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Morgan Speicher, Joshua Glow & Cecil Thomas

Evaluation of poaching and the illegal wildlife trade in the finances of terrorist
organizations in regards to the African, Asian, and Pacific geographic regions

The purpose of this paper is to identify the various methods, routes, and

secondary processes involved in the transport of poached illegal wildlife. Research will

involve type of wildlife, locations, handlers, monetary exchanges, trade routes,

byproducts, and points of origin. This especially refers to the movements and affiliations

of known terrorist groups who are directly or indirectly involved in the process of

wildlife poaching and trafficking. Dangers involved will be analyzed in comparison to

the threat to National Security of the United States as well as any relations to the U.S. in

general.

The illicit trade networks of wildlife poaching are a significant and growing threat

to established governments and their global affairs. Among the many implications

associated with the illegal wildlife trade is its adverse effects on State security through its

ties with transnational organized crime syndicates. According to the National Security

Council’s analysis of transnational organized crime, the expansion and diversification of

criminal networks are resulting in a convergence of threats that pose a strategic threat to

the United States of America with direct and indirect effects to its citizens and interests

(National Security Council, 2011). The widespread and increasing threat of wildlife

poaching and its affiliations to transnational networks, groups, and activities has led to

the creation of an executive order that has established a Presidential Task Force charged

with providing a strategic guide and implementation of U.S. efforts to fight wildlife

trafficking (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016). The purpose of this research

is to identify the ways in which wildlife poaching affects the security of the United
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States. Research will involve the consequences of the demand for wildlife products, the

immediate and long-term threats of wildlife trafficking, and its threat to national security.

In order to explore the consequences of the illegal demand for wildlife poaching,

the connection between China and ivory will be explored. The Chinese demand for ivory

is traceable to its value as a cultural tradition. Often referred to as white gold, Ivory

carved into religious icons and sold as dust to supply demand for traditional medicine.

The modern rise in demand for ivory from China can be traced back to the 2008 CITIES’

designation of China as a legalized buyer of ivory stockpiles in African countries. The

sale was termed a colossal failure, with, “the regulated ivory trade providing

unscrupulous Chinese carvers… with the ideal legal camouflage to buy and sell

contraband tusks.” (Levin, 2013) The increased economic wealth of China and

corresponding legalization of ivory sales will be investigated as one of the primary causes

of an increase in poached ivory value for terrorist and organized crime groups. Poverty

and poor governance will also be investigated as causes for the facilitation of ivory

trafficking. Finally, the efforts of China to stop the flow of illegal ivory will also be

examined as part of the international effort to end the stream of the commodity into

markets

The growth of China’s economy in the 21 century is easily presentable in their

st

levels of GDP progression. This growth peaked in 2007, with the World Bank recording a

GDP annual growth rate of 14.195% (2016). As a result, the purchasing power of

Chinese citizens also amplified, leading to an increased demand for ivory products. The

Chinese government could not meet these demands as a result of the Ivory Trade Ban of

1998, imposed by the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of

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Wild Fauna and Flora (CITIES). Following rebounds in the global elephant population

and a push for African economic development, CITIES legalized a one-off sale of ivory

to China as a designated buyer, purchasing 107 tons from South Africa, Zimbabwe,

Botswana, and Namibia (US Fish & Wildlife Service, 2013). Opponents of the sale cited

two major arguments: “First, when a ban exists, it suppresses demand since some

potential consumers are unlikely to buy banned substances … Secondly, relaxing a ban

may make it more difficult for authorities to distinguish illegal ivory from legal

versions.” (Hsing & Sekar, 2016) Therefore, the legalization of ivory sales would lead to

an influx of illegally poached ivory in order to meet the new demand. Chinese authorities

assured critics that this was impossible based upon a system of recording and resale to

licensed ivory carvers and storefronts. This system would theoretically create a closed

ivory market within China, allowing government control over purchasing power This

was later proven false by the Monitoring of the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE)

program, which presented data that, “poaching had continued to rise since 2006 with

2011 having the highest levels of poaching since the first collection of data in 2002.” (US

Fish & Wildlife Service, 2013). Therefore, the legalization of the sale of ivory has

created a new source of income for terrorists and organized crime syndicates.

The facilitation of ivory smuggling is due to poor governance and poverty that

exists in countries with large elephant populations. Lack of strong government

involvement as a result of, “Political and economic instability has seen ivory poaching

rise along with the steady deterioration of anti-poaching capabilities.” (Gossmann, 2009)

The weaknesses of the governments involved create further opportunities for criminal

and terrorist syndicates. An example is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a group
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operating in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the

leadership of Joseph Kony. Recent reports by the Enough Project claim, “Barter of tusks

from slain elephants provides ammunition and other supplies to Kony and his group,

resulting in continued violence against civilians and the poaching of more elephants.”

(Cakaj, 2015) Another crucial factor in the continued trafficking of ivory is poverty. The

two main reasons that stem from this cause are the availability of impoverished workers

due to lack of jobs and a drive for subsistence hunting due to lack of food security. Poor

governance facilitates conditions, which contribute to the recruitment of poachers, low-

level brokers, or in extreme cases, terrorists. Despite calls for joint conservation and

development projects in order to employ locals and combat the employment of poachers,

many are still swayed by financial incentive. According to a rapid response assessment

by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Criminal

Police Organization (INTERPOL), poachers could potentially earn, “USD 425 per year,

compared with USD 118 for small business, USD 79 for crops, and USD 61 for

livestock.” (Nellemann & Henriksen, 2016) Therefore, the demand for ivory must be

lowered in order to make a significant impact on the economics of the illegal ivory trade.

The Chinese demand for ivory will continue to exist as long as there is availability

in the market. The two major problems with enacting a total ban on the legal ivory trade

are the relatively large stockpiles of legal ivory owned by the government and ivory

carving as part of traditional culture for thousands of years (Qin, 2016). Despite these

concerns, current Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to ban the ivory trade in China

during his inaugural visit to the US in 2015. China has also begun the process of reducing

its stockpiles of confiscated ivory by burning and crushing over 28 metric tons in 2014
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alone (State Department, 2015). Critics of this program claim that the destruction of ivory

increases its market value. Evidence that supports this theory is the gradual increase in

the price of ivory from, “USD 750/kg in 2010 to USD 2,100/kg in 2014.” (Nellemann &

Henriksen, 2016) Other methods to gradually shut down the ivory market that have been

suggested are the deployment of Chinese law enforcement to African regions in order to

bring down more complex criminal syndicates or the amendment of Chinese laws in

regards to business records of ivory acquisition and storage.

Recent findings on the increase of terrorist involvement in illegal wildlife

poaching have unveiled certain national security threats to the United States. Terrorists

use many avenues to promote their cause but these organizations can only function as

much as its revenue supports its operations. This revenue, as of recent, has predominantly

come from illegally poached wildlife. As Panjabi explained, “It is important to consider

that the slaughter of just one elephant and the illicit sale of its tusks would have sufficed

to fund the U.S. Embassy bombings by terrorists in 1998 (Panjabi, 2014).” The revenue

these terrorists groups are receiving come from trade across the globe but surprisingly the

United States is among the top consumers of one of the largest illegally poached items;

ivory. A 2008 study by Stiles & Martin for the British-based conservation group Born

Free Foundation found that the U.S. is the world’s second largest retail market for

elephant ivory products (Born Free Foundation, 2008). This consumption, even after the

ban of its trade on July 6 , 2016, is a national security threat because of the criminality
th

happening within the borders of the United States. Not only is the funding of these

terrorists organizations a national security threat to the United States, so is the possibility

of the traded illegally poached wildlife being used as biological terrorism tools. Illegal
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wildlife poaching presents national security threats to the United States through the

funding of terrorist groups, its trade within the United States, and the threat of biological

terrorism.

A growing threat to US security is the use of illegal wildlife poaching as a

resource for terrorist groups. The non-profit Stimson Center which was founded in 1989,

estimated in 2014 that the annual amounts from wildlife poaching used to finance

terrorists and other criminals amounted to about $19 billion annually (Panjabi, 2014).

Terrorist groups financed by illegal wildlife poaching operate globally, but are

predominantly active in regions with a large quanity of poachable animals. The Somali

Islamist militant group al Shabaab has earned hundreds of thousands of dollars, from

encouraging villages in Kenya to poach ivory, which is then trafficked out of Somali

ports. Escapees from the Lord’s Resistance Army report that the group is trading ivory

with Arab businessmen and officers from the Sudanese military for cash, food, guns, and

medical supplies (Anderson et al., 2014). These terrorist groups are generating revenue

and maintaining status through this trade which in turn creates a security threat to the

United States. The larger these terrorist groups are, the farther they reach, the more of a

threat they become.

The illegal trade of wildlife increasingly is facilitated through the internet as a low

risk, high reward system. Traders are reportedly using chat rooms and auction websites,

such as eBay, to engage in illicit wildlife sales (International Fund for Animal Welfare,

2005). Most U.S. sellers in this study (69.2%) fell into a category listed as “possible

violation” by making a general claim of legality, but failing to list any supporting

documentation attesting to the species or age of the item being sold (IFAW, 2005).
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Businesses such as Boone Trading, The Man Hing Ivory Imports,

ElephantIvoryTusks.com, and KowakIvory.com all sell and trade ivory within United

States borders. Elly Pepper with the Natural Resources Defense Council explained. “The

US has permitted a limited legal market for years, but since it is so hard to date ivory —

it requires DNA testing or bomb carbon dating, which are expensive and not widely-

available processes — people sneak new ivory onto the shelves under the guise of old

ivory (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2016). Even though the United States has

banned international ivory trade, buyers and sellers have found loopholes in these

agreements. As Elly Pepper further explains, “That’s why while the US has banned most

ivory for so long, it hasn’t really mattered. It just created this parallel illegal market." The

United States is not an export country of illegal wildlife; it is a destination country for

illegally poached wildlife.

Another security threat is the spread of diseases through illegal wildlife entering

the United States. The Congressional Research Service explained, “The wildlife trade

might have bio-terrorism implications. For example, imports of lightly regulated wildlife

might be used to carry a disease that could be transmitted to other animals or agricultural

crops (Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). Terrorism is a high priority to United States law

enforcement and this threat of bio-terrorism is a threat to security. Wildlife have a great

capability to breach the protective curtain and easily pass through its fabric. Examples

include infectious diseases transported by wildlife that caused major economic and/or

human health impacts, such as Nipah virus in Malaysia, SARS in China, Monkeypox in

the USA, and current concerns associated with the role of migratory birds in global

movement of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus (United States Geological Survey,
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2016). Based on the findings of the General Accounting Office (now Government

Accountability Office), nearly 75% of emerging diseases reach humans through animals

(2016). Agents such as alphaviruses that are prevalent in wild bird populations can spread

over a wide area in a short time. Experimental studies have documented that viruses such

as West Nile virus can easily spread from animal to animal in bird populations

(Rabinowitz, 2006). The Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act

of 2010 would provide the President with a Personal Advisor specifically to strategize

biodefense planning on a national level as well as funding for biodefense research and

heightened security for higher level laboratories. However, this bill has been discharged

from five different committees and is stuck in the legislative process (H.R. 5498, 2010).

Animals as a delivery system are virtually untraceable and given many terrorist networks

use the wildlife trade as a means for financial support they have access to the animals if

indeed they intend to use this as an avenue for a terrorist attack.

The illicit economy conducts its operations in the dark, beyond the legal and

official political economies of the world. In the world of illicit activities and terrorism,

the most common identifier among black market interconnections is finance (Miklaucic

& Brewer, 2013). According to the United Nations Environmental Programme’s fact

sheet on illegal trade, environmental crime is estimated to be up to $213 billion annually,

with $15-20 billion of that amount being generated from wildlife poaching alone (UNEP,

2016). It is the fourth largest illicit trade activity following narcotics, human trafficking,

smuggling, and counterfeit goods (ICE, 2015). Combined with the large monetary

supply, illicit networks are essentially enhanced in the scope of their activities. In

comparison, the 9/11 attacks cost approximately $500,000 to execute, with over $270,000
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spent in the United States to facilitate the attack on American soil (9/11 Commission,

2004). The increased interconnections between terrorism and transnational organized

crime unveil a growing threat to national security. Transnational organized crime

networks actively hunt for governance gaps, socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and

weaknesses in key characters for expansion, integration, and intensification (Miklaucic &

Brewer, 2013). According to the State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business

Affairs, money and methods used by terrorists and criminal networks for illegal

operations and illicit activities are referred to as threat finance (U.S. State Department,

2016). In the black market, where threat finance is an illegitimate source of

empowerment, these activities produce significant damage to the global financial system

through subversion, exploitation, and distortion of legitimate markets and economic

activity (NSC, 2016). In terms of its direct effect on the U.S. economy, American firms

are being put at a competitive disadvantage by transnational organized crime (Miklaucic

& Brewer, 2013). The convergence of illegal trade, terrorist networks, and threat finance

could lead to the control of key commodities such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious

metals, as well as the transportation sector, which could create economic instability

within the United States (NSC, 2016).

The crime-terror nexus is an area of importance when considering the adverse

effects it could have on United States national security. According to a study conducted

by Celina Realuyo for the National Defense University, the framework and sustainability

of groups involved in illicit activities such as wildlife trafficking involves eight critical

enablers: leadership, illicit activities, logistics and supply chains, personnel, financing,

weapons, technology and communications, and an operating environment lacking state

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control (Realuyo, 2015). These organizations can in turn share tactics and form alliances

with existing terrorist or criminal organizations creating multifaceted groups with solid

infrastructures that can penetrate multiple state boundaries (Rollins, Wyler & Rosen,

2010). In the United States, illicit activities stemming from the U.S.-Mexican border

involve factors such as humans and drugs travelling north across the border, while guns

and money head south back toward Mexico (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013). Evidence for

the possibility of convergence of these networks used between the U.S.-Mexican border

and illicit trade routes used for wildlife poaching is not readily accessible as empirical

data and analysis is scarce. However, the adaptability and market-driven functionality of

convergent transnational criminal organizations continues to locate new sources and

markets for illicit activities, making the United States’ borders susceptible to such threats

(Realuyo, 2015). The United States is among the world’s major markets for wildlife and

wildlife products both legal and illegal (NSC, 2014). The presence of such illicit wildlife

trade products across U.S. borders reveals the possibility of future security implications

due to the convergence of sophisticated transnational organized crime, terrorist networks,

threat finance, and byproducts of various illicit activities.

The divergent dimension of globalization entails illicit activities such as wildlife

poaching and transnational organized crime syndicates which operate without borders.

TOCs do not adhere to the rule of law, sovereignty, or human rights, all while

maintaining vast resources necessary to its function. Wildlife poaching is envisioned as a

low risk, high reward activity to groups that utilize the illicit trade to fund operations, and

appeals to groups that have the potential to impact national, regional, and global security

interests (Clapper, 2011). The resources and structured foundations of such illicit groups
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pose greater future threats that are gradually being addressed by members of the IC, local

and federal law enforcement, NGOs, and individuals around the world. Joint Forces must

understand the unconventional tactics and procedures of non-state actors and illicit

activities that fund its operations on a global scale (Realuyo, 2016). On February 11,

2014, President Obama implemented the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife

Trafficking, which discusses the global responsibility to strengthen enforcement, reduce

demand, and increase cooperation to address challenges associated with well-armed,

well-equipped, and well-organized networks of criminal organizations (NSC, 2014). As

financial resources and criminal capabilities of TOCs and terrorist networks advance,

U.S. vulnerability to potential attacks increase. There is no State border that is impervious

to the operations of illicit groups regardless of economic or political development.

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