Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, G.R. No. 172035

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
- versus - SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

THE HONORABLE Promulgated:

SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondent. July 4, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65[1] filed by
Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27,
2006 resolutions[2] of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the
petitioners suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the suspension order.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

 On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local
officials[3] of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging the petitioner,
among others,[5] with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection
with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design,
and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City
public market (project).[6]

In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among
others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an
extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.[7] In its July 29, 1999
resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some
private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone
for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.[8]

On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations

with the Sandiganbayan.[9] The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 reads:

That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the

Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer
in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as
such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in
relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to
participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and
Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the
publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby
excluding other consultants from participating in said
prequalification.[10] (Emphases and underscoring added)

On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners co-accused,[11] the

Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a
reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit
and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted.
The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his
counter-affidavit with the OSP.[12]

Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked[13] the

Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly
before the expiry of the extension requested, the petitioner asked[14] the OSP for an
additional thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the two extensions
asked and granted, the petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension
period.[15]

Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his
counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the
petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001
resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the
resolution.[16]

On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the

arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private
individuals.[17]

On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the

petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases
against him. On February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners
motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier
termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure to submit
his counter-affidavit.[18]The petitioner did not question the denial of his motion.

On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both
criminal cases.[19]

On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente
Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the
obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation in failing to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[20]

On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed

resolution[21] suspending the petitioner pendente lite
 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecutions Motion is
GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the
petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and
from any other public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period
of ninety (90) days only.[22]

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension

order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.[23] The Sandiganbayan denied
his motion,[24] prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity
of his suspension order.

THE PETITION

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the
giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges
that the phrases evident bad faith and manifest partiality actually refers not to him,
but to his co-accused,[25] rendering the information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his
suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,[26] he claims
that [n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution
requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should
not be ordered suspended.[27] For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-
suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual
hearing to settle the defect in the information.

THE OSPS COMMENT

The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the
offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of
ultimate facts. These elements are:

1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at

the time material to the acts complained of;
 2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when
he invited only his co-accused private individuals to participate in the
prequalification of consultants for the project instead of publishing it in a
newspaper of general circulation; and

3. The petitioners actions, performed in relation to his office, gave

unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused.[28]

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the
phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality when the petitioner
quoted the relevant portions of the information in his petition.

Citing Juan v. People,[29] the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension
hearing was conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order
already satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing i.e., basically,
to determine the validity of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his
right to preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when
the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for
which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash
the information, although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have
waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the
OSP.[30]

ISSUES

There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and

2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing

renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.

THE COURTS RULING

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion
in the issuance of the assailed resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is
valid

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature

and the cause of the accusation against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)[32]requires, inter alia, that the information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules
requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances must be stated
in ordinary and concise language and in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the
court to pronounce judgment.[33]

The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in

intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the
accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an
information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in the
Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[34]

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to

go beyond the standard of a person of common understanding in appreciating the
import of the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. A
reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the
acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield.

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this
elemental phrase was actually omitted in the information[35] when, in his reaction to
the OSPs comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the
phrases position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the
supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is
merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information
which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.[36]
The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is

mandatory,[37] the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine the validity of
the information[38] filed against him, taking into account the serious and far
reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before
his conviction.[39] The accused public officials right to challenge the validity of the
information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an
information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the
acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[40]
In Luciano v. Mariano[41] that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required,
by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension, that

(c) upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an
order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the
accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the
validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a
hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand
down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold
the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary
case.
 (d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing.
Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him,
e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that
the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code
which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of
the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the
Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day,
however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show
cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite,
has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.

The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the

validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the
accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That
hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to
quash.[42]

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity
of the proceedings against him,[43]Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and
fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.[44] With the purpose of a pre-suspension
hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of
the validity of a suspension order.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court considered the opposition of the

accused (to the prosecutions motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to
dispense with the need to actually set the prosecutions motion for hearing. The
same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,[46] where the Court ruled:

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to

determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners,
we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved
the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral
hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties'
pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
 Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when
an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his
possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an
accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted.[47] It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments
in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.[48]

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the
OSPs Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse
ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension
order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea
for reconsideration.[49] Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioners
continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing based on the
same alleged defect in the information,[50] which we have found wanting has
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioners position relates to the
nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call
for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict
construction against the State.[51] The suspension required under this provision
is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if
acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension.[52]

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a

mere preventive measure[53] that arises from the legal presumption that unless the
accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused.[54]

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose
duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days,[55] the adequacy of the
opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings that
preceded its filing vis--vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be
measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to
be heard on ones defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the
suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process
right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle

enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust.[56] In light of the
constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a
public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension,
the petitioners demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only
overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation
of justice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

[1]
RULES OF COURT.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. dela Cruz
and Norberto Y. Geraldez, Sr.
[3]
The Sangguniang Bayan members-complainants are as follows: Rose Dideles, Rene Jumilla, Pablito Subere and
Edwin Abris; rollo, p. 5.
[4]
Id. at 83.
[5]
Gaspar E. Nepomuceno, Jesus G. Casus, Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Bonifacio M. Madarcos, and Vinci Nicholas
R. Villaseor; id. at 103.
[6]
Id. at 110-113.
[7]
Id. at 124-125.
[8]
Id. at 5 and 83.
[9]
The case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25819 (id. at 103). The Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to drop Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Bonifacio M. Madarcos, Jesus G. Casus
and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseor from the Information (id. at 106 and 108). The falsification case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25820 (id. at 103).
[10]
Id. at 117.
[11]
On March 3, 2000 and June 5, 2000, Bonifacio M. Madarcos and Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., respectively, filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation; id. at 103-104.
[12]
Id. at 104.
[13]
Dated August 30, 2000; ibid.
[14]
Dated September 28, 2000; id. at 105.
[15]
Dated October 29, 2000; ibid.
[16]
Id. at 106.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Id. at 27.
[19]
Id. at 6.
[20]
Id. at 6-7.
[21]
Id. at 21-24.
[22]
Id. at 24.
[23]
Id. at 13.
[24]
Id. at 26-28.
[25]
Id. at 67.
[26]
148-B Phil. 178 (1971).
[27]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[28]
Rollo, p. 45.
[29]
379 Phil. 125 (2000).
[30]
Citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151 (1996).
[31]
CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14(2).
[32]
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if
it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
[33]
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
[34]
Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 431.
[35]
See Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144823, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 242.
[36]
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 116, Section 9; and Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 152259, July 29, 2004, 435 SCRA 371, 388-389.
[37]
Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337, 345.
[38]
Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc, et al., supra note 26, at 183-184; and People v. Albano, Nos. L-45376-77,
July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511, 517.
[39]
Ibid.
[40]
People v. Albano, supra note 38, at 518-519; and Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 30, at 179.
[41]
Supra note 26, at 192-193.
[42]
Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622, 632.
[43]
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328, 339.
[44]
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, 356 SCRA 636, 645; and Flores v. Layosa, G.R.
No. 154714, August 12, 2004, supra note 37, at 345-346.
[45]
G.R. No. 161640, December 9, 2005, 513 Phil. 400 (2005).
[46]
Supra note 29, at 140.
[47]
Flores v. Layosa, supra note 37, at 345-346.
[48]
Tan v. Atty. Balon, Jr., A.C. No. 6483, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 645, 655-656.
[49]
Rollo, p. 109.
[50]
Id. at 95.
[51]
Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658, 666-668.
[52]
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383.
[53]
Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 50, at 666-667; and Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 43, at 336.
[54]
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 103, 108.
[55]
Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903, May 15, 1989, 173 SCRA 409, 419.
[56]
CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1; Berona v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142456, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA
303.