not have happened. This specific
the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition
hospitalization of Estela. The demand fell on deaf ears was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person
prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for who resides within the vicinity where the accident
Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that
Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC the accident would be a natural and probable result if he
rendered the decision exculpating Ramos from liability. crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The CA affirmed considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of
the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error
per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila Development for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle
Authority (MMDA). embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
ISSUE: proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. It is unnecessary to delve into the issue of
Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his
Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot
driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L.
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the
Realty for damages suffered in a vehicular collision.
immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
HELD:
VALLACAR TRANSIT V. CATUBIG G.R. NO. 175512
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts MAY 30, 2011
apply in this case, viz:
FACTS:
Article 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner.
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband, Quintin
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from
awarded. Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with
his employee, Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig
Article 2185.Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
was the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over
was violating any traffic regulation.
to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by
If the master is injured by the negligence of a the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the
third person and by the concurring contributory opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided,
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s Catubig and Emperado were thrown from the
negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was
the superior’s action against the third person, thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the
hospital.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 25


ISSUE: Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
W/N the proximate cause of the collision was Catubig’s the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
reckless and negligent act. prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that
a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or
HELD: reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two months.
The petition is meritorious.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
The issue of negligence is basically factual. of Article 2180 are applicable.
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
Article 2180 of the Civil Code — imputing fault or presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
negligence of its employee — does not apply to violating any traffic regulation.
petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee
driver, Cabanilla, which would have made the latter Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of
liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or
Code, has never been established by respondent. To the injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons
contrary, the totality of the evidence presented during or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
trial shows that the proximate cause of the collision of when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in
the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to the his occupation or business.
negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
TISON V. POMASIN G.R. NO. 173180 AUGUST 24,
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in 2011, supra
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and CAEDO V. YU KHE THAI, 26 SCRA 381
without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that FACTS:
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, Ave., in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village bound for the
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the airport. Several members of his family were in the car.
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
which first acted, under such circumstances that the of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael
person responsible for the first event should, as an Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that was a caretela (rig). Defendant’s driver did not notice it
an injury to some person might probably result until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of
therefrom. slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s driver
veered to the left with the intention of passing by the
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream
Catubig's overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of of the caretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s
him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with
immediate and proximate cause of the collision which the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his
led to his own death. part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision
by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas and same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family.
PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving the bus at a Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the
reckless speed when the collision occurred lack driver and owner of the Cadillac car.
probative value.
ISSUE:
We are unable to establish the actual speed of the bus
from Cadimas's testimony for he merely stated that the W/N Bernardo is liable? If Yes, W/N Yu Khe Thai is
bus did not stop when he tried to flag it down because it solidarily liable with Bernardo?
was "running very fast."
HELD:
The presumption that employers are negligent under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the negligence YES. Bernardo is liable, because facts reveal that the
of their employees. Having adjudged that the immediate collision was directly traceable to his negligence. BUT,
and proximate cause of the collision resulting in owner, Yu Khe Thai is not solidarily liable with his
Catubig's death was his own negligence, and there was driver.
no fault or negligence on Cabanilla's part, then such
presumption of fault or negligence on the part of Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a master’s liability in a
petitioner, as Cabanilla's employer, does not even arise. vehicular accident.Note however that the 2nd sentence
Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense of Art 2184 qualifies before the owner can be made
of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the solidarity liable with the negligent driver. This is
selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee because the basis of the master’s liability is not
driver. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but rather the relationship
of PATERFAMILIAS. The theory is that, the negligence
b. Doctrine of Imputed Negligence of the servant, is known to the master and susceptible
of timely correction by him, reflects the master’s
negligence if he fails to correct it order to prevent injury
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 26
or damage.Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 is neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired from
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held in a his conductor if they could still accommodate
uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are passengers and learning that they were already full, he
professional drivers. The law does not require that a decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the
person must possess a certain measure of skill or national highway. Virgilio Llamoso admitted that there
proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the was another motor vehicle ahead of him. The general
observance of traffic rules before he can own a motor rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the
vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning right-of-way as against a feeder road.
of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad,
order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a arrive at the intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that
maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and the intersection began to move forward, and for his part,
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of way to the jeepney. At about this time, the KBL bus was
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very approaching the intersection and its driver was engaged
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would in determining from his conductor if they would still pass
be effectively proscribed. through the town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they
were already full, he turned his attention to the road and
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that found the stopped vehicles at the intersection with the
Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The KBL bus
1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo had no more room within which to stop without slamming
Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty.
years. During that time he had no record of violation of Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on
traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven
employed him at all may be imputed to his master. by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to
cross the center of the highway and was directly on the
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be path of the KBL bus. The gamble made by Llamoso did
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of not pay off. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the
from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon and stopped only when it hit an electric post. After trial,
it. the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private
respondents which was affirmed by the CA but modified
We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. the award of damages.
The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and ISSUE:
devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason
for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He W/N petitioner is liable for the accident.
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his
driver. He became aware of the presence of the HELD:
carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it,
but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute Kapalaran’s driver had become aware that some
negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And vehicles ahead of the bus and traveling in the same
even when he did see it at that distance, he could not direction had already stopped at the intersection
have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver,
another car was approaching from the opposite who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and
direction. The time element was such that there was no proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the any case too high to be able to slow down and stop
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The behind the cars which had preceded it and which had
thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the
man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within
thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus
due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and
regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation
KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO, GR NO. and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended.
85331, AUG 25, 1989 Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was
negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was unable to
FACTS: overthrow.

The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached the Application of Article 2180:
intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped
and cautiously treated the intersection as a "Thru Stop' The patent and gross negligence on the part of the
street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its way from petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of
Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. The regular negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of
itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for
Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is already damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its
fully loaded with passengers and can no longer own negligent employee. The liability of the employer
accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL bus under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 27


immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as
the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record driver and employee.
shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the
presumption of negligence on its own part. In this case, we hold petitioner primarily
and solidarily liable for the damages caused by
MENDOZA V. SORIANO, ET.AL, GR NO. 164012, Macasasa. Respondents could recover directly from
JUNE 8, 2007 petitioner since the latter failed to prove that she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
FACTS: supervising Macasasa.
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, Contributory Negligence
was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer
Macasasa. He was thrown five meters away, while the We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not
impact. One of Soriano’s companions, using the pedestrian overpass while crossing
asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the
after checking out the scene of the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the
incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A appellate court had properly reduced by 20% the amount
school bus brought him to the hospital where he later of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction of
died. the amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the
Civil Code which reads:
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against
petitioner. It found Soriano negligent for When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a small gap in immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
the islands fencing rather than the pedestrian overpass cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
and that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and only contributory, the immediate and proximate
supervision of Macasasa. The Court of Appeals reversed cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
the trial court’s decision. care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
ISSUE:
ANONUEVO V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 130003, OCT. 20,
W/N petitioner is liable and W/N respondent is guilty of 2004
contributory negligence.
FACTS:
HELD:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his
Application of Article 2185 bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane
was driving his Lancer car with owned by Procter and
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother,
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left
he was violating traffic regulations. The records show that turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a
Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to result. As testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano,
maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. Both Añonuevo was “umaarangkada,” or speeding as he
the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa made the left turn into Libertad and that Añonuevo failed
overspeeding. The records show also that Soriano was to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence
thrown five meters away after he was hit. Moreover, the required of him in order that the accident could have
vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of been avoided.
impact.Both circumstances support the conclusion that
the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before
Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section 55, the RTC. The RTC rendered judgment against Procter
Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. and Gamble and Añonuevo while the Court of Appeals
While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. What remains
undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a ISSUE:
police officer, nor did he summon a doctor.
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply
Application of Article 2180 by analogy to non-motorized vehicles and whether
Villagracia’s own fault and negligence serves to absolve
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are the Añonuevo of any liability for damages.
liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability HELD:
arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers
in supervising their employees unless they prove that The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume
family to prevent the damage.While respondents could that the law intended a broader coverage.
recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and
petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
as owner and employer, is directly and separately civilly is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that this was violating any traffic regulation.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 28


As distinguished, motorized vehicle operates by reason occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which happened, was the very thing which the statute or
runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of ordinance was intended to prevent.
burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle,
unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion is Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non- Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an
motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized ordinance?
vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or
damage in the event of an accident or collision. It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for
requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the
obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face
were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger
against, then the framers of the Code would have sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he
expanded the provision to include non-motorized violated. However, there is the fact which we consider
vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the
not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate
peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would
dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of
existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection, whether
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We
motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have
the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety
recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the regulations, especially considering that Añonuevo was
standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had
footing with other types of vehicles. Thus, we cannot seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had
sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow
NEGLIGENCE PER SE: down as he proceeded to make the left turn. The failure
of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or
statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery
matter of law, or negligence per se. The mere fact of unless a causal connection is established between such
violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise
inference that such violation was the proximate cause of finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared
the injury complained. However, if the very injury has that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as
happened which was intended to be prevented by the the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will contributed thereto. Añonuevo had the burden of clearly
be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury. proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was
the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications
that may arise from the logical consequences of the FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER V. DELOS SANTOS
facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article G.R. NO. 152033 MARCH 16, 2011
2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial
guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute FACTS:
culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform
up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the On the night of September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the wife of
relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the respondent Wilfredo de los Santos (Wilfredo), performed
statutory violation and the injury at the Rizal Theater in Makati City, Metro Manila as a
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are member of the cast for the musical play, Woman of the
not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in Year.
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to
provide compensation for the harm suffered by those On that same night, at the request of Wilfredo, his
whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct brother Armando de los Santos (Armando), husband of
of others. respondent Carmina Vda. de los Santos, went to the
Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after the latter's
WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE: performance. He drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma
(Galant Sigma) with Plate No. NSL 559, a company car
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. assigned to Wilfredo.
If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed
limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his Two other members of the cast of Woman of the Year,
prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is namely, Annabel Vilches (Annabel) and Jerome Macuja,
enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance joined Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma.
intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating
the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan
brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the
to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S.
Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of
ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the
injury by the intervention of another agency if the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 29


Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond evidence, that they complied with
recognition all four occupants of the car. everything that was incumbent on
them.
ISSUE:
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
W/N Mejia was negligent.
Court of Appeals, it was explained
W/N petitioner exercised the due diligence of a good that:
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee. Due diligence in the
supervision of employees on
HELD: the other hand, includes the
formulation of suitable rules
st
1 Issue: and regulations for the
guidance of employees and
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed the issuance of proper
beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically instructions intended for the
Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Given the protection of the public and
circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's persons with whom the
vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour, while the records employer has relations
show that he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers through his or its employees
per hour. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is and the imposition of
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving necessary disciplinary
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the measures upon employees in
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. case of breach or as may be
Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the warranted to ensure the
traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was performance of acts
the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart indispensable to the business
from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is of and beneficial to their
nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and employer. To this, we add that
drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with actual implementation and
all the condition's encountered which will enable him to monitoring of consistent
keep the vehicle under control and, whenever compliance with said rules
necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury should be the constant
to others using the highway. To suggest that De los concern of the employer,
Santos was equally negligent based on that sole acting through dependable
statement of the RTC is erroneous. The entire evidence supervisors who should
presented must be considered as a whole. Incidentally, a regularly report on their
close reading of the ruling of the CA would clearly show supervisory functions.
the negligence of Mejia.
nd In order that the defense of
2 Issue:
due diligence in the selection
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury and supervision of employees
is caused by the negligence of the employee, there may be deemed sufficient and
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was plausible, it is not enough to
negligence on the part of the master or employer either emptily invoke the existence
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in of said company guidelines
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability and policies on hiring and
of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and supervision. As the
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse negligence of the employee
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of gives rise to the presumption
the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is of negligence on the part of
incumbent upon the private respondents (in this case, the employer, the latter has
the petitioner) to prove that they exercised the diligence the burden of proving that it
of a good father of a family in the selection and has been diligent not only in
supervision of their employee. the selection of employees
but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The
In Manliclic v. Calaunan, this Court ruled that:
mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures
In the selection of prospective and supervisory policies,
employees, employers are required to without anything more, is
examine them as to their decidedly not sufficient to
qualifications, experience and service overcome such presumption.
records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must
We emphatically reiterate our
formulate standard operating
holding, as a warning to all
procedures, monitor their
employers, that "the
implementation and impose
formulation of various
disciplinary measures for the breach
company policies on safety
thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
without showing that they
employers must submit concrete
were being complied with is
proof, including documentary
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 30
not sufficient to exempt happened "every hour." Obviously, merely ordering the
petitioner from liability arising brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms
from negligence of its reporting derailments — which reports have not been
employees. It is incumbent acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments — is not
upon petitioner to show that in the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
recruiting and employing the
erring driver the recruitment CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
procedures and company
policies on efficiency and We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty
safety were followed." . . . . of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he
was not at his assigned station when the train was
derailed. That might have been a violation of company
d. Res Ipsa Loquitur
rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury,
Translation: “The thing speaks for itself.” as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to
Requisites: suppose that he would not have been injured if he had
1. Event does not ordinarily occur stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he
o NOTE: The test is not based on “rarity” had been killed because he chose to ride in the
but that it would not ordinarily occur in caboose. Contributory negligence has been defined as
the absence of negligence. "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care
2. Exclusive control of defendant on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
3. No other cause the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of
4. No fault on party injured the injury." It has been held that "to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that
MAAO CENTRAL CO. V. CA, GR NO. 83491, AUG. 27, he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
1990 disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger
to health and body." There is no showing that the
FACTS: caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous
place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite
Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose warnings or signs of impending danger.
or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the
petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. RES IPSA LOQUITOR
He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but
the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels The absence of the fish plates — whatever the cause or
and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the reason — is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the
spot. The claims for death and other benefits having petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described
been denied by the petitioner, the herein private recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
respondent filed suit in the RTC of Bago City. Judge (167 SCRA 376) thus: Where the thing which causes
Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the injury is shown to be under the management of the
total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
contributory negligence and the total pension of course of things does not happen if those who have the
P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would management use proper care, it affords reasonable
be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it
was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In its FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, AUG 29, 1988
own decision, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial
FACTS:
court except as to the contributory negligence of the
deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in
the private respondent. Caloocan City was situatedadjacent to the residence of
the Mables.Sometime in August 1971, private
ISSUE:
respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz,
W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its constructed between the shop and Mable’s residence.
defense of due diligence under Art 2176 of the Civil The request was repeated several times but they fell on
Code. deaf ears.In the early morning of September 6, 1974,
fire broke out in Cruz’s shop.Cruz’s employees, who
HELD: slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire,
buttheir efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the
Petitioner is guilty of negligence and cannot claim Mables’ house. Both the shopand the house were
defense under Art 2176. razed to the ground.The Mables collected P35,000.00
on the insurance on their house and thecontents
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND thereof.The Mables filed an action for damages against
SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES; NOT EXERCISED IN the Cruz’s.The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA
THE CASE AT BAR. affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages.

The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of ISSUE:


Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it has
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision W/N the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to
of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record the case.
shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the
necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good HELD:
condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 31


YES. The doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable performance of his duties as a soldier. Crame alleges
to the case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz that he was only going at about 10 miles per hour, and
liable for the loss sustained by the Mables’. that since Coombs suddenly appeared in front of the
car, he tried but failed to change the course of the
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as automobile so as to avoid hitting him. The trial court
follows: convicted Crame of serious physical injuries by
imprudencia temeraria, on the ground that: 1) he did
Where the thing which caused the injury not reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he attempt to
complained of is shown to be under the stop to avoid an accident; 2) he did not sound his horn
management of the defendant or his servants and or whistle or use his voice to call the attention of
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of Coombs to notify him that he should stop and avoid
things does not happen if those who have its being struck by the car; and 3) Crame was driving in
management or control use proper care, it affords the center, or a little to the right of the center of the
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation street instead of on the left side thereof.
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L- ISSUE:
12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of to Coombs.
the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of
operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, HELD:
combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust,
paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
may be found thereon. MORE THAN SUSTAINED.

It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car
the part of petitioneror its employees was not merely was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention
presumed.Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its to duty, especially since the street was wide and
shop and the residenceof the Mables as required by a unobstructed, with no buildings on either side from
city ordinance: which a person can dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the
street was also well-lighted, so there is no reason why
- that the fire could have been caused by a Crame did not see Coombs long before he had reached
heated motor or a litcigarette the position in the street where he was struck down.

- that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored The presence of the carromata was not corroborated
in the shop; and by any of the witnesses. Moreover, it would have
obscured his vision only for a moment. Besides, it is the
- that workers sometimes smoked inside the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a moving vehicle
shop on public streets and highways to use due care and
diligence to see to it that persons who may be crossing
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, behind the moving vehicle are not run down by them.
Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with
city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of It is clearly established that Crame was driving along
negligence.Even then the fire possibly would not have the right-hand side of the streetwhen the accident
spread to the neighboring houses were it not for happened. According to the law of the road and the
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, custom ofthe country, he should have been on the left-
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high hand side of the street. According towitnesses there
enough to prevent the flames from leaping over was abundant room for him to drive on such side.
it. Defendant's negligence,therefore, was not only with
respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect There is no evidence which shows negligence on the
tothe spread thereof to the neighboring houses. part of Coombs. At the time he was struck, he had a
right to be where the law fully protected him from
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner vehicles traveling in the direction in which the accused
be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to was driving at the time of injury. There is no evidence
construct a firewall between its property and private to show that the soldier was drunk at the time of the
respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with accident. And even if he were, mere intoxication is not
the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with negligence, nor does it establish a want of ordinary
an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the
ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. other evidence tending to prove negligence. If one’s
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care
181.] and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
sober.
US V. CRAME, 30 PHIL 2
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; PRESUMPTIONS AND
FACTS: BURDEN OF PROOF.
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an
driving along Calle Herran in the city of Manila, automobile for running down and injuring a pedestrian
knocked down, dragged, and ran over the body of crossing a street, it appeared that at the time the injury
George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who was was produced, the injured person was where he had a
then crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, right to be, that the automobile was being driven on the
and bruises. Moreover, such injuries damaged his wrong side of the street, and no warning was given of its
mental faculties and incapacitated him from further approach, it was properly held that there was a

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 32


presumption of negligence on the part of the driver and LAYUGAN V. IAC, 167 SCRA 363
that the burden of proof was on him to establish that the
accident occurred through other causes than his FACTS:
negligence.
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against
AFRICA V. CALTEX [PHIL], GR NO.L-12986, MAR. 31, Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet,
1966 Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion
were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was
FACTS: parked along the right side of the National Highway; that
defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured
It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank and hospitalized. Serrano bumped the truck being
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening repaired by Pedro Layugan, while the same was at a
of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was stop position. From the evidence presented, it has been
inserted. The fire then spread to and burned several established clearly that the injuries sustained by the
neighboring houses, including the personal properties plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel
and effects inside them.The owners of the houses, Serrano. The police report confirmed the allegation of
among them petitioners here, sued Caltex and the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel Serrano on cross-
Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).Trial court and examination. The collision dislodged the jack from the
CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the ground. As a
that respondents had exercised due care in the result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left
premises and with respect to the supervision of their forearm and left foot. The left leg of the plaintiff from
employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine below the knee was later on amputated when gangrene
of res ipsaloquitur on the grounds that “as to its had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work
applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seemsto be depriving him of his income. The trial court rendered its
nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit decision in favor of the plaintiff, however, the
its adoption inappropriate cases, “in the case at bar, Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of
however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.” the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: ISSUE:

W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine
the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r should apply as to or res ipsa loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis and
presume negligence on the part of the appellees. if not, who is negligent?

HELD: HELD:

DOCTRINE OF R E S I P S A L O Q U I T U R APPLIES. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or
CALTEX IS LIABLE. on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would
be of no moment taking into account the warning device
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or
thing which caused the injurycomplained of is shown to four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this
be under the management of defendant or his servants warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private
things does not happen if those who have its respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo
management or control use proper care, it affords truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left
defendant, that the incident happened because of want foot.
of care.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
and employees, was under the control of appellees. A established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by
neighboring houses. The person who knew or could respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
have known how the fire started were the appellees escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the
and their employees, but they gave no explanation respondent court committed reversible error.
thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care. DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank under the management of the defendant, and the
wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
the underground storage when the fire broke out, not happen if those who have the management use
strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians absence of any explanation by the defendant, that the
often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the accident arose from want of care.
area is used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs
owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out AS DEFINED UNDER BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY:
and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter
from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
2½ meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing
from leaping over it in case of fire. injury was in defendant’s exclusive control, and that the

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 33


accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in television when they heard two loud explosions. In no
the absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may belongings, furniture and appliances.The city fire
be inferred from mere fact that accident happened marshall c submitted a report to the provincial fire
provided character of accident and circumstances marshall and concluded that the fire was “accidental.”
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing had no fire permit as required by law.Based on the
which caused injury is shown to have been under same report, a criminal complaint for “Reckless
management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property” was filed
against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, Perla
RULE OF EVIDENCE: Compania was asked to pay the amount of P7,992,350,
inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for the
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil
negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law complaint based on quasi-delict against petitioners for
but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural a “sum of money and damages,” alleging that Pascual
convenience. It merely determines and regulates what acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the lacked the required diligence in the selection and
burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due supervision of Pascual as its employee.
care. The doctrine can only be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence ISSUES:
is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has
generally been held that the presumption of inference W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine and
arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is W/N Perla Compania liable under tort
overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence HELD:
which is the cause of the injury complained of or where
there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the a.) YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally
on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the
means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It
actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy,
relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference
whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no
to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the
completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's
supposition of negligence and they furnish
liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct
the evidence, as in this case.
evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. V. that the defendant either knows the cause of the
SPS.SARANGAYA, GR NO. 147746, OCT. 25, 2005 accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is
FACTS: compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In
such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known happening of the accident alone to establish
as “Super A Building” and was subdivided into three negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a
doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent,
residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second should be able to explain the care he exercised to
and third doors of the building.In 1988, petitioner Perla prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the
Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no
manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, negligence on his part.
entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the
“Super A Building.” Perla Compania renovated its To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the
rented space and divided it into two. The left side doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites
wasconverted into an office while the right was used by must concur:
Pascual as a garage for a 1981model 4-door Ford
Cortina. 1) the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, 2) the cause of the injury was under the
Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three exclusive control of the person in charge and
days later, he returned, and decided to “warm up” the
car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on 3) the injury suffered must not have been
the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound and due to any voluntary action or contribution on
did not start. He again stepped on the accelerator and the part of the person injured.
started the car but petitioner again heard an unusual
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one
sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the
that does not ordinarily occur unless there is
engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the
negligence. A flame spewing out of a car engine, when
vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when
it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event.
suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and
Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car
engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside
engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct
and suffered burns on his face, legs and
evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine
arms.Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 34


of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud,
draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, were on their way home from a Christmas party they
someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur.
accident. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were
run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang
agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner
falls under the exclusive control of the person in charge Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public
thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to
was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and
ensure its proper functioning. Where the circumstances During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia's
which caused the accident are shown to have been father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six
under the management or control of a certain person minor children of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-
and, in the normal course of events, the incident would 20219, an independent civil action for damages based
not have happened had that person used proper care, on culpa aquilian.
the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such
care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to
defendant to establish that he observed all that was Oscar Jr.'s core defense to release him from
necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his
jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized
this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of
records to show that respondents contributed to the Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the
incident. They had no access to the car and had no obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of
responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was the jeep.
parked in a building they owned.
ISSUE:
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE:
W/N will apply in this case.
The test to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated HELD:
as follows: did the defendant in committing
the alleged negligent act, use reasonable YES. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be
person in the same situation would have under the management of the defendant or his servants;
employed? If not, then he is guilty of and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would
negligence. Here, the fact that Pascual, as not happen if those who had management or control
the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence — in
proof that he had it periodically checked (as the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical
its year-model and condition required) explanation by defendant — that the accident arose from
revealed his negligence. A prudent man or was caused by the defendant's want of care.
should have known thata14-year-old car,
constantly used in provincial trips, was The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as
definitely prone to damage and other defects. established by jurisprudence are as follows:
For failing to prove care and diligence in the
maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary
inference was that Pascual had been 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
negligent in the upkeep of the car.

b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person in charge and
In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, 3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any
experience and service records. While the petitioner- voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
corporation does not appear to have erred in injured
considering Pascual for his position, its lack of
supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable
The above requisites are all present in this case. First,
for the fire.In the supervision of employees, the
no person just walking along the road would suddenly be
employer must formulate standard operating
sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent.
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend
Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the
off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar
proof, including documentary evidence that they
Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
power to instruct him with regard to the specific
CARMEN, JR. V. BACOY G.R. NO. 173870 APRIL 25, restrictions of the jeep's use, including who or who may
2012 not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without
the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it
FACTS: safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no
showing that the death of the victims was due to any
At dawn on New Year's Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy
voluntary action or contribution on their part.
Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 35


V. DEFENSES There are four elements involved in medical negligence
cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
a. Complete Defenses
A physician-patient relationship was created when
a.1 Plaintiff’s own negligence
Editha employed the services of the petitioner. As
PAULAN V. SARABIA, 104 PHIL. 1050 (can’t find, Editha’s physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at
sorry) least the same level of care that any reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
FE CAYAO-LASAM v. RAMOLETE, G.R. No. 159132, the same circumstances. The breach of these
December 18, 2008 professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the
FACTS: patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes
actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical
On July 28, 1994, three months pregnant Editha malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of
Ramolete (Editha) was admitted to the Lorma Medical care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is
Center (LMC) due to vaginal bleeding. A pelvic essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the
sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable
fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation. The following day, only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
Editha’s repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to
the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement support the conclusion as to causation.
was also appreciated. Due to Editha’s persistent and
profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner performed a In the present case, respondents did not present any
Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought physician or surgeon would have done.
at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and
severe abdominal pains. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of
Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latter’s womb. Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was a specialist in
After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to gynecology and obstetrics. He testified that the D & C
have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of
ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a Editha’s uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. From his
procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no expert testimony, the D&C procedure was conducted in
more chance to bear a child. accordance with the standard practice, with the same
level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
Editha and her husband filed a Complaint for Gross would use to treat a condition under the same
Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in
Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.

The Board of Medicine of the PRC rendered a Decision Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought
exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages,
provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:
Respondents went to the PRC on appeal. The PRC
rendered a Decision reversing the findings of the Board
and revoking petitioner’s authority or license to practice Art. 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
her profession as a physician. the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari under Rule
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
65 of the Rules of Court. The petition was dismissed by
the CA citing that neither Rule 43 nor Rule 65 was a
proper remedy. Hence, this petition. In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the
Board of Medicine that petitioner advised her to return
on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C.
ISSUE:
However, complainant failed to do so. This being the
case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence and malpractice. doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was
interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could
HELD: have examined her thoroughly.

Worthy to mention that the fact that the PRC was not Editha omitted the diligence required by the
among those enumerated in the list of quasi-judicial circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The
agencies in Rule 43 does not by its fact alone, imply its omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation
exclusion from the coverage of the said Rule. The Rule played a substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own
expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals injury.
from awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi- Based on the evidence presented in the present case
judicial functions. under review, in which no negligence can be attributed
to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident
resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission when

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 36


she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of precise nature of the explosion which might be expected
petitioner’s orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s from the ignition of the contents of the cap, but he well
injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
damages from the injury. expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly,
and knowingly produced the explosion.
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA reversed and
the decision of the Board of Medicine is affirmed. We are satisfied that while it may be true that these
injuries would not have been incurred but for the
Exception: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
CO., supra. which inflicted the injury.

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BALANDAN, 91


ISSUE:
Phil 488
W/N defendant company is liable to plaintiff for damages
FACTS:
for having negligently failed to provide security measures
to prevent the general public from entering its premises.
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an
HELD: ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in
whose premises were installed two tanks full of water for
cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory
Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks
youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or
company's premises, and the intervention of his action top covers. Through the wide gate entrance, motor
between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity
caps exposed on its premises and the accident which passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory,
resulted in his injury should not be held to have as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the
contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be gate. On April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan,
deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence an 8 year old boy, while playing with and in company of
in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they other boys of his age entered the factory premises
were found by the plaintiff. through the gate, while bathing in one of the said tanks,
sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
On this score, the doctrine of implied invitation is already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia
applicable. In the case of young children, and other secondary to drowning."
persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. The CA and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that the
Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks),
exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to
purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises.
make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away
upon his premises things tempting to children, the same
ISSUE:
implication should arise.

W/N the said tanks constitute an attractive nuisance.


But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon
defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved HELD:
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, we are of The doctrine of attractive nuisance may be stated, as:
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the One who maintains on his premises dangerous
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
on its premises was not the proximate cause of the attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
injury, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that care to prevent children from playing therewith or
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon trespasser in the premises.
the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural,
The doctrine of implied invitation does not apply where in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
the said youth has not been free from fault when he feature other than the mere water and its location.
willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap,
and placed a match to the contents, knowing that his Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which
action would result in an explosion. attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the
danger of drowning. Against this danger children are
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to
was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both know the danger; and if the owner of private property
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely
and the record discloses throughout that he was duplicating the work of nature without adding any new
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. True, danger, (he) is not liable because of having created an
he may not have known and probably did not know the "attractive nuisance.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 37
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo In the present case, the animal was in custody and
Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business
a.2. Assumption of Risk to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the by the animal under those circumstances, was one of
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
recover damages. But if his negligence was only assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff ILOCOS NORTE CO., v. CA, GR No. 53401, Nov. 6,
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the 1989
damages to be awarded.
FACTS:
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may
make use of the same is responsible for the damage Inn the evening of June 28 until the early morning of
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. June 29, 1967, strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the
province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and
'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00
should come from force majeure from the fault of the A.M. on June 29, 1967, when the floodwaters were
person who has suffered damage. beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan,
ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and
a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters
sued the owner of the animal for damages. The Emporium to look after her merchandise therein that
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the might have been damaged. The deceased was followed
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing by Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and
Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5
injury to any one, including himself.
and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the
deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
AFILIADA v. HISOLE and HISOLE, 85 Phil 67 water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear
dissuaded them because on the spot where the
FACTS: deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a
post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to the
by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, but he turned back shouting that the water
deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the was grounded.
defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a
fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he Thereafter, Yabes requested the police to ask the people
was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO
died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to
was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was
and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending receding and the lights inside the house were out
upon him for support. indicating that the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article of the deceased. The body was recovered about two
1905 of the Civil Code, which reads: meters from an electric post.

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if deceased against INELCO. INELCO contends that the
such animal should escape from him or stray away. deceased could have died simply either by drowning or
by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should
out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent. Petitioner
who may have suffered it.
conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must
have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's
ISSUE: electrocution when she tried to open her gate that fateful
day. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of
W/N owner of the animal is liable for the injuries caused petitioner and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was
to the caretaker. filed with the CA which reversed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
HELD:
ISSUE:
NO. For the statute names the possessor or user of the
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may W/N the CA erred in not applying the legal principle of
cause," and this for the obvious reason that the "assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private
possessor or user has the custody and control of the respondents from collecting damages.
animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it
from causing damage. HELD:

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 38


In order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
theory that the deceased was electrocuted when she injury to passengers.
tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically
charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install Petitioner breached the contract of carriage on two
to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that scores. First, as found by the CA, the jeepney was not
the switch to said burglar alarm was left on. But this is properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
mere speculation, not backed up with evidence. two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway,
and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle.
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered This is a violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Acts of God for which no person may be held Code
responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in
of petitioner's negligence that death took place. In times more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of
of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law.
City, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of
electricity to be in constant vigilto prevent or avoid any
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
(linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
manning its office.
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may
not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
"When an act of God combines or concurs with the
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
but for his own negligent conduct or omission" because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon
by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN, ET.AL., v. REYES,
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which GR No. 154259, FEB. 28, 2005
impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon. A person is excused
from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily FACTS:
assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by
life or property of another is in peril. Clearly, an the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that in the
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a evening of 13 October 1994, at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending Dr. Violeta Filart invited him to join her in a party at the
loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right hotel’s manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. At the penthouse, they
to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which
on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. When dinner
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
petitioner's negligence. stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who was Hotel
Nikko’s Executive Secretary. In a loud voice and within
CALALAS v. CA, supra. the presence and hearing of the other guests, Ruby Lim
told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain,
hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Mr. Reyes tried
ISSUE:
to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who
was within hearing distance, however, completely
W/N Calalas is liable for damages to private respondent, ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.
Sunga. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the
traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached
HELD: and asked him to step out of the hotel. Mr. Reyes claims
damages in an action instituted against the hotel, Ms.
The petition has no merit. Lim and Dr. Filart.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the to leave the party but not under the ignominious
truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was circumstance painted by the latter and claimed that she
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of asked the latter to leave in the most discreet manner.
res judicata does not apply.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the Civil giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim . The
Code requires extraordinary diligence from common trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 39


trial court as it found more commanding of belief the safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
testimony of Mr. Reyes. things this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this
ISSUE: moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff
to escape being run down by going to a place of greater
safety. The control of the situation had then passed
W/N the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of volenti
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to
non fit injuria considering that Mr. Reyes, by its own
account, is a gate crasher. bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there
were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to
HELD: avoid the danger of collision.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated,
the risk of being asked to leave as he was a "gate- the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
crasher." problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. Under these
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person circumstances the law is that the person who has the
assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self- last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, ALLIED BANK V. BPI G.R. NO. 188363 FEBRUARY
however, this doctrine does not find application to the 27, 2013
case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
FACTS:
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose
him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more
accepted at petitioner's Kawit Branch. The check, post-
credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of
Mr. Silva with respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the
Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner
credited the account of MMGI with P1,000,000. On
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire
October 22, 2002, MMGI's account was closed and all
belief and is indeed incredible.
the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva
discovered the debit of P1,000,000 from his account. In
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are response to Silva's complaint, respondent credited his
concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have account with the aforesaid sum. On March 21, 2003,
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right respondent returned a photocopy of the check to
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must petitioner for the reason: "Postdated." Petitioner,
be his to bear alone. however, refused to accept and sent back to respondent
a photocopy of the check. Thereafter, the check, or more
a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of accurately, the Charge Slip, was tossed several times
Supervening Negligence; Doctrine of Discovered from petitioner to respondent, and back to petitioner,
Peril; or the “Humanitarian” Doctrine until on May 6, 2003, respondent requested the PCHC to
take custody of the check. Acting on the request, PCHC
PICART vs. SMITH, supra. directed the respondent to deliver the original check and
informed it of PCHC's authority under Clearing House
ISSUE: Operating Memo (CHOM) No. 279 dated 06 September
1996 to split 50/50 the amount of the check subject of a
"Ping-Pong" controversy which shall be implemented
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence to be liable for
thru the issuance of Debit Adjustment Tickets against
damages.
the outward demands of the banks involved. PCHC
likewise encouraged respondent to submit the
HELD: controversy for resolution thru the PCHC Arbitration
Mechanism.
Defendant is liable.
However, it was petitioner who filed a complaint before
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent
right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass should solely bear the entire face value of the check due
over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the to its negligence in failing to return the check to
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as
this would not be done; and he must in a moment have provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing House Rules
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with and Regulations. Petitioner prayed that respondent be
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 40
ordered to reimburse the sum of P500,000 with 12% the payee's account. Thus, notwithstanding the
interest per annum, and to pay attorney's fees and other antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting the
arbitration expenses. post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement
from respondent the amount credited to the payee's
In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged account covering the check.
petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the post-
dated check in the first place. It contended that PANTRANCO v. BAESA, GR No. 79050, Nov. 14, 1989
petitioner's admitted negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the loss. FACTS:

On December 8, 2004, the Arbitration Committee In the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar
rendered its Decision 10 in favor of petitioner and and Marilyn Baesa and their children, together with 10
against the respondent. First, it ruled that the situation of other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on
the parties does not involve a "Ping-Pong" controversy their way to a picnic to celebrate the fifth wedding
since the subject check was neither returned within the anniversary of the spouses. Upon reaching the highway,
reglementary time or through the PCHC return window, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam
nor coursed through the clearing facilities of the PCHC. River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were
proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding
As to respondent's direct presentation of a photocopy of PANTRANCO bus from Aparri encroached on the
the subject check, it was declared to be without legal jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
basis because Section 21.1 11 of the CHRR 2000 does with it. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses
not apply to post-dated checks. The Arbitration Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim
Committee further noted that respondent not only failed and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the
to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary passengers suffered injuries.
period, it also failed to institute any formal complaint
within the contemplation of Section 20.3 12 and it Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner
appears that respondent was already contented with the appealed but CA dismissed the case. Petitioner faults
50-50 split initially implemented by the PCHC. Finding the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the
both parties negligent in the performance of their duties, "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner
the Committee applied the doctrine of "Last Clear claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was
Chance" and ruled that the loss should be shouldered by the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last
respondent alone. clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
ISSUE: competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the
harm.
Last clear chance.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Will the doctrine of last clear chance apply in this case?
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that
the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a HELD:
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious of merit.
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the The doctrine of the last clear chance
plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes simply, means that the negligence of a
negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory claimant does not preclude a recovery
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply for the negligence of defendant where
except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the it appears that the latter, by exercising
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude reasonable care and prudence, might
him from recovering damages caused by the have avoided injurious consequences
supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the to claimant notwithstanding his
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the negligence.
exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of
the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant's failure "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For
to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that
chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury. In this avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril
case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of
cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury
check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a if he does not know or could not have known the
post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to
facility without observing its own verification procedure. show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the
if only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did
process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder
upon seeing the date written on the face of the check on his right since he must have assumed that the bus
"Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have then promptly driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As
petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to held by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 41


BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias
618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision
side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that occurred" is, based on nothing more than the showing
an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the that at the time of the accident, the truck driven by
wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic. There Zacarias had edged over the painted center line of the
was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could road into the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25)
not return to its own lane or was prevented from centimeters. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted
returning to the proper lane by anything beyond the evidence, the actual center line of the road was not that
control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of indicated by the painted stripe, that although it was not
the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver disputed that the truck overrode the painted stripe by
Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was still at least eleven
Ramirez had no choice but to swerve the steering wheel (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center line
to the left and encroach on the jeepney's lane because of the road and well inside its own lane when the
there was a steep precipice on the right [CA Decision, p. accident occurred. By this same reckoning, since it was
2; Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is belied by the evidence unquestionably the jeep that rammed into the stopped
on record which clearly shows that there was enough truck, it may also be deduced that the jeep was at the
space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any time travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the
danger [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50]. lane of the truck by at least the same 11-centimeter
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the width of space.
negligence of petitioner's driver in encroaching into the
lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the Nor was the IAC correct in finding that Zacarias had
bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of
coming from the opposite direction was the sole and getting back inside his lane upon spying the approaching
proximate cause of the accident without which the jeep. Being well within his own lane, he had no duty to
collision would not have occurred. There was no swerve out of the jeep's way. And even supposing that
supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to
jeepney driver which would have made the prior a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away
negligence of petitioner's driver a mere remote cause of cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action,
the accident. there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep
was "zigzagging” and hence no way of telling in which
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. IAC, GR No. 70493, direction it would go as it approached the truck.
May 18, 1989
It was rather Engr. Calibo’s negligence which was the
FACTS: proximate cause of the accident. Evidence and
testimonies show that the jeep had been “zigzagging” or
Engr. Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep was driven erratically at that time and that its driver had
owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., been on a drinking spree on the occasion prior.
with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the
South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Even, however, ignoring theof negligence on the part of
Davao City in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on
time, the cargo truck, driven by defendant Zacarias and the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his
owned by petitioners herein, coming from the opposite designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the
direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. The physical facts, would still absolve the latter of any
cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule
which Engr Calibo died while Roranes and Patos of the last clear chance.
sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. After
the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle
the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. It is also
while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. admitted that the truck was already at a full stop while
the jeep was still 30 meters away when thereafter, the
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse latter plowed into the truck. From these facts the logical
and children of the late Engr Calibo against the driver conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had the
and owners of the cargo truck. last clear chance to avoid the accident, by stopping in
his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either
The Trial Court ruled that plaintiffs were unable to of which he had sufficient time to do. In those
establish the negligence of defendant and thus, circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
dismissed the case. The trial court’s decision was avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to
reversed upon appeal to the IAC. expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to
swerve and leave him a clear path.
ISSUE:
DE ROY vs. CA, January 29, 1988
W/N petitioner is answerable for the death of Engr.
Calibo owing to the negligence of its employee, FACTS:
Zacarias.
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
HELD: petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting
in injuries to private respondents and the death of
The petition is meritorious. The IAC’s decision is
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had
reversed.
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 42


of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed hit the accident mound. Petitioner company cannot be
to do so. held liable to the private respondents. The accident had
not occurred due to the absence of warning signals but
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of rather the abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside
gross negligence and awarding damages to private lane.
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Secondly, the jeep was not running at 25kph when the
petition. accident occurred, otherwise it would not have hit the
accident mound since at that speed, it could easily apply
ISSUE: its brakes on time.

W/N petitioners are free of liability since respondents From the above findings, the negligence of respondent
had the last clear chance of avoiding the incident. Antonio Esteban was not only contributory but rather the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby
HELD: precludes their right to recover damages. The only
purpose of warning signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site. The
The petition is denied. private respondents already knew of the presence of
said excavations. It is basic that private respondents
This Court finds that the CA committed no grave abuse cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson
necessary repairs.” Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and
had knowledge of the presence and location of the
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid him and his wife to danger; hence he is solely
the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of ONG vs. MCWD, 104 Phil 397
"last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case. FACTS:

PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989 Defendant owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon
FACTS: City to which people are invited and nominal fees are
charged.
Private respondents spouses Esteban instituted a case
against petitioner company for the injuries they In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep year old boy, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio,
ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, arrived at the defendant's swimming pools. This has
th th
an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT. The been the 5 or 6 time that the three brothers had gone
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban to said natatorium. After paying the requisite admission
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any where the water was shallow. Later on, Dominador Ong
warning light or signs. told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in
an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon
The trial court issued a decision in favor of the private hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool
respondents. The CA reversed the decision of the trial leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not
court. However, after granting a second motion for see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of
reconsideration, the CA set aside its original decision coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on
and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and
Hence, this petition. Mario Villanueva.

ISSUE: Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the
pool area informed one Andres Hagad, Jr., that
W/N petitioner company is liable to private respondents somebody was swimming under water for quite a long
for the injuries sustained by the latter. time. Another boy informed lifeguard Abaño of the same
happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big
swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body
HELD:
of Dominador Ong from the bottom. Manual artificial
respiration was applied. Despite medical attention by the
The petition is meritorious. nurse and Dr. Ayuyao of UP, the boy died.

As evidenced by the factual findings of respondent court, Plaintiffs instituted a case to recover damages from
private respondents’ jeep were running along the inside defendant for the death of their son in the said swimming
lane of Lacson street when it suddenly swerved (as pool operated by defendant. After trial, the lower court
shown through the tiremarks) from the left and thereafter dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 43


ISSUE: against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo
Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her two
attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages. 22, 1995 at the national highway along Barangay
Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara was
HELD: sued as the operator of the passenger jeep which was
involved in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was
impleaded as the husband of the operator.
The trial court’s decision is hereby affirmed.
Respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving a
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for passenger jeep in a reckless, careless, and negligent
injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the
providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and
is not in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos.
safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his
premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing death. Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara
himself from any presumption of negligence. Thus in failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
Bertalot vs. Kinnare, supra, it was held that there could supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the
be no recovery for the death by drowning of a fifteen- passenger jeep.
year boy in defendant's natatorium, where it appeared
merely that he was lastly seen alive in water at the
Petitioners denied Benigno Valdez overtook a
shallow end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen minutes
motorcycle and bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo
later was discovered unconscious, and perhaps lifeless,
at the bottom of the pool, all efforts to resuscitate him Ramos. They alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving
southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-
being without avail.
type jeep coming from the south and heading north,
running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the
Appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove
danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road,
which may cause their death. west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to
move toward the western lane and bumped the left side
Appellant posits that even if it be assumed that the of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was
deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in
incident, still appellee may be held liable under the driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a
doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having mechanical defect.
the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering
that the record does not show how minor Ong came into ISSUE:
the big swimming pool. The doctrine of last clear chance
simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not
W/N petitioners are liable to respondents for the
preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
damages incurred as a result of the vehicular accident.
where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his HELD:
negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of The petition is meritorious.
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts
of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which The testimony of respondents’ witness, Gamera, that the
is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely vehicular accident occurred because the passenger jeep
responsible for the consequences of the accident." driven by Valdez tried to overtake the motorcycle driven
by PO3 de Peralta and encroached on the lane of the
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big owner-type jeep, which resulted in the collision, was
swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there refuted by PO3 de Peralta, who testified that the
without any companion in violation of one of the passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he
regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, was the one following behind the passenger jeep.
and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the
call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the
immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of its wheels was
disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to detached and stayed immobile at the place of collision.
bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated the
the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants incident, found that the collision took place on the
to impute liability to appellee.. western lane of the national highway or the lane of the
passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the
ECHEVARA vs. RAMOS, GR No. 175172, Sept. 29, owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that
2009 encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.

FACTS: Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To


be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to
Respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint for damages would have realized that certain interests of certain

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 44


persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover
definite class of risks. damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. VIZCARA G.R.
running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the NO. 190022 FEBRUARY 15, 2012
opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made
aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep a.4. Emergency Rule
on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road VALENZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303
or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder
of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before
proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. FACTS:
The CA correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of
inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff
precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which lancer from her restaurant to her home. Before reaching
proximately caused injury to another. A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her
tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos people, to solicit help if needed since rear right tire was
guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's
defective jeep on the highway. condition, she parked along the sidewalk, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped
to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite
by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not
Richard Li. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown
immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon
against the windshield of the car of the defendant and
seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. However, when then fell to the ground. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up
the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the to the middle of her thigh and was eventually fitted with
passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and
an artificial leg.
steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder
of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this point that it
was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent and
his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had the last alleged that when he was driving along the inner portion
opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. he was suddenly
passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of the road. confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, with a car
coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation
instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which
negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair he did not see because it was midnight blue in color,
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so
with no parking lights or early warning device, and the
− is made liable for all the consequences of the accident,
area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
the plaintiff's car was improperly parked.
However, the doctrine does not apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at Both the trial court and the CA found for petitioner.
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. However, the latter modified the former’s decision in
reducing the amount of damages. Hence, this petition.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to
this case, because even if it can be said that it was ISSUE:
Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap
when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western W/N petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of contributory
lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the negligence to preclude her from claiming damages.
opportunity to avoid the collision.
HELD:
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the not guilty of contributory negligence.
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
only contributory, the immediate and proximate injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the he is required to conform for his own protection. Based
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which,
according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to exercise conformed for her own protection was not to park at all
reasonable care and caution. Since the gross negligence at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We
of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of cannot agree.
Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 45


Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless
that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not imprudence. The information was subsequently
to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of
to an individual who is in no such situation. the three victims.

Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly The appearance and intervention of Prosecutor Atty.
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to Navarro for presentation of evidence for damages was
act without much time to consider the best means that disallowed. No appeal was taken from the order.
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what Judgment on the criminal case was rendered on April
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a 15, 1959, acquitting the accused Elordi. Prior thereto, or
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants
his own negligence. commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi
Company and Elordi. Appellee moved to dismiss the
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire said action relying on the ground of prescription among
on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point others. The motion was dismissed by the Court a quo.
which is both convenient for her to do so and which is Hence, this appeal.
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to
run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or ISSUE:
turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find
no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
W/N the action for damages has prescribed.
stop and assess the emergency because the hobbling
vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists. HELD:

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did The action has prescribed.
exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have The present action is one for recovery of damages
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code).
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her Appellants' intervention in the original action was
car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all order. And when they commenced the present civil
reasonable precautions. action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still
pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence the remedy afforded by the Civil Code
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. The circumstances established by the In filing the civil action, appellants considered it as
evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to
that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast
speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had In other words, the civil action for damages could have
settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There been commenced by appellants immediately upon the
is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he death of their decedent, Capuno and the same would not
was under the influence of liquor. Under these have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
changing conditions on the road were significantly complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or
lessened. after the lapse of more than five years.

ORIX METRO LEASING V. MANGALINAO G.R. NO. The contention that the four-year period of prescription in
174089 JANUARY 25, 2012 this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal
action against Jon Elordi is incorrect notwithstanding that
a.5. Prescription appellants had neither waived the civil action nor
reserved the right to institute it separately. Such
Art. 1150. “The time for prescription for all kinds of reservation was not necessary; as without having made
actions, when there is no special provision which ordains it they could still file — as in fact they did — a separate
otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be civil action even during the pendency of the criminal
brought.” case; and consequently, the institution of a criminal
action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
CAPUNO vs. PEPSI, GR No. L-19331, Apr. 30, 1965
b. Incomplete/Partial Defense
FACTS:
b.1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
A vehicular collision occurred on January 3, 1953 in
Apalit, Pampanga which involved a Pepsi-Cola delivery
truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and recover damages. But if his negligence was only
Rizalina Paras. contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 46


may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the On the evening of April 10, 1925, a procession was held
damages to be awarded. in Tacloban, Leyte attended by Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal. After the procession
PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. TUPANG, GR No. was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along a
55347, Oct. 4, 1985 public street. The little girl was allowed to get a short
distance in advance of her mother and her mother’s
FACTS:
friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared from
On September 10, 1972, Winifredo Tupang, husband of
the opposite direction which frightened the child that she
plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of
appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street
passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter
defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When
repairs, taking some two hours before the train could the mother and her companions reached the child, they
resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing found her face downward in the hot water. She was
Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell
taken to the provincial hospital but thereafter died. Dr.
off the train resulting in his death.
Benitez, who attended the child, certified that the cause
of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body.”
Both the CFI and the CA held PNR liable for damages
for breaching the contract of carriage.
The trial court found that the company was negligent but
dismissed the case having ruled that plaintiffs were guilty
ISSUE:
of contributory negligence.
W/N deceased Tupang was guilty of contributory
negligence. ISSUE:

HELD: W/N Enverso was guilty of contributory negligence.

The appellate court found that the train boarded by the HELD:
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that
he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit We are shown no good reason for the departing from the
on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. conclusion of the trial judge to the effect that the sudden
It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even stop, death of the child Purification Bernal was due principally
despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced
person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
by the extensive burns from the hot water.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
passengers to their destinations and to observe
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury
suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the the religious procession was held. There was nothing
presumption that it was negligent in the performance of abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces
its obligation under the contract of carriage. in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with
diligence as required by law, it appears that the hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of reduction of the damages.
said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train.
Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377
PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of
the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same FACTS:
token, the award of exemplary damages must be set
aside.
On 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH AGUILAR
were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store owned
RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF, supra.(See under ACT
OR OMISSION) by herein petitioner. CRISELDA was signing her credit
card slip at the payment and verification counter when
TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud.
CO..supra.(See under DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE She looked behind her and saw her daughter’s body on
NUISANCE) the floor pinned by the store's gift-wrapping counter.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical
BANAL & ENVERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & Center but died a few days later. The cause of her death
HOUSE PLANT, 54 Phil 327 was attributed to the injuries she sustained.

FACTS: Petitioners denied any liability claiming that CRISELDA


was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 47
filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, Even if we attribute contributory negligence to
was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
the counter, triggering its eventual collapse. Petitioners counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and
wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could
the past fifteen years since its construction. not have caused the counter to collapse.

Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any
entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
nine years is incapable of contributory negligence. And CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA
even if ZHIENETH, at six years old, was already capable momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
of contributory negligence, still it was physically when she signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable
impossible for her to have propped herself on the and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child.
counter. Also, the testimony of one of the store's former
employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied NAPOCOR vs. CASIONAN, GR No. 165969, Nov. 27,
ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency 2008
room of the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners'
FACTS:
theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales
claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19
what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "Nothing, I did not years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life.
come near the counter and the counter just fell on me." He worked as a pocket miner.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners finding A trail existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used
that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH’s injuries was by members of the community. Sometime in the 1970’s,
the negligence of the latter and that of her mother. Upon petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some
Hence, this petition. of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing
their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten
ISSUE:
feet.
W/N petitioners should be absolved from liability
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner,
because of private respondent’s negligence.
Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo
HELD: poles for their pocket mining. Noble carried the shorter
pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked
We deny the petition.Under the circumstances, it is ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their
and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she work place.
trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
Gonzales' testimony on the matter. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he
was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw Noble fall to the ground.
keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping He rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was
counter proved their negligence. Petitioner was informed already dead.
of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, it
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents.
situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees
ISSUE:
and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have done. W/N Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence
so as to mitigate NAPOCOR’s liability.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
the conclusive presumption that favors children below HELD:
nine years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting
to happen. As established during trial, the lines were
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required
conclusively presumed to have acted without distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole
criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony and a carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He
quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of would not have been electrocuted.
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of
age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s
incapable of negligence. part.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 48


Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for
he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as
is required to conform for his own protection. There is those loading or unloading passengers may use the
contributory negligence when the party’s act showed shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass
lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could through the said uncemented portion of the highway.
cause him harm or put his life in danger. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as
slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and
regularly used by members of the community. There recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim.
were no warning signs to inform passersby of the
impending danger to their lives should they accidentally The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen
touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the
viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should cemented part of the highway would suddenly swerve to
not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we are
to other workers in the area. unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the
respondent was negligent.
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory
negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a Coming now to the second issue, this Court has recently
mitigation of its liability. reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB
General Insurance Co., Inc.,that the registered owner of
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, GR No. 161846, Nov. 14, 2008 any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone
else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
FACTS:
damage or injury the vehicle may cause.
Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, , at the
intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in VI. LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION
Davao City, 15-year old high school student Bithuel
Macas was standing on the shoulder of the road. a. By tortfeasor
Rosalinda was about two and a half meters away from
the respondent when the latter was bumped and run LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES V. GLODEL
BROKERAGE G.R. NO. 179446 JANUARY 10, 2011
over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca. Respondent
was rushed to the hospital where both his legs were
FACTS:
amputated in order to save his life.
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine
Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared.
Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to
Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in
insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper
the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Cadiente. However,
cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the
Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he
cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard
was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged
Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor,
that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Jalipa with the
Manila. They arrived on the same date.
understanding that the latter would be the one to cause
the transfer of the registration. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release
and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
The victim's father filed a complaint for torts and
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in
damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the
turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of
RTC. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against
its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia's
Jalipa.
warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The RTC held Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and severally
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-
liable to respondent. Such decision was affirmed by the
117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.
CA.
Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B
ISSUE: Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
of P1,903,335.39.
W/N victim is guilty of contributory negligence.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is absolved from liability by the fact that
he was no longer the owner of said vehicle. W/N Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent of
respondent Glodel.
HELD:
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a
In this case, records show that when the accident common carrier because it is engaged in the business of
happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder, transporting goods by land, through its trucking service.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 49


It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where
carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by there are several causes for the resulting damages, a
special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is
goods for the general public. The distinction is significant sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient
in the sense that "the rights and obligations of the parties cause without which the damage would not have
to a contract of private carriage are governed principally resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers." tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or
In the present case, there is no indication that the wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As
undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of
Glodel was private in character. There is no showing that Appeals,
Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to
Glodel. . . . . Where several causes producing
an injury are concurrent and each is
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common an efficient cause without which the
carrier. injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary
responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise against any or all of the responsible
of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may
are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
appear that one of them was more
received by, the carrier for transportation until the same
culpable, and that the duty owed by
are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to
them to the injured person was not the
the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them. same. No actor's negligence ceases
to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both negligence of other actors. Each
Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. result and is liable as though his acts
Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the were the sole cause of the injury.
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary."
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the contract
entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or total damage. Where the concurrent or successive
R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, although acting independently, are in combination the
but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
provide: each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
ART. 2176.Whoever by act or
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
obliged to pay for the damage done. solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article
Such fault or negligence, if there is no 2194 of the Civil Code.
pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi- b. Vicarious Liability
delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
b.1. By parents
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
LIBI vs. IAC, GR No. 70880, Sept. 18, 1992
ART. 2180.The obligation imposed by
FACTS:
Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie
one is responsible. Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her
xxx xxx xxx relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found
him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and
Employers shall be liable for the second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering
damages caused by their employees Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter
and household helpers acting within persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
the scope of their assigned tasks,
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at
the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets,
What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 50
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is
from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same primary or subsidiary.
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the
name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered CUADRA vs. MONFORT, GR No. L-24101, Sept. 30,
from the scene of the crime inside the residence of 1970
private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom
FACTS:
and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

ISSUE: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13,
were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
W/N Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly School. On July 9, 1962 they were assigned to weed the
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners grass in the school premises. While thus engaged
liable for vicarious liability. Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
HELD: frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that precise
moment the latter turned around, and the object hit her
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-
right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the
2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In
eye became swollen and had to undergo surgical
fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
operation twice. Despite the medical efforts, however,
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the
right eye.
minor and the father and, in case of his death of
incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, The parents instituted a suit in behalf of their minor
such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that Monfort's father. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff to
"(t) he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease which the defendant appealed to SC on pure questions
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they of law.
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages." ISSUE:

Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article W/N Alfonso Monfort can be held liable for the acts of his
2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing child which caused damage to the Cuadra daughter.
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall
be answerable with his own property in an action against HELD:
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article
civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision
2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or
is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the
the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to
Revised Penal Code.
cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that
of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by
then becomes himself liable under Article 2180 under
their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the principle of vicarious liability. The presumption of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the liability is merely prima facie and may therefore be
aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number rebutted by proving that they observed all the diligence
of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Capuno, et al., Araneta vs. Arreglado, Salen, et al. vs.
Balce, Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al., and In the present case there is nothing from which it may be
Elcano, et al, vs. Hill, et al. Parenthetically, the aforesaid inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was
parents for crimes committed by their minor children
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or over, authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
since these situations are not covered by Article 101, which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held where it was his duty to send her and where she was
that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as
in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to
hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply play and which no parent, however careful, would have
only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would any special reason to anticipate much less guard
result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or
negligence the parents would be liable but not where the indeed any trait in the child's character which would
damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a blame could be attributed to her parents.
regrettable inconsistency in the Court's determination of
whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving TAMARGO vs. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 51


FACTS: the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of for damages.
10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, We do not believe that parental authority is properly
a complaint for damages was filed against respondent regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
incident. consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor parents had no actual or physically custody over the
Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was granted adopted child. To hold that parental authority had been
on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
and killed Jennifer. burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have
Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but
rather the adopting parents, the spouses Rapisura, were Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc
indispensable parties to the action since parental spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of
petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of
then actually living with his natural parents, parental
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. b.2. By Guardians

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling ART. 217 (FC) - In case of foundlings, abandoned
that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed neglected or abused children and other children similarly
were not indispensable parties to the action. The CA situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in
dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's
Hence, this petition. homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
ISSUE:
b.3. By Owners and Managers of Establishments
Whether the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for
the damages sustained by Jennifer Tamargo. SPS. VILORIA V. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES G.R. NO.
188288 JANUARY 16, 2012
HELD:
FACTS:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious
liability or the doctrine of imputed negligence where a On or about July 21, 1997 and while in the United
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, States, Fernando purchased for himself and his wife,
but also for torts committed by others with whom he has Lourdes, two (2) round trip airline tickets from San
a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Diego, California to Newark, New Jersey on board
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical Continental Airlines. Fernando purchased the tickets at
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents US$400.00 each from a travel agency called "Holiday
— their parental authority — which includes the Travel" and was attended to by a certain Margaret
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. Mager (Mager). According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando
agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
that there were no available seats at Amtrak, an intercity
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the
passenger train service provider in the United States.
parents were negligent in the performance of their legal
Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria were scheduled to leave
and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
for Newark on August 13, 1997 and return to San Diego
their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of
on August 21, 1997.
course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good their flight to Newark to an earlier date or August 6,
father of a family to prevent the damage. 1997. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via
Continental Airlines were already fully booked and
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto
offered the alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier
with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still
Air. Since flying with Frontier Air called for a higher fare
lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
of US$526.00 per passenger and would mean traveling
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that
by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager,

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 52


however, denied his request as the subject tickets are Is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travel’s agents and
non-refundable and the only option that Continental employees such as Mager?
Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within
one (1) year from the date the subject tickets were HELD:
issued. Fernando decided to reserve two (2) seats with
In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can
Frontier Air. only be held liable for the tort committed by its
agent's employees if it has been established by
As he was having second thoughts on traveling via preponderance of evidence that the principal
Frontier Air, Fernando went to the Greyhound Station was also at fault or negligent or that the principal
where he saw an Amtrak station nearby. Fernando made exercise control and supervision over them.
inquiries and was told that there are seats available and
he can travel on Amtrak anytime and any day he Considering that Holiday Travel is CAI's agent, does it
pleased. Fernando then purchased two (2) tickets for necessarily follow that CAI is liable for the fault or
Washington, D.C. negligence of Holiday Travel's employees? Citing China
Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et al., CAI argues that
From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel and it cannot be held liable for the actions of the employee of
its ticketing agent in the absence of an employer-
confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that
employee relationship.
she had misled them into buying the Continental Airlines
tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully
An examination of this Court's pronouncements in China
booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Air Lines will reveal that an airline company is not
Mager was firm in her position that the subject tickets completely exonerated from any liability for the tort
are non-refundable. committed by its agent's employees. A prior
determination of the nature of the passenger's cause of
Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter action is necessary. If the passenger's cause of action
to CAI on February 11, 1998, demanding a refund and against the airline company is premised on culpa
alleging that Mager had deluded them into purchasing aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the
employee of the airline company's agent, there must be
the subject tickets.
an independent showing that the airline company was at
fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or
In a letter dated February 24, 1998, Continental
tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its
Micronesia informed Fernando that his complaint had agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline
been referred to the Customer Refund Services of company's agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to
Continental Airlines at Houston, Texas. hold the airline company liable. There is no vinculum
juris between the airline company and its agent's
In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Continental Micronesia employees and the contractual relationship between the
denied Fernando's request for a refund and advised him airline company and its agent does not operate to create
that he may take the subject tickets to any Continental a juridical tie between the airline company and its
ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets within agent's employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does
not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort
two (2) years from the date they were issued.
committed by its agent's employees and the principal-
Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that the agency relationship per se does not make the principal a
subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the
purchase of another Continental ticket, albeit with a re- principal's own fault or negligence.
issuance fee.
On the other hand, if the passenger's cause of action for
On June 17, 1999, Fernando went to Continental's damages against the airline company is based on
ticketing office at Ayala Avenue, Makati City to have the contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not
subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to necessary that there be evidence of the airline
Los Angeles, California under his name. Therein, company's fault or negligence. As this Court previously
stated in China Air Lines and reiterated in Air France vs.
Fernando was informed that Lourdes' ticket was non-
Gillego, "in an action based on a breach of contract of
transferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that
ticket in his favor. He was also informed that a round trip the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that
ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the
have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his fact of its non-performance by the carrier."
San Diego to Newark round trip ticket. aTSEcA
Spouses Viloria's cause of action on the basis of
In a letter dated June 21, 1999, Fernando demanded for Mager's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly
the refund of the subject tickets as he no longer wished one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing
to have them replaced. In addition to the dubious contractual relationship between them. Therefore, it was
incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was
circumstances under which the subject tickets were
equally at fault.
issued, Fernando claimed that CAI's act of charging him
with US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles, However, the records are devoid of any evidence by
which other airlines priced at US$856.00, and refusal to which CAI's alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart
allow him to use Lourdes' ticket, breached its from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager's
undertaking under its March 24, 1998 letter. supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI's agent,
Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a
ISSUE: party or had contributed to Mager's complained act
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 53
either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and to prove the negative averment. This
Mager to issue the said misrepresentation. Court said:

It may seem unjust at first glance that CAI would "It is an old and well-settled
consider Spouses Viloria bound by the terms and rule of the courts that the
conditions of the subject contracts, which Mager entered burden of proving the action is
into with them on CAI's behalf, in order to deny Spouses upon the plaintiff, and that if
Viloria's request for a refund or Fernando's use of he fails satisfactorily to show
Lourdes' ticket for the re-issuance of a new one, and the facts upon which he bases
simultaneously claim that they are not bound by Mager's his claim, the defendant is
supposed misrepresentation for purposes of avoiding under no obligation to prove
Spouses Viloria's claim for damages and maintaining the his exceptions. This [rule] is in
validity of the subject contracts. It may likewise be harmony with the provisions
argued that CAI cannot deny liability as it benefited from of Section 297 of the Code of
Mager's acts, which were performed in compliance with Civil Procedure holding that
Holiday Travel's obligations as CAI's agent. each party must prove his
own affirmative allegations,
However, a person's vicarious liability is anchored on his etc." (citations omitted)
possession of control, whether absolute or limited, on
the tortfeasor. Without such control, there is nothing Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that CAI
which could justify extending the liability to a person exercised control over Holiday Travel's employees or
other than the one who committed the tort. As this Court that CAI was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed
explained in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.: on CAI for Mager's supposed misrepresentation.

With respect to extra-contractual PHIL. RABBIT LINES, INC. vs. PHIL-AMERICAN


obligation arising from negligence, FORWARDERS, INC. G.R. No. L-25142 March 25,
whether of act or omission, it is 1975
competent for the legislature to elect
— and our Legislature has so elected FACTS:
— to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a
obligation is imposed is morally
freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
culpable or, on the contrary, for
reasons of public policy, to extend along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
that liability, without regard to the The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
lack of moral culpability, so as to which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
include responsibility for the As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered
negligence of those persons whose injuries and the bus was damaged. Balingit was the
acts or omissions are imputable, by manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
a legal fiction, to others who are in
a position to exercise an absolute As a result of the incident, a complaint for damages was
or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil filed against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and
Code has elected to limit extra- Pineda. The CFI dismissed the case as to Balingit citing
contractual liability — with certain that the latter was not the manager of an establishment
well-defined exceptions — to cases in contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code.
which moral culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be charged. ISSUE:
This moral responsibility may consist
in having failed to exercise due care in What is the meaning of “manager” as used in Art.2180 of
one's own acts, or in having failed to the NCC?
exercise due care in the selection and
control of one's agent or servants, or HELD:
in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a The Civil Code provides:
position of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for their ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
conduct. (emphasis supplied) demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI
responsible.
exercised control or supervision over Mager by
preponderant evidence. The existence of control or
xxx xxx xxx
supervision cannot be presumed and CAI is under no
obligation to prove its denial or nugatory assertion. Citing
The owners and managers of an establishment or
Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled in Jayme v. Apostol,
that: enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
In Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled that which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
it was enough for defendant to deny functions.
an alleged employment relationship.
The defendant is under no obligation

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 54


Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not
their employees and household helpers acting within the engaged in any business or industry, an employer is
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former liable for the torts committed by employees within the
are not engaged in any business or industry. scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this
xxx xxx xxx is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer
liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
his assigned task when the tort complained of was
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
prevent damage. (1903a)
the selection and supervision of the employee.
We are of the opinion that the term manager does not
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in
include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered
holding that the driving by a manager of a company-
from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks
("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of
regardless of the time and circumstances.
"employer".
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on
of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that
in connection with the vehicular accident already
he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an
of his employment.
employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some
overtime work at the petitioner's office, which was
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VASQUEZ G.R.
located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he
No. 132266 December 21, 1999
went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu
FACTS: City where he had snacks with friends. It was when
ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the question occurred. A witness then testified that at the
morning, Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle time of the incident, ABAD was with a woman inside his
around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling car.
counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a
rotunda) but only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs
the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was of his own not in line with his duties at the time he
manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, figured in a vehicular accident which was about 2:00
registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On the a.m. of 28 August 1988. ABAD's working day had
same date and time, Abad drove the said company car ended; his overtime work had already been completed.
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug
the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's
St. or to Belvic St. business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
manager.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-
up of Abad collided with each other causing severe Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting
injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and within the scope of the functions entrusted to him,
brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it
later to the Cebu Doctor's hospital where he died a few exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
days after. providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious
An action for damages was commenced by the parents liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD
of the deceased against Abad and Castilex. The trial in driving its vehicle.
court ruled in favor of private respondents. Upon appeal,
the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD b.4. By Employers
and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the
MAMARIL V. BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former.
NO. 179382 JANUARY 14, 2013
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for
Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril
the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
(Sps. Mamaril) are jeepney operators since 1971. They
managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
would park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night
HELD: at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 55


located at 181 Concepcion Street, Malate, Manila for a It is settled that where the security agency, as here,
fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. On May 26, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening, all these vehicles were security guards, the agency is the employer of such
parked inside the BSP compound. The following guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
morning, however, one of the vehicles with Plate No. committed by the security guards attaches to the
DCG 392 was missing and was never recovered. employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of
According to the security guards Cesario Peña (Peña) such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a
and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency, Inc. security agency has no hand in selecting who among the
(AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its security and pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the
protection, a male person who looked familiar to them agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
took the subject vehicle out of the compound. diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
ISSUE: demanded from the client whose premises or property
are protected by the security guards. The fact that a
W/N Boy Scout of the Philippines can be held liable as
client company may give instructions or directions to the
an employer.
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render
HELD: the client responsible as an employer of the security
guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
The petition lacks merit. omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily
no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, contract for services entered into with the security
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes agency.
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same. Similarly, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states: BALIWAG TRANSIT INC. vs. CA G.R. No. 116624
September 20, 1996
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to FACTS:
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no preexisting contractual relation between the On 2 November 1990, petitioner's Baliwag Transit Bus
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the No. 117 was driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal for
provisions of this Chapter. repair of its brake system. Fidel told mechanic Mario
Dionisio to inform the headman about the matters so that
In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then
the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the
of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an gas tank.
unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, Shortly after, Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any driver's seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, was hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario
and without which the result would not have occurred. Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and convulsive,
sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and another bus
Moreover, Peña and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. parked thereat. Mario Dionisio was rushed to the
Mamaril's contention that they readily admitted being at hospital but died a few days after.
fault during the investigation that ensued.
Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged by
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding private respondents Divina Vda. de Dionisio, for herself
of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no reversible and in behalf of her minor children. The trial court
error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any rendered a decision in favor of private respondents.
liability for the loss of the subject vehicle based on fault Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this
or negligence. petition.

Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under ISSUE:


Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is
uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as W/N Baliwag Transit is liable solidarily with Fidel for the
security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard death of Dionisio.
Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employer-
HELD:
employee relationship existed between BSP and the
security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, The petition must fail. The circumstances clearly show
the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP that the proximate cause of the death of Dionisio was the
but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of negligence of driver Fidel when he failed to take the
Peña and Gaddi. necessary precaution to prevent the accident. Driver
Fidel should have parked the bus properly and safely.
In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, the Court
After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the
enunciated thus:
tank, he should have placed a stopper or any hard object

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 56


against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking the Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any
necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. 117 causing it negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
to move and roll, pinning down the deceased which damages of any kind.
resulted in his eventual death. The reckless imprudence
of Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of offended party Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
for damages together with his employer.
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an demandable not only for one's own acts or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
that there was negligence on the part of the employer one is responsible.
either in the selection of his employee or in the selection
xxx xxx xxx
of his employee or in the supervision over him after such
selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had by their employees and household helpers acting
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
family in the selection and supervision of his employee. though the former are not engaged in any business
Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict or industry.
committed by an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer
Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice
supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it must have occurred while an employee was in the
solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by performance of his assigned tasks.
him.
In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. CA, G.R. No. 82465 performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
February 25, 1991 happened not within the school premises, not on a
school day and most importantly while the teachers and
FACTS: students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.
This picnic had no permit from the school head or its
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section
principal because this picnic is not a school sanctioned
1-C at the St. Francis High School, joined a school picnic
activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular
undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach,
activity.
Sariaya, Quezon.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge
During the picnic and while the students were in the
by the principal of the planning of the picnic by the
water, one of the female teachers was apparently
students and their teachers does not in any way or in
drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand,
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the
came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand
holding of the same. The application therefore of Article
himself who drowned. His body was recovered but
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by
efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed.
any jurisprudence.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint for
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the
damages against the St. Francis High School and the
petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to
teachers, contending that the death of their son was due
the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the
to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper
class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good
son's drowning.
father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or
The trial court found in favor of the respondents but damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In
absolved the school from liability. The CA, upon appeal, fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and
ruled in favor of respondents and held the school liable Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout
under the doctrine in Art. 2180 of the NCC. masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and
swimming. The records also show that both petitioners
ISSUE: Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.
W/N St. Francis High School is liable for the death of
Ferdinand Castillo by applying Art. 2180 of the NCC. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. CA, G.R. No.
75112 October 16, 1990
HELD:
FACTS:
The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant case,
petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence nor Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an 82-year
guilty of the negligence of those under them. old retired schoolteacher, was struck by the Pinoy jeep
owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 57


employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of
Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of his assigned tasks. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha
October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence.
Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was
hospitalized. YAMBAO vs. ZUIGA, G.R. No. 146173. December 11,
2003
Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was
driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the FACTS:
authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The
two fled from the scene after the incident. Petitioner Yambao is the registered owner of Lady Cecil
and Rome Trans passenger bus. On May 6, 1992, the
Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages. The bus owned by the petitioner was being driven by
trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Venturina along EDSA. Suddenly, the bus bumped
Zuiga, a pedestrian. Zuiga thereafter died despite being
Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa,
given medical attention.
a non-party to the case. The Appellate Court affirmed
the trial court's decision in toto. Private respondents, as legal heirs of Zuiga, filed a
Complaint against petitioner and her driver, Venturina,
ISSUE: for damages. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in
favor of private respondents. Hence, this petition.
W/N the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is
applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to ISSUE:
Funtecha.
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good
HELD:
father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees, thus absolving her from any liability.
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be
held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the
HELD:
ground that there is no existing employer-employee
relationship between them. We agree.
Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of her driver deserves but
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the
scant consideration. Her allegation that before she hired
provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14, Venturina she required him to submit his drivers license
Rule X of Book III which reads: and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer
in evidence certified true copies of said license and
Sec. 14.Working scholars. — There is no clearances. Moreover, as the court a quo aptly
employer-employee relationship between students observed, petitioner contradicts herself. She declared
on the one hand, and schools, colleges or that Venturina applied with her sometime in January
universities on the other, where students work for 1992 and she then required him to submit his license
the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free and clearances. However, the record likewise shows that
she did admit that Venturina submitted the said
of charge; provided the students are given real
requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of
opportunity, including such facilities as may be the fatal accident itself. In other words, petitioners own
reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court admissions clearly and categorically show that she did
under such arrangement. not exercise due diligence in the selection of her bus
driver.
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law,
petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did
employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of submit his license and clearances when he applied with
students who render service to the school in exchange petitioner, the latter still fails the test of due diligence in
for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two the selection of her bus driver. Petitioner failed to
present convincing proof that she went to the extent of
hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to
verifying Venturinas qualifications, safety record, and
clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there
a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. was negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus,
classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, remains unrebutted.
Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due
But even if we were to concede the status of an supervision over Venturina after his selection. Petitioner
employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for did not present any proof that she drafted and
his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer implemented training programs and guidelines on road
for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of
any showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend
been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting
periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency.
within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any
was to sweep the school passages for two hours every liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of
morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of Venturina.
the jeep from the authorized driver and then driving the
vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 58


In sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents for the without doubt, insufficient to overcome the legal
negligent and imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and and supervision of his driver. Accordingly, we affirm the
clear.
ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for
the injuries suffered by respondent.
SYKI vs. BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149 October 23,
2003 AGUILA vs. BALDOVISO, G.R. No. 163186 February
28, 2007
FACTS:
FACTS:
On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa and his
three companions flagged down a passenger jeepney On April 19, 1993, Lisbos was driving, along EDSA in
driven by Espina and owned by Pisuena. While Caloocan City, a van, registered under the name of
respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney (his petitioner Reyes. The van sideswiped Fausto who was
right foot already inside while his left foot still on the walking along the pedestrian lane and crossing EDSA.
boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries, and
by Sablayan and owned by petitioner Syki bumped the was brought to the hospital but subsequently died.
rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and
fractured his left thigh bone. Fausto’s wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children filed
before the RTC a complaint for damages against Lisbos,
Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of Reyes, Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual operator and
common carrier’s contractual obligations and quasi-delict possessor of the van, and Times Surety and Insurance
against Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney;, Company, the insurer of the van under a third-party
herein petitioner Syki, the owner of the truck;, and liability insurance contract.
Sablayan, the driver of the truck.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The CA
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Pisuena denied the appeal ruling that Reyes and Aguila has lost
but ordered petitioner Syki and Sablayan, to pay their right to appeal.
respondent Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and
moral damages plus attorney’s fees. The CA affirmed ISSUE:
the decision in toto.
Do the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended
ISSUE: decision after the original decision had become final and
executory?
W/N petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father
in the selection and supervision of his employees as to HELD:
absolve him from liability.
We find petitioners’ contentions devoid of merit.
HELD:
While the Resolution dated August 13, 2001, correcting
The petition has no merit. the March 7, 2000 Decision, stated that the name of
Lisbos was inadvertently included in the dispositive
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris portion, hence, said name was ordered stricken off, the
familias" in the selection and supervision of employees ensuing Amended Decision rendered on August 13,
through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to 2001 is null and void because any amendment or
buttress the same with any other evidence, object or alteration made which substantially affects the final and
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased executory judgment is null and void.
nature of the testimony.
Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original
Petitioner testified that before he hired Sablayan, he decision holding the petitioners, Lisbos, and the
required him to submit a police clearance in order to insurance company solidarily liable. In an action based
determine if he was ever involved in any vehicular on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct and
accident. He also required Sablayan to undergo a driving primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
test with conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca. selection and supervision of the employee. Thus, even if
the driver was included albeit not served with summons,
Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand,
petitioners are directly and primarily liable. Thus,
testified that Sablayan passed the driving test and had
petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and registered
never figured in any vehicular accident except the one in
owner or possessor-operator of the van, respectively,
question.
are solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180 in
Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police relation to Articles 2184 and 2194 of the Civil Code.
clearance given to him by Sablayan, nor the results of
Sablayan’s driving test. Petitioner also did not present SPS. JAYME vs. APOSTOL, G.R. No. 163609
November 27, 2008
records of the regular inspections that his mechanic
allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-
FACTS:
serving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic are,

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 59


On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the
Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by negligent driver and his direct employer.
Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality. The pick-
up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Compare: Subsidiary Liability under Art. 103 of the
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto RPC
Simbulan.
SPS. FRANCO vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71137 October 5,
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a 1989
minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in
Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. FACTS:

Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical On October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the
attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident. northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left to
avoid hitting a truck parked along the cemented
Petitioners spouses Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga,
complaint for damages against respondents.
Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming
Isuzu Mini Bus driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the CA
absolved Miguel from liability upon appeal, citing that the making a collision between the two vehicles an
latter was not the employer of Lozano. Hence, this unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.
petition.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers
ISSUE: and two passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and
Fernando Chuay.
May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the
negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of
resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian? the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim
Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of
HELD: driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for
damages.
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds
no application in the present case. The trial court in its decision said that the act of the
Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103 of
employees, the following requisites must be established: the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer Civil Code. Said decision was affirmed by the IAC.
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer ISSUE:
has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the
illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.
herein private respondents was predicated upon crime
or quasi-delict.
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot
be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove
the relationship by preponderant evidence HELD:

In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be
find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of made between the subsidiary liability of the employer
Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the under the RPC and the employer's primary liability under
latter. To determine the existence of an employment the NCC which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: The first type of liability is governed by Article 103 of the
(1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of
Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:
wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to
control the method of doing the work; and (4) the
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
Applying the foregoing test, it was the Municipality of article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen,
was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the duties;
time of the accident is of no moment.
While the second kind is governed by Articles 2176,
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he
still can not be held liable. Mere giving of directions to Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability
the driver does not establish that the passenger has originates from a delict committed by the employee who
control over the vehicle.
is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary
liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 60
Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be crime. It is now settled that for an employer to be
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
criminal action whereby the employee's criminal present:
negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor
are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the
employer's liability would not be predicated under Article discharge of his duties;
103.
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted. his civil liability;
Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
on considering that their liability is merely secondary to
industry.
their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore,
recourse under this remedy is not possible. Without the conviction of the employee, the employer
cannot be subsidiarily liable.
To hold the employer liable under Article 103 of the RPC
sans prior conviction is erroneous. It is erroneous In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has
because the conviction of the employee primarily liable the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
liability and, at the same time, absurd because we will be Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under Article
faced with a situation where the employer is held 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the
subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
previously established. negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of
Thus the present case must be decided on the basis of
the family.
civil liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act
of its employee and not subsidiary liability under Art. 103 In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an
of the RPC. action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file
BERMUDEZ vs. HON. MELENCIO-HERRERA, G.R.
an independent civil action did not preclude them from
No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
FACTS:
ALVAREZ vs. CA, G.R. No. L-59621 February 23,
A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by Cordova 1988
Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-
FACTS:
year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy
sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, a Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide in
criminal case filed against Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants the CFI of Quezon Province. After trial, the court
filed in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File rendered judgment against the accused.
Separate Civil Action."
The accused appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil court's decision but deleted that part thereof making
case for damages. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted herein petitioner, as employer of Renato Ramos,
the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's subsidiarily liable for payment of the adjudged
negligence constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court indemnities to the offended parties, ruling that --
stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the
accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this action. It is
their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, true that the judgment of conviction in the criminal
the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the case binds the person subsidiarily liable with the
complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and accused, and it is therefore the duty of the employer
to suspend the hearing of the case against Pontino until to participate in the defense. The law, however,
after the criminal case is finally terminated. Hence, this does not authorize that the subsidiary liability of the
appeal. employer be adjudged in the criminal action. This is
because, in the criminal proceeding, the employer,
ISSUE: not being a party, is denied the opportunity to
present his defense against such subsidiary liability.
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants
Due regard to due process and observance of
is founded on crime or on quasi-delict.
procedural requirements demand that a separate
HELD: action should be filed against the supposed
employer to enforce the subsidiary liability under
We find the appeal meritorious. Article 103 of the RPC.

To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi- The CA’s decision was not appealed. Meanwhile, on 14
contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to appellant, December 1978, Pajarito v. Seneris was decided by this
her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from Court, holding inter alia that--
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 61
Considering that the judgment of conviction, The trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court
sentencing a defendant employee to pay an made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because
indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised there was no service of summons on him. The trial court
Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained
only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s
with regard to its amount, . . . in the action to enforce employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no
other function than to render decision based upon Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from judgment,
the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has petition for certiorari and annulment of judgment. Mrs.
no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion Cerezo insisted that trial court never acquired jurisdiction
an error has been committed in the decision. over the case considering there was no service of
summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses
In view of the foregoing principles, it would serve no claimed was an indispensable party. All of the actions
important purpose to require petitioner to file a were denied for lack of merit.
separate and independent action against the
employer for the enforcement of the latter's ISSUE:
subsidiary civil liability. At any rate, the proceeding
W/N Foronda was an indispensable party to the action
for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability
so as to enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability.
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. HELD:
After finality of the CA judgment, the case was The petition has no merit.
remanded to the RTC for execution on the strength of
the Pajarito decision. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of
view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis
ISSUE: of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the
Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
W/N a separate civil action is necessary to enforce the
employer’s subsidiary liability. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising
from a delict under Article 103 of the RPC, or may give
HELD:
rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of
The petition is not impressed with merit. the NCC. An aggrieved party may choose between the
two remedies.
The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically
arises upon his employee's conviction, and subsequent Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a
proof of inability to pay. In this light, the application of quasi-delict. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion,
Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.
remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict
recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judicially-
is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based
declared criminally negligent act.
on a delict is merely subsidiary. Although liability under
A separate civil action may be warranted where Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
additional facts have to be established or more evidence employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
must be adduced or where the criminal case has been directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just presumes that the employer has himself committed an
as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was damage.
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce
case. These do not exist in this case. Considering
the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of
appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
the RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary
complainants in this case to require at this time a
capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate
separate civil action to be filed.
a criminal action where the employee’s delict and
CEREZO vs. TUAZON, G.R. No. 141538 March corresponding primary liability are established. If the
23, 2004 present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial
court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However,
FACTS: the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs.
Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
On 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger
collided with a tricycle. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver L.G. FOODS CORPORATION vs. HON. PAGAPONG-
Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. AGRAVIADOR, G.R. No. 158995 September
Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and bus driver 26, 2006
Foronda.
FACTS:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 62
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. (n)
employee, Yeneza. Charles died as a result of the
accident.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with
A criminal case was filed against the driver. the proper government office a bond executed by a
government-controlled corporation or office, to answer
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond
accused driver committed suicide. On account thereof, and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public
the MTCC dismissed the criminal case. official. (n)

Thereafter, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for DUAVIT vs. CA, G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989
damages against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such FACTS:
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar were
aboard a jeep. Catuar was driving the said jeep and
The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,
while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Catuar slowed
principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim
down. Suddenly, another jeep driven by defendant
for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the
Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep. Catuar was
provision of Article 103 of the RPC.
thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise
merit. The CA denied the petition for certiorari and plaintiff Sarmiento was trapped inside the fallen jeep,
upheld the trial court. and one of his legs was fractured.

ISSUE: The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Sabiniano
as driver, and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is
founded on Article 103 of the RPC or derived from Defendant Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other
Article 2180 of the NCC. jeep, denied that the other defendant (Sabiniano) was
his employee.
HELD:
Defendant Sabiniano categorically admitted that he took
The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the
Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for consent or authority of the latter
damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however,
from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict The trial court found Sabiniano negligent but absolved
was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To Duavit from liability. Upon appeal, the CA rendered the
stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable
gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and with Sabiniano.
the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise
ISSUE:
due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the
death of their 7-year old son. NCC when the said vehicle was neither driven by an
employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
latter.
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and HELD:
a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a
b.5 Owner of Vehicle vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving
In the vehicle the said vehicle if the same was driven without his
Not in the vehicle
consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by
him.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle
the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that involved in tire mishap but completely denies having
a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or employed the driver Sabiniano or even having
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was
twice within the next preceding two months. virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold,
therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver
of Article 2180 are applicable. (n) nor employee would be absurd as it would be like

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 63


holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance
accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with
Soriano, paid the latter. By way of subrogation, it sued
JUANIZA vs. JOSE, G.R. No. L-50127-28 March Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR for quasi-delict.
30, 1979 Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen
since he was no longer staying at his given address.
FACTS:
Both the RTC and CA dismissed the complaint for failure
Jose was the registered owner and operator of the of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
ISSUE:
with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways
which resulted in the death to 7 and physical injuries to 5 May an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a
of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Jose was rent-a-car company for fault or negligence of the car
legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been lessee in driving the rented vehicle?
cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Arroyo, for 16 years
in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. HELD:

The CFI rendered a decision against Jose and Arroyo. We find no reversible error committed by respondent
The lower court based her liability on the provision of court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads:
To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the following
When a man and woman living together as husband and requisites must concur:
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
both of them through their work or industry or their
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage
ISSUE:
incurred by the plaintiff.
W/N Arroyo who is not a registered owner of the jeepney
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to
can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with
prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
the registered owner of the same.
negligence of FILCAR, because only the fault or
HELD: negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established.
It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to
The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
NCC requires that the man and the woman living other vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have
together must not in any way be incapacitated to any participation therein.
contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to
Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to Art. 2180 is not applicable in this case. FILCAR being
contract marriage with Arroyo. Under the aforecited engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of
provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no
of the jeepney. There is therefore no basis for the liability vinculum juris between them as employer and employee.
of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible
physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
jeepney. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the being an employer of the latter.
registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from CADIENTE vs. MACAS, supra.
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe
caused to any of the passengers therein. b.6. By State

ANONUEVO vs. CA, supra. REPUBLIC vs. HON. PALACIO, G.R. No. L-20322
May 29, 1968
FGU INSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118889
March 23, 1998 FACTS:

FACTS: Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a case against the Handong


Irrigation Association, Inc. to recover possession, with
On 21 April 1987, 2 vehicles, cruising along EDSA, damages, of a lot located in Camarines Sur, which the
figured in a traffic accident. The car owned by Soriano Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied.
was being driven by Jacildone, while the other car,
owned by respondent FILCAR, was driven by Dahl- The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, filed an
Jensen as lessee. Upon approaching the corner of urgent motion to lift the order of garnishment against the
Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account
of the Irrigation Service Unit at the PNB, Manila, for the
right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 64


reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public plaintiff's controversies with the estate. It did not pass
funds and exempt from attachment or execution. Upon upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it
denial of this motion, the Solicitor General commenced would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the
suit.
CA. The appellate court sustained the propriety of the
said order. Hence, this petition for review.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

ISSUE: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through


a special agent, but not when the damage should
W/N the pump irrigation trust fund may be garnished to have been caused by the official to whom properly it
satisfy a money-judgment against the Handog Irrigation
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
Asso.
provisions of the preceding article shall be
HELD: applicable.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article


An infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent
its ignoring the fact that the initial complaint against the
Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words
Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties
liability thus arose from tort and not from contract; and it of his office if he is a special official) so that in
is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents,
specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained This concept does not apply to any executive agent who
of outside of such agent's regular duties There being no is an employee of the acting administration and who on
proof that the making of the tortious inducement was his own responsibility performs the functions which are
authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
liable therefor. are regulated by law and the regulations."

MERITT vs. GOV’T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, G.R. No. It is, therefore, evidence that the is only liable for the
L-11154 March 21, 1916 acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
FACTS: article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue when
agent.
the General Hospital ambulance turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the b.7.. By Teachers
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn and in violation of the Motor EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO, G.R. No. L-10134 June
Vehicle Act, by which movement it struck the plaintiff. 29, 1957

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so FACTS:


severely injured that, as a consequence, plaintiff
suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor. Dante Capuno was a student of the Bilintawak
Elementary School and on March 31, 1949 he attended
ISSUE: a parade upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
From the school, Dante, with other students, boarded a
W/N the gov’t can be held liable for the damages jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of
resulting from the negligence of the chauffeur. the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left
side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle
HELD:
and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that
the Government by virtue of Act No. 2457 “in order to fix Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at
the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son
and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which when his son told him after the accident that he attended
Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
."
Delfin Capuno contends that he is not liable for damages
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the since at the time of the incident, he was not in
legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for supervision, custody and control of his son. The RTC
the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just sustained the defense and the case was certified by the
as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to CA to the SC on the ground of pure questions of law.
see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than
ISSUE:
remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 65
W/N Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from Virgilio Daffon were classmates in Manila Technical
the death of Isidoro Caperiña. Institute. On March 10, 1966, they, together with another
classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room.
HELD: Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio Daffon were working on a
machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc
5, provide:
was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
preceding articles is enforceable not only for retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face,
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
persons for whom another is responsible. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him
the mother, are liable for any damages caused by to fall face downward. First aid was administered to him
the minor children who live with them. but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to
a hospital where he eventually died.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff-appellants, as parents of the deceased, filed a
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are case against Daffon, Brillantes as member of the Board
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or of Directors of the Institute, Valenton as president and
apprentices while they are under their custody. Quibulue as instructor thereof.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the
for the damages in question because at the time the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial
Dante committed the negligent act which resulted in the court, however, absolved from liability the three other
death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute,
with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not ruling that teachers or heads of establishments of arts
disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. and trades shall be only liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students and apprentices where the
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law
latter are under their custody.
above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or ISSUE:
apprentices while they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades W/N defendants-school officials are liable as tortfeasors
and not to any academic educational institution. Here with defendant Daffon for damages resulting from
Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Palisoc’s death.
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose HELD:
Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. In
The Court holds that under the Art. 2180 of the NCC,
the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that
defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical
school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
Institute are liable jointly and severally for damages to
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not
plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son
then a student of an institute of arts and trades as
at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's
provided by law.
laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of
is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly
parental authority they exercise over them which liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, defendant.
keeping them in their company, educating them and
The rationale of such liability of school heads and
instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students,
the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
so long as they remain in their custody, is that they
punish them in moderation". The only way by which they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students,
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In
family to prevent the damage. This, defendants failed to
the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
prove.
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
SPS.PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. L-29025 mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
October 4, 1971 hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the
FACTS: students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 66


as to take the necessary precautions to protect the establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
students in their custody from dangers and hazards that and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that the general rule.
some student themselves may inflict willfully or through
negligence on their fellow students. . There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving committed by their students are concerned. The same
defendants-school officials on the ground that they could vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the
and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
other defendants officials of the school." As stated make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in
(the students) remain in their custody" means the its custody but if that same tort were committed in an
protective and supervisory custody that the school and academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and or the school head.
students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school. There is nothing in the law that requires that for These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher
such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits of the academic school is to be held answerable for the
the tortious act must live and board in the school, as torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in school only who is held liable where the injury is caused
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present academic or non- technical school, why not apply the
decision. . rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the
liability only on the teacher?
AMADORA vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
FACTS: historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercises a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head
Alfredo Amadora was a graduating student of Colegio de of the academic school. By contrast, the head of the
San Jose-Recoletos. On April 13, 1972, while they were academic school is not as involved with his students and
in the auditorium of their school, a classmate, Pablito exercised only administrative duties over the teachers
Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo. who were the persons directly dealing with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for
The herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a
the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts
civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could
Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
be so blamed.
rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Damon and two other It is conceded that the custody requirement signify that
students, through their respective parents. The that the student should be within the control of the
complaint against the students was later dropped. The school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the injury. However, this does not necessarily mean that
plaintiffs. On appeal to the CA, however, the decision such, custody be co-terminous with the semester.
was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
ISSUE: objective, the responsibility of the school authorities over
the student continues. At the time Alfredo Amadora was
W/N Art. 2180 was applicable as the Colegio de San
fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but
of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that
an academic institution of learning.
the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
W/N the students were in the custody of the school at immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
the time of the incident as the semester had already physics experiment or merely to submit his physics
ended. report for what is important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose.
HELD:
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision charge who must answer for his students' torts. It is not
in question should apply to all schools, academic as well necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather physically present and in a position to prevent it.
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for Custody does not connote immediate and actual
the tort committed by the student will attach to the physical control but refers more to the influence exerted
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result
of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 67


student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Abon
of the school at any time when its authority could be was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of
validly exercised over him. Homicide.

The rector, the high school principal and the dean of Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was damages, impleading Abon, Ungos (ROTC
the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only Commandant), school officials and the BCF as party
a general authority over the student body and not the defendants. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher of Castro. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial
thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence Court.
of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that ISSUE:
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
W/N petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Abon
connection with his physics report did not necessarily
for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer. HELD:
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at
there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
enforcing discipline upon Damon or that he had waived A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the temporary adjournment of school activities where the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him student still remains within call of his mentor and is not
because he was not supposed or required to report to permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
school on that day. And while it is true that the offending within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by
student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere
even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
committed, it has not been established that it was school without more does not constitute "attending
caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
student. On the contrary, the private respondents have custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
proved that they had exercised due diligence, through
the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Abon
that discipline. cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the
school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
held directly liable under the article because only the under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is with Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
made responsible for the damage caused by the student
or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the Besides, the record shows that before the shooting
tort committed by any of the other private respondents incident, Ungos, ROTC Unit Commandant, had
for none of them has been found to have been charged instructed Abon "not to leave the office and to keep the
with the custody of the offending student or has been armory well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school
such custody. when he committed the act for which the petitioners are
sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that
SALVOSA vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with
definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
FACTS:
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic
ART. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers,
institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are
trade.
shall have special parental authority and responsibility
The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly over the minor child while under their supervision,
appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon instruction or custody.
received his appointment from the AFP and received his
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
school, entity or institution. (349a)
Foundation ROTC Unit. Abon was also a commerce
student of the BCF. ART. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
On 3 March 1977, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 68
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, Evidence shows, and this the respondents did not
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute dispute, that the immediate cause of the accident was
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
liable. James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
they exercised the proper diligence required under the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment
particular circumstances. of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned
on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil of the accident.
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS, G.R. No. owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. The
143363. February 6, 2002 registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the
FACTS:
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. As a streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the spouses that the accident occurred because of the
fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
Elementary School. The jeep was driven by James of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
b.8. Defense: Diligence of a Good Father of
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
Family
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained c. Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
from the accident.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
Thereafter, his parents filed a case for damages against liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
James Daniel II and his parents, Villanueva and St. by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
Mary’s Academy. The RTC found the St. Mary’s roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
Academy liable while Daniel’s parents were subsidiarily works under their control or supervision. (n)
liable. Villanueva was absolved from liability. Said
decision was affirmed by the CA. JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 71049 May
29, 1987
ISSUE:
FACTS:
W/N petitioner is liable for the death of Carpitanos.
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he, together
HELD: with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy
"bagoong" at the time when the public market was
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
flooded with ankle deep rainwater. On his way home, he
have special parental authority over a minor child while
stepped on an uncovered opening obscured by the dirty
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
petitioner. After administering first aid treatment at a
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble
under custody is a minor, those exercising special home. Petitioner became ill and his leg swelled with
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for great pain and was thereafter hospitalized. After
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the discharge, he had to walk around in crutches. His injury
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, prevented him from attending to the school buses he is
instruction, or custody. operating.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been
the negligence must have a causal connection to the placed. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon
accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate liable for damages but absolved respondent City of
cause of the death of the victim. Manila.

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 69


ISSUE: been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it.
Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the
W/N the IAC erred in not ruling that respondent City of proximate cause of the injury suffered. The City is
Manila should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner.
Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23052
HELD: January 29, 1968

The petition is impressed with merit. FACTS:

Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
held liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner manhole on P. Burgos Avenue as he stepped down from
because under the Management and Operating the curb of the street to board a jeepney. Teotico
Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all suffered serious injuries due to the fall.
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by
third persons for any cause attributable to it. As a consequence thereof, Teotico filed a complaint for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
held liable under the Revised Charter of Manila which police. The complaint was dismissed by the CFI. The
provides: decision was affirmed by the CA except insofar as the
City of Manila was concerned which was ordered to
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or
indemnify Teotico. Hence, this appeal.
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of
the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City ISSUE:
Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said W/N the City of Manila is liable for the damages incurred
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while by Teotico.
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
HELD:
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides that: The CA applied the Civil Code instead of Act. No. 409
(Charter of Manila), and, we think, correctly. It is true
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned,
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code
person by reason of defective conditions of roads, a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic
under their control or supervision. Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability
of the City of Manila. Upon the other hand, Article 2189
Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila refers constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" —
governs liability due to "defective streets, public specifically — "of the defective condition of roads,
buildings and other public works" in particular and is streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works
therefore decisive on this specific case. under their control or supervision.

Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary
for the liability therein established to attach, that the for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective public works belong to the province, city or defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision" over the municipality have either "control or supervision" over
public building in question. said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana
not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision"
Public Market, despite the Management and Operating
by the City of Manila.
Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the control of the former. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. No. 61516
March 21, 1989
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of
Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public FACTS:
market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place
for their marketing needs. Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) when
openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, she accidentally fell into a manhole. As a result thereof,
that they were adequately covered. Had the opening she had to be hospitalized and operated on. From the
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 70
time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, necessary repairs. (1907)
as she has difficulty of locomotion.

The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioner. On


appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for
damages caused:
findings on the ground that no evidence was presented
by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been
Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of
Boulevard. explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe
and adequate place;
ISSUE:
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to
W/N control or supervision over a national road by the persons or property;
City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to
answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or
the Civil Code. lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

HELD: (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or


deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
We grant the petition.

Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the defective


Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding
road or street to belong to the province, city or
articles should be the result of any defect in the
municipality for liability to attach. The article only
construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person
requires that either control or supervision is exercised
suffering damages may proceed only against the
over the defective road or street.
engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through
DE ROY V. CA, SUPRA
the City Engineer who has the following duties:

Sec. 22.The City Engineer--His powers, duties and


compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who
shall be in charge of the department of Engineering
and Public Works. He shall receive a salary of not
exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He
shall have the following duties:

xxx

(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public


system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of
water supply, and shall control, maintain and
regulate the use of the same, in accordance with the
ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate
the use of all private systems for supplying water to
the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers,
and their connection with the public sewer system.

xxx

The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the


laying out, construction and improvement of streets,
avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of
the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal
Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city
indeed has supervision and control over the
sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

d. Proprietors of building, engineer, architect,


contractor

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is


responsible for the damages resulting from its total or

Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 71


Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 72