266 BOOKREVIEWS

look to the environment as the principal determinant of linguistic behavior. Rather, I

propose that knowledge alone can adequately ‘explain’ language, insofar as language is a
species-specific kind of knowing behavior. But then, this type of explanation is not a
mechanistic one; it Is one appropriate to the level of the phenomenon under study; it is,
if you like, a psychological view that understands linguistic symbolic behavior in terms of
the totality of biological human intelligence.
It is this writer’s bias that Piaget has provided the basis for a biological based under-
standing of the nature of human knowledge. It is only in such a framewurk that the dilemma
‘innate versus learned’ can be overcome in a higher synthesis. Linguistic behavior, like
knowing behavior, need not be inappropriately forced into one of these two alternatives.
One can criticize Lenneberg when he seems to reduce language to an innate structure
without genesis, to the same extent that one can criticize behaviorists who emphasize:
genesis and neglect structure. However, in order to recognize that knowledge is an inter-
action of genesis and structure, one must abdicate a mechanistic viewpoint concerning
knowledge. In other words, a biological foundation of language should be based on a
biological foundation of knowledge. By biological knowledge I do not mean a physiological
reductionism that leads to an impoverished view of both physiology and psychology:
rather the non-mechanical and non-idealistic epistemological view of knowledge as is
exemplified in Piaget’s (1966) works. His position recognizes an active evolution and
development of knowledge. If this position on knowledge is accepted, it implies - and in
this sense, it ‘explains’ - the kind of biological position on language which the author of
this book rightly defends but which without an epistemological basis has inadequate
explanatory power.
References
1966, Biologic et connaissance. Paris, Gallimard.
PIAGET, J.,
S=INER, B.F., 1967, Quoted in Psychology today, 1, no. 5, 69-70.

ERIC H. LENNEBERG: Biologicalfoundations of language. By John W. Black,

The Ohio State University, Columbus.

This book - the author frequently calls it monograph - is an inductive argument that runs
through nine chapters. In the final one the author summarizes his argument in thirteen
postulates - ‘a concise statement of the theory’. (1) Language is evidence of a cognitive
process, much deeper than language itself. (2) The cognitive process is one of establishing
increasing numbers of new categories of similarities and differences among physical stimuli,
and likewise of perceptual processes that are set up by the stimuli. (3) Although some of
the universal features of languages may relate to the peripheral, the anatomical, and the
physiological characteristics of the species, language can be mastered when the typical
peripheral features are lacking. Thus, language behavior is closely related to central
functions. (4) Differences in languages in their outward form and underlying structure
are limited to the range of individual differences in cognition. (5) Maturation brings
cognitive processes to a state of language readiness, a realization of what was formerly
only a potential. Thus, a ‘latent language structure’ evolves into a ‘realized structure’. This
realization involves; an ingestion of the adult language in the environment of the child.
The ‘realized structure’ is not necessarily manifested by talking. Language may be ingested
and understood although it is not used in speech or writing. This might occur with
deformities of the expressive mechanism. It cannot be ingested, however, without receptors.
l? The developyt of cognitive processes accompanies an increasing skill in differenti-
atron. At some time in the development of the organism there is no discrimination; gross
discrimination follows; inc=sin& finer discriminations emerge; and finally marurit~.
Language readiness is a stage in this development. (8) The singular stage of differentiation
 BOOK REVIEWS 267

that accompanies language readiness is transient and is soon lost as subsequent stages
emerge. (9) The biOlOgica accompaniments of latent language structure are universal and
replicated in healthy human beings. (IO) The deep form of different languages is identical ;
it rests upon a UniWmd ‘mode of calculating with categories’. Since the ‘latent language
Structud iS w]icated in all human beings, it follows that these human beings can learn
one natural language as easily as another at the time of ‘language readiness*. (11) The
unfolding of language is a developmental process, not a mirroring of stimuli nor a purpose-
ful behavior. (12) Again, language behavior develops with aneincreasing capacity for
differentiation. The behavior acts upon the oral language of the environment. With language
readiness, SOme crude segments of the environment seem to be copied. These, however, are
only convenient outer manifestations of the deeper realization of latent structure. As the
Process of aCtUa]htiOn continues, an increasing number of features of the environnlenta]
language are recognized and may or may not be spoken. (I 3) There are, as Herbert Spencer
would say, exceptions. As the close replications account for language universals, so the
excePtions (wide individual differences) account for language change. Running throughout
the thirteen foregoing propositions is an assumption that the human being represents’s
developmental process and that one segment of this development is a biological accompa-
niment Of language prereadiness, readiness, and postreadiness. These states determine the
organism’s response to his language environment. There is no important imitating of
language, no achievement of language in order to acquire social control, no mastering of
language in order to get work done, no ego gratification as a cause, and the like.
The consequences of complete acceptance of the foregoing theory are several. It denies
both the need for the teaching of a first language and any power of programmed instruction
toward altering the rate of first language acquisition. It also draws a relatively heavy line
between language and speech. True, environmental speech is the stuff that is brought to
bear upon the developmental stage of language readiness. It can be any speech that has
the superficial characteristics of a natural language. Yet the mouthing of segments of this
speech by the language-ready child is not in itself a stimulus for language irequisition. In
fact, use of the speech through peripheral organs is unnecessary for the acquisition of
language.
The author describes this theory of language development as ‘an interpretive commentary
on observable facts’ - a valid descriptive statement. Of course, it does not preclude other
interpretative commentaries on the same or other observable facts in communication. In
fact, all of the theorists about the origin and development of language have based their
interpretations on observable facts. Yet the topic was thrown out of the French Academy
as an injudicious waste of time: the various proponents could give only logical commenta-
ries, not positive causal relations. Lenneberg’s commentaries are largely developed through
analogies. A dominant one that is introduced late in the monograph but that outlasts all
the others is a ‘resonance’ analogy. An acoustical resonator as used SO profitably by
Helmholtz selectively amplifies a limited band of frequencies of a complex sound, for
example a vowel, l_,enneberg borrows the feature of resonance to illustrate the behavior
Of the language-ready child. A child selects from the milieu of his language environment
a few aspects, perhaps phonemes, words, intonations, plosiveness, and makes vocal Play
out of them. Another child may resonate different features. Babbhng twins may resonate
features of each other’s language environment and develop a new natural language. Here,
indeed, are observable facts and an interpretation of the facts. They fit each oth:r and the
analogy iS intriguing. This iS not to say that the relationships are mSa]]Y did.
The first Six chapters of Bjological.formdatians o~&Wuge are eSpecia]]Y C]OSC]Yr&ted
and might be c&d ‘S&cted and pertinent biological facts Of the mechanisms that relate
to the use of language’.
Chapter 1, The concept& framework. In the author’s words, this chapter covers ‘a vast
territory citing embryo]ogical, anatomical, physiological, and genetic fxts Pertinent to 8
great variety of animals’. More than seventy references are cited, sampling a variety or
biological literature, for example of regeneration. In the treatment Of this topic the author
brings Ollt the Specificity Ofconnsctive tissue, nervous tissue, and muscle within a Particular
268 BOOKREVIEWS

species. The material, for all its completeness, is hardly up-to-date. Thornton has made
successful transplants with no nervous tissue whatever. This, however, is in Lenneberg’s
favor. It extends even beyond the data that he uses for specificity of species tissue. The
neatness with which he integrates specificity of species with regard to tissue, architecture,
and the attendant behavior is impressive. An outcome is to denigrate the importance Of
‘learning theory’ and to emphasize the ontology of the developing specimen. This biological
development creates many ‘readinesses’. The characteristic behaviors of the species ensue.
For an instant the writer nostalgically sensed the appropriateness of a behavioristic
truism, ‘Speech is total bodily activity’. Lenneberg might embrace the phrase, but he would
not accept it from a Watson-Woolbert frame of reference. Another idol that toppled with
the persuasiveness of this chapter was the social-control thesis of DC Laguna (1927). Yet,
with all the erudition shown in this chapter, there remains the fact that the running
commentary on multi-species behaviors does not establish causality.
Chapter 2, Morphological correlates. Here again, the author ranges widely over many
topics. Surely there is no counter argument to the view that the generally common features
of man’s vocal tract account for certain universal aspects of human speech. The face, lips,
and mouth ‘make possible a rapid and airtight closure and sudden explosive opening, both
being prerequisite for speech articulation’. Similar configurations are absent in the lemur,
spider monkey, gibbon, etc. The human palate and teeth are fortunate for speech pro-
duction, The ‘exponentially curved walls’ of the larynx, the manner in which the vocal
ligaments and muscles are attached to the arytenoid cartilages - these are first described
as being fortuitous for the production of speech and then a more expansive interpretation
is suggested. ‘In the course of phi!ogenetic history the various developments exert biasing
influences upon one another - the development of structure may affect the direction of
behavioral developments and vice versa - and therefore it is not unreasonable to assume
that subtle relationships may exist between many aspects of structure and behavior.’
This suggestion becomes even more positive in the conclusion of the chapter. ‘It is not
impossible that some aspect of sound-making etEciency might not have played into the
mechanisms and natural selection during the history of the species.’
A further topic is the uniqueness of the central nervous system in man. The discussion
discounts the importance of both brain weights and brain-body weight ratios. Conversely,
it emphasizes the importance that in man’s nervous system there is lateralization of the
language function, left-hemisphere dominance. Much evidence of cortical mapping and
of subcortical and midbrain involvement in language and speech is presented inconclusively.
Chapter 3, Some physiological correlates. This chapter relates almost entirely to human
speech and its production and minimally to the sound-making of non-humans. Vast as
the cited literature is - largely from experimental phonetics - the topics are selected.
‘There is no dearth of monographs on the physiology of speech and language... This
chapter is not a digest or a survey of this material. Instead we shall concentrate on a few
aspects of speech and language selected to eliminate a selected thesis.’
One topic is respiration. The illustrative figures look natural: the time-of-expiration f the
time-of-inspiration yields a higher ratio during speech than during silence. The interpretation
is less ordinary, an emphasis on the relative adaptability of the human respiratory system to
speech. There are other topics of interest: hyperventilation, the importance of CO2 in the
control of breathing, and the ‘I-fraction’ (time-of-inspiration + time-of-inspiration -+-expi-
ration).
The relationship ofthe sequence of respiratory events with the accompanying articulatory
ones is treated in some detail. Inasmuch as ‘:mporal segmentation of the stream of speech
is achieved at best with dubious validity, the review of the relevant literature here is more
Provocative than final. However, Lenneberg’s review and interpretation of these materials
encourages this writer to retain his optimistic evaluation of the preceding chapters.
Rate of utterance is treated as a backdrop for some hypothetical explanations of
articulators events and of the neurological programming of oral events. One ‘test’ of these
explanations lies in a speaker’s response to delayed sidetone. The author writes ingeniously
on this topic and illustrates his text clearly. Yet he sidesteps one crucial issue: is the speech
 ROOK REVIEWS 269

disrupted by a hiwistic feature of the verbal material or a temporal characteristic of

the speaker?
The use of the term programning in the explanation of on-going speech is convenient
but says little more than ‘I know what 1 want to say and I will say it’, or, alte;natively,
‘1 know what 1 want to start t0 say and I shall continue with “what comes e&lye’.’ The

difference between the two views is considerable. This is a superficial interpretation and
Lenneberg is rarely superficial. However, he does seem to tug a bit to bring the descriptive
material of thischapter into line with biological origins. He succeeds by treating proRrarn_
mh as a matter of ‘SWmtial arrangements of muscular events’. From a viewpoint of
Primacy a speech sound is first a physiological event. If Muyskens had made the term
hYPha - the smallest physiological change to make a perceptual difference-stick, Lenneberg
would have used it in this chapter. indeed, since he defers to Meader and Muy&ens in

the Preface, it is surprising that he did not accept some of their terminology as he writes
of ‘sequential arrangements of muscular events’, preplanning with anticipation of later
l

events’, and ‘the interdigitation of muscular correlates of phones’. The chapter is a

rewarding one for students of speech and phonology.
Qaprer 4, LWW? i,t rlle context of gruwrh and nlaturatiot,,t.Each chapter of this book
is a climax in one way or another. This one exceeds the others in the number of citations,
perhaps hundred references. It is singular in its total attention to human beings, and,
imPortantb, it emphasizes time or human age on the abscissas of the figures, The role of
‘need’ as a basis for learning language or speech is discounted: also practice. Unpracticed
children who have had an opportunity to become language-wise do not appear to become
handicapped: ‘wolf children’ as such perhaps have never existed, but ones who have been
deprived of the oportunity to learn language normally accept it later if the proper language
environment occurred during the appropriate developmental periods. The author alleges
that there are no peculiar need that come with the developmental stage of language
readiness, only a capacity to resonate some of the environmental language. Although
prior cortical lesions may leave tht language-ready individual relatively unmarred, the
age of onset of deafness may be crucial, and mental retardation may be both an obstacle
to language-readiness and achievement. Later the nervous system changes and with the
onset of puberty and later the acquisition of the natural language becomes difficult and,
of a second language, labored. Emphatically, then, the author, in rejecting ‘need’ as either
related to maturation or to the acquisition of language, substitutes the acquiring of
language as a consequence of maturation itself. The reasoning is effective, but the reader
must always be alert that Lenneberg in his commentary on observed facts is never
establishing causality between the commentary and the facts.
Chapter 5, Neurological aspects of speech and language. This chapter is a brief treatment
of aphasia, The author takes exception to the view ‘aphasia is a loss of language’ and the
corollary that the aphasic individual faces a task that is comparable to a child’s learning
a natural language. Rather, he sees the disorder as one of timing. The programming of a
sequence of muscular movements is disarranged; the consequence is a jargon of words.
The program of ‘spaces’ is disarranged; the consequence is an odd phrase or an agram-
matism. Thus, aphasia is ‘lack of availability [of language] at the right time’. This deficiency
of availability is an extension of Iapses in fluency among normal, healthy individuals.
Chapter 6, Langliage in the light of evolu:ion and genetics. The writer finds little in this
chapter that might not have been subsumed under an earlier topic. How did language
come about? HOW does it happen to be restricted to man? Since deficiencies in language
and speech seem to be characteristic of isolated families, does it follow that there is a
language gene or a chromosomal determiner of deficiency in the use of language? Lenneberg
has no new evidence to help with these questions, although he again draws from more than
hundred sources. Frequently, throughout the book, the reader is asked to consider alterna-
tive hypotheses md is leftin a state of uncertainty. This chapter is especially indecisive.
Chapter 7, primitive stages in Ianguage development, and chapter 8, Langllage and
cognition. These chapters are quite differently oriented from the Preceding ones- The
earlier ones are indeed bio/ogicalfiundations of human behavior with a Particular emphasis
270 BOOKRBVtEWS

on language and speech. The present two chapters, however, focus on language and speech.
They draw heavily upon the literature of linguistics and psycholinguistics - a body of
literature to which Lenneberg has contributed impressively. This is interesting material and
much easier to read than are the earlier chapters; however, in considerable measure it
seems to be a re-working of the earlier materials of the book with a different emphasis,
somewhat analogous to the illusion of reversible stairs. In chapters l-6, one had btologicul
fu~ndatiomwith allusions to language and speech. In chapters 7-8, language and speech
are discussed intact with allusions to the biological foundations. Some of the same emphases
carry through: (1) language is a categorizing process, (2) there is a right time for acquiring
language, (3) language emerges as an individual becomes skilled in differentiating his
‘primitive language’, as he resonates some features of his environment, (4) the deep
structure of all natural languages is similar, and (5) there is no evidence that the superficial
differences among languages affect the thought processes differentially.
The task that Lenneberg set for himself was stupendous: to relate ‘man’s language
capacity’ to biological foundations within rhe species. As said here time and again, it is
impossible to prove the thesis: it is only possible to array evidence that is consistent with
it. This the author achieves with considerable force. All readers will notice the ‘unfortunate
omission’ of particular articles with which they are r’amiliar. This writer notes Latif (I 934),
especially because of the similarity of titles. Rather than carp about such omissions, the
reader might marvel at the scope and specificity of the material that is presented in support
of the thesis. The impact is to make it seem highly plausible.
There are two substantive and relevant appendixes: ‘The formal nature of language’, by
Noam Chomsky, and ‘The history of the biological basis of language’, by Otto Marx.
Obviously they are meritorious, but Lenneberg’s argument would be equally complete if
they were published elsewhere.
References
DE LAGUNA,GRACE, 1927, Speech, its j&lion and development. New Haven, Yale Uni-
versity Press (reprinted by the Indiana University Press).
LATIF,ISRAIL,1934, The physiological basis of linguistic development and of the ontogeny
of meaning. Psychol. Re:>. 41, l-3.

ERIC H. LENNEBERG, ed. : New directions in the study of language. Cambridge,

Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1964.

This is a collection of papers taken largely from a cmference on language. Contributors

are from the fields of psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and (we are told on the dust
cover to the hardback edition) the viewpoint of the biologist is also represented. In his
preface, the editor recognizes the heterogeneity of the collection but justifies its publication
because it presents ‘new problems’, ‘different issues’, ‘new avenues’, and is ‘an excellent
cross-section of language research at mid-century’. We may be in better position to discuss
these qualities following a description of the individual papers in the order of their
appearance.
The early growth of language capacity in the individual by Leonard Carmichael is the
lead paper. Man, according to Carmichael, is not only the present result of historical
evolution but may also, along with his capacities, be located on a contemporary continuum
of languaqe: (or communication) where we shall also find bees, apes, and the like. The
parallels between infant ape and infant human development are striking to Carmichael
and the reviewer is left with impression that ape and human language acquisition is nearly
ide&al (except that ape is ahead of human during the early months of life) until the ape
can go no further and the human outstrips the ape by virtue of his greater capacity. The
human’s talent for language is a function of his brain and Carmichael reports some of