Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been

paid to his administration’s broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its
broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would
produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing
crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to
assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of
change, continuity, and regression.

GLOBAL RESOURCES

Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment

DAVID G. TIMBERMAN

JANUARY 10, 2019

PAPER

Source: Getty

Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change,
continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the
Philippines.

Related Media and Tools

Print Page

INTRODUCTION

Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte
became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the country’s infamous
dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of
democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Duterte’s murderous war on drugs
as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain
for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is
included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.

David G. Timberman
David G. Timberman is an independent scholar and development practitioner who has addressed the
challenges of democratic politics and governance in Southeast Asia for over thirty years.

Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been
paid to his administration’s broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its
broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would
produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing
crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to
assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of
change, continuity, and regression.

The Duterte government’s track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly
disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the country’s democratic
institutions. The combination of the Philippines’ powerful presidency and the malleability of most of its
political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to
appreciate two other important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through
nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to
strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to
democratic backsliding in the Philippines.

The Duterte administration’s assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of what
the U.S. government and America’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend
democracy in America’s former colony. The analysis concludes with a discussion of America’s extremely
limited support for human rights and democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and
offers suggestions for a more robust response.

ANTECEDENTS

To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to
understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since
1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (2010–2016); and the
particularities of the 2016 presidential election.

THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY

Liberal democracy, a legacy of America’s colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to
1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include
cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic fatalism); colonial
legacies (America’s empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty
and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all elections). Between
1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight of elite competition and avarice, flawed
economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand
Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For
nearly fifteen years, the Philippines experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.

The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in February 1986 restored many of the
pre-martial-law era institutional features and political elites. Although it is generally accurate to view
1986 as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and modes of political competition
have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive views of democracy in the Philippines since 1986
see it as a flawed work in progress; harsher critics see it as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited flaws
include elections tainted by violence and vote buying, widespread rent-seeking and corruption, policies
that have benefited elites and special interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional
justice system.

However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many ways, and at times has worked fairly
well. Liberal values were central to the nonviolent People Power Revolution and informed the drafting of
the 1987 constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of human rights; regular, competitive
elections for local and national offices; a system of checks and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and
robust civil society. The Philippine military remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has been
reluctant to directly intervene in politics. Beginning in 1986, substantial deregulation and privatization, as
well as economic integration, set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines’ gross domestic product
(GDP) over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the post-1986 reforms have
questioned if they have been broad and deep enough to produce fundamental improvements in politics,
governance, and the economy.

PRESIDENTS, POLITICAL ELITES, AND OLIGARCHS

From 1935, when the Philippines became a semiautonomous commonwealth, the behavior of presidents
and other powerful political and economic elites has heavily influenced the quality of the country’s
democratic politics and governance.1 The Philippines is a unitary state with a winner-take-all electoral
system, a presidency that exercises huge power over budgets and appointments, and congenitally weak
political parties. As a result, the president plays a central role in determining policy outcomes, as well as
the norms and behavior that shape politics and governance.
The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is the country’s remarkably resilient
political and economic elite. The president is limited to a single six-year term, so the power and influence
of individual presidents is transitory. By contrast, political and business families such as the Marcoses,
Cojuangcos, Aquinos, and Ayalas—to name just a few—have had noteworthy longevity and
adaptability.2 They exert a powerful influence over elections, legislation, policymaking, regulatory
bodies, jurisprudence, and the distribution of government resources.

For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong state by limiting the government’s fiscal
base and co-opting, corrupting, or intimidating the bureaucracy. It has stunted and distorted the
Philippine economy, preferring collusion and protection over economic competition, and has been slow
and selective in opening the economy to foreign competition. Because elites dominate legislative and
policymaking processes, successive governments have failed to adopt and implement socioeconomic
policies that address the needs of the poor and middle class. With a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the
Philippines has long been one of the most unequal societies in Asia, with one of the highest levels of
poverty incidence among Asia’s developing economies. Even after more than a decade of relatively
strong macroeconomic growth, the incidence of poverty decreased only a little, to 21.6 percent in
2015.3

Today, by the World Bank’s metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a per capita
income of $3,600 and a consumption-driven economy that has been growing at about 6.5 percent per
year for most of the past decade, fueled by remittances and a growing business process outsourcing
sector.4 As a result, the country’s sizable, predominantly urban, middle class now comprises 15 to 20
percent of the population.5 In sum, over the past quarter century, the rich have become richer, the
middle class has grown but remains insecure, and about one-quarter of the population remains poor.

Now seventy-three years old, Duterte’s world view is heavily influenced by nationalist and leftist thought
dating from the 1960s and 1970s, as well as by his twenty-two years of experience as mayor of Davao
City. In Davao, he combined a hardline approach to law and order with socially progressive and pro-
business policies. As mayor he was both a paternalistic patron and a fearsome boss whose orders had to
be followed. As a result, he has little tolerance for scrutiny or challenges to this authority. He sees the
country as beset by existential threats of drugs, crime, and corruption. As befits Philippine culture, his
approach is highly personalistic: he presents himself as the only leader strong and decisive enough to
save the nation. As for his frequently crude and threatening rhetoric, anthropologist Nicole Curato has
called his approach “crass politics” that, though objectionable to many, communicates multiple
messages:

Duterte may be offending the norms of respectful communication when he prefaces his remarks with
“mother fucker,” but he brings to the surface the collective frustration many feel. He may not offer the
clearest policy, but he puts forward the sincerest discourse of sympathy. . . . Duterte’s gutter language
establishes the urgency of saving the republic. Including “kill” and “death” is essential to the president’s
vocabulary for the country is at war, and his politics of “I will” demands quick, albeit painful, solutions.11

KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

The Duterte government’s top priorities include combating illegal drugs and crime, promoting rapid
infrastructure development, sustaining economic growth and making it more inclusive, enhancing peace
and development in Mindanao, and reorienting the Philippines’ foreign relations. To support these goals,
the government has significantly increased spending on infrastructure, raised the salaries of government
employees, expanded existing social development programs, revived the stalled peace process with the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), entered into
negotiations with the communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.

SEARCH

GLOBAL RESOURCES

Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment

DAVID G. TIMBERMAN

JANUARY 10, 2019

PAPER

Source: Getty

Summary: More than two years into Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the record is mixed with change,
continuity, and regression. This should prompt more robust U.S. support for democracy in the
Philippines.

Related Media and Tools

Print Page

INTRODUCTION

Within weeks of his inauguration as president of the Philippines in June 2016, Rodrigo R. Duterte
became the most internationally known Filipino leader since Ferdinand Marcos, the country’s infamous
dictator, and Corazon Aquino, the iconic housewife-turned-president who championed the restoration of
democracy in 1986. A great deal of media attention has been paid to Duterte’s murderous war on drugs
as well as to his often crass and controversial statements. His embrace of China and his visceral disdain
for the United States has garnered additional attention in foreign policy circles, and he frequently is
included in media reports and scholarly articles on the rise of populism globally.

David G. Timberman

David G. Timberman is an independent scholar and development practitioner who has addressed the
challenges of democratic politics and governance in Southeast Asia for over thirty years.

Although the attention to Duterte and his brutal drug war is warranted, much less attention has been
paid to his administration’s broader policy agenda, its approach to politics and governance, and its
broader impact on democratic institutions and norms. As a candidate, Duterte promised that he would
produce real and rapid improvements in the lives of Filipinos, particularly by aggressively addressing
crime and corruption. Two and a half years into his presidency, it is both warranted and possible to
assess what has and has not changed under Duterte. The picture is a mixed one, with elements of
change, continuity, and regression.

The Duterte government’s track record regarding human rights and democracy is undoubtedly
disturbing. It has run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the country’s democratic
institutions. The combination of the Philippines’ powerful presidency and the malleability of most of its
political institutions is resulting in significant democratic backsliding. But to focus only on Duterte fails to
appreciate two other important elements: the extent to which this degradation has happened through
nominally legal means, and the limited pushback to date by groups and institutions opposed to
strongman rule. This working paper takes an in-depth look at the complex dynamics contributing to
democratic backsliding in the Philippines.

The Duterte administration’s assault on human rights and democracy also raises the question of what
the U.S. government and America’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can and should do to defend
democracy in America’s former colony. The analysis concludes with a discussion of America’s extremely
limited support for human rights and democracy in the Philippines since Duterte became president and
offers suggestions for a more robust response.

ANTECEDENTS
To begin to make sense of Duterte and his approach to politics and governing, it is necessary to
understand three aspects of contemporary Philippine politics: the mixed record of elite democracy since
1986; the successes and shortcomings of the Benigno Aquino III administration (2010–2016); and the
particularities of the 2016 presidential election.

THE MIXED RECORD OF ELITE DEMOCRACY

Liberal democracy, a legacy of America’s colonization of the Philippines (which lasted from 1898 to
1946), has always struggled to become deeply rooted in the country. The reasons given for this include
cultural factors (the power of familial and clientelistic ties); religious beliefs (Catholic fatalism); colonial
legacies (America’s empowerment of a land-owning elite); socioeconomic conditions (persistent poverty
and inequality); and institutional factors (a presidential system with winner-take-all elections). Between
1946 and 1972, democracy struggled under the weight of elite competition and avarice, flawed
economic policymaking, poor governance, and armed insurgency. In 1972, then president Ferdinand
Marcos declared martial law, and until 1986 democracy was dispensed with in favor of a dictatorship. For
nearly fifteen years, the Philippines experienced unprecedented repression and corruption.

The return to democracy following the People Power Revolution in February 1986 restored many of the
pre-martial-law era institutional features and political elites. Although it is generally accurate to view
1986 as a return to elite democracy, Philippine society, the state, and modes of political competition
have changed since 1972. Still, even the most positive views of democracy in the Philippines since 1986
see it as a flawed work in progress; harsher critics see it as a sham and a failure. Commonly cited flaws
include elections tainted by violence and vote buying, widespread rent-seeking and corruption, policies
that have benefited elites and special interests at the expense of the poor majority, and a dysfunctional
justice system.

However, since 1986 democracy has been institutionalized in many ways, and at times has worked fairly
well. Liberal values were central to the nonviolent People Power Revolution and informed the drafting of
the 1987 constitution. This resulted in constitutional guarantees of human rights; regular, competitive
elections for local and national offices; a system of checks and balances; and a free (if flawed) media and
robust civil society. The Philippine military remains somewhat politicized, but since 1992 it has been
reluctant to directly intervene in politics. Beginning in 1986, substantial deregulation and privatization, as
well as economic integration, set the stage for strong growth in the Philippines’ gross domestic product
(GDP) over most of the past decade. But even observers who applaud the post-1986 reforms have
questioned if they have been broad and deep enough to produce fundamental improvements in politics,
governance, and the economy.
PRESIDENTS, POLITICAL ELITES, AND OLIGARCHS

From 1935, when the Philippines became a semiautonomous commonwealth, the behavior of presidents
and other powerful political and economic elites has heavily influenced the quality of the country’s
democratic politics and governance.1 The Philippines is a unitary state with a winner-take-all electoral
system, a presidency that exercises huge power over budgets and appointments, and congenitally weak
political parties. As a result, the president plays a central role in determining policy outcomes, as well as
the norms and behavior that shape politics and governance.

The second important influence on democracy in the Philippines is the country’s remarkably resilient
political and economic elite. The president is limited to a single six-year term, so the power and influence
of individual presidents is transitory. By contrast, political and business families such as the Marcoses,
Cojuangcos, Aquinos, and Ayalas—to name just a few—have had noteworthy longevity and
adaptability.2 They exert a powerful influence over elections, legislation, policymaking, regulatory
bodies, jurisprudence, and the distribution of government resources.

For decades, this elite has thwarted the development of a strong state by limiting the government’s fiscal
base and co-opting, corrupting, or intimidating the bureaucracy. It has stunted and distorted the
Philippine economy, preferring collusion and protection over economic competition, and has been slow
and selective in opening the economy to foreign competition. Because elites dominate legislative and
policymaking processes, successive governments have failed to adopt and implement socioeconomic
policies that address the needs of the poor and middle class. With a Gini coefficient of 0.43, the
Philippines has long been one of the most unequal societies in Asia, with one of the highest levels of
poverty incidence among Asia’s developing economies. Even after more than a decade of relatively
strong macroeconomic growth, the incidence of poverty decreased only a little, to 21.6 percent in
2015.3

Today, by the World Bank’s metrics the Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a per capita
income of $3,600 and a consumption-driven economy that has been growing at about 6.5 percent per
year for most of the past decade, fueled by remittances and a growing business process outsourcing
sector.4 As a result, the country’s sizable, predominantly urban, middle class now comprises 15 to 20
percent of the population.5 In sum, over the past quarter century, the rich have become richer, the
middle class has grown but remains insecure, and about one-quarter of the population remains poor.

THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT AND LIMITS OF REFORMISM

The “real change” promised by Rodrigo Duterte has obscured how much positive change occurred under
the administration of Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016).6 Aquino’s promise to follow the “straight path”
was an effort to both appropriate his mother’s (Corazon Aquino) perceived integrity and draw a sharp
contrast with the pervasive corruption associated with the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(2001–2010).7 Notable successes of the Aquino government included passing reproductive health and
“sin tax” reform laws, implementing twelve years of basic education, extending public finance reform,
expanding fiscal space and social spending, and making an effort to provide greater autonomy to
Muslims in Mindanao. GDP growth reached 6.5 percent, and by virtually every measure the country’s
international standing improved significantly. As a result, Aquino remained popular throughout most of
his term.

To be sure, there also were significant shortcomings and mistakes. Macroeconomic growth was slow to
reduce poverty, and the government was unable to rapidly improve infrastructure, especially in traffic-
clogged Metro Manila. It did little to reform dysfunctional food and agriculture policies, and could have
done more to strengthen anticorruption institutions and to pass a freedom of information law. In terms
of governance, Aquino was widely seen as honest, but he sometimes valued loyalty over competence
and occasionally seemed to lack the empathy that Filipinos expect from their political leaders. His
administration also suffered from complacency (due to the president’s personal popularity), problems
communicating its accomplishments, and its failure to make the Liberal Party a more coherent and
durable political party. And when it came time to choose a successor, Aquino remained committed to
supporting Manuel “Mar” Roxas, his secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG)—even though opinion polls consistently indicated that Roxas would not win.8

DUTERTE AND THE PROMISE OF REAL CHANGE

On May 10, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, then seventy-one years old, was elected president, winning 39
percent of the vote in a five-way race. Charismatic, blunt, and frequently profane, Duterte combined a
Dirty Harry persona with a track record as a successful mayor of Davao City, Mindanao’s largest city.
Although Duterte might appear to be unsophisticated and crude, he is politically savvy and attuned to
the attitudes and concerns of average Filipinos. He ran on his reputation as an effective, no-nonsense
mayor of Davao who prioritized law and order over legal protections for alleged criminals. The
overarching theme of Duterte’s campaign was that his strong leadership would produce rapid change.
During his campaign, he heaped criticism on the Manila-based elite, vowed to undertake a nationwide
assault on illegal drugs and criminality, and promised to change the government to a federal system. His
victory over Mar Roxas, who placed a distant second, signaled that the promise of change was more
compelling than continuity. Even though Duterte had been popular in Mindanao before he ran for
president, his victory showed that his appeal spanned regions and socioeconomic classes. The 16.6
million Filipinos who voted for him appeared to believe that he could deliver real change.
Duterte’s victory surprised many and shocked some. In the wake of his election, political analysts have
grappled with what it says about contemporary Philippine politics. The reasons why he won are complex,
suggesting that cautious and nuanced conclusions are warranted. First, the incumbent, Benigno Aquino
—the embodiment of reformist elite democracy—could not run for a second term. If he had been able to
run, it might have been a very different outcome.9 Second, the Philippine election law has no provision
for run-offs, so there is no incentive to form coalition tickets. Had Mar Roxas and Senator Grace Poe, the
two most like-minded candidates, joined forces, they might have been able to defeat Duterte. Third,
Duterte ran a savvy and effective campaign. He announced his candidacy late, so the media had little
time to scrutinize his record as mayor and his rivals had much less chance to attack him. His campaign
mobilized large numbers of volunteers and used social media well. Fourth, all four of Duterte’s
opponents had significant negatives. In contrast, Duterte, because of his personality and message, was
an attention-grabbing and compelling candidate, who was able to tap into (and to some extent
manipulate) middle class frustrations and “latent anxiety,” particularly about drugs and crime.10
Although the assertions of middle-class frustration seem valid for anyone who has lived in Metro Manila,
Cebu, or the handful of other cities that are home to most of the Philippine middle class, the extent to
which this sense of frustration and anxiety was national in scope is relatively less clear.

THE DUTERTE GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES AND POLICIES

Upon assuming office on June 30, 2016, Duterte assembled an eclectic cabinet that included law school
classmates, long-time associates from Davao, ex-military officers, business leaders, and representatives
of the communist left. His diverse coalition came together through personal loyalty, regional affinity, and
political opportunism. It included many political figures who had been sidelined during the Aquino
administration, most notably former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and members of the Marcos,
Estrada, and Villar families.

Now seventy-three years old, Duterte’s world view is heavily influenced by nationalist and leftist thought
dating from the 1960s and 1970s, as well as by his twenty-two years of experience as mayor of Davao
City. In Davao, he combined a hardline approach to law and order with socially progressive and pro-
business policies. As mayor he was both a paternalistic patron and a fearsome boss whose orders had to
be followed. As a result, he has little tolerance for scrutiny or challenges to this authority. He sees the
country as beset by existential threats of drugs, crime, and corruption. As befits Philippine culture, his
approach is highly personalistic: he presents himself as the only leader strong and decisive enough to
save the nation. As for his frequently crude and threatening rhetoric, anthropologist Nicole Curato has
called his approach “crass politics” that, though objectionable to many, communicates multiple
messages:
Duterte may be offending the norms of respectful communication when he prefaces his remarks with
“mother fucker,” but he brings to the surface the collective frustration many feel. He may not offer the
clearest policy, but he puts forward the sincerest discourse of sympathy. . . . Duterte’s gutter language
establishes the urgency of saving the republic. Including “kill” and “death” is essential to the president’s
vocabulary for the country is at war, and his politics of “I will” demands quick, albeit painful, solutions.11

KEY CONCERNS AND PRIORITIES

The Duterte government’s top priorities include combating illegal drugs and crime, promoting rapid
infrastructure development, sustaining economic growth and making it more inclusive, enhancing peace
and development in Mindanao, and reorienting the Philippines’ foreign relations. To support these goals,
the government has significantly increased spending on infrastructure, raised the salaries of government
employees, expanded existing social development programs, revived the stalled peace process with the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), entered into
negotiations with the communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.

Space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the government’s domestic and foreign policies.
Instead, the following sections discuss three policy areas that offer insights into the Duterte
administration—economic policymaking, peace and development in Mindanao, and constitutional
change—and discuss in greater detail the ongoing war on drugs.

Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed little interest in economic policy
issues. To reassure nervous domestic and foreign businesses, his campaign developed a ten-point
economic agenda that largely continued the Aquino government’s economic policies. Since taking office,
Duterte’s two principal economic priorities have been to accelerate economic growth and make it more
inclusive, and to significantly increase spending on much-needed infrastructure. Key features of the
government’s approach to the economy include running a larger deficit, adopting a more statist
approach to infrastructure development, and continuing increases in social spending.

In 2017, GDP growth was 6.7 percent, and it is projected to be about 6.5 percent in 2018. The
government, under its “Build Build Build” program, has significantly increased spending on infrastructure
and has ambitious plans to build new rail lines, a subway, highways, and bridges in the coming years.12
To finance spending on infrastructure and social services, the government has embarked on a multiphase
tax reform program. The first package of reforms was signed into law in December 2017; the second and
more controversial package is with Congress. Inflation has been increasing, averaging 4.8 percent for
January to August and reaching a nine-year high of 6.7 percent in September and October.13 Higher oil
and food prices, excise taxes associated with tax reform, and the weak peso have all fueled inflation.
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

Duterte’s principal priority has been a highly punitive approach to illegal drug use, which he sees as an
existential threat to the country’s social fabric. His nationwide war on drugs has applied the approach
that he used in Davao City, giving the police free rein to deal with suspected drug users and pushers with
little concern for legal niceties. It also has involved a lesser-noticed campaign against government
officials allegedly complicit in the drug trade. This approach has resulted in the deaths of thousands of
suspected drug users and pushers—mostly young males living in poor urban neighborhoods—at the
hands of the police or unidentified assailants. The police claim that many of these deaths were the result
of the suspects resisting arrest, but evidence from journalists and human rights groups shows that many
were premeditated extra-judicial killings (EJKs).15 The number of EJKs is difficult to determine and
disputed—in part because the government and Philippine National Police (PNP) intentionally obfuscate
the data—but estimates range from 6,000 to 12,000 deaths.16

This loss of life is the most horrific and immediate consequence of the drug war. But the drug war itself is
a sign that the Philippine government has abdicated its responsibility to protect human rights and
respect the rule of law. EJKs violate both the Philippine Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (to which the Philippines is a signatory), particularly the provisions concerning
the presumption of innocence and adherence to due process. Given the attention that human rights
organizations and the media have paid to the drug war, it is worth looking more closely at the reasons for
it and some of its broader consequences.17

Why is Duterte singularly focused on drugs and crime? It is not surprising that crime is a major problem
in the Philippines, given its high level of poverty, underresourced and corruption-prone law enforcement
agencies, and glacially slow judiciary. Criminal activities, in the form of smuggling, illegal gambling, drugs,
trafficking in persons, and money laundering, are significant features of the Philippine political
economy.18 Studies by International Alert suggest that the illicit economy in Mindanao plays an
important role in sustaining the multiple conflicts across the island.19

Impact on local politics and government. Duterte’s almost singular focus on the drug war has far-
reaching consequences for the country’s local politics and governance. In many respects, subnational
government in the Philippines is highly decentralized, but most local government units (LGUs) are
dependent upon central government funding and grapple with the challenge of unfunded mandates.
LGUs are key actors in the drug war, and local officials need to juggle multiple and sometimes conflicting
priorities, including protecting their citizens, cooperating with local law enforcement, and demonstrating
results to central authorities. And as reported by Rappler, a respected Philippine news website, the drug
war has caused a major shift in LGU priorities:
At the local level, the drug war has changed the way barangays [the smallest LGUs] spend their funds. . . .
Traditional social services such as medical clinics or feeding programs for malnourished children are no
longer budget priorities. Through a number of policy incentives as well as strict supervision by the DILG,
the priority at the barangay level has now become the monitoring and surveillance of drug suspects and
the rehabilitation of drug users who have surrendered.42

There also is a darker dimension to the drug war at the local level. Peter Kreuzer notes the pressure and
intimidation experienced by local officials:

It has become highly problematic for local political elites to evade the president’s injunction to
participate in the anti-crime killing spree that is engulfing the Philippines. . . . The various reshuffles are
placing more hard-line police officers in command positions. Furthermore, these officers are well aware
that results measured in dead bodies are expected of them. In addition, police officers and politicians
alike have been publicly denounced as supporting and profiting from drug crimes and thus threatened
not only with being indicted, but also with becoming victims of extrajudicial executions themselves.
Most officials then choose to fall in line with the president.43

Booming economy

The Philippine economy is far from being sick.

As of the first quarter of 2018, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) stood at 6.8%. This is one of
the fastest growth rates in the Asia-Pacific.

But UP economics professor Emmanuel de Dios said that economic managers should not rejoice so
quickly, as this is still short of the government's target range of 7% to 8%.

Moreover, other countries like Laos and Cambodia had already breached 7% years ago.

Duterte's Build, Build Build (BBB) program is also lifting several sectors.
During the first quarter of 2018, the public sector's construction activities grew by 25%. Private sector
construction also grew at 7%.

According to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the government has
maintained its spending targets for infrastructure development.

Economic managers committed to accelerate public infrastructure spending from 5.1% of the country's
GDP in 2016 to 5.4% in 2017, with an increase in funding allocation of P101.76 billion based on the
General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The government has slightly raised the country's deficit ceiling to sustain the BBB's momentum.

However, securing the rest of the funds for the P8-trillion infrastructure push continues to be a
challenge.

Duterte has also revamped the country's tax reform plan for the infrastructure push.

Here other key accomplishments by the Duterte administration compiled in a 56-page report by
Malacañang:

A 6.1% growth of the country’s Gross Domestic Product for the third quarter of 2018;

A 3.3% increase of the country’s total export valued at $6.11 billion from $5.91 billion as of October
2018;

A 31% increase on year-on-year Foreign Direct Investment inflows at $7.4 billion from January to August
2018, compared to $5.7 billion recorded in the same period the previous year;

The signing of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippines and Kuwait, wherein both
countries agreed to uphold ethical recruitment policies, systems, and procedures for the recruitment and
employment of domestic workers;

The completion of major infrastructure projects such as Taguig Integrated Terminal Exchange; Caraycaray
Bridge in Biliran; Lisap Bridge in Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro; Davao River Bridge in Davao City, Davao
Del Sur; Sugpon Bridge in Sugpon, Ilocos Sur; Adriatico Bridge replacement; the P8.53-million road repair
leading to the Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan; Napindan Bridge II, Taguig City; Pasac-Culcul Bridge 1
and 2; and the reconstruction of Otis Bridge;

The groundbreaking for the construction of major infrastructure projects such as the Philippine National
Railways Manila-Clark Project Phase 1; South East Metro Manila Express way Project; Binondo-
Intramuros Bridge and Estrella Pantaleon Bridge; Phase 2, Pasig-Marikina River Channel Improvement
Project; and Panguil Bay Bridge;

Installation and construction of 6,392 small-scale irrigation projects from July 2016 to November 2018 to
provide supplemental irrigation to high-value crops during the dry season;

The signing of key pieces of legislation such as the Universal Access to Quality Tertiary Education Act, the
Masustansyang Pagkain para sa Batang Pilipino Act, the Ease of Doing Business Act, the Philippine
Mental Health Law, the Universal Health Care Law, the Kalusugan at Nutrisyon ng Mag-Nanay Act, the
Balik Scientist Law, the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the
Free Irrigation Act, and the Philippine National Identification System Act;

The launch of the Overseas Filipino Bank to cater to the needs of OFWs, strengthen government’s
presence in the remittance market and eventually influence lower costs of bank remittance;

And an 8.32% increase in tourist arrivals with 5.36 million foreign-visitor arrivals from January to
September 2018.

The Palace report also included a positive outlook for the country from several organizations, including
the Mastercard Asia-Pacific consumer confidence survey, which showed the highest optimism level for
the Philippines in Asia; and the 2018 Henley Passport Index, where the Philippines climbed 3 places to
rank 72nd.

The report also highlighted the approval ratings of Duterte from various social-research organizations.

"2019 will certainly be an exciting year with the following milestones, which started this year beginning
to bear fruit. The Philippine National Identification System has been signed into law and the start of full
rollout is expected next year," said Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo.

"A plebiscite for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao will be held next year. The
Philippines is hosting the 2019 Southeast Asian Games. A new major player in the public
telecommunications market has been officially confirmed,” he added. — With a report from Pia
Gutierrez, ABS-CBN News
5. Transportation

The transportation scene in the Philippines is basically as chaotic as it could get. It was handed over to
the administration with eight trains barely operating, hopeless EDSA traffic, a close to 3-year delay of
license plates release, airport taxis causing troubles frequently, and the list goes on.

The past years have been critical for the transport scene in the Philippines, and it still is now. Public
transportation can still get chaotic every now and then, however, some of the biggest pains that the
government faced when it first started are slowly getting remedied.

For instance, the Department of Transportation (DOTr) has gradually addressed the lack of trains in the
MRT while making sure all the facilities are well maintained, from the public restrooms to the escalators.
By no means are they perfect, but for the most part they now function as expected and facilities are
tolerable. The repair is still ongoing and according to DoTr, they may get 12 more trains after the repairs
are done this year.

On the other hand, it won’t be long until car owners can let go of their license plate receipts, as Land
Transportation Office (LTO) has finally started distributing license plates nationwide. To make sure the
backlogs are delivered as soon as possible, the government established its own license plate
manufacturing facility, which is capable of making 22,000 plates per day at full capacity.

Jeepney modernization received a mixed reception from both the riding public and the public transport
operators. While its aim is to provide safer and more comfortable transport to commuters, many
jeepney operators and drivers are against the modernization because of the expensive overhead cost
that it would entail. Despite that, the government has relentlessly pushed the agenda forward, and they
have just launched the first batch of modernized jeepneys this month. These new jeepneys will start
taking on the streets across Metro Manila on July 23.

The transportation scene in the Philippines still has a long way to go. It is definitely lagging behind its
neighboring nations such as Singapore, Malaysia, and even Indonesia. However, the future seems to be
looking bright for the riding public as the jeepney modernization is slowly getting realized, the train
system getting expanded and is relentlessly being enhanced, and a new subway system in the making on
the horizon.
4. Local business

In his third State of the Nation Address, the President said the state would “sustain” efforts to make
doing business in the country easier. He has consistently expressed his disappointment towards the
bureaucracy of doing business with government agencies in the Philippines.

This year, he was able to pass a law that will cut the red tape in dealing with different agencies in the
Philippines, streamlining the process, making it easier and speedier in accomplishing works. The
President signed the Ease of Doing Business Act last May, requiring government agencies to act on
applications within three days for simple transactions, seven days for complex ones and 20 days for the
highly technical applications.

3. Healthcare

The Universal Healthcare bill aims to provide a full spectrum of health services to individuals and
communities, from health promotion to prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative care. Its
proponent Joseph Ejercito assured that this bill will provide Universal Healthcare to all Filipinos, by
lessening the out-of-the-pocket expenses needed for healthcare needs.

The proposed measure will be applied to both inpatient and outpatient care and will cover the cost of
medicine (prescription drugs), diagnostic studies, vaccination, geriatric care, personal and preventive
services, rehabilitation services, and etc. Aside from that, this bill will also provide an improvement to
government hospital facilities and further increase bed capacities. This bill isn’t a law yet, thus Duterte
has urged its speedy passage during his 3rd SONA.

Aside from this bill which hasn’t seen the light of the day yet, Duterte has also launched different
measures to address the following issues the healthcare system in the Philippines is facing:

Lingap Sa Masa This initiative is delivered through the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
It’s a medical assistance program by the Office of the President to deliver health services and free
medicine to indigent and patients with little to no resources in government hospitals. Early in 2017, this
program was funded with PHP1 billion by the Office of the President.

Lingap sa Masa started in Davao City during Duterte’s term as Mayor and is now extended nationwide as
he sits as the Chief Executive of the land.

Anti-Hospital Deposit Law

Another measure that he turned into a law last year was the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law. This does not
necessarily cut the cost on hospital bills, but it can save lives during medical emergencies.

Republic Act No. 10932, otherwise known as the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law provides that “in emergency
or serious cases, it shall be unlawful for any hospital or medical clinic to request, solicit, demand or
accept any deposit or any other form of advance payment as prerequisite for administering basic
emergency care, for confinement or medical treatment, or to refuse to administer medical treatment
and support to any patient.”

Our Healthcare System still has a long way to go to become highly inclusive for everyone despite the
income bracket and the occupation (or the lack thereof). However, what the administration has started
seems to be a good start in the right direction.

2. Education

The Free Tuition Fee Law is perhaps the Duterte Administration’s most positive achievements to date. In
his effort to bridge this gap between the poor and education, Duterte signed “The Universal Access to
Quality Tertiary Education Act” or Republic Act 10931 on August 3, 2017. The law aims to waive school
fees to provide an opportunity for every Filipino to earn a higher education and a degree in State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs) and Local Universities and Colleges (LUC).

According to the data from the Philippine News Agency, close to 900,000 Filipino students who enrolled
in 112 SUCs for the academic year 2017-2018 benefited from the PHP8 billion Grant of Free Tuition in
SUCs, while kindergarten enrolment has increased from 65% in 2016 to 84% in 2017.

Around 1.3 million students enrolled in SUCs and LUCs will finally enjoy free tuition and miscellaneous
fees beginning the academic year of 2018-2019 while 300,000 poor students will also earn tertiary
education subsidy apart from free tuition and miscellaneous fees through CHED’s Unified Financial
Assistance System for Tertiary Education Act (UNIFAST).

Tertiary education in the Philippines is now within reach, even for the poor. Not only will this even out
the playing field for the younger generation to achieve a good education, it will also lessen the burden of
the parents and students who are struggling their way through college.

1. Taxes
Bigger take-home pay with some compromise – that’s what this tax reform is all about. As the tax paying
workers in the country pocket bigger tax savings, the government will be losing a huge chunk of revenue
from income tax collection. In order to address this compromise, certain adjustments were made which
led to increasing commodity prices. While it may have provided more disposable income to the working
population, the burden of compensating for those lost taxes are placed on every consumer’s shoulders.

Many people will argue that this reform did not turn out the way it was expected and that it has a jarring
contribution to the relentless inflation that the country is currently facing. Many expressed their
sentiments of this reform as anti-poor because after all, not everyone in the lower end of the
socioeconomic spectrum was able to benefit from the personal income tax cuts.

However, it’s also worth noting that this tax reform is funding some of the government’s projects that
are aimed at addressing poverty directly, like the Free Tuition Fee Law and the Universal Health Care. The
“Build! Build! Build!” initiative isn’t the only project that’s greatly dependent on the TRAIN Law.

With that being said, the TRAIN law may have impacted the spending power of consumers, for better or
worse. However, in return, it paved the way for a more inclusive healthcare system and extended college
education to the poorest population.

The TRAIN law indeed has flaws, and hopefully, their mitigating measures will be efficient enough to help
the people (especially the poor) get by the current socio-economic climate. The good news is, the
government has started its initiative to help jeepney drivers combat rising fuel prices through their fuel
subsidy program. If this measure is efficiently dispersed to its beneficiary, this will translate into a less
financial burden to transport system operators, jeepneys, and even commuters.

However, little is known whether there are more measures like this in the government’s pipeline, but
more tax exemptions on daily commodities will cushion consumers from the impact of the rising cost of
living due to unyielding inflation.