LAW ON TRANSPORTATION

I. CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER 1. Definition Article 1732 NCC, De Guzman vs.

Court of Appeals Planters Products Inc vs. CA

c. Boundary System Magboo vs. Bernardo

7 SCRA 952 (1963)

168 SCRA 612 (1993) 226 SCRA 76 (1993)

2. Characteristics Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Co. 31 Phil 1 (1915) US vs. Quinahon
31 Phil 189 Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 315 SCRA 339 (1999) First
Phil. Industrial vs. Court of Appeals 300 SCRA 661 (1998) 3. Distinguished from Private
Carrier Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship San Pablo vs. Pantranco National
Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

2. Liability of Carriers for Loss, Destruction and Deterioration of Goods; Exceptions;

Presumption of Negligence Articles 1734-1735; Articles 1739-1743 Eastern Shipping
Lines vs. IAC, supra Ganzon vs. CA 161 SCRA 646 (1985) Eastern Shipping Lines vs.
Court of Appeals 196 SCRA 570 (1991) Sarkies Tours Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
280 SCRA 58 (1997) Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs. Court of Appeals
274 SCRA 642 (1997) Yobido vs. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 (1997) 3.
Commencement, Duration and Termination of carrier’s responsibility over the goods
(Articles 1736-1738, NCC) Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of North America 12
SCRA 213 (1964) Lu Do vs. Binamira 101 Phil. 120 (1957) American President Lines
Ltd. vs. Klepper 110 PHIL 243 Servando vs. Phil. Steam 117 SCRA 832 (1982) Ganzon
vs. Court of Appeals, supra Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 207 SCRA 498 (1992)
Macam vs. Court of Appeals 313 SCRA 77 (1999) 4. Stipulations Limiting Carrier’s
Liability a. Articles 1744-1745, NCC; Degree of Diligence Reasonable time in the
delivery Case: Maersk Line vs. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA 108 (1993) b. Articles 1749-
1750, NCC; Amount of Liability Ysmael vs. Barretto 51 PHIL 90 (1927) Shewaram vs.
Philippine Airlines 17 SCRA 606 (1966) Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals 91 SCRA 223
(1966) Sea Land Services, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 153 SCRA 552 (1987)
Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 544 (1990) Everett Seamship Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals 297 SCRA 496 (1998) British Airways vs. Court of Appeals 285
SCRA 450 (1998) H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray & Co. 42 PHIL 205 (1921) c. Void
Stipulation (Art. 1745, NCC) Case: Sweet Lines vs. Teves 83 SCRA 361 (1978)

23 SCRA 24 (1968) 153 SCRA 199 (1987) 283 SCRA 45 (1997)

4. Government Regulation of Common Carrier’s Business KMU Labor Center vs.

Garcia, Jr 239 SCRA 386 (1994) Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. 241 SCRA 334 (1997) 5.
Governing Law Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Llyod 132 SCRA 529 (1984)
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC 150 SCRA 464 (1984) National Development Co. vs.
Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 593 (1988) II. CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS A. VIGILANCE
OVER GOODS 1. Extra-ordinary Diligence Required of Common Carriers (Article 1733,
NCC) a. “Registered Owner Rule” Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SCRA 388 (1987) Benedicto
vs. IAC 187 SCRA 547 (1990) Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 273 SCRA
562 (1997) b. Kabit System Santos vs. Sibug 104 SCRA 520 (1981) Lita Enterprises,
Inc. vs. CA 148 SCRA 347 (1987) Teja Marketing vs. IAC 148 SCRA 347 (1987)

5. Passenger’s Baggages (Article 1754, NCC) Quisumbing, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
189 SCRA 605 (1990) Pan American Airlines vs. Rapadas 209 SCRA 67 (1992) British
Airways vs. Court of Appeals, supra Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 192 SCRA
9 (1990) B. SAFETY OF PASSENGERS 1. ‘Utmost Diligence’ Required of Common
Carriers (Article 1755, NCC) Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas bus. Co. vs. CA 83 SCRA 386
(1978) Mecenas vs. CA 180 SCRA 83 (1989) Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. CA 281
SCRA 717 (1997) Korean Airlines Co. Ltd. vs. CA 234 SCRA 14 (1999) Fortune
Express, Inc. vs. CA 305 SCRA 14 (1999) Gatchalian vs. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991)
Del Castillo vs. Jaymalin 112 SCRA 629 (1982) A. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. IAC 189 SCRA 158 (1990) Bustamante vs. CA 193
SCRA 603 (1991) B. Accomodation Passenger Lara vs. Valencia 104 SCRA 65 (1958)
C. Carrier not an insurer against all risks Necessito vs. Paras 104 Phil. 75 (1958) Japan
Airlines vs. CA 294 SCRA 19 (1998) D. Res Ipsa Loquitur Layugan vs. IAC 167 SCRA
363 (1988)

4. Negligence or intentional assault by carrier’s employee Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad

Co. 97 Phil. 884 (1955) Maranan vs. Perez 20 SCRA 412 (1967) 5. Passenger’s duty to
observe diligence to avoid injury; contributory negligence PNR vs. Court of Appeals 139
SCRA 87 (1985) Isaac vs. Al Ammen Trans 101 Phil 1046 (1957) 6. Injury to passenger
due to acts of co-passenger or stranger Bachelor Express, Inc vs. Court of Appeals 188
SCRA 216 (1990) Fortune Express Inc. vs. CA, supra III. DAMAGES (Article 1764,
NCC) A. Actual/Compensatory Damages (Arts. 2199, 2201, 2203, NCC) Cariaga vs.
LTB Co., & MRR 110 PHIL 346 (1960) Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 31
SCRA 511 (1970) Pan American World Airways vs. IAC 153 SCRA 521 (1987)
Gatchalian vs. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991) 1. Recovery for Physical Injuries Soberano
vs. MRR & Benguet Auto Line 18 SCRA 732 (1966) Marchan vs. Mendoza 24 SCRA
888 (1968) 2. Damages in case of death De Caliston vs. CA 122 SCRA 958 (1983) PAL
vs. CA 185 SCRA 110 (1990) B. Moral Damages (Arts. 2206, 2216-2217, 2219-2220,
NCC) Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab 101 Phil. 523 (1957) Fores vs. Miranda 105
Phil. 266 (1959) Lopez vs. Pan American 16 SCRA 431 (1966) Ortigas Jr. vs. Lufthansa
64 SCRA 610 (1975) Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Esguerra 117 SCRA 741 (1982) Sweet
Lines vs. Court of Appeals 121 SCRA 769 (1983) Pan American World Airways vs. IAC,
supra TransWorld Airlines vs. CA 165 SCRA 143 (1988) Armovit vs. Court of Appeals
184 SCRA 476 (1990) PAL vs. CA 106 SCRA 391 C. Exemplary Damages (Arts. 2229,
2232-2233, NCC) Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport 148 SCRA 440 (1987) Marchan
vs. Mendoza, supra.

2. Commencement, Duration and Termination of Carrier’s Responsibility La Mallorca vs.

De Jesus 17 SCRA 739 (1966) Aboitiz Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals 179 SCRA 95
(1989) Mallari Sr. vs. Court of Appeals 324 SCRA 147 (2000) 3. Presumption of
Negligence: Liability of Carriers for death or injury to passengers; Exceptions (Articles
1756-1758, NCC) Bayasen vs. Court of Appeals 103 SCRA 197 (1981) Cervantes vs.
Court of Appeals 304 SCRA 27 (1999) Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 332 SCRA 356
(2000) Pestaño vs. Sumayang 346 SCRA 870 (2000)

SUMMARY OF CASE DOCTRINES De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals Article 1732

makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity
(in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services
or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. The Court of
Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public
convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier,
without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of
the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a
certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from
the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate
of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to
reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory
requirements. Planters Products, Inc. vs. CA It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in
the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods
indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum",
the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner
and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can
the charterer be charged, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring
for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. This
is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship, the manning of
the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of
maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened,
chosen and hired by the shipowner. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall

remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one
or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a
time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and
its crew, that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular
voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or
voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for
the moment, be the property of the charterer. Fisher vs. Yangco In construing Act 98 for
the alleged violation, the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives
without qualification or conditions may have the effect of subjecting any person or
locality or the traffic is such explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary
prejudice or discrimination. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline
to accept a particular class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient reason
the discrimination for such is reasonable and necessary. YSC has not met those
conditions. The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is
such that it is within the power of the State to impose such just regulations in the
interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper. US vs. Quinahon There is no
pretense that it actually cost more to handle the rice for the province than it did for the
merchants with whom the special contracts were made. There was a clear
discrimination against the province which is prohibited by the law. It is however not
believed that the law prohibits common carriers from making special rates for the
handling and transporting of merchandise, when the same are made for the purpose of
increasing their business and to manage their important interests upon the same
principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits.
Absolute equality is not required in all cases. It is only unjust, undue and unreasonable
discrimination which the law forbids. The law of equality is in force only where the
services performed in the different cases are substantially the same and the
circumstances and conditions are similar. Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. CA

Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC;
it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route; and there was only “one
shipper, one consignee for a special cargo.” The SC held that Loadstar is a common
carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC, and this character is not
altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic, occasional,
episodic or unscheduled. First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. CA Based on Article
1732 NCC, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public
employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons
who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from
the definition of a common carrier. (De Guzman Ruling upheld) Respondent’s argument
that the term “common carrier” as used in Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code
refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water is erroneous. The definition of “common
carriers” in NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by
land, water or air. It does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods
should be by motor vehicle. Home Insurance Company vs. American Steamship
Agencies, Inc. The NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the
common carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. Under American
Jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a
special person only becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation
exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. The stipulation
in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its
agent would be void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied.
Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a
ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. The stipulation exempting the owner
from liability for negligence of its agent is not against public
policy and is deemed valid. Recovery can’t be had, for loss or damage to the cargo
against shipowners, unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said
owner or its managers, as distinguished from agents or employees. San Pablo vs.
PANTRANCO Considering the environmental circumstances of the case, the
conveyance of passengers, trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a
ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service. Under no
circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of
the highway. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the
highway when crossing rivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters -
separating the land, however, when as in this case the two terminals, Matnog and Allen
are separated by an open sea it can not be considered as a continuation of the
highway. Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of
an interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions of law. Its
CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water service
under the guise that it is a mere private ferry service. The contention of private
respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private carrier, not as a
common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo
trucks is absurd. PANTRANCO does not deny that it charges its passengers separately
from the charges for the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the
MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen, PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in
issuing tickets to its passengers it did so as a private carrier and not as a common
carrier. The Court does not see any reason why inspite of its amended franchise to
operate a private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just for the
purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen. Indeed evidence to this effect
has been submitted. National Steel Corporation vs. CA In the instant case, it is
undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. It carried passengers
or goods only for those it chose under a special contract of charter party. It is a private
carrier that renders tramping service and as such, does not transport cargo or shipment
for the general public. Its services are available only to

specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner.
Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including their respective
liability for damage to the cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their
contracts of private carriage or charter party. Unlike in a contract involving a common
carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. KMU
vs. Garcia “The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public
need. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the
applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service
shall be the oppositor's.” By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means
something fitting or suited to the public need. As one of the basic requirements for the
grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or
service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing
facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or non-existence of public
convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by
evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means
necessary, in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of
such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and protect, the interests of both
the public and the existing transport operators. Tatad vs. Garcia In law, there is a clear
distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities
and equipment used to serve the public. The right to operate a public utility may exist
independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own
said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate
a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of
property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control
thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.

Samar Mining Company, Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd The validity of stipulations in bills
of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the
same are not in its actual custody has been upheld. There is no doubt that Art. 1738
finds no applicability to the instant case. The said article contemplates a situation where
the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the
warehouse of the carrier. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their
port of destination, and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen
and/or heard of. Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the
carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual
or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person
who has a right to receive them. In sales, actual delivery has been defined as the
ceding of corporeal possession by the seller, and the actual apprehension of corporeal
possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as
his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. By the same token, there is
actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned
over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him
to remove the goods. The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the
consignee through its duly authorized agent, the carrier. Eastern Shipping Lines vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court 1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction
or deterioration. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the
Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code.
However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.
Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of
the Civil Code. (2) Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over goods, according to all the circumstances of each case. Common
carriers are responsible for the

loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity; Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from
liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity.” However, the Court said that fire
may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it arises
almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the
category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or
calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. As the peril
of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735
of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the common
carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it
proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. And even if fire
were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil
Code, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must
have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss," and that the carrier has
"exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after the
occurrence of the disaster.” This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish
satisfactorily. National Development Company vs. CA Significantly, under the provisions
of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is
not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence
of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of
the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the
representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct
of the voyage. The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as
agent, a term broad enough to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact
MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel, including the power
to contract in the name of the NDC. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly
and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin
in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract.

Gelisan vs. Alday The court has held in several decisions that the registered owner of a
public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to
its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. The claim of the
petitioners that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between
him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to 3rd persons, cannot be sustained
because it appears that the lease contract had not been approved by the Public Service
Commission. It is a settled rule in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a
Franchise is transferred or lease to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the
transfer is not binding upon the public and 3rd persons. However, Gelisan is not without
recourse because he has a right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount he may be
required to pay. This is due to the fact that the lease contract in question, although not
effective against the public is valid and binding between the contracting parties.
Benedicto vs. Intermediate Appellate Court The prevailing doctrine in common carriers
make the owner liable for consequences having from the operations of the carrier even
though the specific vehicle involved may have been transferred to another person. This
doctrine rests upon the principle in dealing with vehicles registered under Public Service
Law, the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful
owner thereof. It would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter, for
members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for
injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to
prove who the actual owner is. The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by
proving the identity of the alleged transferee. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s claim, private
respondents are not required to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to
ascertain the owner of the carrier. PHILTRANCO Service Enterprise, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public
service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of
the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. As to
solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employer's liability is
primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by
it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence
which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code
provides: Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of
the claim. Santos vs. Sibug Although SANTOS, as the kabit was the true owner as
against VIDAD, the latter, as the registered owner/operator and grantee of the
franchise, is directly and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to
SIBUG, the injured party, as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of
the vehicle. This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is
considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and
third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another
where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service Commission. Lita
Enterprises Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court Unquestionably, the parties herein
operated under an arrangement, comonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a
person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who
owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public
convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government . Abuse of this privilege
by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. Although not outrightly penalized as a
criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public
policy and, therefore, void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a
fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract,
but will leave them both where it finds them. Teja Marketing vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court The ruling in Lita Enterprises Inc. vs. IAC is upheld. The defect of in existence of
a contract is permanent and cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. The mere
lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void. Magboo vs.
Bernardo The features which characterize the boundary system are not sufficient to
withdraw the relationship between the parties from that of employer and employee. The
owner continued to be the operator of the vehicle in legal contemplation and as such, he
is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation. To exempt from liability
the owner of a public vehicle who operates it under the “boundary system” on the
ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to abet flagrant violations of the
Public Service Law but also to place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and
irresponsible drivers. Ganzon vs. CA Petitioner Ganzon failed to show that the loss of
the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art. 1734. The order of the acting Mayor
did not constitute valid authority for petitioner to carry out. In any case, the intervention
of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible the
fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duly bound to obey the
illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap of iron. Moreover, there is absence of
sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or
intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner’s employees. By the
delivery made during Dec. 1, 1956, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the
possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier of
transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, Ganzon’s
extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced. According to Art 1738, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only
upon the delivery by the carrier to the consignee or persons with right to receive them.
The fact that part of the

shipment had not been loaded on board did not impair the contract of transportation as
the goods remained in the custody & control of the carrier. Eastern Shipping Lines vs.
Court of Appeals The heavy seas and rains referred to in the master’s report were not
caso fortuito but normal occurrences that an ocean-going vessel, particularly in the
month of September which, in our area, is a month of rains and heavy seas would
encounter as a matter of routine. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. These
are conditions that oceangoing vessels would encounter and provide for, in the ordinary
course of a voyage. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the
Jupri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of
the ship's hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the
ship. Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law
of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present
evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of the
Civil Code in order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had
admittedly carried in this case. No such evidence exists of record. Thus, the carrier
cannot escape liability. Sarkies Tours Phils vs. Court of Appeals Under the Civil Code,
common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
them, and this liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the person who has a right to
receive them, unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Article 1734
thereof. Where the common carrier accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation
and even had it placed in the vehicle by its own employee, its failure to collect the
freight charge is the common carrier's own lookout. It is responsible for the consequent
loss of the baggage. In the instant case, defendant appellant's employee even helped
Fatima Minerva Fortades and her brother load the luggages/baggages in the bus'
baggage compartment, without asking that they be weighed,

declared, receipted or paid for. Neither was this required of the other passengers.
Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs. Court of Appeals In a contract of private
carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on
the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo
caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the
Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and
the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress
that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a
common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the
stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public
cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private
carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by
stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers. Yobido vs. Court of Appeals The explosion of the
new tire is not a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The
fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing
defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire
bought and used is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it
could not explode within five day’s use. It is settled that an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito.
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure.
A common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury
resulting from the accident. Thus, having failed to overthrow the presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for
damages.

Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of North America The receipt of goods by the
carrier has been said to lie at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver, and if
actually no goods are received there can be no such contract. The liability and
responsibility of the carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on
their actual delivery to, or receipt by, the carrier or an authorized agent and delivery to a
lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel, where it is the custom to deliver
in that way, is a good delivery and binds the vessel receiving the freight, the liability
commencing at the time of delivery to the lighter and, similarly, where there is a contract
to carry goods from one port to another, and they cannot be loaded directly on the
vessel and lighters are sent by the vessel to bring the goods to it, the lighters are for the
time its substitutes, so that the bill of landing is applicable to the goods as soon as they
are placed on the lighters. Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the
carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it can be said with certainty
that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established. A bill of lading is not
indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. The bill of lading is juridically a
documentary proof of the stipulations and conditions agreed upon by both parties. The
liability of the carrier as common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for
transportation, and not merely with the formal execution of a receipt or bill of lading; the
issuance of a bill of lading is not necessary to complete delivery and acceptance. Even
where it is provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of the bill of
lading, actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier.

a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for what may happen
during the interregnum.

American President Lines, Ltd. vs. Klepper With regard to the contention of the carrier
that COGSA should control in this case, the same is of as moment. Art. 1763 of the
New Civil Code provides that “the laws of the country to which the goods are
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss, destruction
and deterioration.” This means that the law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code.
Under 1766 of NCC, “in all matter not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations
of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws.”
Art. 1736-1738, NCC governs said rights and obligations. Therefore, although Sec 4(5)
of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per
package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and asserted
in the bill of lading, said section is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New
Civil Code.

Servando vs. Phil. Steam The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in
question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated
by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or
constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the
appellant. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the
cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the
loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment therein the following stipulation:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed
'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall
carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or
accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ... We sustain the
validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or
public policy.

Lu Do vs. Binamira While delivery of the cargo to the consignee, or to the person who
has a right to receive them, contemplated in Article 1736, because in such case the
goods are still in the hands of the Government and the owner cannot exercise dominion
over them, we believe however that the parties may agree to limit the liability of the
carrier considering that the goods have still to through the inspection of the customs
authorities before they are actually turned over to the consignee. This is a situation
where we may say that the carrier losses control of the goods because of

Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was
printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the
same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of
Appeals, where the same issue was resolved in this wise: “While it may be true that
petitioner had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions
thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and
valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or
assent to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which
it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made
form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not
entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it
entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent."

denying that he assented to such terms. This rule applies with particular force where a
shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents, and acceptance under
such circumstances makes it a binding contract. In order that any presumption of assent
to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear
that the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of the
contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or
bill of lading or on papers attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed
on its face, if it is shown that the consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper
accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to be found on the back, such
receipt comes within the general rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted and to
be bound by the conditions there to be found. Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of
the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from
the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force
and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the
shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates only after
the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or
such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the
goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and
control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier
has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the
liability of the common carrier commences. Only when such fact of delivery has been
unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods
in the custody of the carrier, absent the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and
the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.

Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals Except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to
prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the bill of lading even prior
to actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is
no law which requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the
covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or, for that matter, that the former
should precede the latter. While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an airway bill
estops the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in
the bill," a further reading and a more faithful quotation of the authority cited would
reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus
become something more than a contract between the shipper and the carrier. . . .
(However), as between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been delivered
for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the true facts . . .
Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to the
goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for
shipment. As between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the
recital." There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of lading
without dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were brought to the
knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and in the absence of fraud or mistake,
he is estopped from thereafter

Macam vs. CA The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual
or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right
to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee
whereas GPC was the notify party. However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly
named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter
to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court.

This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as
buyer/importer which, conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the
right to receive them was proper. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to
petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee.
From the testimony of petitioner, we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as
buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3) years already. When mangoes and
watermelons are in season, his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is
twice or thrice a week. The goods are released to GPC. It has been the practice of
petitioner to request the shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such
as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his "people."
In transactions covered by a letter of credit, bank guarantee is normally required by the
shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers,
petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid.
In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents, there was not a
single instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the
cargoes.

Limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or damage from any cause or for any
reason for less than 1/8 the actual value of the goods is unconscionable and therefore
against public policy. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from
liability, unless such exemption is just and reasonable and the contract is freely and
fairly made. Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines It can not be said that a contract has been
entered into between a passenger and the common carrier, embodying the conditions
as printed at the back of the ticket. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back
of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the
presumption that the passenger was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly
and freely agreed" to those conditions. The passenger is considered not having agreed
to the stipulation on the ticket, as manifested by the fact that he did not sign the ticket.
Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals

Maersk Line vs. CA While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to
carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to prompt
delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a
given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a
reasonable time. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties
indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very
well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in
the bill of lading itself. In this regard, there arises no need to execute another contract
for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. In the case before us, we find that a
delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls
was beyond the realm of reasonableness. Ysmael vs. Barretto

While it may be true that the passenger had not signed the plane ticket, he is
nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of
the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is what is known as a
contract of "adhesion", in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion
wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane
ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to
the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. A
contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of
the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. Sea Land Services,
Inc. vs. IAC Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods
transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by the laws of the country of
destination and the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the
Philippines, the liability of common carrier to the consignee is governed primarily by the
Civil Code. Applying

the Civil Code provisions (Article 1749 and 1750) the stipulation in the bill of lading
limiting the liability of the common carrier for loss or damages to the shipment covered
by said rule unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional
charges is valid and binding on the consignee. Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. CA Basic is the
rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods
appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is
binding. Furthermore, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or
shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable
and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. In this
case, the award based on the alleged market value of the goods is erroneous. It is
provided in a clause in the BOL that its liability is limited to US$2.00/kilo. The consignee
also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill
of lading. Hence, the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies. Everett
Seamship Corp. vs. CA In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that all claims for
which it may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net
invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event shall the
carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss. Its liability
would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper,
had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the
limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher
valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations. The commercial
Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that the common carrier has
knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by the shipper. British Airways vs. CA
The contract of transportation was exclusively between the passenger and common
carrier BA. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s
journey to PAL, as its subcontractor or agent. Conditions of contracts were one of
continuous air transportation. Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any
negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the
principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. When an action is based on breach
of contract of carriage, the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL, since the latter was
not a party in the contract. The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was
overruled although it is recognized in the Philippines, stating that BA had waived the
defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani(the passenger) to testify as to the
actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage, without any
objection. H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray Three kinds of stipulations have often been
made in a bill of lading. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for
loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence. The second is one providing for an
unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation. And the third is one limiting
the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher
value and pays a higher rate of freight. According to an almost uniform weight of
authority, the first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being contrary to public
policy, but the third is valid and enforceable. If a common carrier gives to a shipper the
choice of two rates and if the shipper makes such a choice, understandingly and freely,
and names his valuation, he cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he
thus places upon his property. A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value does
not conflict with any sound principle of public policy; and it is not conformable to plain
principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and
then recover a larger value in case of loss. Sweet Lines Inc. vs. TEVES Considered in
the light of circumstances prevailing in the interisland shipping industry in the country
today, We find and hold that

Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-
island shipping industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the
conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is
Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on
transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and
interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who,
under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would
incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file
the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice.
Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of
its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in
the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause
inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner. Under Art. 2220 of the Civil Code,
moral damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there
was bad faith on the part of petitioner in that: (1) Defendants- Appellants did not give
notice to plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the vessel; (2) Knowing
fully well that it would take no less than fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the
damaged engine, defendants- appellants instead made announce ment of assurance
that the vessel would leave within a short period of time, and when plaintiff-appellees
wanted to leave the port and gave up the trip, defendants- appellants employees would
come and say, “we are leaving already”. (3) Defendants- appellants did not offer to
refund plaintiffs-appellees’ tickets nor provide them with transportation form Tacloban to
Catbalogan. Quisumbing Sr. vs. Court of Appeals The highjacking-robbery was force
majeure. The hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower
and violent fury. Firearms, hand-grenades, dynamite, and explosives are introduced into
the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth, although there is an
occasional use of innocent hostages who will be

coldly murdered unless a plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal. PAL was
not negligent so as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. Hijackers do
not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Firearms
and grenades are brought to the plane surreptitiously. PAL could not have been faulted
for want of diligence, particularly for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil
Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on
board the plane. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices may
have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining hijackers. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. vs. Rapadas The Warsaw Convention governs the
availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or
incorporated in the passenger ticket. In the case at bar, the baggage check is combined
with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger ticket complies
with Article 3, which provides: (c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey
involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure,
the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in
most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of
loss of or damage to baggage. The provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to govern
the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. The passenger, upon
contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant
insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to
overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. The
facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and
chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it
in. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line, private
respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages.
Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be
removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried
Manila-paper or plastic envelope.

The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to
pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with
the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. Alitalia vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court The Warsaw Convention's provisions, do not regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers
and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage, Otherwise, an air
carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute
refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd. In the case
at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of
petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is
true, but without appreciable damage. There can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent
profound distress and anxiety, which gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from
the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when, having gone
to Rome, she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the
conference. Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot
under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for
delay in the transport of baggage. She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for
loss or damage to her luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately
delivered to her in Manila, tardily, but safely.

his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other
words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when
such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already
in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the
service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to
more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained
mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain. Mecenas vs. CA The behaviour of the captain of the
"Don Juan" in tills instanceplaying mahjong "before and up to the time of collision
constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel
to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers
had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or
around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking
and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel
at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary
diligence. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of Capt.
Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoning the ship
and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel after
collision, did not cause the collision by themselves, such failures doubtless contributed
materially to the consequent loss of life and, moreover, were indicative of the kind and
level of diligence exercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers
and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels. The officer-on-watch in the
"Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban not only of the
"imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself " There is also
evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been
certified as allowed to carry. Under these circumstances, a presumption of gross
negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises.

Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Fairness demands that in measuring a
common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance
that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to
their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him
anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his copassengers, not to speak of his own.
Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is
entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
innocuousness of

Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. CA The Duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty
to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel. (Same
Ruling with Mecenas)

Korean Airlines Co., LTD. vs. CA The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was
changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger
manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and
customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in
that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between them when
it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. This Court has held that a contract to transport
passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. The
business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail
themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any discourteous
conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier. Fortune Express Inc. vs. CA Art. 1763 of the Civil Code
provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier
could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos
were planning to take revenge on the petitioner

by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager,
Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing
to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant
they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline
with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the
safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on
board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.
The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was
already a warning by the PC. No contributory negligence could be attributed to the
deceased. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as
a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two
Maranaos were riding. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something
from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the
bus by pleading for his life. Gatchalian vs. Delim The record yields affirmative evidence
of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop
to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard
and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them that it was normal. The
driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in
the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been
checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping
sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it.
Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and
even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be
checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the
roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop
the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained
by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary
diligence, we must construe

any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be
valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs.
A cursory examination of the purported waiver will readily show that appellees did not
actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to
comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they
expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an
actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
condition ante. Del Castillo vs. Jaymalin Common carriers are responsible for the death
of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes the
loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It appears proven that the defendant
corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to
Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo
was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge the conductor should have taken
extraordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. In this he failed. Phil. Rabbit Bus
Lines vs. IAC

harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The
bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers
of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the
accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways.

Bustamante vs. CA The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that
the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other
words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts
may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. All premises considered, the Court is
convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine
of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit
between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs
of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.
Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo
truck from liability. Lara vs. Valencia The principle about "the last clear" chance, would
call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of
the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the The owner and driver of a vehicle
owes to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise
reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The
rule is established by weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile
owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not
unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. The
owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care, and

is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law. A

passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself
which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately caused by his own
negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable. Necessito vs. Paras While the carrier is not
an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to answer for
the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier,
and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The
rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the
manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while
the carrier usually has. Japan Airlines vs. CA Accordingly, there is no question that
when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure," the general
rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when
JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo
eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the
stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL
assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on
June 15, 1991. It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to
the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic
changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the
passenger must assume or expect. While JAL was no longer required to defray private
respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous
event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private
respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on
its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it
declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a
result of

which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements

themselves for the next flight to Manila. Layugan vs. IAC Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine
which states thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Whether the cargo truck
was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be
of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning
which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of
the private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and
left foot. It is clear therefore that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has
been established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, making the employer of the driver liable for the negligence
of his employee. La Mallorca vs. CA The liability of the carrier for the child, who was
already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus for her safety
under the contract of carriage, persists. The relation of carrier and passenger does not
necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant
or employee in removing his baggage from the car. It has been recognized as a rule
that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger
alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of

destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time
or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
Aboitiz Shipping Co. vs. CA The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the
vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily
terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the
conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The
carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in
the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. When the accident occurred, the victim was
in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's
vessel. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was
possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard
procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start
only after that time. Mallari Sr. vs. CA Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the
driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated
and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under
Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating a traffic regulation. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due

regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of
death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. This
liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.

Bayasen vs. CA It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery
roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car.
Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not
necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault. Under the particular
circumstances of the instant case, the petitionerdriver who skidded could not be
regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner
had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. Cervantes vs. CA Since
the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written
request to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents
did to his advantage. The said agents, acted without authority when they confirmed the
flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent
beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the
same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner)
knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be
held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of
authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless
the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. Calalas vs. CA

It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract.
The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. The driver of jeepney did
not carry “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. These are violations of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore, there is no assumption of risk by
the passenger. Pestaño vs. Sumayang In the case at bar, Pestaño, as a professional
driver operating a public transport bus, should have anticipated that overtaking at a
junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible
for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in
the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome
only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal
violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of transportation
obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility
of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through
the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. In the present case, the
act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger
(because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese
occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee
every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and
any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in
question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil
Code (which is the law applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the
given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the
company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby. Maranan
vs. Perez The basis of the common carrier's liability under NCC for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat
superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger
safely. Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act
of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the
act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the
majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the
course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in
excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here
is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults
committed by its own employees. Art. 1759, evidently follows the rule based on the
second view. Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and
similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total

personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude. PNR
vs. CA When a train boarded by the deceased passenger was so overcrowded that he
and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the
coaches of the train, the common carrier is negligent. Likewise when the train did not
even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the
time, neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge, there was negligence. The petitioner has
the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage. But while petitioner failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable
with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal
bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Isaac
vs. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. If the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden
emergency, he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, be required
in the absence of such emergency. By placing his left arm on the window, petitioner is
guilty of contributory negligence. It cannot however relieve the carrier but can only
reduce its liability (ART. 1762). It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for
passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be
had for an injury. Bachelor Express Inc vs. CA The running amuck of the passenger
was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic
among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit

shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut
causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another
passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a
common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough
that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove
that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. In this
case, Bachelor was negligent. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-
the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus
was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or
gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle
after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with
doors in accordance with law. Cariaga vs. LTB Co The income which deceased could
earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board
examinations must be deemed to be within the same category provided for by Art. 2201
of the Civil Code, which are those that are the natural and probable consequences of
the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
time the obligation was constituted. LTB could not be held liable to pay moral damages
under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage
because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. LTB had exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection
with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith.
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA Life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an
important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein.
Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has
been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely
arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. When the liability of common carrier had
been fixed at a minimal rate of only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of
deceased at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" and when the

deceased’s potentiality and capacity to increase his future income was not considered
said liability may be enforced upon finality of the decision. Pan American World Airways
vs. IAC By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight, defendant had willfully and
knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of
destination under its contract with plaintiff. Bad faith was also present. Self enrichment
or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant, but
it is malice nevertheless. The fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in
order to accommodate a white man in an airline owned by an American firm with a
reputation for bumping off non- Caucasian to accommodate whites is very regrettable.
Defendant having breached its contract with plaintiff in bad faith, it is not error to have
awarded exemplary damages. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages
is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good . In view of
it nature, it should be imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter
similar breach of contract in the future by defendant and other airlines. An award of
attorney's fees is also in order, having found bad faith on the part of defendant.
Soberano vs. MRR In case of physical injuries, moral damages are recoverable only by
the party injured and not by his next of kin, unless there is express statutory provision to
the contrary. In this case it was Juana Soberano, not her husband Jose, who sustained
the bodily injuries. Attorneys fees may only be awarded when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to
protect his interest, or when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. It will be
observed that the defendant companies offered to settle the case by offering to the
Soberanos the additional sum of P5,000. The Soberanos, however, rejected the offer
and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum of P76,757.76.

Marchan vs. Mendoza It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the
exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor
counterclaim of error for the same by the respondents. It is to be observed however,
that in the complaint, plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may
deem just and equitable." Now, since the body of the complaint sought to recover
damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for
the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's
employee and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages,
plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the kind of damages they
are trying to recover against the defendant's carrier. Suffice it to state that when
plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed
of under the premises, in effect, therefore, the court is called upon the exercise and use
its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not
expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. Exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the discretion of the court. If the amount of exemplary
damages need not be proved, it need not also be alleged, and the reason is obvious
because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as
compensatory damages. De Caliston vs. Court of Appeals The deletion of the
P10,000.00 awarded for loss of pension is unjustified. Under Article 2206 of the Civil
Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. . The
pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which
Dalmacio was responsible, the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P
10,000.00 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for
one year if she did not die. On the other hand, the P5,000.00 paid to the herein
petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be
deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance.

Since the civil liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is
subsidiary and, at bottom, arises from the same culpa, the insurance proceeds should
be credited in favor of the errant driver. Philippine Airlines vs. CA 185 SCRA 110
Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts
in the United States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising
from death is, as established by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of
the beneficiary, whichever is shorter. However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be
proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Even in
the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive. For
the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and
jurisprudence. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of
damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not
of his beneficiary. Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab While under the law, employers
are made responsible for the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned task, plaintiff, in the present case, does not maintain his action
against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused but on an alleged
breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. However, the
defendant taxicab company has not committed any criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries against the plaintiff. The one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the
driver of defendant's taxicab but he was not made party defendant to the case.
Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for moral damages as his case does
not come within the exception of paragraph 1 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. The
present case does not come under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code, specially of paragraph 2 thereof, because defendant's failure to meet its
responsibility was not the cause that compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur
expenses to protect his interests. The present action was instituted because plaintiff
demanded an exorbitant amount for moral damages and naturally the defendant did not
and could not yield to such demand. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph
11 of said Article because the Lower

Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees, on
which point this Court agrees. Fores vs. Miranda The exception to the basic rule of
damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in
which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger
to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased". But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that
where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it
is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the
mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an
inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is
no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court
of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of
bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to
violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
Lopez vs. Pan American As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its
contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious
anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued
by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were
expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them,
only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as
tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. Senator Lopez was then
Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the prestige
of such an office. And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez
was going to the United States to attend a private business conference of the
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid rank and position were by no
means left behind, and in fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United
States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends

in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore. For the moral damages sustained by
him, therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate. A written contract for attorney's
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of the attorney’s prominence as well
as comparison of the defense counsel’s fees could well establish the reasonableness of
the attorney’s fees, such as in this case. Ortigas Jr. vs. Lufthansa It is Our considered
view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of care
on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in
the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to
the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. But in
the instant case, the breach appears to be of graver nature, since the preference given
to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of
plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may not be
discriminated against with impunity. What worsened the situation of was that Lufthansa
succeeded in keeping Ortigas as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given
first class accommodation at the next stations, the proper arrangements therefor having
been made already, when in truth such was not the case. A passenger contracts for first
class accommodations for many reasons peculiar to himself and pays a higher price
therefor, and it is certainly not for the airplane to say later, after it deprives him of his
space in order to favor another passenger, that economy class is anyway just as good
as first class. We have uniformly upheld the right of a passenger to damages in all
cases wherein, after having contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly
confirmed and validated, he is transferred over his objection to economy, class, which
he has to take in order to be able to arrive at his destination on his scheduled time.

passenger, and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith,
even if death does not result. The Court of Appeals found that the two vehicles
sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. In other words. both vehicles were in
their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other. It cannot be
said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. This
being the case, no moral damages are recoverable.

Trans World Airlines vs. CA Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers
including private respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy. Such inattention and lack
of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to
the award of moral damages. More so in this case where instead of courteously
informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances, he was
angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. At the time of this unfortunate incident,
the private respondent was a practicing lawyer, a senior partner of a big law firm in
Manila. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social
organizations in the Philippines. Considering the circumstances of this case and the
social standing of private respondent in the community, he is entitled to the award of
moral and exemplary damages. Armovit vs. CA The gross negligence committed by
private respondent(Northwest Airlines) in the issuance of the tickets by the erroneous
entry of the date of departure and without changing or correcting the error when the
tickets were presented for re-confirmation and the manner by which petitioners were
rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith
and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages. The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate
court is well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot
co-exist with actual or compensatory damages. Philippine Airlines vs. CA 106 SCRA
391

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Esguerra Moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, as in the instant
case, in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code. The
exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a

I. CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER There was gross negligence by PAL for allowing
Capt. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the accident, even if he was sick,
having tumor on his nose. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering
from the disease. One month prior to the crashlanding, when the pilot was preparing to
land in Daet, private respondent warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet
but above the town of Ligao. The dizziness, headaches and general debility of private
respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. And therefore there is causal
connection between the accident and said after-effects. The negligence of PAL is
clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. 2219(2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of
moral damages. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-
employer relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of
employment, private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding
of bad faith or malice, applying the provisions of Article 2220. Prudenciado vs. Alliance
Transport Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can
admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can
develop after several years and can lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose the
patient to other sickness. Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real and
intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient
of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering. As to exemplary damages,
Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: “In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence.” The rati onale behind exemplary
or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for
the public good. Respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the right
along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that the traffic was clear.
Failing to notice petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to
the right to avoid the collision. Much more, it was raining that time and the roads are
slippery. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers
indeed demands corrective measures.

DE GUZMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendaña is a junk

dealer who was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan.
Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring
such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two six-wheeler trucks which he owned for
hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load
his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to different
establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates which
were commonly lower than regular commercial rates. Petitioner Pedro de Guzman a
merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of
Liberty filled milk from its warehouse in Makati to petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta.
150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent, while 600 cartons were
placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent's
driver and employee. Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner.
The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck which carried these
boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by
armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo. Petitioner
commenced action against private respondent demanding payment of P22,150.00, the
claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner
argued that private respondent, being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise
the extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held liable for the value
of the undelivered goods. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and
argued that he could not be held responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss
having been due to force majeure. The RTC ruled that private respondent was a
common carrier. CA reversed the decision and held that respondent had been engaged
in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual occupation”, a sideline to his scrap
iron business. Issue: 1. Whether or not respondent is a common carrier. 2. Whether or
not respondent is liable.

Held: 1. Yes. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent
held no certificate of public convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a
requisite for the incurring of liability. That liability arises the moment a person or firm
acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also
complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing
regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise.
To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has
not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to
sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to
comply with applicable statutory requirements. 2. No. Article 1734 establishes the
general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or
omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character-of the goods or defects
in the packing or-in the containers; and (5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Article 1735 also provides as follows: In all cases other than those mentioned in
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in
Article 1733. The hijacking of the carrier's truck does not fall within any of the five
categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the
hijacking of the carrier's vehicle must be dealt with

under the provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private respondent as
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This
presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the
part of private respondent. Petitioner argues that in the circumstances of this case,
private respondent should have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck
carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk. We do not believe, however, that in the
instant case, the standard of extraordinary diligence required private respondent to
retain a security guard to ride with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the
risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper. Article 1745 provides in
relevant part: Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy: (6) that the common carrier's liability
for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished. In the instant case, armed
men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's
cargo. Accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force. In these
circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as
quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous
event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute
insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for
acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: PPI purchased from Mitsubishi
metric tons of Urea fertilizer which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel owned by
KKKK from US to La Union. Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel was
entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo,
Japan. Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, they were all presumably
inspected by the charterer's representative and found fit to take a load of urea. After the
Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of
the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with three
layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly
sealed throughout the entire voyage.

A private marine and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI),
was hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped. The survey report
submitted revealed a shortage in the cargo and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer
approximating was contaminated with dirt. PPI sent a claim letter to Soriamont
Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the carrier, KKKK, for the cost of the
shortage in the and the diminution in value of that portion contaminated with dirt. SSA
explained that they did not respond to the consignee's claim because it was not a formal
claim, and that they had nothing to do with the discharge of the shipment. PPI filed an
action for damages. The defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy governing
common carriers does not apply to them because they have become private carriers by
reason of the provisions of the charter-party. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff, stating that
“common carriers are presumed negligent, all that a shipper has to do in a suit to
recover for loss or damage is to show receipt by the carrier of the goods and to delivery
by it of less than what it received. After that, the burden of proving that the loss or
damage was due to any of the causes which exempt him from liability is shifted to the
carrier, common or private he may be. Even if the provisions of the charter-party are
deemed valid, and the defendants considered private carriers, it was still incumbent
upon them to prove that the shortage or contamination sustained by the cargo is
attributable to the fault or negligence on the part of the shipper or consignee in the
loading, stowing, trimming and discharge of the cargo. This they failed to do.” CA
reversed the decision, relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. v. American
Steamship Agencies, Inc., it ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by
private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of
the time charterer-party. Accordingly, the Civil Code provisions on common carriers
which set forth a presumption of negligence do not find application in the case at bar.
Issue: 1) Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-
party. 2) Whether the shipowner was able to prove that he had exercised that degree of
diligence required of him under the law. Held: 1.) Not necessarily. It is not disputed that
respondent carrier, in the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier,
transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel
M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of
the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control.
Hardly then can the charterer be

charged, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo
when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. This is evident in
the present case considering that the steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the
determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime
navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened, chosen and
hired by the shipowner. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as
such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more
persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter
or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, that
a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering
the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be
the property of the charterer. Respondent carrier's heavy reliance on the case of Home
Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, is misplaced for the reason that the
meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a stipulation in the charter-party
exempting the shipowners from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent, and
not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. At any rate, the rule in the
United States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo is not a
common carrier, does not find application in our jurisdiction, for we have observed that
the growing concern for safety in the transportation of passengers and /or carriage of
goods by sea requires a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws, more
particularly, the rules governing common carriers. 2.) Yes. In an action for recovery of
damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped, the RTC’s statement on the
requirements of the law was reiterated. SC held that respondent carrier has sufficiently
overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie presumption of negligence. It
was shown during the trial that after the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship’s holds,
the steel pontoon hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids, then covered with 3
layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained
close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers
made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship’s boom. Also shown,
was that the hull of the vessel was in good condition, foreclosing the possibility of
spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel. SC
agreed that the bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk
of loss or damage. Moreso, with a variable

weather condition prevalent during its unloading, as was the case at bar. This is a risk
the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. Clearly, respondent carrier has
sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable
to deterioration; as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to
the loss. F.C. FISHER vs.YANGCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY Facts: The board of
Yangco Steamship Co. adopted a resolution which was ratified by the stockholders
declaring classes of merchandise which are not to be carried by the vessels of the
company and prohibiting the employees to carry dynamite, powder or other explosives.
The Collector of Customs suspended the issuance of clearances for the vessels unless
they carry the explosives. Fisher, a stockholder of YSC, filed a petition for prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the board of YFC to accept for carriage "dynamite,
powder or other explosives" from any and all shippers who may offer such explosives
for carriage can be held to be a lawful act. Held: No. In construing Act 98 for the alleged
violation, the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives without
qualification or conditions may have the effect of subjecting any person or locality or the
traffic is such explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary prejudice or
discrimination. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a
particular class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient reason the
discrimination for such is reasonable and necessary. YSC has not met those conditions.
The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such that it is
within the power of the State to impose such just regulations in the interest of the public
as the legislator may deem proper. US vs. QUINAHON Facts: Defendants were
charged for violation of Act 98, when they unloaded in the port of Currimao 5,986 sacks
of rice belonging to Ilocos Norte Provincial Government from Manila, and charged the
provincial treasurer 10 centavos for each sack instead of 6 centavos which they have
been regularly charging for the unloading of the same kind of

merchandise and under virtually the same circumstances and conditions. They were
convicted, hence they appealed to the higher court. Issue: Whether or not the
defendants as common carriers caused prejudice to the Ilocos Norte Government. Held:
Yes. There is no pretense that it actually cost more to handle the rice for the province
than it did for the merchants with whom the special contracts were made. There was a
clear discrimination against the province which is prohibited by the law. It is however not
believed that the law prohibits common carriers from making special rates for the
handling and transporting of merchandise, when the same are made for the purpose of
increasing their business and to manage their important interests upon the same
principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits.
Absolute equality is not required in all cases. It is only unjust, undue and unreasonable
discrimination which the law forbids. The law of equality is in force only where the
services performed in the different cases are substantially the same and the
circumstances and conditions are similar. LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO., INC. vs.COURT
OF APPEALS Facts: On November 19, 1984, LOADSTAR received on board its M/V
Cherokee goods(certain types of wood) for shipment. The goods were insured with
Manila Insurance Co.(MIC) against various risks including “TOTAL LOSS BY TOTAL
LOSS OF THE VESSEL”. The vessel, in turn, was insured by Prudential Guarantee &
Assurance, Inc.(PGAI) for P4 Million. On November 20, 1984, on its way to Manila from
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, the vessel sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total
loss of its shipment, the consignee made a claim with LOADSTAR which, however
ignored the same. As the insurer, MIC paid the insured in full settlement of its claim. On
February 4, 1985, MIC filed a complaint against Loadstar and PGAI, alleging that the
sinking of the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of Loadstar and its employees.
Loadstar claimed force majeur. PGAI averred that MIC has no cause of action against it,
Loadstar being the party insured. PGAI was later dropped as a party defendant after it
paid the insurance proceeds to Loadstar. The trial court rendered judgment for MIC,
prompting Loadstar to go to the CA which affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether or not
Loadstar is a private carrier.

Held: No. Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not
issued a CPC; it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route; and there was
only “one shipper, one consignee for a special cargo.” The SC held that Loadstar is a
common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC, and this character
is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic,
occasional, episodic or unscheduled. In support of its position Loadstar relied on the
1968 case of Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, where the Court
held that a common carrier transporting special cargo or chartering the vessel to a
special person becomes a private carrier that is not subject to the provisions of the Civil
Code. This case however is not applicable in the case at bar for the simple reason that
the actual settings are different. The records do not disclose that the M/V Cherokee, on
the date in question, undertook to carry a special cargo or was chartered to a special
person only. There was no charter party. The bills of lading failed to show any special
arrangement, but only a general provision to the effect that the M/V Cherokee was a
general cargo carrier. Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular
type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely coincidental, is not reason
enough to convert the vessel from a common carrier to a private carrier, especially
where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers.
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, Loadstar fits the definition of a
common carrier under Article 1732 of the NCC. The doctrine enunciated in the case of
De Guzman v. CA was also mentioned. CA decision is hereby affirmed. FIRST
PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner
is a grantee of a pipeline concession under RA 387 to contract, install and operate oil
pipelines. The first pipeline concession was granted in 1967 and was renewed by the
ERB in 1992. In 1995, petitioner applied for a Mayor’s permit in Batangas City.
Respondent treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts
for the fiscal year in 1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code. To avoid hampering
its operations, petitioner paid the amount of tax for the first quarter under protest.
Petitioner argued that as a pipeline operator with a government concession engaged in
transporting petroleum products via pipeline it is exempted from payment of tax based
on gross receipts. Respondent refused to make reimbursement on

the ground that petitioner is not a common carrier engaged in transportation business
by land, water or air. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay a local tax based
on gross receipts since it is not a common carrier. Held: No. Based on Article 1732
NCC, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business
of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public
employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons
who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from
the definition of a common carrier. (De Guzman Ruling upheld) Respondent’s argument
that the term “common carrier” as used in Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code
refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water is erroneous. The definition of “common
carriers” in NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by
land, water or air. It does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods
should be by motor vehicle. It is clear that the legislative intent in excluding from the
taxing power of the local government unit the imposition of business tax against
common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called "common carrier's tax."
Petitioner is already paying 3% common carrier's tax on its gross sales/earnings under
the National Internal Revenue Code. To tax petitioner again on its gross receipts in its
transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the Local Government
Code. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY vs. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES, INC.
Facts: A Peruvian firm shipped fishmeal through the SS Chowborough consigned to the
San Miguel Brewery and insured by the Home Insurance Co. The cargo arrived in
Manila and was discharged into the lighters of Luzon Stevedoring Co. When the cargo
was delivered to SMB there were shortages. Home Insurance Co. paid SMB P14,000
after its demand. Home Insurance filed for reimbursement from Luzon Stevedoring and
American Steamship Agencies, owner and operator of the vessel. The lower court
absolved Luzon after finding that it observed the required diligence but ordered ASA to
reimburse Home Insurance, declaring that Art. 587 of the Code of Commerce makes
the ship agent civilly liable for damages in

favor of third persons due to the conduct of carrier’s captain and that the stipulation in
the charter party exempting owner from liability is against public policy under Art. 1744,
NCC. ASA appealed, alleging that under the provisions of the Charter Party referred to
in the bills of lading, the charterer, not the shipowner is responsible for any loss or
damage of the cargo. Issue: Are the provisions of the NCC applicable? Held: No. The
NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the common carrier is not
acting as such but as a private carrier. Under American Jurisprudence, a common
carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only
becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from
liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. The stipulation in the charter party
absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be
void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied. Such policy has no
force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered
for the use of a single party. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for
negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. Recovery can’t
be had, for loss or damage to the cargo against shipowners, unless the same is due to
personal acts or negligence of said owner or its managers, as distinguished from agents
or employees. SAN PABLO vs. PANTRANCO Facts: PANTRANCO offers PUB service
for passengers and freight. It operates passenger buses from Metro Manila to Bicol
Region and Eastern Samar. On March 27,1980 it requested MARINA for authority to
lease/purchase a vessel for its project to operate a ferryboat service from
Matnog,Sorsogon and Allen,Samar that will provide service to company buses and
freight trucks that have to cross San Bernardo Strait.This was not given due course
because the Matnog-Allen run is adequately serviced by Cardinal Shipping Corp. and
Epitacio San Pablo and market conditions in the proposed route cannot support the
entry of additional tonnage. PANTRANCO nevertheless acquired the vessel. It wrote the
Chairman of the Board of Transportation (BOT), that it proposes to operate a ferry
service to carry its passenger buses and freight trucks between Allen and Matnog in
connection with its trips to Tacloban City. PANTRANCO claims that it can operate a
ferry service in connection with its franchise for bus operation in the highway from
Pasay City to
Tacloban City for the purpose of continuing the highway, which is interrupted by a small
body of water, the said proposed ferry operation is merely a necessary and incidental
service to its main service and obligation of transporting its passengers from Pasay City
to Tacloban City. Such being the case there is no need to obtain a separate certificate
for public convenience to operate a ferry service. The BOT granted authority to
PANTRANCO to operate a private ferry boat service, to which the petitioners opposed.
Issue: W/N a land transportation company can be authorized to operate a ferry service
or coastwise or interisland shipping service along its authorized route as an incident to
its franchise without the need of filing a separate application for the same. Held: No.
Considering the environmental circumstances of the case, the conveyance of
passengers, trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat service
but a coastwise or interisland shipping service. Under no circumstance can the sea
between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of the highway. While a ferry
boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when crossing rivers
or even lakes, which are small body of waters - separating the land, however, when as
in this case the two terminals, Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can
not be considered as a continuation of the highway. Respondent PANTRANCO should
secure a separate CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise shipping service
in accordance with the provisions of law. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be
merely amended to include this water service under the guise that it is a mere private
ferry service. The contention of private respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service
operation is as a private carrier, not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the
ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo trucks is absurd. PANTRANCO does not
deny that it charges its passengers separately from the charges for the bus trips and
issues separate tickets whenever they board the MV "Black Double" that crosses
Matnog to Allen, PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it
did so as a private carrier and not as a common carrier. The Court does not see any
reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a private ferry boat service it
cannot accept walk-in passengers just for the purpose of crossing the sea between
Matnog and Allen. Indeed evidence to this effect has been submitted. NATIONAL
STEEL CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On July 17, 1974, plaintiff NSC as charterer and defendant VSI as owner,
entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the
MV ‘VLASONS I’ to make one voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge
them at North Harbor Manila. When the vessel’s 3 hatches containing the shipment
were opened by plaintiff’s agents, nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets
were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. The cargo was discharged and unloaded by
stevedores hired by the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed with the defendant its claim for damages
suffered due to the downgrading of the damaged tinplates in the amount of P941,145.18
but defendant refused and failed to pay. RTC ruled against the plaintiff, stating that the
vessel was seaworthy and that there is no proof of willful negligence of the vessel's
officers. This was affirmed by CA but modified the award of damages, hence the
appeal. Issue: W/N VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or as a private
carrier. Held: It is a private carrier. In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not
offer its services to the general public. It carried passengers or goods only for those it
chose under a special contract of charter party. It is a private carrier that renders
tramping service and as such, does not transport cargo or shipment for the general
public. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special
contract of charter party with its owner. Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI
and NSC, including their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined
primarily by stipulations in their contracts of private carriage or charter party. Unlike in a
contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general
public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting
the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods
as a private carrier. It is clear from the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire, that VSI
“shall not be responsible for losses except on proven wilful negligence of the officers of
the vessel.” The NANYOZAI Charter Party(an internationally recognized Charter Party
Agreement), which was incorporated in the parties’ contract of transportation, further
provided that the shipowner shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the cargo arising
or resulting from unseaworthiness, unless the same was caused by its lack of due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy or to ensure that the same was “properly
manned, equipped and supplied.”

In view of the above, NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by
VSI’s wilful negligence or failure to exercise due diligence in making MV Vlasons I
seaworthy and fit for holding, carrying and safekeeping the cargo. Ineluctably, the
burden of proof was placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement. The CA decision,
affirming the RTC decision in favor of defendant and dismissing the complaint is
Affirmed. KMU vs. GARCIA Facts: The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders
are sought to be nullified by the instant petition, viz: (a) DOTC Memorandum Order 90-
395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme for
provincial bus services in the country, allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate
for a period of one year. LTFRB Chairman, Fernando, finding the MO not legally
feasible submitted a memorandum to DOTC Secretary Orbos as it contravenes the
Public Service Act for the following reasons: i. the rates to be approved should be
proposed by public service operators ii. there should be a publication and notice to
concerned or affected parties in the territory affected iii. a public hearing should be held
for the fixing of the rates The chairman added that to allow bus operators to charge
fares 15% above the present LTFRB fares in the wake of the devastation, death and
suffering caused by the July 16 earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be
politically unsound. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(PBOAP) filed an application for an across-the-board fare increase of P0.085 per
kilometer. It was opposed by Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C.
Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable. The said
increase was granted by LTFRB. (b) DOTC Department Order No.92-587, dated March
30, 1992, defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services; Among
the salient provisions of which include: “In determining public need, the presumption of
need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. The burden of proving that
there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the oppositor(s).”
(c) DOTC Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, laying down rules and procedures to
implement Department Order No. 92-587; (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-
009, providing implementing guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. 92-587;
and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in Case No. 94-3112. Sometime in March,
1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC
allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed
fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public
hearing, announced a fare increase of 20% percent of the existing fares. Petitioner KMU
filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. LTFRB
dismissed the petition hence the present one. Issue: Whether or not the assailed
orders/circulars are valid. Held: While the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to
issue administrative orders to regulate the transport sector is recognized, the Court
found that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order
No. 92-587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the
implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said
administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and
the Rules of Court. Fare Range Scheme: The 20% fare increase imposed by PBOAP
without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and
effect. Presumed Public Need: A CPC is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the
operation of land transportation services for public use as required by law. Pursuant to
Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the following requirements must
be met before a CPC may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the
Philippines, or a corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock company
constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 % of its stock or
paid-up capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii) the applicant must
be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting the
responsibilities incident to its operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the
operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will
promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. It is

understood that there must be proper notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise
its power to issue a CPC. While adopting the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a
CPC, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part IV, provides for yet incongruous
and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. The guidelines states:
“The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The
presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while
the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the
oppositor's.” By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something
fitting or suited to the public need. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a
CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service
meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do
not adequately supply. The existence or non-existence of public convenience and
necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence, real
and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a
public hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of such procedure,
among other things, is to look out for, and protect, the interests of both the public and
the existing transport operators. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed
in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum
dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications between
administrative officers. TATAD vs. GARCIA Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light
railway transit line along EDSA referred to as EDSA Light Rail Transit III (EDSA LRT
III). Then President Aquino, signed into law the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law.
After prequalifying the bidders for the construction of the said transit, it was found that
out of all the applicants, only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the requirements. DOTC
and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. (a private corporation organized under the
laws of HongKong) in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an
"Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under
the terms of the BOT Law.

DOTC sought the approval of the President but the same was denied. Thus, DOTC,
represented by Secretary Garcia, and private respondent entered into a supplemental
agreement—“Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light
Rail Transit System for EDSA" so as to clarify their respective rights and responsibilities
and to submit Supplemental Agreement to the President. Petitioners, in their capacity as
Senators and taxpayers, question the constitutionality of the two agreements between
DOTC and private respondent. They contend that it grants EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., a
foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III which is a public utility. Secretary
Garcia and private respondent on the other hand, contend that the nationality
requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply to private
respondent. Issue: Does the fact that EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign
corporation, own the facilities and equipment of the LRT III mean it also own the LRT III
as a public utility? Held: No. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling
stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility.
While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by
themselves constitute a public utility. As ruled in Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Public
Service Board, what constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to
serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public
utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. The
right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the
ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as
a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be
done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the
owner thereof. In the case at bar, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on
completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT
system by way of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same
as a common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and
repair services to DOTC. Clearly, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles
and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings with the public and the
public will have no right to demand any services from it. It is DOTC which shall operate
the EDSA LRT III. Therefore, private
respondent, EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd. does not own EDSA LRT III as a public utility.
SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC. vs. NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD Facts: The case
arose from an importation made by plaintiff, SAMAR of one crate Optima welded wedge
wire sieves through the M/S SCHWABENSTEIN a vessel owned by defendant
NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD, (represented in the Philippines by its agent, C.F. SHARP &
CO., INC.), which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. 18 duly issued to consignee
SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC. Upon arrival of the aforesaid vessel at the port of
Manila, the importation was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the
bonded warehouse of AMCYL. The goods were however never delivered to, nor
received by, the consignee at the port of destination— Davao. Bill of lading, No. 18 sets
forth in the page 2 thereof that the goods were received by NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD
at the “port of loading at Bremen, Germany, while the freight had been prepaid up to the
port of destination or the “port of discharge of goods”—Davao. The carrier undertook to
transport the goods in its vessel, M/S SHWABENSTEIN, only up to the “port of
discharge from ship”—Manila. Thereafter, the goods were to be transhipped by the
carrier to the port of destination or “port of discharge of goods”. Section 1, paragraph 3
of Bill of Lading No. 18, states: “The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity
whatsoever for any delay, loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship’s tackle
to be loaded or after the goods leave ship’s tackle to be discharged, transhipped or
forwarded. xxx” The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the various clauses and stipulations in the Bill of lading is valid.
Held: Yes. The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability
for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been
upheld in PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. UNITED STATES LINES, 22 SCRA
674 (1968). The stipulations in the bill of lading in the PHOENIX case which are
substantially the same as the subject stipulations provides:

“The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the
goods while the goods are not in its actual custody.” (Par. 2, last subpar.) “The carrier or
master, in making arrangements with any person for or in connection with all
transshipping or forwarding of the goods or the use of any means of transportation or
forwarding of goods not used or operated by the carrier, shall be considered solely the
agent of the shipper and consignee and without any other responsibility whatsoever or
for the cost thereof.” (Par. 16) Finding the above stipulations not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy their validity was sustained. A careful
perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers was looked into by
the Court particularly, Article 1736 and 1738. There is no doubt that Art. 1738 finds no
applicability to the instant case. The said article contemplates a situation where the
goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of
the carrier. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of
destination, and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or
heard of. Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the carrier may
be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or
constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who
has a right to receive them. In sales, actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of
corporeal possession by the seller, and the actual apprehension of corporeal
possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as
his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. By the same token, there is
actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned
over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him
to remove the goods. The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the
consignee through its duly authorized agent, the carrier. Two undertakings appeared
embodied and/or provided for in the Bill of Lading in question. The first is FOR THE
TRANSPORT OF GOODS from Bremen, Germany to Manila. The second, THE
TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE SAME GOODS from Manila to Davao, with appellant
acting as agent of the consignee. At the hiatus between these two undertakings of
appellant which is the moment when the subject goods are discharged in Manila, its
personality changes from that of carrier to that of agent of the consignee. Thus, the
character of

appellant's possession also changes, from possession in its own name as carrier, into
possession in the name of consignee as the latter's agent. Such being the case, there
was, in effect, actual delivery of the goods from appellant as carrier to the same
appellant as agent of the consignee. Upon such delivery, the appellant, as erstwhile
carrier, ceases to be responsible for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from
that point onwards. This is the full import of Article 1736, as applied to the case. The
actions of appellant carrier and of its representative in the Philippines being in full faith
with the lawful stipulations of Bill of Lading No. 18 and in conformity with the provisions
of the New Civil Code on common carriers, agency and contracts, they incur no liability
for the loss of the goods in question. Appealed decision is REVERSED. Plaintiff-
appellee's complaint is DISMISSED. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT Facts: In G.R. No. 69044, sometime in or prior
to June, 1977, the M/S ASIATICA, a vessel operated by petitioner loaded at Kobe,
Japan for transportation to Manila, 5,000 pieces of calorized lance pipes consigned to
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts valued consigned to
Central Textile Mills, Inc. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for with
respondent. In G.R. No. 71478, during the same period, the same vessel took on board
128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories consigned to Mariveles Apparel
Corporation, and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises
and General Merchandise. The 128 cartons were insured for their stated value by
respondent Nisshin and the 2 cases by respondent Dowa. Enroute for Kobe, Japan, to
Manila, the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. The
respective respondent Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values to the
consignees concerned and were thus subrogated unto the rights of the latter as the
insured. Respondents filed a claim for reimbursement from petitioner. The RTC ruled in
their favor to which the petitioner appealed. Issue: (1) Which law should govern the Civil
Code provisions on Common carriers or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? and (2)
who has the burden of proof to show negligence of the carrier?

Held: (1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the
liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the
cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of
Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However, in all matters not
regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed
by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code. (2) Under the Civil
Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods,
according to all the circumstances of each case. Common carriers are responsible for
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity; Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from
liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity.” However, the Court said that fire
may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it arises
almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the
category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or
calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. As the peril
of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735
of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the common
carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it
proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. In this case, the
respective Insurers. as subrogees of the cargo shippers, have proven that the
transported goods have been lost. Petitioner Carrier has also proved that the loss was
caused by fire. The burden then is upon Petitioner Carrier to proved that it has
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law, which it failed to do. And even if
fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the
Civil Code, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster"
must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss," and that the carrier has
"exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after the
occurrence of the disaster.” This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish
satisfactorily.

Nor may Petitioner Carrier seek refuge from liability under the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, It is provided therein that: Sec. 4(2). Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be
responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from (b) Fire, unless caused by the
actual fault or privity of the carrier. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, in
effect, found, as a fact, that there was "actual fault" of the carrier shown by "lack of
diligence" in that when the smoke was noticed, the fire was already big; that the fire
must have started 24 hours before the same was noticed; and that after the cargoes
were stored in the hatches, no regular inspection was made as to their condition during
the voyage. The foregoing suffices to show that the circumstances under which the fire
originated and spread are such as to show that Petitioner Carrier or its servants were
negligent in connection therewith. Consequently, the complete defense afforded by the
COGSA when loss results from fire is unavailing to Petitioner Carrier. NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: An agreement was
entered onto between defendants National Development Company (NDC) and Maritime
Company of the Philippines (MCP) in accordance of which, NDC as the first preferred
mortgagee of three ocean-giving vessels including one with the name “Dona Nati”
appointed MCP as its agents to manage and operate said vessel in its behalf. The E.
Philipp Corporation of the New York loaded on board the vessel “Dona Nati” at San
Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to Manila
Banking Corporation, Manila and the People’s Bank and Trust Company, acting for and
in behalf of Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc. who represents Riverside Mills
Corporation. The vessel figured in a collision at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel
as a result of which 50 bales of aforesaid cargo were lost and/or destroyed. Plaintiff
(DISC) as insurer, paid the respective claims of holders of the negotiable bills of lading
duly endorsed to them. Plaintiff filed complaint for reimbursement from the
defendantsNDC and MCP as owner and ship agent respectively. The RTC rendered a
decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC.
MCP and NDC interposed their appeals. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Issue: Which law shall govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels
outside Philippine waters, and the extent of liability? A. Vigilance over Goods Held: This
issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC
(150 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) In the case at bar, it has been established that the goods in
question are transported from San Francisco, California and Tokyo, Japan to the
Philippines and that they were lost or due to a collision which was found to have been
caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels. Under the
above ruling, it is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is immaterial
that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan. It appears,
however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code,
so that no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at
bar of Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively
with collision of vessels. More specifically, Article 826 of the Code of Commerce
provides that where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the owner of the
vessel at fault, shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert
appraisal. But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code, which
provides that if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own
damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and damages suffered
by their cargoes. Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce,
particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for
damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. Primary
liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted
doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who
has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage. The agreement
between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad enough to
include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact MCP was even conferred all
the powers of the owner of the vessel, including the power to contract in the name of the
NDC. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the
obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not
arise from contract. CA decision is affirmed.

GELISAN vs. ALDAY Facts: Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck.
Defendant Bienveido Gelisan and Roberto Roberto entered into a contact underwhich
Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar,
flour and fertilizer. It also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and
damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him. Benito Alday, a
trucking operator had known Roberto Espiritu. Alday had a contact to haul the fertilizer
of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in
Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of
his truck with the driver and helper. The offer was accepted by Alday and he instructed
his checker to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of zoobags
of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with
the necessary waybill receipts. Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the
Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. Thus, Benito Alday was compelled to pay the
value of the 400 bags of fertilizers to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation and filed a compliant
against Roberto Espiritu and Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI of Manila. The CFI of
Manila ruled that Roberto Espiritu was the only one liable. On appeal, CA ruled that
Bienvenido Gelisan is likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck. Issue:
Whether or not Gelisan should be held solidarily liable with Espiritu, being the registered
owner of the truck. Held: Yes, Gelisan should be held solidarily liable with Espiritu,
being the registered owner of the truck. The Court has invariably held in several
decisions that the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for
damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be
caused to any of the passengers therein. The claim of the petitioner that he is not liable
in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto Espiritu which
exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that
the lease

II. CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS

contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public service Commission. It is
settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or
leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding
upon the public or third persons. However, Gelisan is not without recourse because he
has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required
to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday, since the lease contract in
question, although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the
Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between the contracting parties. The
Court ruled that the petitioner is DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.
BENEDICTO vs. IAC Facts: Private respondent Greenhills Wood Industries Company,
Inc., a lumber manufacturing firm, operates a sawmill in Quirino. Sometime in May
1980, private respondent bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue Star Mahogany, Inc.
(“Blue Star”), a company in Bulacan 100,000 board feet of sawn lumber with the
understanding that an initial delivery would be made on May 15, 1980. To effect its first
delivery, private respondent’s resident manager Dominador Cruz, contracted Virgilio
Licuden, the driver of a cargo truck to transport its sawn lumber to the consignee Blue
Star in Valenzuela, Bulacan. The cargo truck was registered in the name of petitioner
Ma. Luisa Benedicto, the proprietor of Macoren Trucking, a business enterprise
engaged in hauling freight. On May 15, 1980, cruz in the presence and with the consent
of driver Licuden, supervised the loading of sawn lumber with invoice aboard the cargo
truck. Thereafter, the Manager of Blue Star called up Greenhills’ president, informing
him that the sawn lumber on board the subject cargo truck had not yet arrived in
Bulacan. The latter then informed Greenhills’ resident manager. Still, Blue Star had not
received the sawn lumber and were constrained to look for other suppliers. Thus,
private respondent Greenhills filed criminal case against driver Luciden for estafa and
also against petitioner Benedicto for recovery of the value of the lost sawn lumber plus
damages before the RTC of Dagupan City. The trial court ruled against Benedicto and
Luciden. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Benedicto, being the registered owner of the carrier,
should be held liable for the value of the undelivered or lost sawn lumber. Held: Yes,
Benedicto is liable for the undelivered or lost sawn lumber as registered owner. There is
no dispute that petitioner Benedicto has been holding herself out to the public as
engaged in the business of hauling or transporting goods for hire or compensation.
Petitioner Benedicto is, in brief, a common carrier. The prevailing doctrine on common
carrier makes the registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations
of the carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been
transferred to another person. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with
vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume
that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof. It would be very difficult
and often impossible as a practical matter, for members of the general public to enforce
the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being
negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. The
registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged
transferee. In the case at bar, private respondent is not required to go beyond the
vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier. In this regard,
the letter presented by petitioner allegedly written by Benjamin Tee admitting that
Licuden was his driver, had no evidentiary value not only because Benjamin Tee was
not presented in court to testify on this matter but because of the afore mentioned
doctrine. To permit the ostensible or registered owner to prove who the actual owner is,
would be to set at naught the purpose or public policy which infuses that doctrine. The
Court ruled that the Petition fro Review is Denied. PHILTRANCO SERVICE
ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. CA Facts: The victim Ramon Acuesta was riding in his easy
rider bicycle along Calbayog City. Also in Calbayog City, defendant Philtranco driven by
defendant Rogasiones Dolina Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to
start its engine. As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued its
running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding
on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As the engine of Philtranco started
abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said

functioning engine, thereby bumped on the victim Ramon. As a result, fell and was ran
over by the bus. Still, the bus did not stop although it had already bumped and ran over
the victim; instead, it proceeded running. Thereafter, P/sgt. Yabao who was then
jogging approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig and signaled him to stop, but the
latter did not listen. So, the police officer introduced himself and ordered the latter to
stop. The said defendant drivers stopped the Philtranco bus. The trial court rendered a
decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally pay the private respondent. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not petitioner
Philtranco as the registered owner of a public service is liable for damages arising from
the tortuous acts of the driver. Held: Yes, petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner is
still liable. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that, “Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi- delict and is governed by the provision of this
Chapter. Further, Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that, “the obligation imposed by
Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. In the case at bar, the liability of the registered
owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the
tortuous acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and severally or solidary with the
driver. Since the employer’s liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if
the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on
quasi- delict. The court ruled that the petition is partly granted. SANTOS vs. SIBUG
Facts: Prior to April 26, 1963, Vidad was duly authorized passenger jeepney operator.
Also, prior to said date, petitioner Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but he
had no certificate of public convenience for the operation of the vehicle as a public
passenger jeep. Santos then transferred his jeep to the name of Vidad so that it could
be

operated under the latter’s certificate of public convenience. Thus, Santos became what
is known as a kabit operator. For the protection of Santos, Vidad executed a re-transfer
document to the former, which was to be a private document presumably to be
registered if and when it was decided that the passenger jeep of Santos was to be
withdrawn from the kabit agreement. On April 26, 1963, private respondent Sibug was
bumped by a passenger jeepney operated by vidad and driven by Severo Gragas.
Thus, filed a complaint for damages. Judgment was rendered in favor of Sibug. On April
10, 1964, the Sheriff of Manila levied on a motor vehicle, registered in the name of
Vidad, and scheduled the public auction sale. The next day, Santos presented a third-
party claim with the Sheriff, as a result, Santos, instituted an Action for Damages and
Injunction with a prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On October 14, 1965,
branch X affirmed Santos’ ownership of the jeepney in question. Sibug sought relief
from respondent Appellate Court. Respondent Court held that Santos may not be
permitted to prove his ownership over a particular vehicle being levied upon but
registered in another’s name in a separate action. Issue: Whether or not a jeepney
registered in the name of Vidad, an authorized public utility operator but is actually
owned by Santos (the kabit operator), which bumped Sibug be sold at a public auction
to satisfy the court’s award. Held: Yes, the jeepney under the “kabit system” which
bumped Sibu can be sold at public auction to satisfy the court’s award. Sec. 20 (g) of
the Public Service Act provides: “it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the
owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval or authorization of the
Commission previously had- (g) to sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its
property, franchise certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part thereof. In the case at
bar, Santos had fictitiously sold the jeepney to Vidad, who had become the registered
owner and operator of record at the time of the accident. It is true that Vidad had
executed a re-sale to Santos, but the document was not registered. Although Santos, as
the kabit, was the true owner as against Vidad, the latter, as the registered owner/
operator and grantee of the franchise, is directly and primarily responsible and liable for
damages caused to Sibug, the injured party, as a consequence of the negligent or
careless operation of the vehicle. This ruling is based on the principle that the operator
of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards
the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to
another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service
commission. The court ruled that the petition for review filed by Santos is dismissed.

court cannot allow either of the parties to enforce an illegal contract bu leaves them both
where it finds them. The Court ruled that the decisions rendered by the CFI of Manila
and IAC are hereby annulled and set aside. TEJA MARKETING vs. IAC

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. CA Facts: Sometime in 1966, the spouses Nicasio
Ocampo and Francisca Garcia, herein private respondent purchased in installment from
the Delta Motor Sales Corp. five Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs.
Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with petitioner, for the
use of the latter’s certificate of public convenience in consideration of an initial payment
of P1,000 and a monthly rental of P200 per taxi cab unit. About a year later, one of said
taxicabs driven by their employee, Emeterio Martin, collided with a motorcycle whose
driver, Florante Galvez, died from the head injuries sustained. A criminal case was filed
against the driver while a civil case was filed against Lita enterprises seeking for
damages. In the CFI of Manila, petitioner Lita Enterprises was adjudged liable for
damages as the registered owner of the taxicab. Thus, a writ of execution was issued
and one of the vehicles of respondent spouses was levied upon and sold at public
auction. Thereafter, respondent Nicasio Ocampo decided to register his taxicab in his
name, but Lita Enterprises allegedly refused. Hence, the spouses filed a complaint. The
CFI of Manila ordered Lita Enterprises to transfer the registration certificate. On Appeal,
the IAC modified the decision. Issue: Whether or not the parties entered into a “kabit
system” Held: Yes, the parties entered into a “kabit system”. The parties herein
operated under an arrangement, commonly known as the “kabit system”, whereby a
person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who
owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public
convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. Abuse of this privilege
by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. The kabit system has been identified
as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government
transportation services. Thus, the concept of Kabit system being contrary to public
policy and void and existent, the

Facts: On May 9, 1975, the defendant bought from the plaintiff a motorcycle with
complete accessories and a sidecar in the total consideration of P8,000.00. Out of the
total purchase price the defendant gave a down payment of P1,700.00 with a promise
that he would pay plaintiff the balance within sixty days. The defendant, however, failed
to comply with his promise and so upon his own request, the period of paying the
balance was extended to one year in monthly installments until January 1976 when he
stopped paying anymore. The plaintiff made demands but just the same the defendant
failed to comply thus forcing plaintiff to consult a lawyer and file this action for his
damage. It also appears and the court so finds that the defendant purchased the
motorcycle in question and the Court so finds that defendant purchased the motorcycle
in question, particularly for the purpose of engaging and using the same in
transportation business and for this purpose said trimobile unit was attached to the
plaintiff’s transportation line who had the franchise, so much so that in the registration
certificate, the plaintiff appears to be the owner of the unit. Furthermore, it appears to
have been agreed further between, the plaintiff and the defendant, that plaintiff would
undertake the yearly registration of the unit in question with the LTC. Thus, for the
registration of the unit for the year 1976, per agreement, the defendant gave to the
plaintiff the amount of P82.00 of rits registration, as well as the insurance coverage of
the unit. Petitioner Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian filed an action for the “sum of
money with damages”. The city court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto. Issue: Whether or not kabit system applies in
the instant case. Held: Yes, the parties operated under an agreement called “kabit
system”. This is a system whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
public convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under
such franchise for a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege
conferred by the government. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense,
the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and
therefore,

void and inexistent under Article 1404 of the Civil Code. Thus, court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave both where it finds them. The court
ruled that the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the
IAC now the CA is AFFIRMED. MAGBOO vs. BERNARDO Facts: The spouses Magboo
are the parents of the 8-year old child killed in a motor vehicle accident, the vehicle
owned by the defendant Bernardo. At the time of the accident, said passenger jeepney
was driven by Corado Roque. The contract between Conrado Roque and defendant
Delfin Bernardo was that Roque was to pay to defendant the sum of P8.00, which he
paid to said defendant, for privilege of driving the jeepney, it being their agreement that
whatever earnings Roque could make out of the use of the jeepney in transporting
passengers from one point to another would belong entirely to Conrado Roque. As a
result of the accident, Conrado Roque was prosecuted for homicide thru reckless
imprudence before the CFI of Manila, and that upon arraignment, Conrado Roque
pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced to a jail term, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P3, 000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Conrado Roque served his sentence but he was not able to pay the
indemnity because he was insolvent. Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee
relationship exists between a jeepney- owner and a driver under a “boundary system”
agreement. Held: Yes, there exist an employer-employee relationship under a boundary
system arrangement. The features which characterize the boundary system- namely,
the fact that the driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the
amount of fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the jeep- owner, and that
the gasoline consumed by the jeepney is for the account of the driver- are not sufficient
to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer- employee.
Consequently, the jeepney- owner is subsidiarily liable as employer in accordance with
article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court ruled that the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed.

GANZON vs. CA Facts: In 1965, private respondent Tumambing contracted the

services of petitioner Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan on
board the latter’s lighter. Pursuant to their agreement, private respondent delivered the
scrap iron to the captain for loading. When half of the scrap iron was loaded, Mayor
Advincula demanded P5,000.00 from private respondents, which the latter refused to
give, prompting the Mayor to draw his gun and shoot at him. The gunshot was not fatal
but he had to be taken to a hospital. Thereafter, the loading of the scrap iron was
resumed. The Acting Mayor, accompanied by three policemen, ordered the captain and
his crew to dump the scrap iron, with the rest brought to Nassco Compound. A receipt
was issued stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap
iron. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of breach of contract of transportation and
in imposing a liability against him commencing from the time the scrap iron was placed
in his custody and control have no basis in fact and in law. Held: Yes, petitioner is guilty
of breach of the contract of transportation. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were
unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier, and upon
their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed
perfected. Consequently, the petitioner- carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Article 1736, such
extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive,
by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The
fact that part of the shipment had not been headed the lighter did not impair the said
contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the
carrier, albeit still unloaded. The Court ruled that the petition is DENIED.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. CA Facts: On September 4, 1978, thirteen coils
of uncoated 7- wire stress relieved for pre- stressed concrete were shipped on board
the vessel “Jupri Venture” owned and operated by petitioner, for delivery to stresstek
Post- Tensioning Philippines in Manila. The said cargo was insured by respondent
operator E. Razon, from whom the consignee’s broker received for delivery to
consignee’s warehouse. It appears that while en route, the vessel encountered very
rough seas and stormy weather, for the days, which caused it to pound and roll heavily.
The coils which were wrapped in burlap cloth and cardboard paper were stored in the
lower hold of the hatch of the vessel which were rusty on one side each and it was
found that the “wetting” was caused by fresh water that entered the hatch. The
complaint that was filed by the first Nationwide Assurance Corporation (insurer) against
Eastern Shipping Lines and F. Razon in RTC, Manila was dismissed. On appeal, the
judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. Only Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. filed
this petition. Issue: Whether or not rains and rough is considered as caso fortuito which
would exempt petitioner from liability for the deterioration of the cargo. Held: No, such is
not considered caso fortuito which would exempt from liability for the deterioration of the
cargo. Art. 1737 of the Civil Code provides that, “common carrier are bound to observe
extraordinary vigilance over goods according to all circumstances of each case.” Further
Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that, “if the goods are lost, destroyed, or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in
Article 1733.” In the case at bar, heavy rains and rough seas were not caso fortuito, but
normal occurrences that an ocean- going vessel, particularly in the month of
September, is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine.
They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean- going
vessels would encounter and provide for, in the ordinary course of voyage. That rain
water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear
indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of ships hatches so that rain
water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship. Since, the carrier has failed
to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part
of the carrier applies. The Court ruled that the petition is DISMISSED. SARKIES
TOURS PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

pieces of luggage containing all of her optometry review books, materials and
equipment, trial contact lenses, passport and visa. Her belongings were kept in the
baggage compartment and during the stopover at Daet, it was discovered that only one
bag had remained in the baggage compartment. Some of the passengers suggested
retracing the route to try to recover the items, but the driver ignored them and
proceeded to Legaspi City. Fatima reported the loss to her mother, who went to
petitioner’s office. Petitioner merely offered her one thousand pesos for each piece of
luggage lost, which she turned down. Fatima asked the help of radio stations and even
from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same route. Thus, one of Fatima’s bags was
recovered. Respondents, through counsel, demanded satisfaction of their complaint
from petitioner. Petitioner apologized through a letter. After more than nine months of
fruitless waiting, respondents decided to file the case. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondents. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the lost baggage’s of Fatima. Held: The petitioner
is liable for the lost baggage’s. Under the Civil Code, “common carriers from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence and vigilance over goods transported by the,” and this liability “last from the
time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the person who has a right to receive them, “unless the loss is due to any of
the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof. In the case at bar, the cause of the loss
was petitioner’s negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage compartment
of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all the baggage
was lost to the prejudice of the paying passengers. Thus, petitioner is held liable. The
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification.

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY INC. vs. CA Facts: On

August 31, 1984, Fatima boarded petitioner’s De luxe bus in Manila on her way to
Legaspi City. Her brother helped her load three

Facts: Valenzuela hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brother Shipping
Corporation whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven
Ambassador the formers lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Isabela for
shipment to Manila. Petitioner insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South
Sea Surety and Insurance Company. The said vessel sank resulting on the loss of
plaintiff’s insured bags. Both respondent and insurer denied liability. After trial, the court
held that the proximate cause of the los is the negligence of the captain and the
stipulation in the charter party limiting respondent’s liability is void being against public
policy citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the
RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Surety and Insurance Company, but
modified it by holding that Seven Brothers was not liable for the lost of the cargo. Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party exempting the ship-owner from liability
for the loss of the cargo arising from the negligence of its captain valid. Held : The
stipulation in the instant case is valid. In a contract of private carriage, the parties may
validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting
the ship-owner from liability for the loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the
negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such
stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. In the case at bar,
the charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the
“owners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short landing, breakages and any kind of
damages to the cargo”. This stipulation is deemed valid as it is undisputed that private
respondent acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article
1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by the
petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter
party. The petition is denied by the Court.

resulted in the death if Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. Leny filed
a case of breach of contract of carriage against petitioners. The owners of Yobido Liner
Bus. Alberto and Cresencio Yobido raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito. They
claimed that the bus was not full as there were only 32 passengers out of the 42 seating
capacity. They also claimed that the bus was running as speed pr “60 to 50” and that
the tire was brand-new. Respondents on the other hand, asserted the violation of the
contract of carriage was brought about by the driver’s failure to exercise the diligence
required of the carrier. Leny claimed that the was running fast in a winding road which
was not cemented and was wet because of the rain. Issue: Whether or not the tire blow
out is considered a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioners from liability. Held:
The tire blow out is not considered as a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioners
from liability. Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that, “in case of death or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733 and 1755.” Further, Article 1755 provides that “a common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances..” In the case at bar, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered
a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the
tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it
was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used
in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it
could not explode within five days use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident
caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not
a case fortuity that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. Moreover, a
common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous
event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
death or injury resulting from an accident. Thus, having failed to discharge its duty to
overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners
are hereby held liable for damages. The Court ruled that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed.

YOBIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their
minor children boarded a Yobido Liner bus at Surigaodel Sur. along Picop Road,
Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around
the three feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident

COMPANIA MARITIMA vs. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA Facts: Macleod

and Co. contracted, first by telephone and later confirmed by a formal written booking
issued by Macleod and Co. the services of the petitioner Campania Maritime for the
shipment of bales of hemp from Davao to Manila. Two lighters of the petitioner loaded
said cargo from Macleod’s wharf at Davao awaiting the arrival of another vessel of the
petitioner for loading. One of the lighters sunk which Macleod suffered damage P54,
018.55. Petitioner denied the liability on the grounds that there was no bill of lading
issued thereby resulting to the non-existence of carriage contract, that the sinking was
due to a fortuitous event and that the respondent has no personality. Issue: Whether or
not there is a perfected contract of carriage. Held: There was a complete contract of
carriage the consummation of which has already begun when the shipper delivered the
cargo to the carrier and the latter took possession of the same by placing it on a lighter
manned by its authorized employees, under which Macleod became entitled to the
privilege secured to him by law. The responsibility of the carrier commenced on the
actual delivery to, or receipt by, the carrier or its authorized agent, of the goods. The
barges or lighters were merely employed as the first step of the voyage. As to the
issuance of a bill of lading, although Art. 350 of the Code of Commerce provides that
the shipper as well as the carrier may mutually demand that a bill of lading be issued, it
is not indispensable. As regards to the form of the contract of carriage, it can be said
that provided there is a meeting of the minds and from such meeting arise rights and
obligations, there should be no limitations as to form. A bill of lading is not essential to
the contract, although it may become obligatory by reason of the regulations or as a
condition imposed in the contract by the agreement of the parties themselves. The
Code of Commerce does not demand as a necessary requisite in the contract of
transportation, the delivery of a bill of lading to the shipper, but gives the right to both
the shipper and carrier to mutually demand of each other the delivery of the said bill.
Judgment against petitioner is affirmed. LU DO vs. BINAMIRA

Facts: Delta Company of New York shipped six cases of films and photographic
supplies to Binamira. The ship arrived in Cebu and discharged her cargo, placing it in
the custody of the arrastre operator appointed by the Bureau of Customs. The cargo
was checked both by the stevedoring company and the arrastre operator and was found
in good order. On the contract of carriage, however, it was stipulated that the carrier in
no longer liable for the cargo upon its delivery to the hands of the customs authorities.
The cargo was later delivered to Binamira and a marine surveyor found that some were
missing valued at P324.63. Lower Court held that the carrier liable. Issue: Whether or
not the stipulations limiting the liability of the carrier is valid. Held: While delivery of the
cargo to the customs authorities is not delivery to the consignee of the person who has
the right to receive them as contemplated in Article 1736 of the Civil Code because in
such case the goods are still in the hands of the government and the owner cannot be
exercise dominion over them, however, the parties may agree to limit the liability of the
carrier considering that the goods have still to go through the inspection of the customs
authorities before they are actully turned over to the consignee. These stipulations
limiting liability is not contrary to morals or public policy. This is a situation where the
carrier loses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it
be made responsible for any loss or damage that may be caused to the goods during
the interregnum. Judgment reversed. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD. vs. CA
Facts: American President Lines (APL) vessel President Washington(Carrier for short)
receive and loaded on board at Los Angeles, California, the subject of the shipment of
one (1) unit of Submersible Jocky Pump, contained in (3) boxes, complete and in good
order condition, covered by Commercial Invoice No. 602956, and Packing List. It was
for transport to Manila in favor or Lindale Development Corporation, the consignee. The
CARRIER, thru Forwarders Direct Container Lines, Inc., issued its clean Bill of Lading
No. CHI-MNL-120. The shipment was insured by FGU Ins. Corp. for P481, 842.24 The
defendant CARRIER transshipped the shipment in Hongkong on board the vessel MS
‘Partas’, which arrived at the Port of

Manila, on September 6, 1987. On the same date, the shipment was discharged and
turned over to Marina Port Services, Inc.(Arrastre0, with one box in bad order condition,
showing signs of having been previously tampered; hence, covered by a Turn over
Survey Cargoes No. A-08851. The cargo remained with the ARRASTRE for ten days
until it was withdrawn on April 16, 1987 by the defendant broker which delivered the
same to the consignee, aforementioned, at its warehouse, where the said shipment was
examined and inventoried, and the one box discharged from the CARRIER’s vessel in
bad order condition, was found short of one piece waster cone and one piece Main
Relief valued, per invoice, at P28, 248.58. Private respondent FGU Ins. Corp. filed a
complaint for recovery of a sum of money against APL, Marina Port Services, Inc., and
LCM Brokerage Co., Inc. The trial court found in favor of private respondent and
ordered APL to pay private respondent the amount of P28, 248.58. In actual damages,
Issue: What law is applicable the Civil Code provisions or COGSA?
Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning of November 18, 1963, the
cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the
Bureau of Customs. About 2:00 p.m. of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a
fire of unknown origin, destroying Servando’s cargoes. Issue: Whether or not the
stipulations in the bill of lading limiting the liability of carrier is valid. Held: The court a
quo held that the delivery of the shipment on question to the warehouse of the Bureau
of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of
the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the
appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant. However, that in the bills of
lading issued for the cargoes in question, parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the
carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein
the following stipulation. “Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage
to shipments billed “owner’s risk” unless such damage is due to negligence of carrier.
Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage cause by force majeure, dangers or
accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies, xxx fire xxx.” We sustain the
validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or
public policy. Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them
because it was printed in fine letters on the back of the bills of lading; and that they did
not sign the same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu
vs. Court of Appeals. “While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane
ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such provisions have been
held to be part of the contract of carriage and valid and binding upon the passenger
regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation.” There is nothing
in the record to show that appellant carrier in delay in the performance of its obligation
nor that was the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom’s warehouse in anyway
attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees.

Held: The Civil Code. With regard to the contention of the carrier that COGSA should
control in this case, the same is of no moment. Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides
that “the laws of the country to which the goods are transported shall govern the liability
of the common carrier in case of loss, destruction and deterioration.” This means that
the law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code. Under 1766 of NCC, “in all matter not
regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed
by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws.” Art. 1736-1738, NCC governs said
rights and obligations. Therefore, although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier
shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package unless the value of the
goods had been declared by the shipper and asserted in the bill of lading, said section
is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code.

SERVANDO vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. Facts: Clara UY Bico and
Amparo Servando loaded on board the Philippine Steam Navigation vessel, FS-176, for
carriage from Manila to Pulupundan, Negros Occidental, cargoes of rice and colored
paper as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the carrier.

GANZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305
tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT
“Batman.” Ganzon then sent his lighter “Batman” to Mariveles where it docked. On
December 1, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno
Niza; captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually began on the same date by
the crew of the lighter. When about of the scrap of the scrap iron was already loaded,
Mayor Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5, 000.00 from
Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument, Mayor
Advincula drew his gun and fired at Tumambing. The gunshot was not fatal but
Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment. After some
time, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting
Mayor Basillo Rub, accompanied by the three policemen, ordered Captain Filomeno
Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was
brougth to the compound of NASSCO. Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that
the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. Issue: Whether or not
the scrap iron were already delivered. Held: Petitioner Ganzon insists that the scrap iron
had not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control to make him liable.
However, he completely agrees with the respondent Court’s f inding that on December
1, 1956, the private respondent delivered the scraps to Captain Niza for loading in the
lighter “Batman.” That the petitioner, thru his employees, actually received the scraps is
freely admitted. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the
possession and control of the common carrier and upon their receipt by the carrier for
transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the
petitioner-carrier’s extraordinay responsibility for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of
the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1738, such extraordinary responsibility would
cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or
to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not
been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the
goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit unloaded.

SALUDO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: After the death of plaintiff’s mother,
Crispina Saludo, Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago brought the remains to
Continental Mortuary Air Services which booked the shipment of the remains from
Chicago to San Francisco by TWA and from San Francisco to Manila with PAL. The
remains were taken to the Chicago Airport, but it turned out that there were two bodies
in the said airport. Somehow the two bodies were switched; the casket bearing the
remains of plaintiff’s mother was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened there. The
shipment was immediately loaded on PAL flight and arrived on Manila a day after it
expected arrival on October 29, 1976. Plaintiff filed a damage suit with CFI of Leyte,
contending that Trans World Airlines and PAL were liable for misshipment, the eventual
delay on the delivery of the cargo containing the remains, and of the discourtesy of its
employees to them. The court absolve the two airline companies of any liability. The CA
affirmed such decision. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for damages. Held:
The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria and Saturnino Saludo, agonised
for nearly five hours, over the possibility of losing their mother’s mortal remains,
unattended to and without any assurance from the employees of TWA that they were
doing anything about the situation. They were entitled to the understanding and humane
consideration called of by and commensurate with the extraordinary diligence required
for common carriers, and not the cold insensitivity to their predicament. Common sense
could and should have dictated that they exert a little effort in making a more extensive
inquiry by themselves or through their superiors, rather than just shrug off the problem
with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no knowledge about it. With all the
modern communications equipment readily available to them, it could have easily
facilitated said inquiry. TWA’s apathetic stance while not legally reprehensible is morally
deplorable. Losing a loved one, especially one’s parent, is a painful experience. Our
culture accords utmost tenderness human feelings toward and in reverence to the dead.
That the remains of the deceased were subsequently delivered, albeit, belatedly and
eventually laid in her final resting place is of little consolation. The imperviousness
displayed by TWA’s personnel, even for just that fraction of time, was especially
condemnable particularly in the hours of bereavement of the family of Crispina Saludo,
intensified by anguish due to the uncertainty of the whereabouts of their mother’s
remains. TWA’s personnel were remiss in the observance of that genuine human
concern and professional attentiveness required and expected of them. The foregoing
observations, however, do not appear to be applicable to respondent PAL. No
attribution of discourtesy or indifference has been made against PAL by petitioners and,
in fact, petitioner Maria Saludo testified that it was to PAL they repaired after failing to
receive proper attention from TWA. It was from PAL that they received confirmation that
their mother’s remains would be on the same flight with them. Petitioner’s right to be
treated with due courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to
be exercised by every common carrier was violated by the TWA and this entitles them,
atleast to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code
make it clear that nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered
but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable
where some injury has been done but the amount of which the evidence fails to show,
the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of the case.

delivery of the shipment to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and bank
guarantee. Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the
goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee? Held: Under Art. 1736 of
the Civil Code, the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts until actual or
constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to
receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee
whereas GPC was notifying party. However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly
named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter
to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws
us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which,
conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was
proper. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the
goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee. From the testimony of
petitioner, we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for
around 2 to 3 years already. When mangoes and watermelons are in season, his
shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week. The goods
are released to GPC. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines
to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes
through telephone calls by himself or his “people.” In transactions covered by a letter of
credit, bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the
goods. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers, petitioner dispenses with the bank
guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. In his several years of business
relationship with GPC and respondents, there was not a single instance when the bill of
lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes. MAERSK LINE vs. COURT
OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent(consignee) ordered from Eli Lilly. Inc.(shipper)
600,000 empty gelatin capsules for the manufacture of his pharmaceutical products.
The Memorandum of Shipment provides that the shipper advised the consignee that the
goods were already shipped on board the vessel of petitioner for shipment to the
Philippines via Oakland, California. The specified date of arrival was April 3, 1977. For
reasons unknown, said cargo of capsules were mishipped and diverted

MACAM vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner Benito Macam shipped on board
the vessel Nen Jiang, through local agent respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc.
watermelons valued at US$5,950.00 and fresh mangoes valued at US$14,273.46. The
shipment was bound for Hongkong with Pakistan Bank as consignee and Great
Prospect Company of Kowloon, Hongkong as notify party. Petitioner’s depository bank.
Consolidated Banking Corporation(SOLIDBANK) paid petitioner in advance the total
value of the shipment of US$20,223.46. Upon arrival in Hongkong, the shipment was
delivered by respondent WALLEM directly to GPC, not to Pakistan Bank, and without
the required bill of lading having been surrendered. Subsequently, GPC failed to pay
Pakistan Bank such that the latter, still in possession of the original bills of lading,
refused to pay petitioner through SOLIDBANK. Since SOLIDBANK already pre-paid
petitioner the value of the shipment, it demanded payment from respondent WALLEM
but was refused. Petitioner returned the amount involved to SOLIDBANK, and then
demanded payment from respondent WALLEM in writing but to no avail. Hence
petitioner sought collection of the value of the shipment if US$20,223.46 from
respondents before the RTC of Manila, bases on to Richmond, Virginia, USA and then
transported back to Oakland, California. The goods finally arrived in the Philippines on
June 10, 1977 or after two months from the date specified. The consignee refused to
take delivery of the goods. Private respondent alleging gross negligence and undue
delay in the delivery of the goods, filed an action for rescission of contract with damages
against petitioner and shipper. Petitioner alleged that the goods were transported in
accordance with the bill of lading(..”the Carrier does not undertake that the goods shall
arrive at the port of discharge or the place of delivery at any particular time..”) and that
its liability under the law attaches only in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods as provided for in Article 1734 NCC. The shipper alleged that the mis-shipment
was due solely to the gross negligence of petitioner. The RTC dismissed the complaint
against the shipper and ruled in favor of the consignee. RTC ruled that the stipulation in
the BOL is in the nature of contract of adhesion and therefore void. CA affirmed said
decision, hence the present petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to
damages resulting from delay in the delivery of the shipment in the absence in the bill of
lading of a stipulation on the period of delivery. Held: Yes. While it is true that common
carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are
not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously
assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo
should at least be made within a reasonable time. An examination of the subject bill of
lading shows that the subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on April 3,
1977. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date
of arrival of the subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware of the
specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading
itself. In this regard, there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as
it would be a mere superfluity. In the case before us, we find that a delay in the delivery
of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the
realm of reasonableness. With respect to the ruling that contracts of adhesion are void,
SC said that it was necessarily so and that it is a settled rule that bills of lading are
contracts not entirely prohibited. YSMAEL vs. BARRETTO

Facts:Ysmael, a domestic corporation seeks to recover from Barretto P9,940, which is

the alleged value of four cases of merchandise which it delivered to the steamship
Andres, at Manila to be shipped to Surigao. The said merchandise was never delivered
to the consignee Solomon Sharuff. Barretto denied all the allegations against him
stating that the said merchandise was never delivered to him. He also stated that under
the provision of paragraph 7 of the printed condition at the back of the bill of lading,
plaintiff’s right of action is barred for the reason that it was not brought within 60 days
from the time the cause of action accrued. Barretto also alleged that in provision 12 of
the bill of lading, he is not liable for the excess of P300.00 for any package of silk unless
the value and contents of such package are correctly declared in the bill of lading at the
time of shipment. The lower court rendered its judgment in favor of Ysmael & co. Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of defendant of not
more than P300 is valid. Held: No, the stipulation is not valid. A common carrier cannot
lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just
andreasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made. A common carrier cannot
lawfully stipulate for the exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just and
reasonable. The carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped if
such was caused by its own negligence. Based upon the findings of fact of the trial court
which are sustained by the evidence, the plaintiff delivered to the defendants 164 cases
of silk consigned and to be delivered by the defendants to Salomon Sharuff in Surigao.
Four of such cases were never delivered to the consignee, and the evidence shows that
their value is the alleged in the complaint. Also, the goods in question were shipped
from Manila on October 25, 1922, to be delivered to Salomon Sharuff in Surigao,
Plaintiff's original complaint was filed on April 17, 1923, or a little less than six months
after the shipment was made. The lower court also points out that the conditions in
question "are not printed on the triplicate copies which were delivered to the plaintiff,"
and that by reason thereof they "are not binding upon the plaintiff." The clause in
question provides that the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage from any cause
or for any reason to an amount in excess of P300 "for any single package of silk or
other valuable cargo." The evidence shows that 164 "cases" were shipped, and that the
value of each case was very near P2,500. In this situation, the limit of defendants'
liability for each case of silk "for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason"
would put it in the power of the defendants to have taken the whole cargo of 164 cases
of silk at a valuation of P300 for each case, or less than one-eight of its actual value. If
that rule of law should be sustained, no silk would ever be shipped from one island to
another in the Philippines. Such a limitation of value is unconscionable and void as
against public policy. There is no merit in the appeal. The judgment of the lower court is
affirmed. SHEWARAM vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. Facts: Shewaram, a paying
passenger on defendant's aircraft flight from Zamboanga City bound for Manila. He
checked in three pieces of baggages, a suitcase and two other pieces. When plaintiff
Parmanand Shewaram arrived in Manila, his suitcase did not arrive with his flight
because it was sent to Iligan. It was found out that it was mistagged by defendant’s
personnel. The station agent of the PAL in Iligan caused the baggage to be sent to
Manila for delivery to plaintiff. Defendant admitted that the two items (Transistor Radio
and the Rollflex Camera) could not be found inside the suitcase. An action for damages
was instituted against PAL. RTC ruled that the loss of the articles was due to the
negligence of the employees of PAL. PAL however was ordered to pay damages of
P100.00 only, as this was its limited liability as stated in the ticket. (“The liability, if any,
for loss or damage to checked baggage or for delay in the delivery thereof is limited to
its value and, unless the passenger declares in advance a higher valuation and pay an
additional charge therefor, the value shall be conclusively deemed not to exceed
P100.00 for each ticket.”). An appeal was then brought up by plaintiff. Issue: Whether or
not the limited liability rule applies. Held: No. The limited liability rule shall not apply. The
requirements provided in Article 1750 of the New Civil Code must be complied with
before a common carrier can claim a limitation of its pecuniary liability in case of loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods it has undertaken to transport. In the case
before us We believe that the requirements of said article have not been met. It can not
be said that the appellee had actually entered into a contract with the appellant,
embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. The fact that those
conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard
to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those
conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions.

Shewaram did not agree to the stipulation on the ticket, as manifested by the fact that
Shewaram did not sign the ticket.

ONG YIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner was paying passenger of
respondent Philippine Airlines on board flight No. 946-R from Mactan Cebu bound for
Butuan City. He was scheduled to attend the trial in the Court of First instance , Br. II
thereat. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggage, a bull maleta. The plane
left Mactan Airport, Cebu City at about 1pm and arrived at Bacasi Airport, Butuan City at
past 2pm of the same day. Upon arrival, petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not
be found. According to petitioner, it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that
the matter was attended by the porter clerk which however, the later denied. When the
luggage was delivered to the petitioner with the information that the lock was open, he
found out that the folder containing documents and transcripts were missing, aside from
the two gift items for his parents-in-law. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage.
Petitioner filed a Complaint against PAL for damages for breach of contract of
transportation. The lower Court found PAL to have acted in bad faith and with malice
and declared petitioner entitled to moral damages. CA held that PAL was guilty only of
simple negligence, reversed the judgment of the trial Court granting petitioner moral and
exemplary damages, but ordered PAL to pay plaintiff the sum of P100.00, the baggage
liability assumed by it under the condition of carriage printed at the back of the ticket.
Hence the present petition. Issue: Whether or not PAL acted with gross negligence.
Held: No. PAL did not act in bad faith. It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioner’s
luggage which had been miscarried. PAL exerted diligent efforts to locate the plaintiff’s
baggage. Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. Exemplary damages can
only be granted if the defendant asked in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner, which loss, in accordance with the stipulation written at the back of
the ticket is limited to P100 per luggage plaintiff not having declared a greater value and
not having called the attention of the defendant on its value ad paid the tariff thereon.
While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless
bound by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the
contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is what is known as a contract of
"adhesion", in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one
party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the
case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is
in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. A contract limiting
liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding
one from contracting against his own negligence.

applicable to all contracts for the carriage by sea to and from the Philippines Ports in
Foreign Trade by Comm. Act. 65. Even if Section 4(5) of COGSA did not list the validity
and binding effect of the liability limitation clause in the bill of lading here are fully
substantial on the basis alone of Article 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. The justices of
such stipulation is implicit in its giving the owner or shipper the option of avoiding
accrual of liability limitation by the simple expedient of declaring the value of the
shipment in the bill of lading. The stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of
SeaLand for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said rule to US$500 per
package unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional
charges is valid and binding on Cue. CITADEL LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

SEA-LAND SERVICE, INC. vs. IAC Facts: Sea-land, a foreign shipping and forwarding
company licensed to do business in the Philippines, received from Seaborne Trading
Company in California a shipment consigned to Sen Hiap Hing. The shipper not having
declared the value of the shipment, no value was indicated in the BOL. The shipment
was discharged in Manila, and while awaiting transshipment to Cebu the cargo was
stolen and never recovered. The lower court sentences Sea-land to pay Cue the value
of the lost cargo, the unrealized profit and attorneys fees. The CA affirmed the decision,
hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not the consignee of seaborne freight is bound by
stipulations in the covering bill of lading limiting to a fixed amount the liability of the
carrier for loss or damage to the cargo where its value is not declared in the bill. Held:
Yes. There is no question of the right of a consignee in a bill of lading to recover from
the carrier or shipper for loss of, or damage to, goods being transported under said bill,
although that document may have been drawn up only by the consignor and the carrier
without the intervention of the consignee. Since the liability of a common carrier for loss
of or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by the
laws of the country of destination and the goods in question were shipped from the
United States to the Philippines, the liability of SeaLand has Cue is governed primarily
by the Civil Code, and as ordained by the said Code, supplementary, in all matters not
cluttered thereby, by the Code of Commerce and special laws. One of these
supplementary special laws is the Carriage of goods by Sea Act (COGSA), made Facts:
Petitioner is the general agent of the vessel “Cardigan Bay/ Straight Enterprises”, while
private respondent Manila Wine Merchants, Inc. as the consignee is the importer of the
subject shipment of Dunhill cigarettes from England. On or about March 17,1979, the
vessel “Cardigan” loaded on board at England for carriage to Manila, 180 Filbrate
cartons of mixed British manufactured cigarettes called “Dunhill International Filter” &
“Dunhill International Menthol”, as evidenced by a Bill of Lading. Clause 6 of the bills of
lading issued by the carrier states to limit the latter’s liability to US$2.00 per kilo.The
shipment arrived at the port of Manila Pier 13 and the container van was received by E.
Razon an arrastre. Thereafter, the container van containing two shipments was
stripped. One shipment was delivered and the other, containing the cigarettes were
placed in two containers due to the lack of space, both of them duly padlocked and
sealed by the representative of the carrier. On May 1, 1979, the carrier’s headchecker
discovered that one of the container van had a different padlock and the sealed was
tampered with. It was found out that 90 cases of the cigarettes were missing. Based on
the investigation conducted by the arrastre, the cargo was not formally turned over by
the carrier. The consignee filed a complaint against the carrier demanding P315,000
which is the market value of the goods. The carrier admitted the loss in its reply letter
but alleged that the said matter is under the control of the arrastre therefore, the
consignee filed a complaint against the arrastre. The lower court decided to absolve the
arrastre form any liability. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier contained in the
bill of lading is binding on the consignee. Held: Yes, the stipulation is valid. Basic is the
rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods
appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is
binding. Furthermore, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or
shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable
and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. In this
case, the award of P315,000 based on the alleged market value of the goods is
erroneous. It is provided in Clause 6 that its liability is limited to US$2.00/kilo. The
consignee also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear
in the bill of lading. Hence, the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies. The bill
of lading shows that 120 cartons weight 2,978 kilos or 24.82kilos/carton. Since 90
cartons were lost and the weight of said cartons is 2,233.80, the carrier’s liability
amounts only to US$4,467.60. The judgment of CA is hereby modified. EVERETT
STEAMSHIP CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent
Hernandez Trading Co. imported three crates of bus spare parts from Japan from its
supplier Maruman Trading based there. The crates were shipped from Japan to Manila
on board a vessel owned by petitioner’s principal, Everett Orient Lines. Upon arrival at
the port of Manila, it was discovered that one of the crater was missing. Respondent
made a formal claim for the recovery of the actual value of the lost spare parts
contained in the missing crates. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, ordering petitioner to pay Y1,552,500.00. An appeal was brought by
petitioner only 100,000 yen was offered by petitioner, the maximum amount stipulated in
clause 18 of the BOL. The Court of Appeals deleted the award of attorney's fees but
affirmed the trial court's findings with the additional observation that private respondent
can not be bound by the terms and conditions of the bill of lading because it was not
privy to the contract of carriage. Petitioner now comes to SC arguing that the Court of
Appeals erred (1) in ruling that the consent of the consignee to the terms and conditions
of the bill of lading is necessary to make such stipulations binding upon it; (2) in holding
that the carrier's limited package liability as stipulated in the bill of lading does not apply
in the instant case; and (3) in allowing private respondent to fully recover the full alleged
value of its lost cargo.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the actual value and not the maximum
value recoverable under the bill of lading. Held: No. A stipulation in the bill of lading
limiting the liability of the common carrier for the loss, damages of cargo to a certain
sum, unless the shipper declares or a higher value is sanctioned by law, particularly
Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of
law, it is required that the stipulation limiting the common carrier's liability for loss must
be "reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed
upon." The bill of lading subject of the present controversy specifically provides, among
others: 18. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on
the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums, if paid,
and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any
consequential loss. The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in
any connection with, goods in an amount exceeding One Hundred thousand Yen in
Japanese Currency (Y100,000.00) or its equivalent in any other currency per package
or customary freight unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the goods higher than
this amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the
carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is paid as required. The above
stipulations are, to our mind, reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it
clear that its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen.
However, the shipper, Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if
the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that
the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying
with the stipulations. To defeat the carrier's limited liability, the aforecited Clause 18 of
the bill of lading requires that the shipper should have declared in writing a higher
valuation of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert the said declaration
in the bill of lading, with extra freight paid. These requirements in the bill of lading were
never complied with by the shipper, hence, the liability of the carrier under the limited
liability clause stands. The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and
convincingly show that petitioner has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended
by private respondent. BRITISH AIRWAYS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

H. E. HEACOCK COMPANY vs. MACONDRAY & COMPANY, INC. Facts: Mahtani

obtained the services of a certain Mr. Gemar to prepare his travel plan to Bombay,
India. Mr. Gemar purchased a ticket from British Airways, however since it had no ticket
flights from Manila to Bombay, Mahtani had to take a connecting flight to Bombay. Prior
to his departure, Mahtani checked in the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of
luggage containing his clothing and personal effects, confident that upon reaching Hong
Kong, the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay. Unfortunately,
when Mahtani arrived in Bombay, he discovered that his luggage was missing and that
upon inquiry from the BA representatives, he was told that the same might have been
diverted to London. After plaintiff waited for his luggage for one week, BA finally advised
him to file a claim. Mahtani filed his complaint for damages. BA filed a third-party
complaint against PAL alleging that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggage was
due to the latter's late arrival in Hongkong, thus leaving hardly any time for the proper
transfer of Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay. RTC rendered its
decision in favor of Mahtani, which CA affirmed, hence the instant petition. BA alleged
that there should have been no separate award for the luggage and the contents thereof
since Mahtani failed to declare a separate higher valuation for the luggage and
therefore, its liability is limited, at most, only to the amount stated in the ticket. Issue:
Whether or not BA is liable for the compensatory damages. Held: Yes. The contract of
transportation was exclusively between Mahtani and BA. The latter merely endorsing
the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s journey to PAL, as its subcontractor or
agent. Conditions of contacts was one of continuous air transportation from Manila to
Bombay. The Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that
an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is
liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. The
third-party complaint was therefore reinstated. Since the instant petition was based on
breach of contract of carriage, Mahtani can only sue BA and not PAL, since the latter
was not a party in the contract. The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was
overruled although it is recognized in the Philippines, stating that BA had waived the
defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he
incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage, without any objection. Facts: The
plaintiff shipped Edmonton clocks from New York to Manila on board a vessel of the
defendant. The BOL has the following stipulations: 1. It is mutually agreed that the value
of the goods receipted for above does not exceed $500 per freight ton, or, in proportion
for any part of a ton, unless the value be expressly stated herein and ad valorem freight
paid thereon. 9. Also, that in the event of claims for short delivery of, or damage to,
cargo being made, the carrier shall not be liable for more than the net invoice price plus
freight and insurance less all charges saved, and any loss or damage for which the
carrier may be liable shall be adjusted pro rata on the said basis. The clocks were not
delivered despite demands. Plaintiff claimed P420.00, the market value of the clocks,
while defendant tendered only P76.36, the proportionate freight ton value. The trial court
decided for the plaintiff for P226.02, the invoice value plus freight and insurance. Both
appealed. The claim of the plaintiff is based upon the argument that the clause in the bill
of lading, limiting the liability of the carrier, are contrary to public order and, therefore,
null and void. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that clause 1 is valid, and
clause 9 should have not been applied by the lower court. Issue: May a common carrier,
by stipulations inserted in the bill of lading, limit its liability for the loss of or damage to
the cargo to an agreed valuation of the latter? Held: Yes. Three kinds of stipulations
have often been made in a bill of lading. The first is one exempting the carrier from any
and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence. The second is one
providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation. And the
third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper
declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. According to an almost
uniform weight of authority, the first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being
contrary to public policy, but the third is valid and enforceable. A reading of clauses 1
and 9 of the bill of lading here in question, however, clearly shows that the present case
falls within the third stipulation, to wit: That a clause in a bill of lading limiting the liability
of the carrier to a certain amount unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a
higher rate of freight, is valid and enforceable. Thus, if a common carrier gives to a
shipper the choice of two rates, the lower of the conditioned upon his agreeing to a
stipulated valuation of his property in case of loss, even by the carrier's negligence, if
the shipper makes such a choice, understandingly and freely, and names his valuation,
he cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he thus places upon his
property. A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value to obtain a lower rate does
not conflict with any sound principle of public policy; and it is not conformable to plain
principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and
then recover a larger value in case of loss. SWEET LINES, INC. vs. TEVES Facts:
Private respondents Atty. Tandog and Tiro, a contractors bought tickets for Voyage at
the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers
and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel
bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not
proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private
respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to another
vessel. Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to
agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine
Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to
the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits,"
and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not
honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof, private
respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition printed at
the back of the tickets, Condition No. 14, which reads: “It is hereby agreed and
understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this
ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City
of Cebu.” The motion was denied hence the instant petition. Issue: Is Condition No. 14
printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents,
which limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First
Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable?

Held: No. Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the interisland shipping
industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back
of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following
reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is
not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of
the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second,
Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this
nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers
located in different places of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file
suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. Considering the expense and trouble a
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of
Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus
defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate
in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as
was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice,
petitioner. QUISUMBING, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Norberto Quisumbing
Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among the passengers of PAL’s plane from Mactan City
Cebu to Manila. There was an exchange of gunshot between a Senior NBI agent Villarin
and the four armed hijackers one of which was “Zaldy” who is a suspect in the killing of
Judge Valdez. Zaldy then announced to the passengers and the pilots that it was a
hijacked and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS. The robbers divested the
passengers of their belongings including Quisumbing who was divested with his
jewelries and cash amounting to P18,650.00 and Leoffler with his watch, wallet and
cash amounting to P1,700. Quisumbing suffered a shock for a gun had been pointed at
him by one of the hold uppers. The four hijackers succeeded in their escape upon
arrival at Manila. Contending that the "aforesaid loss is a result of breach of PAL's
contractual obligation to carry them and their belongings and effects to their Manila
destination without loss or damage, and constitutes a serious dereliction of PAL's legal
duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the same, Quisumbing and
Loeffler brought suit against PAL to recover the value of the property lost by them to the
robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages.The CFI dismissed the complaint and
the CA affirmed the CFI’s decision. Hence the instant

petition. The plaintiffs declared that their suit was instituted "... pursuant to Civil Code
articles 1754, 998, 2000 and 2001 and on the ground that in relation to said Civil Code
article 2001 the complained-of act of the armed robbers is not a force majeure, as the
'use of arms' or 'irresistible force' was not taken advantage of by said armed robbers in
gaining entrance to defendant's ill-fated plane in questions. And, with respect to said
Civil Code article 1998, it is not essential that the lost effects and belongings of plaintiffs
were actually delivered to defendant's plane personnel or that the latter were notified
thereof. Issue: 1) Whether or not hijacking-robbery was force majeure. 2) Whether or
not PAL was negligent to overcome the hi-jacking-robbery. Held: 1) Yes. The Court
ruled that under the facts, "the highjackingrobbery was force majeure," observing that:
hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent
fury. Firearms, hand-grenades, dynamite, and explosives are introduced into the
airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth, although there is an
occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is
given to the hijackers' complete disposal. 2) No, PAL was not negligent so as to
overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. Hijackers do not board an airplane
through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Firearms and grenades are
brought to the plane surreptitiously. PAL could not have been faulted for want of
diligence, particularly for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil
Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on
board the plane. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices may
have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining hijackers. The
petition is denied and appealed decision of CA is affirmed. PAN AMERICAN WORLD
AIRWAYS, INC. vs. RAPADAS Facts: Private respondent held Passenger Ticket and
Baggage Claim Check for petitioner's Flight with the route from Guam to Manila. While
standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport, Rapadas was ordered by
petitioner's handcarry control agent to check-in his Samsonite attache case. Rapadas
protested pointing to the fact that other copassengers were permitted to handcarry
bulkier baggages. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try
if he can get through without having to register his attache case. However, the same
man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to
register his baggage. For fear that he would miss the plane if he insisted and argued on
personally taking the valise with him, he acceded to checking it in. He then gave his
attache case to his brother who happened to be around and who checked it in for him,
but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. Upon arriving in Manila
Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case.
He sent his son, Jorge Rapadas to request for the search of the missing luggage. The
petitioner exerted efforts to locate the luggage through the Pan American World
Airways-Manila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage Service. Rapadas
received a letter from the petitioner's counsel offering to settle the claim for the sum of
$160.00 representing the petitioner's alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a
passenger's personal property under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and
PAN AM. Refusing to accept this kind of settlement, Rapadas filed the instant action for
damages. The lower court ruled in favor of Rapadas after finding no stipulation giving
notice to the baggage liability limitation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not a passenger is bound by
the terms of a passenger ticket declaring the limitations of carrier’s liability Held: Yes.
The Warsaw Convention, as amended, specifically provides that it is applicable to
international carriage which it defines in Article 1, par. 2 as follows: (2) For the purposes
of this Convention, the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which,
according to the agreement between the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a breach in the carriage or a transhipment, are
situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties or within the territory
of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory
of another State, even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. Carriage between
two points within the territory of a single High Contracting Party without an agreed
stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the
purposes of this Convention. ("High Contracting Party" refers to a state which has
ratified or adhered to the Convention, or which has not effectively denounced the
Convention [Article 40A(l)]). Nowhere in the Warsaw Convention, as amended, is such
a detailed notice of baggage liability limitations required. Nevertheless, it should
become a common, safe and practical custom among air carriers to indicate beforehand
the precise sums equivalent to those fixed by the Convention. The Convention governs
the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or
incorporated in the passenger ticket. In the case at bar, the baggage check is combined
with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger ticket complies
with Article 3, which provides: (c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey
involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure,
the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in
most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of
loss of or damage to baggage. What the petitioner is concerned about is whether or not
the notice, which it did not fail to state in the plane ticket and which it deemed to have
been read and accepted by the private respondent will be considered by this Court as
adequate under the circumstances of this case. As earlier stated, the Court finds the
provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline
for loss of luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the airline and receiving the
plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the
passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the
application of the liability limitations. The facts show that the private respondent actually
refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been
ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. In attempting to avoid registering the
luggage by going back to the line, private respondent manifested a disregard of airline
rules on allowable handcarried baggages. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also
dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and placed
in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. The alleged lack
of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the
corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the
requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. ALITALIA vs. IAC Facts:
Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in UP, was invited to a meeting of the
Department of Research and Isotopes of the Joint FAOIAEA Division of Atomic Energy
in Food and Agriculture of UN in Ispra, Italy. To fulfill this engagement, Dr. Pablo
booked passage on petitioner airline, ALITALIA. She arrived in Milan on the day before
the meeting in accordance with the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. She
was however told by the petitioner’s personnel there at Milan that her luggage was
delayed inasmuch as the same was in one of the

succeeding flights from Rome to Milan. Her luggage consisted of two suitcases. But the
other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board. The suitcases were
not actually restored to Prof. Pablo by petitioner until eleven months and four months
after the institution of her action. Issue: Did petitioner acted in bad faith so as to entitle
private respondent to damages? Held: No. The Warsaw Convention does not exclude
liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. Thus: "The Convention does not
thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability, or as
an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Moreover, slight reflection readily leads to
the conclusion that it should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the
cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or
delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful misconduct, bad
faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or
employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or
extraordinary form of resulting injury. The Convention's provisions, in short, do not
regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct
of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage,
Otherwise, 'an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of
its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd.'
Nor may it for a moment be supposed that if a member of the aircraft complement
should inflict some physical injury on a passenger, or maliciously destroy or damage the
latter's property, the Convention might successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to
determine the carrier's liability to the passenger. Neither may the Convention be invoked
to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger
and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. It is in this
sense that the Convention has been applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar
facts presented by each case. In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage
was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable damage.
The fact is, nevertheless, that some species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo because
petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time
appointed-a breach of its contract of carriage, to be sure-with the result that she was
unable to read the paper and make the scientific presentation (consisting of slides,
autoradiograms or films, tables and tabulations) that she had painstakingly labored
over, at the prestigious international conference, to attend which she had traveled
hundreds of miles, to her embarrassment and the disappointment and annoyance of the
organizers. There can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and
anxiety, which gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from the time she learned
that her suitcases were missing up to the time when, having gone to Rome, she finally
realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference. Certainly, the
compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be
restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of
baggage. She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her
luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila,
tardily, but safely. She is however entitled to nominal damages-which, as the law says,
is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered-and this Court agrees that the respondent
Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at P40,000.00."

not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his copassengers, not to
speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each
passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests
the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in
the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a
passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a
policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in
compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had
already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could
not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. MECENAS vs. CA
Facts: M/T "Tacloban City," a barge-type oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and operated by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
(PNOC Shipping), having unloaded its cargo, left for Negros Occidental when it collided
with a carrier ship named Don Juan. When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the
weather fair and visibility good. As a result of this collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank
and hundreds of its passengers perished. Among the ill-fated passengers were the
parents of petitioners, the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas, whose
bodies were never found despite intensive search by petitioners. Issue: Whether or not
the respondents were negligent? Held: Yes, the behaviour of the captain of the "Don
Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes
behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose
hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been
entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the
time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking and in
contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea
that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary
diligence. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of Capt.
Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of

B. Safety of Passengers

NOCUM vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO. Facts: A passenger boarded the
respondents bus carrying a box which such person attested to the conductor as
containing clothes and miscellaneous items. Appellee, who was a passenger in
appellant's Bus No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay,
Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in the
box brought by the co-passenger. Issue: Did LTB Co. exercise the extraordinary
diligence required? Held: Yes, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's
duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be
reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common
safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will

abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking
of his vessel after collision, did not cause the collision by themselves, such failures
doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life and, moreover, were
indicative of the kind and level of diligence exercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of
his vessel and his officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels.
The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt.
Santisteban not only of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual
collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more
passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry. Under these
circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers
and crew) and of its ship-owner arises. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs. CA Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to
Bacolod City to attend a family reunion boarding the Don Juan. Don Juan collided off
the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her
passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found
and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents' families were never
found. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the extraordinary diligence
required? Held: No. As with the Mecenas case, this Court found petitioner guilty of
negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing
mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in
allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Also, the duty
to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are
within the carrying capacity of the vessel. KOREAN AIRLINES CO. vs. CA

Facts: Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive electrician, was contracted for employment in

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Lapuz was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines. Initially, he
was "wait-listed," which meant that he could only be accommodated if any of the
confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure. When two of
such passengers did not appear, Lapuz and another person by the name of Perico were
given the two unclaimed seats. As he was about to board the said airline a KAL officer
pointed to him and shouted "Down! Down!" He was thus barred from taking the flight.
When he later asked for another booking, his ticket was canceled by KAL.
Consequently, he was unable to report for his work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated
2-week period and so lost his employment. Issue: Whether or not KAL committed a
breach of the Contract of Carriage? Held: Yes. The status of Lapuz as standby
passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered
in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through
immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a
passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage
between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. This Court has held that a
contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It
invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract
of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any discourteous
conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier. FORTUNE EXPRESS vs. CA Facts: Petitioner is a bus
company in northern Mindanao. A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney
in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the
jeepney, including two Maranaos. The Constabulary officer found out that certain

Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses.
On November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers,
seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City.
They started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the passenger at bay
with a handgun then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. A passenger Atty.
Caorong pleaded with the Maranaos to spare the bus driver but the Maranaos shot him.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of a breach of the contract of carriage?
Held: Yes, Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the
employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of
the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his
men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan
de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning
some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado
Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect
the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would
not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them.
Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with
non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could
have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. The acts of
Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was already a
warning by the PC. No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased. The
assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the
collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were
riding. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus.
What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading
for his life. GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM

Facts: Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's mini bus. While the bus
was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound"
was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a
cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a
ditch as a result petitioner sustained injuries. As she and several others were confined
in a hospital, respondent Delim paid for the hospitalization expenses and had the
passengers sign a waiver stating that they were no longer interested to file a complaint.
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed a complaint. Issue: Whether or
not the private respondent were negligent. Held: The record yields affirmative evidence
of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop
to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard
and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them that it was normal. The
driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in
the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been
checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping
sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it.
Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and
even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be
checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the
roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop
the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the
passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained
by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary
diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the
common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law,
morals, public policy or good customs. A cursory examination of the purported waiver
will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from
appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said
document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously
is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked
by appellant must be clear and unequivocal.

A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated
or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are
due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible
in the condition that she was before mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity,
giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. DEL CASTILLO
vs. JAYMALIN Facts: Mario del Castillo, a deaf-mute, son of plaintiff Severo del Castillo
boarded a bus of private respondent bus line. Upon alighting from the bus, he fell and
died as a result. Respondents contend that the proximate cause of Mario's death was
his recklessness and gross negligence in jumping out of the bus while in motion. Issue:
Whether or not respondents exercised extraordinary diligence. Held: No, common
carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the
Civil Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It
appears proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was
their duty to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised
of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge the
conductor should have taken extraordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. In
this he failed. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. IAC Facts: Catalina Pascua with
several others boarded the jeep owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma
Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was
running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which,
the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-
turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane and was hit by the petitioner
company’s bus causing the death of Catalina Pascua and two other passengers.

Issue: Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar? Held:
No, The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit
between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." It is the rule under
the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen
the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to the passengers of the jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast
speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour,
assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case
of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible.
Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the
event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the
passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words,
the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him,
for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally
liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely
vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
BUSTAMANTE vs. CA Facts: A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck, and
a Mazda passenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front
left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the
passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. Due
to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the
injuries they sustained, Among those killed were Rogelio Bustamante and his spouse
and children, and several others.

During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by
defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The
vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated
as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with
a line from Naic, Cavite, to Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and vice versa, which
Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and which the latter transferred to
Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18, 1983. After a careful perusal of the circumstances of
the case, the trial court reached the conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers
contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to
the death of the aforementioned persons. It could not be determined from the evidence
that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the
collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be
solidary. From said decision, only defendants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto
Montesiano, owner and driver, respectively, of the sand and gravel truck have
interposed an appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals, which set aside the trial
court’s decision. Hence the present petition. Issue: Whether the respondent court has
properly and legally applied the doctrine of "last clear chance" in the present case
despite its own finding that appellant cargo truck driver Edilberto Montesiano was
admittedly negligent in driving his cargo truck very fast on a descending road and in the
presence of the bus driver coming from the opposite direction. Held: The respondent
court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that
the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding
the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that
even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an
injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated,
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to
the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165). The practical import of
the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to
a plaintiff who has been

grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise
of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident
(57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799). All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the
respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance
as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
LARA vs. VALENCIA Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry
stationed in Davao. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his
lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his
chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship
anchored in the port of Parang. Lara boarded with several others a pick-up bound for
Davao and were seated at the back on an improvised bench. Lara accidentally fell from
the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death. Issue:
Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the ordinary diligence required? Held:
Yes. The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers or invited
guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported
safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by weight of authority that the
owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise
reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and
injury by increasing the hazard of travel. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is
only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required by our law. A passenger must observe the diligence
of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to the
passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be
held liable.

NECESSITO vs. PARAS Facts: Severina Garces and her one-year old son boarded
passenger auto truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. The truck entered a wooden
bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after
wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where
water was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son,the truck
fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother, Severina
Garces, was drowned; the son sustained injuries. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is
liable Held: While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should
nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all
discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is
considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will
not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that
the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence,
he has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. JAPAN AIRLINES vs. CA
Facts: Private respondents boarded the JAL flights to Manila with a stop over at Narita
Japan at the airlines' expense. Upon arrival at Narita private respondents were billeted
at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents went to the airport
to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA
inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely. JAL then booked another flight fort the passengers and again answered for
the hotel accommodations but still the succeeding flights were cancelled. Issue:
Whether or not JAL was obligated to answer for the accommodation expenses due to
the force majeure.

Held: No, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because
of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due
to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel
and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it
is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected
overnight stay on June 15, 1991. It has been held that airline passengers must take
such risks incident to the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or
extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences
of which the passenger must assume or expect. While JAL was no longer required to
defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the
fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport
private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL
reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers
when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers"
as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary
arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila.
LAYUGAN vs. IAC Facts: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against
Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff
and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the
right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel
Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.
Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being
a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck and hence must suffer the damages. The trial
court decided in favor of the plaintiff, which was reversed by the CA, hence the present
petition. Issue: W/N defendant is absolved by virtue of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Held: No. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things

does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. It is clear that the driver did not know his
responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the
road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was
cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
Moreover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver to
be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record
of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the
finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial
The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In
the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove
that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which
would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. Respondent
Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses
serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway. He argues
that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property,
it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of
the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would
be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of
proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for, as
previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road, while the
immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers
that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and
he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device, like that required by law, or, by
some other adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending
danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar
circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro
concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the
petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. Respondent Isidro's
contention is untenable. LA MALLORCA vs. DE JESUS

Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La
Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from
the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters away from the vehicle.
The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He
was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the running board
awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father
had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed. The Lower Court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca liable
for quasi-delict. La Mallorca contended that when the child was killed, she was no
longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage had terminated. Issue:
Whether or not the deceased is considered to be still a passenger of the bus to which
the petitioner could be held liable. Held: Yes. It is a recognized rule that the relation
between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights
from the carrier’s premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there
was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the
signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here the presence of said passengers
near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. CA Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel
owned by defendant ABOITIZ, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for
Manila. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to
the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck
which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said
vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz. The crane owned by the third
party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed
alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had
disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the
crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said
vessel

obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went
back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the
place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the
side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he
later died. Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for
breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time
of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control of Pioneer as the which
handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since
the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable
under the fellow-servant rule. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plantiffs. The trial
court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to
preponderantly established a case of negligence against the crane operator which the
court ruled is never presumed. Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of
damages awarded to the Vianas. Hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the
responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased when it disembarked from the vessel. Held:
No. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or
premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had
a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after
his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not
terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his
baggage. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the
vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's
vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently,
under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto

Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. As found
by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums
around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact
that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not
indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that
the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the
area in question was fraught with serious peril. Hence, Aboitiz is negligent. Pioneer had
taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a
fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading
Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party
complaint only after ten months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically,
Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the
corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz.
MALLARI SR. vs. CA Facts: The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari
Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of
respondent Bulletin along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan,
Bataan. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting
in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to
the gravity of his injuries. The widow of the victim, filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V.
Netherlands Insurance Company. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van,
considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix
Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo
Mallari Jr. Hence, the trial court held that BULLETIN and Felix Angeles are jointly and
severally liable. It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo
Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr. On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision
of the trial court and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his
employer, respondent BULLETIN. Instead, the appellate court ruled that the collision
was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that
immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he
overtook a Fiera which had stopped

on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera.
Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are negligent. Held: Yes. The
Court of Appeals correctly found, that the collision occurred immediately after petitioner
Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This
act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Sec. 41.
Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the
left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to
be made in safety. (b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction when approaching the crest of a grade, nor upon a
curve in the highway, where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed within a
distance of five hundred feet ahead except on a highway having two or more lanes for
movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass
another vehicle: Provided That on a highway, within a business or residential district,
having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle
may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. The rule is settled that a driver
abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot
do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is
special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have
the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car
approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. In the instant case, by his own
admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was
coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was
still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook
two vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the
collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole
negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who
recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed
by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court,
petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756
of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is
liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the former's employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof
that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees. Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr.
assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely
and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and
any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier. BAYASEN vs. CA Facts: Petitioner was charged of
Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence, being then the driver and person in-charge of
Rural health Unit Jeep, drove along Suyo Municipal Road, Sagada, Mountain Province
in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner. Said jeep fell over a precipice in the
abovementioned place causing thereby the death of Elena Awichen. After trial, the
petitioner was found guilty of the charge. The decision was affirmed in CA, hence the
instant petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground that
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the proximate cause of the death of Awichen
was the petitioner's "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed" is openly contrary
to the evidence of the prosecution. Held: Yes. It is obvious that the proximate cause of
the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the "unreasonable
speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove or support the
finding that the petitioner was driving at "an unreasonable speed".

It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the
instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding
means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily
implying negligence. It may occur without fault. No negligence as a matter of law can,
therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the moment he felt that the rear wheels
of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road, parallel to the
slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play safe and avoid the
embankment. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-
driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an
unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his
regular course. The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established,
his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is,
therefore, entitled to acquittal. CERVANTES vs. CA Facts: PAL issued to the petitioner
a round trip plane ticket for ManilaHonolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which ticket
expressly provided an expiry of date of one year from issuance, i.e., until March 27,
1990. On March 23, 1990, four days before the expiry date of subject ticket, the
petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he immediately
booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office, and it was confirmed
for the April 2, 1990 flight. Upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-
over in San Francisco, and considering that he would be there on April 2, 1990,
petitioner made arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight In San Francisco
instead of boarding in Los Angeles. On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at
the PAL counter in San Francisco, he was not allowed to board. The PAL personnel
concerned marked the following notation on his ticket: "TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE
EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY." Petitioner Cervantes filed a Complaint for Damages, for
breach of contract of carriage. But the said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal, the lower court’s decision was upheld, hence the instant petition. Issue:
Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the
period of validity of petitioner's ticket.

Held: No. Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew
that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary, he cannot use what
the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said agents, according to the Court of
Appeals, acted without authority when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. Under
Article 1989 of the New Civil Code, the acts an agent beyond the scope of his authority
do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting
beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the
agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is
not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure
the principal's ratification. In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage,
the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility
that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to
ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it
should be on the petitioner. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple
negligence. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket
should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket. Neither can the
claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of damages is imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, and the existence of bad faith is established.
CALALAS vs. CA Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity
of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to
Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible
for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which the same court held Salva
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The
appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas
liable for damages to Sunga. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in
Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the
jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the
award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
Issue: Should be petitioner be absolved if his contentions are considered? Held: No.
There is no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva
and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on
Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract.
The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. In quasi-delict, the negligence or
fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination. In case

of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight
could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. First, the jeepney
was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the
broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity
of the jeepney. These are violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway. As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of
the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2)
in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.In
this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual
finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the
contract of carriage. PESTAÑO vs. SUMAYANG Facts: Ananias Sumayang was riding
a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was
his friend Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway
connected with the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven
by Pestaño and owned by Metro Cebu which had tried to overtake them, sending the
motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Apart from the institution of
criminal charges against Pestaño, Respondent-heirs, filed this civil action for damages
against petitioners. The cases were consolidated. The lower court found petitioners
liable. Said decision was affirmed by CA, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not
petitioner Pestaño was negligent

Held: Yes. Petitioners contend that Pestaño was not under any obligation to slow down
when he overtook the motorcycle, because the deceased had given way to him upon
hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left side of the road was clearly visible and free of
oncoming traffic, Pestaño accelerated his speed to pass the motorcycle. Having given
way to the bus, the motorcycle driver should have slowed down until he had been
overtaken. They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road
nearest to the junction but was on the inner lane. This explains why the damages on the
bus were all on the right side - the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the
radiator grill were bent and dented. SC disagreed with this contention and considered
the findings of CA, based on the testimony of the witnesses, wherein, it was found out
that as the two vehicles approached the junction, the victim raised his left arm to signal
that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that the latter and his companion were thrown
off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding bus. As a professional
driver operating a public transport bus, Pestaño should have anticipated that overtaking
at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Petitioners also aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty
speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this
instrument been properly functioning. This contention has no factual basis. Under
Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for
damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in
the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome
only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. GILLACO
vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Facts: Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company
from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station,
Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company happened to be in said
station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he
was going to report for duty. Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge
against Tomas Gillaco, because of this, Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished
to him by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing
him inside the train coach. Tomas died. Devesa was convicted of homicide. A complaint
for damages was filed by the victim’s widow. Damages were awarded to the plaintiff,
hence the instant petition. Appellant's contention

is that, no liability attaches to it as employer of the Emilio Devesa because the crime
was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties
and service and that no negligence on appellant's part was shown. Issue: Whether or
not appellant could be held liable for the acts of its employee. Held: No. While a
passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or
employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a
passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those
acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care
and diligence required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila
Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured
against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the
Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two
would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist
between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual
passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito"
within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable), being
both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and pursuant to
established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage
with the deceased was excused thereby. MARANAN vs. PEREZ Facts: Rogelio
Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by
Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and
was found guilty. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan,
Rogelio's mother, filed an action to recover damages. The court decided in plaintiff’s
favor. Hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not defendant- operators could be
held liable for damages Held: Yes. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling
enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no
absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The

attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different
however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the
course of duty of the guilty employee. Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the
driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had
entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the
Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the
guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889
which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute
liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed
by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a
fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. The Civil Code provisions on
the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law.
There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is
the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the first, which is the
minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope
of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later
cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It
is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense
that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees. As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines
evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons
underlie this rule. (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its
passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of
care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers
and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged
with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of
duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the
performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the
duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as
between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees
with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no
less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral
fibers, and social attitude. Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case,
therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art.
1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also
correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab
driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein
he was convicted by final judgment. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. CA Facts:
Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff, boarded a train of appellant at Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical
defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs. Unfortunately, upon
passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in
his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that
somebody fell from the train. Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial,
held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. The decision was
sustained by the appellate court hence the present petition, wherein PNR raised for the
first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a
mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its
own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to
garnishment or execution. Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine
of state immunity from suit. Held: No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as
amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides: The Philippine national Railways shall
have the following powers: a. To do all such other things and to transact all such
business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
purpose of the corporation; and b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Law.

Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and
attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. There can be no question then
that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like
any other corporation. Now, is PNR negligent? Yes. The appellate court found, the
petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was
so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the
open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train
did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at
the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. The petitioner has the obligation to
transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in
doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the
presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract
of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to
overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence. But
while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears
that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on
the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off
from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR
from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral
damages and exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases
where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. ISAAC vs. A.L. AMMEN TRANS. CO. Facts: Plaintiff boarded defendant’s bus
as paying passenger from Albay. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was
coming from opposite direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel. As a result, his left
arm was completely severed. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual
obligation. Plaintiff brought an action for damages which the lower court dismissed
holding the driver of the pick-up car negligent and not that of the bus. Issue: Whether or
not the common carrier is liable.

Held: The bus was running at a moderate speed. The driver of the bus upon the
speeding pick-up truck swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road. Said
driver would not move the bus further without endangering the safety of his passengers.
Notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side was hit. This finding of the lower court
was sustained. Also, of the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency,
he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, he required in the
absence of such emergency. By placing his left arm on the window, he is guilty of
contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART.
1762), this is a circumstance which further militates against plaintiff’s position. It is a
prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any
part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury.” BACHELOR EXPRESS,
vs.CA Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to
Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus
picked up a passenger, that about fifteen minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion
suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the
passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut
were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and
the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The
passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by
the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private
respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc.,
its alleged owner and the driver Rivera. The lower court dismissed the complaint. CA
reversed the decision, hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is
negligent. Held: Yes. The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa
contractual or breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1732, 1733, 1755 and 1756 are
applicable. There is no question that Bachelor is a common carrier. Hence, Bachelor is
bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were
passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor and, while passengers of the bus, suffered
injuries

which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code,
Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed
extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil
Code. Bachelor denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut in that their death
was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the
petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law,
states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and
Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier
did not have any control. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause
of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such
that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the
falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The
sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the
context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved
from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by
force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing
the injuries resulting from such accident. In this case, Bachelor was negligent.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not
immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a
full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the
bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had
already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. The
petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves
no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two
passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the
petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to
their destinations as warranted by law. FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., vs.CA Facts: A bus
of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norter,
resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. A
constabulary agent investigated and found out that the owner of the jeepney was a

Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by
burning some of its buses. The operations manager of petitioner was advised to take
precautionary measures. Four days after the accident, three armed Maranaos who
pretended to be passengers seized a bus petitioner bound for Iligan City and set it on
fire. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein was a passenger
of the bus and was shot and killed during the incident. The private respondents brought
this suit for breach of contract of carriage. Complaint was dismissed in the lower court
but its decision was reversed in CA, hence the instant petition, with petitioners
contention that the acts of the Maranaos is caso fortuito. Issue: Was there breach of
contract of carriage? Held: Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common
carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of
other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it
is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus
by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine
Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation
manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner
did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees
been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity
of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to
protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their
baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's
constitutional rights. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, and De
Guzman v. Court of Appeals, in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by
the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a
common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect the
passengers from injuries cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the
other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carriers is
not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or
irresistable threat, violence, or force. It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman
do not apply to the prensent case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a

common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents
therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to the
safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of
third persons. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite
for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the
report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of
petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado
Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by
petitioner to protect the safety of passengers. The petitioner contends that Atty.
Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve
something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the
intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees, not its passengers.
The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of
the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were
riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the
passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men
actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently
angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He
was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be considered an
act of negligence, let alone recklessness.

Edgardo were injured. The LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical
and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18, 1952 to April 1953. From January
15, 1953 up to April of the same year Edgardo stayed in a private house in Quezon City,
the LTB having agreed to give him a subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily during his
convalescence. The present action was filed to recover from the LTB and the MRR Co.,
the total sum of P312,000.00 as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
and for Edgardo’s parents, the sum of P18,000.00 in the same concepts. The LTB
disclaimed liability claiming that the accident was due to the negligence of its co-
defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, for not providing a crossing bar at the point
where the national highway crossed the railway track, and for this reason filed the
corresponding cross-claim against the latter company to recover the total sum of
P18,194.75 representing the expenses paid to Edgardo. The Manila Railroad Company,
in turn, denied liability upon the complaint and cross-claim, alleging that it was the
reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident. The lower court held that
it was the negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident and, as a result,
rendered judgment sentencing the LTB to pay Edgardo the sum of P10,490.00 as
compensatory damages, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the coinplaint,
and dismissing the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company. From this
decision the Cariagas and the LTB appealed.The Cariagas claim that the trial court
erred: in awarding only P10,490.00 as compensatory damages to Edgardo; in not
awarding them actual and moral damages, and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay
attorney's fees. Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to an increase in compensatory
damages, and for actual and moral damages, as well as attorneys fees.

III. DAMAGES A. Actual/Compensatory Damages CARIAGA vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS

BUS COMPANY Facts: Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth-year medical student of the
University of Santos Tomas was a passenger in one of the buses of LTB, when it
bumped against the engine of a train passing by, when it reached that part of the
Poblacion of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad track. The
front part of the body of the bus was wrecked, the driver of the bus died, and many
passengers including

Held: The findings of the trial court was sustained. Firstly, the train whistle had been
sounded several times before it reached the crossing; secondly, that another LTB bus
which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo was a passenger, paid
heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing". Upon the whole evidence on the
matter, the lower court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of
Edgardo reduced his intelligence by about 50%; that due to the replacement of the right
frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quite and retired
life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his death." The
impression one gathers from this evidence is that, as a result of the physical injuries
suffered by Edgardo

Cariaga, he is now in a helpless condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and

mentally. Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for
which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good faith, is liable
shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which
the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code,
have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages
suffered by Edgardo consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum
of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the opinion however, that the income
which Edgardo could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the
corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category
because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he
boarded the bus. Upon consideration of all the facts this Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to petitioner should be increased to
P25,000.00.The claim for moral damages and attorney's fees is denied. Article 2219 of
the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages may be covered and the
case under consideration does not fall under any one of them. The present action
cannot come under Paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one of quasi-delict and
cannot be considered as such because of the preexisting contractual relation between
the Laguna LTB and Edgardo. Neither could LTB be held liable to pay moral damages
under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage
because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. LTB had exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection
with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith.
Petitioner is not entitled to recover attorney's fees, because this case does not fall under
any of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. VILLA REY
TRANSIT, INC. vs. CA Facts: An Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated
by the petitioner left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying passengers
was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. When the vehicle was nearing the Sadsaran
Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin,
Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of
a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit
the right

side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet
long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed
on the face of deceased, which caused several wounds. Notwithstanding the medical
assistance, the Quintos died. The private respondents, brought this action against
petitioner for breach of the contract of carriage to recover the aggregate sum of
P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner contended that the
mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the accident and the death of
Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver. Hence the instant petition.
Issue: Did CA erred in its award of the damages to the heirs of Quintos? Held: No.
Petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in placing the life expectancy of
Quintos at 33-1/3, he being over 29 years of age at the time of his demise and in not
acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro in which the damages were computed on a
four year basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of
his death, and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years. The case cited is not, however,
controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara case, none of the parties had questioned
the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards the amount thereof. In addition,
the case had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the
computation of damages. It even declared “that the determination of the indemnity to be
awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to
the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so
it has been said that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a
human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary,
whichever is shorter, is an important factor.” Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant,
but, also, an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents
herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent
reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a
purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has
not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr. With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be
computed, petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the
damages awarded therein will have to be paid now,
whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This
argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara
case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages
recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said
argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in
the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the
liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is
the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training
assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara
case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case,
Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the
conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to have a better job and be
promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not considering the growing
importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income
level of officers and employees therein much more. PAN AMERICAN WORLD
AIRWAYS, INC. vs. IAC Facts: Private respondent Teofista P. Tinitigan, filed a
complaint against petitioner for damages arising from defendant's alleged refusal to
accommodate her on Pan Am Flight No. 431 from Sto. Domingo, Republica Dominica to
San Juan, Puerto Rico notwithstanding the fact that she possessed a confirmed plane
ticket purchased from Pan Am’s Office at Sto. Domingo and thus causing her to suffer
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation She prayed that she be awarded moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary
damages of P200,000.00, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and actual damages
sustained by her in the amount of US$1,546.15. Defendant denied that plaintiff was a
confirmed passenger since the ticket issued to her was on an open space basis which
meant that she could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed
to show up at the airport before departure. The lower court rendered judgment in favor
of plaintiff and awarded the amount of damages as prayed for. Said decision was
affirmed hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the award of damages was
proper. Held: Yes, but subject to modifications. Findings of fact show that plaintiff, a
businesswoman and a multimillionaire in her own right as

evidenced (proprietor of Sampaguita Restaurant, New York City USA; Treasurer of the
Molave Development Corp., Phil., proprietor of Cavite Household Appliances and
Rowena's Handicraft, Phil.), was on a business trip with a Pan-Am ticket. While in Sto.
Domingo, after talking thru the telephone with a certain Mrs. Lilibeth Warner, the former
said that she (plaintiff) must be in San Juan that same day, to sign her contract or lose
it. Plaintiff expected to make a profit of $1,000 in said contract but since she wasn’t able
to board the flight, said profit was lost. Other instances which caused moral damage to
the plaintiff are the following: 1. While plaintiff was standing in line preparatory to
boarding the aircraft, Rene Nolasco, a Pan Am employee ordered her in a loud voice to
step out of line because her ticket was not confirmed to her consternation and
embarrassment in the presence of several people who heard and order. Despite her
Pleas she was not allowed to board the aircraft. And as if to add insult to injury, she saw
that her seat was given to a white man. 2. When the plane took off without her but with
her luggage on board. She was forced to return to her hotel without any luggage much
less an extra dress. It was a good thing that the Hotel people remembered her because
they do not usually accommodate female guests, without any luggage to stay in the
hotel. While normally, hotel accommodation was paid before departure, plaintiff was
made to pay the room accommodation petition in advance. It is clear from the evidence
that defendant issued a Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check with assigned seat and
the corresponding pass and baggage claim symbol. Plaintiff was made to pay the fare
and terminal fee. At the immigration section, plaintiff's passport was stamped
accordingly. Plaintiff's name was included in the passenger manifest. And these show
that plaintiff was indeed a confirmed passenger of defendant's Flight 431 for San Juan.
There was, therefore, a contract or carriage perfected between plaintiff and defendant
for the latter to take plaintiff to her place of destination. By refusing to accommodate
plaintiff in said flight, defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of
carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with
plaintiff. Bad faith was also present. Self enrichment or fraternal interest and not
personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant, but it is malice nevertheless.
The fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in order to accommodate a
white man in an airline owned by an American firm with a reputation for bumping off
non- Caucasian to accommodate whites is very regrettable. Defendant having breached
its contract with plaintiff in bad faith, it is not error to have awarded exemplary damages.
The rational behind

exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or

correction for public good . In view of it nature, it should be imposed in such amount as
to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contract in the future by defendant
and other airlines. An award of attorney's fees is also in order, having found bad faith on
the part of defendant. We believe, however the amount of some damages awarded to
be exorbitant: We therefore reduce the moral and exemplary damages to the combined
total sum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos and the attorney's fees to
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. The award of actual damages in the amount of
One Thousand Five Hundred Forty Six American dollars and fifteen cents
(US$1,546.15) computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment is
hereby retained and granted. GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM Facts: Reynalda Gatchalian
boarded respondent’s minibus at a point in Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang. While
the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was suddenly heard at one
part of the bus and shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the
side of the road, turned turtle and fell into the ditch. Upon medical examination,
petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
Issue: Is petitioner entitled to actual and compensatory damages? Held: Yes. A person
is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due
and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in
the condition that she was before mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity,
giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. In Araneta v.
Areglado, 104 Phil. 529, this Court awarded actual or compensatory damages, for
among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who
had been injured in a vehicular collision. We consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to
recover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.

SOBERANO vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Facts: Juana Soberano boarded a

bus of the Benguet Auto Line (BAL), a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Co. (MRR),
driven by Santiago Caccam, bound for Baguio City. In that trip, Juana brought with her
3,024 chicken eggs to be sold in Baguio City, and some personal belongings which she
needed in that trip. About three kilometers away from Baguio City, along the Naguilian
road, the bus hit a stone embankment, causing it to fall into a 65-foot deep precipice,
resulting in death to two of its passengers and serious physical injuries to Juana and
loss and destruction of all her belongings. Juana Soberano did not intervene in the
criminal case because she filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action
for damages and indemnity against the MRR and the BAL. Because of the loss of the
eggs and the destruction of the personal effects that Juana brought with her in that trip,
Jose Soberano, her husband, demanded from the defendant companies the value
thereof amounting to P370.66, of which sum the MRR paid P300. The MRR also paid
the daily expenses, allowances, subsistence, hospitalization, medical fees and
medicines of Juana Soberano, as well as the service fees of her caretaker. The MRR
has paid a total sum of P4,219. Later the MRR offered to settle the case extrajudicially,
tendering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5,000. The offer was rejected, and
the Soberanos filed the present action against the defendant companies and Caccam,
to recover from them damages in the total sum of P76,757.76. After due trial, the lower
court rendered the decision appealed from, dismissing at the same time the complaint
against Caccam. The Soberanos moved to have the decision reconsidered. The motion
for reconsideration was denied; hence the present recourse. Issue: Whether or not the
amount of damages awarded is adequate. Held: The Soberanos initially contend that
the lower court erred in disallowing their claim of P200, representing the expenses of
Juana Soberano in attending as a witness in the criminal case and attorney's fees
incurred in connection therewith. This claim was correctly denied by the lower court,
because these expenses were properly taxable in the criminal case. It may be argued
that the Soberanos could not have recovered this sum in the criminal case because
Juana Soberano expressly filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action
for damages, but such reservation did not preserve whatever rights they had against
Caccam on the basis of the latter's imprudence. The reservation

is ineffective as to Caccam as it did not include him among those against whom their
rights had been reserved. And the Soberanos not having intervened in the criminal
case, this claim must be considered as having been impliedly adjudicated in the criminal
case, and cannot therefore be ventilated in the present action. The Soberanos next
contend that the lower court erred in denying their claim for moral damages in the sum
of P15,000, for the physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety and fright they
suffered as a consequence of the mishap. The lower court denied this claim on the
strength of the oft-reiterated ruling of this Court that moral damages cannot be
recovered against the employer in actions based on a breach of contract of carriage in
the absence of malice, fraud, or bad faith. The lower court rightly denied the claim for
moral damages as far as Jose Soberano is concerned. In case of physical injuries,
moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin,
unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. In this case it was Juana
Soberano, not her husband Jose, who sustained the bodily injuries. The claim for
attorney's fees was also properly denied by the lower court. The Soberanos aver that
they were obliged to file a separate civil action for damages against the defendant
companies. This claim is predicated upon paragraphs (2) and (5) of article 2208 of the
New Civil Code, which provide that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be
recovered when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest, or when the defendant acted
in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim. It will be observed that the defendant companies offered to settle the
case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5,000. The Soberanos,
however, rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum
of P76,757.76. It was not, therefore, the defendant companies that compelled the
Soberanos to litigate, or to incur expenses in connection with the litigation instituted by
them. Lastly, the nature and extent of the physical injuries suffered by Juana Soberano
has the effect of making her live an abnormal life. Considering all the facts this Court is
of the opinion that the sum of P5,000 in compensatory damages awarded to her for loss
of earning capacity is inadequate; the amount should be increased to P15,000. She
should also be awarded the sum of P45.35, representing unrealized profits from the
3,024 chicken eggs which she brought with her in the trip and which were destroyed.
MARCHAN vs. MENDOZA

Facts: A passenger bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines which was then driven by
Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday, Polo, Bulacan, while
travelling on its way to Manila. As a result of which Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child,
who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in
their multiple injuries. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which
damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities. An action was
brought to recover damages against petitioners predicated not only on a breach of
contract of carriage for failure to safely convey the plaintiffs to their destination, but also
on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant driver. The lower court
ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The award of P40,000.00 as compensatory damages was
affirmed by CA. It however added the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
and sustained the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00. Issue: Whether
or not the award of moral damages was proper. Held: Yes. The amount of P40,000.00
awarded by the court as compensatory damages is quite reasonable and fair,
considering that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower
extremities, which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation
throughout the remaining years of his life, especially so if we take into account that
plaintiff was only 26 years old when he met an accident and taking the average span of
life of a Filipino, he may be expected to live for 30 years more and bearing in mind the
earning capacity of Arsenio Mendoza who before the happening of this accident derived
an income of almost P100.00 a month from the business of his father-in-law as
Assistant Supervisor of the small fairs and his income of P100.00 a month which he
derived as a professional boxer. DE CALISTON vs. CA Facts: While driving a
passenger bus in Bacolod City, private respondent Geronimo Dalmacio ran over Juana
Sonza Vda. de Darrocha (a USVA pensioner) who died instantly, survived by her only
child, Gloria Darrocha de Caliston, the herein petitioner. Prosecuted for homicide thru
reckless imprudence, Dalmacio was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay the herein petitioner
P15,000.00 for the death of the victim, P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 for

burial expenses and P10,000.00 for loss of pension which the deceased had failed to
receive. On appeal, the former Court of Appeals modified the CFI decision by absolving
Dalmacio from the payment of the P10,000.00 for loss of pension and credited him for
the amount of P5,000.00 previously paid to the herein petitioner under a vehicular
insurance policy obtained by the bus owner. Issue: Whether or not the deletion of the
P10,000.00 awarded for loss of pension is justified? Held: The deletion of the
P10,000.00 awarded for loss of pension is unjustified. Under Article 2206 of the Civil
Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. The
pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which
Dalmacio was responsible, the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P
10,000.00 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for
one year if she did not die. On the other hand, the P5,000.00 paid to the herein
petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be
deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance. Since the civil
liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is subsidiary and, at
bottom, arises from the same culpa, the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor
of the errant driver. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA 185 SCRA 110

almost 18,000 hours at the time of its illfated flight. It had been certified as airworthy by
the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla. He was
29 years old, single. His mother, Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir.
As a result of her son's death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint (which was amended twice)
against PAL, demanding payment of P600,000 as actual and compensatory damages,
plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney's fees. In its answer, PAL denied that
the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's flight crew, and
that, moreover, the damages sought were excessive and speculative. On August 31,
1973, the trial court promulgated a decision, ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines,
Inc. to pay the plaintiff Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla the sum of P477,000.00 as award
for the expected income of the deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals
the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto. Issue: Whether or not the respondent
court erred in computing the awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of
the late Nicanor A. Padilla rather than on the life expectancy of private respondent, and
thus erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the excessive sum of P477,000
as indemnity for loss of earnings. Held: Petitioner relies on "the principle of law
generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that "the controlling
element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as established by
authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is
shorter. However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or
jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Even in the absence of local
statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive. For the settlement of the
issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article
1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed
on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary. The articles
provide: Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in
accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article

Facts: On November 23, 1960, Starlight Flight No. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines took off
from Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 persons on board, including the plane's
complement. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro,
one hour and fifteen minutes after takeoff .The plane was Identified as PI-C133, a DC-3
type aircraft manufactured in 1942 and acquired by PAL in 1948. It had flown

2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a
common carrier. Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant,
had no earning capacity at the time of his death. In the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49
SCRA 497 which involved the same tragic plane crash, this Court determined not only
PALs liability for negligence or breach of contract, but also the manner of computing the
damages due the plaintiff therein which it based on the life expectancy of the deceased,
Pedro Davila, Jr. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the trial court
is affirmed with modification. The petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or
her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417,000 (not P477,000), with legal rate of
interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31, 1973, until it is
fully paid. Costs against the petitioner.

sentenced him to suffer 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs. On
December 17, 1952, Tranquilino F. Cachero addressed a letter to the Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., Inc., which was followed by another of January 6, 1953, which he asks for
damages. The Taxicab Co. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered to settle the
case amicably with plaintiff but the latter only agreed to reduce his demand to the sum
of P72,050.20 as his only basis for settlement which, of course, was not accepted by
said company. So plaintiff instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant demanded an exorbitant moral damages? Held: In
all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.The present
action was instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant amount for moral
damages (P60,000) and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to such
demand. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of Article 2208 because
the Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's
fees. As We agree with the trial Judge on this point, We cannot declare that he erred for
not awarding to plaintiff any such fees in this case. "Realizing its obligation under its
contract of carriage with the plaintiff, and because the facts of the case, as have been
shown, mark it as more proper for the Municipal Court only, the defendant, to avoid the
expense and time of litigation, offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff, but the
latter refused and insisted on his demand for P72,050.20 as the only basis for
settlement, thus adding a clearly petty case to the already overflowing desk of the
Honorable Members of this Court. We admire and respect at all times a man for
standing up and fighting for his rights, and when said right consists in injuries sustained
due to a breach of a contract of carriage with us, sympathy and understanding are
added thereto. But when a person starts demanding P2,050.20 for a solitary bruise and
sprain, injuries for which the trial court, even at its generous although erroneous best,
could only grant P5,900, then respect and sympathy give way to something else. It is
time to fight, for, in our humble opinion, there is nothing more loathsome nor truly worthy
of condemnation than one who uses his injuries for other purposes than just
rectification. If plaintiff's claim is granted, it would be a blessing, not a misfortune, to be
injured." This case was instituted by a lawyer who, as an officer of the courts, should be
the first in helping Us in the administration of justice, and after going over the record of
this case, we do not hesitate to say that the demand of this case, we do not hesitate to
say that the demand

B. MORAL DAMAGES

CACHERO vs. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC.,

Facts: Atty. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and
owned by the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. On passing Oroquieta between Doroteo
José and Lope de Vega streets, Gregorio Mira Abinion bumped said taxicab against a
Meralco post, with the result that the cab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of
the vehicle to the ground, suffering thereby physical injuries, slight in nature. The
chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Fiscal and on February 26, 1953,
upon his plea of guilty the Municipal Court of Manila

of P72,050.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone and an insignificant contusion
in 'he chest, has not even the semblance of reasonableness. The plaintiff himself must
have felt embarrassed by his own attitude when after receiving defendant's brief as
appellant, he makes in his brief as appellee the categorical statement that he "DOES
NOT NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE LEAST to collect from the defendant all the
damages he had claimed in his complaint, but instead he is submitting his case to the
sound discretion of the Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and equitable
damages allowable by law, to compensate the plaintiff of the suffering and losses he
had undergone and incurred because of the accident oftentimes mentioned in this brief
in which plaintiff was injured". This acknowledgment comes too late, for plaintiff has
already deprived the Court of Appeals of the occasion to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction over this case which he recklessly dumped to this Court. We certainly cannot
look with favor at this attitude of plaintiff. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
hereby modified by reducing the amount awarded as unearned professioral fees from
P3,000 to P2,000 and by eliminating, the moral damages of P2,000 awarded by the
Lower Court to the plaintiff. Said decision is in all other respects affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. FORES vs. MIRANDA Facts: Respondent
was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was
descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control
thereof, causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the
morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured, including the
respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to the
National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of
operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken
bones and screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a third
one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had not yet
recovered the use of his right arm. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced
accordingly. The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of
the vehicle as that belonging to the petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which
found, among other things, that it carried plate No. TPU-1163, series of 1952, Quezon
City, registered in the name of Paz

Fores, (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even had the name of "Doña Paz" painted
below its windshield. No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the petitioner, who
relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of
the incident. A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21,
1953, or one day before the accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep
that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman. The CA awarded moral
damages to respondent hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral
damages given by the CA was valid? Held: No. Petitioner’s contention of loss of income
and payment of attorneys fees cannot be the basis for the award of the damages on the
ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's
appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's
bare statement of his expenses and the said loss of income. Petitioner fails to note that
attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and
may be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable. Moral damages are
not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide
as follows: "ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries; ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." By contrasting the provisions of these two
articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract
(including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to Justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term
"analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides
for the damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because the definition of
quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisting contractual relation between the parties."

"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter." The exception to the basic rule of damages
now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which
case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206,
that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to
"demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased".
But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the
carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness
of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad
faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral
damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the
part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions
of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. The suggestion that a carrier's
violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breach of the
passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in
bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220 is untenable, for under it
the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to the
passenger is infringed, and it would be never accountable for simple negligence; while
under the law (Art. 1756) "ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755." "ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not
bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the
negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably
reduced." The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or
wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our
law to be ignored; their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. "ART.
2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages forwhich the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that arc the, natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the

obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation." It is to be presumed, in the absence
of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of the
lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of
contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to
amount to malice; but that fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is
not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through
negligence of the carrier's employees. In view of the foregoing considerations, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by
way of moral damages the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and
not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.

LOPEZ vs.PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS Facts: Reservations for first class
accommodations in Flight No. 2 of Pan American World Airways from Tokyo to San
Francisco were made, by "Your Travel Guide" agency, for then Senator Fernando
Lopez, his wife Maria J. Lopez, his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his
daughter, Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. PAN-AM's San Francisco head office confirmed
the reservations. First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were subsequently
issued. As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines. As
soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine
Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations
for that evening's flight. For the given reason that the first class seats therein were all
booked up, however, PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego that PAN-AM
could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first class passengers.
Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to
show the same to PAN-AM's Tokyo office, but the latter firmly reiterated that there was
no accommodation for them in the first class, stating that they could not go in that flight
unless they took the tourist class therein. They were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight
from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers. Suit for damages was thereafter
filed by Senator Lopez and party against PAN-AM. Alleging breach of contracts in bad
faith by defendant, plaintiffs asked for P500,000 actual

and moral damages, P100,000 exemplary damages, P25,000 attorney's fees plus costs.
PAN-AM filed its answer, asserting that its failure to provide first class accommodations
to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees. Court of First Instance rendered
its decision in favor of plaintiffs. Both however appealed the decision. Plaintiff prayed for
an increase in the award. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages. Held:
Yes. According to plaintiffs, defendant acted in bad faith because it deliberately refused
to comply with its contract to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs, out of
racial prejudice against Orientals. Against the foregoing, however, defendant's evidence
would seek to establish its theory of honest mistake. It said that the first class
reservations of Senator Lopez and party were made together with those of four
members of the Rufino family. The reservations employee mistakenly cancelled all the
seats that had been reserved, that is, including those of Senator Lopez and party. Since
the flight involved was still more than a month away and confident that reinstatement
would be made, Herranz forgot the matter and told no one about it except his
coemployee. From the foregoing evidence of defendant, it is in effect admitted that
defendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and
thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the
fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class reservations
stood valid and confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in
the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had
none, defendant willfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach
its contracts with plaintiffs. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct already
amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through
some motive of interest or ill-will. Now on the issue of amount of damages. First, then,
as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its
contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious
anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued
by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were
expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them,
only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as
tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. Senator Lopez was then
Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the prestige
of such an office.

And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez was going to the
United States to attend a private business conference of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar
Company; but his aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind, and in fact
he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by
Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore. For the moral damages
sustained by him, therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate. Considering also
the physical discomfort of the wife of Senator Lopez as well as the members of his
family, it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter
similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we
find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages. A written contract
for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. The amount of P25, 000 is reasonable,
considering the attorney’s prominence in the legal profession, and that the defense
counsel’s fees is more than half the said amount. In concluding, let it be stressed that
the amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately
considering the official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties on
one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other.

ORTIGAS, JR. vs. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES Facts: The Sharp Travel Service,
the travel department of C. F. Sharp, Inc., the majority interest-in-which is held by
Rocha y Cia., Inc., General Agents of the defendant, Lufthansa German Airlines issued
to the plaintiff First Class Pan American Ticket which would take him from Manila, the
place of departure, to Hongkong, various cities in the United States, Europe, Asia, the
Far East, and then back to Manila, the place of destination. Ortigas' ticket for all these
different legs of his journey was first class. He left Manila as scheduled. In New York, he
decided to leave out some cities, included in his original itinerary, to be in Hongkong, for
several appointments he had there. Ortigas arrived in due course in Rome. To be sure
he could fly first class to Hongkong, for his appointments there the next day, Ortigas
went to the office of the Alitalia to book passage. The man at the counter of the Alitalia
office told him it had no flight on Monday but the Lufthansa had. The man thereupon
called up the office of the Lufthansa and, after talking to an employee thereof, told
Ortigas that the Lufthansa had no first class, but only

economy seats available. Ortigas was not willing to take an economy seat and
requested the employee to call up other airlines. The employee afterwards informed
Ortigas that the Lufthansa had a first class seat available. Ortigas immediately asked
him to get the seat and to see to it that his ticket be confirmed and validated for the flight
and a first class seat. The man thereafter asked for Ortigas' passport and other travel
papers and attached a validating sticker on flight coupon No. 4 which corresponded to
the Rome-Hongkong leg of his TWA Ticket. The following Monday, Ortigas checked out
of his hotel and took a taxi to the terminal. He unloaded his baggage and proceeded to
the counter in charge of the Lufthansa passengers. The lady at the counter told him that
Lufthansa had no space for him that day. Ortigas requested her to check with her main
office, which she did by calling it up. After calling, she apologized and said the plaintiff's
ticket was in order and would be confirmed and validated. On her request, Ortigas had
his luggage weighed and was given the free luggage allowance of a first class
passenger. He was furthermore asked to pay 800 liras for bus fare and 700 liras as
embarkation tax. An employee in the airport asked for his passport and other papers
and, after examining his passport, where his Filipino nationality appears, said he could
not board the plane that day because his seat would be given to a Belgian. After an
argument with the employee, Ortigas made another request, that the employee call
other airlines to inquire if they had flights to Hongkong that day but he once more turned
down the plea and insisted that Ortigas travel economy, with the promise that he will be
transferred to first class in Cairo and onward to Hongkong. He was constrained to agree
with the arrangement. Upon arrival in Cairo, the plaintiff requested the Lufthansa agent
to transfer him to first class but the agent said he could not and that he did not receive
any communication from Rome to that effect. At Dharham, the plaintiff once more
requested a transfer to first class but was also told by the Lufthansa agent that he had
not received any communication about the change and the request could not be
granted. In Calcutta, Ortigas once again requested a transfer or that he be assisted in
booking passage on other planes but was also refused. It was only in Bangkok when
the chief steward asked him if he wanted to move over to first class but having been
already embarrassed and humiliated and the trip to Hongkong being only three hours,
he said he would not as a sign of protest. The foregoing facts resulted in the filing of the
case by the plaintiff against defendant, in which an award of moral and exemplary
damages was ordered and now subject of an appeal. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is
entitled to damages.

Held: Yes. Manuel Otayza, general manager of Filital, Inc., which is the general agent of
the Alitalia in the Philippines, testified that space reservation through telephone calls
between airlines is permitted by IATA's, "Manual of Traffic Conference Resolutions" and
that telephone calls for reservation by one airline to another is in fact accepted
procedure in accordance with the official airline guide of the Air Traffic Conference and
International Air Transport Association. There was, therefore, a valid and binding
contract between Lufthansa and the plaintiff to transport him as a first class passenger
from Rome to Hongkong, and this agreement the defendant violated by compelling the
plaintiff to travel as an economy passenger. It cannot be said the breach was the result
of an honest mistake or excusable negligence. There is evidence that the defendant
acted with bad faith and in willful disregard of the plaintiffs rights. It is Our considered
view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of care
on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in
the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to
the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. But in
the instant case, the breach appears to be of graver nature, since the preference given
to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of
plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may not be
discriminated against with impunity. Lufthansa contends, however, that there could not
have been any possible discrimination by reason of race against Ortigas because from
his appearance, said plaintiff can easily be taken for a European or white more than his
own witness Amado Castro and besides, there were other Orientals in the same flight
on that occasion. It is argued that any such policy would be self-defeating, since it would
certainly be damaging to its own business. Again, this ratiocination is untenable, for
what appears from the evidence is not really a case of a general policy of discriminating
against Orientals or non-whites, but a specific act of Lufthansa employee at the airport
of giving preference to a Belgian after examining Ortigas passport wherein his Filipino
nationality is noted. As found by the lower court what worsened the situation of Ortigas
was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping him as its passenger by assuring him that he
would be given first class accommodation at Cairo, the next station, the proper
arrangements therefor having been made already, when in truth such was not the case.
Thus, instead of complying with the request of Ortigas that other airlines be contacted to
find out it they had first class space for him, the Lufthansa employee who had
indifferently told him about his downgrading paid very little attention if ever to said
request. Although molested and embarrassed to the point

that he had to take nitroglycerine pills to ward off a possible heart attack, Ortigas hardly
had any choice, since his luggage was already in the plane. To his disappointment,
when the plane reached Cairo, he was told by the Lufthansa office there that no word at
all had been received from Rome and they had no space for him in first class. Worse,
similar false representations were made to him at Dharham and Calcutta. It was only at
Bangkok where for the first time, Ortigas was at last informed that he could have a first
class seat in that leg of the flight, from Bangkok to Hongkong. This Ortigas rejected, if
only to make patent his displeasure and indignation at being so inconsiderately treated
in the earlier part of his journey. Moreover, it is argued, the economy class
accommodations are not much different from first class and Ortigas was not delayed in
his trip. We cannot see the point. A passenger contracts for first class accommodations
for many reasons peculiar to himself and pays a higher price therefor, and it is certainly
not for the airplane to say later, after it deprives him of his space in order to favor
another passenger, that economy class is anyway just as good as first class. In the light
of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both
moral and exemplary. We have uniformly upheld the right of a passenger to damages in
all cases wherein, after having contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly
confirmed and validated, he is transferred over his objection to economy, class, which
he has to take in order to be able to arrive at his destination on his scheduled time.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified by raising the
award of moral and exemplary damages to plaintiff Ortigas to P150,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively. In all other respects, including as to the payment of interests
on the said amounts, the same is affirmed.

behind the driver, close to the window. As the bus approached barrio San Marcos,
Calumpit, Bulacan, a freight truck owned and operated by the Transport Contractors,
Inc. was coming from the opposite direction. The vehicles sideswiped each other. The
window glass near the driver's seat of the Rabbit Bus was detached and the left side of
its body was damaged. The left forearm of Patrocinio Esguerra was hit by a hard blunt
object, breaking the bones into small fragments while the soft tissues of the muscles
and the skin were mascerated. He was immediately brought to the Bulacan Provincial
Hospital in Malolos, Bulacan for treatment. The left arm was amputated. Plaintiff filed a
case against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and the Transport Contractors, Inc.,
together with their respective drivers, praying that judgment be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants requiring them to pay, jointly and severally
damages, actual and compensatory, moral and exemplary, litigation expenses and
costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed CFI’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the award of
moral damages is proper Held: No. The contention of petitioners with respect to the
award of moral damages is meritorious. This Court has repeatedly held that moral
damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the
contract of transportation, as in the instant case, in view of the provisions of Articles
2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results
in the death of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result. The Court of Appeals found that the two
vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. In other words both vehicles
were in their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other. It
cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier's
driver. This being the case, no moral damages are recoverable. SWEET LINES vs. CA
Facts: Private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner at the latter’s
office in Cebu City. They were to board petitioner’s vessel. M/V Sweet Grace, bound for
Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about
midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00am of July 9, 1972, only to be towed
back to cebu due to engine trouble, arrving at about 4:00pm n the same day. Repairs
having been accomplished, the vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972 at around
8:00am.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs.ESGUERRA

Facts: Patrocinio Esguerra was a paying passenger of Bus No. 223 of Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. He boarded the said bus at the Manila terminal about four o'clock in the
afternoon of November 6, 1961, bound for San Fernando, Pampanga. He sat at the left-
end of the fourth row
Instead of docking to Catbalogan, which was the first port of call, the vessel proceeded
direct to Tacloban at around 9:00pm of July 10, 1972. Private respondents had no
recourse but to disembark and board a ferryboat to Catbalogan. Hence, this suit for
damages for breach of contract of carriage which the Trial court, affirmed by the CA,
decided in favor of plaintiffs. Issue: Whether or not moral damages may be rightfully
demanded. Held: Yes. Under Art. 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages are justly due
in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Both the
Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of
petitioner in that: (1) Defendants- Appellants did not give notice to plaintiffsappellates as
to the change of scheduled of the vessel; (2) Knowing fully well that it would take no
less than fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine, defendants-
appellants instead made announce ment of assurance that the vessel would leave
within a short period of time, and when plaintiff-appellees wanted to leave the port and
gave up the trip, defendants- appellants employees would come and say, “we are
leaving already”. (3) Defendants- appellants did not offer to refund plaintiffsappellees’
tickets nor provide them with transportation form Tacloban to Catbalogan. That the
finding of bad faith is binding on us, since it is not the function of the court to analyze
and review evidence on this point all over again, aside from the fact that we find it
faithful to the meaning of bad faith enunciated thus: “Bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. Self enrichment or fraternal
interest, and not personal ill will, may have been the motive, but it is malice
nevertheless.” Under the circumstances, however, we find the award of moral damages
excessive and accordingly reduce them from P75,000.00 to P3,000.00 respectively for
each of the private respondents. Judgment MODIFIED . TRANS WORLD AIRLINES vs.
CA

Facts: Rogelio A. Vinluan is a practicing lawyer who entered into a contract for air
carriage for valuable consideration with Japan Airlines first class from Manila to Tokyo,
Moscow, Paris, Hamburg, Zurich, New York, Los Angeles, Honolulu and back to Manila
thru the same airline and other airlines it represents for which he was issued the
corresponding first class tickets for the entire trip. On April 18, 1979, while in Paris, he
went to the office of Trans World Airlines (TWA) and secured therefrom confirmed
reservation for first class accommodation on board its Flight No. 41 from New York to
San Francisco. A validated stub was attached to the New York-Los Angeles portion of
his ticket evidencing his confirmed reservation for said flight with the mark "OK " On
April 20, 1979, at about 8:00 o'clock A.M., Vinluan reconfirmed his reservation for first
class accommodation on board TWA Flight No. 41 with its New York office. He was
advised that his reservation was confirmed. Vinluan presented his ticket for check-in at
the counter of TWA at JFK International Airport at about 9:45 o'clock A.M., the
scheduled time of the departure being 11:00 o'clock A.M. He was informed that there
was no first class seat available for him on the flight. He asked for an explanation but
TWA employees on duty declined to give any reason. When he began to protest, one of
the TWA employees, a certain Mr. Braam, rudely threatened him with the words "Don't
argue with me, I have a very bad temper." To be able to keep his schedule, Vinluan was
compelled to take the economy seat offered to him and he was issued a refund
application" as he was downgraded from first class to economy class. While waiting for
the departure of Flight No. 41. Vinluan noticed that other passengers who were white
Caucasians and who had checked-in later than him were given preference in some first
class seats which became available due to "no show" passengers. On February 15,
1980, Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The CFI ruled in favor of Vinluan
which was affirmed by the Court of appeals with some modifications. Issue: Whether or
not Trans World should be liable for damages. Held: Respondent had a first class ticket
for Flight No. 41 of petitioner from New York to San Francisco on April 20, 1979. It was
twice confirmed and yet respondent unceremoniously told him that there was no first
class seat available for him and that he had to be downgraded to the economy class. As
he protested, he was arrogantly threatened by one Mr. Braam. Worst still, while he was
waiting for the flight, he saw that several Caucasians who arrived much later were
accommodated in first class seats when the other passengers did not show up.

The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was
subjected is undeniable. Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages by
the respondent court is in order. Indeed, private respondent had shown that the alleged
switch of planes from a Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 was because there
were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be
accommodated in the smaller plane and not because of maintenance problems.
Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private
respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy. Such inattention and lack of care for the
interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to
their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of
moral damages. 5 More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private
respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed
by an employee of petitioner. At the time of this unfortunate incident, the private
respondent was a practicing lawyer, a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. He was
a director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the
Philippines. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of
private respondent in the community, he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary
damages. However, the moral damages should be reduced to P300,000.00, and the
exemplary damages should be reduced to P200,000.00. This award should be
reasonably sufficient to indemnify private respondent for the humiliation and
embarrassment that he suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the
repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts.

respondent at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning, which is a good
one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled flight time
recited in their tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be
accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off
and the 10:30 A.M. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous. Previous to
the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations through their
representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the
private respondent's Roxas Boulevard office. The departure time in the three (3) tickets
of petitioners was not changed when re-confirmed. The names of petitioners appeared
in the passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight
002. Herein petitioner Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the
bump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S.
Petitioners suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of
January 17th until the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that
seats will be available for them on the flight that day. Because of the refusal of the
private respondent to heed the repeated demands of the petitioners for compensatory
damages arising from the aforesaid breach of their air-transport contracts, petitioners
were compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
RTC awarded actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and nominal
damages to the plaintiffs but the CA eliminated the award for moral and nominal
damages. Issue: Whether or not the elimination of the CA of the award for moral
damages. Held: Yes. The contention of the CA that the appellees did not take the
witness stand to testify on their "social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety" and
the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent was without merit. The CA
overlooked the fact that a year after the incident there was a turmoil in the country
because of the assassination of Benigno Aquino and that violent demonstrations in the
country were sensationalized in the U.S. media so petitioners were advised to refrain
from returning to the Philippines at the time when they were scheduled to

ARMOVIT vs.COURT OF APPEALS Facts: In October 1981, the petitioners decided to

spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and friends in the Philippines, so they
purchased from private respondent, (Northwest Airlines, Inc.) three (3) round trip airline
tickets from the U.S. to Manila and back, plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the
children, though not involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the
handwriting of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on
the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight: from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002,
date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M. Status, OK. On their return trip from Manila to the
U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982, petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private

testify. Nevertheless, Atty. Armovit, brother of Dr. Armovit, took the witness stand for he
was there from the time they checked in until the time they were rudely informed that
their flight had already taken off. Angered and frustrated Dr. Armovit told the said check-
in-officer that he had to be accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all his
appointments in the U.S.; that petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also complained about not
being able to report for work at the expiration of her leave of absence; that while
petitioner had to accept private respondent's offer for hotel accommodations at the
Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up and wait for their flight out of Manila
the following day, petitioners did not use their meal coupons supplied because of the
limitations thereon so they had to spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of
P1,300.00 while waiting to be flown out of Manila; that Dr. Armovit had to forego the
professional fees for the medical appointments he missed due to his inability to take the
January 17 flight; that the petitioners were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18,
1982, but were assured of this flight only on the very morning of that day, so that they
experienced anxiety until they were assured seats for that flight. No doubt Atty.
Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon having
been bumped off. However, considering the circumstances of this case whereby the
private respondent attended to the plight of the petitioners, taking care of their
accommodations while waiting and boarding them in the flight back to the U.S. the
following day, the Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 each. Also, the gross negligence committed by private
respondent in the issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight, the
failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by which petitioners were
rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith
and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages. The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate
court is well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot
co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.

Wherefore the decision of the CA is modified providing the award for moral damages.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS 106 SCRA 391

Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila
to Legaspi with Captain Delfin Bustamante in a plane belonging to petitioner PAL. The
airplane crash-landed beyond the runway due to the slow reaction and poor judgment of
said captain, when it did not maintain the required pressure on the brakes and
notwithstanding the diligent efforts of Samson. The jolt caused injuries to Samson. And
instead of PAL giving Samson expert and proper medical treatment it referred him to a
general medical practitioner. Now, on grounds of physical disability Samson was
discharged from PAL’s employ, which caused him to file a complaint for damages. PAL
denied liability on the ground of fortuitous event, and that the physical headaches and
dizziness experience by Samson were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to
pass the required upgrading course given by PAL. Judgement was rendered in favor of
Samson in the lower court which was affirmed by CA with some modification, by
imposing legal rate of interest on the unearned income of Samson. Hence the instant
petition. Issue: Is there a causal connection between the injuries suffered by private
respondent during the accident and the subsequent periodic dizziness, headache and
general debility allegedly caused by the accident and private respondent’s discharge
from employment, which further warrants the award of damages? Held: Yes. The
dizziness, headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the
crash-landing. Doctors presented by PAL even admit the vital facts about Samson’s
brain injury. There was also gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. Bustamante to
fly on the that fateful day of the accident, even if he was sick, having tumor on his nose.
No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease. One month
prior to the crashlanding, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet, private
respondent warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of
Ligao. The plane hit outside the airstrip. In another instance, the pilot would hit the
Mayon Volcano had not the plaintiff warned him. These
more than prove what private respondent had complained of. Disregard thereof by PAL
is condemnable. Having affirmed the gross negligence and casual connection of the
after-effects of the accident, the award of damages was likewise affirmed. The grant of
compensatory damages[P204,000] by computing the basic salary per annum at
P750.00 a month and P300.00 a month for extra pay for extra flying time including
bonus every year is justified. The grant of moral damages[P50,000] was also justified,
having considered the bad faith of PAL. The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict
and therefore Art. 2219(2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages. Even
from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-employer relationship
between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment, private
respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice,
applying the provisions of Article 2220.

damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral
damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. CA modified the award, reducing the
amount of moral damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or
not the Court of Appeals is justified in modifying or changing the grant of damages by
the trial court. Held: No. A careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that
the injuries sustained by petitioner are not as serious or extensive as they were claimed
to be, to warrant the damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a closer scrutiny of the
exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination
produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be
established, actually took place, not to mention the fact that such were not supported by
the medical findings presented. Unquestionably, therefore, the damages imposed by the
lower court should be reduced to more reasonable levels. On the other hand, it will be
observed that the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too
drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness, which appears to be the
underlying basis to justify such reduction. While the damages sought to be recovered
were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the petitioner, it was
nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of
the respondents that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild
can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can
develop after several years and can lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose the
patient to other sickness. Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real and
intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient
of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering. As to exemplary damages,
Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: “In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence.” The rationale behind exemplary
or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for
the public good. The findings of the trial court is apparent, which became the basis of
the award of exemplary damages that respondent driver was running at high speed
after turning to the right along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that
the traffic was clear. Failing to notice petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes and
did not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision. Much more, it was raining that
time and the roads are slippery. The frequent incidence

C. Exemplary Damages PRUDENCIADO vs. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INC.

Facts: Petitioner was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with
the intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine Normal
College Compound where she would hold classes. She claimed that she was driving
her car at the rate of 10 kmph, that before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped her car and
looked to the right and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side
she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but when she was almost at the
center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned
and operated by Alliance Transport System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck
petitioner’s car, thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body, suffering
more particularly brain concussion while her car was damaged to the extent of
P2,451.27. The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190.00. Petitioner filed a
complaint for damages against respondents. The lower court found Jose Leyson guilty
of negligence. Alliance Transport System, Inc. failed to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that it had exercised the required diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection, supervision and control of its employees. Both defendants were held jointly
and severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff as well as for the
damage to her car, in addition to the other consequential damages prayed for. The
award was P2,451.27 for actual

of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures.
This however was overruled by CA and did not subscribed to the fact that the driver was
grossly negligent, in which this Court finds that it has erred. DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED
insofar as the award of damages is concerned; and respondents are ordered to jointly
and severally pay the petitioner; (1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages
representing the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs. MARCHAN vs.
MENDOZA Facts: A passenger bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines which was then
driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday, Polo,
Bulacan, while travelling on its way to Manila. As a result of which Arsenio Mendoza, his
wife and child, who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the
ground resulting in their multiple injuries. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious
injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities. An
action was brought to recover damages against petitioners predicated not only on a
breach of contract of carriage for failure to safely convey the plaintiffs to their
destination, but also on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant driver.
The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. The award of P40,000.00 as compensatory
damages was affirmed by CA. It however added the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and sustained the award of attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00. Issue: Whether or not there should be an award of exemplary damages.
Held: Yes. It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the exemplary
damages since there was no allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor counterclaim of error
for the same by the respondents. It is to be observed however, that in the complaint,
plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and
equitable." Now, since the body of the complaint sought to recover damages against the
defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they
suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's employee and
since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages, plaintiffs may
not be expected to

single out by express term the kind of damages they are trying to recover against the
defendant's carrier. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for
such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises, in effect,
therefore, the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the
imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or
pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, but
that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon
the discretion of the court. If the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, it
need not also be alleged, and the reason is obvious because it is merely incidental or
dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages. There is no
reason to consider that the lower court erred in awarding the P5,000 attorneys fees. A
modification of the decision however is proper. Respondents are entitled to interest for
the amount of compensatory damages from the date of the decision of the lower court
and legal interest on the exemplary damages from the date of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.