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GARCES v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 180761; 9 August 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
Simplicio Hernandez Jr., Candido Hernandez, and Jeffrey Mangubat were
charged with the murder of Rustico Hernandez. They were acquitted.
According to the appellate court, while physical evidence was submitted,
primarily a gun, empty bullet shells recovered near the body of Rustico,
the slug recovered from the body of Rustico, the traces of blood and the
strands of hair recovered at the house of private respondents, these failed
to point to private respondents as the perpetrators of the killing. The gun
recovered was never established to have belonged to any of the private
respondents. Furthermore, the ballistics examination failed to confirm that
the slug recovered from the body of Rustico came from the same gun. As
for the traces of blood and strands of hair, these were never established to
have come from Rustico.
With regard to the testimonial evidence, the appellate court also gave no
credence to the testimonies of Miguel Jovello and Jefferson Garcia. Both
Jovello and Garcia testified that they saw Simplicio, Jr. and Candido at
around 11AM of 13 August 2000 traversing the barangay road while
carrying the dead body of Rustico with Simplicio, Sr. and Rosita walking
with them. Indeed, as observed by public respondent, if such fact actually
happened, there should have been many witnesses who could have
testified to this event. Settled is the rule that to be credible, testimonial
evidence should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but
should also be credible. In this case, the said testimonies are inconsistent
with human nature. It is unbelievable that private respondents would kill
Rustico and then expose themselves to prosecution by parading the
evidence of their crime in public and in broad daylight.
ISSUE:
What must be included in the contents of the judgment?
HELD:
Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall
state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission,; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3)
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
In the case at bar, there is clearly no moral certainty that can be arrived at
by the Court in convicting the accused. Physical and testimonial evidence
presented by the Prosecution have failed to elicit in the mind of the Court
the conclusion that the herein accused should and must be held criminally
liable for the heinous death of Rustico Garces. As a matter of fact, the
physical evidence in his case instead of strengthening only weakened its
case. These actuations of the accused eloquently speak of their innocence
in the face of unreliable evidence presented by the Prosecution.

Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA
TITLE: Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
CITATION: 219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27,
1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their
agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the
latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and
proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave
with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with
him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the
apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time
became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live
with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed
that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither sought
consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by
stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for
damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for
damages.
HELD:
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The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of
marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he
commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a
deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual
damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the
respondent.
BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97336
February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen,
exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted
private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the
condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They
then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited
Marilou’s parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he
forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude toward
her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill
her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the

barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he
was already married to someone living in Bacolod.
Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied
the accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he
discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor
of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).
It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic
regard for the private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth,
inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at
all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of
love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was
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nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that
the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise
of his right and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means
in equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition
of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by fraud.
Singson vs BPI
Singson vs BPI
23 SCRA 1117
FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which
judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein

Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff
therein. Said judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-
Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was
subsequently served upon BPI — in which the Singsons had a current
account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the Bank were
concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon
reading the name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as
a party defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself
that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant
Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the
garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in
favor of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation,
were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson
that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had
already been garnished and that they are now constrained to close his
credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ
of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the
bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been
inadvertently committed.
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Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a
plaintiff’s claim for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar
the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent
recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class
ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the
latter’s part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
“contractual both in origin and nature … the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort”.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was
remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and
his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of
nominal damages — the amount of which need not be proven — in the
sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would
suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s rights.
Vidar vs. People G.R. No. 177361

A person is killed, either by reason or on occasion of the robbery. To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4)
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is
the malefactors main purpose and objective, and the killing is merely incidental to
the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the
[1]
killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery.
Facts:
That on or about the 30th day of April 2001, at about 7:00 oclock
in the evening at Sitio Burabod, Barangay Poblacion, Bacon
District, Sorsogon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, armed with
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with intent to gain, enter the dwelling of one
Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda and once inside, took therefrom at
gunpoint a Cal. 45 pistol, a wallet containing P1,000.00 cash, a
crash helmet and a motorcycle all belonging to the said Sgt.
Julio D. Dioneda; that on the occasion of the said robbery and
for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away
the items above mentioned with ease, herein accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and taking advantage
of their superior number and strength and with intent to kill,
attack, assault and repeatedly shot the said Sgt. Julio D.
Dioneda, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds that
caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of
his legal heirs.
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Thus, the fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken
against them.[11] What is important is that their testimonies regarding the incident
bear the earmarks of truth and dependability.
Issue: WON the judgement is correct
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable
doubt the elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal
property was committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the
property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi;
and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide
which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.[29]
in relation to Article 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, the Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally,
the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the further sum of P5,500.00 as actual damages,
the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount
of P3,336,768.00 as unearned income and the amount
of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
As to damages, we find the amounts awarded by the trial court as modified by the
CA with respect to the amount of the loss of earning capacity to have been duly
substantiated and warranted. We see no cogent reason to reverse the same.

PANTALEON VS AMERICAN EXPRESS
G.R. No. 174269, May 8 2009 [Credit Transaction]
FACTS:
After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of
American Express Card to approve his credit card purchases worth
US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon commenced a complaint for
moral and exemplary damages before the RTC against American Express.
He said that he and his family experienced inconvenience and humiliation
due to the delays in credit authorization. RTC rendered a decision in favor
of Pantaleon. CA reversed the award of damages in favor of Pantaleon,
holding that AmEx had not breached its obligations to Pantaleon, as the
purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase
pattern.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to
Pantaleon.
2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.
RULING:
1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved “within
seconds,” there really is no strict, legally determinative point of
demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card company to
approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one specifically
contracted upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card
purchase.
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The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve
petitioner’s purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the
same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that AmEx’s
credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a
judgment, we see no reason why it could not have promptly informed
Pantaleon the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the
same could take some time.
2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply
because AmEx incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability
lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under Article 2217 of
the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat
unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was
a deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any
delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions –
gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by
the RTC.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style “ACG
Express Liner,”, petitioner,
vs
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, respondent
G.R. No. 164703
-------------
May 4, 2010
------------

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana
Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson,
an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing
Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast
ferry vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero
offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger
catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers
of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu
City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the
purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran
(SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between
Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each
vessel.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia,
and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family and
Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He
shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations,
transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for long
distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with
Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company
which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told
Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the
second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then
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staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter
but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his
calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with
Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in
Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite
repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go,
Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no
further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking
to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily
for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus
depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission
from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid
commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of
US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary damages,
including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to
Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of
AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no
act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion
was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was
likewise declared in default for failure to filehis answer within the
period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by
the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their
Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by
AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the
Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel
from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports
and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go

engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the
documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. As to the
inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFA’s
other on-going vessel construction, this was merely requested by Robinson
but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a
second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no transaction
whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show any such
shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute,
this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given
US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media
the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any case,
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of
the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7,
1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on
June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and
Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting
the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside the
trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.
The case before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for
review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and
Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
Issue:
(1) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the
respondents for breach of contract; and
(2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for
his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship
appointment by the principal, AFFA.
Held:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of
contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a
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contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing
another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract;
and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the
letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive
distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware of
the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact,
evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed
catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive
distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual
relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the
party who was inducted to break the contract can be held
liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly
held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the
sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso
equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION v. VIVIAN TAN LEE
G.R. No. 166869

FACTS: The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus
with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. On March 15,
2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant
Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a
vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of
respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical
injuries. On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint in her
own behalf and in behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages
against petitioner. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the
death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment
expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the
motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
Petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or
lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its employees, including Margarito Avila.
The trial court adjudged Avila of simple negligence and ordered Philippine
Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila to pay Vivian Tan jointly and
solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of earnings and actual
damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. It found that before the
collision, the motorcycle was on the left side of the road, just as the
passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was in a running
position moving toward the right side of the highway. The trial court
agreed with the bus driver that the motorcycle was moving ahead of the
bus from the left side of the road toward the right side of the road, but
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disagreed that the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus while the bus was
running on the right side of the road. The trial court held that if the bus
were on the right side of the highway, and Margarito Avila turned his bus
to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the motorcyle, then the bus
would not have hit the passenger jeep, which was then parked on the left
side of the road. The fact that the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed
that the bus must have been running from the right lane to the left lane of
the highway, which caused the collision with the motorcycle and the
passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road. The trial court stated
that since Avila saw the motorcycle before the collision, he should have
stepped on the brakes and slowed down, but he just maintained his speed
and veered to the left. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court with modification in the award of damages.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and
whether negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident,
resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to
respondent/ whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages;
and
(2) whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals
are proper.
HELD:
1) The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in
him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests
were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It
also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping

incidents. A review of the records showed that it was petitioners witness,
Efren Delantar Ong, who was about 15 meters away from the bus when he
saw the vehicular accident. Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the
finding of the trial court that petitioners bus driver, Margarito Avila, was
guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a
defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of
risks. In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the
road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the
collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down,
but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep
parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in
veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger
jeep.
2) As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that it
was the only one that appealed the decision of the trial court with respect
to the award of actual and moral damages; hence, the Court of Appeals
erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of respondent, who did
not appeal from the trial courts decision. This contention is unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated
in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon
plain errors and clerical errors.
P a g e | 10
The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that
in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4,
Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just decision of the case.
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the
death of respondents husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for
the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages
granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court overlooked
awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in
her Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded
respondent the sum of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity
(P590,000.00) and actual damages (P155,575.00 for funeral expenses),
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner assigned as error the award of damages by the trial court on the
ground that it was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not the
admissions made by respondent during the trial. In its Decision, the Court
of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and
actual damages, although the amount of the latter award was modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided
for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is

awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn
money. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite
the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.
In this case, the records show that respondents husband was leasing and
operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent
testified that her husband earned an annual income of one million pesos.
Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax
Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that respondents
husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to
use the Certificate and respondents testimony as bases for fixing the gross
annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before respondents
husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was
presented regarding the income derived from their copra business; hence,
the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross
earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living
and other incidental expenses. In the absence of documentary evidence, it
is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the
gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses
at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).
P a g e | 11
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Net Earning = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income Reasonable and
Capacity [2/3 (80-age at the (GAI) Necessary time of death)] Expenses
(80% of GAI)
X = [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 – P800,000.00
X = 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 – P100,000.00
(Living Expenses)
X = 30/3 x P100,000.00
X = 10 x P100,000.00
X = P1,000,000.00
The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses
incurred in connection with the death, wake, and interment of respondents
husband in the amount ofP154,575.30, and the medical expenses of
respondent in the amount of P168,019.55. Actual damages must be
substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove
expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical
injuries sustained by the victim. A review of the valid receipts submitted in
evidence showed that the funeral and related expenses amounted only
to P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted only
to P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in actual damages.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of respondents
husband. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he/she has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and
must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate damages in
the amount of P10,000.00 for the damage caused on respondents
motorcycle. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. The cost of the repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by
respondent in her Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely
a job estimate of the cost of the motorcycles repair amounting to P17,
829.00. The Court of Appeals aptly held that there was no doubt that the
damage caused on the motorcycle was due to the negligence of petitioners
driver. In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage caused on
the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate
damages by the appellate court in the amount of P10,000.00 was
reasonable under the circumstances.
The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded respondent moral damages
for the physical injuries she sustained due to the vehicular accident. Under
Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in quasi-
delicts causing physical injuries. However, the award of P50,000.00
should be reduced to P30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent
civil indemnity for the death of her husband, which has been fixed by
current jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The award is proper under Art. 2206
of the Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 17, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860 is
hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and Margarito Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount
P a g e | 12
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount
of One Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two
Pesos and Eighty-Five Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c) moral damages in the
amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of
earning capacity in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and
(e) temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00).
PACIS VS. MORALES
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES
G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010
FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages
against respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died
in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions
Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and
Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales
was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store
customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a

drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the
store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from
the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun,
the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the
gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the
bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag,
however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the
exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for
homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of
their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual
damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the
plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision
and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
P a g e | 13
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s
Decision reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’
son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under
Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their
claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners
opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s
own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such

fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and
Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to
Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in
P a g e | 14
his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition
when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With
more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded
precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never
accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open
and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.
For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent
had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms
to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence
required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required

of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from
liability in this case.
PACIS v MORALES
Topic: Owners and managers of establishments and enterprises
DOCTRINE: A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in
his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous
in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
FACTS: Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages
against Jerome Jovanne Morales. Spouses Paceis are the parents of Alfred,
17 y.o. who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and
Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Morales is the owner.
Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while
he was at gunstore. The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun
brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair. The gun, was left by
Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who
was the regular caretaker of the gun store was also not around. Jarnague
entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys which included the
key to the drawer where the gun was kept. It appears that Matibag and
P a g e | 15
Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and palced it in top
of the table. Attacted by it, Alfred got hold of it. Matibag asked Alfred to
return the gun. Alfred followed but it went off the bullet hitting Alfred.
The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of Alftred under
A2180 in relation to A2176, ruling that the accidental shooting of Alfred
which caused his death was partyl due to the negligence of Morales’
emplyee – Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was no employee-
employer relationship because Matibag was not under the control of
Morales with respect to the means and methods in the performance of his
worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if Matibag was an employee,
Morales still cannot be held civilly liable because there is no negligence
can be attributed to Morales because he kept the gun.
ISSUE: WON Morales is civilly liable?
RULING: YES. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the
gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it
was not loaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales
himself was negligent.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and
Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to
Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in
his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Morales
has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms

should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the
firearms are not needed for ready access defensive use.
In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault.
Before accepting the defective gun for repair, Morales should have made
sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed,
Morales should never accept a firearm from another person, until the
cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is
completely unloaded
Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required
of a good father of a family, much less the The bullet which killed Alfred
was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
Choice of claim of petitioners
This case for damages arouse out of the accidental shoting of
Alfred. Under A1161 of the Civil Code petitioners may enforce their
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under
Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code.
In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide
case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil
action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s
employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE: Morales is civilly liable to petitioners because he was
negligent.
P a g e | 16
Heirs of Completo v. Albayda, Jr.
Heirs of Redentor Completo, and Elpidio Abiad v. Sgt. Amando Albayda,
Jr.
2010 / Nachura [Negilgence > Standard of conduct > Special
circumstance]
Facts
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the
taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was
riding a bike on his way to the office, when Completo’s taxi bumped and
sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was
brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was transferred to
the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and there was no
orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital. He was confined from 27
Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7
months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint
for physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-
charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against
Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for Albayda’s complaint, and Completo’s complaint [against
Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad.
Albayda alleged that Completo’s negligence is the proximate cause of
the incident. He demanded the following damages and their respective
amounts: Actual damages – 276,550; Moral damages –
600,000; Exemplary damages – 200,000; Attorney’s fees – 25,000 + 1,000
per court appearance.

On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the
taxicab when he heard a strange sound from the taxicab’s rear right side.
He found Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought
Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was
an experienced driver, and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even
before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at
high speed, causing him to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that
Albayda had no cause of action.
Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the
testimony of the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside
from being a soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger
jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to
personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a taxicab driver,
Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s
license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since he was
employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and
good man.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are
ordered to pay actual [46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney’s fees
[25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, the court affirmed RTC’s decision with
modifications [no more actual damages; awarded temperate damages
[40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable
to pay Albayda; added legal interest].
Issues and Holding
1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the
collision. NO
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of the family. YES
3. WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees
for Albayda had no basis. NO / NO / YES
Ratio
P a g e | 17
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care
owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise
the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. NCC 2176
quoted, and said that the question of the motorist’s negligence is a question
of fact. Usually, more will be required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec]
than a bicyclist [10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care
because of the physical advantages the former has over the latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to
exercise reasonable diligence.
 He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda’s bicycle; he did not
slow down even when he approached the intersection
 Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries
sustained by Albayda
 It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the
intersection ahead of Completo
NCC 2180 cited – obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is demandable also
for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for
damage caused by employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that
employers observed the diligence of the good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of employees. The burden of proof is on the
employer. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for QD
is solidary. The employer’s civil liability for his employee’s negligent acts
is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and
supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not in
the vehicle at the time of collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect
to supervision, employers should formulate SOPs and monitor their

implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
[secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
ABIAD’S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE
LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.
On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because Albayda failed
to present documentary evidence to establish the amount incurred.
Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. Moral damages are awarded in QDs causing physical injuries, so
the award is proper. The award of attorney’s fees is deleted for failure to
prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent’s
just and valid claim.
OMC Carriers vs. Nabua Spouses
This is a simple case of vehicular accident involving the tanker of OMC
and the vehicle driven by the child of spouses Nabua. While making a
turn, said tanker driven by Aalucas hit the right side of the vehicle driven
by the 18 year old victim. He was mortally wounded by reason of the
collision resulting in his death. The Nabuas, filed a case with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for damages. After trial, the court found OMC and
Aalucas liable for damages. Both respondents appealed the decision before
the Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed the RTC decision. OMC
and Aalucas then field a petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court
P a g e | 18
questioning the decision on the ground that OMC exercised due diligence
in hiring Aalucas.
Damages are Reduced
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for Certiorari and
reduced the amount of the damages awarded to the spouses. The Supreme
Court determined that the proximate cause of the death of the victim was
the negligence of the driver Aalucas. The Supreme Court did not find any
reason to disturb the findings of the lower courts. On the defense that
OMC exercised due diligence in hiring their driver, the Court said that
OMC “failed to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer” (G.R. 148974, July 2, 2010).Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides: “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage.” It is then the burden of the employer to prove
that it exercised due diligence. In this case, the Court is not convinced.
G.R. No. 148974 : July 2, 2010
OMC CARRIERS, INC and JERRY AÑALUCAS y PITALINO,
Petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO C. NABUA and ROSARIO T. NABUA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 4, 1995, at about 3:00 pm, an Isuzu private tanker with plate
no. PCH 612, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner OMC
Carriers, Inc. and then being driven by its employee Jerry P. Añalucas,
was cruising along Quirino Highway towards the general direction of
Largo, Quezon City. At Barangay Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City,
the aforesaid private tanker hit a private vehicle, an Isuzu Gemini with

plate no. NDF 372, which was making a left turn towards a nearby Caltex
Gasoline station. The impact heavily damaged the right side portion of the
latter motor and mortally injured its 18-year-old driver, Reggie T. Nabua,
who was later pronounced dead on arrival at the Fairview Polymedic
Hospital.
Respondent spouses Berlino and Rosario Nabua, the parents of the victim,
filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners and the General
Manager of OMC Carriers, Chito Calauag, before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 224. On January 19, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision of
which was in favor of the plaintiffs. The petitioners then appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA. On December 28, 1999, the CA rendered a decision
which affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications.
ISSUES: (1) WON the OMC Carriers, Inc demonstrated the
diligence of good father of a family.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTC’s
award of ₱60, 000.00 as death indemnity and ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages. In addition that the award of attorney’s fees was
without legal basis.
RULING:
(1) No. the defendant company failed to produce in court any record
or other documentary proof tending to establish that it had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding
the calls therefore by both the trial court and the opposing counsel,
argues strongly against its pretensions.
(2) Death indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at ₱50,000.00.
Hence, the amount awarded by the RTC and the CA must be
reduced accordingly. On the issue of moral damages, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes moral damages of ₱50,000.00 for death. The
rule on the award of attorney’s fees is that there must be a
jkdhfkdsjustification for the same. On this note, after reading
P a g e | 19
through the text of the CA decision, this Court finds that the same
is bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify the award of
attorney’s fees.
Manaloto v. Veloso III (Case Digest)
Manaloto v. Veloso III
G.R. No. 171365
October 6, 2010
Facts:
This case stems from an unlawful detainer case filed by Ermelinda
Manaloto et al., who are the lessors to of residential house, which was
leased to respondent Ismael Veloso III at the rate of Php17,000 per month.
The action for unlawful detainer was instituted because of Veloso’s failure
to pay the monthly rent from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite
the petitioner’s repeated demands. Veloso, however, denied the
nonpayment of rentals, alleging that he made advance payments when he
spent Php825,000 for the repairs done on the leased property.
While the case was still on appeal, the petitioner lessors published the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, who ruled in favor of the lessors.
Copies of the decision were distributed to the homeowners of Horseshoe
Village, which caused Veloso to be the talk of the town and his good name
to be greatly damaged.
Issue:
Were the petitioners correct in publishing the MeTC’s decision while the
case was still on appeal?
Ruling:
No. The petitioners are obliged to respect the respondent’s good name
 P a g e | 20

even though they are opposing parties in a detainer case. Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. A violation of such principle
constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. Petitioners are also
expected to respect Veloso’s dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of
mind under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
than 2.9 million breakdown, 2.4 million was billed for Ilusorio’s
sponsorship of guests from April 1995 to July 1999. In Ilusorio’s reply to
Manzanal’s letter of demand, he did not contradict the fact that his work
partners and employees used his unit, admitting that he welched on his
undertaking in the contract that only family members are allowed free
usage. Ilusorio, however, said that he should not be charged for the use of
the unit as he is entiled to its use and enjoyment being the owner thereof.

Because of the constant demand letters, Ilusorio took the matter to the
Manzanal v. Ilusorio Regional Trial Court. He felt that the demand letters were a form of
G.R. No. 189311 harassment from his family, so he filed a complaint for damages. Instead
December 6, 2010 of answering, Manzanal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action, which the trial court granted. Manzanal
DENNIS R. MANZANAL and BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB explained that the act of sending a demand letter does not constitute a
CORPORATION, Petitioners cause of action against the obligee or creditor. However, upon appeal, the
vs. Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision.
RAMON K. ILUSORIO, Respondent
Issues:
Facts: Was the complaint for damages filed by Ramon Ilusorio against petitioner
On July 7, 1994, a penthouse at the Baguio Country Club (BCCC) Dennis Manzanal and Baguio City Country Club Corporation state a cause
building was assigned by Felix Adolfo Lopez, Jr., with the conformity of of action?
BCCC, to Ramon Ilusorio. Ilusorio had lived there for years, but conflict Can BCCC collect the unpaid balance from Ilusorio?
within his family arose in 1998. Suddenly, he was barred from using the
unit and was almost expelled as member of the club. Ilusorio sent a letter Ruling:
to BCCC to request for his current statement of account. BCCC replied No. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the
and charged him with Php102,076.74, which he paid under protest. right of another, entitling the injured party to relief. Its existence is
determined from the allegations in the complaint. To sustain Ilusorio’s
Then he requested a breakdown of the amount, which BCCC, through assertions that his complaint states a cause of action would be to rule that
Dennis Manzanal, complied with. In the answer, the breakdown amounted the act of sending a demand letter by itself constitutes a cause of action.
to Php2,928,223.26. Because this was much bigger than what Ilusorio The Court found that the demand letters did not deviate from the standard
paid, BCCC demanded that he pay the unpaid charges. Out of the more practice of pursuing the satisfaction of a club member’s obligations.
 P a g e | 21

its counsel. The LCN Construction, as the only remaining claimant against
Yes. The Supreme Court cited Cebu Country Club, Inc., v. Elizagaque, the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment
which also cites Article 19 in relation with Article 21 of the Civil Code, on/Opposition to the Motion of payment filed by counsel of petitioner, and
which provide argued that RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation
expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by the counsel
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the for petitioner for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court. It also
observe honesty and good faith. averred that claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate
of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in they have been paid. The RTC issued its Order taking note that "the widow
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall and the heirs of the deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not received
compensate the latter for the damage. their respective share in the Estate." The RTC declared that there was no
more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate. LCN
As an exclusive organization that derives life from membership fees and sought recourse from the Court of Appeals and promulgated a Decision
charges, BCCC is expected to enforce claims from members in default of ruling in favor of LCN.
their contractual obligations.
Issue:
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code and results in damages to 1. WON the award in favor of the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere is
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must already a distribution of the residue of the estate - YES
be held responsible. There is a need to connect Article 19 with Article 21
because the former does not provide a remedy for its violation. Held:

Quasha v. LCN Construction, 1. While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the
G.R. No. 174873 | 26 August 2008 RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a distribution of the residue of
Topic: Partition; Distribution of the estate the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still,
they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate.
Facts: Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded
shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or
Raymond Triviere passed away and a proceeding for the settlement of his provided for.
intestate estate was instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere and
 P a g e | 22

In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to

permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion
should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is not
affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of
advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must
post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).There is
no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and
widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its
obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least,
took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely
silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single
sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet
received their respective shares from the estate after all these years.