I.

LAUD V PEOPLE 741 SCRA 239 (2014)

(EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE - SATISFIED)
FACTS:
Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Manila-RTC for a warrant to search 3 caves located
inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily
executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola
was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of 6 persons, and was, in fact, part
of the group that buried the victims.
Judge Peralta, acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-CIDG, in
coordination with the members of the SoCO. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the
presence of human remains.

Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence
premised on the following grounds:
(a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been automatically divested
of his position as Vice Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court;
(b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to be enforced in Davao City;
(c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant;
(d) the police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains;
(e) the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause;
(f) the rule against forum shopping was violated; and
(g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be searched
and the articles to be seized.

Commented [RH1]: Notably, the fact that a search

Manila RTC ruling
warrant application involves a "special criminal case"
The Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud. Respondent, (the People), filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under
however, denied, wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its reasons for the warrant’s quashal, namely: Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
(a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a search warrant by the Manila RTC which was SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
to be implemented in Davao City where the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with
Rules of Court; the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
(b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost 4 years before the search warrant application was filed rendered
committed.
doubtful the existence of probable cause; and
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
(c) the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the subject matter of the present search court within the judicial region where the crime was
warrant application is exactly the same as the one contained in a previous application before the RTC of Davao City, Branch committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
15 (Davao-RTC) which had been denied. known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
CA Ruling However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the
The CA granted the People’s petition and thereby annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been
criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No.
 It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor 03-8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant applications before
involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-mentioned
of the Rules of Court … provided that the application is filed by the PNP… with the endorsement of its head, before the RTC special criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of
of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a
of the said courts, as in this case. search warrant is being applied for in connection with a
special criminal case as above-classified already presumes
 Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness Avasola deposed and testified that he
the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement
personally witnessed the murder of 3 persons and was actually part of the group that buried the victims – two bodies in to this effect would be superfluous and therefore should be
each of the 3 caves. dispensed with. By all indications,
 Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the
involved in a criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the application of a search Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served
warrant. Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a protruding human bone in plain view in one of the caves, in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as
and Avasola’s firsthand eye witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that the crime of the parameters under the said section have been complied
Murder had been committed and that the human remains of the victims were located in the Laud Compound. with, as in this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds
nothing defective in
1
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements of probable cause were complied with.

HELD:
YES.
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-
hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated
crime and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims…

Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge
Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not the crime of Murder of 6 persons had been perpetrated and that the
human remains in connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., the
Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed
by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor
run counter to the clear dictates of reason.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had
been met. That a "considerable length of time" attended the search warrant’s application from the crime’s commission
does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the
CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get
involved in a criminal case

Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by
the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending
a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does not dilute the probable
cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.

2
 II. People v Pastrana and Abad, GR 196025, Feb 21, 2018
(EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE – ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE NOT SATISFIED)

FACTS:
NBI Special Investigator Gaerlan filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City for the
purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom
they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy
stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually
purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows:
 42% to respondent Pastrana's personal account;
 32% to the sales office;
 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with lawsuits;
 10% to the cost of sales; and
 8% to marketing.

Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). In support of the
application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi
Arabia; the affidavits of respondents' former employees who actually called clients abroad; the articles of incorporation
of domestic corporations used by respondents in their scheme; and the sketch of the place sought to be searched.

Judge Salvador, Jr. issued Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the applicant xxx and his witnesses xxx, that
there is probable cause to believe that xxx have in their possession/control located in xxx as shown in the application for
search warrant the following documents, articles and items, to wit:

Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation
papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for
clients; fax messages from the clients; copies of credit advise from the banks; clients['] message slips; company brochures;
letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these
companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC which should be seized and brought to the
undersigned.

Abad moved to quash the warrant because it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of
the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal
procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific
offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 14 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.

Abad moved for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr contending that the lapse of three (3) months without action on the
motion to quash clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr. 's aversion to passing judgment on his own search warrant. Judge
Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.

RTC Ruling
In an Omnibus Order, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it violated the requirement that a
search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. It added that the SRC alone punishes various
acts such that one would be left in limbo divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and that even
estafa under the RPC contemplates multifarious settings. The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the
application thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter were all wanting in particularization.

3
CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search "Warrant No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense, because the
application failed to specify what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type of estafa was committed by
respondents. The appellate court observed that the application for search warrant never alleged that respondents or
their corporations were not SEC-registered brokers or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that respondents
violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or broker capacity
without the requisite SEC registration.

The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed to pass the test of particularity. It reasoned that the
inclusion of the phrase "other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC"
rendered the warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all records of respondents inside the office premises to
seizure and the implementing officers effectively had unlimited discretion as to what property should be seized.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Search Warrant no. 01-118 was validly issued.

HELD:
NO. Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together
with the affidavits submitted.

Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno, the Court stressed two points which must be considered in the
issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Moreover, in
Stonehill, on account of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants involved
in that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."

THE SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE ISSUED FOR ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE.

In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and
for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."

First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law such as
manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker without being registered with the SEC, use of
unregistered exchange, use of unregistered clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members,
brokers, and dealers among others. Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are
three ways of committing the said crime: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses
or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e.,

4
(1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that
Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

xxx… The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its failure to specify what particular
provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also covered estafa under the RPC.

Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a codification of various rules and
regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and
possession of illegal drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in categories. Hence,
it is imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated.

Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in the business of buying or selling securities
in the Philippines as a broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer unless
registered as such with the Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC
which respondents allegedly violated, Search Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The allegations in the
application for search warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers without prior registration
from the SEC which is an essential element to be held liable for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC. It is even worthy
to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to Quash,.

In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the application for search warrant,
there could have been no finding of probable cause in connection with that offense. In People v. Hon. Estrada, the Court
pronounced:

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the
circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative
ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could
not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the
constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities.

Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to operate as
brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC
were in a quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each
other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are
entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former
constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by
means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or
third persons. On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act of performing dealer or broker functions
without registration with the SEC. For such offense, defrauding another and causing damage and prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation are not essential elements. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same manner, a person acquitted of violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because violation of Section 28.1 of
the SRC is malum prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in
the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.
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 III. Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp., G.R. 140946, September 13, 2004
(PARTIALLY VALID WARRANT – PARTICULARITY)

FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari - seeks to reverse CA’s decision and resolution reversing RTC’s Order, denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the
search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright infringement under
Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD 49") and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC").

NBI Agent Samiano filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of
Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, Judge Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454 against Maxicorp.

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the
description stated in the search warrants. Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was
no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC denied
Maxicorp’s motion and motion for reconsideration.

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, Sacriz, and computer
technician Pante. The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent
Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed
activities using petitioners’ products.

Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. CA reversed the RTC’s order
denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants. The CA denied Microsoft’s motion for reconsideration.

CA held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp
produced or sold the counterfeit products. CA pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as
evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was probable cause to issue the search warrants;
2. Whether or not the search warrants are "general warrants."

HELD:

1. YES. Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the
belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper." Thus, probable cause for a
search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the complainant and his
witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." The applicant must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge
must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.

The CA’s reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary
examination failed to prove conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The CA ruled that this
amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a connection between the offense charged and the place searched.

The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition

6
 under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano,
computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt
acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how
they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.

xxx. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He
also saw how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged within Maxicorp’s premises. NBI Agent Samiano
categorically stated that he was certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers
without giving the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity.

Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp installed petitioners’
software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners’ software within
Maxicorp’s premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software. The testimonies of these two
witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also
produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full-blown trial.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it was
improper for the CA to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s
purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name. For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not
the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred.

During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he
purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’ software. Sacriz, who was
present when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer
unit. Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners’ software on the same
computer unit. There was a comparison between petitioners’ genuine software and Maxicorp’s software pre-installed in
the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased. Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of "Joel
Diaz," which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.

This also applies to the CA’s ruling on Sacriz’s testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software
from Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not
limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to
marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners’
witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the judge
examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC
complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

2. NO, except for par. (c)

A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for
this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a
protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.

7
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection
with one specific offense." The articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
issued. Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the search and seizure are used or
intended for use in the commission of a specific offense.

Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to
the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the CA ruled in favor of Maxicorp and
reversed the RTC’s Order thus: Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioner’s store can be seized on the
ground that it is "used or intended to be used" in the illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private
respondents’ software and their manuals.

The CA based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate
court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase "used or intended to be used,"
were previously held void by this Court. The disputed text of the search warrants in this case states:

c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia
bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens
and diskettes, photocopying machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and
unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise
exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights; and

It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The description of
the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary
according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern. Measured against this standard
we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified
physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically
refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software. This
language meets the test of specificity.

The cases cited by the CA are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because of particular
circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase "used or intended to be used." In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v.
Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x"
were found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. The mere presence of counterfeit
video tapes in the defendant’s store does not mean that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The
situation in this case is different. Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v.
Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they authorized the seizure of records pertaining to "all business
transactions" of the defendant. And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. CA, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely
gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally connected with the legitimate
business of renting out betamax tapes."

However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. The scope of this description is all
embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair
competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or
its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether
legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair
competition.

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be
seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant

8
remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items not
sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. The exclusionary rule found in Section
3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable
searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a,
b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

9
 IV. Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil 68 (1938)
(EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES)

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant and two orders of the respondent judge, and the
restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board.

Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a search warrant
commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain
books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer."

The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there (is) just and probable
cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is
contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided."

On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner
in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the petitioner's bookkeeper, Salas, and, without the
presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of
records and a locked filing cabinet containing several Papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt
therefor issued by him to Salas.

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter
were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed, in the CFI of Tarlac, six separate criminal cases
against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, the petitioner, through
counsel, demanded from the respondent Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized.

By motion, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and
the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, the respondent Judge of CFI denied the petitioner's motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.

En el caso presente," declared the respondent judge, "teniendo en cuenta que la acusada Por si o por medio de su representante, xxx…

A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied. Petitioner registered her exception. The resolution of and
the order are sought, together with the search warrant, to be nullified in these proceedings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued.
2. Whether or not petitioner waived her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD:
1. NO. Par. 3, sec. 1 of the bill of right of our Constitution provides as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These requirements are
complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the
obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court.

10
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All
that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not
appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be
seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the
law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they
were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against the petitioner.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that
the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore, correct in
reaching the conclusion that the search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac.

2. NO. While the Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the search warrant was illegally
issued, he maintains "(1) that the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search
and seizure, and (2) that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an unreasonable
length of time after the date of seizure." Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied. No express waiver has
been made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by implication.

It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.

It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not have objected
because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. Of course, the
petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this was precisely the reason
why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to demand the return of the documents seized. In any
event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant
does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the
authority of the law.

As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

As a general proposition, it may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time
to a search and seizure illegally made. It must be observed, however, that the petitioner, on several occasions, and prior
to the filing of criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally, through counsel, the return by the Anti-Usuary
Board of the properties seized. This is admitted by Adolfo N. Feliciano, acting chief of the board, who said that the
demand was refused simply because no habiamos terminado con nuestra investigacion. Counsel for the petitioner wrote
a letter to the Anti-Usuary Board demanding again the return of the documents withheld. And in connection with the
criminal cases pending against the petitioner, similar demands were made.

In the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did not waive her constitutional right. The delay in making
demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication.
The search warrant, Exhibit B, is hereby declared void and of no effect; the orders of the respondent judge are set aside;
and the respondents Anti-Usuary Board and the provincial fiscal of Tarlac or those acting in their behalf, are hereby
ordered to return and restore to the petitioner all the properties, documents, papers and effects illegally seized from
her, within forty-eight (48) hours from the time this decision becomes final. Without costs. So ordered.

11
 V. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 -1984
(EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES)

FACTS:
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with
the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

The contention is that the search warrant issued by Judge was based merel on the application for search warrant and a
joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of
Court of Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent
to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under
PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets
on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai
& Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.”

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could
be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to
inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing
and invoking, among others, Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by Judge, stating
that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner came to
this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and
all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the
matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued.

HELD:
NO. We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court. Under the Constitution:

“no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”.

More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which
provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence
of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the

12
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.

The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at
the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search
warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find
any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to
quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true
copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back.
Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show
also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge’s own admission,
while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that “she did not take the deposition of Mayote and
Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public” such that,
according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere
else.

Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no
“deposition in writing” attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore
quoted. Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man,
woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims
that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal “masiao” lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the
taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.

Two points must be made clear. The term “depositions” is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written
statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written
testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a
commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually
subscribed by the witnesses. The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his
witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a
reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and
said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough
and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It
might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:

“It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others.
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.

13
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro vs. Pabalan,
it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of
which is prohibited.

The writ of certiorari is granted and the order denying the motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the things
seized under such warrant, such as stock of “masiao” tickets; “masiao” issue tickets; bet money; control pad or “masiao” numbers;
stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai,” cannot be returned as sought by petitioner.

14
 VI. Dimal and Castillo, v People, GR 216922, Apr 18, 2018
(PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION – SATISFIED BUT NOT ALL ITEMS SEIZED WERE ADMISSIBLE)
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari - seeking to reverse and set aside the CA’s Decision and Resolution dismissing the petition assailing the Order of
the RTC of Quezon City, which denied the Omnibus Motion (Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11, to Declare the Seized Items as
Inadmissible in Evidence) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-12-175369 to Q-12-175371.

Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio were scheduled to visit the compound of Jaylord A. Dimal in Echague,
Isabela, to negotiate for the sale of palay. Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to Dimal's compound, asking for
information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that they had left an hour
ago.

Petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague Police, and allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing of
Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. A certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement made by Castillo.
Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three victims, and ordered him, Castillo and one
Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by throwing the bodies in a river.

Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. The Echague Police filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilagan,
Isabela, a criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal, Castillo, Sapipi, Miranda,
Marvin Guiao and Robert Baccay.

Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant before the RTC
Ilagan, in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma.

In his application for search warrant, he stated that "he was informed, and verily believed that JAYLORD ARIZABAL
DIMAL @ JAY, 28 years old, a resident of Felix Gumpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Isabela and CMJ Building Dubinan East,
Santiago City, has in control of the following items" in the said address, to wit:
a. Personal belongings such as:
1. Driver's License of Lucio Pua;
2. Alien Certificate of Registration Identification cards of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua;
3. ATM Cards such as BDO under Lucio Pua's accounts;
4. Deposit Slips in BDO accounts of Lucio Pua;
5. Receipts of the palay delivered;
6. Blood-stained clothes of the victims:
6.1 Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants;
6.2 Lucio Pua's black short and pink polo shirt;
6.3 Gemma Eugenio y Estrada's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, black striped t-shirt and a shoulder bag;
6.4 Polo t-shirt and faded pink jacket seen beside the comfort room inside the compound of the warehouse of Jayson Dimal.
7. Picture of Shaira Mae Eugenio's youngest sister (Queen Sean Eugenio) seen inside the shoulder bag of the victim, Gemma
Eugenio.
b. 1,600 sacks of palay inside a warehouse found in the Felix Gurnpal Compound, Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela;
c. Long bolo approximately 16 inches in length; and
d. Glock 9mm caliber pistol.5

P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified and ascertained the veracity of the information and found the
same to be true and correct, as narrated and sworn to by:
a. Ernesto Villador, a long-time employee of Dimal
b. Edison Uy Pua, the nephew of the victims Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, and;
c. Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the victim Gemma Eugenio.

P/Insp. Malixi claimed that the application was founded on his personal knowledge and that of his witnesses, acquired
after conducting surveillance and investigation. P/Insp. Malixi attached to the application as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and
"D" the Vicinity/Location and Floor Map.
Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of Ilagan, issued a Search Warrant, which reads:
15
The undersigned Presiding Judge personally examined in the form of questions and answers in writing and [under oath], the applicant Police Senior
Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi and the witnesses xxx who all collaborated to the fact of death of Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio.

xxx … With the testimony of said witnesses and their Sinumpaang Salaysay and deposition of witness, it would readily show that there is probable
cause to believe that in the house, particularly the Felix Gumpal Compound of Jaylord Dimallocated at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela, said items, to
wit: blood-stained clothes of the victims, 1,600 sacks of palay inside the warehouse in the Felix Gumpal Compound and 9mm cal. pistol are found.

xxx… you are hereby commanded to search… and forthwith seize and take possession of the following properties: blood-stained clothes of
Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just to photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol,
and to bring the said articles to the custody of the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela under custodia legis, to be
dealt with according to law.

In the Return on the Search Warrant, P/Insp. Gary Halay-ay Macadangdang, Deputy Chief of Police, Echague Police
Station, Echague, Isabela," manifested that (1) Search Warrant No. 10-11 was served at the premises of Dimal at
Barangay Ipil, Echague, Isabela, on October 9, 2010 at about 9:00 a.m., and (2) the search was conducted in an orderly
manner and in the presence of owner/custodian Carlos Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio Miguel, Barangay
Kagawads Rodolfo Vergara and Mariano Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo reporter Romy Santos. P/Insp. Macadangdang
enumerated the items recovered: xxx

Dimal and Castillo, together with Michael Miranda, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 and to
declare the seized items as inadmissible in evidence.
 They argued that the search warrant is invalid because it was issued in connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e.,
kidnapping and multiple murder.
 They also contended that except for witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi and witnesses Edison and Shaira Mae have no
personal knowledge surrounding the two crimes committed; hence, their statements did not provide basis for a finding of probable
cause, much less for the issuance of a search warrant. With respect to Villador, petitioners assert that his sworn statement is incredible
because he is just an ordinary laborer, who is unfamiliar with the English language, and there is no showing that the contents of his
statement were fully explained to him by the Judge who issued the search warrant.
 Petitioners further posit that the search warrant was invalidly implemented because the raiding team failed to comply with Section 8,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court on the requisite presence of two witnesses during a search of premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on
the issuance of a receipt of seized properties.
 Finally, petitioners sought that the items seized which are not covered by the search warrant, should be declared inadmissible in
evidence and be ordered returned to the accused.

Three (3) criminal Informations for Kidnapping for Ransom were filed against petitioners before the RTC of Echague,
Isabela. The criminal cases were re-raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.

RTC of Quezon City Ruling

The RTC of Quezon City denied the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 for lack of merit.

The RTC ruled that a perusal of the application for search warrant reveals that it was issued by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, after conducting
searching and probing questions upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and his witnesses Edison, Shaira Mae and more
particularly Villador, and finding probable cause based on their personal knowledge. In rejecting the claim of unreasonableness of the
implementation of the search warrant, the RTC noted that the records show that the owner/custodian of the property subject of the
warrant by the name of Carlos Dimal, was present, together with the Barangay Captain, two Barangay Kagawads, and a reporter
from Bombo Radyo.

Considering that no complaint was filed regarding the implementation of the search warrant, and that a Certification of Orderly Search
was issued by the barangay officials, the RTC declared that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not
sufficiently contradicted. Anent the claim that the search warrant was not issued in connection with a single offense but with the crimes
of Kidnapping and Murder, the RTC said that the nature of the case and the circumstances at the time the search warrant was applied for,
justify the issuance of such warrant as the two offenses are allied or closely related to each other because it was reported to the
applicant that the victims were kidnapped for ransom and murdered. Finally, the RTC stressed that the claim that no return on the search
warrant was submitted must fail because such a return was issued by the executing officer, and was marked as Exhibit "4" for the
prosecution during the preliminary conference.

16
CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the subject search warrant was validly issued.

A perusal of the records show that Judge Ong, through searching and probing questions, personally examined the (sic) P/lnsp. Malixi and
the witnesses, Edison Uy, Ernesto Villador and Shaira Mae Eugenio, on 8 October 2010. The questions that Judge Ong propounded were
sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The facts narrated by the witnesses while under oath, when they were asked
by the examining judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the subject search warrant.

Furthermore, the subject search warrant specifically designated or described Felix Gumpal Compound, located at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela as the place to be searched and enumerated the articles to be seized.

Petitioners['] contention that the subject search warrant which was issued in connection with two (2) separate offenses, Kidnapping and
Murder, as indicated therein, cannot stand. However, as aptly pointed out by the People through the Office of the Solicitor General, the
crimes of kidnapping and murder are interrelated and points to the commission of a single complex crime known as kidnapping with
murder. They cannot be treated as separate crimes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant is void and therefore the items seized are inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly issued, but most of the items seized
pursuant thereto are inadmissible in evidence, as they were neither particularly described in the warrant nor seized
under the "plain view doctrine".

Petitioners submit that the search warrant is void for failing to identify with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized.
 They· assert that Felix Gumpal Compound consists of a very large area, consisting of two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms,
one garage, one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse utilized to store a palay drying machinery.
 They likewise claim that all the items actually seized were either not among those listed in the warrant or were seized in violation of the
"plain view doctrine". Insisting that the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, petitioners
posit that all the items seized in Dimal's compound are "fruits of the poisonous tree" and inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

1. Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified with particularity the place to
be searched, namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal
Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela. This is evident from the Search Warrant issued by the judge, which reads:

xxx In view thereof, you are hereby commanded to search at any time of the day or night the premises of Felix Gumpal
Compound located at lpil Junction, Echague, Isabela, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following properties:
blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just
photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring the said articles to the custody of the Provincial Director of
Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law.

A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with
reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. To the Court's view, the above-quoted search warrant
sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be confined strictly to the place
described. At any rate, petitioners cannot be heard to decry irregularity in the conduct of the search of the premises of
the Felix Gumpal Compound because, as aptly ruled by the RTC, a Certification of Orderly Search was issued by the
barangay officials, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently contradicted
by petitioners.

17
2. Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
(1) when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or
(2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure; and
(3) when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant
is being issued.
The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search
warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that
no unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that technical precision of description is not required.

"It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized,
so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for."

Under American jurisprudence which has persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, the degree of specificity required in a
search warrant's description of the items to be searched for and seized is flexible and will vary depending on the crime
involved and the types of items sought. A description is said to be valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the
nature of the activity under investigation will permit. But if the circumstances make an exact description of the property
to be seized a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of the items
sought. The practical guide to determine whether a specific search warrant meets the particularity requirement is for
the court to inquire if the officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items to be seized.

In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be seized in connection with the
special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely:
(1) blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket and a black t¬shirt, and
(2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol.
Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal
and found in his warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant because they do not fall under the personal
properties stated under Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense, can
be the proper subject of a search warrant.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in upholding the denial of the Omnibus Motion to quash because all the
Constitutional and procedural requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are still present, namely: (1) probable
cause; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

3. Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid, petitioners are correct that most items
listed in the Return on the Search Warrant are inadmissible in evidence. Since only 2 items were particularly described
on the face of the search warrant, namely: (1) the blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of faded pink long
sleeves jacket and black t-shirt; and (2) the 0.9mm caliber pistol, the Court declares that only two articles under the
Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in evidence as they could be the blood-stained clothes of Gemma subject
of the warrant:
c. One (1) Black T-Shirt with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-26 with JAM markings)
d. One (1) Black T-Shirt with red lining with suspected blood stain (Mark as E-15 with JAM markings)

18
It bears stressing that the application for search warrant particularly described the victims' blood-stained clothes as
follows: (1) Rosemarie Pua's green inner garment with black blazer and brownish pedal pants; (2) Lucio Pua's black
shorts and pink polo shirt; and (3) Gemma Eugenio's maong pants, faded pink long sleeves jacket, and black striped t-
shirt. Considering that only Gemma's clothes were described in Search Warrant No. 10-11 as specific as the
circumstances will allow, the Court is constrained to hold as inadequately described the blood-stained clothes of Lucio
and Rosemarie. Without the aid of the applicant's witnesses who are familiar with the victims' personal belongings, any
other warrant officer, like P/Insp. Macadangdang who served the search warrant, will surely be unable to identify the
blood-stained clothes of Lucio and Rosemarie by sheer reliance on the face of such warrant.

The Court could have rendered a favorable ruling if the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits were
incorporated by reference in Search Warrant No. 10-11, so as to enable the warrant officer to identify the specific
clothes sought to be searched. This is because under American jurisprudence, an otherwise overbroad warrant will
comply with the particularity requirement when the affidavit filed in support of the warrant is physically attached to it,
and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with suitable words of reference. Conversely, a
warrant which lacks any description of the items to be seized is defective and is not cured by a description in the warrant
application which is not referenced in the warrant and not provided to the subject of the search.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above, the Court sustains the validity of Search Commented [RH2]:
Warrant No. 10-11 and the admissibility of the items seized which were particularly described in the warrant. This is in For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that
line with the principles under American jurisprudence: the following requisites are present: (a) the law
(1) that the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal, and the enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
(2) the fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first search and seizure. immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
To be sure, a search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Objects taken which were not specified in the The first requisite of the "plain view doctrine" is present
in this case because the seizing officer, P/Insp.
search warrant should be restored to the person from whom they were unlawfully seized.
Macadangdang, has a prior justification for an intrusion
into the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound, for
Although the Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio and Rosemarie and the BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio are he had to conduct the search pursuant to a valid
inadmissible in evidence, for not having been seized in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," these personal warrant. However, the second and third requisites are
absent, as there is nothing in the records to prove that
belongings should be returned to the heirs of the respective victims. Anent the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E- the other items not particularly described in the search
29 with JAM markings), which could not have been used in a 0.9mm caliber pistol, the same shall remain in custodia warrant were open to eye and hand, and that their
legis pending the outcome of a criminal case that may be later filed against petitioner Dimal. In Alih v. Castro, it was held discovery was unintentional.
that even if the search of petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution and the firearms and ammunition taken In fact, out of the 2 items particularly described in the
therefrom are inadmissible in evidence, pending determination of the legality of said articles they can be ordered to search warrant, only the 2 black t-shirts with suspected
remain in custodia legis subject to appropriate disposition as the corresponding court may direct in the criminal blood stain possibly belonging to Gemma were
proceedings that have been or may thereafter be filed against petitioners. retrieved, but the 9mm caliber pistol was not found. It is
also not clear in this case at what instance were the
items supposedly seized in plain view were confiscated
in relation to the seizure of Gemma's bloodstained
clothes - whether prior to, contemporaneous with or
subsequent to such seizure. Bearing in mind that once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found,53 the Court rules that the recovery
of the items seized in plain view, which could have
been made after the seizure of Gemma's clothes, are
invalid.

19
 VII. PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 -1999
(PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION – NOT SATISFIED:
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED WAS NOT DESCRIBED WITH PARTICULARITY)

FACTS:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders issued by the RTC of Quezon
City; and (2) the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist
proceeding with IS No. 95-167.

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in
the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties:
'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade
Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions
for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'

Attached to the application were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a
summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to
believe that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56; Ten (10) M14 US rifles; Two (2) AK-47 rifle[s]; Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.; Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]; Ten (10) cal 38 revolver[s]; Two (2) ammunition reloading
machine[s]; Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms; Ten (10) handgrenades in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.

The police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized the following: xxx…
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the
trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to Suppress
Evidence. The RTC denied petitioners motions and Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.

HELD:
YES. The search warrant is invalid because:

(1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents;

Chief Inspector Pascuas application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except
for Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover,
the applicants’ participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod:

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to
his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other
than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This
Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
20
 Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable
cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.

(2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge
that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms;

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony showed that he did not have
personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives.

When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the
subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod merely
declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP.
Yet, he made no statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those
firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned no
license certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing. Such certification
could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based. In
People v. Judge Estrada, the Court held:

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the
circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of
the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the
time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.

(3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the
Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. Thus, this Court has held that –

this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards. Additionally, the requisite of
particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a
particular place.

In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a
search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and
that is the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,]
Surigao del Sur. The PICOP compound, however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures,
all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares. Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers
unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because they submitted
sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP
Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those identified during the hearing.

21
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the
search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or
structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place
to be searched. Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated in the
warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the
part of law enforcers.

Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals:

xxx… there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises
that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although
not that specified in the warrant [was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence.

What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants
had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's
Variety Store would have been fair game for a search. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede
to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It
would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place
to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion
of the police officers conducting the search.

Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint against petitioners for illegal
possession of firearms.

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and
other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. ] As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence xxx.

In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to
Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complaint and the proceedings
before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.

This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country; however, it
reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights
of our people. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.

22
 VIII. Unilab vs. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005
(OBJECTS OF SEIZURE – INADMISSIBLE; NOT SUBJECT OF WARRANT; ALSO FAILED PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE)

FACTS:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of NBI, filed an application, in the RTC of Manila, for the issuance of a search
warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street occupied
and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation
of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:

a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON multivitamins;

b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the
offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents
used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.

Appended to the application were the following:

xxx (5) the joint affidavit of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the following allegations: MR. RABE averred
xxx that the said premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to manufacture counterfeit
UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was already patented by UNILAB since 1985.

A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the search warrant.
After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-
4916, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building
located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the following items
(itemized above). The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true inventory
thereof executed under oath.

The search warrant was implemented by NBI agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees.
No fake Revicon multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent Isip, containing the following:
792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.

Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he declared that the search of the first and second
floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the warrant, was
done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search Warrant, alleging that no other articles/items
other than those mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that of the items seized,
ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court issued an order granting the motion, on the condition that the turn over be
made before the court, in the presence of a representative from the respondents and the court.

The respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence.
 They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and
fourth floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in open display were
allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in the
search warrant, the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila.
 The respondents asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in
the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant.

The trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely,
Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search warrant. The trial court issued an advisory that the
seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search
warrant had already been quashed.
23
UNILAB filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the
ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the
items was justified by the plain view doctrine.

The trial court issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court declared that: The
Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of finished or unfinished
products of United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the
counterfeit nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant does not,
however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized products are imitations of UNILAB items
is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on the application for search
warrant relative to the seized products. On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot
be sustained.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE SEIZURE OF THE SEALED BOXES WHICH, WHEN OPENED, CONTAINED DISUDRIN SYRUP AND INOFLOX,
WERE VALID.

HELD:
NO. A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory.
Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him.
However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an
initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for
being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition
of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the
warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are
investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another
warrant. Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the
meaning of the Constitution.

- must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure
The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts
therein available to him, determine probable cause of the objects incriminating evidence. In other words, to be
immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officers instantaneous sensory perception of the object. The
object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The
incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any
unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure.

24
- must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have known in advance of the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it. Discovery is not anticipated. The immediately apparent test does not
require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the
seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity. Incriminating means the furnishing of
evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person.

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer
would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical,
non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected
must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law enforcement.

In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the
properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit
Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation,
distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins. The implementing officers
failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place
where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.

It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the
plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence
should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine
during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the
petitioners motion for reconsideration on. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view
exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even
attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who
executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the
warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their
contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who
enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the
contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.

In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for
the application of the plain view doctrine.

25
 IX. People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992)
(WARRANTLESS SEARCHES - VALID WAIVER; CONSENT GIVEN)

FACTS:
Conway B. Omaweng was originally indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Bontoc, Mountain Province. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to
do so, the court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against
the accused, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court.

The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information charging the accused with the violation of
Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The accusatory portion thereof reads:

"That on or about September 12, 1988, at Dantay, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispatch in transit or
transport in a Ford Fiera, owned and driven by him, 10 1/4 kilos of processed marijuana in powder form contained in al plastic bags of
different sizes which were placed in a travelling bag destained (sic) and intended for delivery, disposition and sale in Sagada, Mountain
Province, with full knowledge that said processed marijuana is (sic) prohibited drug or from which (sic) prohibited drug maybe
manufactured.

After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, the accused entered a plea of not guilty during
his arraignment. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses. The accused did not
present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement of prosecution witnesses Joseph
Layong and David Fomocod.

The trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting the accused of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs penalized
under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon the accused herein the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos.

Pursuant to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the aforecited special law, the drugs subject of the crime are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government. Accordingly, it is further directed that such drugs so confiscated and forfeited be destroyed without delay per existing
rules and regulations on the matter.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRABAND SUBJECT OF THE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE.

HELD:
NO.
"In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the Mt. Province PC Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with
other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of the
roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint.

At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing
Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by appellant and had no passengers.

Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to the request. When they peered into the rear of the
vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle.

Layong and his companions asked permission to see the contents of the bag Appellant consented to the request but told them that it only
contained some clothes. When Layong opened the bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes containing
pulverized substances.
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Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana.

The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC
Headquarters.The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling.

Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more than 2500 professional
examinations of marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic packets
taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana

Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the
protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of
the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and
travelling bag. Prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
_______
xxx
This testimony was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by the accused for he chose not to testify on his own
behalf. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
As this Court stated in People v. Malasugui:

". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of (sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly."

Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the
same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said packages were identified by the prosecution
witnesses and later on formally offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any objection whatsoever. Thus, in the
accused’s Comments And/Or Objections To Offer of Evidence, We merely find the following: The prosecution failed to
proved beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibit "A-1" to "A-40" are the same bags allegedly taken from inside Exhibit "A"
because what is supposed to be inside the bag are 41 bags and not 40 bags."

WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial t of Bontoc, Mountain Province of 21 March 1991 in
Criminal Case No. 713 finding the accused CONWAY B. OMAWENG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
is hereby AFFIRMED.

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 XI. Lopez vs. Comm. of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)

FACTS:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which arose from the seizures made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of
1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema, our decision of November 29, 1974 in Nasiad v. Court of Tax
Appeals made clear that there was no failure to comply with the requirements of the law in effecting the same. The seizure was therefore declared
lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by us.

The only question left then is whether the search conducted by a party headed by respondent Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of Davao, without
the search warrant for the hotel room of petitioner Tomas Velasco, who entered into a contract with the other petitioner, Jose G. Lopez, the
awardee of such Philippine Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use ostensibly for fishing, is violative of such constitutional
provision.

The petition alleged that when the vessel was searched, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling
Center operatives headed by NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being rented by petitioner Tomas
Velasco without any search warrant and in the absence at the time of such petitioner Tomas Velasco or the presence of
any other person, except one Teofila Ibañez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by occupation and "forcibly opened
luggages and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away
the same."

There was this refutation of such allegation in the answer presented by respondents, represented by the then Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo:
(a) After Captain Pantinople informed the team that petitioner Tomas Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing
that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee, some members of the team proceeded to the room of petitioner
Velasco at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said documents;
(b) Although petitioner Velasco was not inside the hotel room, respondent Reynolds, after identifying himself as a police officer and after
explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco who subsequently volunteered to open the suitcases and
baggages of petitioner Velasco and delivered the documents and things contained therein to respondent Reynolds; ...
(c) The said police team did not search the room; neither did the members thereof forcibly open the luggages and boxes nor seized and
confiscated the documents and things contained therein, since that was not necessary because ... Mrs. Tomas Velasco voluntarily opened
the baggages and suitcases and gave their contents of documents and things to respondent Reynolds.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS CONSENT SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO DISPENSE WITH THE WARRANT.

HELD:
YES. There has been marked receptivity on the part of this Court to claims based on the protection of the search and
seizure clause of the Constitution, whenever properly invoked. There can be no question that without the proper
search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of
search and seizure. It does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as
unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For this immunity from unwarranted
intrusion is a personal right which may be waived either expressly or impliedly.

The crucial question then is whether in this instance there was consent on the part of the person who was the occupant
of the hotel room then rented by petitioner Velasco. It cannot be contended that such premises would be outside the
constitutional protection of a guarantee intended to protect one's privacy. It stands to reason that in such a place, the
insistence on being free from any unwelcome intrusion is likely to be more marked. Was there, however, consent
sufficient in law to dispense with the warrant?

Respondents, contend that there was such consent. They so alleged in their answer. Their memorandum would stress it
further in these words:
"Here the wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, upon being informed of the purpose of the search by the officers, invited
them to enter and search the hotel room and even voluntarily gave the documents and things requested by said officers.

28
This fact could be gleaned from the following records of the two seizure cases involving the vessel M/V Jolo Lema and its
cargo of Indonesian copra and coffee:

(a) On September 19, 1966, Teofila Ibañez, wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, issued a written statement which states that — "... I have voluntarily
and freely allowed my husband's and my personal belongings to be searched and freely gave the following items." ...
(b) On the same date, she issued another certification which reads in part, viz.: "... That I have voluntarily turned over for safekeeping and
verification the following."...
(c) Also on the same date, she issued still another certification which reads partially, thus:"... that I have freely and voluntarily allowed the search of
my and my husband's personal belongings and turn-over to the NBI of the following items."...
(d) On October 13, 1966 the Davao City Police Department issued a certification to the effect that the petitioner Tomas Velasco never filed any
"report for robbery or other offenses ... against any member of the NBI or the PC during the period from September 19, 1966 to the present,"... ."

Their memorandum likewise included as an annex an affidavit from Benjamin Doronal Y. Yañez, the assistant manager of the Skyroom Hotel. It was
worded thus:

 "That on September 19, 1966 at around 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a joint NBI, PC and Davao City Police Commando
Team conducted a search on Room 220 of the Skyroom Hotel occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Tomas Velasco;
 That before said search was conducted, Teofila Ibañez, the actual occupant of the room at the time, voluntarily consented to
the request of Atty. Earl Reynolds and Lt.Romeo Arceño, to search their room (Rm. 220) after the latter introduced themselves
by showing their respective identifications cards;
 That during said search, upon the request of Atty. Reynolds and Lt. Arceño, Teofila Ibañez voluntarily opened her handbag
which was found to contain a .45 caliber pistol and likewise voluntarily opened the maletas which were found to contain
several papers and documents;
 That receipts were duly issued to Teofila Ibañez which accounted for everything taken from their room (Rm. No. 220) during the
search, including said .45 caliber pistol, papers and documents and that nothing was lost;
 That Teofila Ibañez signed the receipts and received copies thereof;
 That Teofila Ibañez and I were present when the said search was being conducted; That said search was conducted in a
peaceful and orderly manner ..."

There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the force of the above recital by an affidavit of one
Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, and another by such petitioner
himself reiterating such a fact and that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibañez, "a
manicurist by occupation." Their effort appurtenant thereto is doomed to failure.

If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who could
be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent
readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and
even petitioner Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they
would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their
request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was
there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to
dispense with the need for a search warrant. The petition cannot, therefore, prevail.

29