What is the classification of a land; solely devoted to the growing

of grass for the purpose of feeding Carabaos located in a separate

parcel of land?

The abovementioned legal dilemma, contemplates similarities with the

2018 case of Heirs of Ramon Arce Jr. v DAR1. In this case, the Philippine Carabao

Center of Agriculture sometime in around 1998, recommended and eventually

caused Arce to transfer his cattle for health and sanitary reasons. Thereafter, Arce

continued to plant and grow grass on the subject parcel of land, and his employees

would cut and gather around 6 tons of grass daily for the purpose of feeding the,

despite Arce’s cattle being located in another parcel of land. This method is called

the “feedlot operation”, which is recognized by the DAR in Administrative Order

No. 01 series of2004. Ultimately, Arce’s operations led to the issuance of a Notice

of Coverage (NOC) over his land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP). The said issuance, regarding the proper classification of Arce’s

land, led to several conflicting decisions from the Department of Agrarian Reform

(DAR), and between the Office of the President (OP) and the Court of Appeals (CA)

regarding the proper classification of the subject land. Ultimately, the Supreme

Court Ruled that Arce’s land is non-agricultural, thus it is excluded from the

coverage of CARP for the following reasons:

1
Heirs of Ramon Arce Jr. v DAR. G.R. 228503. 2018.
 (1) The subject lands are devoted to livestock raising, and are therefore

industrial.

a. The Court cited the case of Luz Farms2 in mentioning the

transcripts of the Constitutional Commision’s deliberations that

“it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to

include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the

constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the

government”

(2) The transfer of Arce’s Carabaos is temporary in nature and did not divert

the use of the subject land from the purpose of livestock farming.

(3) Arce acquired his landholdings as early as the 1950s, and eversince the

subject lands covered by grass was used for the raising of livestock.

There was no evidence that Arce converted to the raising of livestock

after the enactment of the CARL that may lead to the suspicion that

petitioners had the intention of evading its coverage.

a. The Court mentioned that the CARL prohibits the conversion of

agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the

effectivity of the CARL. “Here, there was no showing that the

2
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM. G.R. No. 86889. 1990.


 subject lands which were devoted for livestock raising prior to

the CARL, had been converted to an agricultural land, after its

passage.Thus, the petitioners' subject lands remained to be non-

agricultural, i.e., devoted to livestock raising, and thus, excluded

from the coverage of the CARP.”

(4) The OP found that the subject lands had a predominant slope of %18,

and should therefore be expempted from the coverage of CARP.

Although the Arce case elucidates on the contemplated legal dilemma

mentioned at the beginning of this study, the decision in the said case could not

include situations wherein; there were no transfers of livestock for health and

sanitary reasons to begin with, or that such transfer would be permanent in nature;

or where the subject land holdings were never classified as industrial prior to the

passage of CARL, but was eventually used for the production of grass for the

purpose of feeding livestock/poultry/cattle. Therefore, this paper opines that the

Arce precedent is limited in application with regard to the matter of classifying

land solely devoted to the growing of grass for the purpose of feeding Carabaos

located in a separate parcel of land, due to the abovementioned reasons.

According to jurisprudence, the equal protection clause in the Philippine

Constitution allows for valid classification as long as (1) the classification is based

on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies

to past and future conditions; (4) it must apply eaqually to each member of the
same class. In the case of Arce, the Supreme Court construed laws, and rules in

order to arrive at the proper classification of Arce’s land. The ruling however, does

not substantiate the 3rd requisite of valid classification as provided by

jurisprudence. Moreover the ruling not include possible current/future situations

wherein; there were no transfers of livestock for health and sanitary reasons to

begin with, or that such transfer was of permanent nature; or where the subject

land holdings were never classified as industrial prior to the passage of CARL, but

was eventually used for the production of grass for the purpose of feeding

livestock/poultry/cattle.

In a possible situation where the bare facts would entail a parcel of land that

is solely devoted to the growing of grass for the purpose of feeding Carabaos located

in a separate parcel of land, would it be possible for that parcel of land to be

considered agricultural? Perhaps this is possible, by way of harmonizing the Arce

decision, with existing laws.

According to section 3(c) of the CARL defines Agricultural land as those, “…

devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,

commercial or industrial land.” Under the law all land suitable for agriculture may

be covered under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Therefore, in

order for a parcel of land solely devoted to the growing of grass for the purpose of

feeding Carabaos located in a separate parcel of land, be classified agricultural,

therefore such land must first be suitable for agricultural activity. Under
the said law, “agricultural activity is the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,

growing of fruit trees, raising of fish, including the harvesting of such farm

products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in

conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or

juridical.” This also necessarily includes that the land must predominantly have a

slope of less than 18%.

Second, the transfer of the carabaos must be of permanent

character, or that there was no transfer of animals to begin with. In the

case of Arce, the Supreme Court excluded Arce’s farm from the coverage of CARP,

because of the factual circumstance surrounding the nature of the transfer of his

livestock was only of temporary character, having been for health and sanitary

reasons. Moreover, this decision cannot necessarily contemplate land which has

never been inhabited by the subject livestock, before these were transferred to a

separate parcel(s) of land.

Third, the subject land must have never been converted into a

land other than agricultural land. According to the CARL, the following are

the grounds for conversion, (1) 5 years have lapsed from the award of the land; (2)

land is no longer feasible for agricultural purposes, or that the locality has become

too urbanized that it will have better economic value if classified otherwise; (3)

application of beneficiary or land owner, and subsequent authorization of DAR;

(4) beneficiary must have fully paid his obligation.

 Therefore, study opines that it might be possible to classify a land that is

solely devoted to the growing of grass for the purpose of feeding Carabaos located

in a separate parcel of land as agricultural as long as it meets the

abovementioned requirements; for if it were otherwise, such land would be

considered industrial. As provided by the Court in the case of DAR v. Sutton3, 1986

Constitutional Commission showed a clear intent to exclude all lands exclusively

devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry raising, and that the DAR has no power to

regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the

coverage of agrarian reform.

3
DAR v. Sutton. G.R. 162070. 2005