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AMADO G. SORIANO and RAFAEL B.

GARCIA
vs
HON. RUBEN B. ANCHETA,
[G.R. No. 57589. March 18, 1985.]
LANDMARK CASE

SYNOPSIS:
EVIDENCE; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; WRITING IS DATED;
PRESUMPTION NOT REBUTTED IN CASE AT BAR. — Memorandum was ante-
dated and was prepared subsequent to the filing of the petition so as to divest this Court of its
acquired jurisdiction is unsupported by any evidence. Against it is the presumption that writing is
truly dated. (Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5 [u].) The petitioners assert that if the memorandum
had existed as early as May 22, 1980, Commissioner Ancheta should have mentioned it in his
letters to them both dated April, 1981. The answer to this assertion is that Commissioner Ancheta
had no duty to inform the petitioners about the existence of the memorandum.

FACTS:
Petitioners Rafael B. Garcia was Supervising Revenue Examiner III and Amado G.
Soriano was Supervising Revenue Examiner II when they were purged from the
government service in 1975. They filed petitions for reinstatement with the Appeals
Committee which was created in the Office of the President but the committee was
unable to act on their petitions because of time constraints. Garcia and Soriano later
revived their petitions with the Office of the President and in a decision dated May
19, 1979, rendered by Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave granted their
reinstatement provided that if the same are still vacant, and if not then to equivalent
positions in that Bureau.
Messrs. Soriano and Garcia wrote two letters dated May 13, 1980, and January 31,
1981, to Commissioner Ruben B. Ancheta. In both letters they requested
reinstatement as directed in the decision in their favor. However, Commissioner
Ancheta denied the petition which prompted the filing of the instant petition on
August 4, 1981, for mandamus and other relief.

The petitioners sought reconsideration which was granted by setting aside the
resolution of October 12, 1981. At the same time the petition was given due course.
Ancheta filed a petition contending that it was ante-dated and was prepared
subsequent to the filing of the petition so as to divest this Court of its acquired
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome the
disputable presumption that writing is truly dated. (Par. U, Section 3, Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence)

HELD: NO, PRESUMPTION THAT A WRITING IS TRULY DATED


PREVAILS
This contention is unsupported by any evidence. Against it is the presumption that
writing is truly dated. (Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5 [u].) The petitioners assert that
if the memorandum had existed as early as May 22, 1980, Commissioner Ancheta
should have mentioned it in his letters to them both dated April, 1981. The answer to
this assertion is that Commissioner Ancheta had no duty to inform the petitioners
about the existence of the memorandum.’
We are satisfied that the Clave decision in favor of the petitioners had been revoked
by the memorandum and since there is no showing that the President has signed an
order reinstating them; the respondent has no ministerial duty to reinstate them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
CITIBANK
VS
SABENIANO
G.R. No. 156132

SYNOPSIS:
The evidence presented by the Citibank is not enough to debunk the presumption that writing is truly
dated. The Citibank submitted a photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge before the RTC was undated
while the respondent on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge, certified
by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September 1979 despite that respondent
presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of the country on the said date and
could not have signed the pledge.

Petitioner Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before 24 September 1979, but could not
provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written on the pledge. Although Mr.
Tan testified that the Declaration of Pledge was signed by respondent personally before him, he could
not give the exact date when the said signing took place. Hence the Court shall abide by
the presumption that the written document is truly dated.

FACTS:

This case started when Modesta R. Sabeniano a client of both petitioners Citibank and
FNCB Finance filed a complaint with the RTC against petitioners as she claims to
have substantial deposits and money market placements with the petitioners and other
investment companies, the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited
automatically and directly to her account with Citibank. Sabeniano alleged that
Citibank et al refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market
placements despite her repeated demands, thus, the civil case for Accounting, Sum of
Money and Damages.

Citibank et al admitted that Sabeniano had deposits and money market placements
with them, including dollar accounts in other Citibank branches. However, they also
alleged that respondent later obtained several loans from Citibank, executed through
Promissory Notes and secured by a pledge on her dollar accounts, and a deed of
assignment against her MMPS with FNCB Finance.
Petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when the Declaration of Pledge
was actually executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to
overcome the disputable presumption that writing is truly dated. (Par. U, Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)

HELD: NO, the evidence presented by the Citibank is not enough to debunk the said
presumption.

The photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank before


the RTC was undated. It presented only a photocopy of the pledge because it already
forwarded the original copy thereof to Citibank-Geneva when it requested for the
remittance of respondents dollar accounts pursuant thereto.

Respondent, on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of
Pledge, certified by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September
1979. However, presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of
the country on the said date and could not have signed the pledge.

Petitioner Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before 24 September 1979, but
could not provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written on the
pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified that the Declaration of Pledge was signed by
respondent personally before him, he could not give the exact date when the said
signing took place. It is important to note that the copy of the Declaration of Pledge
submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certified by an officer of Citibank-
Geneva, which had possession of the original copy of the pledge. It is dated 24
September 1979.

Hence the Court shall abide by the presumption that the written document is
truly dated. Since it is undeniable that respondent was out of the country on 24
September 1979, and then she could not have executed the pledge on the said date.
ROMAN MOSQUERRA, PETITIONER, V. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE C-J YULO & SONS,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. L-45833. JUNE 20, 1988.

SYNOPSIS:
The presumption that a writing is truly dated prevails in this case. The court find no
merit in the respondents’ contention that the claim for review in the decision of the
Workmen Compensation was prescribed since they it is clear, however, that the
decision in question is dated 30 December 1976 so that it could not have been served
upon and received by petitioner’s counsel on 23 March 1976, some eight (8) months
before it was promulgated. It is true that in a Manifestation filed with the Court on 15
April 1976, counsel for the respondent company stated that the decision in question
was rendered on 30 December 1975. But, this mere manifestation is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the writing (decision) was truly dated.

FACTS:
Roman Mosquerra, is a former employee of the respondent, He started to work with
the respondent in 1947 and his work was to plow, plant and weed sugarcane in fields.
While he was at work in the field, he felt acute stomach pains. Upon examination by
the company physician, Dr. Zoilo Bunye, he was found to be suffering from peptic
ulcers, for which medicines were prescribed to relieve the pains. In December 1966,
however, he was retired from the service upon recommendation of the company
physician due to the persistence of the ailment. But, he continued to receive medical
treatment from Dr. Eusebio Panganiban in Calamba, Laguna, who opined that the
petitioner’s work had contributed to the development or aggravation of the disease.

On 31 March 1975, the petitioner filed a claim against the respondent employer
before the Workmen’s Compensation Unit in San Pablo City, seeking benefits under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, due to disability resulting from peptic ulcers
which he claimed to have incurred in the course of his employment or was aggravated
by the nature of his employment which was granted. The respondent company
opposed the claim mainly on grounds of prescription, no knowledge of the illness and
payment of retirement benefits.

The decision of Workmen’s compensation Unit is in favor of Ramons Mosquerra.


The respondent company appealed. Acting on the appeal, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission reversed the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Unit and absolved the respondent company from liability.

The petitioner now seeks a review of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. He claims that the Commission seriously erred in dismissing his claim.
The court finds merit in the petition.

However it is claimed by the respondent company that the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, which is sought to be reviewed, is already final and can
no longer be reviewed. Counsel for the respondent company alleges that Mr. Feliciano
Reyes, counsel for the petitioner, received a copy of the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission on 23 March 1976 so that it was already final when the
petitioner filed on 18 March 1977 his petition before the Court for an extension of
time within which to file a petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the respondent is enough to


overcome the disputable presumption that writing is truly dated. (Par. U, Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)

HELD: NO, Presumption prevails in this case

The court find no merit in the respondents’ contention that the claim had already
prescribed since the petitioner was taken ill sometime in October, 1960 and filed his
claim only on 31 March 1975. The determining point of the accrual of the cause of
action is the time the employee becomes disabled or incapacitated to do his regular
work because that is the time when the benevolent mantle of the law commences to
cover him

It is clear, however, that the decision in question is dated 30 December 1976 so that it
could not have been served upon and received by petitioner’s counsel on 23 March
1976, some eight (8) months before it was promulgated. It is true that in a
Manifestation filed with the Court on 15 April 1976, counsel for the respondent
company stated that the decision in question was rendered on 30 December 1975.
But, this mere manifestation is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
writing (decision) was truly dated. And the date on said decision is 30 December 1976.