Palsgraf vs. Long Island Rail Company - PDF
It is the failure to observe that
PAL vs. CA- daghan kaau ug PAL vs. Ca
[G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996]
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,
INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996]
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.
LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS; NOT
NORMALLY DISTURBED AS A GENERAL RULE;
EXCEPTION. - As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and this
Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless
the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported
by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is
based on a misapprehension of facts.
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. - Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. (Keeton and Dobbs, et al., Prosser and Keaton
On Torts, 451 [1984] citing Second Restatement Of Torts,
Sec. 463.)
3. ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF EMERGENCY RULE,
CONSTRUED; APPLICATION THEREOF DEPENDS ON
THE OVER-ALL NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. -
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that
an actor who is confronted with an emergency is riot to be
held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same
standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.
Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs.
Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 (1988) cf. Siegl vs.
Watson, 195 NW 867, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if
he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence. While the emergency
rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is
absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such
cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the
over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a
vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not
be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for
her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.
4. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED. - Negligence,
as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an
undue risk of harm to others.
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 27 SCRA 674 (1969), that negligence is the want
of care required by the circumstances.
5. ID.; ID.; CAR OWNER IS JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
BONUS PATER FAMILIAS. - In fine, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction,
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations
were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency
and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden
of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the
principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
VITUG, J., concurring:
CIVIL CODE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF A PERSON
UNDER A RELATIONSHIP OF PATRIA POTESTAS. -
Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code that acknowledges
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas, a
person may be held accountable not only for his own direct
culpable act or negligence but also for those of others albeit
predicated on his own supposed failure to exercise due care
in his supervisory authority and functions. In the case of an
employer, that vicarious liability attaches only when the
tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the
course of, his employment. The question to ask should be
whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is
engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or,
independently, in that of his own. While an employer incurs
no liability when an employees conduct, act or omission is
beyond the range of employment, a minor deviation from the
assigned task of an employee, however, does not affect the
liability of an employer.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The
facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by
the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict,
for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiffs version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00
in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate
No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her
home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling
along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon,
heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A.
Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that cars
1
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went
to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left
side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial,
Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed,
and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected
to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM
Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).
She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and
was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for
the hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the
artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the
car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the
amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses
amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of
expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was
on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was
raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic
was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner
portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction
of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the
vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from
the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright
lights. Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the
right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and
bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his
defense that the left rear portion of plaintiffs car was
protruding as it was then at a standstill diagonally on the
outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par.
18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiffs witness
that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the
right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was
reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars
involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiffs car was
near the sidewalk; this witness did not remember whether
the hazard lights of plaintiffs car were on, and did not notice
if there was an early warning device; there was a street light
at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100
meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. things can be seen
(p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that
after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
compartment, defendants car came approaching very fast
ten meters from the scene; the car was zigzagging. The rear
left side of plaintiffs car was bumped by the front right portion
of defendants car; as a consequence, the plaintiffs car
swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk.
Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of defendants car,
which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated
that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could
smell it very well (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions
and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence
and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant
to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and
severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her
severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga
restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24,
1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the
plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month,
for unrealized profits in plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from
July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial courts decision, defendants filed an
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing
testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs.
Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as
depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties cars,
appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed
an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals
found that there was ample basis from the evidence of
record for the trial courts finding that the plaintiffs car was
properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was
bumped by defendants car.[1] Dismissing the defendants
argument that the plaintiffs car was improperly parked,
almost at the center of the road, the respondent court noted
that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was
at or near center of the right lane was never presented
during the trial of the case. The respondent court furthermore
observed that:
Defendant Lis testimony that he was driving at a safe speed
of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was
in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that
he was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard
after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990
when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring
to the plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk
compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li approaching
very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene; defendants
car was zigzagging, although there were no holes and
hazards on the street, and bumped the leg of the plaintiff
who was thrown against the windshield of defendants car,
causing its destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff,
who was pulled out from under defendants car and was able
to say hurting words to Richard Li because he noticed that
the latter was under the influence of liquor, because he could
smell it very well (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He
knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the
1970s, but did not know either plaintiff or defendant Li before
the accident.
2
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was
liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of
Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Lis employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of
moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for
exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award
of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorneys
fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise,
dismissed the defendants counterclaims.[3]
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent courts
decision by filing two separate petitions before this Court.
Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not
be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of
the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuelas own negligence.
Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela assails the respondent courts decision insofar as
it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the
owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it
reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages
awarded by the trial court.[4]
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby
consolidated. It is plainly evident that the petition for review
in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of law.
What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are
factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the
Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early
morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of
fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
a misapprehension of facts.[5]
In the first place, Valenzuelas version of the incident was
fully corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio
Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located
just across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified
that he observed a car being driven at a very fast speed,
racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue.[6]
Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of
the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling
her against the windshield of the defendants Mitsubishi
Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendants
car. Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the
street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had
alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the
incident.[7] Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he
observed Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk,[8] contrary to Lis allegation that Valenzuelas car
was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as
between Lis self-serving asseverations and the observations
of a witness who did not even know the accident victim
personally and who immediately gave a statement of the
incident similar to his testimony to the investigator
immediately after the incident, the latters testimony deserves
greater weight. As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination
of the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial
courts reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating
defendants assertion that he was driving at a safe speed.
While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of
speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected to
cross-examination and no attempt was made to question his
competence or the accuracy of his statement that defendant
was driving very fast. This was the same statement he gave
to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a
newspaper report (Exh. P). We see no compelling basis for
disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez testimony are not
borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez
testified that the scene of the accident was across the street
where his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away
(pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the
accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment.
The ownership of the Lambingan sa Kambingan is not
material; the business is registered in the name of his
mother, but he explained that he owns the establishment (p.
5, tsn., June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of
Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident transpired
(p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc.
Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified
that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain
has stopped and he was outside his establishment at the
time the accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991).
This was consistent with plaintiffs testimony that it was no
longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn.,
April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it was
raining all the way in an attempt to explain why he was
travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn., Oct. 14, 1991). As to
the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at
the scene only in response to a telephone call after the
accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We
find no substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguezs testimony
that would impair the essential integrity of his testimony or
reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial
courts acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we
note that Lis testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the
accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any
and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuelas
corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up
by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a
speed of 55 kph. when out of nowhere he saw a dark
maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiffs
car. He alleged that upon seeing this sudden apparition he
put on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.[9]
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence
to Lis disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations.
The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no
difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed
claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street,
and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had
ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if
he were alert - as every driver should be - to those
conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. Physiological fight or flight[10] mechanisms are at
work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs,
3
alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.[11] Lis failure to react
in a manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the two
factors: 1) that he was driving at a very fast speed as
testified by Rodriquez; and 2) that he was under the
influence of alcohol.[12] Either factor working independently
would have diminished his responsiveness to road
conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior
to reaching Valenzuelas car, rather than be in a situation
forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court
noted (quoted with approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San
Juan Police immediately after the incident, he said that while
driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark
maroon lancer right in front of him, which was plaintiffs car,
indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very
fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him,
because if he was not, then he could not have missed
noticing at a still far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at
the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency
lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff
who was then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan
Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs car in
front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and
slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary to his claim,
he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he
could have easily completely stopped his car, thereby
avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the
road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was
running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per
hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could
have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or
applying his brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his
testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more
believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes, but
simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-
coming car with glaring headlights, from the opposite
direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped
the car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right
beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him
to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a
collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora
Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at the center by a
dotted white paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars,
since her car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane
going to Cubao.[13]
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in
driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next
question for us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela
was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her
car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points
out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. [14] Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according
to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her
own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that
an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be
held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same
standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.[15] Under the emergency rule adopted by this
Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals,[16] an individual who
suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a
vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting
two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc
Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, that the driver therein,
Jose Koh, adopted the best means possible in the given
situation to avoid hitting the children. Using the emergency
rule the court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he
was in the wrong lane when the collision with an oncoming
truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by
the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled
by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at
a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run
the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to
help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and
assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of
Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the
hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to
other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake
St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself
and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under
the situation. As narrated by respondent court:
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota
Corona Car.[20] In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix
Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident
confirmed that Valenzuelas car was parked very close to the
sidewalk.[21] The sketch which he prepared after the
incident showed Valenzuelas car partly straddling the
sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists
passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was
itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.[22]
4
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and
could not be considered to have contributed to the
unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency
which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident
that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. Negligence, as it is commonly understood is
conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.[23] It
is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.[24] We stressed, in Corliss
vs. Manila Railroad Company,[25] that negligence is the
want of care required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in
the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly
negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis
that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a
heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the
street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on
record to show that he was under the influence of liquor.
Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing
with changing conditions on the road were significantly
lessened. As Prosser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an
automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles
at intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb
may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street,
and his failure to act properly when they appear may be
found to amount to negligence. [26]
Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation
confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his
own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Lis employer. In denying liability on the part
of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis testimony, that
the visit was in connection with official matters. His functions
as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform
work outside the office as he has to visit buyers and
company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the
accident he came from BF Homes Paraaque he did not have
business from the company (pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991).
The use ofthe company car was partly required by the nature
of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official
business is a benefit, apparently referring to the fringe
benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence
of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties,
the basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the
relationship of pater familias, which theory bases the liability
of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55
Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage must have occurred while an employee was
in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties
(Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341).
In defining an employers liability for the acts done within the
scope of the employees assigned tasks, the Supreme Court
has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to
impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called
for in the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial
courts finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the
company to use the company car either officially or socially
or even bring it home, he can be considered as using the
company car in the service of his employer or on the
occasion of his functions. Driving the company car was not
among his functions as assistant manager; using it for non-
official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of
the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon
the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier
quoted, there must be a showing that the damage was
caused by their employees in the service of the employer or
on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that
Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act
in furtherance of the companys business or its interests, or at
least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against
defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore
fail.[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in
question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior,
which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that
of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the
employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement
with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater
familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code,[28] we are of the opinion that Lis employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of
Appeals[29] upon which respondent court has placed undue
reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teachers
supervision of students during an extracurricular activity.
These cases now fall under the provision on special parental
authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which
generally encompasses all authorized school activities,
whether inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employers primary liability under the concept of
pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176)
of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced
showing that the employer exercised the required amount of
care in selecting its employees, half of the employers burden
is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however,
depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has
exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough
to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not
expected to exercise supervision over either the employees
private activities or during the performance of tasks either
5
unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes
of their employees with courtesy vehicles. These company
cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the
company itself or are subject to various plans through which
employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given
period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many
companies provide liberal car plans to enable their
managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars,
which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not
otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and
maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to
the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned
and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing
vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved
of responsibility when an accident involving a company-
issued car occurs during private use after normal office
hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide
cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road
worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives.
In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the
company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the
employee to whom the car has been given full use of the
said company car for company or private purposes will not
be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others.
When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company
car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every
good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company
employees are given the privilege of using a company-issued
car. For large companies other than those cited in the
example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves
important business purposes either related to the image of
success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the
public in general, or for practical and utilitarian reasons - to
enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its
sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases,
providing a company car serves both purposes. Since
important business transactions and decisions may occur at
all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of
guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a
company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial
employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for
a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the companys image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of
a company issued car are able to use the company issue
capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of
Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial
court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager
did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours
as he was required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and
meeting with company clients.[30] These meetings, clearly,
were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his
company with its clients, meetings with clients were both
social as well as work-related functions. The service car
assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore
enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the
front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latters
goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting
between Li and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on
the night of the accident because he was coming from a
social visit with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare
allegation which was never corroborated in the court below.
It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from
his officemates place, the same could give rise to
speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a
work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales
and other work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to
our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
No allegations were made as to whether or not the company
took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the
driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.[31] Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the
injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of
damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the
amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages,
while the said damages are not intended to enrich the
plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In
the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in
moral damages from an amount of P 1,000,000.00 to
P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified
considering the nature of the resulting damage and the
predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity
at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this,
Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of
the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of
hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required
to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and
months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and
therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to
be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her
lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause,
for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to
respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate
decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-
menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
6
changes which her body would normally undergo through the
years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented,
are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface
of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be
highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological
pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden
severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic
device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a
reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor
functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever
lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological
injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts
discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord
with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis
grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early
morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of
the court of Appeals is modified with the effect of
REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
HEDY GAN y YU vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide
thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201 of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided
by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor as minimum and two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum
and was made to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's
decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of
Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the
decision of the Court of Appeals,1 petitioner has come to this
Court for a complete reversal of the judgment below.
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as
follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about
8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was
driving a Toyota car along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of
house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard,
there were two vehicles, a truck and a
jeepney parked on one side of the road,
one following the other about two to three
meters from each other. As the car driven
by the accused approached the place
where the two vehicles were parked, there
was a vehicle coming from the opposite
direction, followed by another which tried
to overtake and bypass the one in front of
it and thereby encroached the lane of the
car driven by the accused. To avoid a
head-on collision with the oncoming
vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right
and as a consequence, the front bumper of
the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man
who was about to cross the boulevard from
south to north, pinning him against the rear
of the parked jeepney. The force of the
impact caused the parked jeepney to move
forward hitting the rear of the parts truck
ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured,
the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its
front, the jeep suffered damages on its
rear and front paints, and the truck
sustained scratches at the wooden portion
of its rear. The body of the old man who
was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was
immediately brought to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced)
dead on arrival.2
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was
filed against petitioner in view of the above incident. She
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case
was set for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-
investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial
fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner
during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972. The
grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the
complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by
an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack
of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved.
The Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of-
offense charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy
Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide thru simple
imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, she
is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months and eleven
(11) days of arresto mayor and to
indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the
sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(Pl2,000.00) without, however, any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
7
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following
assignments of errors:
I sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
when the petitioner saw a car travelling
directly towards her, she should have
stepped on the brakes immediately or in
swerving her vehicle to the right should
have also stepped on the brakes or
lessened her speed, to avoid the death of
a pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting
the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging
the petitioner liable to indemnify the
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00.4
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent
in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in
the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against
its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency
rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which
he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." 6
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the
petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the
brakes when she saw the car going in the
opposite direction followed by another
which overtook the first by passing towards
its left. She should not only have swerved
the car she was driving to the right but
should have also tried to stop or lessen her
speed so that she would not bump into the
pedestrian who was crossing at the time
but also the jeepney which was then
parked along the street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would
seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion
did not take into account the amount of time afforded
petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is
undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different
courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented
by the prosecution with respect to the relative distances of
petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming
overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did
have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her
instant decision to swerve her car to the light without
stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by
the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to
the police 8 stating::
And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako
sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake
sa sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung
kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin
kotse subalit siya naman biglang pagtawid
ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan
at ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang
buong pangyayari nang nasabing
aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own
evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have been
admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by
petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much
from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an
eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself
from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver
of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be
expected to act with all the coolness of a person under
normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner was
real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had
no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to
heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the
petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above
applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection
with the incident under consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of
the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due them,
had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting
petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the
P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to
the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
8
 [G.R. No. L-46558 : July 31, 1981.]
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
JESUS V. SAMSON, Respondents.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April
18, 1977, affirming with modification the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay
in Civil Case No. 1279, entitled “Jesus V.
Samson, plaintiff, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
defendant,” for damages.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff, the
following sums: P1988,000.00 as unearned
income or damages; P50,000.00 for moral
damages; P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation, or a total of
P273,000.00. Costs against the defendant.”
The appellate court modified the
decision, to wit:
“However, Plaintiff-Appellee, who has
been deprived of his job since 1954, is
entitled to the legal rate of interest on
the P198,000.00 unearned income from
the filing of the complaint (Sec. 8, Rule
cranad
51, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, with the modification
indicated above, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against
defendant-appellant.”
The complaint filed on July 1, 1954 by plaintiff
Jesus V. Samson, private respondent herein,
averred that on January 8, 1951, he flew as co-
pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi
with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte and Pili,
Camarines Sur, with Captain Delfin Bustamante
as commanding pilot of a C-47 plane belonging
to defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc., now the
herein petitioner; that on attempting to land
the plane at Daet airport, Captain Delfin
Bustamante due to his very slow reaction and
poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a
result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of
the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the
airplane crashlanded beyond the runway; that
the jolt caused the head of the plaintiff to hit
and break through the thick front windshield of
the airplane causing him severe brain
concussion, wounds and abrasions on the
forehead with intense pain and suffering (par.
cranad
6, complaint). :onad
The complaint further alleged that instead of
giving plaintiff expert and proper medical
treatment called for by the nature and severity
of his injuries, defendant simply referred him to
a company physician, a general medical
practitioner, who limited the treatment to the
exterior injuries without examining the severe
brain concussion of plaintiff (par. 7, cranad
complaint); that several days after the
accident, defendant Philippine Air Lines called
back the plaintiff to active duty as co-pilot, and
inspite of the latter’s repeated request for
expert medical assistance, defendant had not
given him any (par. 8, complaint); that as a
cranad
consequence of the brain injury sustained by
plaintiff from the crash, he had been having
periodic dizzy spells and had been suffering
from general debility and nervousness (par. 9, crana d
complaint); that defendant airline company
instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert
medical treatment, discharged the latter from
its employ on December 21, 1953 on grounds
of physical disability, thereby causing plaintiff
not only to lose his job but to become physically
unfit to continue as aviator due to defendant’s
negligence in not giving him the proper medical
attention (pars. 10-11, complaint). Plaintiff
above
cranad
prayed for damages in the amount of
P180,000.00 representing his unearned income,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses, or a
total of P255,000.00.
In its answer filed on July 28, 1954, defendant
PAL denied the substantial averments in the
complaint, alleging among others, that the
accident was due solely and exclusively to
inevitable unforeseen circumstances whereby
plaintiff sustained only superficial wounds and
minor injuries which were promptly treated by
defendant’s medical personnel (par. 5,
cranad
answer); that plaintiff did not sustain brain
injury or cerebral concussion from the accident
since he passed the annual physical and
medical examination given thereafter on April
24, 1951; that the headaches and dizziness
experienced by plaintiff were due to emotional
disturbance over his inability to pass the
required up-grading or promotional course
given by defendant company (par. 6, answer),
cra nad
and that, as confirmed by an expert neuro-
surgeon, plaintiff was suffering-from neurosis
and in view of this unfitness and disqualification
from continuing as a pilot, defendant had to
terminate plaintiff’s employment (pars. 7, 9,
cra nad
answer).
9
Further, defendant alleged that by the very
nature of its business as a common carrier, it is
bound to employ only pilots who are proficient
and in good mental, emotional and physical
condition; that the pilot, Captain Delfin
Bustamante, was a competent and proficient
pilot, and although he was already afflicted with
a tumor of the nasopharynx even before the
accident of January 8, 1951, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, in passing upon the
fitness of pilots, gave Capt. Bustamante a
waiver of physical standards to enable him to
retain his first class airman certificate since the
affliction had not in the least affected his
proficiency (pars. 16-17, answer). By way of
c ranad
counterclaim, defendant prayed for P10,000.00
as expenses for the litigation.
On March 25, 1958, defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint is
essentially a Workmen’s Compensation claim,
stating a cause of action not cognizable within
the general jurisdiction of the court. The Motion
to Dismiss was denied in the order of April 14,
1958. After the reception of evidence, the trial
court rendered on January 15, 1973 the
decision, the dispositive portion of which has
been earlier cited.
The defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
as being contrary to law and unsupported by
the evidence. It raised as errors of the trial
court (a) the holding that the damages
cra nad
allegedly suffered by plaintiff are attributable to
the accident of January 8, 1951 which was due
to the negligence of defendant in having
allowed Capt. Delfin Bustamante to continue
flying despite his alleged slow reaction and poor
judgment; (b) the finding that defendant was
cranad
negligent in not having given plaintiff proper
and adequate expert medical treatment and
assistance for the injuries allegedly sustained in
the accident of January 8, 1951; and (c) inc ranad
ordering defendant to pay actual or
compensatory damages, moral damages and
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.
On April 18, 1977, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision affirming the judgment of
the lower court but modified the award of
damages by imposing legal rate of interest on
the P198,000.00 unearned income from the
filing of the complaint, citing Sec. 8, Rule 51 of
the Rules of Court.
Its motion for reconsideration of the above
judgment having been denied, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. filed this instant petition
for Certiorari on the ground that the decision is
not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence, aside from its being replete with
findings in the nature of speculation, surmises
and conjectures not borne out by the evidence
on record thereby resulting to misapprehension
of facts and amounting to a grave abuse of
discretion (p. 7, Petition).
crana d
Petitioner raises the fundamental question in
the case at bar as follows: Is there a causal
connection between the injuries suffered by
private respondent during the accident on 8
January 1951 and the subsequent “periodic
dizzy spells, headache and general debility” of
which private respondent complained every now
and then, on the one hand, and such “periodic
dizzy spells, headache and general debility”
allegedly caused by the accident and private
respondent’s eventual discharge from
employment, on the other? PAL submits that
respondent court’s award of damages to private
respondent is anchored on findings in the
nature of speculations, surmises and
conjectures and not borne out by the evidence
on record, thereby resulting in a
misapprehension of facts and amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s submission is without merit.
As found by the respondent court, the following
are the essential facts of the case:
“It appears that plaintiff, a licensee
aviator, was employed by defendant a
few years prior to January 8, 1951 as a
regular co-pilot on a guaranteed basic
salary of P750.00 a month. He was
assigned to and/or paired with pilot
Delfin Bustamante.
Sometime in December 1950, he
complained to defendant through its
authorized official about the slow
reaction and poor judgment of pilot
Delfin Bustamante. Notwithstanding said
complaint, defendant allowed the pilot to
continue flying.
On January 8, 1951, the two manned
the regular afternoon flight of
defendant’s plane from Manila to
Legaspi, with stops at Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon
making a landing at Daet, the pilot, with
his slow reaction and poor judgment,
overshot the airfield and, as a result of
and notwithstanding diligent efforts of
plaintiff to avert an accident, the
airplane crash-landed beyond the
runway into a mangrove. The jolt and
impact caused plaintiff to hit his head
upon the front windshield of the plane
thereby causing his brain concussions
and wounds on the forehead, with
concomittant intense pain.
10
 Plaintiff was not given proper medical
attention and treatment demanded by
the nature and severity of his injuries.
Defendant merely referred him to its
clinic attended by general practitioners
on his external injuries. His brain injury
was never examined, much less treated.
On top of that negligence, defendant
recalled plaintiff to active duty as a co-
pilot, completely ignoring his plea for
expert medical assistance.
Suffering periodic dizzy spells, headache
and general debility, plaintiff every now
and then complained to defendant. To
make matters worst for plaintiff,
defendant discharged him from his
employment on December 21, 1953. In
consequence, plaintiff has been beset
with additional worries, basically
financial. He is now a liability instead of
a provider, of his family.
On July 1, 1954, plaintiff filed a
complaint for damages. Defendant vainly
sought to dismiss the complaint after
filing an answer. Then, the judgment
and this appeal.”
Continuing, the respondent Court of Appeals
further held:
“There is no question about the
employment of plaintiff by defendant,
his age and salary, the overshooting by
pilot Bustamante of the airfield and
crashlanding in a mangrove, his hitting
his head on the front windshield of the
plane, his intermittent dizzy spells,
headache and general debility for which
he was discharged from his employment
on December 21, 1953. As the lower
court aptly stated:
‘From the evidence adduced by
the parties, the Court finds the
following facts to be
uncontroverted: That the plaintiff
Jesus V. Samson, on January 8,
1951 and a few years prior
thereto, December 21, 1953, was
a duly licensed pilot employed as
a regular co-pilot of the
defendant with assignment in its
domestic air service in the
Philippines; that on January 8,
1951, the defendant’s airplane
met an accident in crashlanding
at the Daet Airport, Camarines
Norte by overshooting the
runway and reaching the
mangroves at the edge of the
landing strip; that the jolt caused
plaintiff’s head to hit the front
windshield of the airplane causing
him to suffer wounds and
abrasion on the forehead; that
the defendant, instead of giving
the plaintiff expert and proper
medical treatment called for by
the nature and severity of the
injuries of the plaintiff, simply
referred him to the clinic of the
defendant’s physicians who are
only general medical practitioners
and not brain specialists; that the
defendant’s physicians limited
their treatment to the exterior
injuries on the forehead of the
plaintiff and made no
examination of the severe
concussion of the brain of the
plaintiff; that the Medical Director
and Flight Surgeon of the
defendant were not able to
definitely determine the cause of
the complaint of the plaintiff as to
the periodic attack of dizziness,
spells and headache; that due to
this laxity of the defendant’s
physician and the continuous
suffering of the ailment of the
plaintiff complained of, he
demanded for expert medical
assistance for his brain injury and
to send him to the United States,
which demand was turned down
and in effect denied by the
defendant; that instead the
defendant referred the plaintiff to
a neurologist, Dr. Victor Reyes;
that from the time that said
accident occurred on January 21,
1953, he was ordered grounded
on several occasions because of
his complaint of dizzy spells and
headache; that instead of
submitting the plaintiff to expert
medical treatment as demanded
by him and denied by the
defendant, he was discharged
from its employment on
December 21, 1953 on the
ground of physical disability, and
that the plaintiff, at the time
when the defendant’s plane met
the accident, up to the time he
was discharged, was regularly
employed as a co-pilot and
receiving a basic salary of
P750.00 a month plus extra pay
for flying time, and bonuses
amounting to P300.00 a month.’
Even defendant-appellant itself admits
as not controverted the following facts
11
 which generally admit what have been
stated above as not controverted.
“In the case at bar, the following facts
are not the subject of controversy:
‘(1) First, that from July 1950 to
21 December 1953, plaintiff was
employed with defendant
company as a first officer or co-
pilot and served in that capacity
in defendant’s domestic services.
(2) Second, that on January
1951, plaintiff did fly on
defendant’s PI-C 94, as first
officer or co-pilot, with the late
Capt. Delfin Bustamante in
command as pilot; that while
making a landing at the Daet
airport on that date, PI-C 94 did
meet an accident as stated
above.
(3) Third, that at or about the
time of the discharge from
defendant company, plaintiff had
complained of “spells of
dizziness,” “headaches” and
“nervousness”, by reason of
which he was grounded from
flight duty. In short, that at that
time, or approximately from
November 1953 up to the date of
his discharge on 21 December
1953, plaintiff was actually
physically unfit to discharge his
duties as pilot.
(4) Fourth, that plaintiff’s
unfitness for flight duty was
properly established after a
thorough medical examination by
competent medical
experts.’ (pp. 11-12, appellant’s
c ralaw cra nad
brief)
hence, there can hardly be an issue,
factual, legal or medical.”
Taking exception from “the rest of the essential
facts of the case as found by the respondent
court” PAL claims said facts are not fully borne
out by the evidence on record and insists that
the injuries suffered by private respondent
during the accident on January 8, 1951 were
superficial in nature; that the “periodic spells,
headache, and general debility” complaint of
every now and then by private respondent
subsequent to the Jan. 8, 1951 incident were
due to emotional disturbances and that no
negligence can be attributed to Capt. Delfin
Bustamante much less to PAL for the
occurrence on January 8, 1951, hence PAL
cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner claims absence of any causal
connection between private respondent’s
superficial injuries and his alleged subsequent
“periodic spells, headache and general debility,”
pointing out that these subsequent ailments
were found by competent physician, including
an expert neuro-surgeon, to be due to
emotional disturbances insights the conclusions
of Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo that respondent’s
complaints were “psychosomatic symptoms” on
the basis of declarations made by respondent
himself, which conclusions are supported by
similar diagnosis made by Drs. Damaceno J.
Ago and Villaraza stating that respondent
Samson was suffering from neurosis as well as
the report of Dr. Victor Reyes, a neurological
specialist, indicating that the symptoms were
probably, most probably due to psychogenic
factors and have no organic basis.
In claiming that there is no factual basis for the
finding of the respondent court that the crash-
landing caused respondent’s “brain concussion
. ., with concomittant intense pain, for on the
cra
contrary, testimonial evidence establish the
superficiality of the injuries sustained by
respondent during the accident of January 8,
1951,” petitioner quotes portions of the
testimony of Dr. Manuel S. Sayas, who declared
that he removed the band-aid on the forehead
of respondent and that he found out after
removal that the latter had two contussed
superficial wounds over the supra orbiter
regions or just above the eyes measuring one
centimeter long and one millimeter deep. He
examined and found his blood pressure normal,
no discharges from the nose and ears. Dr.
Trajano V. Bernardo also testified that when he
examined respondent Samson three days after
the accident, the wound was already healed and
found nothing wrong with his ears, nose and
throat so that he was declared fit for duty after
the sixth day.
Petitioner goes further. It contends that there is
no causal connection between respondent’s
superficial injuries sustained during the accident
on January 8, 1951 and plaintiff’s discharge
from employment with PAL on December 21,
1953. According to PAL, it was the repeated
recurrence of respondent’s neurasthenic
symptoms (dizzy spells, headache,
c ranad
nervousness) which prompted PAL’s Flight
Surgeon, Dr. Bernardo, to recommend that
plaintiff be grounded permanently as
respondent was “psychologically unfit to resume
his duties as pilot.” PAL concludes that
respondent’s eventual discharge from
employment with PAL was effected for
absolutely valid reasons, and only after he was
thoroughly examined and found unfit to carry
out his responsibilities and duties as a pilot.
:onad
12
We agree with the respondent court in finding
that the dizzy spells, headache and general
debility of private respondent Samson was an
after-effect of the crash-landing and We find
that such holding is supported by substantial
evidence, which We quote from the court’s
decision, to wit:
“Defendant would imply that plaintiff
suffered only superficial wounds which
were treated and not brain injury. It
would, by the opinion of its company
doctors, Dr. Bernardo and Dr. Reyes,
attribute the dizzy spells and headache
to organic or as phychosomatic,
neurasthenic or psychogenic, which we
find outlandishly exaggerated.
That plaintiff’s condition as
psychosomatic rather than organic in
nature is allegedly confirmed by the fact
that on six (6) separate occasions after
cranad
the accident he passed the required CAA
physical examination for airman’s
certificate. (Exhs. 78, 79, 80, 81, 83
cranad
and 92). We noticed, however, that
there were other similar physical
examinations conducted by the CAA on
the person of plaintiff the report on
which were not presented in evidence.
Obviously, only those which suited
defendants cause were hand-picked and
offered in evidence.
We hesitate to accept the opinion of the
defendant’s two physicians, considering
that Dr. Bernardo admittedly referred to
Dr. Reyes because he could not
determine the cause of the dizzy spells
and headache and the latter admitted
that ‘it is extremely hard to be certain of
the cause of his dizzy spells,’ and
suggested a possibility that it ‘was due
to postraumatic syndrome, evidently due
to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in
hitting the forehead against the
windshield of the plane during the
accident.’ Judgment are not based on
possibilities.
The admitted difficulty of defendant’s
doctors in determining the cause of the
dizzy spells and headache cannot be a
sound basis for finding against the
plaintiff and in favor of defendant.
Whatever it might be, the fact is that
such dizzy spells, headache and general
debility was an after-effect of the crash-
landing. Be it brain injury or
psychosomatic, neurasthenic or
psychogenic, there is no gainsaying the
fact that it was caused by the crash-
landing. As an effect of the cause, not
fabricated or concocted, plaintiff has to
be indemnified. The fact is that such
effect caused his discharge.
We are prone to believe the testimony of
the plaintiff’s doctors.
Dr. Morales, a surgeon, found that blood
was coming from plaintiff’s ears and
nose. He testified that plaintiff was
suffering from cerebral concussion as a
result of traumatic injury to the brain
caused by his head hitting on the
windshield of the plane during the crash-
landing (Exhibit “G”).
cranad
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neurologist and
psychiatrist with experience in two
hospitals abroad, found abnormality
reflected by the electroencephalogram
examination in the frontal area on both
sides of plaintiff’s head (Exhibits “K”,
crana d
“K-1”).
The opinion of these two specialist
renders unnecessary that of plaintiff’s
wife who is a physician in her own right
and because of her relation to the
plaintiff, her testimony and opinion may
not be discussed here, although her
testimony is crystallized by the opinions
of Dr. Ador Dionisio, Dr. Marquez, Dr.
Jose O. Chan, Dr. Yambao and Dr.
Sandico.
Even the doctors presented by
defendant admit vital facts about
plaintiff’s brain injury. Dr. Bernardo
admits that due to the incident, the
plaintiff continuously complained of his
fainting spells, dizziness and headache
everytime he flew as a co-pilot and
everytime he went to defendant’s clinic
no less than 25 times (Exhibits “15” to
c rana d
“36”), that he complained of the same to
Dr. Reyes; that he promised to help
send plaintiff to the United States for
expert medical assistance provided that
whatever finding thereat should not be
attributed to the crash-landing incident
to which plaintiff did not agree and that
plaintiff was completely ignored by the
defendant in his plea for expert medical
assistance. They admitted that they
could not determine definitely the cause
of the fainting spells, dizziness and
headache, which justifies the demand for
expert medical assistance.”
We also find the imputation of gross negligence
by respondent court to PAL for having allowed
Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly on that fateful
day of the accident on January 8, 1951 to be
correct, and We affirm the same, duly
13
supported as it is by substantial evidence,
clearly established and cited in the decision of
said court which states as follows:
“The pilot was sick. He admittedly had
tumor of the nasopharynx (nose). He is
cra nad
now in the Great Beyond. The spot is
very near the brain and the eyes. Tumor
on the spot will affect the sinus, the
breathing, the eyes which are very near
it. No one will certify the fitness to fly a
plane of one suffering from the disease.
“. . The fact First Pilot Bustamante has a
cra
long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx
for which reason he was grounded since
November 1947 is admitted in the
letter (Exh. 69-A) of Dr. Bernardo to the
c ranad
Medical Director of the CAA requesting
waiver of physical standards. The
request for waiver of physical standards
is itself a positive proof that the physical
condition of Capt. Bustamante is short of
the standard set by the CAA. The Deputy
Administrator of the CAA granted the
request relying on the representation
and recommendation made by Dr.
Bernardo (See Exh. 69). We noted,
cra nad
however, that the request (Exh. 69-A)
c ranad
says that ‘it is believed that his
continuing to fly as a co-pilot does not
involve any hazard.’ (Italics supplied).
c ralaw c ranad
Flying as a First Officer entails a very
different responsibility than flying as a
mere co-pilot. Defendant requested the
CAA to allow Capt. Bustamante to fly
merely as a co-pilot and it is safe to
conclude that the CAA approved the
request thus allowing Bustamante to fly
only as a co-pilot. For having allowed
Bustamante to fly as a First Officer on
January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty of
gross negligence and therefore should
be made liable for the resulting accident.
As established by the evidence, the pilot used
to get treatments from Dr. Sycangco. He used
to complain of pain in the face more particularly
in the nose which caused him to have sleepless
nights. Plaintiff’s observation of the pilot was
reported to the Chief Pilot who did nothing
about it. Captain Carbonel of the defendant
corroborated plaintiff of this matter. The
complaint against the slow reaction of the pilot
at least proved the observation. The
observation could be disregarded. The fact that
the complaint was not in writing does not
detract anything from the seriousness thereof,
considering that a miscalculation would not only
cause the death of the crew but also of the
passengers.
One month prior to the crash-landing, when the
pilot was preparing to land in Daet, plaintiff
warned him that they were not in the vicinity of
Daet but above the town of Ligao. The plane hit
outside the airstrip. In another instance, the
pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not
plaintiff warned him. These more than prove
what plaintiff had complained of. Disregard
thereof by defendant is condemnable.
To bolster the claim that Capt. Bustamante has
not suffered from any kind of sickness which
hampered his flying ability, appellant contends
that for at least one or more years following the
accident of January 8, 1951, Capt. Bustamante
continued to fly for defendant company as a
pilot, and did so with great skill and proficiency,
and without any further accident or mishap,
citing tsn. pp. 756-765, January 20, 1965. We
have painstakingly perused the records,
particularly the transcript of stenographic notes
cited, but found nothing therein to substantiate
appellant’s contention. Instead, We discovered
that the citation covers the testimony of Dr.
Bernardo on the physical condition of
Bustamante and nothing about his skills or
proficiency to fly nor on the mishaps or
accidents, matters which are beyond Dr.
Bernardo’s competence anyway.
Assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the
tumor did not affect the pilot in managing the
plane, the evidence shows that the
overshooting of the runway and crash-landing
at the mangrove was caused by the pilot for
which acts the defendant must answer for
damages caused thereby. And for this
negligence of defendant’s employee, it is
liable (Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308). At
cranad
least, the law presumes the employer negligent
imposing upon it the burden of proving that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employees.
Defendant would want to tie plaintiff to the
report he signed about the crash-landing. The
report was prepared by his pilot and because
the latter pleaded that he had a family too and
would have nowhere to go if he lost his job,
plaintiff’s compassion would not upturn the
truth about the crash-landing. We are for the
truth not logic of any argumentation.
At any rate, it is incorrect to say that the
Accident Report (Exh. 12 & 12-A), signed by
cra nad
plaintiff, exculpated Capt. Bustamante from any
fault. We observed that the Report does not
categorically state that Capt. Bustamante was
not at fault. It merely relates in chronological
sequence what Capt. Bustamante and plaintiff
did from the take-off from Manila to the landing
in Daet which resulted in an accident. On the
contrary, we may infer the negligence of
14
Bustamante from the following portion of the
Report, to wit:
“. . I felt his brakes strong but as we
cra
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed

neared the intersection of the NE-SW

extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
runway, the brakes were not as strong
1733 and 1755.
and I glanced at the system pressure
which indicated 900 lbs. per sq. m.” The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on
the part of common carriers is for the safety of
It was during the above precise instance that
passengers as well as for the members of the
Capt. Bustamante lost his bearing and
crew or the complement operating the carrier,
disposition. Had he maintained the pressure on
the airplane in the case at bar. And this must
the brakes the plane would not have overshot
be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof
the runway. Verily, Bustamante displayed slow
will certainly result to the damage, prejudice,
reaction and poor judgment. (CA decision, pp.
nay injuries and even death to all aboard the
cranad

8-12).
plane, passengers and crew members alike.
This Court is not impressed by, much less can
Now to the damages. The Court of Appeals
We accept petitioner’s invocation to calibrate
affirmed the award of damages made by the
once again the evidence testified to in detail
trial court, stating that “the damages awarded
and plucked from the voluminous transcript to
plaintiff by the lower court are in accordance
support petitioner’s own conclusion. It is not
with the facts, law and jurisprudence.” The
the task of this Court to discharge the functions
court further observed that “defendant-
of a trier of facts much less to enter into a
appellant is still fortunate, considering that the
calibration of the evidence, notwithstanding
unearned income was reckoned with only up to
petitioner’s wail that the judgment of the
1968 and not up to the present as plaintiff-
respondent court is based entirely on
appellee is still living. Whatever mathematical
speculations, surmises and conjectures. We are
error defendant-appellant could show by
convinced that respondent court’s judgment is
abstract argumentation, the same must be
supported by strong, clear and substantial
compensated by such deficiency of the
evidence.
damages awarded to plaintiff-appellee.”
:onad

Petitioner is a common carrier engaged in the

business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the
public, as defined in Art. 1732, New Civil Code.
The law is clear in requiring a common carrier
to exercise the highest degree of care in the
discharge of its duty and business of carriage
and transportation under Arts. 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the New Civil Code. These Articles
provide:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
As awarded by the trial court, private
respondent was entitled to P198,000.00 as
unearned income or compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation, or a total of P273,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the sum of
P198,000.00 as unearned income or damages
by considering that respondent Samson “could
have continued to work as airline pilot for
fifteen more years, he being only 38 years at
the time the services were terminated by the
defendant (PAL) and he would have earned
cranad

P120,000.00 from 1954 to 1963 or a period of

the vigilance over the goods and for the safety
ten (10) years at the rate of one thousand per
of the passengers transported by them,
cra nad

month (P750.00 basic salary plus P300.00

according to all the circumstances of each case.
crana d

extra pay for extra flying time and bonuses;

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods is further expressed in Articles
1734, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755
and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry
the passenger safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
and considering further that in 1964 the basic
pay of defendant’s pilot was increased to
P12,000.00 annually, the plaintiff could have
earned from 1964 to 1968 the sum of
P60,000.00 in the form of salaries and another
P18,000.00 as bonuses and extra pay for extra
flying time at the same rate of P300 a month,
or a grand total of P198,000.00 for the entire
period. This claim of the plaintiff for loss or
impairment of earning capacity is based on the
provision of Article 2205 of the New Civil Code
of the Philippines which provides that “damages
may be recovered for loss or impairment of
15
earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury.” This provision of
law has been construed and interpreted in the
case of Aureliano Ropato, et al. vs. La Mallorca
General Partnership, 56 O.G., 7812, which rules
that law allows the recovery of damages for
loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases
of temporary or permanent personal
injury.” (Decision, CFI, pp. 98-99, Record on
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
Appeal)
The respondent appellate court modified the
above award by ordering payment of legal
interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income
from the filing of the claim, citing Sec. 8, Rule
51 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner assails the award of the total sum of
P198,000.00 as unearned income up to 1968 as
being tenuous because firstly, the trial court’s
finding affirmed by the respondent court is
allegedly based on pure speculation and
conjecture and secondly, the award of P300.00
a month as extra pay for extra flying time from
1954 to 1968 is likewise speculative. PAL
likewise rejects the award of moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 on the ground that
private respondent’s action before the trial
court does not fall under any of the cases
enumerated in the law (Art. 2219 of the New
Civil Code) for which moral damages are
recoverable and that although private
respondent’s action gives the appearance that it
is covered under quasi-delict as provided in Art.
21 of the New Civil Code, the definition of
quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code
expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the
parties, as in the case under consideration,
where an employer-employee relationship
existed between PAL and private respondent. It
is further argued that private respondent’s
action cannot be deemed to be covered by Art.
21, inasmuch as there is no evidence on record
to show that PAL “wilfully cause(d) loss or
injury to (private respondent) in a manner that
crana d
is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy . .” Nor can private respondent’s action
c ra
be considered “analogous” to either of the
foregoing, for the reasons are obvious that it is
not.” (Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 418-
c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry
421, Records)
Having affirmed the gross negligence of PAL in
allowing Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly the
plane to Daet on January 8, 1951 whose slow
reaction and poor judgment was the cause of
the crash-landing of the plane which resulted in
private respondent Samson hitting his head
against the windshield and causing him injuries
for which reason PAL terminated his services
and employment as pilot after refusing to
provide him with the necessary medical
treatment of respondent’s periodic spells,
headache and general debility produced from
said injuries, We must necessarily affirm
likewise the award of damages or compensation
under the provisions of Art. 1711 and Art. 1712
of the New Civil Code which provide:
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other
employers are obliged to pay compensation for
the death or injuries to their laborers,
workmen, mechanics or other employees, even
though the event may have been purely
accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause,
if the death or personal injury arose out of and
in the course of the employment. The employer
is also liable for compensation if the employee
contracts any illness or disease caused by such
employment or as the result of the nature of
the employment. If the mishap was due to the
employee’s own notorious negligence, or
voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer
shall not be liable for compensation. When the
employee’s lack of due care contributed to his
death or injury, the compensation shall be
equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the
negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the
employer shall be solidarily liable for
cranad compensation. If a fellow-worker’s intentional
or malicious act is the only cause of the death
or injury, the employer shall not be answerable,
unless it should be shown that the latter did not
exercise due diligence in the selection or
supervision of the plaintiffs fellow-worker.
The grant of compensatory damages to the
private respondent made by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court by computing
his basic salary per annum at P750.00 a month
as basic salary and P300.00 a month for extra
pay for extra flying time including bonus given
in December every year is justified. The correct
computation however should be P750 plus P300
x 12 months = P12,600 per annum x 10 years
= P126,000.00 (not P120,000.00 as computed
crana d
by the court a quo). The further grant of
increase in the basic pay of the pilots to
P12,000 annually for 1964 to 1968 totalling
P60,000.00 and another P18,000.00 as bonuses
and extra pay for extra flying time at the same
rate of P300.00 a month totals P78,000.00.
Adding P126,000.00 (1964 to
crana d 1968
compensation) makes a grand total of
P204,000.00 (not P198,000.00 as originally
c ranad
computed).
As to the grant of moral damages in the sum of
P50,000.00 We also approve the same. We
have noted and considered the holding of the
appellate court in the matter of bad faith on the
part of PAL, stated hereunder, this wise:
16
 “None of the essential facts material to
the determination of the case have been
seriously assailed: the overshooting of
runway and crash-landing into the
mangroves; the hitting of plaintiff’s head
to the front windshield of the plane; the
oozing of blood out of his ears, nose and
mouth; the intermittent dizzy spells,
headaches and general debility
thereafter for which he was discharged
from his employment; the condition of
not to attribute the cause of the ailment
to the crash-landing imposed in bad faith
for a demanded special medical service
abroad; and the resultant brain injury
which defendant’s doctors could not
understand nor diagnose.”
xxx
“The act of defendant-appellant in
unjustly refusing plaintiff-appellee’s
demand for special medical service
abroad for the reason that plaintiff-
appellee’s deteriorating physical
condition was not due to the accident
violates the provisions of Article 19 of
the Civil Code on human relations “to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” (CA
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
Resolution, pp. 151-152, Records)
We reject the theory of petitioner that private
respondent is not entitled to moral damages.
Under the facts found by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court and under the
law and jurisprudence cited and applied, the
grant of moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 is proper and justified.
The fact that private respondent suffered
physical injuries in the head when the plane
crash-landed due to the negligence of Capt.
Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of
the latter is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore
Article 2219, (2) New Civil Code is applicable,
cranad
justifying the recovery of moral damages.
Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that
there is an employer-employee relationship
between it and private respondent arising from
the contract of employment, private respondent
is still entitled to moral damages in view of the
finding of bad faith or malice by the appellate
court, which finding We hereby affirm, applying
the provisions of Art. 2220, New Civil Code
which provides that willful injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due.
The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
The justification in the award of moral damages
under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code on Human
Relations which requires that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith, as applied by respondent court is
also well-taken and We hereby give Our
affirmance thereto.
With respect to the award of attorney’s fees in
the sum of P20,000.00 the same is likewise
correct. As pointed out in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, “the plaintiff is entitled to
attorney’s fees because he was forced to litigate
in order to enforce his valid claim (Ganaban vs.
cranad
Bayle, 30 SCRA 365; De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz,
22 SCRA 33; and many others); defendant
acted in bad faith in refusing plaintiff’s valid
claim (Filipino Pipe Foundry Corporation vs.
cranad
Central Bank, 23 SCRA 1044); and plaintiff was
dismissed and was forced to go to court to
vindicate his right (Nadura vs. Benguet
cranad
Consolidated, Inc., 5 SCRA 879).”
We also agree with the modification made by
the appellate court in ordering payment of legal
interest from the date judicial demand was
made by Pilot Samson against PAL with the
filing of the complaint in the lower court. We
affirm the ruling of the respondent court which
reads:
“Lastly, the defendant-appellant claims
that the legal rate of interest on the
unearned compensation should be
computed from the date of the judgment
in the lower court, not from the filing of
the complaint, citing a case where the
issue raised in the Supreme Court was
limited to when the judgment was
rendered in the lower court or in the
appellate court, which does not mean
that it should not be computed from the
filing of the complaint.
Articles 1169, 2209 and 2212 of the Civil
Code govern when interest shall be
computed. Thereunder interest begins to
accrue upon demand, extrajudicial or
judicial. A complaint is a judicial
demand (Cabarroguis vs. Vicente, 107
c ranad
Phil. 340). Under Article 2212 of the Civil
Code, interest due shall earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may
be silent upon this point.” (CA
chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry
Resolution, pp. 153-154, Records).
The correct amount of compensatory damages
upon which legal interest shall accrue from the
filing of the complaint is P204,000.00 as herein
computed and not P198,000.00.
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
judgment of the appellate court is hereby
affirmed with slight modification in that the
correct amount of compensatory damages is
P204,000.00. With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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