Que vs.

Atty Revilla

In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before
the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that
these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also
repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property
subject of the unlawful detainer case;

(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order
to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own
personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute
the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by
fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which
allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case.
The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of
preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in
supporting the above falsehood.[4]

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed
the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the
previous counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in

the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;

(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being
authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

 In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development
Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the
homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases
formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled
by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents
present clients were the defendants.

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his
sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect
the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based
on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer
case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the
complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did
not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted
that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of
his clients.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of
the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the
respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had taken
during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.

The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from
the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out
of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on
forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in
the second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation
whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic
of the Philippines.The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the
Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case.[6]

The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or
immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his
dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice
and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the
disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe
to grind against him.

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the present complaint
violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a
complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and
defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized
members of the KDC.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

 Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan[8] (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan)
found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he
stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and
rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally
true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and
majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain
and defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He
may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-
shopping.[9]

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted
the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions
of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.[10]

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in
filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition
for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful
detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11]

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence
showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for
annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding
judge, all of which were untrue. [12]

On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents explanation
that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already
deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating
Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the
authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping
requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument
regarding his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well
that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and
on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-
2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the
respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14]

The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions
should carry.

The Courts Ruling

 Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving
the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders,
Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures
and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency
subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the
final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA
held:

Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy,
still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the
ejectment case.[17]

Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again
questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for
annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer
for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this
petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-
38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved
in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of
legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment
of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the
same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged
nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed
in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition
for annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents
persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against
his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
 Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means
allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled
for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the
respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it
obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed
against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of
court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial
procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[23]

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions
involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to
secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is
most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both
geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had
become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City,
the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud
was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:

In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file
the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants
therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by
a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them
when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his
defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) [24]

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that
the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no
doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it
involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another
violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor
General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a)
the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the
proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without
its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as
counsel for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic
to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients
what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both
counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge,
in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs
and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis
theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the
respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys
motion to dismiss.[28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents
application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse
party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of
stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the
allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.

how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and
legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or
iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the
Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the
respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all
squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly
transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings
with the court. This provision states:

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31] The
respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable
participant in the administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and
truthfully in his work.[33]His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or
to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. [34] In
case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF LAW

Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals
or institute clearly groundless actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the
execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule
expressly prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of
deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.

We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his
accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases
previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition
for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was
filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the
respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now
dead and unable to defend himself.

Unauthorized appearances

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented
parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in
the second petition for annulment of title.[38]

In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did
not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority
of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the
necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could
have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice
of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from
the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously
associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of
compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of
appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the
respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in
actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of
forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs
his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he
undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant
without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without
leave of court.[40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes
contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for
professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses

We find no merit in the respondents defenses.

Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction
unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are
states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from
the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.

In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his
clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all
obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That
he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably
strengthen the presence of bad faith.

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the
soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC
decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The
succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims;
these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful
detainer judgment against his clients.

On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not
amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case. [44] As we explained
in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense
of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to
his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as
well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the
law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and
common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his
client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because
the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument,
considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only
the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the
respondent.

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is
mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant
in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance.
For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information
of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que
and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the
Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law
should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of
suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns
for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court
is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in
the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the
legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client
can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession
and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction
of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We
cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past
experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December
17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable
for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the
IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10910
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594)

ANTERO M. SISON, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERCURIAM:

In his verified affidavit-complaint,1 dated September 17, 2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD), complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty.
Sison), president of Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty.
Manuel Camacho (Atty. Camacho) with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He
accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement
without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to render an accounting of funds which were
supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.

Complaint's Position

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action against
Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed as Civil Case No. 05-655,
before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of MDAHI
against Paramount Insurance was P14,863,777.00.

On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate secretary
of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their claim to P64,412,534. l 8 by taking into account the interests
imposed. Atty. Camacho, however, clarified that the increase in the claim would require additional
docket fees in the amount of Pl,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written computation.2 MDAHI agreed
and granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced by a Payment Request/Order
Form.3 On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who
promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but never did.4

Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a decision5 in favor of
MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.

On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter6 to MDAHI recommending a settlement with
Paramount Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a
protracted appeal with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not
indicate its conforme on the letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity
of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,7 dated August 15, 2011, before the R TC
stating that the parties had entered into a compromise agreement.

On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events that transpired.8 He asked
Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the latter
replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.

Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison sent a letter, 9 dated August 24, 2011,
stating that he was alarmed that the former would accept a disadvantageous compromise; that it was
against company policy to bribe any government official with respect to the Pl,288,260.00 given to the
clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.

Respondent's Position

In his verified answer,10 dated October 30, 2012, Atty. Camacho denied all the allegations against him.
He stressed that he had the authority to enter into the compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged
docket fees given to him by MDAHI formed part of his attorney's fees.

He further stated in his position paper11 that the judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI
without any objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.12 Thus, there was no
irregularity in the compromise agreement.

With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to Compel
Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011 before the RTC. The Court granted the said
motion in its April 12, 2012 Order13 stating that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 was considered as part of
his attorney's fees.

On July 6, 2012, the R TC issued an Order14 resolving the motion for reconsideration filed by both parties
in favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that only P300,000.00 was previously paid
to Atty. Camacho15 as attorney's fees. Based on the foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount
of Pl,288,260.00 which he received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that
the said RTC order had attained finality and constituted res judicata on the present administrative case.
He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an estafa case against him concerning the
amount ofl:ll,288,260.00.

Report and Recommendation

After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and
Recommendation,16 dated April 1, 2013 finding Atty. Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule
1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law against him. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-474,17 dated April 16,
2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Board) adopted the said report
and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera.

Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration18 before the Board reiterating that the
compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI did not reject the same and that the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees.

In his Comment/Opposition,19 Atty. Sison countered that Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the
satisfaction of judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and that there was ca pending estafa
case against him before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 13-1688, regarding the Pl,288,260.00 handed to him.

In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10, 2014, the Board adopted the report and
recommendation21of National Director Dominic C.M. Solis. The Board partially granted the motion for
reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice, the charge regarding the failure to account for the
money, because it was premature to act on such issue due to the pending criminal case against the
Atty. Camacho. Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year suspension imposed was lowered to six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.
Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.

Entering into a compromise

agreement without written
authority of the client

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no
man for money or malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.22

In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate compromise agreements for the benefit of their
clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [ s ]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the
following cases: xxx (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to
appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription
already acquired xxx."

In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
specifies a stringent requirement with respect to compromise agreements, to wit:

Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In the case at bench, the R TC decision, dated May 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI approximately
P65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance offered a compromise settlement in the amount of
Pl5,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that MDAHI never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned
from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI did not sign the conforme regarding the compromise agreement.23

Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment
award on behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the R TC. The said pleading also
failed to bear the conformity of his client.24 Although MDAHI subsequently received the payment of
P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does not erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the
compromise agreement without the prior consent of his client.

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho
violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that " [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Members of the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.25

Failing to account for the money of the client

Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer's
duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."

Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount of P 1,288,260.00 as payment of
additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty.
Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI allegation as
unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on
the other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide such issue because there was a pending
estafa case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI against Atty. Camacho involving
the same amount of P 1,288,260.00.

The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his
failure to account for the money of his client. The pending case against him is criminal in nature. The
issue therein is whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 entrusted to him by his client. The present case, however, is administrative in character,
requiring only substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of whether Atty. Camacho violated
his solemn oath by failing to account for the money of his client. Evidently, the adjudication of such
issue in this administrative case shall not, in any way, affect the separate criminal proceeding.

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.1âwphi1 The only concern of the Court is the
determination of the respondent's administrative liability. The findings in this case will have no material
bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. While a lawyer's
wrongful actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each
must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the
facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.26

Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule
16.01 of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the
latter obediently granted the amount of Pl ,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood that
such amount was necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-
655. Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied that
he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the said amount was
pocketed by him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it was unmistakably clear
that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by his client for its intended legal purpose.

Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving
such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said amount formed part of his
attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is grossly contradictory to the established purpose of the
Pl,288,260.00. In its Payment Request/Order Form,27 it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released
the said amount only to be applied as payment for additional docket fees, and not for any other
purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it constitutes a
mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a
perilous path where the payment of his attorney's fees is more important than his fiduciary and faithful
duty of accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not entitled to
unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them
attorney's fees.28

Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he received the said
amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort,29 the Court held that ethical and practical considerations made it both
natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the
receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is
accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging
MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in the amount of approximately P.65,000,000.00. From that date
on, there was no more need for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the judgment,
MDAHI subsequently released the money for additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it
to Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not
reject the said amount or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead, he unilaterally withheld the said
amount by capriciously invoking the payment of his attorney's fees.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A
lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him
by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.30

Administrative penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted
to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.31

In Luna v. Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he
accepted a compromise agreement without valid authority and he failed to tum over the payment to
his client. In the case of Melendrez v. Decena,33 the lawyer therein was disbarred because he entered
into a compromise agreement without the special authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and
dishonest contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses III,34 another lawyer, who misappropriated the
money entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or refused to account for despite repeated
demands, was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty and good moral character rendered him
unworthy of public confidence.

In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the conformity of his client
which is evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to
account for the money he received from his client, which was supposed to be paid as additional docket
fees. He even had the gall to impute that the money was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The
palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be countenanced by the Court for these constitute as
a blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to his client.

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the Bar. His
actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of
the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty.
Camacho deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of Pl,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in his
professional capacity for payment of the purported additional docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative liability, which must
include those intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness

Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay for additional docket fees which he received from the latter
in the amount of P 1,288,260.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records
of respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360 November 19, 2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)

DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case stems from an Amended Administrative Complaint1 dated October 6,
2008 filed by Dorothy Fe MahArevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of
Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 (RTC), before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against Judge
Celso L. Mantua (respondent) of the same court, accusing him of Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, 2 Gross Violation of
the Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and Gross Ignorance of the Law.

The Facts

In the said complaint, it was alleged that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his
chamber, as his residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff,
especially by a former Utility Worker of the Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez
(Nuñez); (c) used the court process server, Benjamin Pepito (Pepito), as his personal driver; (d)
delegated his work load tohis legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape (Atty. Mape), because he could no
longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance of the law when, in
one criminal case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to testify
in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and furthermore, extorted money from
the accused in the amount of ₱200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal allowance, and other
benefits from the local government; and (g) failed to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period
because he was waiting for litigants to offer him monetary consideration.3

In response to the OCA’s 1st Indorsement4 dated February 13, 2009 directing him to comment on the
complaint, respondent submitted an undated comment5 denying all accusations against him. In
particular, respondent maintained that he: (a) could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was
already renting a vacant house near the same during his tenure as judge of the RTC; (b) had no mistress,
explaining that the woman that often goes inside his office was his caterer who brought him food; (c)
merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc City and viceversa on Mondays
and Fridays since the latter synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers of Ormoc City on
such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions as Atty. Mape only assisted him with legal research; (e)
indeed allowed trial to proceed without the accused being assisted by counsel in that criminal case
pointed out by the complainant, but only because the accused violated the three (3)-day rule of filing
postponements and failed to inform the adverse party of such intention, and that he never extorted
money from the accused; and (f) never asked for gasoline allowance, but nevertheless affirmed that
he, like all other local officials, received allowances from the local government. Further, respondent
averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already been separated from service due to compulsory
retirement.6

The OCA and CA Proceedings

Pursuant to the OCA’s Memorandum7 dated September 8, 2009, the administrative case was referred
to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8

In an undated Report9 received by the OCA on July 6, 2010, the Investigating Justice found respondent
guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.0110 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and accordingly,
recommended that he be fined in the amount of 25,000.00. Giving credence to complainant’s
consistent and spontaneous answers as well as her demeanor in the witness stand during her
testimony, the Investigating Justice concluded that respondent indeed made his chamber in the Hall of
Justice as his residence,11 a prohibited act under SC Administrative Circular No. 3-9212 and A.M. No. 01-
9-09-SC.13 Similarly, the Investigating Justice also believed Nuñez’s testimony that respondent indeed
brought his mistress and slept with her inside his chamber, finding no reason for Nuñez to fabricate a
story.14

The Investigating Justice, however, exonerated respondent from the other charges for failure of the
complainant to substantiate the same.15

In view of the foregoing, the Investigating Justice noted that respondent’s acts would have warranted
the latter’s suspension and even dismissal from service, if not for his compulsory retirement on January
9, 2009. In lieu thereof, respondent was instead meted a fine in the aforesaid amount.16

Pursuant to such report, the OCA issued a Memorandum17 dated August 5, 2013 finding respondent
guilty of Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92,and accordingly increased the
recommended fine to 40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due
him. Similar tothe Investigating Justice, the OCA found respondent to have violated Administrative
Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC when heused his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his
residence.18 The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of Immorality for bringing his mistress to his
chambers and using the same as their "love nest."19

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 inrelation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings of the Investigating Justice and the OCA.

SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for
functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose: SC ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 3-92, AUGUST 31, 1992

TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for
purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be
devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for
carrying on therein any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nelly Kelly Austria v. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving
unauthorized and improper use of the court’s premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and his
family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of
irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best
interest of the service and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that
such use of the court’s premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to
exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.

FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar restrictions regarding
the use of the Halls of Justice, to wit:

PART I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

xxxx

Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ.

Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Probation and
ParoleOfficers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel.

Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for residential,
i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes.

Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed in the
HOJ.20(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in
the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating
Justice and the OCA, respondent’s defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that
he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place
while actually and physically residing in another.

Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of
Immorality.1âwphi1 Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.’" 21 It is a
serious charge which may be punishable by any of the following: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture
of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office withoutsalary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.22
In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an extramarital affair with his
mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent
paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by
bringing her to fiestas and other public places, without any regard to consequences that may arise as a
result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for their
morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality
and decency which every memberof the judiciary is expected to observe.23 There is no doubt that
engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of the
members and employees of the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of
marriage which the Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.24

Finally, the Court agrees with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA that
since respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended from office on account of his compulsory
retirement on January 9, 2009, he should be fined instead.25 In this light, the Court deems that given
the circumstances herein discussed, it is proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of fine in the
amount of ₱40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch
17 is found GUILTY of Immorality and violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M.
No. 01-9-09-SC. Accordingly, he is hereby meted the penalty of a FINE in the amount of ₱40,000.00,
which amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him.

SO ORDERED.
VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner, v. ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and
ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The subject of this Petition for Review is the April 30, 2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.

The facts follow.

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against
petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568.
Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and
Emmanuel Mariano.

During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her
visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was
accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their
agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage
between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.3 They, including

their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioner's
dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additionallegal fees amounting
to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them
several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for settlement."6

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion for payment of lawyers'
fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2
million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de
Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.

The issues raised in this petition are:

(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees;
and

(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of
the main action in which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client.
The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9

The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed,
had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to
collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties awarded to
petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional payment for
legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by
the principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."10 The
recovery of attorney's fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express
agreement for the payment of attorney's fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents
an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel
without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer
himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only
to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be
filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.11

In the case at bar, respondents' motion for payment of their lawyers' fees was not meant to
collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.

Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an
act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.

As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable

profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents' despicable behavior which
gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The vernacular has a word for
it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.12

Respondents' claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner
a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them
in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioner's business - all of which were not
denied by respondents - more than sufficed for the work they did. The "full payment for
settlement"13 should have discharged petitioner's obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys' fees cannot be
denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of
administering justice.14 When they took their oath, they submitted themselves to the authority
of the Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial control.15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 2002 in CA G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional
attorney's fees in favor of respondents is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
PAULINA T. YU COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution[1] of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)which adopted and approved the findings and the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner for the disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela
Cruz (respondent lawyer).

It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T.
Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance fees, to
wit:

Case Title Acceptance Fees

People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case No. 06-
359) filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor,P 20,000.00
Cavite
Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Rodel Gamboa for qualified
theft/estafa (I.S. No. XV-07-INV-116-05339) filed withP 8,000.00
the City Prosecutor of Manila
Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case No. LP-
00-0087) filed before the Regional Trial Court of LasP 15,000.00
Piñas[2]

On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer
borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings
Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of
Pledge.[3] Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In
order to facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to
complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31, 2011, in the amount
of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the check
was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed."[4] Complainant immediately notified
respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.

In a letter,[5] dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance
fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the cases and the payment
of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.

In another letter,[6] dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer, Atty.
Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of the check in cash
within five days from notice; the refund of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no
service was rendered; the payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the amount of
PI00,000.00 in order to avoid the interests due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge; and
moral damages of P 300,000.00.

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pinas City, against him.[7]

On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD),[8] where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the
lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the
complaint.[9] Despite having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to
file his answer, as shown in a certification[10] issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central
Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.

Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing on

November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her counsel appeared on the said day. The
IBP-CBD then ordered the resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January
11, 2013 and the personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given
address.[11] Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's mother,[12] he
still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move for the
termination of the conference and the submission of the case for report and recommendation.

On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent

lawyer from the practice of law.[13] Based on the evidence on record, respondent lawyer was
found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
proscribed the borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had
clearly issued a worthless check in violation of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct."

On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in Resolution No. XXI-
2014-698.[14]

Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review before this Court
was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for
appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore,
would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[15]

The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the accusations
against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to explain his side. All means
were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a chance to oppose the charges against him but to
no avail and for reasons only for known to him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally
read the orders by the IBP-CBD or his mother failed to forward the same for his personal
consideration may only be an object of surmise in which the Court cannot indulge. "Disbarment
of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the
bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession."[16] Surely,
respondent lawyer's failure or refusal to participate in the IBP-CBD proceedings does not
hinder the Court from determining the full extent of his liability and imposing an appropriate
sanction, if any.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent lawyer's violation of Canons
1,[17] 16,[18] 17,[19] and Rules 1.01,[20] 16.04,[21] of the CPR.

In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client's
property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he
presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered
her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it
thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule 16.04.
Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial considering
that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from
clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an
exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate
for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the
value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his
exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the
latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency
goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse.[22] The rule against borrowing of money by
a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his
influence over his client.[23] The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.[24] Suffice it to say, the
borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an
unethical act that warrants sanction.

Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his representation that the
subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She accepted respondent lawyer's check,
which was eventually dishonored upon presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor,
respondent lawyer did not take steps to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on
his obligation, constraining complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.

Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer.
Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of
issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These
shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between
lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action,[25] and
thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession.[26] Such conduct, while
already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when
exhibited by a member of the Bar.[27] In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the
promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."[28]

As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes heed of the
guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end
desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic
life and honor of the erring person."[29]Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary
power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[30] the Court finds it
proper to impose the penalty of three-year suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stern
warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar
act, shall merit a heavier penalty.

Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule that in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.[31] Thus, the Court is not concerned
with the erring lawyer's civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction
separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it
cannot order respondent lawyer to make the payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the
value of which is yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding.

As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating Commissioner

erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"—

As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after payment of
attorney's fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the complainant was able to prove it
with substantial or clear evidence. It was not fully explained in the complaint how or in what
manner were the cases "abandoned" by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to
the complainant. This Commission noted that not a single document or order coming from the
court of prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-Affidavit that would at least
apprise this body of what the respondent actually did with the cases he represented.[32]

There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that
attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept.[33] In its ordinary
sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for
legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by
the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for
damages.[34] On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for
merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is
precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of
interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which
is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only
seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and
extent of the legal services rendered.[35]

In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00, respectively,
were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent lawyer agreed to
represent complainant. Despite this oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court
affirms the finding that aside from her bare allegations, complainant failed to present any
evidence showing that respondent lawyer committed abandonment or neglect of duty in
handling of cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject acceptance
fees.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 16, 17,
and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING

that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the personal record
of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gregory Fabay (Fabay) against respondent
Atty. Rex A. Resuena (Atty. Resuena), docketed as A.C. No. 8723 for Gross Misconduct due to
the unauthorized notarization of documents relative to Civil Case No. 2001.[1]

The facts are as follows:

On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez
and Valentino Perez (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against Gregory
Fabay before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with respondent Atty. Resuena as
their counsel.

On the same date, October 15, 2003, Atty. Resuena notarized a special power of attorney (SPA)
with plaintiffs as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only
Remedios Perez who actually signed the SPA in behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria
Perez and Gracia Perez. Said SPA was recorded in Atty. Resuena's notarial book as Doc. No.
126, Page 26, Book 1, Series of 2003.[2]

The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the client of Atty. Resuena, however, on
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be
remanded to the court a quo to try the case on the merits.[3] In its Decision[4] dated August 4,
2005, the trial court noted that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have already died on
September 7, 1988 and April 26, 1976, respectively.

Complainant Fabay alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by
notarizing a special power of attorney notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals
therein, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of
the SPA. Complainant added that Atty. Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for ejectment
in 2003 where Apolo Perez was made to appear as attorney-in-fact of Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez when again the latter could not have possibly authorized him as they were
already dead. Further, complainant averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs,
participated in the barangay conciliations which is prohibited under the law.

Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for violation of the notarial law and for Atty.
Resuena's misconduct as a lawyer.

On October 18, 2010, the Court resolved to require Atty. Resuena to file his comment relative
to the complaint filed against him.[5]

In compliance, Atty. Resuena submitted his Comment[6] dated December 20, 2010 wherein he
denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that it was tainted with malice, considering
that it was only filed with the Supreme Court on August 20, 2010 when in fact it was allegedly
prepared last June 18, 2006.

Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SPA on behalf
of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was no
misrepresentation since Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and she was likewise
previously authorized by the other co-owners, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, to represent
them.[7] Atty. Resuena, thus, prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of
merit.

On January 19, 2011, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation/decision.[8]

On June 16, 2011, a mandatory conference was conducted where complainant was assisted by
his counsel Atty. Crispo Borja, Jr., while Atty. Resuena appeared for himself.

Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented the
certificate issued by the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his attendance
during the confrontations of the parties before the barangay. He, however, did not deny that
Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution and
notarization of the SPA, albeit, he argued that in the same SPA, Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez were signed by or represented by Remedios Perez. He further insisted that in the
acknowledgment portion of the SPA, the names of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were
not included as among the parties who have personally appeared before him. Thus, Atty.
Resuena insisted that there was no misrepresentation done in the notarization of the SPA.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Resuena to have violated the
provisions of the notarial law. The pertinent portion thereof reads as thus:

A close scrutiny of the evidence submitted would show that respondent notarized a Special
Power of Attorney on October 15, 2003 wherein the supposed principals were Virginia Perez,
Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez, Valentino Perez, the purpose of
which, was to authorize Apolo D. Perez to represent them to sue and be sued in any
administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may arise out of any and all
transactions in their properties covered by TCT No. RT-1118 (14380), 38735, 38737. In the said
document, the signatures of Amado Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and Valentino Perez were
signed as "BY: REMEDIOS PEREZ". Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and the
mother of [Apolo] Perez.

Evaluating the Special Power of Attorney, two of the parties, namely, Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez were already dead during the execution of the Special Power of Attorney.
Amador Perez died sometime in September 7, 1988, while Valentino Perez died in April 26, 1976.
Despite this fact, respondent allowed them to be represented by Remedios Perez in the signing
of the Special Power of Attorney without the proper authority provided for by law.

On the other hand, the other parties in the Special Power of Attorney, GRACIA PEREZ and
GLORIA PEREZ were both residing in the United States of America. While the respondent
alleged that there was a previous authority to sign the Special Power of Attorney, no proof was
presented by the respondent to that effect. They also were signed as "BY REMEDIOS PEREZ".[9]

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and that he be
disqualified to be commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.

In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors
adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On September 9, 2013, complainant moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-591

and prayed that the same be set aside and instead the penalty of suspension be imposed
against Atty. Resuena as an erring member of the bar and not merely as a notary public.

On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-293,[10] denied
complainant's motion for reconsideration, thus affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-591 but
modified the penalty imposed to two (2) years disqualification from notarial practice.

We concur with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.[11]

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is the party's free act and deed.[12]

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the
affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:

x x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA without all the affiant's personal
appearance. As found by the IBP-CBD, the purpose of the SPA was to authorize a certain Apolo
D. Perez to represent the principals "to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal
in connection with any suit that may arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling that
Atty. Resuena permitted Remedios Perez to sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez knowing fully well that the two were already dead at that time and more so when he
justified that the latter's names were nevertheless not included in the
acknowledgment albeit they are signatories of the SPA. Equally deplorable is the fact that
Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were
said to be residing abroad. Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an
ejectment case that was filed in court. In effect, Atty. Resuena, in notarizing the SPA, contented
himself with Remedios' representation of four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with
the actual physical appearance of all the parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena
ignored the basics of notarial procedure and actually displayed his clear ignorance of the
importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the notarial law, he also did
so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance.

We cannot overemphasize that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the
appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public
would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.

In Agbulos v. Atty. Viray,[13] this Court, citing Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan,[14] reiterated anew
the necessity of personal appearance of the affiants, to wit:

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to
authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the
adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the
absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant
does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the
affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act
and deed.

Atty. Resuena's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document but also made a mockery of the integrity of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. Moreso, in this case, where Atty.
Resuena being the counsel of the plaintiffs-affiants can be assumed to have known the
circumstances of the subject case, as well as the fact that affiants Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution of the subject SPA. Having appeared
to have intentionally violated the notarial law, Atty. Resuena has, in fact, allowed himself to be
an instrument of fraud which this Court will not tolerate.

A graver responsibility is placed upon Atty. Resuena by reason of his solemn oath to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional
Responsibility also commands lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.[15] It requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes.[16] Moreover, the Notarial Law and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly-commissioned notary public to make the proper
entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act which
constitutes good cause for the revocation of commission or imposition of administrative
sanction.[17] Unfortunately, Atty. Resuena failed in both respects.

Through his acts, Atty. Resuena committed a serious breach of the fundamental obligation
imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to
corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics,
and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon
an honorable profession.[18] Atty. Resuena must now accept the consequences of his
unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rex A. Resuena is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and of
violating the lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and likewise
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Resuena's personal record. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gregory Fabay (Fabay) against respondent
Atty. Rex A. Resuena (Atty. Resuena), docketed as A.C. No. 8723 for Gross Misconduct due to
the unauthorized notarization of documents relative to Civil Case No. 2001.[1]

The facts are as follows:

On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez
and Valentino Perez (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against Gregory
Fabay before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with respondent Atty. Resuena as
their counsel.

On the same date, October 15, 2003, Atty. Resuena notarized a special power of attorney (SPA)
with plaintiffs as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only
Remedios Perez who actually signed the SPA in behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria
Perez and Gracia Perez. Said SPA was recorded in Atty. Resuena's notarial book as Doc. No.
126, Page 26, Book 1, Series of 2003.[2]

The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the client of Atty. Resuena, however, on
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be
remanded to the court a quo to try the case on the merits.[3] In its Decision[4] dated August 4,
2005, the trial court noted that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have already died on
September 7, 1988 and April 26, 1976, respectively.

Complainant Fabay alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by
notarizing a special power of attorney notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals
therein, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of
the SPA. Complainant added that Atty. Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for ejectment
in 2003 where Apolo Perez was made to appear as attorney-in-fact of Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez when again the latter could not have possibly authorized him as they were
already dead. Further, complainant averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs,
participated in the barangay conciliations which is prohibited under the law.

Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for violation of the notarial law and for Atty.
Resuena's misconduct as a lawyer.

On October 18, 2010, the Court resolved to require Atty. Resuena to file his comment relative
to the complaint filed against him.[5]

In compliance, Atty. Resuena submitted his Comment[6] dated December 20, 2010 wherein he
denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that it was tainted with malice, considering
that it was only filed with the Supreme Court on August 20, 2010 when in fact it was allegedly
prepared last June 18, 2006.

Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SPA on behalf
of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was no
misrepresentation since Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and she was likewise
previously authorized by the other co-owners, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, to represent
them.[7] Atty. Resuena, thus, prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of
merit.

On January 19, 2011, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation/decision.[8]

On June 16, 2011, a mandatory conference was conducted where complainant was assisted by
his counsel Atty. Crispo Borja, Jr., while Atty. Resuena appeared for himself.

Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented the
certificate issued by the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his attendance
during the confrontations of the parties before the barangay. He, however, did not deny that
Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution and
notarization of the SPA, albeit, he argued that in the same SPA, Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez were signed by or represented by Remedios Perez. He further insisted that in the
acknowledgment portion of the SPA, the names of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were
not included as among the parties who have personally appeared before him. Thus, Atty.
Resuena insisted that there was no misrepresentation done in the notarization of the SPA.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Resuena to have violated the
provisions of the notarial law. The pertinent portion thereof reads as thus:

A close scrutiny of the evidence submitted would show that respondent notarized a Special
Power of Attorney on October 15, 2003 wherein the supposed principals were Virginia Perez,
Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez, Valentino Perez, the purpose of
which, was to authorize Apolo D. Perez to represent them to sue and be sued in any
administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may arise out of any and all
transactions in their properties covered by TCT No. RT-1118 (14380), 38735, 38737. In the said
document, the signatures of Amado Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and Valentino Perez were
signed as "BY: REMEDIOS PEREZ". Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and the
mother of [Apolo] Perez.

Evaluating the Special Power of Attorney, two of the parties, namely, Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez were already dead during the execution of the Special Power of Attorney.
Amador Perez died sometime in September 7, 1988, while Valentino Perez died in April 26, 1976.
Despite this fact, respondent allowed them to be represented by Remedios Perez in the signing
of the Special Power of Attorney without the proper authority provided for by law.

On the other hand, the other parties in the Special Power of Attorney, GRACIA PEREZ and
GLORIA PEREZ were both residing in the United States of America. While the respondent
alleged that there was a previous authority to sign the Special Power of Attorney, no proof was
presented by the respondent to that effect. They also were signed as "BY REMEDIOS PEREZ".[9]

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and that he be
disqualified to be commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.

In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors
adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On September 9, 2013, complainant moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-591

and prayed that the same be set aside and instead the penalty of suspension be imposed
against Atty. Resuena as an erring member of the bar and not merely as a notary public.

On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-293,[10] denied
complainant's motion for reconsideration, thus affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-591 but
modified the penalty imposed to two (2) years disqualification from notarial practice.

We concur with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.[11]

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is the party's free act and deed.[12]

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the
affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:

x x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA without all the affiant's personal
appearance. As found by the IBP-CBD, the purpose of the SPA was to authorize a certain Apolo
D. Perez to represent the principals "to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal
in connection with any suit that may arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling that
Atty. Resuena permitted Remedios Perez to sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez knowing fully well that the two were already dead at that time and more so when he
justified that the latter's names were nevertheless not included in the
acknowledgment albeit they are signatories of the SPA. Equally deplorable is the fact that
Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were
said to be residing abroad. Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an
ejectment case that was filed in court. In effect, Atty. Resuena, in notarizing the SPA, contented
himself with Remedios' representation of four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with
the actual physical appearance of all the parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena
ignored the basics of notarial procedure and actually displayed his clear ignorance of the
importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the notarial law, he also did
so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance.

We cannot overemphasize that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the
appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public
would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.

In Agbulos v. Atty. Viray,[13] this Court, citing Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan,[14] reiterated anew
the necessity of personal appearance of the affiants, to wit:

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to
authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the
adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the
absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant
does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the
affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act
and deed.

Atty. Resuena's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document but also made a mockery of the integrity of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. Moreso, in this case, where Atty.
Resuena being the counsel of the plaintiffs-affiants can be assumed to have known the
circumstances of the subject case, as well as the fact that affiants Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution of the subject SPA. Having appeared
to have intentionally violated the notarial law, Atty. Resuena has, in fact, allowed himself to be
an instrument of fraud which this Court will not tolerate.

A graver responsibility is placed upon Atty. Resuena by reason of his solemn oath to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional
Responsibility also commands lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.[15] It requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes.[16] Moreover, the Notarial Law and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly-commissioned notary public to make the proper
entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act which
constitutes good cause for the revocation of commission or imposition of administrative
sanction.[17] Unfortunately, Atty. Resuena failed in both respects.

Through his acts, Atty. Resuena committed a serious breach of the fundamental obligation
imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to
corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics,
and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon
an honorable profession.[18] Atty. Resuena must now accept the consequences of his
unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rex A. Resuena is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and of
violating the lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and likewise
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Resuena's personal record. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8723
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2974]

GREGORY FABAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. REX A. RESUENA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gregory Fabay (Fabay) against respondent Atty. Rex
A. Resuena (Atty. Resuena), docketed as A.C. No. 8723 for Gross Misconduct due to the unauthorized
notarization of documents relative to Civil Case No. 2001. 1

The facts are as follows:

On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and
Valentino Perez (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against Gregory Fabay
before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with respondent Atty. Resuena as their counsel.

On the same date, October 15, 2003, Atty. Resuena notarized a special power of attorney (SPA) with
plaintiffs as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only Remedios Perez
who actually signed the SP A in behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia
Perez. Said SPA was recorded in Atty. Resuena's notarial book as Doc. No. 126, Page 26, Book 1, Series
of 2003.2

The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the client of Atty. Resuena, however, on appeal,
the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be remanded to the
court a quo to try the case on the merits.3 In its Decision4 dated August 4, 2005, the trial court noted
that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have already died on September 7, 1988 and April 26,
1976, respectively.

Complainant Fabay alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by
notarizing a special power of attorney notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals therein,
Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of the SPA.
Complainant added that Atty. Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for ejectment in 2003 where
Apolo Perez was made to appear as attomey-infact of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez when again
the latter could not have possibly authorized him as they were already dead. Further, complainant
averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs, participated in the barangay conciliations
which is prohibited under the law.

Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for violation of the notarial law and for Atty. Resuena's
misconduct as a lawyer.

On October 18, 2010, the Court resolved to require Atty. Resuena to file his comment relative to the
complaint filed against him. 5

In compliance, Atty. Resuena submitted his Comment6 dated December 20, 2010 wherein he denied
the allegations in the complaint and claimed that it was tainted with malice, considering that it was
only filed with the Supreme Court on August 20, 2010 when in fact it was allegedly prepared last June
18, 2006.
Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SP A on behalf of
Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was no misrepresentation since
Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and she was likewise previously authorized by the
other co-owners, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, to represent them.7 Atty. Resuena, thus, prayed that
the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.

On January 19, 2011, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation/decision. 8

On June 16, 2011, a mandatory conference was conducted where complainant was assisted by his
counsel Atty. Crispo Borja, Jr., while Atty. Resuena appeared for himself.

Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented the certificate
issued by the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his attendance during the
confrontations of the parties before the barangay. He, however, did not deny that Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution and notarization of the SP
A, albeit, he argued that in the same SP A, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were signed by or
represented by Remedios Perez. He further insisted that in the acknowledgment portion of the SP A,
the names of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were not included as among the parties who have
personally appeared before him. Thus, Atty. Resuena insisted that there was no misrepresentation
done in the notarization of the SPA.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Resuena to have violated the provisions
of the notarial law. The pertinent portion thereof reads as thus:

A close scrutiny of the evidence submitted would show that respondent notarized a Special Power of
Attorney on October 15, 2003 wherein the supposed principals were Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez,
Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez, Valent.ino Perez, the purpose of which, was to authorize
Apolo D. Perez to represent them to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in
connection with any suit that may arise out of any and all transactions in their properties covered by
TCT No. RT-1118 (14380), 38735, 38737. In the said document, the signatures of Amado Perez, Gloria
Perez, Gracia Perez and Valentino Perez were signed as "BY: REMEDIOS PEREZ". Remedios Perez is the
spouse of Amador Perez and the mother of [Apolo] Perez.

Evaluating the Special Power of Attorney, two of the parties, namely, Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez were already dead during the execution of the Special Power of Attorney. Amador Perez died
sometime in September 7, 1988, while Valentino Perez died in April 26, 1976. Despite this fact,
respondent allowed them to be represented by Remedios Perez in the signing of the Special Power of
Attorney without the proper authority provided for by law.

On the other hand, the other parties in the Special Power of Attorney, GRACIA PEREZ and GLORIA
PEREZ were both residing in the United States of America. While the respondent alleged that there
was a previous authority to sign the Special Power of Attorney, no proof was presented by the
respondent to that effect. They also were signed as "BY REMEDIOS PEREZ".9

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified
to be commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.

In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted
and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On September 9, 2013, complainant moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 and
prayed that the same be set aside and instead the penalty of suspension be imposed against Atty.
Resuena as an erring member of the bar and not merely as a notary public.

On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-293, 10 denied
complainant's motion for reconsideration, thus affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-591 but modified
the penalty imposed to two (2) years disqualification from notarial practice.

We concur with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at
large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.11

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed. 12

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's
personal appearance before the notary public:

xxxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but also his
oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SP A without all the affiant's personal appearance. As
found by the IBP-CBD, the purpose of the SP A was to authorize a certain Apolo D. Perez to represent
the principals "to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit
that may arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling that Atty. Resuena permitted Remedios
Perez to sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were
already dead at that time and more so when he justified that the latter's names were nevertheless
not included in the acknowledgment albeit they are signatories of the SP A. Equally deplorable is the
fact that Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were
said to be residing abroad. Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an ejectment
case that was filed in court. In effect, Atty. Resuena, in notarizing the SPA, contented himself with
Remedios' representation of four of the six principals of the SPA, doing away with the actual physical
appearance of all the parties. There is no question then that Atty. Resuena ignored the basics of
notarial procedure and actually displayed his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a
notary public. Not only did he violate the notarial law, he also did so without thinking of the possible
damage that might result from its non-observance.

We cannot overemphasize that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person
who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person
who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act or deed.

In Agbulos v. Atty. Viray, 13 this Court, citing Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, 14 reiterated anew the
necessity of personal appearance of the affiants, to wit:

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to authenticate
documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences
of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away
with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the
likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to
be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free act and deed.

Atty. Resuena's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document but also made a mockery of the integrity of a notary
public and degraded the function of notarization. Moreso, in this case, where Atty. Resuena being the
counsel of the plaintiffs-affiants can be assumed to have known the circumstances of the subject
case, as well as the fact that affiants Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the
time of the execution of the subject SP A. Having appeared to have intentionally violated the notarial
law, Atty. Resuena has, in fact, allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud which this Court will not
tolerate.

A graver responsibility is placed upon Atty. Resuena by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws
and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.1âwphi1 The Code of Professional
Responsibility also commands lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 15 It requires every
lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. 16 Moreover, the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly-
commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from
committing any dereliction or act which constitutes good cause for the revocation of commission or
imposition of administrative sanction. 17 Unfortunately, Atty. Resuena failed in both respects.

Through his acts, Atty. Resuena committed a serious breach of the fundamental obligation imposed
upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1. 01 of Canon 1, which
prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as
an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he
was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not
only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession. 18 Atty.
Resuena must now accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rex A. Resuena is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and of violating
the lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and likewise PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Resuena's personal record. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray
that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be
discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an
Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No.
38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of
the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas
tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to
defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why
and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act
accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge
Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had
already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a
copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after
all because according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision
dated August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge
Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas
be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer
in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No.
3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of
the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was
declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable
judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to
the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino
Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he
refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure
to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure
amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to
submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate
compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad
Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the
FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to
declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal
Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in
the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution
was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on
grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-
10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable
by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the
dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered
the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their
answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of
the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R.
SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the
respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon
plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was
authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-
parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly
and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his
services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence,
as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was
rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment,1 subject,
however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.2 He must serve the client with competence and
diligence,3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied.5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense.6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He
justifies his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru
honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition,
he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest
mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage,
to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of
default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure of legal work."9 In short, the
complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent
reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the
respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness
occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he
attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question
the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the
other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's
full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he
subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave
abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of
Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second
ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not
comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was
compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse
of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of
Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further
assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was
it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a
meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise
as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the
court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence
and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in
fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on
the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from
the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed
the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have
seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of
the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all
the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction
and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court
of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil
case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They
could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he
were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the
sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be,
henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.