129
Causes of Breakdown in Steam Plant
Informal Discussion on Friday, 26th January 1951
The informal discussion on causes of breakdown in steam
plant was introduced by ten speakers, each of whom made a
contribution based on his own experience and, where time per-
mitted, replied to the ensuing discussion upon his contribution.
LOOSE W H E E L S O N T H E T U R B I N E SHAFT
Mr. H. J. BENNETT (London) said that he had selected the
subject of loose wheels on the turbine shaft because he thought
that there was a lesson to be learnt, and a considerable change
in design had resulted from the troubles experienced.
The machine concerned was of the three-cylinder type, with
a stop valve condition of 600 Ib. per sq. in. and 850 deg. F. ;it
had run satisfactorily from 1933 until 1935, having then been in
service for approximately 13,000 hours. Later, however, heavy
vibration occurred and when the high-pressure cylinder was
opened up examination showed that the spindle was bent and
that loss of shrink fit had taken place on some of the wheels.
A repair had been carried out by fitting a new spindle to give
increased shrink fits to the wheel hubs. After that repair, the
machine was returned to service, but towards the end of 1939
further vibration troubles arose, necessitating the machine being
taken out of service. A deflexion of 0.005 inch was recorded on
checking the spindle.
The reason advanced for that permanent deflexion of the
shaft was that.the loss of shrink fit on the wheel hubs, with the
additional loss due to centrifugal action, had led to the possibility
of steam working between shaft and hub, resulting in a tempera-
ture difference large enough to cause permanent deflexion.
At that time the need for plant was urgent, and it was decided,
therefore, to run the machine if possible, and observe its further
performance. The bearing clearances were closed, and a
stabilized type of bearing was fitted on the high-pressure end.
The set was put into service and ran successfully for a long
time. T o check on any further increase in the permanent shaft
deflexion, a “clocky’gauge was fitted on the inlet-end pedestal
to obtain deflexion readings at a point about 15 inches from the
inlet-end bearing centre. That permitted readings to be taken
when the machine was being shut down, and thus gave a fairly
reliable indication of whether the shaft deflexion was increasing.
It had been hoped that the machine could be kept running for
a considerable time, but unfortunately, after a short shut down
of some 6 hours’ duration, heavy vibration occurred when the
machine was being run up again, and on that occasion the
vibration was so severe that the set had to be stopped.
On examination it wab found that the spindle had deflected
sufficiently to cause the diaphragm glands to be rubbed away
completely and, in addition, the throw of the spindle had been
of such magnitude that the blade shrouding had cut through
many of the diaphragm stop plates. The spindle deflexion was
found to be 0-012 inch.
A careful analysis was made of the running hours and the
average temperatures which had been obtained over a period
of five years and, when those were related to the time-creep
curve of the wheel material, it was seen that if the shrink fits
could be restored there would be every possibility of a further
ten to fifteen years’ trouble-free running.
The repair in that instance had consisted of straightening the
shaft, re-boring the hubs, fitting sleeves, and shrinking the hubs
on to the shaft. The repair had been successful, and the machine
had since been running satisfactorily for about 66,000 hours.
Following that failure, it was decided to fix clock gauges on
For the Minutes of the meeting in London on 26th January 1951,
at which this informal discussion took place, see Proc. I.Mech.E.,
1951, vol. 164, p. 107.
9
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all the remaining machines, purely as a precautionary measure,
to indicate whether spindle deflexions were occurring. When
opportune, and to forestall further failures of that nature on
other sets, new spindles were fitted to restore shrink fits, and
no further troubles of that kind had occurred. If clock gauge
readings were taken when starting up, wide differences occurred
and the total throw measured could be about 0.001 inch, or
even as much as 0.024 inch; it was evident from those indications
that the final failure of the machine concerned had been due to
the permanent deflexion coinciding with the lateral deflexion
caused by the cooling of the spindle when the set was shut down.
The total deflexion in that instance must have been such that at
approximately 1,OOO r.p.m. the out-of-balance force was equiva-
lent to the rotor weight, thus rendering the set inoperative.
The clock gauge technique was used subsequently on all
machines when running up, and it was found by experience that
machines should be turned slowly until the spindle deflexion was
of a normal “cold” order, the periods required being between
10 minutes and 1 hour. The term “cold’y was used in t h i s instance
merely to indicate that the datum deflexion was that recorded at
the time of overhaul.
The lesson to be learnt from the breakdown was that t h i s
type of trouble could be anticipated, and that if any symptoms
of vibration occurred it was time to consider whether they might
be caused by the conditions mentioned.
This type of failure had resulted in design modifications
including the introduction of the “solid” spindle for high-
temperature conditions.
Discussion. A speaker remarked that it would be interesting
to know where the wheel was situated and whether there was any
evidence that the bend of the shaft, due to static load, had caused
fretting. Unless the shrink fit were heavy, fretting must be
expected-probably a reason why shrink fits were little used now.
In reply, Mr. Bennett said that the loss of shrink fits had been
excessive. On the first wheel it had been about 0.009 inch on a
total shrink fit of 0.013 inch, but the loss had diminished between
the first and last wheels, the minimum (0.003 inch) being
recorded on the last wheel. The deflexion had been towards the
inlet end, the maximum being at about the fourth wheel down.
On stripping, definite signs of fretting had been observed.
P R E S S U R E VESSELS
Mr. J. EYERS, B.Sc. (Eng.), M.I.Mech.E., said that it would
take many lectures to deal adequately with the causes of pres-
sure-vessel breakdown. Fortunately, serious explosions of the
type which occurred in the early 1900’s were now comparatively
rare. That might be attributed to improved legislation, a higher
standard of inspection and plant operation, and improved manu-
facturing methods. Constant vigilance was always necessary, as
emphasized by the recent explosion at a York power station.
The water-tube boiler concerned had been manufactured in-
the 1920’s and operated at a pressure of approximately 200 Ib.
per sq. in. T h e reason for the explosion was failure from end to
end of one of the drum longitudinal seams. Failure took place
beneath the covering butt-straps. A full-scale inquiry had been
conducted by the Ministry of Transport under the Boiler
Explosions Acts, and the report would probably be issued
shortly.
Failure of pressure vessels due to faulty inspection or manu-
facture was comparatively rare, compared with the number of
failures which actually took place. By “failures” he meant not
only explosions but also breakdowns of which the majority did
not come to public notice. He estimated that some 80 per cent
130 CAUSES OF BREAKDOWN I N STEAM P L A N T
of the breakdowns which occurred were due to carelessness or practicable since the competency of the inspecting engineer
neglect of the operating staff, and a further 15 per cent to would still be reconsidered in the light of any circumstances
ignorance or mismanagement. which brought his competency into question. Most certification
In his experience, since the 1939-45 war there had been a societies had hitherto required their inspecting engineers to
sharp upward trend in the number of pressure-vessel break- possess a Ministry of Transport certificate as an indication of
downs, which he considered was due principally to lack of competency. That or another similar qualification would be
proper training of engineers. He did not think that plant engi- regarded as prima facie evidence of training and experience.
neers’ apprenticeships in Great Britain were as thorough as they
used to be. Formerly certain rudimentary engineering principles F A I L U R E O P B R U S H TURBINE
were firmly impressed on the young apprentice, one being an
exact knowledge of the working and operation of the boiler water- Mr. E. HYWEL JONES, M.I.Mech.E., said that a breakdown
gauge. Several cases had come to his notice recently where, after had occurred in a 37,500kW. Ljungstrom turbo-alternator at Tir
explosions or breakdowns of boilers, it had been found that the John power station, Swansea, in April 1945, and had caused
employee in charge of the plant had not know11 how to test the serious damage to the machine. The first examination showed at
water-gauge. That was a serious matter. once that the first stage axial-flow disk at the governor end had
Another cause of the breakdown of boilers was the increased shattered and in flying outwards had broken through the cast-
reliance placed on automatic controls. Automatic controls were iron outer casing of the turbine. Two holes, one approximately
essential for modern economic running, but should never 2 feet by 2 feet and the other rather smaller, had been made in
replace the trained boiler attendant. the casing. Pieces of the damaged machine, some weighing as
In two typical examples of the collapse of Lancashire boiler much as 1 cwt., had been scattered around the engine-room.
flues, which he had encountered on an average four or five times The machine was broadly similar to the first British-built
a month, both the boilers concerned were fitted with low-water Ljungstrom turbo-alternator of that size, which had been
alarms, which had failed to function, but that was no excuse for installed at Brighton and worked for seven years before trouble
the water gauges not receiving constant attention. Good work- developed. The Swansea machine had been installed early in
manship had prevented those failures from resulting in major the 1939-45 war, and failures of the axial-flow blading had
explosions. occurred within a few months. It was known that a serious carry-
Breakdowns due to low water were not confined to the shell over of alkaline salts existed from the particular boilers serving
type of boiler; failures of water-tube boilers were also quite the machine. Conditions were so bad that “washing” of the
common. He had recently investigated a case where overheating blading had been necessary at regular intervals of two or three
due to low water had taken place to such an extent that the front weeks if a reasonable load was to be carried.
steam and water drum had enlarged circumferentially-in places Following the blade trouble, the last eight rows of axial-flow
+ inch about the tube holes. Almost all the tubes had partially blade rings had been removed and the turbine operated at a
withdrawn through the drum and an explosion had occurred, suitable reduced load. In addition, the machine had been
through two of the tubes having withdrawn completely, causing switched out at intervals and allowed to run down, the casing
the death of a man. door being removed to allow an operator to “listen in” for
Had those tubes not withdrawn and released the pressure, the any possible sounds of friction or touching. That had been
drum itself would undoubtedly have failed within a few moments done a few days before the breakdown and nothing untoward
of the actual explosion, and not only the stokehold but also the had been observed. There had been no warning of any kind
whole factory would have been involved. In that particular case before the breakdown.
the low-water alarm had been found to be inoperative, because The fmt stage axial-flow disk which had failed was eventually
at the previous thorough examination the boiler attendant had assembled on the floor of the engine-room, and there were fifty-
replaced the float and the balancing weight on the wrong ends five pieces. Running through the many fractures was a suggestion
of the lever; when the boiler started to work the whistle operated of six roughly equal and equally spaced “bites”. Subsequent
continuously, and the whistle had, therefore, been gagged. investigation by the manufacturers disclosed that the disk had
A disastrous vertical boiler explosion had recently probably had a vibration about three nodal diameters, with a critical speed
been caused by over-pressure through non-functioning of the of 1,450 r.p.m., corresponding to 48.3 cycles per second. A wave
safety valve. The safety valve was equipped with a gland and had travelled round the disk in the opposite direction to the
packing similar to a stop-valve, improper adjustment of which rotation and at the critical point equalled the running speed,
would result in seizure of the spindle. under which condition the wave had been stationary in space.
No vibration had been transmitted to the framework to indicate
Discussion. In reply to a question concerning boiler that anything was wrong. The breakdown occurred at a time
operators, Mr. Eyers said that he favoured the introduction of when, owing to war conditions, the national grid was running
a system similar to the American and Canadian one, whereby for periods of an hour or more at 48 cycles per second or slightly
operators were obliged to have a certificate before they could above, a phenomenon almost unknown previously.
operate a boiler. The disk was manufactured from a nickel-chrome-molyb-
In regard to the hour at which explosions usually occurred; denum steel forging, and the specificationcalled for the following
they happened at all times, but principally at night. minimum requirements :-
A speaker said that boilers manufactured by British firms Yield . . 57.0 tons per sq. in.
were inspected in the place of manufacture, and when they were Maximum stress . . 64.0 tons per sq. in.
put in working condition. That included all the fittings. They Elongation . . 15 per cent
were also checked from time to time by boiler insurance com- Reduction of area . . 42 per cent
panies. He asked whether the boiler insurance companies should Brine11 number . . 293-321
be made responsible for any accidents, as it was their duty to In general, the material recovered from the broken disk complied
look after the boilers. with the specification, but a low Izod impact value had been
Mr. Eyers replied that the boiler insurance companies were noted-f the order of 4 or 6 ft.-lb.
responsible only for inspection and certification and, short of During manufacture, the disk forging had been oil-hardened
having an engineer-surveyor on the premises all the time and at 850-860 deg. C. (about 1,560 deg. F.), tempered at 600-610
actually operating the boilers, he did not see how the suggestion deg. C. (about 1,110 deg. F.), and cooled in the furnace. The
could be implemented. turbine manufacturers, during the rough machining process,
He agreed that boiler safety valves were the subject of a British had twice subjected the disk to stress annealing to ensure free-
Standard Specification. The fitting of a safety valve of incorrect dom from residual internal stresses. With nickel-chrome-molyb-
design should have been noted by the boiler surveyor. denum steel the effect was to reduce the Izod impact resistance
In reply to a question regarding the qualifications required to low values. There was, of course, ample precedent for that as
for persons to be considered “competent” within the meaning many other disks were running with the same condition.
of the Factories Act, he said that the actual qualifications had Further examination of the disk material had revealed the
never been defined by the authorities nor would that be presence of cracks, some of which were clean and prohably

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 CAUSES OF B R E A K D O W N I N STEAM PLANT
occurred at the time of the breakdown, whilst others were dark-
coloured and appeared to have existed for some time. Micro-
scopical examination showed them to be intercrystalline in
character. The cracks were similar to those found in the higher
temperature regions of steam turbines, where material which had
residual stresses due to cold working during manufacture was
brought into contact with concentrations of caustic salts. That
suggested that stress corrosion might have contributed to the
failure, despite the low working temperature (150-180 deg. F.),
and also the presence of wet steam.
The possibility of an obscure connexion between a low Izod
value and susceptibility to stress corrosion had been investigated.
Four test specimens were taken, in a circumferential direction,
from the rim of the disk and three were subjected to heat treat-
ment which increased their Izod impact resistance by varying
amounts whilst retaining their other mechanical properties.
The samples were strained so as to provide a fibre stress at the
surface of 30 tons per sq. in. They were then immersed in a
solution of 35 per cent caustic soda and 2-5 per cent sodium
silicate and maintained at boiling point (238 deg. F.) under a
reflux condenser. Examination after four weeks had indicated
clearly that susceptibility to stress corrosion decreased with an
increase in the Izod impact resistance of the steel.
it was first concluded that a failure of the --flow blading
might have caused a shock which shattered the disk, but the
later research indicated that the failure was the direct result of
the weakening of the disk through stress corrosion.
T o maintain a similar machine in service at Swansea, a damp-
ing ring had been fitted between the first and second stage axial-
flow disks. The ring was attached to the second disk and had a
narrow “ landing ” on the other to absorb by friction the energy
required to maintain the standing wave.
Failures of the radial-flow blading were made much less
probable by heat treatment of the blading after cold-rolling the
blade slots into the strengthening rings (Wray 1950)*. It was
reasonable to say, however, that stress relieving, coupled with a
modification of the cold-rolling technique, had improved the
mechanical properties of the blade rings by as much as 100 per
cent and materially reduced the risk of stress-corrosion failures,
even under adverse conditions such as had occurred at Swansea.
After damping rings had been fitted and the other blading
parts had been stress-relieved, the sister set at Swansea had since
been maintained in service on approximately full load and with
almost no “outage”, except for an annual inspection to ensure
that the damping rings continued to function.
The present-day design of Ljungstrom turbines had com-
pletely removed any risk of disk vibration as the two rows of
axial-flow blading were mounted on one stiff disk. The possibility
of the blade fastening becoming loose had been eliminated by
threading the blades sideways into the disk. In addition, a
superior method of building up the axial-flow blading had been
adopted which eliminated the rolling of the blade roots into the
strengthening rings. The first machine of the new design was
now due to come into service at Swansea, and its performance
would be watched with great interest.
Discussion. In regard to whether the failure was attributable
to vibration of the disk, disk vibration accelerated by stress
corrosion, or by stress corrosion, Mr. Hywel Jones said that there
was no doubt that stress corrosion was present, and it was
probable that the main reason for the failure was stress corrosion,
but it might have been accelerated by a blow, owing to possible
failure of the axial-flow blades. The damage was so extensive,
however, that he would not like to express a definite opinion.
In connexion with the Izod impact value for the disk, before
it went into service; when the material was received, the value
would probably have been of the order of 70 or 80 ft.-lb. He
believed that the actual figure for test pieces from the broken
disk varied between 4 and 6 ft.-lb. The annealing during machin-
ing was responsible for the low Izod impact value.
C O R R O S I O N FATIGUE
Mr. J. A. MTTHEWS, M.I.Mech.E., said that he proposed
to discuss : the nature of corrosion fatigue ;how it was caused
* WRAY,G. H. 1950Enginewing, vol. 169, p. 141, “Stress Corrosion
in Radial-flow Steam Turbines”.
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131
in practice and where it was to be found, and how it should be
prevented.
It was well known that fatigue failure of metal by push-pull,
vibration, bending, or any other kind of testing was accelerated
by allowing the surface of the material to be continually wet.
Mere wetness of the surface lowered the endurance of the metal,
and transgranular cracks occurred far more rapidly than when
the material was in a dry condition. When material was subjected
to fluctuating stresses and was also exposed to moisture mixed
with oxygen or acids, fatigue and corrosion acted together and
accelerated each other, owing to continual rupturing of the
oxide film. Corrosion fatigue was, therefore, failure of metal
under fluctuating stresses supplemented by moisture in contact
with the stressed material. It was known as ‘‘crazy cracking”
owing to its appearance.
Corrosion fatigue was difficult to detect by visual examination
in the early stages, and it could develop rapidly and to a
dangerous extent before revealing itself. Cracks which were
difficult to detect in the early stages had been known to penetrate
to considerable depths. Although the corrosion was not always
so active, an instance had occurred when cracks had penetrated
the walls, 24 inches thick, of a steam receiver within a period
of eighteen months,
In regard to the causes of corrosion fatigue in practice, and
where it was to be found, the trouble would be located where
there were fluctuating stresses and moisture, but the stresses
could be caused either by mechanical or thermal effects. Mecha-
nical stresses could be induced in steam pipe-lines by in-
adequate provision for expansion and by insufficient supports
to prevent vibration or bending which, with unsuitable drainage
arrangements or defective steam traps, allowed condensate or
“carry-over” to settle in the steam pipes at the stressed parts.
Stresses induced by thermal effects were, however, more
prevalent in practice and were confined mainly to superheated
steam systems where the piping was at a considerably higher
temperature than the condensate. It was well known that the
temperature of condensate could not exceed the temperature for
saturated steam, so that a difference of several hundreds of
degrees Fahrenheit could exist under such conditions between
that portion of the pipe in contact with condensate and the
remainder of the pipe. One authority had estimated that a
tensile stress of 20 tons per sq. in. could occur on the surface of a
steam pipe when there was a difference in temperature of
200 deg. F. When it was considered that the stress exceeded the
yield-point of some manganese steels, it was not surprising that
corrosion fatigue was found at those parts. The frequency of the
wetting, and the consequent cooling process, had a direct bearing
on the rapidity of the development of corrosion fatigue, but it
was not possible to give guidance in that direction, except to say
that it could be rapid and, when detected, should receive
immediate attention.
Corrosion fatigue occurred on smooth or rough surfaces, but
accelerated considerably when a rough surface developed-for
example, through pitting or coarse machining-owing to the
retention of moisture. It could also occur over a few square
inches or extend over large areas.
Superheated steam pipes had been found on numerous
occasions to have crazy cracking for several feet on the bottom
owing to condensate forming into globules and travelling along
the pipe, progressively reducing the pipe-wall temperature.
Another example was the introduction of water into a superheated
steam pipe-line for desuperheating purposes, where the sudden
cooling of the material created the necessary condition for the
development of corrosion fatigue.
Steam receivers were also prone to corrosion fatigue, owing
to steam pipe-lines being inadequately lagged and the resulting
condensate being carried into the receiver. It was common
practice for several boilers to supply a p k c d a r steam receiver
and, if one boiler were withdrawn from service and the steam line
from that boiler to the receiver improperly blanked off, it acted
as a condense), with the formation of considerable condensate.
If the drainage arrangements of a steam receiver were faulty or
inoperative, that trouble would develop on its lower surfaces.
Careful examination of a l l superheated steam receivers was
necessary, therefore, in the vicinity of the branches. An examina-
tion should extend to the body of the receiver, around the
132 CAUSES OF B R E A K D O W N IN STEAM PLANT
branch, and also for a distance into the branch. It was necessary
to clean the metal thoroughly, using wire brushes, scrapers, or
acids, and for examination purposes a magnifying glass would
greatly assist. Further, the body of a steam receiver opposite
all branches, where impingement of condensate was likely to
occur, should receive careful examination.
Where a horizontal steam receiver was fitted with dished end-
plates, corrosion fatigue could be found on the end plate at the
bottom in the root of the flanging where the metal was naturally
stressed owing to “breathing” under working conditions. It was
also a position where some moisture could collect. Pressure-
gauge connexions fitted to steam receivers should also be care-
fully examined, owing to the continual trickle of condensate from
the U-tube into the receiver. Drain pockets on vertical and
horizontal steam receivers and steam pipes were places where
that trouble could be located.
Numerous instances of corrosion fatigue had been located in
the steam and water drums of water-tube boilers. The corrosion
fatigue was due to faulty feed-water arrangements whereby cold
water was periodically allowed to enter the boiler and impinge
on the shell plates, or possibly the internal feed-pipe was not
securely attached to the end plate, or the feed pipe had corroded
and allowed the feed water to discharge on the shell plate.
When making examinations it was prudent to treat all water
marks in piping or steam receivers, in the form of slight dis-
colouration of the metal, faint white h e s or white deposits,
with extreme suspicion. Liiders lines on the mill-scale of plates
should not be dismissed as being merely the results of manu-
facture, without thorough examination.
Corrosion fatigue was caused through faulty design or
improper maintenance and stresses induced in the material
must be kept below the yield-point of the metal, and moisture
must be eliminated or removed before it could concentrate at
the stressed parts. Stwm pipes must be correctly designed to
allow for expansion and must be adequately supported and free
from sharp bends. Drainage arrangements must have special
attention and ample provision must be made for separators and
drain pockets with drain pipes and steam trap attachments of
suitable capacity to deal with the condensate.
Carry-over was frequently the cause of corrosion fatigue, and
consideration might have to be given to the fitting of baffles in
the steam and water drums; to feed-water treatment, or even to
the lowering of the water-level.
It was incorrect to allow a steam receiver to become a drain
tank, and all condensate should be removed before the steam
reached that vessel. Adequate lagging played an important part
in the prevention of corrosion fatigue, and attachments such as
U-pipes for pressure-gauges and recording instruments must
be designed to allow incorporation in the lagging medium. Steam
traps were possibly one of the most neglected items of plant in a
steam installation. It was essential that proper and regular
maintenance be given to allow them to function efficiently, and
that each steam trap had an independent outlet pipe, the open
end to be visible for inspection purposes, and not submerged.
The steam trap should also have a by-pass arrangement.
Corrosion fatigue could be rapid and extremely dangerous
when it was still difficult to detect, but it could not occur if
stresses were kept within reasonable limits and the surfaces of
the material were free from moisture.
Discussion. It was observed, in regard to the remark that the
stress must be kept below the yield-point, that surely it had been
demonstrated that the stress must be kept much lower than that.
Mr. Matthews said in reply that he meant that it was necessary
when designing to make adequate allowance for expansion
of steam pipes to prevent stresses reaching the yield-point. He
agreed that it was necessary to keep the stresses considerably
below the yield-point in a high-temperature steam pipe, to
prevent failure by creep.
He had experienced the spray type of desuperheaters causing
ccjrrosion fatigue, and in a recent case, complete removal of the
desuperheater had been necessary, but, he had had no experience
of finding corrosion fatigue in a condenser. He had found it in
steam boiler drums, however, where the feed entered through an
end plate where there had been a faulty joint and cold water had
impinged on the surface of the plate.
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He thought that there was divergence of opinion on the point,
raised by a speaker, that branches should be taken off at the top
of the receiver and that the valve should be horizontal to the
receiver. He himself preferred the vertical branch connexions.
He had not found that corrugated steam pipes and loops were
particularly susceptible to corrosion trouble. He had only found
corrugated steam pipes-r any steam pipes-to be susceptible
to corrosion fatigue if moisture were present.
Another speaker inquired whether it would be possible for
corrosion fatigue to be caused by welding pipes on the outside.
The welding of a pipe into a vessel could cause cracking which
penetrated the metal of the original cylinder.
I n addition, he remarked that it was not correct that corrosion
fatigue took place only on the bottom of a pipe or a steam receiver,
where water collected. In one instance of which he knew it had
occurred in a small pressure-gauge hole, where the pressure-
gauge pipe had apparently been welded into the receiver. That
hole was not in the bottom of the receiver and not likely to be
subjected to much moisture. A siphon pipe leading to the
pressure-gauge might hold water and cause moisture through
condensation, but not necessarily at the entrance to the hole.
Mr. Matthews replied that he did not think that corrosion
fatigue would be found to occur owing to welding ;he had had
no experience of welding causing crazy cracking. Cracks would
occur with welding. However, it was possible that the heat-
affected zone around a weld did assist corrosion fatigue.
SCALING O F WATER S I D E O F C O N D E N S E R TUBES, ETC.
Cdr. (E.) R. H. TRIBE, M.B.E., R.N., said that he proposed
to discuss three subjects, the first being the fouling of the fire
side of boiler tubes and deterioration of boiler brickwork.
The quality of the fuel oil used in British warships, during the
1939-45 war and subsequently, had been degraded for various
reasons. The fuel oil now used formed a stable emulsion with
sea-water. The effect of burning fuel emulsions in water-tube
boilers was twofold: bonded deposits were formed in the gas
passages, and brickwork deteriorated rapidly, owing to slagging.
The action was rapid, depending on the quantity of water in
the emulsion being burned. Concentrations of the order of 1 per
cent would cause damage. The flame gave little or no indication
that there was water in the fuel; even with 25 per cent of water,
its presence could not be detected visually.
The bonded deposits which formed on the fire side of the
boiler tubes were 60-70 per cent sodium sulphate, the remainder
being fly ash. The mechanism of formation was not known. It
was believed that sulphur trioxide was formed from the fuel by
the action of catalysts such as vanadium, and that the reaction
of the sulphur trioxide with sodium from the sea-water formed
sodium sulphate. The effect of those deposits was well known;
they dld not cause emergency shut-down, but a falling off in
performance, loss of output, and loss of efficiency. Moreover,
the deposits were liable to block the gas passages and cause the
flame to be diverted towards the return bends and tube ends,
resulting in overheating, distortion, and possible cracking.
It was especially difficult to provide a remedy for bonded
deposits in water-tube boilers fitted with superheaters because
of the inaccessibility of the gas passages, but water-washing was
being used in H.M. Ships in an attempt to remove the deposits.
In regard to the slagging of brickwork, the agent was again
sodium sulphate, although slagging was promoted by vanadium
and iron in the fuel ash. Deterioration of brickwork was unlikely
to cause an emergency shut-down in warships, because there was
a high degree of air cooling of all casings, but it put a severe strain
on repair facilities and the supply organization in war-time.
Claims had been made for certain proprietary products, then
being tried, to be added to fuels. The makers claimed that
they stopped the formation of emulsion and also disposed of
accumulated deposits.
His second subject was the life of bciler and superheater
tubes. Navy boiler feed-water compound wzs now used in
warships, and this had much reduced internal corrosion and had
shifted the emphasis from internal to external cleaning of boilers,
but there was still considerable external wastage of water-tube
boilers, and again the problem was cleaning the gas passages in
three-drum water-tube boilers fitted with superheaters. It had
been found, however, that external deposits could be removed
 CAUSES O F BREAKDOWN I N STEAM P L A N T 133
by water-washing, i.e. by “lancing” through the gas passages A further contributor said that if a mixture of common salt,
with warm water jets to which wetting agents had been added. sulphur dioxide, and air were passed through a heated space,
Most external corrosion took place when boilers were idle sodium sulphate would inevitably be produced; there was no
because the external surfaces were in an acid condition, and it need for a catalyst.
was thought that by the addition of an alkali to the water used
for water-washing it might be possible to leave the external
surfaces in a neutral or alkaline condition and reduce corrosion F A I L U R E O F T H E H I G H - P R E S S U R E SHAFT OF A
during idle periods. 25-MEGAWATT T U R B I N E
During recent years two defects had been experienced in Mr. S . ANDERSON, A.M.I.Mech.E., said that he would deal
superheater tubes which had considerably shortened their lives. with the failure of the high-pressure shaft of a 25-megawattY
One was cracking and distortion, which occurred during long 3,000 r.p.m. turbine. The machine was not a modern one in
periods of low output. It developed in boilers where there was terms of years or of steam conditions, having been installed in
a low pressure-drop across the superheater. Under conditions 1929. The steam pressure was 350 lb. per sq. in. and the steam
of low output there was poor steam distribution through the temperature 750 deg. F. It was, however, an important machine
superheater, and some tubes were starved and therefore over- in its division; the station in which it was situated had the lowest
heated. In some of the ships affected, modifications had been coal cost per ton delivered in the division. The machine was
camed out to increase the pressure drop across the superheater efficient, and so were the associated boilers, and the replacement
to improve the steam distribution at low outputs. In other ships value was about E80 a day, i.e. it cost the division k80 a day to run
some of the auxiliaries which now used saturated steam had other machines, lower down in the economic scale, to take the
been converted to use superheated steam, again in an attempt to output of the machine in question.
improve the steam flow through the superheater. A fracture had occurred under the thrust collar, a short way
Another type of superheater defect occurred when ships along the thrust-collar key. Investigation showed that little
having non-draining superheater elements were laid up in damage had been done apart from the breaking of the shaft itself.
reserve. It was extremely difficult to remove all the moisture The over-speed trip had operated and cut off the steam almost
from a superheater element which was non-draining. Blowing at once. The keys on the thrust collar maintained the oil pump
through each tube separately with hot high-pressure air did not and governor drive. The shaft itself was free to move forward,
remove all the moisture, and after a short period in reserve and it had done so for about 3% inch, but the timely operation
corrosion took place. Trials of mechanical dehumidification of the over-speed trip had quickly removed the thrust from the
had been conducted by connecting up a dehumidifying machine high-pressure turbine, so that the major damage, apart from the
in series with the superheater and circulating until there was a broken shaft, was to the labyrinth glands, which had to be
relative humidity constant at 30 per cent. That was an effective completely renewed.
but lengthy process. Although the machine had run for nineteen years before the
The alternative was to empty the boiler as far as possible and breakdown occurred, for sixteen years (until 1946) there had
then light a low-output sprayer to evaporate the remaining been trouble of some sort on the bearing and its associated
pockets of water. There was a natural disinclination to light a equipment. The trouble appeared to have been caused mainly
flame in the furnace of an empty boiler, but under strict super- by vibration, no doubt partly due to malalignment, and also
vision, with well-placed thermometers in the parts of the boiler to the fact that during the early years of the 1939-45 war a
which were liable to overheat, that process proniised to be very heavy air-raid shelter, consisting of 18-inch brick walls sup-
effective. In a large furnace, the flame of a 250 lb. per hr. porting roof slabs of 14-inch reinforced concrete, had been
sprayer was relatively small. built around the machine. The weight of the shelter, which was
The third subject related to loss of vacuum. In some of the carried mainly on the foundations of the turbine and alternator
older destroyers there was a serious loss of vacuum at full power and was approximately the same as that of the whole set, was not
-that was particularly serious in the Mediterranean. It had been conducive to smooth running.
traced to bad heat transfer in the condenser itself, due to scaling of There was a single thrust bearing on the collar, and at the back
the sea-water side of the tubes. Scalingwas not anew phenomenon was the thrust-adjusting gear. The pedestal was ,free to move
and that led to the further conclusion that the fouling margin in parallel with the axis of the shaft, being located by a long key in
the condensers of the ships was too small, and the problem was the middle of the pedestal. The holding-down bolts had loose
to remove the scale and then improve the fouling margin. washers,fitted with about 0.020 inch clearance. Part of the trouble
It was the practice to fit cupro-nickel tubes in H.M. Ships, had been due to the “cocking-up” of the pedestal under tem-
and a remedy would be to fit some material with a better thermal perature conditions, kind a mistaken attempt had been made to
conductivity than cupro-nickel, such as aluminium-brass, but cure or mitigate it by bedding the bearing (a parallel-house
that was rejected because of the inferior corrosion-resistance of bearing with no self-alignment features) on the after-portion
aluminium-brass compared with cupro-nickel under marine only. There was fracture of the metal in the bearing and also
conditions. The remedy finally adopted, which was entirely effec- excessive wear on the thrust pads and trouble with the over-
tive, was chemical de-scaling of the condensers and the fitting of speed trip operating because the vibration was SO bad. There
circulating water scoops to improve the water flow through the had also been trouble in the oil pump itself.
condensers, and therefore the fouling margin. The failure of the shaft was a simple fatigue fracture, and
the analysis of the metal afterwards had shown no fault in the
Disczcssion. In reply to questions, Cdr. Tribe said that the material itself. The fracture was doubtless largely due to the
procedure of lighting a low-output sprayer to dry out the super- reversal of stress (3,000 times per minute) caused by the peculiar
heater had been adopted experimentally and the temperature thrust arrangement and tipping of the bearing.
of air rising from the fire-row tubes gave a good indication of A new stub end had been made and screwed into the old
conditions. During initial tests the boiler had been well covered shaft (Fig. la); it had lasted a month.
with thermometers. A final satisfactory repair had been made two years before.
A speaker remarked that there might be distortion of the tube A stub end had again been made and screwed into the shaft
due to differences of temperature between back and front, which (Fig. lb), but it was a shrink fit in the collar and it had been
might be more severe than when the tube was filled with water; welded right round. The machine had since run for over
there might be tubes, along the width of the boiler, at different 8,000 hours and had functioned satisfactorily.
temperatures, with stresses and strains at the tube seats. He The manufacturers had made improvements in subsequent
thought that there might be, local to the flame, some rather machines by fitting a spherical bearing as No. 1 bearing, and a
higher temperatures than in the general space, despite Cdr. spherical housing to the thrust bearing. They had also, with the
Tribe’s comment that the flame was of small proportions. larger three-cylinder machines, removed the oil pump drive
Another speaker said that he thought the so-called Mannheim to the shaft between the high- and medium-pressure cylinders.
process for catalysing sulphur dioxide to trioxide worked up to The governor drive had been changed from a worm and worm-
about 700 deg. F., and beyond that the other way. That disagreed wheel drive to a simple pinion and gearwheel drive, which
with Cdr. Tribe’s reference to vanadium acting as a catalyst. considerably shortened the overhang.

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133 CAUSES O F B R E A K D O W N I N S T E A M PLANT
The successful repair had saved the division &25,000, which
would have been the cost o€ running other machines. A new
spindle would have cost roughly #,500, while the cost of the
two repairs was E1,600, so that they had been fully justified.
TWO DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE DOWEL PEGS
-_I-
I
4
l
i u Initial repair; stub end screwed in.
WELD SHRINK FIT
I
/
f
b Second repair; stub end screwed in, shrunk and welded.
Fig. 1. Repairs to High-pressure Rotor Shaft of 25-megawatt
Turbine
Discussion. In connexion with the fitting of the stub end,
Mr. Anderson said that the shaft was heated and the stub end
was screwed in and, with the cooling of the shaft, the shrink fit
became effective.
A new shaft had been ordered immediately the first failure took
place, but, as the makers gave the minimum time of delivery as
fourteen months, it was essential to effect a repair. The new shaft
was now ready to be fitted-after two years. The second repair,
made a month after the first, had lasted for those two years and
had run for 8,000 hours. He was confident, on inspecting the
shaft, that it could have run much longer.
Mr. B. POCHOBRADSKY, M.I.Mech.E., said that probably the
most damaging breakdowns were caused by blade vibration
which was merely a resonance of the frequency of some mode
of natural vibration of the blade with the frequency, or its
multiple, of some impulse provided by the turbine itself. One
of the most important impulses of that nature was due to the
Sresence of stationary blades in front of the moving blades. Along
the surfaces of the stationary blade the steam velocity was lower
than in the major part of the channel formed by two stationary
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blades ;lower velocity meant, at the same time, lower mass flow
along the blade surfaces ;the impulse was then proportional to
the square of the velocity. The moving blade travelling along
the stationary blade was then subjected to substantial variation
of the steam forces acting upon it.
If there were 100 stationary blades in a stage, and the turbine
turned at 50 r.p.s., there would be 5,000 impulses per second
on the moving blade j if that blade happened to have some mode
of natural vibration of a frequency of 5,000 per second, or a
multiple of 5,000 per second, there would be a possibility of a
JI final fatigue failure.
A blade had several modes of vibration which might be
!
dangerous. A blade of uniform section could vibrate either in
1 approximately axial or tangential planes ;in each plane the blade
had a series of modes of vibration. A blade fitted at one end in
the rotor, and held at the other end by a cover band, could vibrate
as shown in Fig. 2 by the curve a (fundamental mode) ;as shown
1\11 t
>;5Wz ”
Y I
’;;::mW7///&7AQ/f,
I
ROTOR
Fig. 2. Modes of Vibration of Turbine Blade
by the curve b (first harmonic), or as shown by the curve c
(second harmonic), etc. Blades of 3-5 inches in length usually
broke with the a mode and longer blades with the b mode, but
a blade 18 inches long could break if a sufficiently strong
excitation impulse existed in the turbine even with the second
harmonic (curve c).
The problem was how to prevent those vibrations. The
designer from his past experience, and by well conducted
experiments, would build up data for frequencies of the various
modes of blade vibration; he would then, in a given stage of a
turbine, use a type of moving blade and a number of stationary
blades such that the frequencies of blade vibration did not
coincide with, or were not close to, the frequency of the excitation
impulses or its multiples. With low multiples and lower modes of
vibration that was comparatively easy. But with higher multiples
and higher harmonics an almost continuous field of vibrations
was possible, so that it was necessary to distinguish between a
dangerous vibration and that which was less, or not dangerous.
At the same time care must be taken that the manufacturing
methods ensured reasonably uniform rigidity of blade fixation
and uniformity of blade dimensions.
Experiments which he had carried out showed that at a
distance of about 4 inches in the direction of the steam flow
from the stationary blades, the disturbances caused by them
practically disappeared. Usually 4 inches in the direction of the
steam flow meant about 1 inch clearance between the stationary
and moving blades ;that was a large dimension and he would
 CAUSES O F BREAKDOWN I N STEAM P L A N T Plate I
ru
0
ru
0
[I.Mech.E., 1951:
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Plate 2 CAUSES O F BREAKDOWN I N STEAM P L A N T

a Failed area after deep acid-etching.

b Intergranular disintegration of decarburized area.

Fig. 4. Acid-etched Tubes, Showing Decarburized Areas Occurring Under Scab

[I.Mech.E., 19511

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 CAUSES OF BREAKDOWN I N STEAM P L A N T
not like to apply it in many turbine stages, but half of that ideal
clearance would reduce the excitation impulses so that dangerous
vibration would often be avoided.
Another frequent cause of blade breakages was the so-called
discontinuous cover-band. If the cover band consisted of a
number of separate sections, each spanning a group of blades,
the groups themselves had several possible modes of vibration.
A continuous cover-band eliminated all those possible group
vibrations, which otherwise proved a difficult problem. Such a
cover band would not withstand all the stresses imposedupon
it by the varying operating conditions unless it were pre-stressed
by compression at room temperature.
CORROSION OF HIGH-PRESSURE BOILER TUBES A N D
SUBSEQUENT EMBRITTLEMENT CRACKING
Mr. C. W. PRATT, B.Sc. (Eng.), M.I.Mech.E., said that a bad
type of tube failure had been prevalent during the last ten
years in highly-rated high-pressure boilers. In two samples of
tubes taken from a high-pressure boiler (Fig. 3, Plate l), one
showed internal corrosion and a crack which was filled with
copper. The copfler could be considered to be incidental. The
tubes’ insides were covered with calcium phosphate, and also
with some copper and a small quantity of iron oxide. The “scab”
itself was 100 per cent magnetic iron oxide. He believed that the
copper had been washed into the crack when the water escaped
from the tube. The other tube was bulged owing to overheating
caused by the insulating effect of the scab.
Corrosion scab seemed to form in layers; it probably started
as a “pin-point” and gradually grew in area. A n illustration by
Hankinson and Baker (1945, Fig. 2)* showed a typical formation.
Fig. 4, Plate 2, showed two samples of tube which had been
acid-etched with hot hydrochloric acid to show the decarburized
areas of the tube which occurred directly under the scab.
The decarburized areas showed black. The material was about
0.13 per cent carbon, but drillings taken from the decarburized
zone showed only 0.03 per cent carbon. Decarburization was
said to arise from the liberation of hydrogen which could occur
when water seeped through corrosion scab. As the metal of the
tube was hot, owing to the insulating effect of the scab the water
dissociated and liberated the hydrogen, which then diffused into
the tube metal. The hydrogen combined with the carbide and
subsequently escaped, leaving the material devoid of carbon.
Cracking which occurred in the decarburized areas (Fig. 4b,
Plate 2) was said to result from the high pressure set up between
the grains, as a result of the formation of methane. Apparently
the methane escaped when the g a i n s were forced apart.
In the opinion of many experienced observers embrittlement
could be avoided by the avoidance of feed water contamination,
and particularly anything likely to cause a sludge, and certainly by
the complete elimination of oxygen.
Discussion. A speaker asked for the range of pressure covered
by the troubles. He had experienced similar trouble due to scabs,
in a boiler working at 600 lb. per sq. in., owing to minute traces
of magnesium salts in the water, which had led to the formation
of hydrochloric acid on the hot tube surfaces.
Mr. Pratt replied that the troubles had been found mainly
in boilers of 1,000 lb. per sq. in. working pressure and over.
They had also, however, been found %I boilers working at lower
pressures-down to 500 lb. per sq. in. Apparently one of the
factors was the tube metal temperature; that being dependent
on the boiler pressure, the boiler rating, and the heat trans-
mission rate. The most important factor, however, was the
deposit inside the tube, so that if tubes were kept free of deposit,
even with high metal temperature associated with high-pressure
boilers, avoidance of the trouble was probable.
In reply to a question regarding the desirability of maintaining
su5cient residual sodium sulphite to ensure that oxygen would
not cause trouble, even at very high pressures, Mr. Pratt said
that it was desirable, if possible, to have sulphite; general
experience indicated that it was possible to keep about 5 or 6 parts
per million in a boiler working up to about 1,500 lb. per sq. in.,
but in the 2,000 lb. per sq. in. pressure region it was not possible,
so that it was necessary to improve de-aeration by other means.
HANKISON, L. E., and BAKER, M. D. 1945Trans. A.S.M.E,, vol. 67,
p. 317. “History of Potassium Boiler-water Treatment at Spnngdale”.
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135
F A I L U R E OF J O I N T O F D O M E H E A D O F H I G H - P R E S S U R H
PREHEATER
Mr. W. B. SHANNON, M.I.Mech.E., referring to a joint
problem with which he had been concerned, said that the domed
head of a high-pressure heater for a 30-megawatt turbo-
alternator (operating steam conditions: 600 Ib. per sq. in. and
850 deg. F.) had been made from a dished plate welded to a
forged flange of 1-3-13 per cent manganese steel. During
manufacture, X-ray examination had shown that the material
of the forged flange adjacent to the weld was faulty although the
weld was satisfactory, and the makers decided to fit a different
type of head machined from a solid 8-inch thick plate.
THIRTY 2: -INCH STUDS
,/ (EN. I4 STEEL)
COPPER RING-
;’THICK
-
u
/’ I t4
‘KLINGERITE’ JOINT’
Fig. 5. Form of Original Joint
In the new head the flange thickness of the forging was
7+ inches, whereas the original forged &nge thickness was
3 inches-the basic change which gave rise to joint leakage.
Fig. 5 showed the spigot form of the original joint having a
-1 .
,-inch thick copper ring.
Off-load tests (“throwing” 30 megawatts off the machine)
caused the joint to leak. The explanation of that leakage was
that the flange cooled at a greater rate than the bolts and calm-
lations showed that the contraction of the flange due to the
temperature reduction was about 0.013 inch. The loading on
the bolts gave a stress of nearly 11 tons per sq. in. and the strain
on the bolts corresponding to that stress was about 0.006 inch.
With the bolts lagging behind in contraction, there was con-
sequently a loss of contact pressure at the joint.
One alternative (Fig. 6)which involved making contact beyond
the bolt circle had been tried and had proved effective with
further off-load tests. Three other alternative joints had been
considered but had not yet been tried, One comprised an
assembly of Belleville washers to counteract the differential
contraction, previously mentioned, by giving a strain of about
0.010 inch; another utilized a super-sealed packing of shredded
metal which was caulked between each bolt and flange to
obtain, as far as possible, homogeneous conditions between the
bolt and the flange; the third involved an effort to return to the
3-inch bolt length as used in the original design of head.
Although this was really a simple case of stress and strain, it
emphasized the necessity of taking into account strain as well as
stress in component assemblies.
GENERAL F A I L U R E S
Mr. F. W. SKELCHER, A.M.I.Mech.E., said that he would
review his experiences of central power-station plant and some
incidents of other steam plant which had been brought to his
notice.
136 CAUSES OF B R E A K D O W N IN STEAM P L A N T
The breakdowns described included examples in which plant not be definitely established. It was clear, however, that a con-
has been extensively damaged or completely wrecked, and might tinuous locking effect had been produced between the rotating
be attributed to indifferent design, faulty materials, insufficient coupling and surrounding stationary part. The implication was
care in erection or overhaul, or bad operation. that some part of the coupling had broken away, producing that
As some of the breakdowns had occurred within the past effect, other damage being consequential.
twenty-five years, the contributory factors might be recognized
and, in modern plant, might have been avoided by now. ( 2 ) Turbine Blading Failure. A turbine blading failure of
a 20-megawatt, twin-cylinder machine, running at 1,500 r.p.m.,

r
had occurred probably owing to operational conditions. The
failure was thought to have been due to vibration produced by
rapid loading of the machine. Owing to an electrical disturbance
on the outside system approximately full load had been thrown
on to the machine within a few minutes of synchronizing. Two
of the wheels were completely stripped and the last row of
blading was badly damaged. Some of the diaphragms had turned
and locked the top and bottom halves of the machine, making
dismantling laborious. Practically all the condenser tubes were
cut, and turbine blades were twisted round the condenser stay
rods. The cylinders were undamaged, however, and the spindle
had been re-bladed, the machine re-lined and put into service.
(3) Thrust Failure. Thrust failure in ’a 12+-megawatt
machine, running at 3,000 r.p.m., steam conditions 250 Ib. per
sq. in., 650 deg. F., had resulted in the wheels and diaphragms
making rubbing contact. The wheels were dished, presumably
owing to heat generation.
Patches of fused metal and closure of the lifting holes were
noted on one of the wheels.
( 4 ) Failure of End Bells or Caps or Rings of Electrical Rotor.
I The machine concerned was a 12+-megawatt, two-cylinder
turbo-alternator, running at 3,000 r.p.m., with a steam pressure
I of 200 lb. per sq. in. It had been installed in 1928.
-I---- The rotor was a solid forging, the windings being retained in
slots by dove-tail keys. The end-bell locating disks, to which the
ventilating fan impellers were bolted, were mounted on the shaft
at each end of the rotor.
The rotor end-windings were retained by end bells or rings
hollow cylindrical steel forgings approximately 24 inches thick.
The end bells bore on the extremities of the rotor teeth at the
opposite end of the coned portion of the end disks.
Failure of the end cap had resulted in the end shields dis-
integrating and completely tearing away from the top securing
bolts. The end bell of the rotor had disintegrated and the rotor
end-turns had sheared off.
The alternator cast-pin bed-plate had fractured and the stator
dowel pins had sheared. The stator end windings had been
wrenched from their bracing rings and the insulation stripped.
(5) Boiler Drum Failure. A boiler drum had been scrapped
after sixteen years’ service owing to cracks in the butt straps and
shell plates. This was a fatigue failure.
The boiler operating conditions were: 220,000 Ib. per hr.;
420 Ib. per sq. in. working pressure; 760 deg. F.
Fig. 6. Alternative Joint
(6) Failure of Boiler Domncomer Pipe. The boiler concerned
( 1 ) Sheared Alternator Shaft. A 25-megawatt, twin-cylinder had a twin-grate stoker. The operating conditions were: 150,000
turbine, running at 3,000 r.p.m., had been installed in July 1931 Ib. per hr.; 710 Ib. per sq. in. working pressure.
and had broken down in February 1945. The machine had been The end of the front downcomer pipe, which was expanded
completely overhauled fifteen months prior to the accident. At into the furnace left-hand side water-wall bottom header, had
the time of the failure the machine was being overspeeded to been blown out of the header, .and boiler water had been
check the operation of the emergency governor, after having discharged at full-bore on to the firing floor of the boiler house.
been on load continuously for one week. Before the overspeed The explosion had been caused by constraint imposed on the
tripping value was reached, coupling failure occurred. downcomer pipe by the furnace-casing side plates. The clearance
Despite extensive damage, the high-pressure casing of the cut into the plates at the pipe hole had been insufficient to
turbine w2s intact, and also the centre of the low-pressure casing. permit the pipe to conform freely to the normal thermal move-
Both turbine rotors were free and had continued to run for ment of the header. The joint between the pipe and the header
some 10 minutes after the accident. The top half of the exhaust had been consequently subjected to abnormal stresses which had
casing on the alternator side was almost completely broken off, eventually loosened the expanded part and also the end of the
together with the bearing cradle. Other damaged parts were the pipe at the bell-mouthing, until the joint was unable to with-
bottom half of the exhaust casing, the turbine coupling star, the stand the working pressure of the boiler.
coupling sleeve embracing the coupling stars, and the alternator
coupling bush. ( 7 ) Wastage of Main Rear Supporting Beam An unusual
A thorough investigation, including physical tests, chemical failure of a main rear supporting beam had been caused by
tests, microphotographs, and macro- and sulphur-prints, had oxidization from the combustion chamber side. The boiler
been made. operating conditions were: 220,000 Ib. per hr.; 420 lb. per sq.
The general conclusion was that the first cause of failure could in. j 750 deg. F.

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